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
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NEW YORK MONUMENTS COMMISSION

"

FOR THE

BATTLEFIELDS OF GETTYSBURG AND CHATTANOOGA.

FINAL REPORT

ON THE

BATTLEFIELD OF GETTYSBURG.

COMMISSIONERS.

MAJ.-GEN. DANIEL E. SICKLES, U. S. A.	MAJ.-GEN. DANIEL BUTTERFIELD.
BVT. MAJ.-GEN. ALEX. S. WEBB.	BVT. BRIG.-GEN. ANSON G. MCCOOK.
COL. LEWIS R. STEGMAN.	COL. CLINTON BECKWITH.
MAJOR CHARLES A. RICHARDSON.	THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE STATE, EX-OFFICIO.
CHAIRMAN, MAJ.-GEN. DANIEL E. SICKLES, U. S. A.	
ENGINEER AND SECY., A. J. ZABRISKIE.	

VOL. II.

ALBANY:

J. B. LYON COMPANY, PRINTERS.

1902.

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J. R. LYON PRINT.

61ST NEW YORK INFANTRY.
In the Wheatfield.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

(INSCRIPTIONS.)

(Front.)

61ST REGT. N. Y. INFY.

1ST BRIG. 1ST DIV.

2ND CORPS.

ORGANIZED SEPTEMBER 1861.

MUSTERED OUT JULY 14TH 1865.

(Reverse.)

THIS POSITION HELD BY THE

61ST REGT. N. Y. INFY.

ON THE AFTERNOON OF

JULY 2, 1863.

CASUALTIES,

KILLED 6; WOUNDED 56.

TOTAL LOSS, 62.

DEDICATION OF MONUMENTS.

61ST REGIMENT INFANTRY.

July 1, 1889.

ORATION OF LIEUT. CHARLES A. FULLER.

COMRADES:

It lacks but a little of twenty-six years since the members of this organization, or some of them — all who could be — were present on this very spot, then as active members of a hardy, fighting regiment.

Those here to-day who responded to the order, "Forward," on the 2d of July, 1863, if they then thought of anything beyond the immediate present, did not look ahead a quarter of a century and anticipate this occasion. We all felt then that a desperate encounter was before us, and we were mostly anxious to acquit ourselves like men.

To-day we, the survivors of the Sixty-first Regiment of New York Volunteers, meet to dedicate a monument sacred to our dead who fell on this field, and in recognition of the stalwart services of the regiment.

The story might be briefly told, and still be wonderfully eloquent. We went into the fight with less than 100 muskets, and we left on the field over 60 killed and wounded. Gettysburg is by no means the only great battle in which our little regiment did deeds of valor. But it is not practicable to erect costly monuments at every place where soldierly acts were performed worthy of commemoration.

This is one of the great battlefields of the world, and is, so far as post-bellum attentions go, the greatest. There is no other place on this broad earth, noted as a battle site, where so much has been done by art and labor to make it worthy of pilgrimage as here. This expenditure and expression is not a forced and artificial affair. No one has said that it is the proper thing for the leading nation of the world to have a pet battlefield, and in assent selected this one. Many things conjoined to make it the place where people from all nations would desire to visit. The location was fitted by nature for a great battle. Here two well matched and unexcelled armies joined issue, in what each at the time believed might be the decisive struggle. With us it was a battle in defence of our firesides; with the enemy, they felt that to be broken up and routed was the grave of their cause. The number engaged was great, the fighting was fierce and prolonged, the dead and wounded on each side were numbered by the thousands. It was a time when the people, North and South, outside of the armies, looked on with bated breath, and regarded the result as almost conclusive. When the plans of the enemy were here brought to a halt, when, in place of a glorious victory, he pulled out under cover of night and marched for a ford over the Potomac, which he placed between himself and our following troops, there was throughout the North such a sense of relief and gratitude that its remembrance has not faded away, but is readily recalled; and, therefore, it is that this has become the place of places in regard to the War of the Rebellion.

We meet to-day around this granite pile in response to a sentiment. The State of New York has expended thousands on this field in response to sentiment. The effect of all this effort and expenditure will be considerable and prolonged; bodies of men such as we are from a dozen different States cannot come together after years of separation and dedicate a monument in memory of deeds here transacted, without such action having a lasting moral effect that will radiate as does light and heat from the sun.

Our patriotism is brightened, our regard for the land we fought for is enhanced, and we will return to our homes better fitted to do the remnant of our work, part of which is to perfect the Government we saved. It is proper that we should briefly refer to the history of the regiment that calls us here, and makes possible this occasion. What eventually became the Sixty-first New York Volunteers, was at the start named the "Clinton Guards," and Spencer W. Cone was its first colonel. It was organized, uniformed, drilled and armed at Staten Island, between the months of August and November, 1861. During the time spent on Staten Island, difficulties of some sort resulted in a change of officers, and in, what may be said to have been the making of the regiment, the appointment of Francis C. Barlow to the lieutenant colonelcy.

I think it was in November that we left the Island about 700 strong, a fact that convicts the State Government of a blunder, little short of a crime. That fact and the later one, of organizing new regiments when further requisitions were made for men instead of keeping full the ranks of veteran regiments whose numbers had been thinned by battle and disease, reduced the efficiency of New York troops at least one-half. No possible excuse could be rendered for such a practice, except the desire on the part of the State officials to furnish offices for ambitious men who wanted shoulder straps without earning them by service in the old regiments that had received the baptism of blood.

The regiment arrived at Washington without incident, and went into camp for a week or two on Kendall Green. The next move was across the Potomac, where a camp was made about three miles out of Alexandria, called Camp California. Here the winter was spent in drilling, camp guard, and picket duty. It was a trying time to the men; the measles took down many, and there were numerous deaths from that and other diseases. We were here brigaded with the Fifth New Hampshire, the Fourth Rhode Island, and the Eighty-first Pennsylvania, under Gen. O. O. Howard. During the winter the Fourth Rhode Island was detached, and the Sixty-fourth New York took its place. The first real campaign of the regiment was the hard march to the Rappahannock, where the sight was permitted us of a handful of withdrawing Johnnies, and where we received a few harmless shots. This bootless movement was valuable in disposing of the surplus and unnecessary things which the men had received from loving hands when they said "good-bye," and had up to that time deemed essential to their army work. About the time of leaving the Potomac for the Peninsula, the organization of the army was changed by corps formations, and our brigade was called the First of the Third Division of the Second Corps. If there was any burning desire in any man of the Sixty-first to be a fighting soldier and go where there was likely

to be something besides brass bands, dress parades and grand reviews, he could hardly have been better served.

Barkow was almost unapproachable for bravery, skill and discipline. Howard demonstrated that a godly man could fight, and that it was not necessary to be wicked to be valiant. General Richardson — "Old Dick," as we lovingly called him — captured the admiration of every man in the division the day they looked upon his herculean frame. And we all cheered for Sumner, the grand old fighter from "way back," whose locks were bleached with years of army service, but whose "eye was not dimmed nor his natural force abated." With these surroundings, was it likely that we could return, go up Broadway, and have a reception, without a casualty? From the commander of the corps to the colonel of the regiment, it was believed that the Rebellion was to be conquered by hard fighting at short range.

We were in the second line at the ridiculous siege of Yorktown. Williamsburg and West Point were fought before we got there. But few who made it will ever forget the night march from Yorktown towards Williamsburg.

On Saturday, May 31, 1862, we were in camp at Cold Harbor. It was afternoon. Suddenly the thunder of Casey's guns greeted our ears. Johnston was making a mighty effort to crush our left before help could come from across the swollen Chickahominy. In a few minutes we were under arms and awaiting our turn to cross the log bridge that was dancing on the surface of the stream. We reached the battlefield of Fair Oaks after dark; too late for a hand in that day's proceedings. It was our turn next day. Gallantly we were led, and the regiment was no discredit to its colonel. We took in about 400 muskets. I will not attempt a description of that battle, suffice it to say that we lost six officers killed. Colonel Fox in his valuable work on "Regimental Losses in the War," says that the average is 16 men killed to 1 officer. That estimate would make a loss of 102. Company C lost in killed, 2 officers and 6 men. If that rate was maintained in all of the companies, it would make a death loss of 80. Whatever may have been the actual loss, it was heavy. The regiment stood like a rock, and its reputation with every other one in the First Brigade was made, as a "fighting regiment."

Then followed three weeks in the trenches, with frequent picket duty that was hazardous. Early on the morning of the 29th of June, our corps fell back on the line of the railroad. We passed the commissary depot where millions of rations were piled, to which the torch had been applied. A little beyond, at Peach Orchard, the advance of the enemy overtook us. We formed line of battle, and maintained our position. We were under destructive Rebel artillery fire, but we were not engaged with musketry. Then we fell back to Savage Station, where just at dark the corps had a brisk fight, and repulsed the enemy. This is the place where Sumner was so disgusted that he came near disobeying the order of the commanding general to "fall back." The old fighter said it was against his practice and principles to run away from a beaten enemy. But McClellan was down on the gun boats seeking for a new spot in which to set his base, and the unwise order could not be reversed.

That night we crossed White Oak Swamp, and the next day supported our batteries under a heavy fire from the enemy's artillery. At this place we lost

some men, but it was child's play with what was to follow. As the sun was going down, orders came for us to move. All the afternoon there had been heavy firing in the direction of Glendale. Now we were headed towards it. Soon the order came, "Step out;" then, "Double-quick;" and then, "Run." It would take too much time to attempt a description of that fight. In it we lost in killed and wounded, Deming, Moore, Spencer, Gregory, and a good share of our men. It was fought after dark, and we aimed our muskets at the flash of the enemy's rifles. Towards morning we withdrew, and again formed our lines at Malvern Hill. This was a magnificent battle. The enemy were thoroughly whipped, but there was no one in authority to direct an onward movement; consequently the army fell back to Harrison's Landing.

In due, or rather dilatory, course of time, with our corps we were again on the old camp ground of the winter before; then, at Arlington Heights; and finally, after Pope was beaten, we reached Centreville. We ought to have been in the Second Bull Run. One or more people ought to have been killed by slow torture, for this damnable blundering — or worse.

Again, movements were started that resulted in the battle of Antietam, where brave fighting was done by piece-meal; where Lee ought to have been crushed, and where he wasn't. In this battle the Sixty-first, I believe, did the most brilliant thing in its career, in the capture of more of the enemy than it had men, and where Captain Greig took a Rebel battle flag. This was due to the generalship of Barlow. Here, on account of a dangerous wound, we parted company with the man who had up to that date given us a special character. Barlow was to lead us as colonel no more. When he rejoined the army, it was as general of a brigade in the Eleventh Corps. It was fortunate for us that the next in command was Nelson A. Miles. It is rare that any regiment has at one time two such men.

While at Harper's Ferry, or on the way to Fredericksburg, a new company, under Captain Bain, reached us, and about doubled our numbers. On December 13, 1862, we had a losing hand in the slaughter at Fredericksburg. It is said that while we were lying down on the right side of the road, behind the close-board fence, that Miles was prospecting, and had sent back for permission to charge the rifle pits beyond. If such is the case it was lucky for us, that a bullet clipped his throat in time to prevent such an heroic act; had it been done, some of us, who to-day can enjoy a good dinner, would have added our names to the list of "killed in battle." Miles recovered in time to lead the regiment at Chancellorsville, where he gained great credit by soldiership while in charge of the picket line. Our losses were not heavy in this campaign aside from Miles, who was dangerously wounded and never served again with the regiment. Lieutenant Colonel Broady succeeded him.

In a few weeks' time we were again in motion. We were going where the enemy led us, and that happened to be here. As I have said before, we had less than 100 muskets. There was not to exceed six in Company C, a company that started out one of the strongest. Clearly do I now recall what happened as we reached this vicinity on the evening of the 1st of July; how we stacked arms; ate supper; removed a rail fence and worked it into a line of rifle pits; went to bed, or rather rolled up in blankets and slept the sleep

of the just; how we were called at an early hour; prepared breakfast; had a thorough inspection; and then moved towards the town. I remember passing our doctors in a little piece of woods, and giving a good-bye shake of the hand, and moving on. I remember our position in the meadow, between the town and the "wheatfield." The brigade was closed in mass, the Sixty-first with 97 men; then the Eighty-first Pennsylvania with, perhaps, 150; then the One hundred and forty-eighth Pennsylvania with 300 or 400; and the Fifth New Hampshire with about 200. These numbers, except in the case of the Sixty-first, are estimates. I remember, while we were nervously awaiting the order to advance, the admonition of Colonel Cross, commanding the brigade. He said: "Men, you know what's before you; give'em hell!" Sickles' troops had been engaged for some time and were falling back; then came the order for the First Division to go to the rescue. The brigade moved by the left flank, and in that formation reached the narrow cross-road in rear of the wheatfield. We deployed by filing right and marching along the road. When deployed to have fronted would have presented our *backs* to the Rebels, and that was not the side we had been accustomed to present to them. There was no time to countermarch. We, therefore, "left-faced," and advanced officers and file closers ahead of the men. We scaled the fence and were in the field — the celebrated "wheatfield." We advanced to our position, supposed to be about where this monument is located. Here the officers and file closers took their proper place and awaited the onset. Soon it came. Well do I remember the first rebel that showed himself, and in an instant the appearance of the entire force. The enemy were partially protected by the stone wall. We were without any cover. Here we remained until 63 of our number were killed or seriously wounded. It is, of course, but seldom that a regiment loses such a percentage of its men. Before the fight ended I ceased to be an eye witness, and what I know of its heroism I know from the lips of others. But history says the old regiment was at Bristoe Station, Wilderness, Corbin's Bridge, Po River, Spotsylvania, North Anna, Totopotomoy, Cold Harbor, Petersburg, Strawberry Plains, Deep Bottom, and Reams' Station.

The Sixty-first was scant in muskets from the start. Before the first battle, sickness, slinks, and details reduced the fighting force 50 per cent.; and beginning with Fair Oaks, the bullets of the Johnnies kept down the number, so that frequently it was less than 100.

Colonel Fox says that the records show that of all the regiments in the United States service during the Rebellion — and there were hundreds of them — only 45 lost 200 and over in killed and mortally wounded. Of these the Fifth New Hampshire lost the largest number of any regiment in the service, 295, of which 18 only were officers. The Eighty-first Pennsylvania lost 208. The Sixty-first New York, 189, and of that number 18 were officers. You will see by Colonel Fox's book that few regiments lost over 10 officers killed. For example; the One Hundred and Fortieth Pennsylvania lost 188, and but 10 officers. Most regiments entered the field with a plump thousand, and some had a large number of recruits. This tells the story. The Sixty-first had part of the time a full complement of officers; hence there was the same chance for large losses, as if she had carried full ranks. She was in the battles. She never

let go her grip. Estimating losses on the basis of officers killed, she would be rated with a death loss of at least 250. Few regiments graduated from their numbers. She furnished two major generals, and such as Barlow and Miles. Among the tribes, she was like Jacob's Benjamin — small in numbers; but she had in prodigal abundance Sauls and Jonathans. No good man who ever served in her ranks would ever to-day exchange her number for that of any other. Her dead were found on almost every infantry battlefield of the Army of the Potomac from Fair Oaks, June 1, 1862, to Appomattox, April 6, 1865.

There was but little in her make up of fuss and feathers; but it was solid work. Her blows told, and if her enemy ever came to personally know her, he must have respected her courage and endurance.

This monument, about which we are now gathered, plain, solid, and enduring, well typifies her characteristics. Here it will stand for years after the last one of her ranks has been mustered out to join the countless throng of those who have been and are not.

For myself, and I trust that I speak the sentiments of every one who ever had honorable membership with her, I am proud of the fact that I had a voluntary hand in the War for the Union, and that my efforts were put forth in the ranks of the Sixty-first New York.

TRANSFER OF MONUMENT.

ADDRESS OF CAPT. LEE NUTTING.

COMRADES:

We are assembled here this beautiful Sabbath afternoon to dedicate this monument erected by the liberality of the great State of which we are citizens, to the memory of her sons of the Sixty-first New York Regiment, who fell on this and other fields, in defence of the Union and the Flag.

This monument by its rough simplicity fittingly typifies, and by its substantial outline shows forth, the solidity of the regiment for which it stands. The Sixty-first New York was a service regiment; when the call to duty came it was always ready. On this and many another battlefield it testified its devotion to Country and Flag, and sealed that devotion with the blood of its members. Of the 93 men who came upon this field in its ranks to battle for the right, 63 fell, killed or wounded.

So stern was the discipline inculcated and commanded by Col. Francis C. Barlow, and so renowned did the regiment become by reason of that discipline, that finally the veteran regiments of the division dubbed us "Barlow's Regulars." From Yorktown to Appomattox, the colors of the Sixty-first were always to the front, and Colonel Fox, in his book on "Regimental Losses" puts the Sixty-first in the list of "fighting regiments," who never had soft snaps, but fought, and fought from start to finish. The regiment while nominally 770 strong when it left New York, numbered probably not over 600 men. We were sworn into the United States service by companies, and captains

York City, and three companies from Hamilton and Madison Counties, the latter being largely officered by students from Hamilton University. The seven city companies were recruited mainly in the coal boxes, and were rough, insubordinate, and, as it seemed, poor material; but under the exacting discipline they became model soldiers, and were found to be better able than the countrymen to withstand the hardships and privations of a soldier's life. At Kendall Green, Lieut. Col. Francis C. Barlow joined the regiment, a medium-sized, slender man, with no beard, and looking so much like a boy that he was named the "Boy General" when he attained that rank. But though boyish looking, the spirit that animated Francis C. Barlow was a mighty one, and the discipline which he enforced and, above all, the gallantry and wisdom with which he led the Sixty-first into battle endeared him to both officers and men. As our poet, Quartermaster Wren, says in some doggerel verse composed to the air of Billy Barlow —

Governor Morgan, he didn't do slow
When he gave us a colonel in Billy Barlow.

The surviving members of the regiment revere his memory. Singularly modest, no trumpet proclaimed his gallant deeds. In fact, he shrank from notoriety; and, yet, the fact remains that in our estimation no soldier from this State was his equal in anything which goes towards the making of a great soldier or general, and when New York finally writes the history of her sons who fought in the Great Rebellion, the name of Maj. Gen. Francis C. Barlow will occupy the highest niche in her Temple of Fame.

In the spring of 1862, the Sixty-first, then brigaded with the Fifth New Hampshire, Eighty-first Pennsylvania and Sixty-fourth New York,—the whole forming the First Brigade of the First Division, Second Army Corps, under the command of Brig. Gen. O. O. Howard,—marched to Manassas, and from there to the Rappahannock River, in pursuit of the rear guard of Johnston's army. The enemy sent a few shells back to us, but we did not get near enough to use our Enfields.

Returning to Alexandria, we took the transport J. R. Spaulding, and steamed down to the Peninsula, landing by wading ashore at Ship Point, and assisting in various ways in the Siege of Yorktown. From Yorktown we marched in the night, and in mud and rain, to the assistance of our comrades at Williamsburg. Returning to Yorktown, we took transports up the York River to White House Landing, and from there marched to Deep Bottom on the Chickahominy.

Heavy musketry firing aroused us Saturday afternoon, May 31, 1862, and our gallant old corps commander, Gen. E. V. Sumner, ordered us to fall in, and marched us to the bridge heads. Farther he did not dare to go without orders, which General McClellan finally sent him, and we started to cross the river. The rain had caused the river to rise so that the frail bridges were afloat; but the marching column kept it solid and we passed over. We were soon halted and ordered to load with ball cartridges, and then it seemed at least a serious matter. Getting on the field about 9 p. m., we were too late for the fight that day, but forming column closed in mass, we were told to

lie down behind our gun stacks. The Rebel wounded lay on the wet ground around us, and we got our first taste of the horrors of war. I know one soldier that, as he rolled his blanket around him that night, debated seriously whether he had not mistaken his vocation, and whether he would be able to stand the storm of the morrow. Sunday, June 1st, broke bright and clear, and French's Brigade was sent into the woods ahead of us. Then the storm broke; the air seemed filled with lead; and some of us were very much troubled in mind. Soon the regiment was ordered forward, and finally entered the woods relieving French's men. We were received by the Johnnies with a heavy fire, which, before we were relieved, struck down one-third of the regiment killed or wounded. French's men having replenished their cartridge boxes, started in to relieve us, and when they had nicely gotten into the woods, opened fire on us. Colonel Cone had some time before this been dismissed, and Colonel Barlow commanded the regiment. The fire in the rear was more than green troops could stand, and, supposing we were flanked, the regiment broke and started for the front. Colonel Barlow rushed up to the color bearer, and seizing the flag faced to the rear and planted the staff in the ground; the regiment drilled to rally on the colors, faced to the rear, and rallied on the flag. One of our captains went back, had the troops stop firing, and we faced about once more to the enemy. When relieved, we marched out at the cadenced step in column of fours, and through our colonel notified the general that we were ready again as soon as needed. General Howard lost his arm in this fight, Fair Oaks, near the place we were engaged.

Breastworks were built, and for the next month we did picket duty; and that was dangerous work, as both sides were in a killing mood and casualties were of daily occurrence. Later on, the pickets of the contending forces did not fire at each other, unless a forward movement was noticed. What was known as the change of base, commenced for us June 29th, and at Peach Orchard and Savage Station we had sharp encounters with the enemy. Crossing White Oak Swamp, the morning of the 30th was spent in supporting our batteries, which were handled so effectively that "Stonewall" Jackson was, for the whole day, prevented from crossing. During the afternoon Company H, Captain Mount, was sent out to picket the further side of the swamp. Towards evening the firing grew heavy in the direction of Charles City Cross Roads, and the regiment was ordered at the double-quick to the support of Kearny, who was hard pressed by Longstreet. Captain Broady had been sent to call in Mount's company, but did not succeed in finding the regiment in the darkness and confusion, and was finally ordered to join the company to the right of the Fifth New Hampshire, who occupied the reserve line of the army.

In the meantime the regiment advancing through the woods in the darkness came to an open field, and was saluted by the colonel of a Georgia regiment with a volley. "What regiment is that?" Laurender, or I will blow you to hell!" One of our fellows answered, "Last, first New York," and Barlow gave the command, "Ready! Aim! Fire!" Both regiments fired at this point, and at the close range the destruction was awful. The fire was kept up until the Georgia were about annihilated. The writer was with Mount's

company, and distinctly remembers hearing some one say: "This way, Sixty-first!" and soon Colonel Barlow, carrying the regimental flag (he had looked out for that himself after the fall of several color bearers), accompanied by one lieutenant (Keech) and about thirty men made his appearance. Two of our officers had been lost in the woods, and with that exception, and the two captains with the picket companies (Mount and Broady), every other officer was left on this fatal field. One year afterwards three of this Georgia regiment deserted and came into the picket post of the Sixty-first, on the Rappahannock. They said their colonel had not got the word "hell" out of his mouth before he was in hell; and that their regiment was a shadow when we got through with them.

The morning of July 1st found us at Malvern Hill, where the last mighty wrestle of the Seven Days Battle was to occur. We had time in the morning to get a cup of coffee and to fill our cartridge boxes, eighty rounds being issued to each man. At 3 or 4 o'clock we advanced to the help of our comrades, and just before sundown became actively engaged. The eighty rounds were fired, and the lieutenants and sergeants were kept busy searching the boxes of the dead and wounded to keep up the supply. The rifles became so hot that we soon had to hunt for guns that could be handled. I remember seeing a Company H man (Carney) with a cartridge half way down the barrel of his gun, turn it upside down and endeavor to ram home by striking the ramrod on a rock at his feet; failing in this, he recovered arms and fired, ramrod, cartridge and all at the risk of bursting his gun. I have sometimes wondered what the Johnny thought had struck him, if Carney's aim was true.

On the 2d of July, we reached Harrison's Landing. The regiment that nine months before had left New York with about 600 men, barely mustered 100; but they had their flag, and one belonging to the Johnnies also. Lieut. Col. Nelson A. Miles here joined the regiment. Tall, finely proportioned, handsome as a picture, and possessed of all the fiery courage and admirable judgment that characterized Barlow, he was well fitted to take his chief's place should the occasion demand. Rarely was a regiment officered as was the Sixty-first. Barlow and Miles! The mere mention of their names is enough to any Second Corps man. President Lincoln reviewed us here. He rode by our regiment, tall, gaunt, sad eyed, and the boys gave him a hearty cheer.

Moving with the rest of the army, we left the Peninsula in the latter part of August, and after several stops, went into camp in Virginia, opposite Georgetown, a suburb of Washington. Urgent orders reached General Sumner here to go to the assistance of General Pope, who through the lukewarmness of some of the generals, and his own misapprehension of the enemy's movements, had been defeated. We left Georgetown at 4 p. m. in light marching order, leaving our blankets behind, and at 1 p. m. were at Centreville Heights, a march of about thirty miles. As an illustration of the discipline maintained in the Sixty-first it should be stated that when we stacked arms at 9 o'clock the next morning, we had a longer line of battle than a regiment of our brigade which started with three men to our one. Two men fell out during the trying night march, and they were each court-martialed, and fined two months' pay.

We covered the retreat of Pope's forces, and finally went into camp at Tennytown, where we remained for several days.

By easy marches through Rockville, Clarksburg, and Frederick City, we came to the Antietam Creek, and on the other side once more beheld our old antagonists, the Army of Northern Virginia. We fought in the centre at what is called the Sunken Road, which was a country road leading from the Old Dunker Church to Antietam Ford. The road was three or four feet lower than the surrounding fields, and in it was posted a brigade of Alabama troops. The Irish Brigade went up the hill first and engaged the enemy. They were in the open — the Rebels hidden under the banks — and they suffered terribly. As we passed over the ground where they had fought, the few survivors of the brigade went to our right and rear, and our serious work commenced. Captain Angell, Company E, was killed by a sharpshooter before our advance started. Our line was parallel with the road, but our ready colonel, who commanded the Sixty-first and Sixty-fourth New York, soon saw that the men under the bank had the best of the game, and gave the order, "By Regiment, Right Half-Wheel!" This movement threw our left flank over and across the road, and a spirited charge finished the business. Two flags and more prisoners than we had men were the fruits of this movement. The Johnnies threw down their guns, and getting on their knees threw up their hands. Advancing from this point into the cornfield beyond, we were met by a heavy fire of canister, and Colonel Barlow was seriously wounded in the hip. We had no color guard, and a sergeant (Montgomery) carried the colors between the first and second companies. Twenty-nine balls and shell passed through the flag, and the staff was struck twice, but the brave Montgomery came through without a scratch. Colonel Miles assumed command after Barlow's mishap, and ably aided in beating back an attempt to turn our right flank.

Lee retreated and we marched to Harper's Ferry, and on Bolivar Heights spent the month of October, refitting and resting. General Richardson, our division commander, was killed at Antietam, and Brig. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock was assigned to his command. Captain Bain here joined us with a newly recruited company raised in Albany. Lieutenant Bain was wounded at Fair Oaks, and used his enforced absence in re-enforcing our depleted ranks with this fine company, which we designated Company I. On October 30th, we started down the Loudoun Valley, reaching Rectorstown, November 6th. General McClellan was here relieved of the command of the army, and Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside appointed his successor.

General McClellan was beloved by the army, and most of us regretted his departure. Talking over the matter at our bivouac that evening, one of our lieutenants said: "Lincoln, Seward, Chase and Stanton are in Washington; they are patriots; they know infinitely more than we do. They have removed him; I think they are right." Later I formed the same opinion.

November 17th saw us at Falmouth on the Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg, and December 13, we crossed and charged the heights in rear of the town, General Hancock and Colonel Miles riding their horses at the head of their commands. Miles went up the hill at the head of his regiment, the only mounted officer in sight. I thought at the time it was certain death, and was pretty near right. The ball struck the point of his chin and glancing, ploughed around his neck, just escaping the jugular vein. He put spurs to his horse, and with his front covered with blood went to the rear. Capt. E. C. Kittle ably commanded the regiment during the rest of the engagement.

After our bloody repulse at Fredericksburg (and I may say by the way that I never saw so many dead blue jackets; the hills back of the town for as far as the eye could reach were covered with them) we went into winter quarters, the monotony being relieved by frequent calls from the adjutant to go three days on picket. Our division picketed above Falmouth. The river there was fordable in places on the rocks, and we sometimes exchanged coffee for the Richmond papers with the Johnnies, and while patrolling our line, met the Rebel lieutenant performing the same duty and exchanged salutes across the stream. Hooker was appointed to succeed Burnside, and we began once more preparing to meet our gallant enemy.

We crossed the United States Ford, April 30, 1863, and marched to the Chancellor House, in the Wilderness, where the next grapple of the giants was to take place. When our lines were finally adjusted, we found ourselves to the left of the Chancellor House, and Colonel Miles was detailed to take charge of the picket line. This duty he accomplished in a manner that brought forth the commendation of his superiors; but he was finally carried in, shot through the groin, and, as we all supposed, mortally wounded. Afraid to trust him in an ambulance, our boys carried him to the river on a stretcher.

Beaten once more, we fell back over the river and after a brief rest started on a series of exhausting marches, and finally found ourselves at Gettysburg, Pa., with Lieut. Col. K. O. Broady in command of the regiment. The Sixty-first suffered heavily at Gettysburg, but we had the consolation of winning the fight, and of seeing our foes turning their backs from the field and start for Dixie. Lieutenant Fuller lost a leg and shoulder joint here, and while lying in a hospital tent awaiting amputation was annoyed by a Rebel lieutenant who was wounded in the arm, crying and groaning. It is said that Fuller finally threatened to get up and kick him out of the tent if he did not keep still, and the Johnnie subsided. Private Jerry H. Post was wounded, and putting his gun in one of the wagons, followed the regiment until again able to bear arms. This incident is related because it was rarely that officer or man put aside the chance for a turn at home, when he was wounded; in fact this is the only instance I remember in my war experience. Post was a model soldier. He was shot through the bladder at Spotsylvania, a wound generally considered fatal; but as he did not die, he was finally taken to Washington. The doctors there told him he must die; but he told them no, and he lived in spite of them, and is living to-day near Newark, N. J., married and the father of a family. His case is, in the medical history of the war, classed as one of the remarkable cures.

We followed Lee into Virginia, the writer a first lieutenant at the time, com-

manding the skeletons of five companies — the right wing of the regiment, only twelve men. Lieut. Isaac Plumb commanded the five left companies, twelve men. The Sixty-first by this time had got pretty near the last ditch. Every duty captain was absent, sick or wounded. The middle of September found our brigade commanded by Col. N. A. Miles, picketing the Rapidan. Lee took the initiative and attempted to turn our right, which necessitated our falling back, which we did, our division reaching Auburn, Va., October 14th. While getting our coffee in the early morning, and just as I had put in a spoonful of condensed milk, which I had carried many miles in my haversack, we were startled by the sound of cannon and the bursting of shells. The fire came from down the road, which was our line of retreat. Drawing my sword and telling the men to fall in, I with the other hand held the precious coffee, which I drank after we had moved around the hill and laid down out of fire. We were in a field, which rose in the centre and trended to the different sides. General Caldwell ordered up a battery — Ricketts's, I think — and they soon drove away the light guns that Stuart, the Rebel cavalry leader, had trained upon us. But a new danger threatened; three batteries opened upon us from our rear, and Ricketts's guns were turned around to confront the new fire, while we double-quickened around the hill and laid down on the side from which we had just moved. The enemy's fire was too much for Ricketts, and as quickly as possible, the division was withdrawn, and started for Bristoe Station, where we arrived to find a desperate struggle going on for the possession of the railroad embankment. We held it, and the Sixty-first was double-quickened across the run to the support of Brown's First Rhode Island Battery, one of whose caissons blew up just before we reached them, and the lieutenant in command had hard work to keep his men at the guns without infantry support. Bristoe was one of the prettiest fights of the Second Corps. We captured a battery and 500 prisoners, although the enemy outnumbered us three to one. Gen. G. K. Warren, who commanded the corps at that time, is entitled to great praise for the generalship he there displayed. The lieutenant colonel sent for the officers at nightfall, and told us to caution our men to save their rations, as we were in a tight place. We had started with six days' rations in haversacks. Most men on a march will eat six days' rations in three or four at the outside. Going back to our commands, I asked Lieutenant Plumb what he was going to tell his men. I told him I was not going to bother my men, or tell them we were in a tight place, for I knew they did not have any rations to save. I confess this was somewhat insubordinate, but we reached Centreville before morning, and rations were plenty again. Lee, having failed in his flanking movement, fell back leisurely, and we followed. In November we took part in the Mine Run fiasco. The weather was so cold during this movement that some of our men were frostbitten, and some of the division frozen.

Returning to our camp, we went into winter quarters at Stevensburg, Va. During this winter seven companies of the regiment re-enlisted for three years, and they and their officers, accompanied by Colonel Miles, went home for a thirty days' furlough. We landed at the battery and marched up Broadway, carrying the three Rebel flags we had captured. The business men in Wall Street and vicinity were going home, and they gave us an enthusiastic

welcome. The officers went to work to recruit our regiment. Colonel Miles succeeded in getting from Provost Marshal Maddox, in Brooklyn, one full company, which joined the regiment under the command of Capt. Fred. Cochen. Others were fairly successful, and when the spring opened, the Sixty-first had 600 men following her colors.

Gen. U. S. Grant led us in this campaign, which opened May 5th at the Wilderness. Our brigade was the left infantry brigade of the army at the Wilderness, and did no serious fighting. On May 8th, at Todd's Tavern, the Sixty-first was sharply engaged, and lost heavily in officers and men. Captains Morrison and Collins were killed; Captain Nutting, Lieutenants Owens, Welsh and Perrington were wounded. May 12th, at Spotsylvania, the Sixty-first led the charge, commanded by Col. N. A. Miles, the division being led by another Sixty-first man, General Barlow. This charge was the most successful of the war, and ended in the capture of Generals Johnson and Steuart, with 5,000 prisoners and twenty pieces of artillery. A volume would be needed to describe the marches and countermarches, and the desperate grapples which ensued from this time until we reached Petersburg. On every field the regiment left its dead, and on some exacted from the enemy heavy toll. The corps suffered its first serious reverse at Reams' Station, losing there some guns and colors. The Sixty-first led by Lieut. Col. Richard A. Brown and Maj. Theodore W. Greig, removed some of the stigma by recapturing in a charge some of the guns that had been taken. In November, the veterans who had not re-enlisted, were mustered out. The re-enlisted veterans and recruits were reorganized, and Maj. George W. Scott, a capable and gallant officer, made colonel. In the round up of Lee's army, culminating at Appomattox, two divisions of the corps were commanded by Sixty-first men; Barlow commanded one, and Miles the other, and between them they fought the last infantry battle of the Army of the Potomac.

In closing, I would like to mention all the gallant officers and men that fought under the old regimental banner, but space will not permit. In my judgment, leaving out less in number than could be counted on one hand, every member of this gallant organization deserves the Medal of Honor. Congress, for distinguished service, gave it to Col. Nelson A. Miles, Maj. Theodore W. Greig and Capt. Lee Nutting. Mention should be made of our genial, whole-souled quartermaster, George W. Wren, who, in and out of season, saw to it that we were fed and clothed. Of our Surgeon Rowland, and his steward, Charles Lowell, whom every man remembers for their unselfish devotion to its interests. Priv. John Kenney (one of the Brooklyn Bridge police) has a remarkable record. He fought in the Sixty-first from Bull Run to Appomattox, was never in hospital a day, and returned home without a scratch. This hero of fifty battles is as erect and vigorous as ever, and looks good for another war, if called on.

Owing to the absence of accurate data, I cannot give our exact losses in battle, but as near as I can reckon, we lost, killed in battle, 18 officers and 190 men.

Their bones are dust,
Their swords are rust,
Their souls are with the saints, we trust.

*(INSCRIPTIONS.)**(Front.)*

62 NEW YORK INFANTRY.

(ANDERSON ZOUAVES)

3 BRIGADE, 3 DIVISION, 6 CORPS.

JULY 2, 1863. 7:15 P. M.

THIS REGIMENT PARTICIPATED WITH THE ARMY OF THE
 POTOMAC IN ALL ITS CAMPAIGNS, AS WELL AS IN SHERI-
 DEN'S CAMPAIGN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY, 1864.

(Reverse.)

ERECTED BY THIS MONUMENT THE REGIMENT, UNDER COMMAND
 OF LIEUT. COL. T. B. HAMILTON,
 DEFEATED THE ENEMY AND RECAPTURED TWO GUNS.



J. B. LYON PRINT.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

62D NEW YORK INFANTRY.

Near Plum Run, north of the Wheatfield Road.

DEDICATION OF MONUMENT.

62D REGIMENT INFANTRY,

July 2, 1888.

HISTORICAL SKETCH BY EDWARD BROWNE.

The part taken by the Sixty-second Regiment in the great and memorable Battle of Gettysburg is briefly as follows:

The regiment was attached to the Third Division of the Sixth Army Corps. It reached the actual scene of action on the battlefield about 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the 2d of July, 1863, after a forced march of thirty-two miles. We were moved from one position to another between that time until 4:30 p. m., when we were directed to take position on the left of "Rocky Hill." This was the extreme left of our line. The regiment had barely gone into position, when all of our troops in front, except two regiments of the Pennsylvania Reserves, were driven back and up the hill, passing through our lines.

At that moment we received the order to advance to the support of the two regiments of the Pennsylvania Reserves. The command received, the Sixty-second dashed forward with eager enthusiasm, closed up with the Pennsylvania troops, and immediately opened fire upon the advancing enemy. After delivering several volleys, we charged the enemy's columns, broke them, drove them in disorder down the hill, and captured two light twelve-pounder guns, which had been lost by the Fifth Corps earlier in the day. Reaching the front of "Rocky Hill" the regiment advanced about 100 yards, and halting, remained in this position until the morning of the 3d of July.

About 10 o'clock that morning the enemy advanced their column in reconnoissance. We promptly met the advance, and by a well-directed fire drove it back. At 2 o'clock p. m. our line and the hills beyond were viciously shelled by the enemy, but without any advance of their troops. At 6 o'clock we were moved forward to the left in support of a reconnoissance, under General Crawford. Our regiment was actively engaged in this movement, and advanced to the extreme left of our line, where we met some of the enemy's troops, which we drove for half a mile or more, capturing many prisoners. We remained in our advanced position until 9 o'clock on the morning of the Fourth of July, when we were ordered to support a reconnoissance made to the front by General Sykes. This was accomplished without loss, and we occupied the position thus gained for the rest of the day.

Col. David J. Nevin, of our regiment, who commanded the brigade to which the Sixty-second was attached, in his report of the action of his brigade, says: "The extraordinary endurance evinced by my command and their daring bravery at the turning point of the battle deserve larger mention than the limit of the report will allow. Never did troops advance upon the enemies of their country with more cheerfulness and spirit."

The bronze tablet on the monument is illustrative of the moment when the Sixty-second New York drove the advancing columns of the enemy down

NEW YORK AT GETTYSBURG.

The regiment captured the two twelve-pounder guns of the Fifth
The regiment was organized and mustered into the service
of New York on the 30th day of June, 1861,
and continued in its command until the after-
noon of July 3d, when he was killed while gallantly leading
his men to resist the advance of the enemy at Fair
The regiment was 1,000 strong when it reached the seat
of the battle. When it was commanded by Col. David J.
Theodore B. Hamilton, a son of the late
The term of its original enlistment was three
years, and at the close of the three years' term nearly all the survivors
remained to serve during the war.

The regiment served in the Army of the Potomac, and participated
in the following battles: It was always in active field service, from
the beginning to the end of the war, under General McClellan, until
the evacuation of the Peninsula.

When in the Army of the Potomac it was first attached
to the First Corps, and subsequently to the Sixth
Corps, under General Sedgwick. It participated in the follow-
ing battles: The Siege of Yorktown,
Seven Pines, Fair Oaks, Oak Grove, Savage
Creek, Bull Run, Second Manassas, South Mountain,
Fredericksburg, Marye's Heights, Salem
Church, Fankstown, Rappahannock Station, Mine
Run, Antietam, Gettysburg, Fort Stevens, Stras-
burg, Chancellorsville, Fisher's Hill, Cedar Creek, Siege
of Petersburg, Appomattox.

The regiment fought at Marye's Heights, The Wilderness,

and at the battle of Gettysburg. The regiment lost in killed in battle and by
other causes, as near as I can gather the
number exclusive of those who were disabled by
wounds. I cannot get an approximate figure.

I have to state that the most general character
of the regiment during the war. Reference may be
made to the fact that I make short extracts. These
testify to the fact that the Sixty-second Regi-
ment bravely and fearlessly performed its whole duty
to the last.

At the battle of Fredericksburg, in which he says: "Just
before the enemy's works upon the Heights of Fredericks-
burg, General Newton to feel them and learn something
of the number of guns, etc. I selected the
Sixty-second Regt. U. B. Hamilton commanding, and form-
ed a column of the regiment, marched up to draw the enemy's fire.

Before the regiment was 200 yards from the brigade line, it was opened upon by a heavy musketry fire, and apparently five pieces of artillery from the Rebel works and rifle pits. The Sixty-second New York and One hundred and second Pennsylvania were compelled to fall back a few yards to a line where the slopes afforded them protection from the enemy's fire, and in about as many seconds lost in killed and wounded 64 officers and men. Their conduct is worthy of special praise and notice. The Sixty-second lost its color sergeant, its commander was wounded, and 30 musket balls pierced its flag."

"During the Battle of Salem Heights, the Ninety-eighth Pennsylvania and the Sixty-second New York were necessarily left on the south side of the main road, where they performed gallant service under the officer in charge of that portion of the line. They lost heavily, and held their position to the last."

General Wheaton, in closing his report of that battle, said: "It was impossible for the gallant little band—forty-five in number—of the Sixty-second New York Volunteers, under Lieutenants Morris and Stewart, to escape capture. Their fire as skirmishers on the advancing enemy delayed his movements and necessitated a more careful reconnoissance which took time, and in my opinion the time thus gained, saved the right of the Second Division and my own brigade from capture."

Col. David J. Nevin, who took command of the regiment after the death of Colonel Riker, at the Battle of Fair Oaks, Va., in his report of the service of the regiment in that battle, and the manner in which they received and delivered their fire, concluded his reference as follows: "My men behaved bravely, and while they act so nobly, I have no fear for the cause in which they are engaged."

Like commendations of the service of this regiment in other battles of the war could be quoted, but enough has been presented here to satisfy the citizens of our great State that the men who composed the Sixty-second Regiment New York Volunteers rendered gallant service to the Empire State and deserved well the monument erected in their honor.

The "Congressional Medal of Honor" was won and awarded to the following members of the regiment for special gallantry upon the battlefield: Edward Browne, James Evans, and Charles E. Morse. Many acts of greater gallantry by members of the Sixty-second might be pointed to at periods of great emergency and danger, which were probably unnoticed at the time by those who had the power to invoke our superior officers to give them deserved recognition.



J. B. LYON PRINT.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

63D, 69TH, AND 88TH NEW YORK INFANTRY.
In the woods west of the Wheatfield, and near the "Rocky Knoll."

DEDICATION OF MONUMENT.

IRISH BRIGADE.

63D, 69TH, AND 88TH REGIMENTS INFANTRY.

July 2, 1888.

ADDRESS OF GEN. ROBERT NUGENT.

MR. PRESIDENT, COMRADES AND SURVIVORS OF THE IRISH BRIGADE:

I am honored by your distinguished invitation to address you as the Chairman of these proceedings. I am a soldier merely, not given to speak, and can ill address you in a manner befitting this illustrious occasion, commemorative of the services of our heroic dead.

Through the generosity of the Empire State of the Union and many friends of the Irish soldier we meet here to decorate the graves of our fallen comrades, and to erect this beautiful monument in honor of their gallant services.

On this spot, twenty-five years ago to-day, that brigade, of which we are the only survivors, took part in this great battle of the war, and fought with a gallantry whose story has been echoed from North to South and from East to West.

The Irish Brigade, comrades, like that famous old brigade at Fontenoy, is exemplified in the hearts of every true Irishman the world over, and its name and deeds are enrolled on the list of the immortal military organizations that took part in the great conflict on this field.

I will not tell the story of its many engagements, leaving that for the distinguished orator who is to follow me, but will only refer to the details connected with the inception of the organization which afterwards became so famous and widely known as the Irish Brigade.

On the morning of the day on which the Sixty-ninth Militia returned to New York from the battlefield of Bull Run, in the armory of that regiment, the heroic soldier, distinguished scholar, and Irish patriot, Gen. Thomas Francis Meagher, with myself, conceived the idea of forming an Irish Brigade, with the intention of having for its first commander that fearless soldier, Gen. James Shields.

Owing, however, to the absence of that gentleman from this country and the inability to reach him, and the necessity of having some representative Irish soldier to take immediate command, we were unable to secure the services of General Shields, and so the command devolved on that gallant soldier, the record of whose life is emblazoned on the escutcheon of the Irish patriots — Gen. Thomas Francis Meagher.

From this time on and until the close of the war the Irish Brigade took part in nearly all of the battles in which the grand and gallant old Second Corps, under Sumner, Couch, Hancock, Warren and Humphreys was engaged, and of which it formed a part.

The brigade originally numbered about 5,000 men; but the losses sustained on the many battlefields on which it played such a prominent part so decimated

its glorious ranks that when it reached the city of New York after the cessation of hostilities, its roll-call did not disclose as many hundreds.

The battle of Fredericksburg came near wiping it out of existence; and to illustrate the loss of my own regiment at this battle, I will state that the regiment took into battle 210 muskets and 18 officers. Of these 141 were either killed or wounded, and of the 18 officers that went in 2 were killed and 14 wounded. The loss in the other regiments was equally as great.

But, comrades, I must give way to the ceremonies which are to follow. In conclusion I only desire to say that it affords me great pleasure and satisfaction to know that the only legacy that I can leave to my children is the fact that in the wisdom of Divine Providence, I was once the commander of the Irish Brigade, which never lost a color, nor had one of its flags stained by the hands of the enemy.

THE IRISH BRIGADE AT GETTYSBURG.

BY WILLIAM GEOGHEGAN.

I.

O comrades, step with reverent tread
 Tow'rd this historic mound;
 The soil once wet with brave men's blood
 Is always holy ground.
 Here five-and-twenty years ago
 An Irish phalanx stood,
 And here they swelled the battle-tide
 With generous Celtic blood.

II.

Thro' many a fierce, ensanguined fight,
 Two banners o'er them flew —
 The emblems of the land they left,
 And the land they came unto;
 No stain e'er fell on either's folds —
 No foeman e'er could say
 He'd plucked a tassel from those staffs,
 Or snatched a shred away!

III.

Though rent and splintered, flags and staffs,
 With foeman face to face,
 Above the vanguard's fire-swept line,
 Those flags maintained their place,
 And out of Stonewall Jackson's lips
 The wrathful sentence drew:
 "There goes that damned green flag again
 Beside the Yankee blue!"

IV.

On Fair Oaks field, on Marye's Heights,
 Through Fredericksburg's dread days,
 Well, well the Southland's veterans knew
 Those blended banners' blaze;
 Where'er the fight was desperate
 And spears struck fire from spears,
 Those flags flashed out above the lines
 Of Irish Brigadiers.

V.

Columbia hath a memory,
 Generous, proud, and keen,
 That fondly holds remembrance of
 The boys who bore the green;
 So sleep, ye brave, unselfish dead,
 Who fell within its shade;
 This shaft will tell to other times
 The sacrifice ye made.

VI.

The war-drum's throb and bugle sound
 Ye loved to hear is o'er —
 The damp, cold earth is heaped above
 Your hearts forever more;
 But mem'ry of your gallant deeds
 Enlivens, stirs, and thrills,
 Like echoes of a clarion call
 Around Killarney's hills.

 ORATION OF GEN. DENIS F. BURKE.

COMRADES:

On this great occasion I am sorry that I do not possess the oratorical power of Thomas Francis Meagher, or the poetic genius of "Miles O'Reilly," to depict in fitting terms the magnificent behavior of those three regiments, which we are assembled here to-day to honor by unveiling a monument erected by the great State of New York to mark the locality where they so heroically fought twenty-five years ago. The Irish Brigade when it went into battle here numbered only 530 men, consisting of five regiments — the Sixty-third, Sixty-ninth, and Eighty-eighth New York Volunteers, One hundred and sixteenth Pennsylvania Volunteers, and Twenty-eighth Massachusetts Volunteers, under the command of that brave and accomplished soldier, Col. Patrick Kelly of the Eighty-eighth New York. To do justice to that brigade, and to show why our ranks were depleted from nearly 5,000 men to the size of half a regiment, it is necessary for me to give a synopsis of its achievements from the time of its organization until it arrived on the field of battle, July 2, 1863.

came on that bright July morning a quarter of a century ago, with the rest of the heroic corps, which on that occasion was commanded by the noble Hancock. Here it was, foot sore and tired from forced marching, depleted in numbers but resolute and determined to do its whole duty, and at every cost to uphold the renown won in all former combats as if its ranks were full. It numbered only 530 men, but every man was a tried veteran who remembered that the Irish Brigade represented an expatriated race fighting for the unity of a nation that extended to its countrymen liberty and citizenship; and that if it failed on this occasion to maintain the reputation formerly gained, the bravery of the Irish race and standing as soldiers would be seriously affected. It fought then as it was its wont to do. Each man became equal to ten, and the brigade on this historic field of battle won the plaudits of the army and the country for its brilliant conduct.

To me these surroundings to-day bring back vividly the scene of that great struggle witnessed here in 1863. On yonder ground the advancing column of gray, and here the moving line of battle of blue to repulse that threatened stroke which is about to be delivered by the veterans of Lee. Here we saw a sublime sight just as the order of advance was about to be given. The brigade were kneeling and our faithful Chaplain, Father Corby, invoked the Divine blessing on their cause and undertaking. Rising from that posture, the command "Forward!" is heard along the line; and fortified with religious consolation the Irish Brigade advanced, carrying the Stars and Stripes and the old Green Flag of Erin — the two flags they had already followed through so many battlefields. On and through the wheat that covered the ground, they advanced gradually and surely, losing many of their number, until out of the 530 who advanced, 195 are killed and wounded before they are brought to a halt.

Here twenty-five years ago the Puritan and the Celt fought side by side for the Union founded by George Washington and his confreres, just the same as they did under Montgomery in the Revolution, Jackson at New Orleans, Scott at Lundy's Lane, and Shields on the plains of Mexico; and everywhere during our civil war, wherever the Stars and Stripes floated in battle, there were Irishmen fighting for the preservation of this Republic, the only refuge of the oppressed of all lands.

Yes, Irishmen and the sons of Irishmen have stood nobly by the Republic at every critical period in its history. Americans of all classes and sections gladly acknowledge this fact. Witness the conduct of General George G. Meade, the grandson of an Irishman, who, taking command of the Army of the Potomac on its way to this historic ground, accomplished such a victory in less than a week! I shall dare to say, that he was one of the greatest military geniuses of the war. The presence of mind, the coolness, the sagacity, and the indomitable energy displayed by him at a moment of extreme peril to the Union and Army, combined with his masterly tactics, all go to point him out as the very man for that occasion.

And to-day the people of this broad land, irrespective of creeds, religious or political, are sending their prayers to Heaven for the recovery of one, who by his deeds is enshrined an idol in their hearts; one who in peace is meek

and gentle as a lamb, but in war a thunderbolt; one whose valor and genius shines with resplendent light on the pages of American history, and who has added a lustre to the military genius of this free land, which time cannot dim nor history eclipse. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan! Sprung from the grand old Celtic race, filled with their fiery valor, he rose from an humble station to the proudest and highest in our army. He is of our blood. His fame and name are linked with ours, and none render more loving homage to his merits than we the survivors of the Irish Brigade. From this historic field we send him loving greeting to-day and a heartfelt wish for his speedy recovery.

During all the battles, sieges and other operations in which we were engaged, each regiment of this brigade carried two flags, the Stars and Stripes of Free America, and the Green Flag of poor persecuted Ireland. They bore both to the front in the headlong charges at Malvern Hill, Antietam, Fredericksburg, here, the Wilderness, and Spotsylvania, and never lost or deserted either flag. They never lost a battery they were assigned to support, nor a position given them to hold until ordered to withdraw.

Comrades, we have seen these two banners wave at Gaines' Mill when despair and defeat were imminent; they waved at Malvern Hill when the ground shook beneath the charging legions of Lee; we have seen them at Antietam breast the shock of death, when their folds became as gory as the ground over which we bore them, and, though reddened and stained with the sweat and blood of battle, they still maintained their position in the front. They waved together here when a Continent was at stake; they flashed in the Wilderness amid a revel of death; they were the first flags planted on the angle at Spotsylvania; and at each and every place, begirt by patriotism and buttressed by valor, they never wavered, never faltered, never quailed until they blazed in the sunlight of victory at Appomattox.

But we witnessed scenes on every battlefield we participated in which are not recorded by historians, but which, nevertheless, were as heroic as the charges of the brigade. I refer to the conduct of our chaplains, Fathers Charles Cuddy and Dillon, in the discharge of their sacred duties. In the press and tumult of battle, when terror and death were nigh and many a brave man's face pale, they have been with us, constant in their trust, faithful to their duty, and devoted to the flag. Unwavering in their loyalty and undiminished in their devotion to their country and religion, these meek and humble followers of the Crucified bore with heroic fortitude all the trials and privations which surrounded their perilous mission. When night closed on the victor and vanquished we have seen them, lantern in hand, visiting the wounded, kneeling beside them, consoling those in pain and shriving the dying. They were the custodians of the last message from the departing soldier to the dying soldier to loved ones at home. It mattered not to them who brought the unfortunate sufferer's confession, their generous souls went out in sympathy for his agony. And could our fallen comrades, the brave and good men, their willing lips would this day swell the glorious testimony to their worth.

As our good heroes who led us in that mighty struggle, Meagher, our first commander, is the only one who did not meet death on the battlefield at the

head of the brigade he loved so well. The turbid waters of the Missouri engulfed him; he was lost by an accident and the resting place of his coffinless corpse is unknown. But to-day in every land where civilization extends, the name and fame of this orator, soldier, and pioneer of Freedom is known and revered. No monument is erected to perpetuate his genius; but his fame is ever cherished in the hearts of the people of two continents, and his burning words in the cause of the Union which aroused the lethargic, gave valor to the patriot, and compelled the wavering to leap to arms in defence of their country, are remembered and prized.

And Col. Patrick Kelly, who so valiantly led us, here deserves to be remembered with veneration and love by every soldier of the Irish Brigade. He was with us from the commencement, and shared the fortunes of the brigade in all its weary marches and fighting till he came to Petersburg, where he fought his last battle. On that June afternoon in 1864, when we advanced to storm the intrenchments of that city, while at the head of his command leading the charge with the colors of his old regiment in his hands, a shell struck him and he fell without an utterance. So died one of the bravest soldiers of the Army of the Potomac. He went to his grave having filled a measure of usefulness, beloved by his comrades and mourned by the soldiers of the Second Corps without regard to rank.

And the splendid hero and magnificent soldier whose name is as familiar among the old soldiers of the Army of the Potomac as that of the organizer of that patriotic body himself! How can I find language to depict to you his brilliant services? Suffice to say that Gen. Thomas A. Smyth was one of the grandest soldiers of our race. He came to us prior to the battle of the Wilderness, and commanded us in that fearful battle and at Spotsylvania. In both encounters he added to his own splendid reputation as a soldier and shed fresh lustre on our brigade. He left us for a higher command. He fell two days before the surrender of Lee at the head of his troops, respected and mourned by the whole army. As a patriot and as a soldier, General Smyth was an example worthy of study, emulation and commemoration. As an officer in the service of his adopted country, his glory belongs to the United States; but we of the Irish race reverence his memory for the love he bore the land of his birth, and his unsurpassed fidelity to all trusts imposed upon him during his brilliant career as a soldier.

And next comes Col. Richard Byrnes of the Twenty-eighth Massachusetts. There was not a braver or more accomplished soldier in the army than he. He joined the regular army of the United States when but a boy, and rose by attention to duty and good conduct to the position of captain. He was subsequently commissioned by the Governor of Massachusetts as colonel of our old comrades, the Twenty-eighth Massachusetts. He commanded us after the departure of General Smyth, and met his death wound at the terrible battle of Cold Harbor, June 3, 1864.

Peace to the souls of all the brave men of our organization! No matter whether they ranked as officers or carried the rifle, they were ever faithful to honor, duty and country.

Comrades, our task is performed! We have unveiled this pile, and it will stand to perpetuate the fame of those heroes. To keep their memory green in the American heart, this Celtic cross has been erected. It is an emblem of Ireland, typical of faith and devotion, and the most appropriate that could be raised to hand down to posterity the bravery of our race in the great cause of American liberty. To our dead it will be unknown; for, all the plaudits we can speak, all the honors we can give, all the monuments we can raise cannot awaken the dreamless sleep of the tomb. Still, in the coming years it will raise its front to heaven, and in lettered language tell to those who shall come after us how bravely their fathers battled and bled for the old flag and human liberty! And as the sympathetic ivy clings around it and the path is worn by the footsteps of Freedom's worshippers who shall visit here, it will stand a shrine at whose footstool the patriot shall be buoyed with hope and those who are yet slaves in their native land will be nerved with earnest and unpassioned valor to meet the foeman who oppress them, as did the brave and their comrades on this field of renown where the liberties of the Nation were saved and perpetuated for the glory and benefit of millions yet unborn.

Next followed the blessing of the Monument by the brigade Chaplains, **Rev. Rev. William Corby, U. S. C., Eighty-eighth N. Y. V.,** and **Rev. Thomas Sheehan, N. J., Sixty-ninth N. Y. V.**

OUR FALLEN COMRADES.

By WILLIAM COLLINS.

I.

Peace spreads her wings of snowy white
 O'er Gettysburg to-day;
 No sound is heard of coming fight,
 No marshalling for the fray;
 No legion battalions dream no more
 To mourn the low to greet;
 The long, long titful strife is o'er,
 And we as comrades meet.

II.

We meet in love, and hand in hand,
 Above our brothers' graves,
 We salute you truly to the land
 Which our banner waves;
 So we can fold in glory swell
 And proudly throned the an-
 We can exult who fought and fell;
 We see a floating threl

III.

Of those who in their manhood died
To blot out Slavery's stain,
And rear aloft in all its pride,
Fair Freedom's flag again!
'Tis ours to raise this cross on high
Above the Irish dead,
Who showed mankind the way to die,
When Truth and Freedom led.

IV.

They came from a land where Freedom was only known by fame,
Where Slavery's spell, like a breath of hell, had banned and barred her name,
Where the brave man moaned in fetters, and the patriot wept in thrall,
And red with the blood of martyrs the despot ruled o'er all!
But when on Freedom's soil they stood and saw her banner soar,
And heard the foemen's mustering shout re-echo on our shore,
They leaped, as leaps the lightning's flash athwart the storm-tossed sky,
For that old flag, with bosom bare, to triumph or to die!

V.

This soil is the grave of heroes, it is not common mould!
Each foot is dyed and sanctified with the blood of the brave and bold;
And an incense rises from their graves to light us on to fame,
And mingles in each patriot soul and sets his heart aflame,
And nerves the veriest slave that e'er shrank from a tyrant foe,
To leap to life with armed hand, and give him blow for blow —
To strike the despot to the death though bulwarked round in steel,
And right with fierce and desperate strength the wrongs that brave men feel!

VI.

Here, on the field of Gettysburg, where treason's banner flew,
Where rushed in wrath the Southern Gray to smite the Northern Blue,
Where'er that Blue, by valor nerved, in serried ranks was seen,
There flashed between it and the foe the daring Irish Green!
And never yet on any land rushed forth to Freedom's aid,
A braver or more dauntless band than Ireland's brave brigade.
Pause on their graves! 'Tis holy dust ye tread upon to-day,
The dust of Freedom's martyred dead whose souls have passed away!

VII.

No more the ringing bugle blast
Shall fright the trembling air;
No more the squadrons hurrying fast
To meet the charge, perchance their last,
Amid the battle's glare;
Their pride, their strength, all, all are past,
In peace they slumber there.

And comrades true beside them lie,
 Who, oft on field and flood,
 Fought in the strife for Liberty,
 And sealed their faith in blood;
 But never yet beat hearts as proud
 As those which Ireland gave —
 Night's sable mantle was their shroud,
 The battlefield their gravel

VIII.

But though from earth has passed away
 Their spirits bold and true,
 And tombed in cold and senseless clay
 The hearts that bounded warm and gay
 In war's wild wassail, every fray
 Where men could dare and do,—
 Their deeds will shine in Freedom's ray
 To light the foeman on his way,
 While tyrants stand appalled.
 Their name and fame shall last for aye,
 And brighter burn from day to day
 Till the sun sinks into eternity,
 And the Judgment Roll is called!

TRANSFER OF MONUMENT.

BY COL. JAMES D. BRADY.

MEMBERS OF THE GETTYSBURG COMMISSION:

The fame of Gen. Thomas Francis Meagher, patriot, orator, soldier, commander of the Irish Brigade is imperishable. Would that he were here to-day to present this magnificent monument to you! None could match him upon such an occasion as this. How eloquently, how appropriately, how ably he would perform the duty! The recollection of the noble deeds of valor of his own dearly beloved brigade would inspire him; and our illustrious patriot and grand hero would, if he were here, give us even a more touching and beautiful word-picture than his famous and soul-stirring apostrophe to the sword.

These, my comrades, were the thoughts that rushed through my mind upon my arrival on these grounds a few moments ago, when as I jumped from the wagon I was clasped in the arms of Father Corby, whom I have not met since the end of the war, more than thirty years ago.

I behold for the first time since the surrender at Appomattox a number of my dear companions of the old brigade, and as my thoughts wander back to my boyhood days, when side by side we were at the front fighting together for the maintenance of the American Union, I am bewildered. Amid such

surroundings, in such presence, with such reflections, thoughts smother words, and I really do not know what to say.

In 1861, when the war broke out, I was a Virginia boy in New York. My first service was in the Sixth New York Militia; afterwards, in the Thirty-seventh New York; and from December, 1861, to August, 1865, when the regiment under my command was mustered out, I was an officer of the Sixty-third New York Volunteers. Although my service with the Irish Brigade was curtailed by assignments to staff-duty with other commands, I regard it as an honor that any man may be proud of, to have been a soldier in the Irish Brigade; and to me it was a still greater honor and mark of distinction to have served on the staff of Gen. Thomas Francis Meagher, as I did for a time as acting adjutant general of the brigade.

This grand monument which we are to-day dedicating, is the living witness of the devotion of Irishmen to the American Union, and the great sacrifice made by them in the desperate struggle of the American Nation for existence.

Irishmen everywhere, and at all periods of time, have been conspicuous for their unselfish devotion to the cause of liberty. How well I remember in New York, in 1861, how they were inspired by the patriotic devotion to the Union when the flag of our country was fired upon at Fort Sumter.

Shields and Meagher, Corcoran, Lyons, and Mulligan, did not hesitate, but immediately espoused the cause of the Union; and, as has been truly said by Abraham Lincoln, Archbishop Hughes of New York rendered as valuable service to the Government as any patriot in the land.

The Irishmen of the North, in 1861, were inspired by the fame and glory of their countrymen in the Revolutionary War. They remembered Jeremiah O'Brien and General Sullivan, Commodore Barry and General Pickens, General Stark and the Rutledges, Charles Carroll of Carrollton and Anthony Wayne, Sergeant Jasper and Gen. Richard Montgomery, General Knox and Charles Thompson; and many other Irish patriots were upon the lips and deep in the hearts of the Irish patriots of 1861. They cheerfully volunteered and were ready to freely shed their blood in the battles for Liberty and Union. Under such patriotic sentiments as these the Irish Brigade was organized.

It is not my purpose to recite the story of its heroic deeds from 1861 to 1865. In all the great battles in which the Army of the Potomac was engaged, the Irish Brigade was to the front, and performed its duty faithfully. It would be impossible to write the history of the Army of the Potomac without giving the highest of praise to the gallant Irish Brigade. At Antietam it was to the front, nearest "Bloody Lane." At Fredericksburg the men with the green sprig in their hats were found dead nearer the stone wall than any other of the Union troops. At Gaines' Mill it stopped and held back the exultant and victorious foe, and magnificently covered Porter's retreat from that bloody field. At Savage Station the well directed and steady fire from the Irish Brigade staggered and drove back the enemy.

Magruder, in his terrific assault upon Malvern Hill, rushed over other troops, but the yell of the Irish Brigade and its volley after volley into the Confederate ranks brought them to bay. Here upon this battlefield, although reduced in numbers, it not only held its own, but drove the enemy from their position.

race which fought so nobly on the fields of Fontenoy — the Irish Brigade was distinguished by its insignia, its red trefoil, its green feather, and above all, by its glorious standard, the flag of its adopted country the Stars and Stripes, which we carried successfully through so many battles, unstained by the hand of the enemy. The tattered remnants of our colors now in the Armory of the Sixty-ninth Regiment, in New York City, are the only vestiges of what remain to exemplify the deeds of fallen comrades, the memory of which exalts us to the highest pitch of patriotism.

The brigade remained at Camp California until the 10th day of March, 1862, when the Army of the Potomac moved on to Manassas under command of that able and gallant soldier, the late General George B. McClellan. The army did not meet the enemy at Manassas, and returned to Alexandria, embarking for Fortress Monroe, and sailing thence up the York River to Ship Point, and thence to Yorktown. The Siege of Yorktown was this brigade's baptism of fire. The battle of Fair Oaks came next, followed by Gaines' Mill, Savage Station, Peach Orchard, White Oak Swamp, Glendale, Malvern Hill, Antietam, the famous charge at Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, Bristoe Station, Mine Run, Wilderness, Po River, Spotsylvania, North Anna, Totopotomoy, Cold Harbor, Petersburg, Strawberry Plains, Deep Bottom, Reams' Station, Skinner's Farm, Siege of Petersburg, White Oak Road, Hatcher's Run, Boynton Road, Sutherland's Station, Sailor's Creek, Farmville, and finally Appomattox, where the Army of Northern Virginia, under command of General Lee, surrendered to General Grant on the 9th day of April, 1865.

And here I am proud to state, that on the night of the 7th of April, the first communication sent by General Grant to General Lee requesting a cessation of further hostilities was delivered to me by Gen. Seth Williams, Adjutant General of the Army of the Potomac, accompanied by General Miles, with instructions to deliver the same to a commissioned officer of the Confederate picket line. Accompanied by Capt. John Oldershaw, one of my aides, we passed through our lines and hailed a commissioned officer of the Confederate pickets. The importance of this letter can be realized when I say it was General Grant's first letter to General Lee, asking the surrender of his army; and, being of so much interest, I will quote it in full.

"April 7, 1865.

"GENERAL,—

"The result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States Army, known as the Army of Northern Virginia.

"U. S. GRANT,

"*Lieut. General.*

"GENERAL R. E. LEE."

The letter was duly delivered to a major in charge of that portion of the picket line directly opposite my brigade's line of battle, where we had fought

different elevations, and the top or crest was garnished with artillery. At the base, or foot of the Heights, there runs a stone wall, and behind this was posted a strong force of infantry. From the point where the brigade formed its line of battle to this stone wall is a quarter of a mile. The ground inclines in a gentle ascent throughout the whole distance. Now, the slope between the point where the brigade formed its line of battle and the stone wall constitutes the battlefield. The view revealed an impenetrable barrier, an impregnable wall.

Previous to the attack, and before the final orders were given to advance on the works, General Hancock, then in command of the First Division, Second Corps, sent for the colonels of the First Division, some fourteen in number, and thus addressed them: "Gentlemen, I have called you together for the purpose of communicating to you the orders of the commanding general. They are imperative and must be carried out at all hazards and at all costs." Describing how the battle would be opened, he said: "General French's Division will lead the advance, supported by the First Division, Zook's Brigade supporting French, and the Irish Brigade supporting Zook. Caldwell's Brigade will support the Irish Brigade, and if one or either line should fail, the other should pass on and over, and so on until the works of the enemy were carried." He advised, however, that all mounted officers should go in on foot, as we were going to encounter some hot musketry, and "that scarcely a pigeon could live through it." When the general had finished his short address the fourteen colonels shook each other by the hand, many of them for the last time.

The gallant Cross of the Fifth New Hampshire was standing by my side and on my right. Turning around and taking him by the hand, I said, "Cross, we are going to have hot work to-day; but if you get into Richmond before I do, order dinner at the Spottswood House and I will dine with you." Cross, who was a good fellow and a very gallant soldier, a little profane at times, replied to me in very strong and emphatic terms, "So — and so — Nugent, we are!" We did not carry the works; we did not get into Richmond that day; the dinner has never been ordered. At his next fight, Gettysburg, that brave and gallant soldier gave up his life for his country's cause. The Fredericksburg fight was terrific; no pen can describe with accuracy the horrors of this battle. The casualties were enormous. It was a living hell from which escape seemed scarcely possible. I was myself carried off the field, having been shot through the right side while I was leading the charge. Owing to the commanding position of the enemy no attack could have been successful.

Gen. Francis A. Walker, in his history of the Second Corps, reports that Gen. John R. Brooke says that the bodies found nearest the celebrated stone wall were recognized as those belonging to the Sixty-ninth New York, the Fifth New Hampshire, and the Fifty-third Pennsylvania. In the campaigns of 1862, from the battle of Fair Oaks to the battle of Fredericksburg, there were killed and wounded, in officers, 96; and in enlisted men, 1,521; making a total of 1,617.

The brigade participated in no less than 34 battles throughout the war, and had enlisted in its organization no less than 7,000 men. When, at the ces-

eighth Massachusetts stand side by side as they have stood in many hard fought battles, both being regiments of the Irish Brigade. It will be seen that the Sixty-ninth stands at the head of the list of the New York regiments, it having lost more men killed and mortally wounded in action than any regiment from the State.

It is a grand and glorious record. It needs no words of praise. Its name will live in history. Its record was unsurpassed. I might go on and record the deeds of this splendid military organization, and the brave fellows who sacrificed their lives in this country's cause, but space will not permit me to go into all the details of the Battles of Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, Bristoe Station, the Wilderness, and those that followed up to the surrender at Appomattox.

63D REGIMENT INFANTRY

HISTORICAL SKETCH BY MAJ. JOHN DWYER

After the Battle of Bull Run, Va., July, 1861, and the repulse of the Union army, it became evident to the "powers that be" that to conquer the Confederate States was something besides an "excursion" to the land of Dixie. President Abraham Lincoln called for 500,000 volunteers "for three years, or the war," in addition to the 75,000 already raised "for two years." During the summer Gen. Thomas Francis Meagher was urged to raise a brigade "for the war." Having decided to do so, he found no difficulty in getting the necessary authority from the Adjutant-General's office, Albany. Headquarters were accordingly opened in New York City, and recruiting officers began to raise companies for Irish-American regiments. As soon as thirty-two men were formally mustered, an officer received a commission as captain, with pay dating from the day of muster. His two lieutenants were subsequently commissioned as the company increased.

After some time spent in recruiting, General Meagher determined to have three regiments in his brigade. The Sixty-third was mustered into the United States service in September, October, and November, 1861. Several of the officers had been recruiting for some months previous to the authority being given for the formation of the brigade, with a view to organizing an Irish-American division, to be commanded by Gen. James Shields, an officer who distinguished himself in the Mexican War. The original scheme, however, was abandoned.

David's Island, in the East River, was selected as the site of the camp, where the men were taught the first duties of the soldier. The other regiments were designated the Sixty-ninth and Eighty-eighth New York Volunteers. They had their camps on Staten Island.

Some friends of the Sixty-third Regiment in New York City procured the necessary funds, and having purchased two beautiful flags (regulation size) came to the Island, November 6, 1861, for the purpose of presenting the same. Quite a delegation accordingly chartered a steamer, headed by General Meagher and the crack band of the Metropolis — Dodworth's. One of the flags was

for the latter place the army was formed into divisions ourselves in the Second Corps, Major General Sumner; and Richardson; Second Brigade, General Meagher. The at Alexandria, and after an unpleasant experience on the days, the weather moderated and the troops disembarked

army the Second Corps sat down before Yorktown, the surrendered his army to the united forces of America er, 1781. Gens. Joe Johnston and Magruder in command exhausted their engineering skill to make the fort and out-

It is about seventy miles from Richmond on the right river, and ten miles from its mouth. McClellan had three : Sumner's, Heintzelman's, and Keyes's, and probably First Corps, under McDowell, was encamped in the neighborhood of Yorktown for the protection of Washington.

with 15,000 men held the works at Yorktown, but the in threatening his rear compelled him to evacuate, which

At daylight the brigade was under arms, preceded by the my. It rained incessantly, rendering the road from Yorktown almost impassable. The contest for the possession of front of the old capital of Virginia, was "short, sharp and Union loss being 2,228. The enemy suffered severely. were left behind as were their guns in the fort.

ed on towards Richmond after the fall of Williamsburg, ing their steps to Yorktown (the Sixty-third among them) for West Point on the York River. The wife of an Brigade was conspicuous on horseback on the way back immense green feather in her hat and dark-green riding little attention. She went aboard with the troops. A week quite a contrast in her appearance, before we reached the and the Union line of investment. The writer observed trying to adjust her wall-tent in the woods, in a drenching temporary absence of her husband with his regiment at the habit and green feather were missing, as were "the pomp of war." The trials and privations of camp life were too woman, and she left for her home in New York, per transporter, satisfied with her taste of war, which quite dispelled all

and considerable difficulty in crossing the Chickahominy, in of Cold Harbor, owing to the river overflowing its banks. ere all flooded. Before the troops were well over Johnston the Union right (May 31st). Temporary bridges were built, the battle of Fair Oaks found the Union Army on both sides ominy. At the close of the first day's battle the brigade arld in a rain storm, after much difficulty. The Confederates, whelming numbers, drove the Union troops, and captured the Division the first day.

his feet in the water, and both the sun and water, too, very hot. As we rode by he called out to know if we had ever seen a 'boiled Irishman.' "

A few days after the battle, General Prim of the Spanish army was a guest at army headquarters. He accompanied McClellan through the camps. As he passed the brigade in line, the Castilian (himself a distinguished soldier) was struck by the appearance of Meagher and his men. He inquired of the latter, "What troops are these?" He was informed "the Irish Brigade, Sir." "Fine material, fine material, General." Meagher promptly called for "Three cheers for the Spanish General." They were given with a tiger. It startled and pleased the gray-headed soldier, who said to Meagher, in good English: "Soldiers who can cheer like that must fight well. Such cheers are better than cold lead."

After Fair Oaks the siege of Richmond fairly began. The Union right was thrown across the Chickahominy, the left swinging round in the shape of a crescent, a distance of thirteen miles. Sumner's Corps held the centre, with the First Division placed across the field at Fair Oaks. The men were employed for weeks in throwing up breastworks. In our front was slashed timber to prevent surprise; our line was carefully picketed. On one occasion an amusing incident occurred, but serious withal. Secret information having reached the ears of General McClellan, on the afternoon of June 25th, that the enemy would make an attack on Sumner's front that night, he took steps to meet the emergency. The Sixty-third took position in front of our breastworks, beyond the slashed timber in the woods, at the junction of two old roads coming from the direction of the Rebel lines.

During the night, the company cook (of "G" company) came out to the regiment carrying welcome coffee and a camp kettle filled with apple sauce, a rich treat at any time for hungry soldiers. About the time the cook reached the rear and left of Company G, a shot from the pickets in front broke the dead silence of the summer night. Another followed, and another, and immediately firing became general along the whole front. This was in dense woods, and the night being dark nothing could be seen but the flash from the rifles of the pickets. The men of the command were lying quietly on the ground, in battle line, but the first shot brought every soldier to his feet. The pickets of the Sixty-third had scarcely reached the regiment when a heavy volley of musketry from apparently a full regiment was fired in the faces of our men. Several soldiers fell. A prompt fire was returned from at least 600 muskets. The officers shouted to their men to "keep cool, fire low, and stop talking." The musketry fire was kept up for some time, numbers of our men having fallen, when the ringing voice of Col. John Burke was heard above the din: "Charge bayonets;" and at them we went, pell mell through the timber and underbrush. The Rebel line was so near, and this move being so entirely unexpected, we were upon them in an instant. Those who did not throw down their arms took to their heels and ran for their lives. In the melee our precious coffee and apple sauce were forgotten. While occupying our old line, and the tumult having ceased, I was on the left of the company when I stumbled over something in the darkness and underbrush. I stooped down to ascertain what it was, when there lay a man at full length, face down-

ward. "Captain Condon! here is another man killed or wounded," I called to that officer who was on the right. He came running down to the left. "Indade I am not, sergeant, dear," said the supposed "dead" man, "but I am suffering from a bad stomachache, so I am, and I must have the docther, at once." "Corporal Tinsley, as sure as I am a living man," was the captain's exclamation of surprise. "You are skulking, sir." "No, indade, Captain, honey, I am sick, and must have some medicine." The apple sauce kettle was kicked over when the music began. Tinsley saw his opportunity. He lay on his stomach, in the dark, and went for that demoralized apple sauce. In the meantime he thought he would be excused from fighting, at least would not be missed out of seventy in his company. A court-martial brought these facts out some days later, when Corporal Tinsley was reduced to the ranks, and deprived of his pay for three months. All of which was caused by the tempting and toothsome apple sauce.

The right of the Union army having been attacked by Stonewall Jackson on the 26th of June, and overwhelmed by superior numbers, the commanding general reluctantly decided on a "change of base" to the James River. The sick and wounded, and baggage trains were ordered to the rear, the objective point being Harrison's Landing.

The Confederates had sufficiently reinforced their left by the arrival of Jackson's force from the Valley, when a forward movement was commenced with a view to crush Fitz John Porter, who held McClellan's right wing north of the Chickahominy. They came on like the waves of the sea, but the onset was met bravely by the Union general. In addition to other troops the division of regulars was in his command. Regiments, brigades, and divisions fought manfully, but Jackson attacked with determination to win. His superiority of numbers gave assurance of success. To augment his left, the lines in front of McClellan's main army were denuded of troops for the time being, knowing that the Union general would strongly reinforce his right.

Line after line of the Federals gave way. The reserves were brought up, and after repelling repeated assaults they, too, were forced to retire. It was near dusk, when Porter was almost in despair at the rout of his noble army, and he called frantically on McClellan for help. It was given. Meagher's and French's Brigades of the First Division, Second Corps, were ordered to vacate their lines at Fair Oaks and go to the rescue,—ten of the oldest regiments of the Union Army. Five minutes from the time the orders were given these brigades were on the way—a distance of between three and four miles—in light marching order. It was a forced march; not a man of either brigade fell out of the ranks. As they advanced, wounded officers and men began to appear, and before the sluggish Chickahominy was reached the dusty road was filled with the fugitives from the battlefield. Guns, cartridge boxes, haversacks and clothing were to be seen all round. It is to the credit of Porter's force to say that the wounded far outnumbered the others.

In a turn in the road, and not far from Woodbury's Bridge—the only one available, a temporary, wooden affair, erected by our engineers—the sound of the conflict was quite distinct. The loud boom of the field guns, the crash of the musketry, and the cheers of the combatants were plainly heard. Reach-

ing the bridge it was choked by a disorganized mass of soldiers, in their efforts to escape from the exultant foe. It required the efforts of the right company at a "charge bayonet," to clear the bridge to let the troops pass, which they soon did.

The hill on this battlefield comes almost to the river. Its whole face was covered with the shattered remnants of Porter's force — infantry, cavalry and artillery — in one jumbled mass, fleeing for their lives. As soon as the newcomers were seen, panting for breath and covered with dust, after their run of four miles, the brave fellows who fought nobly all day took courage and began cheering as they never did before.

"What troops are these?" a soldier called out, as the head of the Sixty-third came toward him. His appearance indicated he had done his duty, as his head was bandaged and his face was covered with blood and dust.

"This is Meagher's Brigade," was the response of a sergeant of the regiment.

"Hurrah for the Irish Brigade! Hurrah for Tom Meagher! Boys, three cheers for the Union!" shouted the poor fellow with the gash in his head. They were given, and three times three.

As the troops neared the top of the hill the exultant Rebel yell was heard on the other side. Shells from the enemy began to drop among the fugitives, but the appearance of the fresh troops changed the situation materially. Each regiment was thrown into line of battle promptly, and in less time than it takes to tell it, these ten fresh regiments were going down the hill at a "right shoulder shift," bayonets fixed. The effect was magical. From being the pursuers the Rebels were now the pursued, and they had the good sense not to hesitate on the order of their going, but ran helter skelter before the advancing blue coats. Here is McClellan's recognition of the conduct of these brigades when they charged on the enemy:

"This gave an opportunity to rally our men behind the brigades of French and Meagher, and they again marched up the hill ready to repulse another attack."

Being effectually checked for the time being, Meagher and French halted their men, and thus gave the troops of Porter a chance to cross the river in safety — a rather difficult task where there was only one apology for a bridge. The soldiers of the two brigades were ordered to lie down, which they did and slept soundly until about 3 in the morning. They were then quietly moved off the field, their departure being unnoticed by the enemy until daylight. As the last regiment crossed the bridge a troop of Rebel cavalry made its appearance on the brow of the hill, and fired a harmless volley at the retreating foe. The horsemen continued to advance, and as they neared the frail structure, one of the regiments, detailed for the purpose, fired a train of powder, and Woodbury's Brigade went into the air, leaving the muddy Chickahominy between the contending armies.

Jackson's trophies were considerable — field guns, thousands of muskets, standards, ammunition wagons, as well as the killed and badly wounded. But the remnant of Porter's splendid fighting force was saved. Had the reinforcements not arrived at the opportune moment, and charged the victorious foe,

there was no organized force between him and the river, thousands would have been drowned, and those who might have escaped death in that form would have been prisoners of war that night, most of them to perish in Rebel prisons.

All stores that could not be transported were given to the flames, at Savage Station, when the retreat began. Sumner's Second Corps held the rear, and awaited the advance of the enemy at Savage Station. Sunday evening, June 29th, the Rebel advance appeared in an attack on Sumner. It was desperate while it lasted, the Sixty-third taking its full share in repulsing the enemy, after which the retreat continued to White Oak Swamp, our dead and wounded lying where they fell.

An impressive scene took place on this evening. The Confederate advance made a desperate attack at twilight. Richardson's Division met the onset. Several brigades were already engaged, when General Meagher was directed to attack and stem the enemy's advance. The fire from their batteries was heavy, thoroughly sweeping the field. The Eighty-eighth and Sixty-ninth were ordered in and they made a gallant charge, losing many men in killed and wounded. Just before the order came to Colonel Burke of the Sixty-third, that officer massed his command by division, right in front, in a clearing. Chaplain Dillon was on the right. He (the chaplain) told his men they were about to be called into action, and that a part of the brigade was already engaged. Many of his hearers would stand before their Creator within an hour, and he wanted they should be prepared for that dread moment. "Let every soldier," said the good man, "officer and private, Catholic and Non-Catholic, fall on his knees and repeat with me a sincere act of contrition for their past sins, after which I will impart absolution in the name of Christ." The regiment of bronzed soldiers were promptly on their knees, and then to the music of bursting shells, the swish of round shot, and the buzz of rifle balls, the solemn act of devotion was performed. No sooner done than the voice of Colonel Burke rang out his words of command above the din of battle, and the regiment, in less than five minutes, were led against the enemy.

The next day, Monday (White Oak Swamp), was a repetition of the scenes of Sunday, with a like result—the enemy being driven back at every point. At midnight the retreat was continued to Malvern Hill—the last of the Seven Days' battles.

While the battle raged all day at Malvern, the Irish Brigade remained inactive. In the gathering twilight an aide came to summon them to the left. It was threatened, and the only road over which the army could reach the James. In a short time they were on the "double-quick" to where the fight was hottest. The Eighty-eighth New York, Sixty-ninth New York, and Twenty-ninth Massachusetts (the latter having been added to the brigade a few weeks before) were already engaged. The Sixty-third was the left regiment. A musketry fire from the left flank killed and disabled several officers and men, Colonel Burke among the former, who was shot in the knee. He fell from his horse. The command devolved on Lieut. Col. Henry Fowler. While advancing by the flank to take position in line, General Fitz John Porter halted the regiment. He ordered the column to remain there, and support

a battery now coming (Pettit's) a short distance in the rear. It came like a whirlwind, took position on the hill, the Sixty-third in front, the guns belching death and destruction over them as they lay on their faces. They continued to do so until the enemy gave up further efforts to storm the heights and capture the battery. The next morning the Union army lay bleeding and hungry on the banks of the James, under the guns of our war ships, completely exhausted. The Army of the Potomac was saved, but at what a cost. Union loss, 15,249; Confederate, 17,583.

The army soon recuperated, and on the 16th of August we left Harrison's Landing behind, preparatory to taking steamers at Newport News for Alexandria, to reinforce Pope, who was sorely pressed at Manassas. The Second Corps reached Centreville, and met the broken battalions of Pope on the retreat to Washington. Sumner held the enemy in check to allow the Union troops to get safely to the rear, when he, too, got under the protection of the defences of Washington.

On the 17th of September the Union and Confederate armies again confronted each other at Antietam,—this time the Federal forces in command of "Little Mac," who had been reinstated. That part of the line in front of "Bloody Lane" was assigned to the Irish Brigade to carry. The brigade was in this order: Sixty-ninth New York, Twenty-ninth Massachusetts, Sixty-third New York, and Eighty-eighth New York. The losses of the brigade in this battle were fearful, but they captured the position held by the enemy. The total loss of the Sixty-third here was 202 out of 341 brought into action—35 killed, 165 wounded, 2 missing. No less than 5 officers were killed in front of Bloody Lane, and 16 men fell successively while carrying the colors.

An exciting incident occurred on the 16th. The Sixty-third was supporting a German battery on our extreme left, before the infantry was engaged. On an opposite hill the Confederates also had a battery, and an incessant cannonade was kept up. At times it was round shot; then again bomb-shells were thrown. The infantry was a few rods in front, down the slope, on the edge of a corn-field, the men lying down. A twenty-pound shell was thrown by the enemy. It fell short, struck in front of the guns, but did not explode. It commenced rolling slowly down the hill, directly for the centre of the Sixty-third line, the fuse burning. The men all saw it, but could do nothing. Not a man spoke, but that dreaded Rebel messenger of death continued to roll. It came right on until it struck the foot of Sergt. Matthew Hart, of Company K (an Albany boy), who like the rest was lying on his face. It stopped. Moments of intense agony followed for every man and officer in the regiment, but still that stranger said not a word. The fuse failed to reach the powder. There was rejoicing in that regiment for the rest of the day.

On the 12th of December, 1862, Burnside's army forced its way across the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg. They drove the enemy out of the houses and through the streets. Lee held the heights back of the city. The same day a committee of New York citizens arrived with two sets of colors for the Sixty-third and the other New York regiments, their old flags being nearly all shot away. A caterer with a sumptuous spread had accompanied them. The only theatre in the place was confiscated, where the collation was laid out. Many of the leading officers of the Right Grand Division were guests. The

wants of the inner man were first looked after, when the presentation was made in due form. General Meagher responded, and had hardly concluded when cannonading was heard on the heights. Presently shells commenced to burst all around the banquet hall, and several round shot struck the same. Confusion reigned around the dinner tables, and in short order the place was deserted, when it presented an array of empty seats, champagne bottles, and other *et ceteras* of a feast. The enemy noticed the assembling of so many officers in that particular spot, suspected some scheme was being concocted, and took measures to break up the gathering, which they effectually did.

December 13, 1862, the Sixty-third participated in the battle of Fredericksburg, under Burnside. It took into action 100 men and 18 officers, under command of Maj. Joseph O'Neill. In charging up the heights O'Neill was badly wounded in the arm, the brigade at the time being under a heavy artillery fire. Capt. P. J. Condon assumed the command after the disabling of the major.

War histories have graphically described this onslaught of the Right Grand Division of the Union Army on the Confederate works. They were natural heights in the shape of a crescent, mostly wooded, over two miles in extent. From base to summit Lee had his artillery planted behind redoubts, his infantry occupying every available spot, lying securely behind breastworks. At the base of the heights, in a sunken road, was a stout stone wall, five feet high, behind which lay several lines of riflemen, besides numerous field guns. On the plain beyond, out of sight and in no danger, was massed the superb infantry of the Army of Northern Virginia. Had Sumner's troops succeeded in forcing this impregnable wall of steel they had to encounter the fresh battalions on the plain beyond. This was a task never before assigned to any army in the world's history, and it had but the inevitable ending — failure!

The Union artillery, on the bluff across the river, and on the plain behind the city, although well served, did but feeble execution, owing to the Rebel batteries being all protected.

Hancock's assault was made in brigade lines, French in the advance. When he had covered half the plain — a third of a mile in extent — French's command threw themselves on the ground, where they remained. Meagher's Brigade, in the order of the day, was to support French. In the rush up the slope French's men were overtaken, hugging the earth. Meagher's troops rushed on. From right, left, and centre, a plunging fire from the heights tore through their ranks. Canister shot, shrapnel, and shells ploughed the ground all round this devoted brigade, but they faltered not; they rushed on to their doom. Arriving a few rods from the famous stone wall sheets of flame from thousands of muskets, withheld until this moment, assaulted them. Men fell in groups along the entire front of those five regiments, until nothing remained but skeletons of companies.

The order was given: "Lie down and fire." Fortunately it came, or not a man or officer would have lived. The soldiers then loaded their pieces on their backs, turned over, and fired. This was a slow process, but still it did some execution.

"Here comes help, boys!" some one called out. Away in the rear, through the powder smoke, could be seen a thin blue line; it was Caldwell's Brigade, of

Hancock's Division. They came on nobly. The artillery of the enemy trained their guns on Caldwell. How his ranks were thinned! But they halted not until they reached Meagher's men, and then advanced a few paces beyond. Then the whole fury of the Rebel fire was concentrated on this veteran brigade. The dead were piled in heaps. It seemed as though not a soul could survive. Then the miserable remnant was ordered to retire, carrying their colors with them, and leaving the Irish Brigade where it lay, fighting. Our men, too, were soon ordered to go to the rear, where they suffered as much as in the advance, the field being still swept by a hurricane of iron and lead. The colors of the Sixty-third were torn into shreds and a canister shot shattered the staff. Color Sergeant Chambers (an Albany man) had his coat honey-combed with bullets and grape-shot, but he miraculously escaped.

Fredericksburg will forever stand as the monumental blunder of the commanding general. The Sixty-third, with the rest of the Right Grand Division, suffered heavily. In the famous charge on Marye's Heights it left 44 of the 118 men taken into action on the field — 1 officer and 1 enlisted man killed; 7 officers and 31 enlisted men wounded; missing, 4.

On the morning of December 13, 1862, when Hancock's Division was drawn up in the streets of Fredericksburg, running parallel to the Rappahannock River, the left of the Sixty-third rested on the dock. The commissioned officers of Company B were absent, sick and wounded. Capt. Joseph O'Neill was in command of the Sixty-third. He made an order detailing Lieut. John Dwyer, of Company K, temporarily, to command Company B.

Just before the brigade moved off to charge the enemy's works, Lieut. J. D. Brady, formerly adjutant, came to the front of Company B and remarked:

"Lieutenant Dwyer, are you aware of the fact that my commission as first lieutenant antedates yours?"

"I am not aware of that fact, Lieutenant Brady. What if it does?"

"Then I should be in command of this company as your senior. I just came from Captain O'Neill, and convinced him what I say is true, and he desired me to see you and ascertain your wishes, as he had assigned you to this company. Do you wish to see the captain?"

The officer addressed said it was immaterial to him whether he was in command or not; he had been assigned without his knowledge; he would see the commanding officer. Brady and Dwyer waited on the latter, when the correctness of Brady's statement was apparent. O'Neill then directed Dwyer to go back to his own company, and Brady took command.

An hour later, when the brigade was charging up the heights, exposed to a withering fire from cannon and musketry, the wounded were streaming to the rear. While getting his men up into the battle line Dwyer met his friend Brady staggering and making his way as best he could to the shelter of the town. A crimson streak of blood ran down his face from a wound in the forehead, a bullet having struck him a glancing blow between the eyes. A word of recognition passed between them.

Dwyer supposed that was the end of Brady, but it was not. The latter was sent to a hospital at Washington, and was back again within a few weeks, ready for duty, after his close call from instant death.

"Lieutenant Dwyer!" was Brady's salutation the day he arrived in camp, "Why did you not insist on commanding Company B that day in the streets of Fredericksburg? Had you done so, and staid with the company you would have stopped that Rebel bullet instead of me."

"Oh, you insisted on your 'rights,'" was the reply, "and you got them."

Back to the old camps at Falmouth after the evacuation of Fredericksburg, where the regiment's numerical strength was increased by the return of sick and wounded soldiers.

On the 26th of April, 1863, the movement under Hooker began, preliminary to the battle of Chancellorsville. The object was to get in the rear of Lee's army in Fredericksburg. To accomplish this, one-half of Hooker's force was held in front of Fredericksburg, and the remainder effected a crossing at fords up the river. The Union general's plan of campaign proved abortive, and after severe fighting he was compelled to recross the Rappahannock, May 6th, losing in the campaign 1,512 killed; 9,518 wounded; missing, 5,000; total, 16,030. The Sixty-third lost 6 in killed and wounded.

On Sunday, May 3d, the Sixty-third, with the rest of the brigade, distinguished itself in saving the Fifth Maine Battery, near the Chancellorsville House. It was exposed to a destructive fire, but the guns were nobly worked until every officer and man were killed and wounded; but Corp. H. Lebroke and one private remained. The horses were all killed. The two brave cannoniers, seeing there was no prospect of saving the guns, blew up the caissons. Volunteers were called for by General Meagher, when the whole command (less than 600) rushed forward; at the same time the Rebels made a charge to seize the guns. Meagher's men halted, gave them a volley, seized the ropes, and hauled the guns to a place of safety, getting a rousing cheer for the brave act from their comrades of the First Division.

General Hancock authorized Meagher to command the retreat, and his brigade held the rear, the Sixty-third holding the post of honor — the left — which was commanded by Capt. P. J. Condon.

During the spring of 1863, there being no prospect of recruiting the New York regiments of the brigade, to make good the losses from casualties in battle, it was decided to consolidate the three regiments into a battalion of six companies. This was accordingly done, and in June the supernumerary officers of the Sixty-third and the other two New York regiments were mustered out. General Meagher, previous to this, asked leave to resign, as his brigade no longer had an existence except in name. On the march to Gettysburg the supernumerary officers took their leave from their comrades, the parting being an affecting one. They had fought and suffered together through all the fortunes of war from the day they first broke camp in front of Washington to the present, and only a handful of their brave comrades now were present for duty. Those remaining alive a year from that time were "few and far between."

At the Wheatfield at Gettysburg, the remnant of the old brigade acted their part nobly. The three monuments erected to the memory of their dead tell their mute but undying story. Of the 80 men in the two companies of the Sixty-third brought into the fight, 23 were put hors-de-combat. But 57,

alone, remained of the gallant regiment when Gettysburg was won, "present and accounted for."

The Sixty-third entered the Wilderness campaign, May, 1864, with the Army of the Potomac, the ranks having been recruited by the addition of three new full companies, C, D and E, recruited in New York and Brooklyn during the winter and spring. The old companies of the battalion, A and B, were also considerably augmented. In June, Company F (recruits) also were added. By the addition of recruits to the other four regiments—Sixty-ninth and Eighty-eighth New York, Twenty-eighth Massachusetts and One hundred and sixteenth Pennsylvania, the brigade attained, numerically, its original strength, or nearly so.

From the opening of the campaign in May, 1864, through all the battles to Petersburg, the Sixty-third was constantly on duty, the battalion being commanded by Maj. Thomas Touhy (who died May 30, 1864, of wounds received in action in the Wilderness), and subsequently by Col. James D. Brady. It participated in all the vicissitudes and successes of the Second Corps, until the final victory at Appomattox, and the surrender of Lee in April, 1865. In July, 1865, the remnant was mustered out at Hart's Island, N. Y., and honorably discharged.

This is how Sergeant Sheridan stopped a Rebel "punkin:" The regiment was getting into position under direction of Colonel Brady, preparatory to making a charge. There was a hill between us and the enemy, the Sixty-third a few rods down the slope. A round shot fired from a Rebel battery struck the brow of the hill, and came ricocheting down the incline. It came for Company G, but was almost spent.

"Boys, let's stop the Rebel 'punkin,'" said Sergeant Sheridan, and he attempted to give the stranger a vigorous kick. He was successful. When he recovered an hour later, after lying under the shade of an oak tree, his first exclamation was: "Oh, Docther, did I sthop the d——d 'Rebel punkin?'" He was told he certainly did. "Thin oi'm satisfied!" Poor Sheridan had his leg broken, and it finished his soldiering days in the Sixty-third for the rest of the war.

In Colonel Fox's work on "Regimental Losses," the Sixty-third is classed with the "Three Hundred Fighting Regiments," and its losses are officially given thus: Killed or mortally wounded, officers, 15; enlisted men, 141; total, 156. Died of disease, accidents, etc., officers, 1; enlisted men, 62; total, 63. Died in Confederate prisons, enlisted men, 16. Total deaths, 249. Percentage of killed during service, 11 per cent. The total enrollment was 1,411. Total casualties, killed, wounded and missing, 657.

Discretion is always "the better part of valor." While holding the dearly-bought and bloody salient at Spotsylvania, and the Rebels massing for a last desperate charge for its recapture, Corporal O'Neil of Company D got his fighting blood up. His comrades were hugging the earth waiting for the onslaught of the enemy. Not so, the corporal. He jumped to the top of the breast-work of logs and earth and yelled at the top of his voice: "We have licked you before, you blankety, blanked Rebs, and we can do it again. Come on! We are ready for you!" The last words were hardly uttered when smack

came a bullet from a sharpshooter perched in a tree. It struck the enthusiastic Galway man in the mouth, which sent him to grass like a flash. As he was borne to the rear, his mouth filled with gore, he shook his fist at the Johnnies and yelled back, "I'll pay you for that some day!"

It is officially announced that the regiment participated in these battles: Yorktown, Va.; Fair Oaks, Va.; Seven Days' Battle, Va.; Gaines' Mill, Va.; Peach Orchard, Va.; Savage Station, Va.; White Oak Swamp, Va.; Malvern Hill, Va.; Antietam, Md.; Fredericksburg, Va.; Chancellorsville, Va.; Gettysburg, Pa.; Bristoe Station, Va.; Wilderness, Va.; Spotsylvania, Va.; Po River, Va.; North Anna, Va.; Totopotomoy, Va.; Cold Harbor, Va.; Siege of Petersburg, Va.; Deep Bottom, Va.; Reams' Station, Va.; Sailor's Creek, Va.; Farmville, Va.; Mine Run, Va.; Strawberry Plains, Va.; Boydton Road, Va.; Hatcher's Run, Va.; Appomattox, Va.

We will conclude this sketch with an incident that occurred between the lines, which, probably, had not its counterpart in the whole war. Also with one selection of poetry from the "Poet of the Sixty-third."

Private Michael DeLacy did his share in crushing the Rebellion by a conspicuous act of heroism, in this way: June 18, 1864, a bloody assault was made on the enemy's works along the lines in front of Petersburg. Tons of shot and shell were rained on the enemy's works. The compliment was returned. In the afternoon, Grant's infantry columns emerged from their covering, and made a desperate assault, to be hurled back after effecting a lodgment in many places, leaving the ground littered with the Union dead and dying. The Federals were not discouraged, but they were desperate at the loss of many brave comrades.

In the centre of the Union line the Sixty-third held one of the chain of forts, closer than usual to the Confederates. The latter were exultant, and did everything to aggravate their Yankee opponents. The day following the unsuccessful assault, Private DeLacy of Company G could stand it no longer. He was in an advance rifle pit with six other comrades. Before nightfall, after enduring the taunts of the Rebels for several hours, he called out to the men in the nearest rifle pit on the other side: "Say, Johnnies? You are a low-lived lot of spalpeens. You face the Yankees in the open, and we'll knock the devil out of yees. We can lick yees every time."

Thus spoke DeLacy. A voice from the Rebel rifle pit came with this rejoinder: "Do you hear the Yankee-Irishman! Go soak your head, Pat! You keep still or we'll send a niggah after you!"

"I won't fight your nagur, but I will and can whip the best man in your measly gang. You infernal slave drivers; meet me half way and I'll show yees!"

"Agreed, Yank, come on!"

"Do you mane it? Bring your gun and bayonet! Man agin man! No shootin," spoke up Michael, and he jumped from the pit. A stalwart Rebel did the same, bayonet fixed. By common consent the pickets on both sides popped their heads over the slight protection of earth to witness the singular combat. Yank and Johnny deliberately marched towards each other at "charge bayonet." When within a few paces they halted. Michael first spoke:

"Now thin, prove yourself a man, you d——d Rebel!"

"I'll show you, you green Yankee-Irishman," came from the man in gray. At it they went. They moved in a circle, the points of the bayonets touching each other. It was certain death for one or both, and they felt it. The spectators on either side kept up a constant shout of approval for their respective friends.

The suspense was becoming painful, while the combatants went round and round, glaring at each other, with vengeance in their eyes. Suddenly the butternut made a lunge at his opponent, expecting to dispatch him with a desperate thrust, aimed at his heart. The man in blue nimbly jumped to his left, and before his enemy could recover himself from his effort the butt of Michael's musket took him in the chin, delivered with the strength of an ox. Mr. Rebel staggered from the force of the blow, and fell full length on his back, his gun going into the air. In an instant DeLacy's foot was on his neck, his fixed bayonet pointed at his heart, where he held it for a moment.

"Now, Rebel, who is the best man, Yankee or Johnny?"

"You've won, Yank, and I give up."

"Thin you larn to behave yourself, and remember a Yankee-Irishman can fight and be generous too. If you are not satisfied, send on your nagurs!"

With that the Sixty-third man threw his cap in the air, caught it on the point of his bayonet, and marched back to his dugout with the air of a Roman conqueror. The soldiers on both sides gave him a rousing cheer, after which the shooting of the pickets was again resumed. It is proper to say here that the victor after that day was borne on the rolls as "Sergeant" Michael DeLacy, an honor he honestly and bravely won.

Dr. Lawrence Reynolds, surgeon of the Sixty-third, was a born poet. He stood deservedly high in his profession as a surgeon. In the beginning of Grant's campaign, Col. Thomas A. Smyth, of the First Delaware, was transferred to the command of the Irish Brigade, temporarily. His daring and soldierly qualities endeared him to every man in the brigade. His departure from the command called forth the verses below by the talented surgeon of the Sixty-third, to show the esteem in which he was held. Sad to tell, General Smyth was killed two days before Lee's surrender while leading his men in a charge. His early death was universally regretted by every officer and man in the First Division.

TOM SMYTH OF THE IRISH BRIGADE.

Must friendship be strengthened by time?

Is the growth of affection so slow?

Ah, no, 'tis a feeling sublime,

Like the sun bursting forth in full glow;

Though few are the days you are here,

Your memory never shall fade;

For no one on earth is more dear

Than "Smyth of the Irish Brigade."

the Sixty-third and Eighty-eighth Volunteers from New York State, Twenty-eighth Massachusetts from Boston, and the One hundred and sixteenth Pennsylvania from Philadelphia. There were also two batteries of artillery organized — Hogan's and McMahon's — that served to the end of the war. The numerical designation assigned to the Sixty-ninth was given in order to indicate its identity with the militia regiment from which it originated, and which had won distinction at the battle of Bull Run.

The regiment passed through Philadelphia and Baltimore on its way to Washington, where it encamped for a short time on Meridian Hill. It was then assigned to the division of Maj. Gen. E. V. Sumner, which was stationed at Camp California, on the Little River Turnpike, a short distance west of Alexandria, Va. The regiment was joined soon after by the Eighty-eighth New York, and, later, by the Sixty-third.

The brigade was commanded by Col. Robert Nugent, of the Sixty-ninth, up to March, 1862, when Gen. Thomas Francis Meagher was assigned to its command. It was engaged in drilling, guard duty in camp, and picket duty at Edsall's Hill, up to about March 10, 1862, when we broke camp and marched to Union Mills, Centreville, Manassas, and to the Rappahannock River, where, after a skirmish with the enemy, we returned to Camp California. We then marched to Alexandria, where we embarked on the steamer Ocean Queen, and were taken to Fortress Monroe, arriving there the night after the attack of the Rebel ram Merrimac on the frigates Cumberland and Congress. Early in the morning our steamer proceeded to Pohick Creek, or Ship Point, where we disembarked and marched to Yorktown.

The regiment was assigned to duty with the Engineer Brigade, General Woodbury, and was employed in the construction of a mortar battery, in making gabions, fascines, etc.; also on guard and picket duty. After the evacuation of Yorktown we moved with the division up the Peninsula, passing Yorktown, Williamsburg, White House Landing and St. Peter's Church. We crossed the Chickahominy River at Grapevine Bridge on the afternoon of May 31, 1862, and marched to the battlefield of Seven Pines. Were engaged at the Battle of Fair Oaks, June 1, 1862.

June 1st to 26th we were on picket, guard, and other duties. On June 26th, in the afternoon, the brigade moved on the double-quick to Gaines' Mill, to the relief of General Porter. June 27th, recrossed the Chickahominy, and back to camp at Fair Oaks. June 28th, the army marched towards the James River, leaving the Sixty-ninth Regiment, under command of Col. Robert Nugent, as an advanced picket in extended order to occupy and hold the position while the army was retiring. Colonel Nugent, with his regiment, held this position until long after the last of our troops had retired, and then, when the ruse was discovered by the enemy, successfully withdrew his men in time to escape capture and rejoined the brigade.

Engaged in actions at Peach Orchard, Savage Station, and other points; crossed White Oak Swamp at night, and halted at Nelson's Farm next morning; during the day was in line of battle, under fire, supporting the artillery who were resisting the attempts of the enemy to cross the Chickahominy River; in the afternoon marched to Charles City Cross Roads, and engaged the

enemy; marched to Malvern Hill, arriving there July 1st; engaged in the battle at that place, the fighting extending into the night; our losses there were very severe; marched to Harrison's Landing and went into camp in a very heavy rain; troops all drenched; encamped here with usual drills, guard, and picket duty.

August 5th. Went on a reconnoissance to near Malvern Hill; skirmished with the enemy and returned to camp. August 11th. Broke camp and marched southeast, passing through Charles City Court House to the Chickahominy River, where we crossed on a pontoon bridge; passed through Williamsburg to Newport News, where we embarked on transports; were landed at Aquia Creek on the Potomac River; marched to Falmouth, Va.; received orders within one hour after arrival, and marched to Alexandria; thence to Arlington Heights, Falls Church, Fairfax Court House, and Centreville.

Marched with the rear guard on the retirement of the army to Washington, crossing the Potomac at Chain Bridge; marched to Tennallytown, Rockville and Frederick City, Md., alternately in line of battle, and advancing westerly; in the advance with the cavalry, crossing South Mountain at South Pass the morning after General Reno was killed; skirmished through Boonsboro and up to a point near Antietam Creek; assigned to support the battery of twenty-four-pounder howitzers on a hill, on the west side of the Sharpsburg Road and near Antietam Creek.

September 17th. Left knapsacks in camp and marched to and crossed the Antietam at a farm ford. Took position on a hill on the southwest side of the creek, in line of battle; were moved to the left and put into action in front of the sunken road. General Richardson, commanding our division, was mortally wounded in the line near the regiment; Gen. W. S. Hancock succeeded to the command of the division. The losses in the brigade were very heavy. In the regiment 201 were killed and wounded out of 320 officers and men taken into action; no men missing.

September 20th. Marched to and crossed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry; marched to Bolivar Heights and encamped; drill and picket duty; marched with the division on a reconnoissance to Halltown and Charlestown, Va., and returned to our camp on Bolivar Heights. Broke camp November 5, 1862; marched to Falmouth, Va., passing through Warrenton, Rectorstown and Manassas Gap; arrived at Falmouth November 17th, and went into camp, as we supposed, for the winter. Many officers were here detailed to go North for recruits.

Preparations being made for an advance, we crossed the Rappahannock in front of Fredericksburg on pontoons under fire. On December 12th the regiment was presented with a beautiful stand of colors, in the opera-house in Fredericksburg. December 13th engaged in the battle and assault on Marye's Heights, where the loss in the brigade was very heavy. The men of the Irish Brigade wore sprigs of boxwood in their hats; during a flag of truce, ordered to enable both parties to bury the dead, with which the entire field was covered,—the Union details being under command of Gen. John R. Brooke,—the dead found nearest the stone wall and in the advance were those who wore the boxwood in their hats. One of the color bearers of the Sixty-ninth was

found dead, and near by the staff of the regimental color. On examination the flag was found buttoned up inside of the dead color bearer's blouse, and, with its staff, was recovered. Back to camp at Falmouth, with picketing on the river, guard duty, and drilling through the winter.

April 30, 1863. Marched to Banks' Ford; May 1st, marched to United States Ford and crossed the river there; engaged in the battle of Chancellorsville; returned to camp at Falmouth, and resumed picket duty on the river. Here occurred the resignation of our brigade commander, Gen. Thomas Francis Meagher.

Owing to the small number of men present for duty in the three New York regiments of the brigade (Sixty-ninth, Sixty-third and Eighty-eighth), the result of casualties in the field, each of these regiments was consolidated into a battalion of two companies, each to have but one field officer, with the proper proportion of staff and company officers; all supernumerary officers were mustered out and sent home by order of the War Department.

Broke camp in the latter part of June, 1863; marched with the division to and crossed the Potomac River; thence to Monocacy Junction, Md., and then in one continuous march to Gettysburg, Pa., arriving there in the night of July 1st; engaged in battle at the Wheatfield, near the foot of Little Round Top, on July 2d; when formed in line of battle, the left of the regiment was joined by the right of the Fourth United States Infantry; after this action we returned to the position first occupied, which we held during Pickett's charge on July 3d.

Marched with the army to and recrossed the Potomac River; through Loudoun Valley, Culpeper Court House, Cedar Mountain, Rapidan Station, and other points; in action at Auburn Ford and Bristoe Station; participated in the Mine Run campaign, and then recrossed the Rapidan and went into camp near Brandy Station, under orders received from the War Department, relative to Veteran Enlistment Act. The regiment re-enlisted under that act for three years or the war, and it is believed that it was among the first, if not the first regiment in the army to do so. In accordance with orders the Sixty-ninth received a thirty-days' furlough and proceeded to New York City, arriving there January 2, 1864. The regiment returned to the field largely recruited by new members and convalescents. It resumed camp duties, new recruits being constantly received, owing to the interest in the regiment taken by our late colonel, Robert Nugent, then captain, U. S. A., and mustering officer in New York City.

On May 4, 1864, we crossed the Rapidan at Germanna Ford; May 6th, and afterwards, marching, battles and skirmishing with the enemy every day; May 11th, night march in front of the enemy's intrenched position at Spotsylvania, which was assaulted at daybreak, May 12th, and carried with great slaughter, the brigade participating; many thousands of prisoners and twenty guns captured; continually engaged in advanced and close range picket duty, so severe that the men could be relieved only after night. May 18th, stormed and carried another line of the enemy's intrenchments in rear of the one carried on the 12th instant. Moved to North Anna River, May 22d; engaged at Totopotomoy Creek, May 27th; on June 3d the Battle of Cold Harbor, with severe losses;

crossed the James River on pontoon bridge, and engaged in the battles and assaults on the enemy's works at Petersburg, June 16th and 17th; many casualties occurred in carrying the works; Col. Patrick Kelly, commanding brigade, and many officers and men killed and wounded; continually advancing and skirmishing with the enemy; engaged June 22d, afterwards intrenching, with usual picket and guard duty; participated with the division in all its marches and engagements, including the battles at Strawberry Plains and Deep Bottom, on the north side of the James River; August 25th, engaged at Reams' Station on the Weldon Railroad; losses very heavy. More recruits arriving, the regiment was entitled to its full complement of companies and officers.

Capt. James E. McGee was promoted to be lieutenant colonel, but resigned soon afterwards on account of disability. Capt. Richard Moroney was promoted major. Capt. Robert Nugent, of the Thirteenth United States Infantry, our former colonel, was recommissioned colonel and placed in command of the brigade, and many other old officers returned and were recommissioned. James J. Smith, formerly adjutant of the regiment, was commissioned as lieutenant colonel. Returning to duty he was mustered February 16, 1865, and assumed command of the regiment. The Sixty-ninth was engaged at Skinner's Farm, March 25, 1865, and participated also with the division in all its marches and battles at Hatcher's Run, Five Forks, Sutherland's Station, South Side Railroad, Amelia Springs, Farmville, and Appomattox. It was present at the surrender of General Lee and the Confederate forces, comprising the Army of Northern Virginia. It participated with the corps and division in the march to Washington, and in the Grand Review of the Army of the Potomac. Returning to New York it was mustered out at Hart's Island, New York Harbor, July 2, 1865.

The writer looks back to the days of the war with feelings of profound regret for the loss of the noble soldiers whose names are on the rolls of this grand old regiment; but this feeling is softened by the knowledge that their sacrifice was made for their country, and that at no time did the regiment, either in camp or field, fail to deserve the confidence or merit the approbation of their commanding general, or the friendship and esteem of their fellow soldiers of the army.

88TH REGIMENT INFANTRY.

HISTORICAL SKETCH BY CAPT. W. L. D. O'GRADY.*

The Eighty-eighth New York Volunteers of Meagher's Irish Brigade, sometimes styled the "Connaught Rangers" (from the British Regiment of Foot holding that number), the "Faugh a Ballaghs," the "Fourth Irish," which long appeared on the guidons, and "Mrs. Meagher's Own," was raised in the fall of 1861 by Brig. Gen. Thomas Francis Meagher, and rendezvoused at Fort Schuyler, on Long Island Sound. Their colors were presented to them

* Captain in the Eighty-eighth New York, and previously second lieutenant Royal Marines (Light Infantry), British army.

on November 18th by Mrs. Meagher, in front of the Archiepiscopal Palace on Madison Avenue, and late in December the regiment went to the front. The winter was spent in Camp California, near Alexandria, Va., with plenty of drill, picket duty and fun.

As a part of Richardson's Division in Sumner's Corps of the Army of the Potomac they proceeded on March 10, 1862, to investigate the deserted camps of the Rebels as far as Warrenton; then returned to Alexandria, and embarked for Yorktown and the Peninsular campaign. The regiment was armed with buck-and-ball muskets, as were the Sixty-third and Sixty-ninth New York; for General Meagher had a theory that most of our fighting would be at very close quarters. So it was; but sometimes our short-range weapons were a disadvantage. The baptism of fire came at Fair Oaks, where the splendid volleys of the brigade were conspicuous and effective.

It may be mentioned that the regiment was practically as alien as the old Irish Brigade in the French service, comparatively few being citizens by birth. Fully a third were old British soldiers, many of whom had seen service in the Crimean war and the Indian mutiny. One private had been a British officer, and a few spoke nothing but Gaelic when they enlisted from the very gates of Castle Garden. The officers at first were nearly all ex-officers or non-commissioned officers of the Sixty-ninth Militia, S. N. Y., who had smelt powder at First Bull Run. There was, therefore, a leaven of veteranism about the regiment at the start, and it was no wonder that their steadiness excited the warm appreciation of the grim old Sumner.

In the famous change of base on the Peninsula the regiment was hotly and frequently engaged. At Gaines' Mill they checked the rush of the enemy at nightfall. At Savage Station they were detached, under Maj. James Quinlan, to reinforce the Philadelphia Brigade of General Burns, which was hard pressed, and made a memorable charge on a battery which they captured, and held the ground as the last of the rear guard of the army for the second time in three days. Major (now Colonel) Quinlan got the Medal of Honor for his superb conduct on this occasion, as skillful as it was dashing, deploying at the double from quarter distance column on passing Burns' men, and charging home with a rush that was not to be denied. Their mettle was again tried at White Oak Swamp, and at Malvern Hill, where, after doing their full share in the action by day, the regiment got into a regular Donnybrook scrimmage at night, in which clubbed muskets were the favorite tools. The next morning General Sumner was invited to inspect a pile of broken muskets, and asked to order new ones, which excited an outburst of wrath, very profanely expressed, until he was made aware that the damage was not occasioned by stragglers disgracefully abandoning or spoiling their weapons, but because "the byes wint for the Rebs in the way they wor used to." The general never forgot this nor failed to remind us of the incident, adding more than once that he wagered his shoulder straps on us. We were certainly favorites with the old dragoon.

After recuperation at Harrison's Landing and the march to Newport News we embarked for Aquia Creek, packed like sardines, and so harassed had we been by incessant marching and fighting, that on a musket being accidentally

or otherwise discharged on another boat, two poor fellows who had been sleeping on one of the paddle-boxes, started up and stepped overboard, where they sank like stones. From Aquia Creek we went to Fredericksburg, crossing very gingerly in the first train over the wonderful trestle bridge erected by General Steinmetz over Potomac Creek with pine trees cut on the spot, lashed with ropes, to replace an iron structure destroyed by the enemy. Our stay was short, for we re-embarked the next day for Alexandria, and thence hurried to the music of the guns at Second Bull Run, and were in time to cover the retreat of the army which Pope had well-nigh destroyed. So tired were the men that they slept as they marched, waking up in a dazed way at the frequent halts occasioned by the numerous obstructions, such as dead mules and wagons in mudholes.

Then came the march in fine weather, through lovely Maryland and its peach and apple orchards towards Antietam. We left Frederick on September 14, 1862, and as we were crossing North Mountain, our restored commander, McClellan, dashed past us, and was greeted with such fervor that he kept waving his cap till out of sight. We had a glorious view of the battle of South Mountain as we were winding down the slopes on the other side of the valley. At nightfall we were deployed with bayonets fixed, and made a gallant charge over fences and ditches with sundry casualties to our front ranks from the harmful and decidedly unnecessary bayonets of the men behind till we brought up in a marsh—a most absurd exploit for which we could never fix the responsibility—where we camped for the night, or rather alternately squatted or walked about, as the mud was very wet, solacing ourselves with coffee.

Before daybreak on the 15th we were sent in advance to storm the heights, but found no enemies but dead ones. Then came the pursuit in hot haste, the Eighty-eighth ahead of the army, and we crossed the bridge at Keedysville as it was just beginning to blaze up, with the rear guard of the Johnnies just before us. All this time we had been gathering up Rebel stragglers and packing them to the rear. The Eighth Illinois Cavalry (a regiment with which we had so often been in company that we were collectively known as the three Eights) galloped past us, followed at a swinging pace by the Fifth New Hampshire, of our division, a splendid body of good shots with rifles. Under cover of this skirmishing we soon reached the outskirts of Sharpsburg, formed line and straightway went to sleep, to find, on being aroused, that a cannonade and skirmishing had been going on for a couple of hours, and that the neighborhood so scantily occupied at our arrival was thronged by dense masses of troops. We were moved a little to the right and there remained during the artillery duel of the 16th.

On Wednesday, September 17, 1862, General Meagher, gotten up most gorgeously in a somewhat fancy uniform, with a gold shoulder-belt, was carefully brushed by an orderly, and remarked that "we'd all have a brush soon." We had it. We forded the creek, by General Meagher's orders, taking off our shoes (those who could, many were barefoot, and some, like the writer, were so footsore that they had not been able to take off their shoes, or what remained of them, for a week), to wring out their socks, so as not to incumber the men in active movements, and every man was required to fill his canteen.

While not excellent as a tactician, General Meagher was most thoughtful of his men, and his magnetism in recruiting not only our brigade, but inducing the Irish to flock to the defence of the Union, was worth thousands of men. He was a victim of jealousy; and his men suffered too by coldness and lack of promotion, instead of receiving the recognition they had earned. The Eighty-eighth, for instance, had but one Medal of Honor man beside Colonel Quinlan, the late Captain Ford, who was allowed to die in poverty without a pension, though most grievously wounded, and on whose breast Lincoln himself had pinned the coveted decoration.

The bullets were whistling over us as we hurried past the general in fours, and at the double-quick formed right into line behind a fence. We were ordered to lie down while volunteers tore down the fence, and some with rifles, for which they had surreptitiously exchanged their muskets, picked off some sharpshooters in trees. Then, up on our feet, we charged. The Bloody Lane was the witness of the efficacy of buck-and-ball at close quarters. We cleared that and away beyond, leaving on the ground a lot of flags which we were too busy to pick up, for the capture (?) of which Medals of Honor were freely bestowed on the men of another regiment, whose commander was an able performer on the trumpet of self-laudation. When our ammunition was exhausted, Caldwell's Brigade relieved us, the companies breaking into fours for the passage as if on parade, as specially reported by General McClellan, who was watching our steady, unwavering advance through field-glasses. When we got ammunition we returned to the front. By some misunderstanding, part of the Sixty-third New York with their colors were massed on our right for a few minutes, during which our two right companies, C and F, were simply slaughtered, suffering a third of the entire casualties of the regiment. We were always proud of Antietam.

Our next affair was the failure — more glorious for us, perhaps, than a victory, in which our behavior received the commendation of foes as well as friends, and the story is embodied in the histories supplied to the children in our public schools,—at Fredericksburg. Here, in the absence of our new green flags (the old ones torn by shot and shell having been sent to New York), which were lying in boxes at Falmouth Depot, and in honor of the presentation of which, with the true Hibernian spirit a banquet was held in the outskirts of the town, we were decorated by General Meagher and his staff with sprigs of boxwood, while he harangued each regiment separately, giving us the idea we were on a forlorn hope, and that we should be engaged in street fighting with batteries to storm. The actual conflict was not exactly this way, but it sufficed to nearly annihilate us. We crossed the Rappahannock, after a cold night in the open air on the 11th, in the morning of the 12th with the frost so hard that Captain (afterwards General) Burke consolingly remarked that the ricochet shots would be bound to hit all that were otherwise missed. Some lives were saved by breastplates of plug tobacco, garnered from sunken barges, a luxury which, owing to the several months' arrears of pay, had become exceedingly scarce and correspondingly precious. The night was remarkable for a wonderfully brilliant aurora borealis, which was supplemented by the flames of the burning town and the glowing trains of bursting shells.

The morning of the 13th was foggy and cold, which made it worse for the wounded, who could not drag themselves from the field. The oft-told story of that fatal day need not be repeated here. But, it may be stated with emphasis, despite the contrary statements made by two prolific writers of Massachusetts, that, on official authority, the dead found nearest the stone wall at Marye's Heights wore the boxwood of the Irish Brigade; that the two nearest of all were Maj. William Horgan and Adjutant Young, of the Eighty-eighth New York; and that the nearest man who got out alive (with three wounds) is truthfully reported on page 322 of "Field, Fort and Fleet, by M. Quad," as having fired six shots with careful deliberation and fatal execution after the withering hail of shot had swept away every living thing from his neighborhood.

At our next inspection by General Hancock, one company presented seven men. A solitary private, standing at company distance in the column, was angrily accosted by the general, who wanted to know "Why the etc. he didn't parade with his company?" The convincing reply was that "This is all *my* company, sir." In truth we were shattered, and while other troops were allowed to go home on short furloughs to recruit, the unhappy dislike entertained by Stanton for Meagher and ourselves operated to keep us in this condition. And we had to do our full brigade picket duty, which meant forty-eight hours at a stretch every alternate day for several weeks.

Gradually, convalescents rejoined us, but it was not until the further losses at Chancellorsville that the absurdity of a regimental organization under such conditions became too palpable to be overlooked. At that miserable fiasco, the Eighty-eighth was separated from the brigade during most of the fighting, and even all the regiment was not together. Suddenly detailed as part of a baggage guard, with the Fifth New Hampshire and Eighty-first Pennsylvania, under Colonel Cross, of the Fifth New Hampshire, we left behind us a large detachment with several officers, including the adjutant, on picket at Banks' Ford, where they remained and were entangled in Sedgwick's struggle. The rest of us never saw any baggage, but held the front of Hancock's Division on the 2d and 3d of May, 1863.

We were rushed about from one side to the other of the salient in front of the Chancellor Mansion, under the worst cross-fire of shells we were ever under; were abused as "cowards" by General Geary, while we were quietly waiting for his division to finish their hurried retreat over our bodies to allow us to open fire, for which he was nearly bayoneted by a sergeant whose weapon the writer struck aside, and General Hancock, who was with us, savagely informed Geary that, "I command here;" then, from literally the last ditch, where the Rebels got at us with the bayonet, the Eighty-eighth were the very last troops of the army in front of the Chancellor House, incidentally taking off the last gun of the Fifth Maine Battery, the wheel-team of which was alone able to stir. This team was mounted by Sergt. John Sparks, an old regular, and the gun saved. The sergeant was so injured that he did not rejoin the regiment for a year. By an extraordinary coincidence we found it was the Irish Brigade we fell among, and among them they had saved the rest of the battery. It was here the One hundred and sixteenth Pennsylvania, under Major (now General) Mulholland, won its numerous Medals of

Honor, richly deserved; but there are others who did not get them. Cringing in the woods, disgusted with the imbecility that put us on the defensive, tormented by sharpshooters, pelted by rain, lying in trenches filled by the storm,—even the horrible night march through fathomless mud and treacherous stumps to the swollen river, and thence to our old dismantled camp at Falmouth, seemed a relief.

The brigade was reduced to a skeleton, and Meagher resigned. His farewell on May 19, 1863, was touching. The brigade was drawn up in a hollow square to receive his address, at the close of which he bade an individual farewell to every officer. Col. Patrick Kelly succeeded to the command. He was a father to the brigade, as he was always to his own regiment, a brave, gentle, splendid soldier. The three New York regiments were now reduced to two companies each, and the superfluous officers mustered out. This was not encouraging to those who went or those who stayed. The different policy pursued in the Twenty-eighth Massachusetts and One hundred and sixteenth Pennsylvania made it the more galling. As a second lieutenant I had a Twenty-eighth Massachusetts sergeant under me on picket; was under his command as first lieutenant the week after; and found him field officer of the day after Gettysburg.

We left our old winter camps on June 13, 1863, for a long and tortuous march, including a considerable deviation to Thoroughfare Gap, where some trifling skirmishing took place, and brought up at Gettysburg on the night of July 1st. Our "butcher's bill" was not imposing there, but we managed to lose a third of our few men, and captured twice as many prisoners as we took men in, during the struggle in the Wheatfield on the 2d. So, though the battle of Gettysburg is not one our brigade is proudest of, for many of our bravest and best were not there, the little contingent present did its share to maintain the glories of the earlier days. And the absolution under fire by our chaplain, who hasn't received a Medal of Honor (Father William Corby, now the Right Rev. General C. S. C., Notre Dame University, Notre Dame, Indiana),* is, perhaps, the most picturesque as well as solemn of any incident of the war, and one of the best known.

In the fall raid of Lee we came in for the opening of the brisk little surprise at Auburn, on October 14, 1863, where Stuart, who had been sandwiched during the night between our marching columns, spoilt our breakfast on "Coffee Hill" with his artillery, when, to show our steadiness, we went through the manual and gave General Warren a marching salute in great shape. Later, on the same day, at Bristoe Station, the Eighty-eighth, who had been flankers for the First Division, Second Corps, all day, and sharply engaged at the halt, was left after nightfall as extreme rear guard; but the regiment stole softly away in the darkness, and then stretching out at a rapid gait, caught up with the rest.

The Mine Run campaign, from November 24th to December 5th, gave us some more marching and picket duty in weather so unseasonably cold, that with sentries relieved every half hour, some men were actually frozen to death on post. We didn't fire a shot. Then came the veteranizing, when nearly all

*Recently deceased.

the men re-enlisted for the war. We had a month's furlough in New York city; bounties abounded; the officers banqueted the men at Irving Hall, where Meagher delivered perhaps the best of all his speeches; and recruits were gathered in so that we were again expanded to ten companies.

Capt. Denis F. Burke succeeded Colonel Kelly in command of the regiment, which did its duty under Grant in the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, Totopotomoy, Cold Harbor, Petersburg, Deep Bottom, Reams' Station,—where a number were captured, which gave Lieutenants Granger and Wall a chance to honor their regiment in an unusual way by the superb skill and gallantry displayed in a marvelous escape from Columbia, S. C.,—Boydton Road, and the hard but exhilarating chase to be in at the death of the Rebellion, from Sailor's Creek to Appomattox.

To name, with even brief mention of their idiosyncrasies, the gallant officers, and those more especially distinguished of the rank and file of the regiment, would not only take much space but be invidious, and, at this distance of time, the deficiencies of memory might, by unintended omission, inflict injustice on the deserving and pain the relatives who are proud of them. In general terms it may be said that the regiment was one of "300 fighting regiments," and that its health was good, the percentage of loss by sickness being extremely low, thus betokening military stamina and cheerfulness. It was certainly a cheerful regiment, playing cards under fire, joking while actually engaged in file firing, and in camp ready for anything from a snowball fight to tossing pie peddlers in blankets, or driving a mule in full uniform into the colonel's tent. In the St. Patrick's Day functions, begun with the solemn celebration of high mass, with all the imposing ceremonies possible in a camp and continued with unique festivities, which attracted the whole army (what a scattering there was of generals and everybody else at Falmouth, March 17, 1863, when the guns of the cavalry fight at Brandy Station were heard), they held their own.

They were a well-drilled regiment, with clean brasses and muskets, even if they hadn't been able to wash for a week. They had no idea of being second to any other in anything. For instance, at Stevensburg, in December, 1863, when the disagreeable work of building log and brush bridges was pretty generally shirked, the Eighty-eighth, at the desire of an officer for whom they had some regard, turned to and built a wooden bridge, staked and picketed in the most approved fashion, the best by far ever built by the Army of the Potomac, and it undoubtedly exists to this day. Mention might be made of our two mascots: "Fan," a little slut decorated with a silver collar for many wounds, and "Big Mary" Gordon, one of the jolliest and handsomest of young Irishwomen, a very practical cantiniere, whose little husband minded the colonel's famous horse, "Faugh a Ballagh," while she washed his shirts and those of several other officers whom she favored.

Above all, while they loved the Green Flag of Erin, whence they sprung, they upheld with devoted, undying affection and loyalty the Stars and Stripes of America, the country of their adoption.





J. B. LYON PRINT.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

64TH NEW YORK INFANTRY.

In the woods on the ridge south of and beyond the Wheatfield.

(INSCRIPTIONS.)

(Front.)

64TH N. Y. INFANTRY,
4TH BRIGADE | SECOND
1ST DIVISION | CORPS. .

JULY 2ND 1863.

(Reverse.)

CASUALTIES,

KILLED,

OFFICERS 4,

ENLISTED MEN 11, TOTAL 15.

WOUNDED,

OFFICERS 7,

ENLISTED MEN 57, TOTAL 64.

MISSING,

ENLISTED MEN 19

TOTAL 98.

DEDICATION OF MONUMENT.

64TH NEW YORK INFANTRY — "CATTARAUGUS REGIMENT."

July 2, 1890.

ORATION OF GEN. WILLIAM GLENNY.

COMRADES AND VETERANS OF THE SIXTY-FOURTH REGIMENT, N. Y. VOLS.,
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

When informed by the chairman of your committee of arrangements, for the dedication of this monument to the memory of our dead comrades, that I had been chosen to deliver the oration upon this occasion, it was a matter of surprise to me, having previously indicated my inability to be present at that meeting, and almost certain impossibility of being here at the time set for the occasion. Furthermore it must have been apparent to you that to do justice to the memory of our fallen braves, and recount, even in a small degree, the heroism, individual, and collective, of the Sixty-fourth Regiment New York Volunteers, required an orator of elegant diction and eloquent power. However, the most humble veteran who bore his part of the aggregate service, and filled his place as one of the component numbers of this organization, though not versed in poetry or prose, can relate a history eloquent with meaning and unsurpassed by valorous deeds.

Comrades, we have come together and meet here on this historic field on this twenty-seventh anniversary of the battle of Gettysburg to dedicate a monument to the memory of those of our number, who in order that our Government and its institutions might live and be perpetuated, gave here as the price, their lives, their all. And the ground whereon we stand is sacred to their memory, made so, by having here freely yielded up their lives.

Among the great number who served in the war for the Union, and where each did so much, and each performed so well his part, it is hardly possible for every individual, or even every organization, to receive its just and merited praise. So we shall be excusable if we become our own historian and make mention of a few of the many honorable and brave deeds of our command.

We need have no fear and may feel at liberty to ask the question: "Has the Sixty-fourth New York Volunteers a record?" Let us for a few moments contemplate its personnel.

The basis of its formation was a militia regiment of eight companies from the counties of Cattaraugus and Allegany, under command of Col. Thomas J. Parker, which was accepted by the State as volunteers and allowed to retain its original number. It was filled by two companies of volunteers, one each from Ithaca and Owego, and recruited to a little over the minimum standard. Its personnel was above the average of the citizen volunteer, having among its number, men from the varied professions, also the mechanic, the artisan, the tradesman, and tiller of the soil, and nearly all were magicians. I think I hear you say, that's not very complimentary. Well, I can assure you it's a very high order of talent. As you all know, the discipline of the Potomac army was

very strict; at times, even severe. They were no sooner in camp after a march or a fight than orders came to police the grounds; the next day they must drill; and by the next day, they must appear on parade and for review, with white gloves and shoes blackened; and when ordered to move again the men were required, in addition to their sixty rounds, etc., to carry a full uniform, regulation cap, and army shoes. They would march for a day through a sparsely-settled country, pass but a few business places, and come into camp at night, about one-half with slouch or straw hats, and the other half with boots. I call this a high order of talent. That brave, fighting old Irish Brigade, however, could beat us by one or a length; as, in addition, they usually came into camp with their bayonets ornamented with a pig.

We will not go back to the time of rendezvous and organization at Elmira, where it was looked upon as the crack regiment of all that formed there, and received more praise from the citizens and smiles from the ladies than any that left that city for the war save their own, the Twenty-third under Colonel Hoffman. This regiment came into the field under the second proclamation* by the President, calling for 300,000 men, and formed a component part of that mighty host which the poet phrased into song and verse,—

“We are coming, Father Abraham,
Three hundred thousand more.”

We will take up its record from the time it left Camp California (near Alexandria, Va., where it wintered) in the spring of 1862, where the entire Potomac army was set in motion with the refrain, “On to Richmond.”

The brigade to which we belonged, under command of Gen. O. O. Howard, was sent in advance to repair the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. Here it became necessary, as a safeguard, to establish an outpost, and for that service two companies were selected from our regiment. While occupying this advanced position, the enemy's cavalry came up and demanded to know who we were. The response from our picket post was an order to dismount and come in as prisoners. As they wheeled to retreat, one replied: “To hell with your dismount!” He had no sooner uttered the words than one of our boys took him out of his saddle with a minie ball. This was the first blood drawn in that campaign, and the honor belongs to the Sixty-fourth New York. At our first regular battle, Fair Oaks, we were in line with our brigade when it made the charge. It suffered as a whole severely, and our regiment was unfortunate in having to fill a gap where another had been repulsed, meeting them on their retreat. We faced the enemy at a point where their troops were temporarily flushed with victory, but succeeded in putting them to flight. It was here that the brave General Howard led the brigade into the maw of death with a spirit that said, as he flourished his sword and encouraged his men: “Perish my right arm rather than defeat!” And, it was severed. It was also here that others learned the lesson that their place was in the rear

*The Twenty-third New York enlisted under the first call in 1861. The speaker may have had the One Hundred and Seventh New York in mind. [Ed.]

than a detail was called for which took nearly every able-bodied man, among them, one, I remember in particular, whose feet were so blistered and sore that he cried from pain when pulling on his boots. His sufferings were relieved next day by death. As we came up to this battlefield on that eventful morn, a lady, with others going in the opposite direction for safety, when opposite to me said, in a general way, "God bless you; how glad we are to see you come." These words from a woman's lips were so electric and full of inspiration that I knew no weariness, no hunger, or even thought of danger until after this battle was fought and won. It was an electric spark that would have sent me voluntarily into the cannon's mouth, or, if need be, into the very jaws of death.

It was here that this regiment sealed again its vows to the Union by pouring out its blood.

Pouring, did I say? Yes, literally so. The brave and lamented young Captain Fuller, who reached the extreme front on that day, here received the missile of death and poured out his blood. I saw it,—not trickle, but flow from his breast like a river. Lieutenants Thurber, Lewis, and Babcock also fell, as did many others of the rank and file, of whom time will not permit us fittingly to speak. This was the most awful, yet the grandest battle ever fought by mortal man. This field attests the bravery of the American soldier, whether fighting in the right or the wrong cause, and shows to the nations of the earth that if we are united, in time of trouble they may stand aghast.

This monument again witnesses the heroism and bravery of this command by standing farthest to the front of any who fought on that day. While this was the greatest and most decisive battle of the war, yet the story is not half told. We pass from this scene of carnage and death to a succession of engagements, of which time will permit here only a reference.

Subsequently we followed with others, the lead of that great chieftain, Gen. U. S. Grant, whose every attribute was childlike and kind, but combined with a determined and iron will. Unconditional right, as well as surrender, was the mainspring which prompted his every act. From that time forward we were never out of business until work was at an end.

We fought at Strawberry Plains, and again got left to fight the battle alone, while others who had withdrawn long before us eventually turned up prisoners of war. We immediately took the chances of bullets by getting out.

We were at the Wilderness six days without rest, and ten successive days under fire. In this period is included the battle of Spotsylvania Court House, where in the twilight of the morning our troops, massed in closed columns, charged the enemy's works. The Sixty-fourth again being in the front line, were the first to reach and scale them at the angle. The works were carried, but with fearful slaughter. For a time, it was a hand-to-hand encounter. It was here that Lieutenant Fisk while acting as adjutant fell with a bullet through his heart. It was also here that Colonel Fassett, then commanding Company I, was taken prisoner and ordered to surrender, but escaped without giving up his sword. It was here, also, that Lieutenant Bockoven gave a practical demonstration of what getting up on your ear means. While contending for the possession of a battery, with his sword he clipped off the Rebel

officer's ear. This engagement was another harvest of death, and so great were the numbers slain that a year after they lay in ranks yet unburied. Some conception of the severity of this battle may be gained from the fact, that so fierce and so thick and continuous did the missiles fly, that at one particular concentration of fire, a tree twenty-two inches in diameter at its base, was literally shameder in two. This is no fairy tale, for the stump can be seen on any one who will take the pains to visit the Patent Office at Washington where it may be found.

Is there anything in premonitions? Lieutenant Fisk came to me before this engagement, and said that it would be his last fight. He gave into my possession everything he had about him of value, with minute instructions regarding them, and what to say to his parents and his affianced.

I must pass over a number of important battles, and fierce ones, too,—Cold Spring Station, Petersburg, and others. Suffice it to say, this regiment participated in all the campaigns and battles of the famous Second Corps, and was always at the front. At the taking of the Southside Road the Sixty-fourth was the first infantry to reach it. We were sent out by General Miles as a skirmish line. Either through his own knowledge, or word sent to him by some one, that the enemy were in too strong force for a skirmish line, he sent to the support a regiment from this State, when I immediately advanced the Sixty-fourth to the road at Sutherland's Station, and passing down the road toward the advance of some of the enemy, whom I ordered to lay down their arms when they did, and friendly like, we took them in. Just at this time Sherman's cavalry made its appearance coming up the road. Captain Short killed five prisoners, for whom I yet hold the provost-marshal's receipt. Now we come to the time of the surrender of Lee's army—five days prior, and while slowly following up the retreating Rebels, all of a sudden they opened a battery on our marching column, and took the brigade back's head off with a cannon ball. General Miles came riding speedily down the line inquiring excitedly, "Where's the Sixty-fourth New York?" When answered promptly, "Here," he ordered it to charge upon the battery, which it did, and gained possession of it; but not being followed by support we had to yield it, with a loss to our command of 14 men in killed and wounded, 8 of them commissioned officers, one of whom was the lamented young Captain Parby. This was the last battle of the Potomac army, as two days after the enemy surrendered to General Grant.

Thus we drew the first blood at the opening of the campaign in 1862, and shed the last at the close, in 1865.

This is but a brief summary of our work. What is our record and where do we stand? In the rivalry and claim for prestige these estimates have been produced, and, as it is claimed, were taken from the records. Consequently, they are intended to be impartial. They show, as I have once before stated, that out of the 2,000 regiments that fought in the war, but two others fought in a greater number, and three others in an equal number, of battles. This is a record to be proud of. But if the records give the others correctly, we have fought in a greater number than any in the entire army, as we can count four that are not included in the foregoing estimate, putting us two ahead of all others, and, we believe, a perfect record will still give us two more.

That, gentlemen, tells the story where, estimating losses, we stand on an average with a half dozen usually named. Thos. S. Townsend in his compilations and history of New York State volunteer regiments says: "No regiment from the State has a more enviable reputation than the Sixty-fourth. Few participated in a greater number of battles, or lost a larger percentage of its men and officers. The regiment was engaged in nearly all the great engagements of the Army of the Potomac from Yorktown to Reams' Station."

What are the lessons to be gained, and what are the results of this gigantic war which we have been contemplating? They are stupendous. It effected the freedom of 4,000,000 of bondmen, and effaced from our fair Columbia that foul blot of slavery forever and forever. Its influences are extending and will continue its freedom-loving work until nowhere upon the face of the earth will a man hold in bondage his fellow. It tested the strength of our people for self-government, and showed that our resources of power and wealth were beyond that of any other country, and proved that we are the strongest nation on the globe.

What is our status as citizens, and what are our rights as veterans? Well, we are equal before the law, and entitled to all the rights and privileges that others enjoy. Anything more? Yes! To that honor which attaches to the few among the many who do honorable and patriotic service for their fellows, and in behalf of the Government and its beneficent institutions. Anything more? Yes! We are entitled to the benefits of special enactments in our behalf. Anything more? Yes! Governments and peoples in their patriotism and wisdom pass laws sometimes anticipating emergencies. But it is beyond the power of human wisdom to foresee all; hence, from time to time they pass laws applicable to circumstances which arise. We now ask Congress to pass a law that will meet our case. I refer to pension legislation. There is such a disposition, but there are so many minds and so many measures to that end that they are confusing. I think it wise to ask that they codify them in a bill which will meet every case; and we want it in its stipulations like Grant's terms to surrender, an unconditional per diem bill that will take it out of politics and stop this constant talk, so much of which has created a prejudice against the veteran.

Last Thursday, June 26th, at Boston, Bishop H. C. Potter, of New York, among other unsavory sentiments, uttered these words before the Phi Beta Kappa Society:

"It was a huge military organization, remember, which once put the Roman Empire up at auction and proposed to knock it down to the highest bidder. To-day it is in the air that it is the party which bids highest to a precisely similar constituency that is to be rewarded with the symbols of national primacy and national authority, and out of this it has come to pass that not alone some scarred and honorable veteran, brave and maimed survivor of an heroic charge, but every skulking camp follower and deserter, every fraudulent and tainted claimant who has effrontery to demand his bribe can have it, if only his vote shall thus become a commodity within the control of partisan dictation, and he himself a lackey to do his political master's bidding."

This gentleman presides over a diocese which has within it corporations more powerful and dangerous than any trusts, and for aught I know he may receive

\$25,000 a year; yet any wearer of the cloth who, under the disguise of religion, would in these days utter such slanders upon the veteran, and insinuations upon the Congress of the United States, before a class of rising young men, is unfit to be a bishop.

However, I do not propose to be cowed down; neither should you because you happen to speak of the war, even though you be met with the taunt of that stereotyped phrase, "I thought the war was over." It grates upon the ear of those only who fought against us, or their cowardly allies in our midst, who remained at home and were their abettors. The next time you are met with that disloyal and insinuating phrase, ask the individual in what regiment of the Confederate army he served; or, if it meets the case better, say: "How are you, my erring brother? Yes, the war is over. Have you just returned from Canada, and have you been there since 1861?" Individuals practice these tactics, and they do not create in my mind a high estimate of their loyalty. There are also prominent journals which prate loudly of their virtues in denouncing crime and immorality, and of their advocacy of right measures and right principles; and are also great censors of the body politic, notably among them, the New York Herald. It is a subtle sheet, and almost every line of its editorials is written in a vein of sarcasm and irony. It does it in as disguised a manner as possible when it pretendedly speaks in behalf of the veteran; but you can take its cue from a paragraph which it keeps at the head of its editorial page, which reads as follows: "In 1888 we paid in pensions \$80,288,508.77; in 1889 we paid \$87,624,779.11. The cost of the German army, it may be interesting to note, is for this year \$91,726,293. Besides our pensions, our army costs \$30,000,000." What for? For the purpose of prejudicing the minds of the people against the veterans' interests. In its issue of June 6th, it makes a scurrilous attack on ex-Commissioner Tanner, for no reason other than that the Corporal indicated to a correspondent that he was doing well financially. It has not got a patriotic, loyal-loving thread in its entire warp and woof. The New York Times is a brevet special co-partner in a lesser amount. "It's English you know."

Let not the lessons of the war be lost. Let us teach our children the spirit of patriotism, love of country, and adoration for the old flag. It is not likely that this Union will be again disrupted or thrown into bloody strife; but the flag of treason should be suppressed, for the reason that it is a constant menace to a perpetual peace. One of these old unexploded shells may be a harmless toy until brought into close proximity to the fire. The cause of danger had best be removed, and Congress should do it by enactment without delay. However, should such an evil day come, I promise you that no white man's blood need be shed. It has been said that a "little learning is a dangerous thing." The author did not tell us whether "per se," or for want of more, or that much of it was proportionately so. Be that as it may, learning and intelligence to my mind is essential to the well being of both individual and a people, and is a source of good or evil in proportion and in the direction it may be exercised by disposition and force.

Well, the late enslaved race upon whom the amended Constitution has conferred the full right of citizenship, and which outnumbered those who but recently

held them as chattels in servitude, now has a little learning, and is constantly acquiring more. They will solve the problem without your aid and mine. That time, however, will never come, though their representatives create scenes upon the floor of Congress that would disgrace the lowest of New York dives. Well don't be afraid of keeping alive a spirit of war. We have recently had in our capital a Congress of Nations, called "Pan-American." Its objects were to devise measures, and frame a code for settlement of disputes by peace measures. It was conceived in a humane and high-toned spirit of amity. Everybody wishes it success, but I am of the opinion that the settlement of any vital question, except upon the equal and exact balancing of the scales, will be of short duration. Any settlement that partakes of the nature of a compromise will sooner or later be abrogated by one of the parties to it, and is a rotten thread which will cause the fabric to part upon the least strain.

The vital questions of the past, of the recent present, and, I believe, those of the future, will be the most permanent and lasting that are settled by the arbitrament of arms. We have a class of people who stand upon the street corner and cry aloud: "We have no more use for the soldier; there will be no more wars." You will find the same individual or class upon the next corner berating the Government for not expending the surplus in the treasury in building and mantling forts along our defenceless coasts. If the inconsistencies of men could be manufactured into powder, in the ratio of one pound of charcoal and saltpetre mixed, it would be sufficient to blow up the entire earth.

I hope, in future, that this Commonwealth or the General Government will cause this field to be laid out in beautiful walks and driveways; that its sod may be set with sweetest flowers and in a profusion that will make it like unto Eden's Bower; and that when these monuments shall have become twined about by the ivy vine, the sweet violet may bloom at their base in varied hue, and the daffodil in its beauty lift its smiling and bedewed face for the moisture to be kissed away by the genial rays of the morning sun.

Comrades, we have here erected a monument to the memory of our dead. Perhaps it is not quite as pretentious in size or as artistic in design as some others upon this field. Nevertheless, it is noble and grand, and as solid as the granite hills of New Hampshire, out of which our honest and faithful sculptor, Mr. W. B. Archibald, of Fredonia, N. Y., caused it to be chiseled and fashioned into a thing of beauty. Set as it is, upon a solid base of granite, with a substratum of eternal rock fashioned by the Great Master's hand and placed here in this grand old Keystone State, it will stand through all the ages to come, teaching to future generations the lessons of Patriotism, Loyalty and Love. It will stand possibly, until the Apostle Peter's writings shall come to pass, "and the elements shall melt with fervent heat," until Isaiah's prophecies are fulfilled, "and the Heavens shall roll together as a scroll." Alike enduring and imperishable will be the name and fame of the Sixty-fourth Regiment New York Volunteers.

OUR DEAD COMRADES.

BY FRANK F. SNOW.

When the "Boys in Blue," the tried and true,
Assemble on Gettysburg plain,
To recount the scenes of the old canteens,
Where they drank of the leaden rain,
May the Heaven above bend down in love
O'er the spot we love so well,
On each soldier's face set a kindly grace,
Though scarred by the shot and the shell.

Then in memory sweet with willing feet,
At Gettysburg I'll stand,
And join the song of the veteran throng,
As they sing of our native land.
Up to the skies see the column rise,
Which recounts the hopes and fears
Of the heroes slain on that battle plain,
Of these twenty-seven years.

Sound no funeral knell — ring the gladsome bell
On that most auspicious day,
That the braves who weep, and the ones who sleep,
May together unite and pray,—
That the God of love send a white-winged dove,
And give to this land of ours,
For all our dead as honored a bed,
As at Gettysburg we gave ours.

Bright flowers red to lay over the dead,
And tell of their blood-bought prize,
While the shaft to-day, o'er their senseless clay,
Points in silence to the skies.
Bring flowers white to greet the sight
Of the monument raised on high,
Which tells of peace and the war's surcease,
And of brothers who dared to die.

Bring flowers blue; for tried and true
Were the heroes who died that day;
And blue are the skies where heroes rise,
To await the trumpet day.
Honor the dead with the flag's bright red,
For war is a thing of the past;
And white shall stand for the peace of our land,
While the great blue heavens shall last.

ADDRESS BY COL. L. H. FASSETT.

The Greek poet Aeschylus, who was one of the greatest poets, statesmen and scholars of history, was so proud of his services to his country that when the time came for him to prepare for his departure he ordered this inscription to be placed upon his monument: "He was a soldier and fought at Marathon." He put aside all his literary attainments and gloried only in the fact that he had served his country. We are soldiers and we must be excused if we are proud of the fact that we have assisted in this great service to our country. We come here from all over this great land. We are here from Shiloh. We fought with Hooker above the clouds at Lookout Mountain. We marched with Sherman to the Sea. We stopped the tidal wave at Gettysburg. And now we come here for a camp fire. I am always glad to meet you and to hear the story that soldiers remember—we fought elbow to elbow and shoulder to shoulder and drank from the same canteen for three long weary, weary years. And now it is a pleasure to meet and talk over old times. I am glad to meet you; I am glad to greet you; and may God be with you till we meet again.

HISTORICAL SKETCH.

The Sixty-fourth Regiment of New York Volunteers, quite generally known as the "Cattaraugus Regiment," was mustered into the United States service at Elmira, December 10, 1861.

The Sixty-fourth New York State Militia Regiment, organized in 1853, was in existence when Fort Sumter was fired on in April, 1861, having 3 field officers, 10 captains, 20 lieutenants, 8 staff officers, 17 musicians and nearly 400 noncommissioned officers and privates. At once, upon the President's call for 75,000 men, the services of the militia organization were tendered to the Governor of the State, and in April and May, 1861, enlistments were made for the United States service, and drilling commenced. This was especially the case with Companies A of Gowanda, and B of Randolph, which for nearly three weeks were substantially in readiness for acceptance. The State's quota was then filled without them.

July 30, 1861, Col. Thomas J. Parker of the Militia Regiment, again tendered the services of his command, and August 15, 1861, Governor Morgan, through D. Campbell, acting assistant adjutant general, accepted "the Sixty-fourth Regiment N. Y. S. M., as a portion of the 25,000 men called for by the Governor's proclamation of July 25, 1861." The order of acceptance announced that "the present officers of the regiment, company officers included, may all be retained, provided they are pronounced qualified by the board of examiners."

After preliminary work Colonel Parker went to Elmira, the rendezvous, August 27, 1861, and obtained enlistment and organization quarters, at Barracks No. 3, from General Van Valkenburg, who was in command at that place. Lieut. Col. Daniel G. Bingham was absent from the county, but soon returned to aid the movement. Maj. Enos C. Brooks visited the different

companies. September 7, 1861, Companies A and B arrived at Barracks No. 3, with something like 50 men each.

A total of 849 men in the regiment started for the front for three years on the 10th of December, 1861, including Lieutenant Colonel Bingham and Quartermaster Sergeant Crowley, who were sent forward two days previously to obtain assignment of camp and supplies at Washington.

Six of the companies, A, B, C, F, I, and K, were recruited in Cattaraugus county. D and G were raised in Allegany county, E in Tompkins county, and H in Tioga.

On the morning of December 12, 1861, the regiment arrived in Washington, and located near the Bladensburg Toll Gate, a mile northeast of the Capitol. Receiving arms and camp equipage it became a part of the provisional division under General Casey. January 7, 1862, it marched through Washington, across the Long Bridge, through Alexandria, Va., to Camp California, three miles from the latter city on the "Little River Turnpike," and there became incorporated in the brigade of Gen. O. O. Howard, of General Sumner's Division. Through that winter at this place many deaths occurred from typhoid pneumonia, mainly incurred in process of acclimatization.

On March 7, 1862, it spilled its first Rebel blood by killing Charles Dillon, a spy of the enemy, while scouting in advance of the line near Fairfax Court House, by a detachment under Major Brooks. This man had passes from Union officers at Washington and Alexandria, and also from General Beauregard.

Immediately after, the regiment was ordered back to Springfield Station, on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad, where it joined the division in its advance toward Manassas on the extreme left of the army. At Manassas Junction a company of sixty men, formed of details from all the companies, under Captain Malthie, accompanied a force under Colonel Barlow of the Sixty-first New York, on a reconnoissance as far as the Rappahannock River. A large percentage of these sixty men were disabled by malaria or diseases resembling poisoning.

The whole command moved back to Alexandria, and on April 5, 1862, took the steamer Daniel Webster down the Potomac to Fortress Monroe, leaving Captains Barstow, Fancher, Malthie, Pittenger and others here in the hospital. On the 9th,, it was taken to Ship Point and disembarked. Marching to the front of Yorktown it was quartered in Camp Scott, and participated in the siege for three weeks. About this time Major Brooks was detailed as provost marshal of the division. When on the 4th of May, 1862, the Rebels evacuated the fortifications, the Second Army Corps (recently formed under General Sumner) followed Stoneman's Cavalry and Heintzelman's Corps in pursuit, and were within supporting distance at the battle of Williamsburg by midnight of the 5th. Returning to Yorktown the regiment boarded transports in two detachments, and proceeding up the York and Pamunkey Rivers to Eltham, six miles from West Point, disembarked and again took up the march to the front with the rest of the Second Corps. Marching towards Richmond, and the hard work of building roads and bridges in Chickahominy Swamp, was the main part of the duty of the troops for the remainder of the month.

In the afternoon of May 31, 1862, the long roll sounded at Tyler's, or Cold Harbor, and the Sixty-fourth with great difficulty succeeded in crossing the Chickahominy over an almost floating bridge, and at midnight lay on their arms on the battlefield of Fair Oaks. Very early in the morning of June 1st General Howard led the Sixty-fourth and Sixty-first New York Regiments in a charge against the enemy in the woods, and heavy fighting for hours ensued. The Sixty-fourth gained ground and held it, losing heavily in killed and wounded. One officer, Lieutenant Kendall, of Company D, was killed, and 11 officers wounded. Of the enlisted men, 29 were killed and 132 wounded — total, 173. Among the wounded were Colonel Bingham, Captains Glenny, Renwick, and Bradley, and Lieutenants Loomis, Darby, Cooper, and Crowley. In General Howard's report of the battle, speaking of the Sixty-fourth and Sixty-first, he says: "All the men behaved most gallantly. I cannot speak too highly of such troops." The general's other two regiments, the Fifth New Hampshire and Eighty-first Pennsylvania, had been detached before daylight. After this conflict the Sixty-fourth was assigned to French's Brigade.

During the series of battles which succeeded, known as the Seven Days' Battle, the regiment was engaged at Gaines' Mill, Savage Station, White Oak Swamp, Glendale, and Malvern Hill, with great credit, losing a total of 38. It remained with the army at Harrison's Landing, on the James River, from July 2, 1862, to August 13, 1862. Captain Battin was in command there except during the first two days. Colonel Parker resigned July 12, 1862.

The march down the Peninsula to Newport News and steamer transports up the Potomac brought the force to Alexandria again August 28th. At 11:30 a. m., August 31st, the command was on the right of the line at Centreville under Pope. September 1st, it made a reconnoissance north from Centreville, and on the 2d formed a rear guard towards Chain Bridge, by way of Vienna. September 3d it supported the Tenth New York Cavalry in a skirmish towards Centreville.

Temporarily joined with the Sixty-first New York under Colonel Barlow for active movements (Major Brooks being senior field officer of the Sixty-fourth), the combined organization pushed on to and struck the enemy at South Mountain, and followed them thence to Antietam, where it was warmly engaged September 17, 1862, losing 50 men killed and wounded and aiding Colonel Barlow to win his star as a brigadier.

Among the achievements of the regiment here was the charge upon the enemy, protected in a sunken road, and the capture of 100 of them. Resting at Harper's Ferry and getting newly supplied with almost everything, it joined in reconnoissances and skirmishes in the vicinity of Charlestown, Va., October 16, 1862.

The headquarters of the Second Corps remained at Harper's Ferry from about September 20 to October 28, 1862. While there the regiment was recuperated considerably in health and strength, and added to its number by a few recruits and by recoveries from hospitals, etc.

Lieutenant Colonel Bingham had been commissioned colonel, July 25, 1862, but had remained North disabled. Major Brooks was commissioned lieutenant colonel, and soon after mustered in as such. On the 28th of October,

1862, an advance movement was made by the whole Second Corps on the east side of the mountains and through Loudoun Valley, which had not been devastated as yet by either army; passed Snicker's Gap, Upperville, Manassas or Paris Gap, where the First Division, in which was the Sixty-fourth, were opposed by the enemy's skirmishers, and to camp near Warrenton, where on the evening of November 7th, orders arrived placing General Burnside in command of the army in place of General McClellan. After an all night's conference with his generals, McClellan, on the 8th, turned over the command. At that time the grief was general at the change, not only in this regiment but in the rest of the army.

From this place the troops moved rapidly to Falmouth, but were prevented from crossing the Rappahannock into Fredericksburg by a delay in arrival of pontoon trains.

December 11, 1862, the Army of the Potomac commenced the movement against the enemy at Fredericksburg, Va., whose troops were intrenched in the impregnable positions on Marye's Heights, beyond the city. The Sixty-fourth took part in forcing the passage of the river. On the 13th, the Sixty-fourth, with the First and other divisions of the corps, made repeated assaults on the Rebel intrenchments, losing 72 officers and men killed and wounded. Lieutenant Colonel Brooks was shot through the body near the heart, but strange to say survived for further service. Lieutenant Parker died from wounds.

In the early spring of 1863, Colonel Bingham rejoined the regiment, which was now in the Fourth Brigade, commanded by Col. John R. Brooke, of the Fifty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, and in the First Division, Second Army Corps. On April 27th, with 120 rounds of ammunition to each soldier, and eight days' rations, the regiment moved forward to Chancellorsville by way of the United States Ford, arriving on the field on the 30th, and on the 1st day of May engaged the enemy. On the 2d and 3d the regiment was on the extreme left. The men were in single line, three feet apart, in rifle pits, opposed to a whole brigade of Georgia troops, and held their position though fiercely and repeatedly attacked. On the 4th it supported a battery of the Eleventh Corps in its new position, and on the 6th, returned to Falmouth by way of Banks' Ford, having lost 4 officers and 34 men killed and wounded, and 6 missing; total, 44.

June 13, 1863, at night, we marched up the Rappahannock as far as the United States Ford, lighting fires all the way. At daylight we went by hard and forced march to Stafford Court House, there joining the corps, and moved on to Thoroughfare Gap, guarding it for five days in presence of the enemy's outpost; skirmished at Haymarket on the 23d, crossed the Potomac at Edwards Ferry the 25th, reaching Frederick City the 26th. On the 29th we marched thirty-seven miles to Uniontown, and on the 30th, were mustered for pay, showing 202 guns. July 1st, 1863, we moved to within about two miles of Gettysburg. At 4 o'clock on the morning of July 2d the march to the battlefield of Gettysburg commenced, and early the brigade line was formed in column by regiments—the Sixty-fourth second, behind the Second Delaware—midway between the village and Little Round Top—a little to the left of "the bloody angle" of the third day's battle.

Lying quietly under artillery fire all day until about six in the evening, when, moving to the left to assist the Third Corps, the brigade, left in front, lined up in the historic Wheatfield, and charged the Rebels in three lines, driving them half a mile with loss. So impetuous was the Sixty-fourth and the other regiments of Brooke's Brigade, that they found themselves in the Wyble Woods, far in advance of supports on either flank, nearly surrounded, and fell back to the Union line, and retired from that part of the field with what was left of the division. The fighting force of the regiment, 187 men and officers, there lost 97 officers and men, over 53 per cent. Four officers and 12 men were killed, 7 officers and 57 men were wounded (7 of the wounded dying from their wounds) and 17 men were captured. Captains Fuller and Lewis, and Lieutenants Babcock and Thurber were the officers killed.

On the 3d of July the regiment occupied the position which it held the day before, witnessing Pickett's charge, which struck the Union line a little to the right of it, and lost one man — making the total loss in this battle, 98. It remained on the field, July 4th, ready for action. Colonel Bingham never recovered from the wounds and injuries received in this battle. He died at Leroy, N. Y., July 21, 1864.

On July 5, 1863, the regiment was again put under marching orders. Col. Daniel G. Bingham having been severely wounded on the 2d, the command devolved upon Maj. Leman W. Bradley. The line of march was in the direction of Frederick City, Md., over South Mountain, passing the battlefield of Antietam, and on to Falling Waters, where the Rebel army was overtaken and skirmishing took place, but with no casualties in the Sixty-fourth. We remained here in camp several days. Some time after the middle of July, the Army of the Potomac moved across the Potomac River into Virginia, and through Loudoun Valley to Snicker's Gap, where another skirmish took place and the enemy were driven from their position. The camp here was distinguished by the name of "Camp Mutton," in honor of the capture by our boys of nearly an entire flock of sheep. Mutton diet was the rule for several days subsequently. The next evening the regiment arrived at Warrenton, where it went into camp several days.

Early in August, the regiment moved across the Rappahannock River, on to Brandy Station, and to Culpeper Court House, where it remained several days; then to Bristoe Station, near which point on Kettle Run, they encountered the enemy's artillery. After a day's skirmishing and manoeuvring, driving the enemy from point to point, a severe contest occurred near Bristoe Station, in which the loss of the regiment was 6 killed, 11 wounded, and 25 missing. Marching to Warrenton, Va., several weeks were passed at camp and picket duty.

November 7, 1863, with Colonel Brown, of the One hundred and forty-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers, commanding the brigade, each soldier carrying eight days' rations and 120 rounds of ammunition, and the Sixty-fourth at the head of the column, the troops marched to the Rapidan River, and were directed to cross and attack the enemy on the opposite bank. The weather was extremely cold and the water high, at some points reaching the arm pits of the men; muskets and cartridge boxes had to be raised aloft. The passage was successfully accomplished and the Rebel skirmish line driven into a belt

of woods, the Sixty-fourth alone holding the position on the further bank until the pontoon bridges were laid, when the balance of the brigade marched to its relief. Then the regiment was moved forward near the enemy's works; pickets were thrown out and all rested under arms during the night without fires, or opportunity to sleep, or dry clothing. This day's exertion proved one of the most severe and exhaustive trials of any in the service. Moving the next morning to Mine Run, several days were passed in skirmishing, manoeuvring and picketing continually. The loss was 1 killed and 2 wounded.

On November 1, 1863, Capt. Rodney R. Crowley, who was severely wounded at Gettysburg, returned to the regiment at Warrenton, still disabled. On certificate of the medical director of the division that he would not be fit for field duty for a year, he resigned on the 7th of that month and was honorably discharged.

Near Mine Run, on a dark night in November, Major Bradley led the regiment on a reconnoissance. Very quietly the head of the column had proceeded some distance into the woods beyond the Union lines, when the major was suddenly confronted by a Rebel picket who caught his horse by the bit and ordered him to surrender. With great presence of mind the major uttered a hurried inquiry, gave the opposite rein of his bridle a quick jerk, put spurs to his horse, and rode rapidly to the rear, giving the order "Right about face! Double quick! March!" At once a sharp volley was sent after the command, but it was harmless and the expedition returned safely to camp. Early in December winter quarters were established on the north bank of the Rappahannock, near "Nigger Tavern."

During the winter of 1863-64 efforts were made to induce the men to re-enlist for another term of three years. A bounty of \$400 and a thirty days' furlough were offered, and the unexpired year of first enlistment to count upon the second term. Upwards of 30 of the regiment re-enlisted at this time.

On May 4, 1864, the Sixty-fourth, then in the Fourth Brigade, First Division, Second Corps, broke camp and joined in the Wilderness campaign, losing from the 5th to the 7th, 8 men wounded. From the 8th to the 12th, in the various engagements of Spotsylvania Court House, Po River, and the Salient, the regiment was fiercely engaged, losing 4 officers and 71 men, killed, wounded, and missing, and greatly aiding the capture of 4,000 men from the enemy. Serg. Albert Marsh, of Company B, captured the flag of the Forty-fourth Virginia Regiment; and Sergeant Van Vlack of Company A took possession of the Rebel Generals Johnson and Stuart, and marched them to General Hancock's headquarters. At North Anna and Totopotomoy 2 officers and 2 men were severely wounded. At Cold Harbor, May 31st and June 2d and 3d, the regiment was engaged, losing 12 men wounded. In the various engagements before Petersburg from June 15, 1864, to April 2, 1865, the regiment lost 28 men.

August 31, 1864, about 200 recruits were added to the regiment. Many of the new men proved to be poor soldiers, some deserting even into the ranks of the enemy. There were many honorable exceptions, however, the largest portion making good soldiers. Major Bradley was wounded at Spotsylvania and disabled, when the command devolved upon Capt. William Glenn of Company E, who was made major by a commission dated May 4,

1864, at which date Bradley was commissioned lieutenant colonel, though never mustered as such. On July 22, 1864, Glenny was commissioned as lieutenant colonel, afterwards mustered as such, and on the 30th of November, 1864, he was commissioned as colonel of the regiment. Colonel Glenny ably commanded the Sixty-fourth for the last year of the war, and was brevetted brigadier general for gallant and faithful service. On August 22, 1864, Capt. Lewis H. Fassett was commissioned major, and afterwards brevetted lieutenant colonel, proving a very brave and efficient officer. Among the August recruits was William L. Ross, who was soon appointed a sergeant, and on November 30, 1864, was commissioned a second lieutenant; on February 4, 1865, first lieutenant, and after the close of the war was commissioned captain, to rank from May 4, 1865.

During September and October, 1864, the terms of enlistment of many men expired, and they were discharged. A considerable number had re-enlisted, and several hundred recruits had been added. The regiment was organized into a battalion of six companies, A, B, D, E, G and H.

The regiment especially distinguished itself in the assault of May 12, 1864, led by General Hancock in person, near Spotsylvania, which carried the enemy's fortified position, capturing a brigade or more of Confederates, including 2 general officers, 40 pieces of artillery, many colors and small arms. Lieut. David Wiggins, Lieut. George R. Fisk and Lieut. Pulaski V. Alton were killed in the charge.

In the assaults on Petersburg from June 15th to 19th, and in the engagements at the Weldon Railroad, June 21-23, the loss was 32 men. At Strawberry Plains, August 14th-18th, the loss was 4. At Reams' Station, August 25th, 25.

In the spring of 1865, in an engagement in front of Petersburg, on March 25th, the regiment was severely engaged, and lost 31 men. From March 28th to April 9th, in the Appomattox campaign, in engagements at White Oak Ridge, March 29-31; at the Fall of Petersburg, April 2d; Sailor's Creek, April 6th; Farmville, April 7th; and Appomattox Court House, April 9th, 45 men were killed and wounded. Capt. Henry Darby was mortally wounded at Farmville.

The regiment was present at forty-six battles or skirmishes, in most of which losses in killed and wounded were sustained. The casualties during its entire term of service were:

	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Total
Killed and mortally wounded	12	160	172
Died in Rebel prisons	1	30	31
Died of disease and other causes	5	93	98
	18	283	301
Wounded, recovered	38	535	573
	56	818	874

The total enrollment of the regiment was 1,490.

Total killed and died of disease and wounds, 301.

Percentage, 20.2.

All of the men of this regiment were, and its survivors are, proud of its record of achievements in every one of its many engagements under Generals Howard, Barlow, Miles, Richardson, Hancock, Brooke, Gibbon, Humphreys and Ramsay. Its history is gloriously identified with that of the Second Army Corps, and its hardest fighting was under Hancock, "The Superb." In this corps were the several regiments of the whole army of the United States which sustained: 1st. The largest percentage of loss in any one action. 2d. Which sustained the greatest numerical loss in any one action. 3d. Which sustained the greatest numerical loss during its term of service; while of the 100 regiments in the Union army which lost the most men in battle, thirty-five of them belonged to the Second Corps.

Colonel Fox, in his work "Regimental Losses," says of this corps: "The hardest fighting and the greatest loss of life occurred in the First Division (Hancock's), in which more men were killed and wounded than in any other division of the army, East or West. Within its ranks were the Irish Brigade and crack regiments like the Fifth New Hampshire, One hundred and fortieth Pennsylvania, and Sixty-fourth New York."

The last-named regiment was present at a greater number of engagements than any other regiment in the service during the War of the Rebellion.





J. B. LYON PRINT.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

65TH NEW YORK INFANTRY.
On Culp's Hill.

(INSCRIPTIONS.)

(Front.)

65TH

N. Y. INFTRY.

(1ST U. S. CHASSEURS)

1ST BRIG.

3RD DIV.

6TH CORPS

(Reverse.)

ARRIVED ON
THE FIELD AT
2 P. M. JULY 2.
AT DAYLIGHT OF
THE 3D MOVED
FROM BASE OF
LITTLE ROUND TOP
TO CULP'S HILL.
HELD THIS POSITION
TILL 3 P. M. THEN
MOVED TO LEFT
CENTRE.

(Left Side.)

PARTICIPATED
WITH 4TH & 6TH CORPS
IN EVERY BATTLE
OF THE ARMY OF
THE POTOMAC.

(Right Side.)

ORGANIZED
JUNE 11, 1861.
RE-ENLISTED NOV. 1863.
FINALLY MUSTERED OUT
JULY 17, 1865.

DEDICATION OF MONUMENT.

65TH REGIMENT INFANTRY — "UNITED STATES CHASSEURS"

June 13, 1889.

ORATION BY GEN. ALEXANDER SHALER.

COMRADES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

We are met to-day upon historic grounds. Some of us have met here before. Twenty-five years ago, within a few days, two great armies confronted each other in this vicinity. I shall not attempt to describe, in full, the great battle which ensued, relate the causes which led to it, nor discuss the effect upon the country of the resulting victory of the Union army; but content myself with a brief synopsis of the part taken in this and other battles by that portion of the Sixth Corps in which we had the honor of serving.

Let us go back to the autumn of 1861. Washington and its suburbs was one grand encampment. Troops from every loyal State were being marshalled and prepared for active service. Gen. George B. McClellan, whom we familiarly called "Little Mac," owing to his success in West Virginia, in the summer of 1861, had been called to Washington to organize and command an army for the double purpose of defending the Capital and of taking the field. As regiment after regiment arrived, they were organized into brigades and divisions without much reference to the States from which they came, and were encamped contiguous to each other. At Queen's Farm on the Bladensburg Road, just on the outskirts of the city, the Twenty-third Pennsylvania, Colonel Birney, the Thirty-first Pennsylvania, which afterwards became the Eighty-second Pennsylvania, Colonel Williams, the Sixty-fifth New York, Colonel Cochrane, and the Sixty-seventh New York, Colonel Adams, were encamped, and formed what was known as Graham's Brigade, under the command of Brig. Gen. Pike Graham, an officer formerly of the United States cavalry service.

As early as October, 1861, the organization of the army was practically completed, and from that time until April, 1862, when the Peninsular campaign was begun, we were drilled and schooled in the practices of war. With the exception of a skirmish at Lewinsville, Va., just beyond Chain Bridge, in which part of the brigade (the Chasseur Regiment) was engaged, the troops had so far experienced only the drudgery and jollities of camp life. In the meantime, the Sixty-first Pennsylvania, Colonel Rippey, had joined us. Couch's Division, to which we were attached, belonged to Keyes's Corps. Our advance up the Peninsula was slow and tedious, although no enemy was seen until we reached Yorktown. Pending the siege of that place we were occupied in watching the Warwick River. The battle of Williamsburg followed the evacuation of Yorktown, and our brigade, after marching all day through a drizzling rain and mud ankle-deep, reached the battlefield in time to support some of Hooker's troops in making their final charge.

We crossed the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge about the 25th of May, and advanced within five miles of Richmond, where, at Seven Pines and Fair

Oaks, on the 31st of May, was fought the first important and severe battle of the campaign. In this battle the regiments of our brigade were separated. We were encamped along the Nine Mile Road, extending from Seven Pines, on the Williamsburg Pike, to Fair Oaks Station, on the Richmond and York Railroad.

Owing to the suddenness of the enemy's attack, the Twenty-third Pennsylvania and the Sixty-seventh New York were thrown forward, while marching towards Fair Oaks on the Nine Mile Road, into a dense pine grove on the left, through which the enemy were advancing. They succeeded, with the Thirty-first Pennsylvania and the Sixty-first Pennsylvania, already in line, in checking that advance, but were subsequently forced to retire with very heavy losses. In this onslaught the Sixty-first Pennsylvania lost its colonel (Rippey), and was badly cut up. Their resolute stand, however, enabled the rest of the brigade to reach Fair Oaks Station, where, after holding position a short time, the Thirty-first Pennsylvania and Sixty-first Pennsylvania having previously taken position in advance of their camps near the railroad station, they were withdrawn under the personal supervision of General Couch, the division commander, with a section of Brady's Battery, the Sixty-second New York, Colonel Riker, and the Seventh Massachusetts, Colonel Devens, along the road leading to the Grapevine Bridge, as far as the Adams House.

The Thirty-first Pennsylvania, the Sixty-fifth New York, and the two companies of the Sixty-first Pennsylvania, which had been on the picket line, were posted in the order named on the right of the road, facing and on the edge of a dense woods; while the Sixty-second New York, Brady's guns, and the Seventh Massachusetts were posted in their order named on the left of the road, on a knoll overlooking an open field and flanking the woods along which the first-named regiments had been formed.

The enemy's advance through the piece of woods was resolute and persistent. Regiment after regiment was brought forward to drive us back and get on the flank of Brady's guns, but without avail. The dogged tenacity with which the men of the Thirty-first Pennsylvania, the Chasseurs, and the Sixty-first Pennsylvania clung to their position, outmatched the fierceness of the enemy's assault.

Despairing of success in their efforts to flank the artillery the enemy essayed a direct attack, but with no better success, although a few Rebels were found within twenty yards of the muzzles of the guns. The attack was made about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and so sudden that the brigade commander, General Abercrombie, was caught in the woods between the lines and received a slight wound in the face. Between 4 and 5 o'clock, the leading brigade of Sedgwick's Division, and Kirby's Battery of twelve pounders, which had crossed the Chickahominy on the Grapevine Bridge, arrived on the field.

The infantry were posted on the right and in the rear of our line, and the artillery on the knoll beside Brady's two guns. Other infantry were put in position on the left of the artillery, and connection made with the troops which had been forced back by the impetuosity of the assault. Fresh troops were advanced by the enemy, and the battle raged until dark, but not an inch of ground was yielded. The conduct of our men in this battle furnishes an

We crossed the Rappahannock about three miles below the city, near the Burnett House, and supported General Meade in his attack upon the enemy's right, without serious loss, although constantly under a heavy artillery fire.

General Burnside's retirement from the command of the army soon followed, and General Hooker, already known as "Fighting Joe" for his gallant and persistent assaults upon the Rebel earthworks at Williamsburg on the Peninsula, and at South Mountain and Antietam, superseded him.

The resignation of General Cochrane on the 1st of March, 1863, placed the speaker in command of the brigade. General Hooker's first field operation was an effort to crush the Army of Northern Virginia at Chancellorsville.

It was part of his plan to have Sedgwick, who now commanded the Sixth Corps, assault and carry the Heights of Fredericksburg, move on the road to Chancellorsville, and strike the rear of Lee's army while he, Hooker, engaged it in front. For that purpose the Sixth Corps crossed the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg, near the old Franklin Crossing, on April 29th, and on the night of Saturday, May 2d, at 1 a. m., commenced a flank march into Fredericksburg.

Our brigade was honored with the advance, and instructed to let nothing impede the march through the town, over the heights, and out on the Chancellorsville road; an easy order for a general to give, but not easy of execution in the presence of a wide-awake enemy holding earthworks across your path, an effort to take which had already cost 15,000 men. After driving in the outposts, in which the Chasseur Regiment under the lamented Hamblin showed conspicuous gallantry, losing many men and leaving Major Healey on the ground mortally wounded as was supposed, we continued our march until the enemy's line of defenses at the foot of Marye's Heights was encountered, when, by order of the division commander, the head of the column entered the city, leaving one of our regiments, the Twenty-third Pennsylvania, deployed in the open field facing the never-to-be-forgotten stone wall. When daylight appeared the men of the Twenty-third found themselves exposed to the enemy's fire, and for five long hours, without an opportunity to even make a cup of coffee, maintained this harassing position. About 10 o'clock Sunday morning, the columns and deployed lines were formed by General Newton for storming the heights. The column on the extreme right was composed of the Sixty-first Pennsylvania and the Forty-third New York, of the Light Brigade, under the command of Colonel Spear, and was supported by the Eighty-second Pennsylvania and the Sixty-seventh New York, of our brigade, under command of the speaker. The Twenty-third Pennsylvania formed a part of the deployed line on the left of the second column of attack. The Chasseur Regiment and the One hundred and twenty-second New York were directed to follow with the rest of our division and join the brigade after the heights had been carried.

Upon the opening of Newton's batteries both columns debouched from under cover, and the deployed lines advanced to the assault. Spear's column on the right was enfiladed by batteries stationed in the road at the top of the hill, and in the works on each side of the road; rifle pits at the base of the hill also confronted him. The column moved out on the double-quick, but the

and was thrown and before the column had passed over half the distance it was literally swept away by the iron hail showered upon it. General Spear was mortally wounded. Major Bassett, with the Eighty-second Pennsylvania, found himself at the head of the column, and struggled manfully to carry his men across, and finally encouraged by the presence of their brigade commander with his two aides, Lieutenants Armstrong and Johnson, rushed forward with the Twenty-seventh New York and carried the heights capturing the guns of the Washington Battery of artillery, one officer and a number of men. The Twenty-third Pennsylvania, in keeping pace with the First Wisconsin, took Stone and the Thompson New York moved gallantly in the charge. As eye-witness belonging to the Second Division, in speaking of this day he says: "Four more gallant regiments could not be found in the service. Leaving everything on guns and ammunition they started forward encountering a shower of bullets, grape and canister as soon as they rose above a slight crest. It was a severe spectacle and filled our hearts with pride in our own comrades."

General Barry and General Kautz had so improved the morale of the Third Army that it was reinforced by two of Longstreet's divisions from the James River and a large number of conscripts from Richmond, that Lee determined upon an advance to the North.

Thus reinforced they were marching to Manchester, which would have been the scene of the battle if Meade's line of battle had been formed along the river as some suppose he had intended. But events occurred which determined Longstreet to be the ground upon which was to be fought the fiercest and most unequalled battle of modern times.

On a night of the 29th July our Corps was at Manchester, thirty-six miles from the scene of the battle. In the evening we started for Gettysburg, and did not expect any action of this kind. We reached Rock Creek, which crosses the Potomac River and a mile from here. There we rested and made coffee. Following the march we moved to the base of Little Round Top, where the Fifth Corps was remaining, the Rebel current which had forced back portions of the Third Corps. Two of our brigades were immediately thrown forward to the head of the Fifth Corps, while the rest were placed in a line of reserve.

The march of the Sixth Corps, of thirty-six miles in seventeen hours, on a rainy summer night and morning, is probably the most memorable one of the war. When we consider the load which a soldier carries on the march, even in light marching order, the absence in the field of all comforts which he enjoyed at home, and the peril to life and limb which constantly surrounds him, we cannot but admire the pluck and courage with which he undertakes the most difficult and perilous tasks, and honor him for the sacrifices he makes.

About sunrise on the morning of the 3d, our brigade was ordered to Culp's Hill to aid General Cary, of the Twelfth Corps, in retaking the works on the extreme right, occupied by the enemy during the previous night. The seriousness of Longstreet's attack upon our left induced General Meade to order reinforcements from General Locust, commanding on this part of the field, which necessitated the evacuation of a part of the line before established. These works were seized by the wily enemy, and at daylight our troops undertook to dislodge him and drive him back.

Upon reporting to General Geary, our brigade was formed in the open field, just in the rear of the line of defences in a column of battalions deployed. After a personal reconnoissance by General Geary and the brigade commander, the One hundred and twenty-second New York, Colonel Titus commanding, was directed to relieve the One hundred and eleventh Pennsylvania, then occupying a position in the front line. This position they held for two hours and a half, under a very severe fire, losing many in killed and wounded, and were then relieved by the Eighty-second Pennsylvania, Colonel Bassett. At 9:20 a. m., the Twenty-third Pennsylvania, Lieutenant Colonel Glenn commanding, was placed in position to support the front line. Three hours later five companies of this regiment, under a galling fire of musketry, were advanced into the breastworks, and, after silencing the enemy's fire, sent out a line of skirmishers, which, however, were promptly recalled, the enemy still being in line of battle in close proximity to our works. At 11 a. m., the Sixty-seventh New York, Colonel Cross, marched into the breastworks from which the enemy were then fleeing, and succeeded in capturing about twenty prisoners. At 11:15 a. m., the Chasseur Regiment (Sixty-fifth New York), Colonel Hamblin, occupied a position in support of the Twenty-third Pennsylvania. About 3 p. m., all of our regiments were relieved by others belonging to the Twelfth Corps.

Longstreet's attack upon our left and Ewell's attack upon our right had both failed; and now a desperate attempt to pierce our centre was to be made. As a prelude to the grand assault of Pickett's Division, 115 pieces of artillery opened their murderous fire upon our lines, and were responded to by about 80 of our own guns. With the order and steadiness of troops on parade, Pickett's lines moved out in view, and commenced to advance across the open field to a point just south of the Cemetery grounds marked by a clump of trees. No sooner was the point of his attack made manifest than every available Union battery was trained upon his columns. The carnage which ensued was terrible; but on they came, alternately wavering, staggering, rallying and pressing forward, until the Rebel General Armistead found himself, pierced by a rifle-shot, within our own lines, followed by a few hundred of the most fortunate and courageous of his men, who became prisoners of war. It was while this was being enacted that our brigade was called from this position on the right to traverse the field and report to General Newton, commanding the First Corps, at the left centre, near the point of Pickett's assault. After the repulse of his infantry charge the Rebel batteries kept up a tantalizing but irregular fire; and one of the last shots fired lost to the Twenty-third Regiment one of its most promising young officers, Lieutenant Garsed. A solid shot literally tore him to pieces. Before darkness had shrouded the field the roar of artillery and the rattling of musketry had ceased. The great battle of the war had been fought. The stillness of the night was broken only by the groans of the wounded and dying, and the rumbling of ammunition and commissary wagons. The losses in both armies amounted to about 50,000 men, equal to one-third of all the number engaged.

The Rebel army was now compelled to abandon all the hopes which its scheme of invasion had inspired; and bitter as the alternative was, its retreat

was imperative. So, after spending the fourth day in burying the dead and caring for the wounded, it silently and sullenly retired from our front on the morning of the 5th, and the Sixth Corps was sent on the Fairfield Road in pursuit. Lee's rear guard was overtaken in a pass of the South Mountain range, but was not pursued beyond it, General Meade having determined to keep his army on the east side of that range.

In an address which I had the honor of delivering upon these grounds two years ago on the occasion of the unveiling of the monument of the Twenty-third Pennsylvania Regiment, I took occasion to refer to an injustice which had been unintentionally done us, in the report of the battle by the army commander. As the remarks I then made in reference to the Twenty-third Regiment are applicable to each and all the regiments of our brigade, I quote them verbatim. After speaking a word of praise in behalf of General Doubleday of the First Corps, and General Sickles of the Third Corps, for the services they rendered on the first and second days respectively, I say:

"And while claiming this special recognition for them, I have a less pleasing, but to you a more important duty to perform, and that is, to demand an official recognition of the services, in this battle, of the brigade to which you were attached. The student who in future years peruses the official reports and records in the War Department, will there find recorded, over the signature of the commander of the Army of the Potomac, that in the battle of Gettysburg Wheaton's Brigade was ordered to the right to aid in driving back the enemy and in retaking the works. In other words the troops of Wheaton's Brigade were credited in the official report of the battle, with the service performed by your brigade. Upon learning of this error I spoke to General Meade about it, at an army reunion held in Boston nine years after the battle, and he promised to have his report corrected. I spoke also to General Wheaton of the credit he had received at another's expense, and of the injustice done the regiments of the First Brigade. He promised that he would write to General Meade upon the subject, but I am not informed that either of the promises were fulfilled. As our great lamented President Lincoln said in commenting upon the battle, 'There was glory enough to go all.' No excuse, therefore, can be given for withholding from any of the troops engaged the full measure of credit due them; much less should one organization be gratified at the expense of another. In justice to the memory of those brave men whose heroic services you this day commemorate, and in justice to you who have been permitted to survive them and to perform the act of soldierly love and friendship, I protest against the wrong which has been done. I may be answered that it matters little so far as the brigade is concerned, since the survivors have erected tablets upon one of the grounds they occupied in this battle. Is it of no consequence to the relatives and friends of those who have died for their country, to their comrades who have survived them, to the officers who commanded them, that the official reports are silent as to the services of the organization with which they fought and died? Nay, more, that such reports should actually give to another organization credit for services which cost them so many lives? For years, and, perhaps, ages, to come the archives of the war will be perused and studied

by the historians and military students in search of material with which to compile history or solve military problems; and must it be said to them, that the records are unreliable,—that to ascertain the services of any particular organization of the army a visit must be made to the battlefields, and the monuments and tablets consulted? Such a confession would be humiliating. But it must be made, so far as it relates to the services of the First Brigade, Third Division, Sixth Corps, in the Battle of Gettysburg; and, if I am correctly informed, in reference to other organizations also. A greater value attaches, therefore, to the testimonials you this day dedicate, than you probably anticipated, for it corrects the record; more than that, it stands alone as the only record accessible to all, that our brigade fought and suffered in this part of the field in the greatest battle of the war."

On the 7th of November following, an advance movement was ordered, and the right wing of the army, composed of the Fifth and Sixth Corps, under the command of General Sedgwick, was moved to a point on the river called Rappahannock Station, at which point the enemy occupied a series of earthworks on the north side of the river, consisting of two or three redoubts and a long line of rifle pits or trenches. The approach to these works was over an open field, which could be swept by the enemy's guns for a considerable distance in every direction; and as the head of our columns debouched from the woods to deploy in line of battle, they furnished a splendid target for the Rebel gunners' practice. The scene was grand beyond description. When the speaker entered the open field the Fifth and part of the Sixth Corps were already in line of battle, with flags flying and bayonets glistening in the sunlight of a beautiful autumn day, having the appearance of troops on dress parade rather than formed for deadly conflict. Like Humphreys' tactical movement of his division on the field of Gettysburg, our brigade was closed up, and without halting advanced and deployed in the position assigned it, having only the sound of the enemy's guns to keep step with. Without delay our brigade was ordered to drive in the Rebel sharpshooters and secure the possession of a knoll in the right and front, for the occupation of a battery. This was quickly done, and soon after the battery was established a column of attack was formed from the Sixth Corps and put in command of General Russell. Colonel Upton led the column with his regiment, and made one of the most brilliant and successful charges ever made upon any field. He not only captured the whole line of works, but with it, some 1,600 prisoners, 6 battle flags, and many pieces of artillery and small arms. His attacking column numbered only 1,500. The service of our brigade, as well as that of Upton's troops, was made the subject of a complimentary order from corps headquarters.

In January, 1864, our brigade was ordered to Sandusky, Ohio, to prevent an anticipated attempt to liberate the Rebel officers confined on Johnson's Island, Sandusky Bay, and remained there until the 12th of April, 1864, when brigade headquarters and three regiments (the Sixty-fifth, Sixty-seventh, and the One hundred and twenty-second New York) proceeded to rejoin the army at Brandy Station.

Grant's overland campaign to Richmond began at midnight, the 3d of May. Our brigade, or rather the three regiments of it in camp, crossed the Rappahannock River.

at Sailor's Creek, a few days later, where the fortunes of war gave to the Sixth Corps the final opportunity to make still more brilliant its record by crushing forever and utterly destroying its ancient antagonist. It is not a little remarkable, but the fact is without dispute, that the Sixth Corps was confronted, in its four years of battling, oftener by Ewell's Corps than by any other in the Rebel army. There seemed, therefore, a Providential dispensation in the circumstances which placed it in the power of the Sixth Corps, at Sailor's Creek, Virginia, on the 6th of April, 1865, to compel General Ewell and all that remained of his corps to lay down their arms and become prisoners of war — the crowning glory of a brilliant record.

During the period of its service the integrity of our brigade was preserved from beginning to end. While, by reorganization of the army and the necessities of the service, whole corps and divisions were broken up and disbanded, our brigade organization continued intact. Regiments were added to it and taken from it, indeed, to such an extent that but one of the original regiments retained its identity in the brigade until the disbandment of the corps and final muster out. The Sixty-fifth New York (First United States Chasseurs, as it was called) was, therefore, the only one of all the original members which retained its identity through four long years of war, and until the final disbandment of the army and muster out. It is said that this was the last regiment of the Army of the Potomac mustered out.

Upon the muster out of the Sixty-seventh New York Colonel Cross retired from the service, and the command of the brigade devolved upon Col. Jos. E. Hamblin, of the Sixty-fifth New York, than whom a more gallant and faithful officer could not be found in the service.

To commemorate the services of this noble body of men upon this field of battle, and to dedicate memorials to their fallen comrades, we have met to-day. In looking back, visions pass before us like a dream. We see the demon of war with haughty mien uplift his arm to assail our national existence. Rebellious hordes are marshalled for unholy conquests. With rapid strides and swift approaches the swelling ranks besiege our Capital. Indignant loyalty with glaring astonishment nerves herself for defence. Liberty is fettered, and affrighted Peace seeks safety in flight.

With sentiment akin to filial love, the masses with one accord uprising and bid defiance. The conflict rages. Death, devastation, and destruction revel. Gloom and sorrow prevail. Portentous clouds of darkness envelop us. Evil spirits with hellish intent pursue unchallenged their damnable ways. The angels mourn, and all nature in darkness weeps. But, see! A silver lining appears. Peering with hopeful aspect, Peace, with olive branch extended, seeks audience. In the distance seething masses of armed men struggle for mastery. With diminished force Rebellion aims her blows, and finally sinks to rise no more. Victory perches on loyalty's crest. Homeward turns the Spartan band, heroes all! Halos of glory illumine the sky. Loved ones meet in joyous ecstasy. Liberty and Peace have resumed their places. The dream has passed; but stern reality bids us inquire, where is father, brother and son. In yonder graves they lie, victims of disloyalty, and

martyrs for their country. Let us keep their memories green, and each recurring year cover them with immortelles, and sweet-scented flowers.

And let us not forget the living heroes. Let us remember that to them we are indebted for the blessings of peace and prosperity which our reunited country now enjoys. Let us remember that the "stars on our banner grew suddenly dim;" and that it was the private soldier who restored to them their lustre, and palsied the hand which attempted their obliteration. While our children are taught to revere that emblem of unity and strength, let them also be taught the danger of assailing it. Teach them to honor its defenders; and if in after time it should again be threatened, let them emulate the patriotic example set by their fathers on this hallowed spot.

ADDRESS BY COL. GEORGE W. FORD.

VETERANS:

Colonel Truesdell whom you all know so well, "Sammy of Ours," as we have affectionately dubbed him, was among the early ones to enlist in the ranks of the *First United States Chasseurs* at Palace Garden, in June, 1861. Be it known, that if not the historian of Shaler's Brigade, he is to-day the living lexicon of all the prominent events (especially the Sixty-fifth Regiment) connected with that brigade from its first inception down to the present time. Comrades, it is unfortunate for you that this same "Sammy of Ours," who was to have announced the program of the closing ceremonies of this interesting day's work around this monument, the Sixty-fifth, should have been taken with a severe cold, reducing his voice to so low a whisper that it would barely prove audible to this large crowd of earnest listeners. Now, friends, if his hoarseness proves such a disappointment to you, I beg that you will sympathize with me when I tell you that but five minutes ago he put this program into my hands, begging me to carry it out, with a few remarks of my own. If a quartermaster (and who ever heard of such a thing) had been called upon to face a brace of Parrots and be blown into 10,000 atoms, I don't believe he could have been more shocked or alarmed than that same quartermaster, obliged under present circumstances to face this critical and good-natured audience of men and women. Why, of course I protested with all my might. But what did this same "Sammy of Ours" do, but to say, if I did not comply, he would report me forthwith to General Shaler for "disobedience of orders and conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman." Well, having tested the martinet qualities of General Shaler's discipline in the field, I replied: "Don't; I'll do it." And so here I stand, trembling with embarrassment under this beautiful bright sunshine, meeting face to face the scarred veterans of that cruel war, and the bright faces and sparkling eyes of our lady friends, whose presence here is nothing less than an inspiration on this joyful occasion.

Now, as I look up and my eyes rest upon that stalwart Sergeant McEntee, who has survived many a hard-fought battle, I cannot but exclaim, God bless him! for he is here to-day among the survivors, bearing the same magnetic

cross on the glorious old flag of the Sixth Army Corps, which he carried through every campaign of the war. And this sacred cross leads me to speak first of one whom we all loved so well, Gen. John Sedgwick,—“Uncle John,” as the boys in blue tenderly called him. It was but a few days since when a chance visit sent me to Cornwall, Connecticut, my own State, and a friend from there drove me over to Cornwall Hollow, the old home and birthplace of our noble commander; and, alas, now his final resting place. There, inclosed in an iron picket fence, surrounded by beautiful hills, one of the loveliest spots on earth perhaps, lies all that was mortal of John Sedgwick; and I read with aching heart and swimming eyes, on that plain granite shaft, simply the day of his birth and death; everything so quiet and unpretentious. And how fitting, these plain surroundings to the great captain’s memory. As you all well know, he hated display of any kind; and there he rests in all his glory.

“He has slept his last sleep,
He has fought his last battle;
No sound can awake him
To glory again.”

I greatly regret the absence of our good friend, General McMahon, so long the firm friend and chief of staff of General Sedgwick, and in whose arms our dear “Uncle John” yielded up his last breath. If he had been here present with us to-day, how eloquently he would have spoken in behalf of his chief’s military and social career.

Comrades, it does not devolve upon me to revert to prominent events connected with the great Rebellion. All that has passed into history, and is now a “twice-told tale.” And as we have just listened to General Shaler’s eloquent and graphic sketch of the battle of Gettysburg, and more particularly the doings of the Sixth Army Corps, there would seem but little for me to say. But right here I would like to remark, but for General Shaler’s prowess, his discipline and bravery, these monuments of this brigade might not have been here. I was with him in the field nearly four years, sleeping under the same blanket, so to speak, partaking of the same mess, following him under all the different phases of the war; and I can sincerely say, that I never knew a braver soldier, or a more upright, honorable gentleman, and one who was more devoted to love of country. His industry and hard work in the field were proverbial. True, he was a martinet; and is there a comrade present here to-day, who fought under his banner, who does not thank him for that same quality, rarely found in the field? Count up on your finger ends, if you please, the number of brigadiers that graduated from the Sixty-fifth, or your own brigade; and then you will find the work of a martinet. In those long evening conversational drills, often on the march, he was ever ready to give instruction and teach the rank and file how to become good soldiers. I am grateful to-day, beyond expression, to see the survivors of Shaler’s Brigade rally around him with so much love and enthusiasm. We all remember his stormy march up Marye’s Heights, when the brave General Newton turned, and said: “Boys, I fear you will never see Shaler again;” showing how perilous the

undertaking was. But perilous as the feat proved to be, the God of Battles was on his side, and he returned unharmed after bravely fulfilling his commission. And it was for this daring charge that the lamented Lincoln, with his own hands, placed upon his shoulder the *star* of merit won on the battlefield. And here to-day, after his long and useful services to his country, his star is still in the ascendant, and a grateful homage of the survivors of his old command is the crowning work of the day; a fitting and closing token of love and admiration to the gallant soldier in the field, as well as to the true and honorable gentleman in private life.

Another great disappointment has fallen upon my heart to-day, and that is in the absence of General Cochrane, the founder, head and front of the old "Chasseurs," the true soldier, the genial gentleman. It was his eloquent tongue that was first heard at "Camp Cochrane," on Queen's Farm, in the early autumn of 1861, in favor of arming the colored men and giving them a prominent place in our ranks. The few living ones here to-day who heard that eloquent appeal have never forgotten it; I never shall. The *New York Herald* in its columns the next morning scouted the idea of arming the colored race. But Simon Cameron, that grand old Roman, then Secretary of War, was on the platform with General Cochrane, and indorsed in telling language every word said on that momentous question. And again, my heart cries out in anguish over the memory of the noble soldier, Joe Hamblin, the hero of a hundred battles; so full of generous impulses, brave even to rashness. How well we all remember at the battle of Sailor's Creek, where the same minie bullet that passed through his leg, killed the splendid horse (a gift from his regiment) under him; and Joe, our Joe, fell fainting to the ground. At that moment some noble fellow of the rank and file rushed forward and pulled him from under his dying horse; and while he was not entirely unconscious, he snatched from his breast a beautiful chasseur badge and pinned it upon the breast of this noble fellow. But our brave General Hamblin recovered, and lived long enough to die peacefully in his bed in the city of New York, July 4, 1870, at once the pride of his regiment, the glory of Shaler's Brigade, and the cynosure of all eyes of the Sixth Army Corps. Peace to his ashes! And right here, too, I miss some old familiar friends, still in the flesh, but absent in the body, that should be standing here,—our fearless, dashing young comrade, as prompt to the call in civil life, as he was to his post of duty in the field—Col. William H. Roome, the able and brave chief of Shaler's staff; and our witty and genial friend, Col. George Bernard, though desperate in battle, "a fellow of infinite jest, of flashes of merriment, that were wont to set the table in a roar." And Capt. Ed. Bernard, who received almost a mortal wound on Malvern Hill, but survived, though disabled for life. And Maj. "Hank" Healey, so badly wounded the night before the attack on Marye's Heights, as to disable him from further service in the regiment. And our brave, young, dashing friend, Major Tailor, who did such splendid work all through the war. I need not say how much we miss these absentees on the last opportunity of ever meeting together again under such happy auspices. And now a few words of affectionate remembrances regarding some of our departed friends and comrades, and I will close this long and somewhat rambling talk.

We all remember our brigade surgeon of the Sixty-fifth, Doctor Petherbridge, than whom a more modest and tender-hearted gentleman never lived. Graduating from a high medical college, he started out in his profession, fully equipped for his honorable calling, and no doubt on the high road to fame in civil life, until the quick eye of General Shaler called him to his staff, where he served faithfully till his promotion to a higher sphere of duty. He worked diligently till the end of the war among the wounded and dying, and in this most important department of active service, where his skill was so often displayed, he won all hearts; a good and true soldier, as well as a skilled physician and accomplished surgeon. He survived the war, and finally passed away in a military hospital, of which he was the chief, of some malignant type of disease,—universally respected, and deeply beloved by all his personal friends and old comrades.

We, of the Sixty-fifth, well remember the tall, grand-looking man, who came to us at Palace Garden, in June, 1861, somewhat under the guise of a stern exterior, and naturally diffident and retiring in his manners. This man was our good and faithful chaplain, Peter H. Burghardt, a descendant of the Huguenots. And although some of our young fellows did not, at first, take kindly to him, later on, as the war progressed, and at its final close, the sterling merits of our comrade came out in bold relief. A devoted chaplain, a brave soldier, loyal and true to the old flag, he passed quietly away at his home in Washington, tenderly mourned by a loving wife and children, and respected by his old comrades-in-arms. Peace to the ashes of a true Christian gentleman!

Among the officers of the Sixty-fifth there was no man who became a more conspicuous figure than Lieut. Col. Thomas H. Higginbotham. He came into our regiment as a captain, at a time we were sorely pressed for recruits, with the full maximum of 101 men from Ohio, and each man a giant in stature. As some of you will remember, he was one of the most enthusiastic soldiers of our regiment, and his expression of the day was: "Bedad Fourd, I understands me juty." With a quick brain to grasp a new subject, he soon mastered military tactics, and with his Scotch-Irish blood, made a bold, splendid fighter. And when he fell at "Cedar Creek," with a bullet piercing his brain, my heart was deeply touched with sorrow. Alas, poor "Tom!" So brave and ambitious, to be cut down in the very flower of young manhood! Peace be with you as a true soldier and a devoted lover of the dear old flag under which you fought so gallantly!

While dwelling upon these personal reminiscences of the past, so identified with us all, my memory calls to mind another departed comrade of the Sixty-fifth, Lieut. Warren H. Hedden, one whom I was proud to call my friend, and one with whom I was daily and closely associated all through the war. I never knew a better trained soldier. You will call to mind his neat and tidy appearance in the ranks, as well as his tall, erect figure and martial tread; but more than all these things, he was the very soul of honor, as well as true in his personal friendships, never shrinking from the call of duty. He, too, served faithfully through the Rebellion, and died but recently of a painful accident, greatly respected and lamented by those who knew him best.

From Lieutenant Hedden my memory naturally reverts to Capt. Nathaniel Ellmaker, Jr., who was assigned for duty to Shaler's Brigade, and whom we all knew so well, and one whom I especially hoped to meet here on this sacred ground. But, alas, the relentless hand of death has been busy with very good friends, and he, too, is no longer among the living. And although we had many a *wordy fight* around the camp-fire at night over the vexed question of forage, it was amicably settled over our coffee and hard tack; and at taps, as we crept under our blankets, with naught above us but Heaven's blue canopy and the stars, it was always with a cheery and cordial "good-night" from one to the other.


Captain Ellmaker was possessed of much character, wise and just, but always just before generous; of splendid physique and health, as well as an indefatigable worker, a true soldier, with an inordinate love of country, the natural instincts of all Pennsylvanians. I have ridden with him often fifty and sixty miles a day in the saddle; and when the time came to dismount at night, I was too tired to stand up, while "Nat," the irrepressible, was as fresh as the "morning star." He was a practical joker, too, and too often at my own expense. I remember one cold night in December, just before the first night at Fredericksburg, he rode on in advance of me several miles, and happened to stumble into a cosy farm house, forgetting in the meantime to come back after his friend. The temptation was too great. Visions of a warm supper and a soft bed besieged his imagination. He sent back a note by his orderly concerning forage for the night; and his closing words were in large letters,— "Yours affectionately in a *Feather Bed!*" while I was out in the storm bewailing my uncomfortable lot. Jolly, good Ellmaker! My heart is too full of you to say more. And so I might go on to the end of the calendar, but for wearying your time and patience.

Comrades, to-day you are revisiting the scene where a quarter of a century ago you stood in all the strength and freshness of young manhood. In looking back over the years gone by you have much to be thankful for. The whole world blesses you for the great work you have accomplished. Slavery is dead. The past is buried; and in a few days, here upon this sacred spot at Culp's Hill, where we now stand, the Blue and Gray will clasp hands in peace and harmony over the "bloody chasm," where, twenty-five years ago, they touched bayonets and fought each other to the bitter end.

And now, comrades, farewell. And in the language of one of America's sweetest poets,—

"So live, that when thy summons comes to join
The innumerable caravan, that moves
To that mysterious realm, where each shall take
His chamber in the silent halls of death,
Thou go not, like the quarry slave, at night,
Scourged to his dungeon, but sustained and soothed
By an unfaltering trust, approach thy grave
Like one that draws the draperies of his couch
About him, and lies down to pleasant dreams."

[REDACTED]



J. B. LYON PRINT.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

66TH NEW YORK INFANTRY.
In the woods west of the Wheatfield.

(INSCRIPTIONS.)

(Front.)

66TH NEW YORK

INFANTRY.

3RD BRIGADE,

1ST DIVISION,

2ND CORPS.

JULY 2, 1863.

6 P. M.

CASUALTIES:

5 KILLED,

29 WOUNDED,

10 MISSING.

DEDICATION OF MONUMENT.

66TH REGIMENT INFANTRY.

October 9, 1889.

ADDRESS OF SAMUEL G. ADAMS.

COMRADES AND FRIENDS:

We are here to-day for the purpose of dedicating the monument erected by the great and generous State of New York to those of the Sixty-sixth Regiment, New York Volunteers, who died on this now historic battlefield, and as well to the survivors who fought, and who by their exertions, their bravery and love for their country, decided on this spot that this was one country; and that from the North to the South, from the East to the West, the Atlantic to the Pacific, there was room but for one government and one flag.

Wars have been waged and battles fought as the consequences of mistaken ideas of patriotism and public policy, but to-day I think no man will say that the war for the Union was a mistake. Even the Southerners, our opponents who were defeated, recognize that their defeat was a blessing in disguise. We are here, however, not to discuss the war and its causes, its conduct, or its results. We are simply to dedicate this monument. And what is more natural and proper than for us to speak of the regiment in whose honor it was erected, and of the battle in which that regiment took such an honorable part.

Our regiment was organized in New York City in 1861, by Col. Joseph C. Pinckney. Its first camp was at Elm Park. It was intended to be a reorganization as volunteers of the old Sixth Regiment, New York Militia, known as the Governor's Guard. This regiment had served the United States for three months under the command of Colonel Pinckney. This reorganization was a nucleus to which several small organizations were joined, making in the end a regiment of about 900 men. The time had come in the history of the war when every man felt that going to the front was no holiday excursion; that it meant hardships, wounds, and perhaps death. All felt that actual, stern and cruel war was upon us, and few members of our regiment left their homes without a full appreciation of the possible consequences to themselves and their families. It is hardly necessary to inquire into the motives of the men who enlisted in 1861. History will credit them with patriotic motives, and correctly, I believe. It is hard to analyze motives, even our own; and it would be difficult for us, at this day, to recall our exact sentiments and emotions at that moment of the country's danger. In all ages men have sacrificed life and limb, wealth and health for their country. I think the sentiment of patriotism is so firmly planted in the average human breast, that there is no inward discussion of the why and wherefore we have the desire to battle for the cause of our country. The same impulse we feel to defend our mothers, wives or children in the moment of danger, compels good citizens to fight for their country in times of peril. There can, then, be no cold deliberation.

Such has been the history of the world in all ages. It is considered the duty of the good citizen to bear arms in times of war as a matter of course.

Such is the theory of this government, and I believe all other governments. And if all men were good citizens it would not be considered a meritorious or a brave act to do so. Simply their duty. All men, however, are not good citizens, and, therefore, while we hold up the cowards and traitors who shirk duty, to public scorn and contempt, we praise and honor the good soldier and good citizen who has done his duty, and we hold them up to the youth of the land as examples. We confer honors upon them. This was the motive which induced the various States of the Union to erect memorials in the shape of monuments to the brave soldiers who, more than a quarter of a century ago, fought and conquered upon this field.

I believe that the men of the Sixty-sixth Regiment, New York Volunteers, did their duty by their country as good citizens through pure patriotism. There was no other incentive.

It was before the time and era of bounties, and the pay — thirteen dollars a month — could hardly have been an incentive to risk life and limb. The Sixty-sixth New York was an ordinary, every-day regiment — one of many of the same kind enlisted for three years or the war. Its members did not rush to arms under the excitement of martial music and fiery oratory. It did not leave the city with the prestige of the more fortunate regiments, with glittering and fancy uniforms. There was no ovation tendered to them on their departure for the seat of war, from which many of them never returned.

Although raised in New York, there was no pride of locality in the men. They came from many different points. There was no county or city that claimed the regiment as its particular offspring, watched its course during the war with pride, and inspired its members by patriotic and encouraging messages. Its recruits came from Maine, Massachusetts, and from various counties in the State of New York. A large number were from Westchester County. It cannot be called a typical city regiment. It was only watched by those at home who were interested in or connected by some tie with the members of the regiment. It was unlike regiments that came from localities, where every man was known, and every man's record discussed (some even to this day), by reason of which and through fear of disgrace and ridicule at home, they were almost compelled to be brave. The majority of the private soldiers of our regiment could have returned at any time to the city of New York without loss of reputation. There was no pride of nationality, for while we had many Germans and Irishmen, the regiment had no nationality predominating to the extent of making it an Irish or German regiment.

It is one thing to lead a forlorn hope, to charge at the head of a body of brave men when the eyes of the whole army or community are upon you, with almost certain promotion or honor as the result. It is another thing to advance on the skirmish line, say in the dark, knowing that personal bravery will not be seen or rewarded. The men of the Sixty-sixth New York Regiment went to the front as men go on the skirmish line under such circumstances. There was a short notice in the morning papers that another regiment had gone to the front, and nothing more. After each engagement there was the usual list of the killed and wounded, with many names spelled wrong. Yet these men fought, and fought well. Attached to a fighting corps, the

Second, they helped as much as any other regiment to win for that corps its reputation.

In a division with such commanders as Sumner, Richardson, Hancock, Barlow, and Miles, there was plenty of fighting to do, and the Sixty-sixth did its share,—did it always and did it gallantly. It took part in twenty-eight battles, and many skirmishes. Its casualties in these battles, while not excessive, were very large, showing a good percentage of loss to the numbers engaged. It was never a very large regiment.

In a report from the Adjutant General of the State of New York, it is credited with having lost 9 officers and 88 enlisted men killed; 4 officers and 120 men by death from disease, and a total loss of 728 killed, wounded, missing and died of disease. This report is erroneous, I think. In one instance, Lieutenant Turbayne is reported as having died at Andersonville of disease. Captain Nelson, of this regiment, a fellow prisoner, saw him shot at Columbia by a Rebel guard. Captain Davis, who is reported as having died of disease, lost a leg in action at Petersburg, and died as the result of an amputation while in prison at Richmond. Thus it will be seen that eleven officers were either killed or died of wounds, while only two died of disease. As to the enlisted men, 88 killed or died of wounds, is, I think, much too small. I am led to this conclusion by reading a copy of the report made by Captain Munn while in command of the regiment, a report required by the War Department, and which I think is correct. In this he reports a loss of 76 men killed, 119 wounded, and 106 missing, from the Wilderness to Appomattox, a total of 304. This would make a total loss to the regiment of about 800 men during the war.

We had received our baptism of fire in May, 1862, two years before the Wilderness campaign. We had been through the Seven Days, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, and many other battles before this time. The greatest number of men lost in any one action was at Antietam, where 11 men were killed, 91 wounded, and 1 missing, making a total of 103 in all. Then next came Fredericksburg, when the regiment was much smaller, with 11 killed, 55 wounded, and 20 missing, making 75 in all. At Spotsylvania, 9 were killed, 44 wounded, and 20 missing. The missing in this battle were mostly wounded and killed; at Chancellorsville, a loss of 70; at Cold Harbor, a loss of 44; Seven Days, a loss of 45; at Gettysburg, 5 killed, 29 wounded, and 10 missing; a total of 44. Here, again, most of the missing were killed or wounded. None of the missing have been seen since the war.

Thus it will be seen that the Sixty-sixth Regiment of New York did its full duty. It belonged to the Army of the Potomac, which always had hard fighting, and which was very often repulsed. It had met with the terrible disasters of Fredericksburg and Cold Harbor, and yet, with unshaken courage after every disaster, and after every repulse, it came bravely to the front and did its duty in response to the call of its country. To that army and to its members, in my opinion, more credit is due than to other armies who did their duty under more favorable and inspiring circumstances.

As we stand here to-day my memory goes back over the twenty-eight years which have passed since we left New York, and I think of the many noble and

gallant soldiers who started out with us, now sleeping their last sleep. Our first commander, Colonel Pinckney, is gone. The gallant Bull, our first lieutenant colonel, and the brave Wehle, and Dodge, our senior captain, laid down their lives at Fredericksburg. Captains Munn and Ince died at Gettysburg. Our second colonel, Orlando H. Morris, died on Cold Harbor's bloody field. Davis lost his life in a Rebel prison as the result of the wounds received in battle, and Turbayne was shot at Columbia by a Rebel guard. Our last colonel, John S. Hammell, who started as a mere boy, being only about seventeen years of age, and who was always ready to lead, died after the war, although he bore upon him the marks of the enemy's bullets. There are very few of us left, as the small assemblage on this occasion will bear witness. While not here in the flesh, we hope and believe that our old comrades who have joined the Grand Army above, are here with us in spirit, watching over us and taking part in the dedication of this stone.

We dedicate this monument to the memory of those of the Sixty-sixth New York who struggled on this field that the Nation might live. Although it recalls sad memories, we perform it cheerfully. We feel that the regiment well deserves this memorial.

To you, Dr. McKnight, as the representative of the Gettysburg Battlefield Association, I, now, on behalf of the survivors of the Sixty-sixth Regiment, New York Volunteers, deliver this memorial tablet.

I hope and believe that it will be a Mecca to which our children and our children's children will make many a pilgrimage, and when gazing on it will say proudly, I am a descendant of one who served in that regiment.

HISTORICAL NOTES.

The Sixty-sixth New York Volunteers were organized in New York City during the summer of 1861 by Col. Joseph C. Pinckney. Its first camp was at Elm Park. It was intended to be a reorganization, as volunteers, of the old Sixth New York State Militia, known as the Governor's Guard, which had already served three months under Colonel Pinckney.

By accessions from this regiment and the consolidation of several small organizations, it finally became a regiment of about 900 men. * * *

The regiment is credited by the Adjutant General of the State with a total loss during the war of 9 officers and 88 enlisted men killed. Four officers and 120 enlisted men died of disease—total, 221 deaths. Also 272 officers and men wounded, 235 missing, making a total of 728.

A loss of 728 men is, without doubt, very nearly the total loss of the regiment during the war, from all causes, but it is not accurate as to the statement of comparative number killed, wounded and missing; also died of disease.

The regiment is credited with a loss of 1 killed, 10 wounded, and 59 missing at the battle of Chancellorsville. Many of the missing here were either killed or wounded, and left on the field. At this battle, the regiment, with others, held that portion of the line commanded by Colonel Miles. After Miles was wounded, the command devolved upon Col. O. H. Morris, and it was always

thought that some of the credit of holding the line should have been given to Morris. It was a difficult position, and was held to the last moment possible. The Sixty-sixth only retreated after a Delaware regiment on its left had been captured. Many were wounded. The retreat was extremely dangerous, and the wounded were left in the hands of the enemy. Some were burnt to death, without doubt, as the woods took fire. Of the 50 missing then, it is fair to assume that many were killed or wounded. Finally, Capt. Daniel Munn, who commanded the regiment for a time after the capture of Colonel Hammell at Petersburg, in a letter to the writer, says:

"You wished me to give a statement of the losses during the Wilderness campaign. I can give a statement of the losses sustained by the regiment from May 2, 1864, to December 30, inclusive. I rendered a report to army headquarters in triplicate, giving the losses by company, in killed, wounded and missing, by name, and the date of the disability. I simply give the company and their aggregate losses during the above-mentioned period.

"I omit the loss by company, but the total was 65 killed, 100 wounded and 49 missing. Most of the missing were captured on the 17th of June at Petersburg, and many of them died in prison."

Captain Munn goes on to say: "When the regiment, April 30, 1864, broke camp, it numbered 265 enlisted men and officers. Our losses were 254 enlisted men and officers, killed, wounded and missing. The regiment gained by recruits and men returned from hospital, during the above period. The morning after your capture, the regiment numbered but 70 men and officers."

It is hard to reconcile this report with that of the Adjutant General of the State, except on the supposition that the State reports were made up from first reports made by regimental adjutants, when there was an uncertainty about the fate of the missing, while Munn's report was made after more accurate information had been obtained.

As to Gettysburg, no accurate account will be attempted. The loss of 5 killed, 49 wounded, and 10 missing, was made on the second day, and is probably a fair percentage of those engaged. Capt. Elijah F. Munn was the first man killed—his death occurring just before the charge through the Wheatfield and while holding position on the left centre. A solid shot passed through his body. Most of the loss was met in the Wheatfield, and the road just beyond. Colonel Morris and Lieutenant Colonel Hammell were both wounded. Capt. George H. Luce was killed, and Lieutenant Banta shot through the lungs. And here, in the woods, at about the most advanced point reached by the regiment in its charge on the enemy, the State of New York has erected a monument to the memory of the men who died there.





J. B. LYON PRINT.

67TH NEW YORK INFANTRY.
On Culp's Hill.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

(INSCRIPTIONS.)

(Front.)

1ST

LONG ISLAND

VOLUNTEERS

67TH N. Y. INF'Y

1ST BRIG.

3D DIV. 6TH CORPS.

(Reverse.)

HELD THIS

POSITION JULY 3,

THEN MOVED

DOUBLE QUICK TO

LEFT CENTRE TO RESIST

CONFEDERATE CHARGE

UPON OUR BATTERIES.

(Left Side.)

ACCEPTED AND MUSTERED IN

AS U. S. VOLUNTEERS

JUNE 20, 1861.

MUSTERED OUT JULY 4, 1864.

320 RE-ENLISTED VETERANS

SERVED THROUGH THE WAR.

(Right Side.)

ENGAGED

IN 23 BATTLES;

ARMY

OF THE POTOMAC.

GETTYSBURG

JULY 2, 3, 1863.

censure, much less of condemnation. There, test of patriotism was fidelity to State; here, it was fidelity to the Union of States, one and inseparable. Fortunately for the solidarity of the Nation, the North prevailed; but even the "Lost Cause" is a cause gained, for has it not roused the genius of industry in the new South? All through her borders the earth has been made to give up its treasures; unnumbered furnaces are belching their fires; factories are filled with busy life; the pick and the anvil are never at rest;—and, above all, slavery has perished from the land.

A hearty greeting to the new era! Welcome, thrice welcome the reign of Peace, and the inestimable blessings that follow upon its restoration! Now, indeed, have the North and South joined hands in a fellowship which is to be hoped will endure forever. Once more are we a united people. The barriers have been broken down, the danger line obliterated. Onward, still onward with unbroken ranks is the march of the Nation. And peace is there, and the old flag, with only added stars.

And comrades, a share of the honor is yours; and yours, too, the well-deserved gratitude of your State and the renewed union of States, ever mindful of its duty to its disabled veterans. Of such are some of you. May your and each of your days be long and peaceful to the end; and when in the twilight of declining years your marching orders shall come, may they find you with your regulation knapsack packed, your accoutrements polished, and all things in order to undergo the last inspection. But fear naught:

"If there be on this earthly sphere
A boon, an offering Heaven holds dear,
'Tis the last libation Liberty draws
From the heart that bleeds and breaks in her cause."

ORATION OF REV. THOMAS K. BEECHER.

VETERANS, COMRADES, CITIZENS:

We are met to set a monument—to dedicate a memorial stone.

In 1861 a thousand men took the soldier's oath. Through years of hardship they did their duty. Their blood stained twenty battlefields. Their dead lie buried where their deeds were done. Their living served to the end of the war and honorable discharge.

A handful that yet survives are here met, to set this monument to the memory of this thousand men—the Brooklyn Phalanx—Long Island First—the New York Sixty-seventh—the name has varied; the fact remains, a thousand men did their duty.

The whole thousand, I say. For, strangely enough, we need reminding that great battles, though fought by all, are won by the survivors only. All victories are due to the men who are not killed. Yet we often glorify and belaud the dead as the ones to whom we are chiefly indebted.

To be a good soldier and die is a manly feat. To be a good soldier and live is manlier. To be a good citizen — upright before God and downright with men — is manliest of all, because most complex, difficult, and least rewarded.

A million men at call of our chief magistrate, volunteered and became soldiers. This was the world's wonder.

They fought their battles, buried their dead, went home with their wounded, and became citizens once more! This was and is the greater wonder. The muster-in surprised mankind. The muster-out astounded them.

As, after a tornado curious men pick their way backward along the track of it, to note the lay of trees and beams and even straws and by them learn the law of storms,— so, now that the war is ended, is it still too soon to go back along the track of it, and note whence it came and why it raged? The wisdom or unwisdom, the reason or the folly illustrated? These thousands in their graves have surely died in vain, if standing among them we can have no profitable speech together?

The facts recited, shall be as colorless as the items of a bookkeeper's balance-sheet.

In 1776, thirteen colonies, by their representatives in Congress or Convention, called "God to witness the rectitude of our (their) intentions" and declared themselves "free and independent States."

In 1787, these free and independent States proposed a "more perfect union" in the name of the people. "We the people" they said in their preamble to the proposed Constitution. But:—

In the last article of the same Constitution we read of "the States ratifying the same" as establishing the Constitution between the States so ratifying.

In 1788, by June, the States had so ratified the Constitution; and in 1789, an orderly, constitutional government came into power, George Washington its executive.

In 1860-61 four of these very States that had formed the Union, with seven other States that had been added, assumed to "retrace" their steps and cease to be members of the Union. They formed or had come into the Union freely, voluntarily; they proposed to go out by the same door.

Their reasons for this step need not be stated here and now. One thing at a time.

A grave question of law and duty arose, deeper than the Constitution itself, viz.:

Has a State that has once ratified the Federal Constitution, and formed or come into the Union, a right to retrace her steps and go out and part, and be, as she was originally, free and independent?

Where shall, where could citizens look or listen for an answer to this question, conclusive, authoritative?

For more than thirty years political doctrine and controversy had flamed around this question until the masses of population came unconsciously to a welding heat, and a local unity of sentiment upon one side and the other. Hot and united, the people were ready to act; and they acted.

Eleven States, acting in an orderly manner, by conventions lawfully called, retraced their steps with accuracy, and supposed themselves to have become once more free and independent.

They went on accordingly. The old partnership dissolved they offered to "divide the effects by negotiation."

Now it happened that certain ports, custom-houses, post-offices, and other real estate lay within the bounds of these States that supposed themselves once more free and independent. Real estate cannot be moved off. The soil remains in its place. It must be given over to the State within whose bounds it lies or stands. The United States officers must cease from function, surrender office, title, keys and cash.

This logical demand was made, refused, enforced by arms, resisted, and a great civil war began.

By the only voice authorized to speak for the United States, and by speaking bind them, proclamation had been made:—

"In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow countrymen, and not in mine are the momentous issues of civil war. The Government will not assail you. You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors. You have no oath registered in heaven to destroy the Government, while I have the most solemn one, to preserve, protect and defend it."

Argument and entreaty cease when battles begin.

The question was, may a once free and independent State retire from a Union that she has helped to form, or has entered voluntarily?

Possibly this was one of those many questions that arise in history that cannot be answered unanimously by the intellect or reason or conscience of erring, finite men. Appeal must be had to force. Offences must needs come.

On scores, nay hundreds of battlefields great and small, this case was called for argument and adjudication during the years 1861-5.

Easily the greatest, bloodiest and most nearly decisive of them all, was the battle on this field where we now stand. The rules of procedure for the trial for this grave question of organic law in these courts of last resort were simple and uniform. The story of one describes them all.

Twenty-five years ago where we now stand, 150,000 picked men came thronging. Soldiers all, they deployed one-half over against the other half; three days with little rest by night, they strove together, to ascertain which half could kill most men.

Lest any should kill the wrong man the one-half wore gray clothes and the other blue.

At the end of three days 45,000 men were missing, wounded or dead.

Twenty thousand of these had worn blue clothes. Twenty-five thousand gray. And the grays went out of court.

And so it became clear to us and to all mankind that the men in blue were right, and the men in gray wrong. And another battle was added to the world's list of battles that have shaped the course of history.

It is not known what those dead men think of the Battle of Gettysburg at whose cost it was fought.

From out of bodies, shot, shattered, bloody, battered, the souls of men went

forth mid dust and smoke and thunder to learn the lessons and the language of the dead. For three days their solemn exodus lasted along the paths of mystery.

What salute or countersign these soldiers exchanged; what conference or controversy they set up; or with what awe and curiosity they moved along to meet their destiny, we may not say; we do not know.

By this great battle, and others like it the question was at last decided. A result and settlement were come by, which few now regret, and none resist.

In no long time after the battle on this famous field all the armies melted away, soldiers became citizens, and grass began to grow once more.

Then he, who at the first had said to all his countrymen, "We are not enemies but friends! We must not be enemies!"—his duty done as President, himself went forth to be joined to the army of the dead that lingered for their leader.

On the day when the Church commemorates the sacrifice of the world's Redeemer, Abraham Lincoln died, and, may we not reverently say, took his place as leader of the men who had died in settlement of the Nation's controversy, for them to speak, as was his gift and wont, the truth with magnanimity:—

These, my countrymen untimely dead, be soldiers all who did their duty. At call of magistrate they took up their arms; these to quell insurrection, these to repel invasion, all obediently and with courage. Thy judgments, O God, are true, and righteous altogether. Let it be unto Thy servants, according to the sincerity of their purpose, the courage of their endeavor, the multitude of Thy compassions and the bounty of Thy grace.

The judgment of God has not yet been published.

As one of the incidents of the war, not wholly unforeseen, slavery or involuntary servitude disappeared. "All knew that this interest was somehow the cause of the war." "It may seem strange," said our President, "that any men should dare to ask a just God's assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other men's faces. But let us judge not, lest we be judged."

To escape from compulsory toil and live in easy circumstances is the ambition of most men, the attainment of the envied few. Yes, the slave market is closed. The labor market opens everywhere. Involuntary servitude has ceased—so it is written. Is there then a *voluntary* servitude? Have cruel compulsions ceased? He who buys labor in the labor market, is buying men and women and children.

One, and an ancient form of industrial organization has come to an end—chattel slavery. What is to take its place does not yet appear.

The restlessness, envy, and even malignity that prevail among our laborers in their voluntary servitude, so-called, chasten the rejoicing of the thoughtful over the downfall of responsible, conservative, patriarchal, chattel slavery.

The Creator of mankind persists in sending into this world men so feeble and men so strong that to get on at all they become led and leaders, owned

and owners. In one age we find the military despotism. In another slavery — captives and their children serving their conquerors. In another priestly domination, and “slaves of superstition.” In another hereditary royalty, and taxtamed loyalty. In this our age, O, shade of Thomas Jefferson, how shall thine equal men whom God endows so unequally, get on together?

The reply that seems to be a making to this question is this: Our free and equal men may be, and have, and do whatever they can buy and pay for — cash or credit. If a man have money he is free. If he have no money he must be a slave or a tramp. This experiment is on trial. With what outcome let us watch and see. Let the hopeful rejoice with trembling. Let the anxious and the careful cast their care on God, who careth for us all.

And so with gratitude, sobriety and courage we set up and dedicate this our memorial stone and exult together. Our thousand Brooklyn boys arose up early, toiled all the day, and when it was evening they saw the bow of peace, and went home contented. But:—

A grander monument than this, or these, not made like them with hands, nor graven by art or man’s device, is standing broad and high, to certify mankind that our living labored, and our dead died not in vain. Rising from either ocean and reaching to the other, its base is the western continent; its uplift tops the clouds, salutes the morning and detains the evening sun. Its carvings are the work of ancient days, when by the word of God the waters ran down and found their place and the dry land appeared, a continent unveiled. Its decorations are the forests, rivers, plains and valleys, rejuvenated by each returning spring. Its inscriptions are the cities, villages, farms and homes of men.

Set thus between the oceans, *The United States*, thank God! still united; her own magnificent monument and memorial proclaims, and certifies the world, that we fought a good fight and kept our faith in those days by gone, whose deeds we celebrate.

One people, one language, one Constitution, one flag, and one God, over all and in us all, blessed forever.

REMARKS OF CAPT. THOMAS McKENNA MILLS.

COMRADES:

I feel satisfied from the happy and smiling faces around me that you are all proud of our beautiful monument, and of our glorious Empire State that placed it here to mark one of our positions on this famous battlefield.

It was the wonder of many after the battle, and has since been said to have been almost miraculous, that our losses were so small, considering the part we took, in the second and third days’ fight. General Geary expressed surprise that we got into position without loss, with the enemy among the trees but a few yards away. All the credit is due to the careful handling of the regiment by our commander, General Cross, who is with us to-day. One regiment on our left lost 11 men in going into position with less exposure than we had.



J. B. LYON PRINT.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

68TH NEW YORK INFANTRY.
East Cemetery Hill, foot of northeasterly slope.

(INSCRIPTIONS.)

(Front.)

68TH

NEW YORK

INFANTRY,

1ST BRIGADE,

1ST DIVISION,

11TH CORPS.

(Reverse.)

THIS REGIMENT

HAVING

PARTICIPATED IN

THE FIRST DAY OF

THE BATTLE, HELD

THIS POSITION

ON THE 2D AND 3D

OF JULY, 1863.

(Left Side.)

CASUALTIES.

KILLED 8

WOUNDED 63

MISSING 67

(Right Side.)

MUSTERED IN AT

NEW YORK CITY,

AUG. 24, 1861.

MUSTERED OUT AT

FORT PULASKI, GA.,

Nov. 30, 1865.

DEDICATION OF MONUMENT.

68TH REGIMENT INFANTRY.

HISTORICAL SKETCH BY MAJ. ARNOLD KUMMER.

The Sixty-eighth New York Regiment was recruited by its officers in the city of New York during the months of July and August, 1861. It was made up almost entirely of Germans, a majority of whom had resided in the United States for a number of years prior to enlistment, and contained as good fighting material as any of the regiments that enlisted for the war, many of its members having seen service in the German and Austrian armies. It was named in honor of Simon Cameron, Secretary of War.

After being mustered into the United States service, the Sixty-eighth, under the command of Col. Robert J. Betge, left for Washington, D. C., on the 10th of September, with the regulation strength of 1,020 men, without arms, and without any baggage, where arms and ammunition were received. After a short stay at the Arsenal, the regiment was ordered to Roach's Mills, Va., where it was assigned to Blenker's Division, then stationed near Hunter's Chapel.

Along with the other regiments belonging to this division the Sixty-eighth was stationed along the line of the defences of Washington during the winter. In March, 1862, the Army of the Potomac was ordered to move and started on the Peninsular campaign. Blenker's Division, General Sumner's corps, was to have accompanied the army, but when it was ready to embark orders were issued to General McClellan's army, and ordering it to join General Sumner's corps, then operating in the mountains of West Virginia. The Sixty-eighth, prior to this campaign, numbered 807 officers and men, and with something like 1000 horses, was ordered to join Blenker's Division on March 18, 1862, and to move on to Winchester.

During the march and counter-marches ensued, during which the division suffered greatly from inclement weather, scanty rations, and lack of shelter and tents. The division arrived at Winchester, Va., on the 20th of April, from whence it marched to the Shenandoah Valley.

In the Shenandoah Valley the regiment was present at the battle of Cross Keys, but it was only slightly engaged, and suffered no casualties. It was then ordered to join General Sigel's Division, and was assigned to Steinwehr's (Second) Brigade. On June 30, 1862, Generals McDowell, Banks, and Fremont were ordered to move on to the Army of Virginia, the command of which was then held by General Sigel. Under this arrangement the Sixty-eighth was assigned to Steinwehr's (Second) Division, Sigel's Division. It was assigned his commission, August 6, 1862, and was commanded by John H. Kleefisch.

The regiment was stationed at Thoroughfare Gap, Va., where it received orders, and on the 10th of September, 1862, it was ordered to move on to the Army of Virginia.

of August it reached Culpeper Court House, one day after the battle of Cedar Mountain. From the 16th of August on, the regiment took part in all the engagements around Gainesville, White Sulphur Springs, and Warrenton Junction, which culminated in the Second Battle of Bull Run.

The regiment was actively engaged, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Kleefisch, on August 29th and 30th, in the battles known respectively as Groveton and Second Bull Run, sustaining a loss of 13 killed, 68 wounded (including those mortally wounded), and 11 missing; total, 92. Although the men had taken part in several skirmishes and reconnoissances in force, this was their first experience under a heavy fire; but they acquitted themselves with honor, their movements under fire being executed with the same precision and steadiness as if on ordinary drill. The brigade moved on the field in column by division on the centre, forming afterwards in columns by companies left in front, the Sixty-eighth holding the right of the line, and deploying as it came under fire. Col. John A. Koltes, the commander of the brigade, fell dead in front of this line while swinging his sword high in air and calling on his men to charge a battery, the flying fragments from an exploding shell killing both horse and rider. Lieutenant Colonel Kleefisch was mortally wounded in this battle.

In the operations from August 16 to September 2, 1862, including the battle of Second Bull Run, the casualties in the Sixty-eighth were: Killed, Lieutenant Lindstrom and 13 men; mortally wounded, Lieutenant Colonel Kleefisch; wounded, Captains von Dalwigk and Koeberlin; Lieutenants A. Kummer, von Amelunxen, von Schaumburg and 66 men; missing, 11 men; total, 97.

After the defeat of General Pope at Manassas his troops were added to the Army of the Potomac and reorganized by General McClellan, who changed the numerical designations of the three corps which had belonged to Pope's Army of Virginia. Under this arrangement General Sigel's corps became the Eleventh Corps of the Army of the Potomac, and the Sixty-eighth New York was placed in Schimmelfennig's (First) Brigade, of Schurz's (Third) Division. The corps was stationed in the defences of Washington, while the main army marched away on the Antietam campaign.

Lieutenant Colonel Kleefisch died of his wounds at Washington, D. C., September 22, 1862, leaving the regiment under the command of Maj. Carl von Wedell. During the greater part of September, October, and November, 1862, the regiment was encamped in the neighborhood of Washington, Dumfries, New Baltimore, and Fairfax Court House, Va., and arrived near Fredericksburg on the 15th of December. The Sixty-eighth was not present at the battle of Fredericksburg, as the Eleventh Corps was held in reserve, and was several miles distant from the field.

After taking part in the second move of General Burnside on Fredericksburg, in January, 1863, the regiment went into winter quarters near Stafford Court House until April the 27th. In the meantime Gotthilf Bourry had been commissioned colonel of the regiment to fill the vacancy caused by the resignation of Colonel Betge, and General Sigel was succeeded by General Howard in command of the Eleventh Corps.

Upon the opening of the Chancellorsville campaign the regiment, under command of Colonel Bourry, left its winter quarters at Brooke's Station, near Aquia Creek, Va., starting on the morning of April 27, 1863. The regiment numbered 259 present for duty. It was engaged in the fighting on the evening of May 2d, when Jackson made his flank attack on the Eleventh Corps, which held the right of the Union army. Through the neglect at corps headquarters to make the necessary disposition of troops to meet this attack,—ample notice of which had been given,—the Eleventh Corps was taken at a terrible disadvantage, and after an hour's fighting was driven from the field. In this disastrous affair, the Sixty-eighth New York, in company with the other regiments of Schurz's Division, made a gallant effort to stem the tide of defeat, and did not abandon their position until one-fourth of their number had fallen. Among the killed in the Sixty-eighth were Maj. Robert Rother and Lieut. Adelbert Hoya. The battle having ended, Hooker's defeated army recrossed the Rappahannock, and the little regiment returned to its abandoned camp at Brooke's Station.

On the 9th of June the Sixty-eighth was transferred to Von Gilsa's (First) Brigade, of Barlow's (First) Division. On the 12th tents were struck, and the Army of the Potomac set out on its march through Northern Virginia and Maryland, to Gettysburg. The regiment was still under command of Colonel Bourry, and on June 30, 1863, the day before the battle of Gettysburg, it mustered 16 officers and 251 men present for duty, while resting at Emmitsburg, Md., about ten miles from the battlefield.

The regiment reached Emmitsburg, Md., on the evening of the 30th, and on the morning of the 1st of July, found itself in a drenching rain on the road to Gettysburg. At about 10 o'clock heavy cannonading in front was heard, and, soon after, the news of the death of General Reynolds, commander of the First Corps, was spread through the ranks. The order to advance at double-quick was given as the regiment approached the town, which was quickly traversed and position taken north of it, where we deployed in line of battle to face the enemy who were rapidly approaching. The engagement lasted until 3 p. m., when outflanked and outnumbered the Eleventh Corps was ordered to retreat to Cemetery Hill, which was occupied by General Steinwehr's Division as a reserve. The movement was executed in good order; but in passing through the town, the Sixty-eighth was ordered to throw out a line of skirmishers to cover the left flank, many of whom were cut off and taken prisoners by the enemy, who were closely pressing in the rear. The regiment was assigned a position at the foot of the hill under the guns of the corps artillery, which it occupied during the remainder of the battle.

The morning of the 2d of July passed without important events; but in the afternoon a Rebel battery took position in a wheatfield towards the northeast, and a heavy artillery duel commenced which lasted until about 5 p. m., when, what was left of the enemy's battery retreated. It was evident that an attack on our position was contemplated, and about 6 o'clock the assault began with great violence. Our lines were driven up the hill where a fierce fight occurred for the possession of our artillery; but reinforcements came to our assistance and the enemy was driven back, the regiment regaining its

former position, which it kept in spite of further repeated attacks by the Rebels. The loss in killed and wounded was considerable. This ended the regiment's active participation in the battle.

The losses of the Sixty-eighth at Gettysburg were: Killed, Captain Friedrich and 7 men; wounded, Capt. A. Kummer and 62 men; taken prisoners and missing, Capt. A. Von Haake, Lieut. Otto Mussehl and 65 men; total, 138.

The 63 wounded included many who died of their wounds; the 67 captured or missing embraced many who were killed and left on the field, but whose fate could not be ascertained because the Union troops lost possession of the ground where the fighting on the first day occurred, and in which most of the casualties in the regiment occurred. The actual percentage of loss was still greater than the figures given indicate; for the 277 "present for duty" at the muster on the previous day included a large number of musicians and other noncombatants, to say nothing of those who fell out during the long, hot, rapid march made in order to reach the field. Capt. Otto Friedrich, who was killed, was a gallant officer, beloved and respected by all who knew him.

After Gettysburg the regiment joined in the pursuit of Lee's army, and recrossing the Potomac returned to Virginia. It was stationed in the neighborhood of Centreville and Manassas Junction, where it was assigned to the duty of guarding the railroad.

In September, 1863, the Eleventh Corps was sent to the relief of Chattanooga, Tenn., the troops making the long journey from Virginia by rail. The Sixty-eighth was now in Hecker's (Third) Brigade, of Schurz's (Third) Division. The Second Division did not accompany the corps to the west, but was transferred to the Coast Department of South Carolina and never rejoined it. The Sixty-eighth, under command of Lieut. Col. Albert von Steinhäusen, participated in the battle of Wauhatchie, Tenn., on October 28, 1863, the battle occurring in the night. At this battle the regiment numbered only 127 men present for duty, its ranks having dwindled to that through sickness, wounds, death, discharges for disability, and lack of recruits.

Camp was broken again on November 21st, and on the 23d, General Howard's Corps was placed in position near Fort Wood, in rear of the centre of the army, which was about to attack the position of General Bragg on Missionary Ridge. The regiment was not under fire on the first day of the battle, but on the 24th the corps was shifted to the left of the line, participating in some lively skirmishes with the enemy. Immediately after Bragg's retreat the regiment found itself on the road to Knoxville, Tenn., as part of General Sherman's command, to relieve General Burnside. Upon its return it went into winter quarters near Bridgeport, Ala. Colonel Bourry having left the regiment in October, 1863, Felix Salm Salm, a prince and officer in the German army, was commissioned colonel of the Sixty-eighth. Salm Salm was a gallant and accomplished officer, but he had no opportunity to distinguish himself, for the regiment was not in action after he took command. He returned to Germany at the close of the American war and was killed a few years later at the head of his regiment at Gravelotte, a battle in the Franco-Prussian War.

Having enlisted for three years, the regiment had now — in January, 1864 — served about 2 years and 6 months. When asked to enlist for another period of three years, or the war, it renewed its oath of allegiance to the Union cause, and on the 26th of January, started for New York on a four weeks' leave of absence. On its return the regiment went into camp at Whiteside, Tenn. Having received recruits at different times the regiment now numbered about 400 men present for duty.

Upon the organization of the Twentieth Army Corps, formed by the consolidation of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, the regiment was assigned to the Fourth Division. This division never served with the corps proper but was assigned to guard duty along the line of the railway communications of Sherman's army during his Atlanta campaign.

When, in May, General Sherman began his celebrated march to Atlanta and the Sea, the Sixty-eighth with other troops was left behind to guard the railroad and railroad bridges between Bridgeport, Ala., and Whiteside, Tenn. The commanding officer was General Steedman, with headquarters at Chattanooga. Until November, 1864, the position of the regiment remained unchanged; but when, in November and December, Hood invaded Tennessee for the purpose of beating General Thomas at Nashville and destroying the line of supply of General Sherman's army, it undertook several expeditions, supported by the gunboats on the Tennessee River, to Decatur and Huntsville, Ala., and Florence, Miss., taking part in a number of engagements, making many prisoners, and enduring all the hardships of a winter campaign in the mountains. For the rest of the winter the regiment encamped again at Bridgeport, and on the 19th of March, 1865, was ordered to Cleveland, Tenn., where it remained until the 2d of May, when it was divided into detachments with orders to guard the railroad at Chattanooga, Tenn., and Dalton, and Tunnel Hill, Ga.

The war was over, but on the 1st of July the regiment was ordered to Atlanta, Ga., where it arrived on the 8th, and was again broken up in detachments which were stationed at Madison, Macon, and Griffin, Ga.

In these places our duties were of a decidedly peaceful nature. The colored people of the district had been manifesting an inclination to leave the plantations, which the Government in the interest of the planters and the growing crops, as well as of the blacks themselves, was determined to prevent. Our orders, therefore, were to make written contracts between the planters and their former slaves, by which the planters were to retain two-thirds of the growing crops, and take care of the colored people, while the latter were to receive one-third of the crops, besides patches for watermelons and vegetables, obligating themselves to stay on the farms and do their work as before. Every morning, two, three, or more landowners of the surrounding country would appear at headquarters with their former slaves; the situation was explained, the contract written out and signed by the planters, and for the colored people by the commanding officer, who would then step out among the waiting crowd, show the contract, confirm its validity, and admonish the men and women to return peacefully to their work. In all cases the agreement, as authorized and confirmed by the officer, seemed perfectly acceptable to the colored people, and his directions were cheerfully obeyed.

The war had now been over several months, and the regiment was anxious to go home; but although the three detachments were ordered back to Atlanta on August 9th, the regiment remained in this city until the 4th of October, when it boarded the cars for Waynesborough, Ga. From this place the railroad had been destroyed, and so we marched to Savannah, and from there were transported by boat to Fort Pulaski.

While in the fort, guard duty, drilling and dress parade were the duties of the day, when at last, towards the end of November, Capt. Henry L. Wood appeared with others to discharge the men. Papers were prepared as speedily as possible and on the 30th of November the regiment was mustered out of service. On the 6th of December, 1865, it embarked on the Steamship Varuna, arriving in New York on the 10th, was paid off at Hart's Island on the 14th, and disbanded.

Thus ended a long and eventful term of service, undertaken in the service of the country under the glorious Stars and Stripes for the restoration of the Union.

(INSCRIPTIONS.)

SICKLES' EXCELSIOR BRIGADE

2D BRIGADE, 2D DIVISION, 3D CORPS.

COL. W. R. BREWSTER, COMMANDING.

POSITION JULY 2, 1863, 2 TO 6 P. M.

JULY 3, SUPPORTED LEFT CENTRE.

E PLURIBUS UNUM.

70TH NEW YORK INFANTRY,

(1ST EXCELSIOR)

ON THE AFTERNOON OF THE 2D OF JULY 1863, THE BRIGADE OF WHICH THIS REGIMENT FORMED A PART SUPPORTED CARR'S BRIGADE IN RESISTING THE ASSAULT OF THE ENEMY ALONG THE LINE OF THE EMMITSBURG ROAD. ON JULY 3, SUPPORTED THE LEFT CENTRE OF THE ARMY.

CASUALTIES

32 KILLED. 81 WOUNDED, 4 MISSING.

TOTAL 117.

MUSTERED IN JUNE 20, 1861. MUSTERED OUT, JULY 1, 1864.

71ST NEW YORK INFANTRY

(2ND EXCELSIOR)

ON THE AFTERNOON OF THE 2D OF JULY 1863, THE BRIGADE OF WHICH THIS REGIMENT FORMED A PART SUPPORTED CARR'S BRIGADE IN RESISTING THE ASSAULT OF THE ENEMY ALONG THE LINE OF THE EMMITSBURG ROAD. ON JULY 3D, SUPPORTED THE LEFT CENTRE OF THE ARMY.

CASUALTIES.

14 KILLED, 64 WOUNDED, 13 MISSING.

TOTAL, 91.

MUSTERED IN JUNE 20, 1861. MUSTERED OUT JULY 30, 1864.



J. B. LYON PRINT.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

70TH, 71ST, 72D, 73D, AND 74TH NEW YORK INFANTRY.
EXCELSIOR BRIGADE, THIRD CORPS.

In the field north of the road leading from Little Round Top to the Peach Orchard.

72D NEW YORK INFANTRY

(3D EXCELSIOR)

ON THE AFTERNOON OF THE 2D OF JULY 1863, THE BRIGADE OF WHICH THIS REGIMENT FORMED A PART SUPPORTED CARR'S BRIGADE IN RESISTING THE ASSAULT OF THE ENEMY ALONG THE LINE OF THE EMMITSBURG ROAD. ON JULY 3, SUPPORTED THE LEFT CENTRE OF THE ARMY.

CASUALTIES.

7 KILLED, 94 WOUNDED 15 MISSING.

TOTAL 116.

MUSTERED IN JUNE 20, 1861. MUSTERED OUT JULY 19, 1864.

73D NEW YORK INFANTRY

(4TH EXCELSIOR, "2D FIRE ZOUAVES").

AT 5.30 P. M. JULY 2, 1863, THIS REGIMENT WAS DETACHED TO SUPPORT GENERAL GRAHAM'S BRIGADE AT THE PEACH ORCHARD WHICH WAS HEAVILY ATTACKED BY MCLAW'S DIVISION OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY. ON JULY 3, SUPPORTED THE LEFT CENTRE OF THE ARMY.

CASUALTIES.

51 KILLED, 103 WOUNDED, 8 MISSING.

TOTAL 162.

MUSTERED IN JULY 10, 1861. MUSTERED OUT JUNE 29, 1865.

74TH NEW YORK INFANTRY

(5TH EXCELSIOR)

ON THE AFTERNOON OF THE 2D OF JULY, 1863, THE BRIGADE OF WHICH THIS REGIMENT FORMED A PART SUPPORTED CARR'S BRIGADE IN RESISTING THE ASSAULT OF THE ENEMY ALONG THE LINE OF THE EMMITSBURG ROAD. ON JULY 3D, SUPPORTED THE LEFT CENTRE OF THE ARMY.

CASUALTIES

17 KILLED, 69 WOUNDED, 3 MISSING.

TOTAL 89.

MUSTERED IN JUNE 20, 1861. MUSTERED OUT JUNE 26, 1864.

and brilliant page was about to be added to it, and many another afterwards, but the rising sun of that fateful 2d of July, as its early rays shot across the shoulder of the Little Round Top, beheld an Excelsior Brigade that needed not the ordeal it awoke to face to prove its quality. Its fiery baptism was long past. It had then a record of which its very colors, as the sunshine kissed their folds rustling in the gentle summer air, were proud. It had ample reason to know, and did know, the stuff it was made of. It was conscious of a tried and seasoned soldiery. It was sure of itself that in whatever emergency, and in whatever fortune, it would act its part.

It is quite impracticable for me, within the limits proper to this address, to recapitulate, however briefly, the story of its service; even that portion of it which, in honor of the fallen, whose memorial we have journeyed hither to dedicate, it would in particular be fitting to rehearse. It is too long; there is too much of it, and I shall not make the attempt. But, saving the First Bull Run, and Antietam, from which Hooker's old division, reduced to a skeleton, exhausted, well-nigh destroyed, was withheld, it had stood in the powder smoke of every considerable action which down to that time was inscribed on the banners of the ever-glorious Army of the Potomac; that peerless army which, from first to last, and through all vicissitudes to which it was subject, oftentimes so dark, never for one moment lost its high-hearted confidence, or dreamed of aught but success in the event.

Our men who died on this field — almost all of them — saw Yorktown, Williamsburg, Fair Oaks, Malvern Hill, Bristoe Station, Second Bull Run, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville. I do not forget that superb regiment from the banks of the Hudson; that though it had not been with us in our earlier campaigns, had yet become so incorporate with us that it stood that day in our line fit and rightful partaker of the honors of our name, in the work of advancing which, before the night fell, and on many a later field, it was so heroically to share. Forever will the Old Excelsior Brigade congratulate itself upon the fortune that awarded the One hundred and twentieth New York to its fellowship; for a nobler regiment never shouldered arms.

If I cannot recite the history that lay behind us on the 2d of July, 1863, still less can I call up in separate mention the men by whose toils and deeds it had been illumined. Many of them were not here; some had been parted from by the call of honorable promotion. The accomplished Dwight, whose recent death has brought back to us the vision of his robust young manhood, laurelled by wounds received in front of Fort Magruder, was away in another army. Knightly Graham, always identified with us in the reckoning of fond attachment, the flower of our chivalry, was mustering his sturdy brigade immediately on our left, where the resistless wave of onset will presently strike him, and since it cannot move, will overwhelm him. And others, who had served with us, were on duty elsewhere.

But many, alas, many more were absent from us in another and sadder separation. We had left them behind sleeping in soldiers' graves. Under the pines of Williamsburg, beside the flowing stream of the Chickahominy and the Rappahannock, and on the Manassas Plain, we had laid them down with tears and with farewells. If the dead are mindful of the living and can

visit them, may we not think that their dear spirits hovered over us that day and kept us viewless company while we moved out to battle; that the brave, beloved, pure-hearted Stevens looked down on us with a commander's and a comrade's blessing; he and many another whom in that silent hour we remembered and missed. A long and shining list it was already, the roll of our heroic fallen, ere it was augmented by the names which that dread afternoon was to hallow with its deathless renown.

But there were heroes remaining. The living were worthy of the dead. I see them, as my youthful eyes beheld them, marshalling for the mortal encounter which they knew, and were content to know, was now at last to be joined. Not a musket-bearer but foresaw that it was to be an encounter tremendous, terrific, gigantic. Not a drummer boy but understood how much hung on its issue; not a soul but was ready for it.

Oh, but it was a goodly sight to see — that gallant array! Nothing in all my memory of the war has left such an abiding impression with me as a military spectacle, as the advance of our division towards the Emmitsburg Road, while the silent gathering cloud along our front was just bursting into flame; but it was upon the Excelsior Brigade that my gaze was fastened, for my heart was there. I find it set down in my journal of that day, that watching it, I said to myself, "There go the bravest men in this army." Forgive me, fellow soldiers, who, in that same hour, stood in equal daring under other standards. Forgive me, ye slumbering host, whose dust makes the place of your rest glorious forever. I meant no comparison. I was but speaking of my own. But surely there were none braver. Their leaders pass before me: Farnum, Potter, Leonard, Burns, Holt; and at the head, strong, calm, sturdy Brewster; each at his post, true commanders, intrepid spirits, one and all, fit to lead. And in the ranks veterans like them, as fit to follow; the light of valor in every bronzed face; a solid line of manhood; the flag of the world's brightest hope over them, marching with firm, eager step into the open field. Never, so long as memory holds her seat, will that sight be forgotten, or its power to quicken the currents of the heart be lost.

It is a remnant only of the old brigade, 1,700 in all, but it is a notable body of men pushing on there into the blazing battle's edge; in some respects a singular body of men. It is unique in its composition. In it is largely represented each of the three martial races that furnish the bulk of the total volunteer force of the Union. In that line, shoulder to shoulder with those who were born beneath the Stars and Stripes, you will find some hundreds who first saw the light on the Wicklow or Wexford Hills, or by the waters of Galway; and other hundreds who are by nativity sons of the German Fatherland. It is deserving of remembrance and record that in one of our regiments is a Chinese, and he a true soldier and a brave man, who, at the battle's close, will be counted with the dead. Nor does the diversity end there. Though its ensigns bear, and proudly bear, the escutcheon of the great Empire State, the Excelsior Brigade had, as will be remembered, under circumstances which I need not delay to set forth, been originally organized as a corps of United States volunteers, and had been recruited from no one neighborhood, but from many quarters. Men who were enrolled in Eastern New York, in

bless our holy cause," adding, "In a war like this, a man's life isn't much to give." And as he grew yet fainter and the light darkened before his eyes, he whispered, "Let me die here on the field." For it was his thought that he was dying; but, oh General, thank God, thank God, it was not for death; and that it is our untold felicity to have you with us here to-day. And the prayer of us all is that the life that was then so nearly quenched, and that was so freely offered if it was God's will, but that in His goodness was spared, may by his favoring providence long be continued to enjoy its bright renown, and the benediction of a Nation's gratitude, and be filled with honor and fortune to its close.

It was on the Fourth Day of July, fittest of the whole year's calendar for the patriot's burial, and while the skies wept with showers, as if in sympathy with those drops of sorrow we could not restrain, that we performed the last office of love and reverence for our dead. Their bones have since been gathered into the necropolis over whose silent ranks yonder stately column, tribute of a Nation's homage, stands sentinel; but each torn body was, on that anniversary of the Nation's birth, committed to the dust on the very spot that had received its blood.

And here, on the ground itself, where they cheered and fought, and falling, with one last fond look at the flag they loved, yielded up their spirits, this memorial, on which the noble commonwealth, whose star in that flag's constellation their valor made more lustrous forever, records its undying gratitude to them, and to which is, in part, intrusted the keeping of their name and praise in the generation to come, is most appropriately to be reared.

Ours is a great privilege, comrades, for which we should be devoutly thankful, in that we are permitted, returning hither after so many years, to formally dedicate and set apart this spot on which it will stand, to its sacred use.

A thousand thoughts, how many of them quite unspeakable, quickened by the charmed and potent influence of the hour and of the place, are stirring in us.

The duty we are commissioned to discharge is one that would not be unfit, would, we may believe, be grateful, to any company whatsoever of the loyal citizens of this Union. But who, save the survivors of the Excelsior Brigade, could bring to it the hearts we do; we who ourselves knew the dear heroes, whose sacrifice and whose fame is to be written on these tablets; who were knit to them in the glorious fraternity of camp and march and siege and battle; who gave them love while they lived and tears when they died.

Bless God, enough of us are left who were in fellowship with them, and are in fellowship with them still, who still have love and tears for them, to exchange a comrade's greeting with one another, and to breathe a comrade's greeting towards them, in presence of their graves.

They were young men, beardless youths, the majority of them, whom we laid in those graves, and we were young with them. The years, the burdened, changeful, toilful years, that have flown over us since, have left their mark upon us all; and the most of our heads are now gray. But whenever we think of them, whenever we recur to the days in which we grasped them by the hand, and tented with them, and heard their brave voices round the bivouac fire, and stood with them on the high places of the field, the heart of youth

revives in us, and always will. They bind us to that great past and replenish in us the soul of its great life.

They were young men, I repeat, yet how few of those to whom fulness of earthly years is allotted, is it given, is it possible, to accomplish the life-work they accomplished going so early to their death. They knew not, they could not know, no one at that period could foresee or compute, the infinite worth to this Republic and to mankind of that success, to the purchase of which they contributed all they had to give.

They knew, indeed, that the cause was one which a man might well be willing to die for, and for it they paid the supreme cost without regret; but it is for us who live, for the regenerate Nation whose new birth in liberty they, and those who in like manner were consumed on its holy altar, did so much to achieve, to measure what the triumph of that cause signified. No, it is immeasurable, its magnitude will ever unfold with the process of the centuries.

But in the light of what we are given already to see arising from it, we pronounce that never since men first offered their bosoms to the sword in defence of right had such a sacrifice, either by its occasion or by its issue, such justification in the sight of Heaven and of earth, as theirs.

Tears we have for them, but not tears of pity; far, far from it. They laid their young heads down, and we, to-day, beholding the fruits of the peace wrought by their blood, beholding our united country's blessing therein, and marking the omens of a happy and mighty future that hang refulgent in her skies, congratulate them that they were counted worthy in the morning of life of the crown of so high a martyrdom.

We shall grow old, our vital currents ere long will slacken, and our step in the march of life lose its vigor; the generations will come and go; these stones at last will crumble; but the bright youth of these heroes is an immortal youth, unchangeable from age to age, till time shall be no more.

Yes, dear comrades, we congratulate you; from our heart of hearts we congratulate you on the secure prize and irrevocable reward of everlasting gratitude, honor and remembrance ye won upon this consecrated field.

I said in the beginning that this hour is sacred to memory, and so it is; yet, may I remind you in closing that the import of such a memory as that we here converse with, is not all contained in thoughts that look back upon the past.

Abraham Lincoln, you will recall, in that transcendent utterance of his, which has passed into the liturgy of Freedom forever, spoken above the ashes of these same dead, summoned the living to take increased devotion to the cause; their devotion to which, given here in its last full measure, had itself hallowed this ground far above the power of any to add or to detract. The word is renewed to us to-day. That cause, indeed, in one sense is won; but, in another and larger sense, it is still unfinished. The cause of God and of humanity; the cause of our country's and the world's better day; the same cause our battle flags stood for, is, in one form and another, always in conflict. These dead in their time and in a great crisis struck a mighty stroke for it, and set it a long step forward. They sleep their glorious sleep. Well done!

Well done! we cry, as hailing them victors we inaugurate their memorial, which, however costly and beautiful, will be all too poor for their dues.

But appropriate as this and every other such acknowledgment of the incalculable debt we owe them is, it is by no means the only tribute they claim from us, or the most precious; by no acts, nor by all acts of fidelity in this sort is our full obligation to them discharged; there is something more binding upon us still. It is that we see to it that, while they rest, their works follow them. It is that we take up their fallen mantle to wear it reverently, dutifully, bravely, in the unceasing onward march of life in which we move; till we too go the way of all the earth; else we are not worthy of them.

No graves were ever so eloquent as these. What do they say? "Hear us, ye living, who once pressed our hands. We died while our blood was leaping in the pulses of our prime. Let your hearts beat ever true response to the high calling of a patriot's duty. We gave our lives; give yours freely, wholly, purely to the service of God and Right and Liberty."

In the heat and burden of our remaining day, my comrades, let our ears be always open to this voice crying to us from the ground. May we hear it from out the distant years behind us, saluting us and cheering us on, mingling in one harmony with the Divine voice from the heavens above, that evermore bids us endure hardness as good soldiers on this whole field of life's campaign.

HYMN.

Written for the Occasion

By CHAPLAIN CHARLES H. A. BULKLEY, D. D.

Tune — "Old Hundred."

I.

Thou God of Love! — who wert the Life
Of those who joined in Freedom's strife,
Accept, to-day, our note of praise,
While we this monument upraise.

II.

Thou God of Truth! — who didst inspire
Our spirits with the patriot's fire,
Smile on us, as by memory led,
We honor here our heroes dead.

III.

Thou God of Life! — who didst bestow
Thine life on these who lie below;
That life they to the Nation gave,
Which ours Thou didst in mercy save.

IV.

Thou God of Battles! — whose right hand
Gave victory to our patriot band,
Grant that our hearts may cherish still
These souls that died at Duty's will.

V.

Thou God of Freedom! — may our land
Honor, with monumental hand,
These valorous dead, who won free life
For us, amid the deathful strife.

VI.

Thou God of Power! — may Thy strong arm
Our Country shield from War's alarm,
That Peace may breathe above each grave,
Where silent lie our comrades brave.

VII.

Thou God of Nations! — may ours be,
For aye, the banner of the free,
And may it wave, as it has waved,
The symbol of a UNION saved!

DEDICATION OF MONUMENT.

EXCELSIOR BRIGADE.

July 2, 1893.

INVOCATION BY CHAPLAIN W. R. EASTMAN OF THE THIRD EXCELSIOR.

Oh God! we bow before Thee in reverent gratitude for the high privilege into which Thou dost permit us to enter at this hour.

Thou hast spared these Thy servants and brought them hither from homes of peace to stand upon the ground where thirty years ago they met the shock of battle. With the memories of that hour thronging upon us, we thank Thee for the strength Thou didst give them to stand against that fierce assault, and to turn it back; we thank Thee that by the unconquerable valor of our living and our dead, the day was won.

We have come to dedicate this monument to the memory of our own comrades whom we left sleeping on this field of blood. Command Thy blessing, we pray Thee, upon the story which these clustered stones shall tell. May they teach the coming generations the same patriotism, devotion and comradeship so nobly illustrated here.

We thank Thee for the name and the fame of the brigade in which we served, that took the motto of the Empire State and bore it on their colors to the front of the battle.

placid winter of 1861 and 1862, and ending only where the fluttering white flag, above the tufts of smoke, on that spring morning of April, 1865, stopped the clashing charges in the Appomattox battle. Yorktown, Williamsburg, Fair Oaks, Glendale, Malvern Hill, Bristoe Station, Second Bull Run, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, Wapping Heights, Mine Run, Wilderness, Spotsylvania, North Anna, Cold Harbor, Petersburg, Reams' Station, Farmville, Sailor's Creek, Appomattox, are not to you merely *names*, to be rolled off in idle talk, but ineffaceable pictures in your mental vision. Nor can I ever forget the picture of my own Seventy-third when, under its orders from General Humphreys to follow me, it was lined up, under its gallant Colonel Burns, exactly where its yonder marker stands, in the bloody attempt to stem the tide which finally rolled over the wounded Graham and his little band at the Peach Orchard corner. With the close of that day the fortune of war separated me from the old brigade into other fields of duty. But on skirmish or march, in camp or battle, my thoughts went back to the scenes, and to the men of the Excelsior Brigade, where you and I were baptized with fire.

Your commander had already succeeded to the command of your division, and then of your corps; when your chiefs were honored, you were honored. I would not willingly let this moment pass without voicing also your gratification at his presence with us here to-day. As history declares, that without the fierce combat he compelled Lee to wait, to prepare for, and then to wage with the Third Corps at this point, for the possession here of this Emmitsburg Road on July 2, 1863, yonder Round Top Mountain might have been gained by the enemy without firing a gun; and then, what, my comrades, might have been the history of Gettysburg's battle? So we, the comrades of General Sickles, should to-day acknowledge that to his persistent efforts are we chiefly indebted for the action of the State of New York in its grand work of monumenting this field, and for projecting and advancing the Congressional legislation that will establish here a National Park under the permanent authority of the United States Government.

It was, in one sense, the misfortune of the Excelsior Brigade at the battle here, that, one after another, its regiments were detached to reinforce other commands. This monument, therefore, is necessarily located as representative of a central position, not showing the *regimental* lines of battle, which were more or less distant. As our five regiments were always united in service and in sentiment, it was fitting that their survivors should unite in consolidating their interests in this enduring monument. May it help to perpetuate the memory of the Excelsior Brigade, and of the sturdy soldiers of which it was composed.

And may the spirit, that thirty years ago on this sacred ground animated the Excelsior Brigade, the Third Army Corps,—yes, the whole incomparable Army of the Potomac,—that spirit of devotion to duty, forever flow from this hallowed battlefield throughout the length and breadth of our rescued Republic; so that from generation to generation every American, justly proud of his citizenship, shall continually be inspired to perform his civic duties in an honorable peace, or to sacrifice his life in an honorable war.

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1. The first step is to identify the problem or issue that needs to be addressed. This involves gathering information and understanding the context of the problem.

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1. The first group of people who are interested in the study of the history of the United States are the people who are interested in the history of the United States.

— 2 —

1. The first group of people who are not in the majority are those who are not in the majority of the population. This group is the largest and most diverse. It includes people of different ethnicities, religions, and social classes. They are often the most vulnerable to discrimination and oppression.

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The banners of the Excelsior Brigade were in the heart of this volcano, and you won imperishable renown by your unflinching courage and heroism in the desperate struggle.

As the sun sank over the distant hills on that eventful day, and the shades of night began to fall, your depleted ranks were withdrawn from the ground you had so stubbornly contested. For hours you had been battling over this very ground where now you stand, and your dead lay in scores on the extreme front of the day's conflict. Your standards were still unsullied, and history had to add another page to tell of your valor.

I will now take up in chronological order our battles and losses, but in a paper of this kind, written to illustrate the deeds of our brigade, and to briefly give an account of its heavy sacrifices, it will be impossible for me to dwell upon the details of our campaigns.

On May 18, 1861, Hon. Daniel E. Sickles was authorized by President Lincoln to organize a brigade for service in the field. To this task he devoted all his energies, and, after surmounting many difficulties, he completed the organization of five regiments.

The First Regiment was organized with General Sickles as temporary colonel, he being succeeded by Col. Wm. Dwight, Jr.; the Second Regiment, under Col. Geo. B. Hall and Lieut. Col. H. L. Potter; the Third Regiment under Col. Nelson Taylor; the Fourth Regiment under Col. James Fairman, who was succeeded by Col. Wm. R. Brewster; and the Fifth Regiment under Col. Charles K. Graham. The regiments were organized independently of all State authority and were known as United States volunteers until December 5, 1861 — long after they had been mustered into service — when orders were issued by the War Department for their incorporation in the volunteer forces of the State of New York. It was for this reason that their numerical designation became so high.

The First Regiment was mustered into the United States service at Camp Scott, on Staten Island, June 20 and 22, 1861. The Second Regiment, originally the Jackson Light Infantry, was mustered by companies at Camp Scott between June 20th and July 18th. The Third Regiment was mustered by companies at Camp Scott between June and October. The Fourth Regiment, which was recruited as the Second Fire Zouaves, was mustered between July 8th and October 8th, at Camp Scott; and the Fifth Regiment was mustered at Camp Scott between June 30th and October 6th.

When the Excelsior regiments reached Washington, they were placed in camp in the vicinity of the Capitol.

Late in the fall, the brigade was sent to the Lower Potomac, near Liverpool Point, where it did excellent service guarding the river. The regiments were regularly drilled in marching, bayonet exercise, and musketry practice, and passed the winter in perfecting themselves for the sterner duties that were to follow when the spring should open.

You were now the Second Brigade of the Second Division, Third Corps of the Army of the Potomac, or Sickles' Brigade, Hooker's Division, Heintzelman's Corps.

On the 9th of April you were on transports on your way to the Peninsula, and on that dark and bloody ground you were to prove that the motto on your banners was well deserved.

You were soon before the formidable works of Yorktown, where the brigade was thrown well to the front, and was almost constantly engaged in building redoubts and intrenchments, or on duty on the skirmish line. You were ever vigilant in the performance of this duty, and always ready to take advantage of any carelessness of the enemy. Your vigilance was rewarded, for at early dawn on the morning of the 4th of May, after a night of terrific artillery fire from the enemy, our enterprising comrades of the Fourth Regiment, becoming suspicious of the unusual quietness in their front, made up their minds to find out the cause of it, and, pushing forward, were soon climbing over the Rebel works, thus being among the first to announce their evacuation.

The loss in the brigade during the siege of Yorktown was slight, being 1 killed and 2 wounded.

Hooker's Division is selected to lead in pursuit of the retreating foe. Many of you remember that march,—the heavy roads, the driving rain as night descended, and the comfortless bivouac in the woods, as weary and exhausted, we sank to rest.

Early the next morning, May 5th, you resume your march, and you do not fail to notice that your commanding officers keep the columns well closed up, and that they have an air of expectancy which does not usually mark their faces.

The rain is still falling, and the roads and woods are dismal; the air is heavy with moisture and seems like a pall. At last we are halted, and as the noise of jingling accoutrements ceases, we hear peculiar sounds and reverberations. Our cheeks flush, and we begin to tighten our belts and inspect our arms. We know what it means. Hooker, with the leading brigade, has overtaken the enemy and he is contesting our advance, and the increasing noise indicates that the resistance is becoming serious. We are on the eve of our first battle, my comrades, and our minds wander to our far-off homes where our loved ones are, and as the vision comes before us, a feeling heretofore unknown pervades our hearts, and the eye becomes moist with the tender reflection.

The gentle breeze that brings to our ears the noise of conflict unfolds our banners, and the motto upon them dispels the vision. Our lips become compressed and our brows knit, and the light deepens in our eyes. The sound of battle increases, and the atmosphere becomes heavy with its smoke as we stand by the roadside awaiting orders.

Hooker's advance has been severely contested all the morning. Longstreet, who has command of the enemy's forces on the field, has thrown into the contest regiment after regiment, and is fighting desperately to hold the ground where he has made his stand. The iron bolts from Fort Mifflin and the heavy musketry fire from masses of the enemy's infantry have decimated the ranks of the gallant New Jersey regiments, who have been bearing the brunt of the battle up to this hour, and they feel that unless succor comes they will have to abandon the ground covered with the bodies of their comrades.

At this critical moment, about 2 p. m., Hooker calls upon the Excelsior Brigade, and soon the command, which now becomes a welcome one, is given and we move forward.

Our arrival on the field is opportune. Longstreet has been heavily reinforced, and he has thrown forward several regiments into a dense woods on our front and left, apparently with a view of cutting off the remnants of the Jersey Brigade. At this moment we confront him, and we have advanced so far that when his line emerges from the edge of the woods we are within short range. There is a moment's hesitation, as if the Angel of Death shrank from the harvest before him. But more than human life is at stake — the fate of the battle is wavering in the balance, and the duel is to be a bloody one.

The enemy now opens upon us along his whole line, and we return his fire with calm deliberation. The months of drill and musketry practice on the Lower Potomac give you confidence and firmness. There is no shrinking, no wavering. You stand to your work, and with your deadly buck-and-ball soon throw his lines into confusion, and they are driven into the woods.

Again Longstreet throws forward fresh regiments, and the contest is renewed. The musketry fire is terrific, and Fort Magruder lends its thunder and hurls an iron hail into our ranks. For hours you have held at bay thrice your number; you begin to find your cartridge-boxes empty, and use those of the comrades who have fallen around you. These soon become exhausted, and you slowly fall back, loth to surrender the field; but your heroism and heavy sacrifices have not been in vain — succor is at hand. Kearny comes to the rescue, and the enemy soon give way before his enthusiastic and gallant troops, and the victory is ours.

The story of the battle of Williamsburg is an interesting one to the soldiers of Hooker's Division, for upon them fell the brunt of the fighting. The reports of that battle did not do justice to our gallant leader. They were brilliantly colored when referring to other parts of the field, but here in front of Fort Magruder the vision of the author of the report was obscured by the smoke of battle and the volcano of fire that whirled around the vicinity.

Col. William F. Fox in his work on "Regimental Losses" says: "The Battle of Williamsburg was fought almost entirely by the Third Corps. Of the 2,239 casualties on that field, 2,002 occurred within its ranks, and three-fourths of them in Hooker's Division; the brunt of the battle having fallen on the Excelsior Brigade and Jersey Brigade, both in Hooker's Division."

Your proportion of the loss was enormous; the First Regiment losing 330 in killed, wounded and missing; the Third Regiment, 195; Fourth Regiment, 104; and the Fifth Regiment, 143; a total loss in the four regiments, in killed, wounded and missing, of 772.

The brigade was commanded by Col. Nelson Taylor in this battle, General Sickles' nomination as brigadier general having failed of confirmation in the United States Senate. This is no time to criticise the gross injustice of that act, but we can remember the bitter resentment we felt when our general was relieved of his command as we were about embarking for the Peninsula; and it spoke well for your loyalty to your country that you still remained true and faithful soldiers.

After the battle of Williamsburg this act of injustice was repaired, and General Sickles was confirmed as brigadier general, and he resumed command of the brigade while we were encamped at Bailey's Crossroads.

On the 31st of May, we were at Bottom's Bridge engaged in the usual routine of camp duty, and looking forward to a quiet Sabbath on the morrow, when suddenly an aid from headquarters dashes up, and soon the command to fall in is passed along. The "assembly" is sounded, and the men hasten to form company. With your usual promptness you are soon in line, and receive the first intimation of the battle which has been raging across the Chickahominy, at Fair Oaks, and of the disaster that has befallen Casey's troops. Leaving tents and knapsacks you are off on the double-quick, and do not cease your rapid march until you reach the field. The shades of night have now descended, and the battle has ceased, leaving the enemy in possession of Casey's intrenchments, and confident of success on the morrow.

At early dawn the battle is resumed, and the rattle of musketry is heard all along the line. It increases in violence on the Williamsburg Road, and the order comes for you to move forward. General Sickles is now in command, and you bear yourselves proudly as his eye wanders along your ranks. The Second Regiment, owing to a detail which kept them near Yorktown, was not with us at Williamsburg, and are now anxious to show of what mettle they are made. The opportunity soon comes, and in a gallant bayonet charge cover themselves with glory and win the commendation of the commanding general of the army for their gallantry. The other regiments of the brigade press forward, and soon come in contact with the foe, and the enemy is driven from the field. Night finds you occupying Casey's old intrenchments, and the commanding general thinks you have done so well that he leaves you there for three or four days, evidently believing that the men of the Excelsior Brigade are insensible to fatigue and hunger, and that coffee, hardtack and bacon are luxuries that they abhor. General Sickles, however, loses his patience, so the story goes, and sends word to the rear that if they want him to take Richmond alone, he will have to go to New York and raise another brigade. The hint was sufficient, for that afternoon the brigade was relieved from duty at the front.

Though closely engaged with the enemy two or three times during this battle, our loss was not severe, the brigade only losing 74 in killed, wounded and missing.

During the month that we remained on this field the brigade was called upon to do almost constant picket duty, and the duty was arduous for us, as the regiments we would relieve were frequently forced back by the enemy and we had the line to retake. Thus it was, that whenever we were seen going to the front, the comrades in other regiments would commence to look to their arms, and grumble about Sickles's men always raising a fuss. Thus it became almost a daily battleground for the Excelsior Brigade, and our losses were serious. The Twin Houses would often be filled with our wounded, and the rattle of musketry as you pressed back the foe would echo through the woods like a general engagement.

You lost in these brief but severe contests, which included the engagement at Oak Grove and Peach Orchard, 322 killed, wounded, and missing.

I will not dwell on the Seven Days' Battles which followed; they are too full of blood and misery. All your heroism and your glorious deeds which had shed so much lustre on our arms had been in vain. You looked upon your banners with Yorktown, Williamsburg and Fair Oaks emblazoned upon them with a proud glance, but your hearts grew heavy as you gazed upon your depleted ranks and remembered the hundreds of your comrades who were buried on those fields.

You were in action at Glendale, June 30th, and rendered gallant service in the severe Battle of Malvern Hill on July 1st, in which engagements your loss was 26.

On the 2d of July, you were at Harrison's Landing, and on August 14th, on your way to Yorktown to embark for Alexandria. On your arrival there you were sent on to Warrenton Junction to reinforce Pope, and on August 27th were severely engaged at Bristoe Station with a superior force of the enemy under Ewell, who was strongly posted along the railroad and in the woods. After a severe contest which lasted from between 3 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon until dusk, you drove the enemy from his position and across Broad Run, and were victors of the field, the enemy leaving his dead and many of his wounded in your hands. This was a brilliant action and proved that you were still capable of great deeds. Your loss in this engagement was severe, numbering 307.

You were engaged at Groveton on the 29th; at Bull Run on the 30th; and at Chantilly on September 1st. Your losses in these engagements, however, were slight, only numbering 20.

After this campaign you were stationed near Alexandria with the rest of the Third Corps, and, owing to your depleted ranks, you were not called upon to participate with the rest of the Army of the Potomac in its march into Maryland, nor in the sanguinary battle of Antietam which followed. You were not idle, however, as you were constantly employed in building intrenchments and in picket duty.

During the latter part of October, the enemy having made a demonstration in the vicinity of Fairfax Court House, you were selected for the hazardous duty of a reconnoissance, and on November 1st, broke camp and marched for Manassas Junction. On your arrival there the Third Regiment was thrown forward to Warrenton Junction; the First and Fifth to Bristoe Station, and the Second and Fourth Regiments remained at the Junction. You remained in this vicinity some three weeks, when you took up your line of march with the rest of the army for the Rappahannock. This march was a severe test of your endurance. It began in a heavy rain, which continued until we reached Wolf Run Shoals. Here the sun came out, the roads dried up, and a sharp frost coming on, marching became comparatively easy. A few days after leaving this camp you were in front of Fredericksburg.

On the 13th of December you were across the Rappahannock engaged in the campaign which resulted so disastrously to our arms, but were not called upon to sustain a severe loss, only losing 16.

Burnside was soon relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac, Hooker superseding him. Under this leader the army soon recovered from

the effects of its recent defeat. With wonderful courage and elasticity it responded to his efforts, and was soon in a condition equal to its palmiest days.

On May 1, 1863, you cross the United States Ford, on the Rappahannock, to participate in the Chancellorsville campaign. With the rest of Hooker's old division, you were held in reserve near the Chancellor House, and rest quietly on your arms in the woods to the left of the road that leads from the United States Ford. Fighting and skirmishing were going on around you, and you wondered how it was that you were not called upon to lead the advance and to bear the brunt of the storm of shot and shell that your comrades were facing. But your commander knew your value, and was reserving you for a much more serious duty if the occasion should arise.

The 2d of May dawned, and the splutter on the skirmish-line was all that disturbed the tranquillity of the scene. As the early hours passed this gave place to a heavy musketry fire on Hancock's front, which soon involved Couch and Stocum. It was now discovered that this attack was only intended to conceal the movement of a large body of the enemy that was rapidly passing to our right, and Sickles, to develop the intention of the enemy, threw forward Birney's Division, supported by Whipple's.

This movement resulted in the capture of the Twenty-third Georgia, and the discovery that Jackson, with a large force, was rapidly moving in the direction of Howard's position. Howard was immediately advised of this and cautioned to be prepared for an attack.

About 6 o'clock a crash of musketry was heard, and before we had time to realize what was the cause of the uproar, word came to us to fall in. We now knew that the emergency had come, and that we were to be thrown into the breach. You will remember with what alacrity we seized our arms and moved on the road in light marching order, and impatiently awaited the signal to advance. The word came, and as we started off on the double-quick, the evidence of the disaster to our right flank increased, and soon we were among the flying troops of the Eleventh Corps.

General Doubleday, in his work on the Chancellorsville campaign, says: "A constantly increasing uproar and the wild rush of fugitives past the Chancellor House told Hooker what had occurred. It was not easy to find a reserve force for this emergency, for the whole line was now actively engaged. Fortunately, Perry's Division was held in reserve and was available. They were true and tried men, and went forward at once to the rescue. We soon appreciate the steadiness and courage required, when all around us was confusion, for a force to make its way through crowds of fugitives, to the point of danger in front, and meet the exulting enemy, who were seeking safety in the rear. Such men are heroes, and far more honorable than those who fight in the full blaze of successful

the superhuman exertions of Sickles and the gallant Pleasanton. And, after a sharp contest, Jackson's forces sullenly fell

On the battlefield, the gentle moon shone forth, lighting the shadows the depths of the forest in which our line is formed. Under the glow of her soft light, we gathered logs and earth and

strengthened our position as best we could, knowing that the contest on the morrow would be a desperate one.

While thus engaged, a heavy musketry and artillery fire opened on our left near the Plank Road and involved the Fourth Regiment of our brigade. In this storm of missiles Stonewall Jackson was mortally wounded, and the South lost one of her greatest generals.

On the morning of the 3d the contest was renewed, and the storm of fire ran along the whole line. The enemy worked around on our left flank, and, the Third Maryland giving away, our position became untenable. We were forced, after desperate resistance, to give ground. We fell back to the artillery reserve and formed in support, but were not allowed to remain, as our commander, General Revere, notwithstanding our earnest protest, marched us to the rear. It was the only instance in our history of our having been marched from the field while under fire. As soon as this was discovered General Revere was relieved, and Colonel Farnum of the First Regiment was placed in command. Under this gallant soldier we were marched back to the battleground, and remained at the front until the army recrossed the Rappahannock. Our losses in this battle amounted to 250.

The enemy, flushed with his recent victory and confident of his superiority, soon determined on a bold, aggressive movement. Collecting his forces and abandoning our front, he made a detour and marched rapidly towards the Potomac. Hooker followed with energy, and we were soon passing over our old battlefields of Bristoe, Groveton and Manassas, and the enemy was allowed to cross the Potomac without molestation.

As we passed into Maryland and across the Pennsylvania line, your eyes brightened and you marched as you never marched before. The Pennsylvania boys in our ranks had an air of confidence, and the seal of grim determination was upon their faces. They were on their own soil, and they held their lives of little value, if by their sacrifice they could deal a deathblow to the invader.

It would be idle for me to dwell upon the battle of Gettysburg. You, the survivors of this field, know its history. The heroism of the Army of the Potomac, and the fruitless efforts of Lee, Longstreet, and Pickett, are well known to you. These hills and woods and valleys are eloquent with the story of your victory and the saving of a Nation. This was the high tide of the Rebellion, and the hope of the Confederacy was blotted out in the blood of the brave but mistaken soldiers who battled against you on this field. Thirty years have passed since the battle, and we have assembled here to dedicate to the memory of our dead who fell on this field this beautiful monument, which stands like a temple of fame on the front line of the second day's contest.

They are sleeping in their soldiers' graves, my comrades, but they are not forgotten, for we have in our hearts a tender love, a fond undying remembrance of them.

The First Regiment carried into action on the 2d of July, 22 officers and 349 men, and lost 1 officer and 32 men, killed or died of wounds; 7 officers and 73 men, wounded, and 4 men missing; total, 117.

The Second Regiment carried into action 13 officers and 230 men, and lost 1 officer and 13 men, killed or died of wounds; 6 officers and 58 men, wounded, and 13 men, missing; total, 91.

The Third Regiment carried into action 22 officers and 283 men, and lost 1 officer and 10 men, killed or died of wounds; 6 officers and 69 men, wounded, and 28 men, missing; total, 114.

The Fourth Regiment carried into action 27 officers and 480 men, and lost 5 officers and 47 men, killed or died of wounds; 10 officers and 92 men, wounded, and 8 men, missing; total, 162.

The Fifth Regiment carried into action 17 officers and 258 men, and lost 1 officer and 16 men, killed or died of wounds; 5 officers and 64 men, wounded, and 3 men, missing; total, 89.

These figures make a total loss in the brigade of 573 killed, wounded and missing.

The night of the 3d found Lee vanquished at all points, and his decimated battalions soon retreated and recrossed the Potomac, with the Union army in close pursuit.

On the afternoon of July 23d we overtook the enemy at Manassas Gap, where we found him strongly posted on Wapping Heights, supported by artillery. General Meade determined to dislodge this force if possible, push through the gap, and compel him to give battle.

The Excelsior Brigade was selected for this duty, and you moved forward, climbed the heights and charged the foe. General Spinola, commanding the brigade, fell seriously wounded, and the gallant Farnum took command. You pressed on with determination, and drove the enemy from his position, the cheers of the onlookers echoing from hill to hill as you planted your colors on his defences.

The following morning the Fifth Regiment was thrown forward to feel the enemy, but he had abandoned the Gap, leaving his dead unburied and many of his wounded in your hands. The brigade lost in this action 74 in killed and wounded.

You were soon resting in camp near Brandy Station, and were not brought in contact with the enemy again until November 27th, at Locust Grove, during the Mine Run campaign, where the brigade lost 45 in killed and wounded.

During the winter of 1863 and 1864 reorganization and consolidation is the order of the day, and when the campaign opens in the spring we were marching with the standards of the Second Corps,—all that was left of the old Third Corps having been consolidated with that corps.

The fierce and sanguinary struggle in the Wilderness began on the 5th of May. As Lee would not leave his defences, we had to attack him in his works, and the contest promised to be fierce and bloody.

For two days the struggle continued. The musketry fire exceeded in violence any experienced before. In this vast jungle the enemy was like a tiger in his lair and not easily driven forth; therefore, the left flank movement, which was to become such a feature of this campaign, was adopted. The brigade lost in this battle 140 in killed, wounded and missing.

At Spotsylvania we found the enemy strongly fortified in an almost impregnable position from which he could not be tempted, and after a series

of desperate encounters, the Second Corps was called upon to assault his works. On the morning of May 12th, at the first light of dawn, you charged his intrenchments, and a hand-to-hand struggle took place which had no parallel in the history of the two armies. The enemy fought gallantly, but was driven from his position, which has become known in history as the Bloody Angle, leaving 3,000 prisoners, several pieces of artillery, and 30 battle-flags in our hands. Our loss in this battle in killed, wounded and missing was 148.

On May 23d, you were engaged at North Anna; on the 30th you were under fire at Totopotomoy, and on the morning of June 3d, participated in the assault at Cold Harbor. The loss in the brigade in these engagements was 76.

In the movements upon Petersburg your marches were long and exhaustive, and the James River as you approached it spread out invitingly like an oasis in the desert to the weary Arab. You were not allowed to halt, however, and refresh yourself in its cooling waters. You crossed the river and pushed on for Petersburg, where you arrived on the night of the 15th, and participated in the assault on the works around that city on the 16th, in which action you lost 86.

The time had now come, my comrades, when the Excelsior Brigade shall cease to exist, your three years' term of service having expired.

The First Regiment was withdrawn from the field on June 22d, and honorably mustered out under Lieut. Col. Thomas Holt, July 1, 1864. The men not entitled to discharge were transferred to the Eighty-sixth New York.

The Second Regiment was honorably mustered out under Lieut. Col. Thomas Rafferty, July 30, 1864, and the men not entitled to discharge were transferred to the One hundred and twentieth New York.

The Third Regiment was honorably mustered out under Lieut. Col. John Leonard, June 19 and 20, 1864, and the men not entitled to discharge were transferred to the One hundred and twentieth New York.

The Fourth Regiment retained its organization, a sufficient number of the men having re-enlisted, and it remained to fight on other fields and to participate in the Grand Review at Washington on the cessation of hostilities.

The Fifth Regiment was honorably mustered out under Lieut. Col. Wm. H. Lounsberry, from June 10th to August 3d, and the men not entitled to discharge were assigned to the Fortieth New York.

During your term of service the total enrollment in the brigade was 6,442, divided as follows: The First Regiment had 1,462; the Second Regiment, 1,170; the Third Regiment, 1,250; the Fourth Regiment, 1,350; and the Fifth Regiment, 1,210.

The brigade lost during its term of service, in which I include the losses in the Fourth Regiment and among the veterans of the brigade who were transferred to the Fortieth, Eighty-sixth and One hundred and twentieth New York, after the brigade ceased to exist and in several minor affairs not mentioned in this history, 3,028, which severe loss places you among the 300 fighting regiments in Colonel Fox's valuable work, "Regimental Losses in the Civil War."

My task is done. I have, as briefly as the remembrance of your glorious career would allow, carried you along from the time of your first muster until

you stacked arms after your last battle. As you followed me in your history, many scenes not mentioned and of almost equal interest must have come before you; some personal deed of gallantry, some incident of the march and camp, which would all go to make up a marvelous story, and which should not perish.

And now for the years that remain to us let "the tie that binds" be drawn closer. Let our motto be Fraternity, Charity and Loyalty to one another, and let us so live that the honors gained while following our glorious banners shall never be dimmed by an unworthy act, so that when the time comes to lay down our arms and answer to the last roll-call we can exclaim, "Excelsior!"

At the close of Colonel's Coyne's oration, Gen. Daniel E. Sickles, President of the Excelsior Brigade Association, made a few remarks. He said:

"Colonel Coyne in his admirable address has carried you through all of your campaigns. He has accomplished in thirty-five minutes what it took the Army of the Potomac four years to do. This eloquent story of your heroism and never-faltering courage shall not perish with the hour; it shall be preserved in the annals of the State whose motto you bore upon your banners, for future generations to read."

Here followed a notable event. Gen. Jos. B. Carr upon being called upon for an address, in a few felicitous words referred to the gallantry of the Excelsior Brigade, its discipline and reliability in action, and turning to General Sickles, said:—

"I congratulate you, General Sickles, in having been the creator of a brigade that carried its banners unsullied through all the campaigns of the Army of the Potomac; and now, General Sickles, as a souvenir of this day, and as a testimonial of the affection and loyalty of your comrades of the Third Corps, I have been selected to present you with this gold medal, which is made from the same die from which are struck the beautiful bronze medals the State of New York has bestowed upon the veterans who represented that State upon this field thirty years ago."

General Sickles was so much overcome by this unexpected mark of affection on the part of his comrades in arms, he could only briefly respond. Among other things, he said that he would preserve the medal as a priceless treasure and wear it near his heart as long as he lived.

REMARKS BY GOVERNOR ROSWELL P. FLOWER.

COMRADES:

I am especially glad to be with the members of the Excelsior Brigade and its gallant commander upon this occasion. Your record in this great battle was a proud one. The only criticism I have ever heard passed upon your conduct is that you were too anxious to fight. Indeed, if it had not been

for your impetuosity, there perhaps would not have been a Battle of Gettysburg — with all that that implies. Your valor at that time on this field turned the tide of the Rebellion, and what would have happened but for your precipitation of the conflict here none of us can predict. Your corps deserves, therefore, a special place in the history of Gettysburg, and the dead whom this monument commemorates are deserving of the grateful remembrance of the American people.

In these days, recalling the dangers and sufferings which you brave soldiers incurred for your country on this battlefield, we must all admit that no reward of an appreciative country can be too generous for her true defenders. We now and then read the newspaper criticism of the Government's liberality in the matter of pensions to her veteran soldiers; but it seems to me as I go over this battlefield and hear retold the stories of these scenes, that even the newspaper critic, if he could have been on the ground and heard the bullets whizzing around his head; if he could have seen the brave acts of valor and the intense suffering; if he could have seen the Union soldiers falling one after another, and amid these surroundings had been communicating to his paper hundreds of miles away, I fancy that he might have telegraphed back: "Give all surviving soldiers pensions; give their widows and children pensions; give their grandchildren pensions; but for God's sake let me come home!"

Comrades, I am glad to be here to show even in this small way my appreciation of your courage and your patriotism.

*(INSCRIPTIONS)**(Front)*

SECOND FIRE ZOUAVES — MAJOR MICHAEL W. BURNS COMMANDING
 SICKLES' EXCELSIOR BRIGADE — COLONEL WILLIAM R. BREWSTER
 SECOND DIVISION — BRIG. GENERAL A. A. HUMPHREYS
 THIRD CORPS — MAJOR GENERAL D. E. SICKLES
 MUSTERED IN JULY 10, 1861 — MUSTERED OUT JUNE 29, 1865.
 73D N. Y. INFANTRY.

(Reverse)

VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT — NEW YORK CITY.

ORGANIZED 1868

DISBANDED 1865

THIS MONUMENT WAS ERECTED AT THE INSTANCE OF THE VOLUNTEER FIREMEN OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED BY THE FIGURE ON THE LEFT, IN GRATEFUL RECOGNITION OF THE SERVICES RENDERED BY THE SECOND FIRE ZOUAVES ON THIS FIELD IN DEFENCE OF THE UNION JULY 2, 1863.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES.

UNDER CHAPTER 397 LAWS OF NEW YORK 1897

ROBERT B. NOONEY
 MATTHEW STEWART
 THOMAS FAIR

GEORGE W. ANDERSON
 PETER J. HICKEY
 JOHN SIDELL

RICHARD CULLEN
 MICHAEL F. WYNN
 FRANCIS MCCARTHY

(Right Side.)

THE FOURTH EXCELSIOR REGIMENT WAS CONDUCTED TO THIS POSITION BY MAJOR H. E. TREMAIN, OF THIRD CORPS STAFF ABOUT 5.30 P. M., ON JULY 2, 1863. ITS LOSS ON THIS FIELD WAS:

KILLED — 4 OFFICERS AND 47 ENLISTED MEN.

WOUNDED — 11 OFFICERS AND 92 ENLISTED MEN.

MISSING — 8; AGGREGATE 162.

(Left Side.)

THE SECOND FIRE ZOUAVES SERVED WITH THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, AND PARTICIPATED IN ITS CAMPAIGNS FROM YORKTOWN, 1862, TO APPOMATTOX, 1865. TOTAL ENROLMENT 1350. TOTAL CASUALTIES 711.

ERECTED 1897.

KNOWN ALSO AS THE FOURTH REGIMENT OF SICKLES' EXCELSIOR BRIGADE.



J. B. LYON PRINT.

J. I. NUNPER, PHOTO

73D NEW YORK INFANTRY.

In the fields near the Emmitsburg Road, and north of the Peach Orchard Road.

DEDICATION OF MONUMENT.

73D REGIMENT INFANTRY — "SECOND FIRE ZOUAVES."

September 6, 1897.

ADDRESS OF CAPT. MATTHEW STEWART.

COMRADES:

We are assembled here to-day to dedicate a monument that will perpetuate the courage and glory of the regiment that fought upon and held this line against an overwhelming force of the enemy.

But not alone on this field did it exhibit that courage imbued by its connection with the old volunteer fire department of New York City and Williamsburg. On twenty-seven other battlefields where they were engaged, the Second Fire Zouaves, carrying the colors presented to them by the Volunteer Firemen, won for themselves a record of which we are justly proud.

Mustered into the service of the United States in 1861 as the Fourth Regiment of the Excelsior Brigade, United States Volunteers, it was subsequently claimed by the State as a portion of its quota, and thereafter was known on the army records as the Seventy-third Regiment, New York Volunteers.

It was one of the few regiments that entered the service in 1861, re-enlisted in 1864, and maintained its regimental organization to the surrender at Appomattox, and its muster out in June 29, 1865.

During its term of service it bore upon its rolls the names of 1,352 officers and men, of whom 17 officers were killed, 25 were wounded and 2 died from disease incident to privations and hardships of the life of a soldier; 136 enlisted men were killed, 378 were wounded, 59 died from disease and 74 were prisoners of war, few of whom returned to grasp the hands of their comrades.

This is the record of the regiment that represented the volunteer firemen in the Army of the Potomac during four years of war. And the volunteer firemen represented here to-day determined that the story of these glorious deeds and illustrious records, written in the blood of their comrades upon this field and upon the battlefields of Virginia, from Yorktown to Appomattox, should be inscribed upon an enduring monument that will commemorate the devotion to duty of the fireman soldier. Here it will stand, so that the American people, while the Republic endures, can behold this tribute of fidelity, of love, and of devotion from the volunteer firemen to their fallen comrades.

And now let us bow in devotion while the Rev. Dr. Eugene A. Shine, an honored son of Capt. Eugene Shine of this regiment, who was killed upon this field, invokes the blessing of our Divine Father.

* * * * *

ADDRESS OF HON. ROBERT B. NOONEY.

VETERANS OF THE SEVENTY-THIRD, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

The First Regiment New York Fire Zouaves, that became the Eleventh Regiment New York Volunteers, sprang into existence like a meteor. The steamship *Star of the West* was fired on in Charleston Harbor, April 17, 1861. Chief Engineer Decker, of the New York Fire Department, called a meeting to consider the subject the next night at No. 128 West Broadway, when a company roll was opened, to which Elmer Ellsworth signed his name.

The assassination of Ellsworth by Jackson on May 24th, at Alexandria, aroused a patriotic sentiment throughout the country, and a determination to avenge his unmerited death, that was without a parallel during the whole period of the war.

The meeting that was the origin of the Second Fire Zouaves, Seventy-third New York Volunteers, was held in The Gotham, No. 296 Bowery. It was called by John Decker, then chief engineer, on May 3, 1861. Henry Wilson, then commissioner of the department, was present, as was also the entire board of assistant engineers and other prominent members of the department. Patriotic enthusiasm manifested itself throughout the proceedings. John Baulch, then an assistant engineer, was called to the command of the regiment. Headquarters was at first in the old Chatham Theatre, and afterwards at Centre Market. The organization at first was only temporary, for when the men were ready to enter the service the quota of New York State was full, and they could not be accepted until the President issued his second call for troops.

General Sickles was organizing the Excelsior Brigade on Staten Island. Col. James Fairman held the colonelcy of the Fourth Regiment, and he agreed to accept the companies of the Second Fire Zouaves as they were organized, and transfer his then skeleton companies to the other regiments of the brigade. After the brigade had been ordered to Washington for service, in October, the Secretary of War ordered an election for colonel, when William R. Brewster was elected. While in camp the fire department ordered a stand of colors for the regiment, as it had done for the First Regiment, and Mr. John Decker, the chief engineer, with several prominent men of the department, went down to make the formal presentation on behalf of their fellow firemen of New York.

Commissioner Wilson was of the party, and when it was reported to him that although the men were positively assured that if they would enlist in the regiment their names would still be continued on the rolls of the companies as active firemen—they had already commenced to drop their names from the rolls—he very promptly agreed that all such occurrences would be rectified if brought to his attention. And he kept his word.

The record of the regiment and its officers while in the service is history. It has achieved a record of which it may be truly proud. You have heard it here to-day, and we all wish to share that delight with you that were of its ranks and strength.

The muster-roll of the regiment was as follows: Colonel, Wm. R. Brewster; lieutenant colonel, Lewis Benedict; major, John D. Moriarty; adjutant, George

dangers and excitements as the experiences of this field. Justly, therefore, do the inscriptions recall the whole four years during which the forces that collided here were combating for the mastery on hundreds of other fields.

By common consent this battlefield is to represent the fields of four years of war. These monuments at one battlefield are to represent all battlefields where the several factors assembled in this battle engaged in other battles against a common enemy and upheld a common cause. These monuments typify a world of history, a multitude of lives, and a multitude of deaths.

Who can measure the lives, the joys, the sufferings, the deaths, the sacrifices, the experiences, the defeats and the victories covered even by the few letters on this monument, denoting, for instance, casualties exceeding 50 per cent. of the enrollment?

These letters record losses equaled by few other regiments in the war. They record a career covering the entire period of Army of the Potomac hostilities. In killed, you lost 17 officers killed or mortally wounded, and 2 died of disease; 136 enlisted men were killed or died of wounds, 59 died of disease, and 15 in Rebel prisons. Total killed, 229.

In wounded, 25 officers were wounded and 5 missing; 378 enlisted men were wounded and 74 missing; total wounded, 482; thus making your aggregate casualties 711.

Colonel Fox, in his standard work on "Regimental Losses," places your total enrollment at 1,350. Your casualties, therefore, exceeded 50 per cent. of your force. This means that every other man among you was a voluntary sacrifice to patriotism, a martyr to the self-imposed obligations of a citizen soldier.

If one out of every two able-bodied men in this country shall always be found willing to march to his death for the sake of the country, then this Nation will live forever.

Many reported as only "wounded" or "missing" were afterwards learned to have perished; and few regimental records are known to be accurate beyond the totals, where the commands have experienced the vicissitudes of all the Army of the Potomac campaigns.

This regiment never missed a campaign. That it was organized as early as May 3, 1861—as testified to us to-day by Captain Stewart—is further established by the dates on the muster-rolls opposite the names of many of its members—like names on this monument of Captain Stewart, Sergt. Thomas Fair and Lieut. William Gleason, of your Monument Committee. Its first camp was a part of the Excelsior (Sickles's) Brigade at Staten Island, where by companies it was mustered into the United States service in the summer of 1861. In August of that year it went to Washington about 800 strong. Its first winter was passed on the Maryland side of the Lower Potomac, where the Excelsior Brigade became the Second (Sickles's) Brigade of the Second (Hooker's) Division of the Third (Heintzelman's) Corps.

In picketing the river shore a small party from this regiment crossed the river with me and exchanged the first shots received from the enemy by the Excelsior Brigade. The report of this adventure led to an expedition of picked companies from the brigade to Stafford Court House in Virginia. The report of

this reconnoissance was a factor in bringing about the transfer of McClellan's army from Washington to Yorktown. At Yorktown you quickly became accustomed to life in the trenches, and reported your ability to move on the enemy's intrenchments before evacuation. You were the first to move into them when finally permitted, and there captured, as far as I can learn, the first flag taken from the enemy by the Army of the Potomac—a relic now in New York and much prized by the survivors.

At Williamsburg you were lined up to fight in a slashing where a horse could neither walk nor jump. The printed report of the Thirteenth Mississippi shows the efficiency of your conduct at that critical moment, and your losses give a slight indication of your gallant struggle there right under the guns of Fort Magruder—24 enlisted men killed or died of wounds, 1 officer and 61 men wounded, and 15 men missing; total, 104. That was your great baptism of fire.

Time will not admit of my pausing to mention your losses on the many other fields familiar in the history of the Army of the Potomac.

From thenceforward to the surrender you were sharers of its fortunes. The blood of your men was spilled at Fair Oaks, in many combats about Richmond in that peculiar Peninsular campaign of General McClellan, and again in General Pope's army at Bristoe Station, where for the number of men actually present your losses were extraordinary and your conduct superb. Your loss in officers made it necessary near the end of that battle for me to place your remnants on that field temporarily under the command of a sergeant. I wish I knew his name. Then two days later you fought at Manassas, August 29, 1862. That winter you were at the battle of Fredericksburg, and afterwards at Chancellorsville, and here at Gettysburg, and then at Wapping Heights and Mine Run, the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, North Anna, and Totopotomoy, Cold Harbor, the Siege of Petersburg, Strawberry Plains, Deep Bottom, the Weldon Road, the Boydton Road, Hatcher's Run, Sailor's Creek, High Bridge and Appomattox.

In January, 1863, it became my duty as a staff officer of the Third Corps commander to arrange the consolidation of the One hundred and sixty-third New York Regiment with the Seventy-third New York, which somewhat increased your ranks, when the One hundred and sixty-third was disbanded. It fell to my lot also at that time to be instrumental in selecting your commander, the colonel being in command of the brigade. Curiously, I had to choose between that duty for myself or to continue the higher responsibility I was then exercising on the corps staff. Captain Burns, your senior captain present, appealed to me and my love for the regiment to place him again in command. There were reasons why I hesitated to assume the responsibility of so recommending.

But with a solemn pledge from him that I would never regret doing it, and the belief that no man could fight this regiment better than he, while Michael W. Burns lived, I left your camp to write the paper placing him in command, an act I never did regret; and no man ever lived who could have led this regiment more gallantly and efficiently in all its subsequent battles and arduous experiences than this same Col. Michael W. Burns. After an honorable civic

career he has now joined the great majority of our comrades on the bright side of the dark river, where he and his comrades are blessing us to-day.

Here at Gettysburg you came upon this field at near midnight (July 1st) with Humphreys' Division, throwing yourselves silently upon the ground for rest in the fields at the right and rear of where we now stand.

Knowing we were in the immediate presence of the enemy it was the business of your generals at daylight to get into proper position. Lest surprise and destruction should reach you it became essential to decide if the Emmitsburg Road, by which we had marched, was to be held or abandoned. I was sent to General Meade to ask that question, and I asked it. In the absence of explicit orders to abandon it, military necessity and good discipline required it should be held. The picket and skirmish line, therefore, of your division held it, as I rode along the lines at daybreak. To aid in your division manoeuvres I soon asked to have the fences leveled. Thus, with an intense consciousness of the approaching struggle, you occupied these fields, on the line of the road at the old log building that stood at our right from here, until the middle of the afternoon of July 2d, before which time Humphreys had taken up his position in lines of battle.

About 5 p. m. you were detached from your brigade and placed in the fighting line, under the following circumstances, which, at the risk of becoming personal, perhaps, it is my duty here to record:

I had been actively occupied along the Third Corps lines, and, in bearing communications thence to and from General Meade, as well as between General Graham, commanding near the Peach Orchard (as it was then), and General Sickles, Third Corps commander. About 5 o'clock Graham pointed to the enemy's movements and asked me to take his urgent appeal to Sickles for reinforcements. It was plain that they were needed, if that position was to be held.

At my utmost speed I reported this to General Sickles, who was then near the place where he afterwards was shot. Sickles sent me immediately to General Humphreys, commanding his Second Division (Graham's troops were of the First Division), with an oral order for a regiment. I found Humphreys standing near his main line, not at that moment firing.

The Seventy-third New York was then resting on Humphreys' left second line, directly in my path in passing from Humphreys to Graham. General Humphreys said he would send Burns's regiment with me and I rode at once to Burns. He swiftly moved his regiment left in front and followed me to this place, where we put it in line of battle facing the highway.

I continued forward to Graham, whose guns, infantry, and artillery, were all playing. A struggle for that eminence was portending. It did not seem possible for a horse to live on its crest. Graham was, therefore, dismounted, but gallantly directing everything. He approved of Burns's position, and I reported again to General Sickles. With the assistance of survivors, who had marched at my horse's tail during this incident, we placed a public marker on this spot in 1886; and the War Department has adopted it as the site for this monument. You have bought the ground and conveyed it to the Government.

The regiment, it seems, was driven from this position shortly after I had

formed. The front, on the Emmitsburg Road, was again reached, and guns secured, and we (Rafferty says) commenced to drag them back, men and officers together. Strange to say, the enemy never fired a shot. Whether they took it for a counter attack and were waiting until we came nearer I don't know. At all events, they remained quiet."

Some Rebel stragglers were gathered in as prisoners as the lines swept out, and a Rebel captain and private found in a ditch were compelled to help drag one of the guns to its place of safety. Darkness had then stopped the fighting at this point.

In this gallant recoup the officers and men of the Excelsior Brigade all distinguished themselves, the regimental field officers—Leonard, and Rafferty, and Potter, and your own Burns—being conspicuous leaders and participants. The major, thirty men and the colors of the Eighth Florida Regiment were among the trophies of the Excelsiors.

That morning the Excelsior Brigade had numbered, all told, only 1,837 men. That night 778 of those men had been struck down by the bullets of the enemy. The Second Fire Zouaves came to this spot with 324 souls—162 of them fell before night, 5 officers and 46 enlisted men killed; 10 officers and 83 enlisted men wounded and 8 missing.

If no other service had been rendered by this regiment during the entire war, that day's doings justify this monument.

But that was only one of over twenty-five actual battles where the Second Fire Zouaves were present, shooting and being shot at, lest—as was said on yonder Cemetery Hill by the immortal Lincoln,—lest this "Government * * * should perish from the earth."

In any other country but America an occasion of this kind would resound with plaudits for some acknowledged leader. The rank and file would lapse into a subordinate factor.

Look upon this monument. This dedication is to the American soldier. The Second Fire Zouaves is justly proud of its leaders. It loved them and obeyed them. Many men born to lead, and who gallantly did lead among them, fell to the earth a willing sacrifice to the cause of their soldiership. With what pleasure the few surviving comrades here would love to recall the names of familiar forms and voices! Time and the occasion will not permit. We can only name a few of our commissioned leaders: Our Colonel Brewster, our Lieut. Col. Lew Benedict, killed at the head of another command; Michael W. Burns, our last and greatest regimental commander; Lieut. Benjamin Beach, the first man in the regiment who was killed in battle; Capt. Alfred A. Donalds, killed at Bristoe; and then the names on yonder New York State Monument, of Capt. Eugene Shine, of Engine Company No. 31; Lieut. James Marksman, of Hose Company No. 59; Lieut. Martin Higgins, Engine Company No. 2; Lieut. Thomas Dennen, Engine Company No. 47, and Lieut. William Logan Herberth, Engine Company No. 53, and others who were killed in battle after having marched and fought with them and with you, like Captain Le Fort, Capt. John Feeney, Capt. John L. Glass, Capt. Michael Purtell, Capt. John Phelan, Lieut. George Dennen, Lieutenant Lewis, Lieutenant Benedict, Lieutenant Stack, and a long roll of other departed heroes who carried muskets with them.

I wish that the names of every man on our rolls could be graven on enduring tablets to be preserved on this field.

No honor for us could be greater with our posterity than the record of our names among those who contended there.

No honor could be greater to the volunteer firemen of New York than this monument — except the honor of the work done by their representative regiment, the Second Fire Zouaves, on this and other battlefields.

I was too young to be a volunteer fireman, but not to carry a musket. When I had learned that, it became my high privilege to help teach your men under me how to use a musket. Although not in the immediate ranks of the regiment after Yorktown and Williamsburg, yet, until I fell a prisoner at Manassas, I was daily and nightly at the regiment's side with its orders. Even afterwards, when I was serving at division, or corps, or army headquarters, the centre of the army to me was always where the Second Fire Zouaves could be found.

Never shall I forget my sensations when it was suddenly given to me to conduct you into this vortex of the Peach Orchard.

But now your wish is mine, that every soul of that 324 who followed me to this spot shall, from the other world, and from this presence, send a recognition and a blessing to this memorial of their lives.

To the living let me voice the sentiment, that no nation can long survive that does not preserve an honorable regard for its soldiers. Let a grateful country cherish the spirit and the purpose of the citizen soldiers who volunteered for death if need be at Gettysburg.

[REDACTED]



J. B. LYON PRINT.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

76TH NEW YORK INFANTRY.
Seminary Ridge in the background.

(INSCRIPTIONS.)

(Front.)

76TH

NEW YORK
INFANTRY,
2D BRIGADE,
1ST DIVISION,
1ST CORPS.

(Reverse.)

FIRE OPENED HERE,
JULY 1, 1863,
AT 10 A. M.
SECOND STAND AT
R. R. CUT.
THIRD,
AT CULP'S HILL
JULY 2 AND 3.

(Left Side.)

NUMBER ENGAGED,
348

CASUALTIES

KILLED 32,
WOUNDED 132,
MISSING 70.

(Right Side.)

REGIMENT RAISED
AT CORTLAND AND
CHERRY VALLEY, N. Y.
MUSTERED IN OCT. 4, 1861.
PARTICIPATED IN
25 ENGAGEMENTS.
CONSOLIDATED WITH
147TH N. Y. INF'Y.
DEC. 31, 1864.

Thomas Martin, and a long list of equally deserving. There stands the knoll that hid the enemy from sight until they arose and returned our first volley with that deadly fire.

On this memorable spot we to-day erect the granite shaft that for all time shall point to that interesting portion of the great event which changed the current of the war, and set the fortunes of the nation on the road to final triumph. Hereafter for all time the pilgrims to this historic field shall read with wonder and admiration the portion of history here carved in the enduring granite. Listen, oh ye survivors:—

Whole number engaged, 348; killed, 32; wounded and missing, 202; total expended in the service, 234; left for duty, 114.

Who shall say, as they read these figures in the years to come, that the Seventy-sixth New York did not do its duty at Gettysburg? Other regiments covered themselves with glory. We join in the Nation's peans of praise for their faithful services. What honors one branch of the service honors all. We only ask to stand beside them and share their laurels. When the entire history of that grand struggle shall be thus carved in stone and wrought in bronze, embalmed by historians and poets in story and in song, and the music of future bards shall be sung by redeemed people with patriotic fervor, what a glorious symphony shall arise to heaven, and how the thrones of oppression shall be shaken with the melody! Already we can proudly say, "There is not a slave in all the broad domain." Already 4,000,000 of chattels have joined the wage-earners. Already is ignorance and superstition being supplanted by education and refinement. Already are the harvests of liberty being gathered from the fields of carnage.

Twenty-five years! How the memory struggles to grasp and retain the details. The stirring fife and drum; the war meeting at the schoolhouse; the grand uprising of an alarmed people; the patriotic sacrifices of loyal fathers and mothers; the unselfish devotion of loving wives; the mysterious hush of children at the vague, half-understood preparations for departure; the farewell kiss of the "nearer one still and the dearer one yet than all other;" the last "good bye;" the long, weary march; the cheerless bivouac; the lonely sentinel on the outpost; the falling out of the exhausted by the wayside; and then the awful clash of arms in the deadly battle and the long list of dead and wounded! How the bent old forms trembled, as they murmured, "Oh, my son!" How the faithful wife gathered her little ones closer to her, as she ran her finger down the fatal column—"Oh! my God, my husband!" "Dead!" What a world of meaning in a single word! And yet all over the land, how often with pallid cheek and quivering lips it was spoken a quarter of a century ago! Beneficent God! That Thou shouldst heal such wounds, and let in the compensating rays of sunshine on such dark pictures of human woe!

To each organization its own history has a peculiar charm. To us the very number was talismanic, and there is a fragrance to the memory of the favorite regimental song with its chorus:

"Seventy-six is our banner,
'Twill cheer us in the fight,
And we shall have the victory, boys;
For God is with the right."

were permitted to witness the surrender at Appomattox, April 6, 1865. What a three years' interval of marching and fighting! It entered the service with nearly 1,000 men. Many times reduced to a mere skeleton by the casualties of active service, it filled up only to be depleted again, until nearly 2,500 men had answered to its roll-call; and finally, on the 30th day of December, 1864, when consolidated with the One hundred and forty-seventh New York, it contained but 2 commissioned officers and 165 noncommissioned officers and men. The other 2,300 had been mostly "expended in the service."

Oh, the cruel fate of war! Where shall we look for compensation? Slavery wiped out? Aye, that National cancer is removed. The Nation purified? Aye, that is indeed a compensation; but over and above it all, the brave men living and dead have demonstrated the power of this Government to successfully defend itself not only from foreign invasion, but from internal dissension and insurrection. It has convinced the world — much of it against its wishes — that this is the strongest, yet the most flexible government under the sun. It has assured mankind that we are, and are to remain, a nation "one and inseparable." The debate upon that question is closed — we will hope closed forever!

To-day we celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the pivotal battle of the great struggle. With varying victories and defeats other battles have gone into history with their heroic incidents, their grand achievements, and their stupendous failures. The oncoming generations will read them more for their incidents than for their controlling influence upon the final result. But to this historic battle shall they look not only for incident and entertainment, but as the world looks at Waterloo — as the one battle which turned the tide of war and determined the struggle. Had we met defeat here, no spirit of prophecy has pointed out any road to success.

It was the first contest on free soil; it was the first great battle after this Government had abolished slavery and taken a high stand for the right. It was a struggle for our home, as well as for our National life. What a prize! How nobly won!

We stand here to-day to voice our admiration alike for the daring personal courage and determined warlike sacrifices of Confederates as of Unionists. It was a struggle of brave men, each determined to win and each willing to make any sacrifices to that end. Let not the brave Sickles, as he rejoices in his crutches, so honorably won at Gettysburg, disparage the Confederates under Longstreet, in their unexcelled bravery at Round Top. Let not the friends of the glorious Hancock speak lightly of Pickett's charge across the plains. The grand and patriotic Doubleday shall never sneer at Early or at Hill. Noble men, fighting bravely and well for their own cherished principles. Equally brave, equally determined, each and all threw themselves into the fight, determined to win. We recognize the difference in principles fought for, but the victor looks proudly upon the vanquished as a former foe worthy of his steel.

What a change in twenty-five years! Then from Round Top to where we stand, the booming of cannon and death rattle of musketry, the rushing of cavalry, the rumbling of artillery, the shouts of leaders and men, the blare of

ADDRESS BY COL. JOHN B. BACHELDER.

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is not only an unexpected surprise, but it is an unexpected pleasure. I had not contemplated the rare treat of meeting on this historic spot the men who led the van of the great army of the Union on the morning of July 1, 1863; of looking in the face and grasping by the hand the gallant boys who faced the foe on this ground twenty-five years ago.

It is by mere chance that I am present at your dedicatory exercises this morning, and I have enjoyed them more than I can well express. I would not have missed the eloquent remarks of your distinguished orator, Judge Smith. Indeed so exhaustive have they been that little remains for me to say. It occurs to me, however, that the words which interest this audience most will be a brief resume of the engagement of the Seventy-sixth New York, of Cutler's Brigade, on the very ground where we stand; for in the half-hour while these men writhed and strove in mortal combat, they had little time to note the incidents of battle, and the story of that desperate conflict, in which 234 officers and men went down in death, were shattered and torn, or borne prisoners into captivity, can hardly fail to interest others of this audience. The very thought is appalling; and the fact that we now stand on the spot where this occurred adds to the interest. Although the general description of that event may be familiar to the actors, many are now accompanied by their families, who may hear the details of that event for the first time; for brave men are proverbially reticent when describing their own acts, and I am glad of the opportunity of speaking of the gallant deeds here enacted, in the presence of the actors themselves and of their friends who must feel so deeply interested in them. I will, therefore, narrate a few of the incidents which led up to this scene. It was the fortune of the old Seventy-sixth to lead the army on its march that bright July morning. The men moved cheerily on, little thinking that the sun had risen on the most important day of their lives, little dreaming that before the shades of the evening came hundreds of their comrades would be bleeding on the field. As the head of the column approached Gettysburg the distant sounds of cannon met the ear; and the puffs of smoke on the western horizon notified all that our cavalry, which covered the advance, had met the enemy. This was soon confirmed by the reports of staff officers from the front, who came galloping with orders for the infantry to hurry forward to support their hard-pressed comrades. The sound of distant artillery was a new incentive to action. The ranks closed up, the head became more firm, and the whole column swept grandly on, and every one seemed anxious to meet the invader. On reaching the vicinity of Gettysburg the order was given, "Head of column to the left!" The troops left the road, and started across the fields directly for the scene of action. "Forward, double-quick," was the order, and the head of column soon arrived at the Theological Seminary, where, turning to the left, it crossed the ridge. The Seventy-sixth New York, Maj. Andrew J. Grover in command, followed by the Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania, Colonel Hoffman in command, crossed the Chambersburg Turnpike and the old unfinished railroad, and continued up

this valley in our rear, and in a moment's time the battle commenced. Davis's Brigade of Mississippians lay concealed in the grass, and as the Union column advanced met it from their ambuscade with a murderous fire of musketry. So sudden and unexpected was this attack that Major Grover evidently thought the fire must be from our own men, as several volleys were received before the fire was returned.

But now a new danger presented itself. A heavy column of the enemy was seen coming around the brow of yonder knoll, and soon the Fifty-fifth North Carolina, the extreme left regiment of Davis's Mississippi Brigade, was sweeping down on Cutler's flank. Major Grover promptly gave the order to the right of the regiment to "Change front to rear," and the Seventy-sixth commenced that difficult evolution under a murderous fire from front and flank. But most grandly was the movement executed. As promptly as on parade the men swung back the line and presented a new front to the enemy. Simultaneously with this movement Major Grover fell mortally wounded, and a gallant soldier sealed his devotion to his country with his life's blood. Capt. John E. Cook assumed command, and soon after this General Wadsworth saw the perilous condition of these two regiments and ordered them back to the outskirts of the town. In less than a half hour, while the Seventy-sixth New York stood on this ground, though numbering only 346 men and 24 officers, it had 2 officers and 30 men killed outright and 16 officers and 116 men wounded, while 70 others were made prisoners of war.

In the meantime the Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, which fought here on the left of the Seventy-sixth New York, with its left extending towards yonder railroad cut, was heavily engaged. The Ninety-fifth New York and Fourteenth Brooklyn had been ordered to the left by General Reynolds to support Hall's (Second Maine) Battery, which stood on yonder ridge north of the Chambersburg Turnpike. The regiments went into position between those farm buildings (McPherson's) and the woods. The One hundred and forty-seventh New York halted a moment at the McPherson garden, while the Seventy-sixth was moving to this position, and the Ninety-fifth and Fourteenth Brooklyn were going to the left. A moment later, however, Lieutenant Colonel Miller was ordered to lead the One hundred and forty-seventh across the old railroad, and get into position on the north side to cover the right of Hall's Battery. Each command had its full share of the battle which followed, and all eventually fell back over Seminary Ridge, where the brigade was again united and was ordered to again advance, reoccupy this ground, which it did, this regiment being under command of Captain Cook. Soon after reaching this position, however, Rodes's Division of Ewell's Corps arrived on the field from Carlisle. Carter's Battalion of artillery was put into position on yonder hill, from which an artillery fire was opened which enfiladed the First Corps line, and General Cutler ordered the brigade to fall back to Seminary Ridge. In the meantime Robinson's Division of the First Corps had gone into position on Cutler's right, beyond yonder grove. Soon after, Iverson's Brigade of North Carolina advanced from yonder hill to attack Robinson's Division; but in so doing it exposed its right flank, and General Cutler ordered his brigade to advance and attack it. Baxter's Brigade made a simultaneous attack, and some

of Iverson's regiments were captured with their colors. Soon after this the Seventy-sixth Regiment, having exhausted its ammunition, was relieved by the Ninety-fourth New York and fell back. On the second and third days' battle the regiment lay with the brigade on Culp's Hill, and was not heavily engaged.

I will not delay the exercises of the occasion to go further into the details of the battle. But I repeat, Mr. President, it has been a source of great pleasure to meet so many surviving members of this gallant command; for I do not now remember to have met any member of it since my visit to the army during the winter of 1863-64. Permit me, sir, to congratulate you, and through you the members of this regiment, for the success which has attended your efforts in marking this historic spot with a monument which is alike creditable to the patriotism of your members and artistic taste of its manufacturers.


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F. J. BEVERENCE, PHOTO.

77TH NEW YORK INFANTRY.

On Powers' Hill, near General Slocum's headquarters.

DEDICATION OF MONUMENT.

77TH REGIMENT INFANTRY—"BEMIS HEIGHTS BATTALION,"

October 16, 1889.

ADDRESS OF GEN. WINSOR B. FRENCH.

COMRADES:

It is said that the history of war "is the history of the human race. It is one of the natural functions of the savage, and the most honored profession of civilized society. All civilized men regard it as a great evil, yet some one of the leading nations of the world is nearly always engaged in it, and it may safely be said that the sun never sets upon a world wholly at peace."

It is a fact known to all, that no matter how deeply engaged a people may be in the engrossing concerns of business, they are always ready to give a day to recreation, to meet and talk with the old soldiers, and listen to their tales of patriotic deeds in battle, and stories of the field and camp. It is also true, that however far removed these events may be by time, the patriotic heart of the nation will always hold a warm corner for the men who sacrificed and fought in defence of the institutions and government so dear to them. And it is always a source of the greatest satisfaction and pride to the veteran that the people for whom he fought desire to embody in the most enduring form their appreciation of his devotion to his and their country.

And to-day, after the lapse of so many years, standing where they stood on that memorable 3d day of July, 1863, and speaking for and on behalf of the survivors of the Seventy-seventh Regiment, New York State Volunteers, known as the Bemis Heights Battalion, which I then had the great honor to command, I thank the people of the Empire State, their Representatives at Albany, and their Commissioners here represented by you, sir, for the opportunity and great privilege of dedicating this beautiful monument, commemorative of their services on this now historic field. Too much praise cannot be bestowed upon all of the actors in this most patriotic work, on account of their regard for the men who then took part in that momentous struggle for the mastery.

It was not allotted to us on that occasion to stand in the front line and meet the shock of battle, but to be held in reserve, and, with beating hearts and bated breath, to watch the deadly contest, ready when the order came to rush forward with steady arms, with firm tread and unflinching courage, taking the place of the defeated, should defeat assail our arms, or adding fresh strength to the wild and headlong charge that should make the victory overwhelming.

Let those who will, contend as to what was the post of greatest honor; we do not strive in that contest. It is sufficient honor for us to know that it will be recorded in history and chiselled on this commemorative granite, rising above the rock around which we then stood, that we formed a portion of the old fighting Sixth Corps on this far-famed field of war, and there it will remain forever. It is neither my purpose or province on this occasion to rehearse the

for American independence. To-day, we, the representatives of the regiment which bore its name, are here assembled, far from the scene of that glorious contest, to dedicate a monument commemorative of the services of the Bemis Heights Battalion on this famous field, whereon was fought the greatest, and probably the decisive battle of the War of the Rebellion; and which made permanent upon this continent the principle for which our forefathers then and there fought and established at Saratoga. May these sister emblems of patriotism stand to remind our children and our children's children to remotest time, of the sacrifices made by their forefathers to establish and perpetuate the principle of universal freedom and independence throughout the land.

And now it becomes my duty and great pleasure to deliver the monument to the Gettysburg Memorial Association, appointed to watch over and care for this sacred field, destined to become a very Mecca for those pilgrims who, in future years, shall visit those spots hallowed by the blood of freemen, where the spark of liberty has been kindled into a flame that illumines the whole earth.

ORATION BY REV. NORMAN FOX, D. D.,

CHAPLAIN 77TH NEW YORK.

COMRADES:

Our lives are made up not of years but experiences. As one looks over this landscape before us he sees not the whole surface, but only the hill crests and ridges; and so as we look back over our lives we recall only a few important days and scenes. When the rock surface is worn down by the waters, there are certain harder veins that will still remain. So, though the years may obliterate the greater part of the recollections of the past, there are certain flinty nodules of experience that will stand forth in memory. Among such recollections are those of the battle days at Gettysburg.

We stand again upon the historic spot; and, though more than a quarter of a century has passed, the scene is little changed. We stand in the same bright sunlight that marked those July days so long ago. The landscape of Gettysburg Field, one of the most beautiful to be found, lies before us with the same charms as of yore. A goodly number of old comrades are here, grayer of hair indeed, and, perchance, a little wrinkled of brow; but their hearts have not changed a whit. The hands are turned backward on the dial of time. The six and twenty years drop out from the calendar, and we are young again.

The Gettysburg campaign must ever hold a prominent place in our recollections of army life. While Hooker was fighting at Chancellorsville, our corps stormed the Fredericksburg Heights. After that we went back and encamped not far from our winter quarters near White Oak Church. But in a little more than a fortnight we were called out for the Third Crossing of the Rappahannock. In that sharp though short fight, one of the best men in our regiment was killed. On the familiar plain, across the river, we lay for several days in the presence of the enemy, the hostile pickets being in some places hardly more than 100 yards apart. But, one evening, came the order for re-

wet blankets, which, of course, would not dry during the day, and at night we would wrap ourselves again in their soggy folds and lie down with no trouble from insomnia.

We were at Manchester in Maryland, when one evening was sounded the order to fall in. We marched all night, and, after a short halt in the morning to make coffee, we marched on. In the early forenoon a farmer by the way-side told us that there had been a fight the day before at Gettysburg, a town of which not many of us had ever heard; and that General Reynolds had been killed. It was evident that Gettysburg was our destination.

At 2 or 3 in the afternoon as we went over some of the ridges of the Baltimore Pike we could look forward and see the valley some miles before us filled with smoke. A regiment was always a walking debating society, and the boys began to discuss what made that smoke. Some said it was only a farmer burning fallow. But before long we could see the white cotton balls in the air, and this smoke of bursting shells showed the real state of affairs. It was perhaps 4 o'clock when our brigade reached the margin of the field, the second day's battle being then at its height.

The men had marched nearly forty miles, and were turned aside into a field to rest a little. They had had nothing to eat since their coffee in the morning, and they went to work frying their pork and boiling their coffee in the most unconcerned manner, paying no attention to the fact that there, but a little distance in front, hundreds of cannon were thundering, and there were being enacted scenes which would form one of the great turning points of history.

And after all such unconcern is not strange; for the true man attends simply to what is before him, taking each duty only as it comes. There is a great deal of the hum-drum in heroism. The man who made the good soldier was not the swaggering swash-buckler, not the street brawler, but the respectable plain man who at home had always done his duty, faithfully, whatever it might be. The man who being set to hoe corn on a hot day would hoe his row without watching, even when the day was hot, was the man who, when assigned a station on the field of battle, would stay there till recalled, even though it was apparent that the recall would be given only by the resurrection angel.

The part assigned to the Seventy-seventh at Gettysburg was not one of especial danger. Its service on that field was for the most part only to "stand and wait." But it stood ready for any duty which might arise; and, had occasion demanded, it would have taken the same part in that deadly *melee* which it bore in so many other terrible conflicts. For there were many battles in which the Seventy-seventh was called to act a part which involved heavy losses of life. There was not a company which had not a long list of dead.

Among the dead of Company A are Lieutenant Lyon, who fell at Spotsylvania, and Sergeants Burt and Havens, and Corporal West, and Kipp, and Sheran, and Todd.

From the ranks of Company B there died in battle Sergeants Craig and Bolton, and Corp. McWilliams, who fell bearing the colors, and Hill, and Keenholtz, and Lakely, and Strong.

Of Company C, the noble Captain Wheeler fell at Second Fredericksburg, and Lieutenant Thomas at Cedar Creek; and in various battles fell Powers,

Briggs, Burnham, Darrow, Farthing, Gallup, Kempton, Lapham, Miller and Quivey.

Among the dead of Company D were Sergeants Norton and Sexton, with the brave soldiers Briggs, Bowen, Day, Deal, G. R. Deyoe, Dwyer, J. W. Ham, Hubbell, Moss and See.

From Company E the noble Captain Carpenter and First Sergeant Craig; and Corporals Deyoe and Hendricks, and McNeil; and also Dorley, Emperor, Green, Hass, Knickerbocker, Minever, Ruggles, Seeley, Smith, Tack and Woolsey.

From Company F were killed Allen, Barker, Dennison, Frank, Frey, Hawley, Lamey, Mowry, Pung, Reuchler, Thomas and Van Salisbury.

From Company G died Captain Rugg and Corporal Horrigan; and also Darrow, Hall, Matott, Munn, Phillips, Sherman, Vandenburg, Van Kleeck and Wheeler.

From Company H fell that noble Christian soldier Sergeant Carr; and also Armour, Bortell, Brown, Burns, Cole, Conradt, Devine, Dowen, Fowler, Kuapp, the brothers Francis and Matthew Love, Manning, Root and Rowley.

Of the dead of Company I, were Captain Lennon and Lieutenant Belding; and Sergeant Gilroy, with Daiminson, Huntingdon, Russell, Stillwell, Walton and Weston.

Company K lost Lieutenant Taber, killed at Cedar Creek; and Sergeant Green and Corporal Hart, with Allen, Davenport and Fairchild.

From the battalion which remained to the final campaign from Petersburg to Appomattox, fell Captain Oakley and Lieutenant Pearce, with Kitchen, and Chase, and Stewart, and Kipp.

Among the dead of the regiment are others whose names I have overlooked. Eleven officers and something like 120 men were killed or mortally wounded. Besides these are a great number who were disabled like Captain Deyoe, who is with us to-day, whose right eye was shot out at Spotsylvania; and Captain Orr who lost his arm at Cedar Creek. Many, very many, are those of our comrades who, in such losses, bear the marks of the battles of the Seventy-seventh.

My dear old comrades, the recollection of your heroism has been a strength to me as a laborer in the gospel ministry and in the discharge of duty in every circumstance of life. Sometimes my conscience has told me to speak out on some subject where utterance would affect my personal popularity and perhaps pecuniary interests. Whenever I shrank from such utterance I remembered the men whom I had so many times seen face death in sternest form, and so I was admonished to be faithful.

Of course it is not to be expected that so many of us will ever assemble again on a spot like this. The lapse of time leaves fewer years through which your career shall be extended. But I know that the men who have so bravely discharged their duty on the battlefield, will, in all the remaining years of life, be faithful to country and to God.

ADDRESS OF HON. JEREMIAH KECK.

COMMANDER, COMRADES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

Nothing now can be said and nothing now can be thought, for the greatness of the struggle and the grandness of the victory are more appreciated as they are more studied and better understood. And so it will be while patriotism dwells in the hearts of the American people. What was done here was not done for that day and for that time, but for all days and all times. It was not a mere contest between Union and Rebel forces, but between the eternal principles of right and wrong.

When the martyred Lincoln expressed the hope that the result of the great conflict might be "that this government of the people shall not perish from the earth," the dark clouds of war rolled over and shrouded the land. That hope has been triumphantly fulfilled. Not only has this government been established, but before the eyes of all other nations has a grand proof been given of the permanence of free institutions, and the power of an intelligent and devoted people to maintain the stability of their country in times of the greatest trial.

Times of trial and danger may come upon the nation very different from those we commemorate, and yet very great; and when those times do come, we believe it is not in vain to hope that the memory of this struggle will encourage and animate the breasts of her citizens to maintain that Union which has been purchased with so much blood.

We felt that our country was at stake; but the nations of the civilized world felt that something greater was imperiled — the principle that a Republic could by the devotion of her citizens save her national life by the greatest struggle that has been yet recorded in the history of the world. We, my comrades, having done what we could here, in the time of our country's need, now do this as the last permanent thing that we can do, for we shall soon pass away to join our comrades, and our very names will be forgotten; but the work we have done will live after us, and this monument will speak for us to the generations to come, and tell where the Bemis Heights Battalion stood on this harvest field of death.



J. B. LYON PRINT.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

78TH AND 102D NEW YORK INFANTRY.

On Culp's Hill line of Greene's Brigade.

78TH REGIMENT INFANTRY.

HISTORICAL SKETCH.

BY BVT. CAPT. JOHN W. PECK.

Although the Seventy-eighth was classed as a New York City regiment its companies came from various parts of the State. Only three were recruited in the City of New York, while the others came from Rochester, Utica, Buffalo, Bath and Suspension Bridge. One company—K—came from Michigan. These companies were sworn into service at different dates between October, 1861, and April, 1862.

The regiment adopted the name "Cameron Highlanders;" but it was unable to complete an organization until April 26, 1862, when it obtained the required strength by the accession of the men recruited for the Eagle Brigade by Col. Daniel Ullman, who, thereupon, was commissioned colonel of the Seventy-eighth. The field officers were:

Colonel
Lieut. Colonel
Major

Daniel Ullman,
Jonathan Austin,
Henry C. Blanchard.

The regiment left New York on April 29, 1862, and proceeded to Washington. After encamping there for about three weeks it was ordered to Harper's Ferry, Va., where it arrived May 26th, in company with other troops which were hurried to that point on account of General Banks's retreat down the Shenandoah Valley, and Jackson's pursuit. In June, the Seventy-eighth was assigned to Greene's Brigade of Angur's Division, Banks's Corps, in which command it was present at the battles of Cedar Mountain and Second Bull Run.

The designation of Banks's Corps was changed to that of the Twelfth, General Mansfield succeeding Banks in the command. General Angur having been wounded at Cedar Mountain, General Greene was placed in command of the division.

Lieut. Col. Jonathan Austin commanded the Seventy-eighth at the battle of Antietam, the regiment going into action with 12 officers and 209 men. Colonel Goodrich, of the Sixtieth New York, who was in command of the brigade, was killed early in the fight, and the command of the brigade devolved on Lieutenant Colonel Austin. Capt. Henry R. Stagg took charge of the regiment. Entering the action early in the morning Greene's Division was actively engaged until noon or after, having pushed its way into the woods behind the Dunker Church, where it held the most advanced position on the entire Union line, and held it for two hours or more. The Seventy-eighth fought with conspicuous gallantry, executing every movement as steadily as if on battalion drill. Capt. Peter M. Mitchell was killed, and Lieut. Peirson B. Peterson fell mortally wounded. The official report mentions "the daring and courage of Lieutenant Colonel Austin," and "the valuable services of Lieutenant McGregor of the Seventy-eighth New York, the latter having charge of the skirmishers."

After the battle of Antietam the Army of the Potomac occupied Harper's Ferry and Maryland Heights for a few weeks while refitting and preparing for a fresh campaign, and then started in pursuit of Lee, with the expectation of bringing on another battle. When the army moved into Virginia the Twelfth Corps was left to guard the fords of the Potomac and garrison Harper's Ferry, and it did not leave Maryland for the front for several weeks after the main army had gone.

In December, 1862, the Seventy-eighth, in company with the corps, moved southward again through the Loudoun Valley and marched to Fairfax Station; thence after a short stay to Dumfries, and then to Brooke's Station, where it went into winter quarters.

On April 27th the regiment broke camp and marched with the corps to Chambersville, where, under command of Capt. W. H. Randall, it was engaged in the fighting of May 1st, 2d and 3d. It went into the fight on May 1st with 15 officers and 307 men. The regiment built breastworks in the woods, which it held during all the fighting, until by the withdrawal of the troops on the right and left the brigade was obliged to retreat. The regiment lost 13 killed, 51 wounded or mortally wounded, and 68 missing or captured; total, 141. Lieut. Charles A. Courter was killed on Sunday morning, May 3d. After the battle the army recrossed the Rappahannock River, and marching in rain and mud returned to the camps from which they had started on this disastrous campaign only ten days before.

In the spring of 1864, several changes occurred in the field and staff. Colonel Albion, who had not served with the regiment since its organization, was made a brigadier, January 13, 1863. Lieutenant Colonel Austin resigned about the same time, and Major Blanchard, who succeeded Austin, resigned April 12, 1864. Maj. Henry R. Stagg, who had been promoted from a captaincy, resigned May 14, 1864.

On May 30, 1864, Herbert von Hammerstein was commissioned lieutenant colonel of the Seventy-eighth New York. He joined the regiment soon after and assumed command. On June 12th the corps left its camps at Stafford Court House and Aquia Landing, and, starting northward, commenced the long march that was to bring it to Gettysburg. On June 30th, while in bivouac at Darktown, the corps was mustered for pay, at which time the Seventy-eighth reported 20 officers and 100 men present for duty. With this comparatively small force the little regiment marched upon the field of Gettysburg.

On the 30th the Twelfth arrived at Gettysburg on the afternoon of the two-day fighting, after a forced march from Two Taverns, where it first received news that the enemy had been encountered in force. On the 31st the information received put his columns in motion promptly, and on the 1st of July, at Rock Creek, just as the First and Eleventh Corps, after retreating from Cemetery Hill, were taking position on Cemetery Hill.

The division to which the Seventy-eighth New York belonged, was assigned to the extreme left of the Union line, where the troops bivouacked in the immediate vicinity of Little Round Top, two regiments of the division being that commander. Early the next morning—July 2d—the division was ordered to Culp's Hill, where it rejoined the corps, and built

breastworks along its front on the summit of the ridge. The entire line of the Twelfth Corps on Culp's Hill lay in the thick woods that covered the hill and the slopes in its front, the timber extending down to Rock Creek and up the opposite hills. The corps held the right of Meade's army. The brigade — Greene's — held the left of the corps, and joined Wadsworth's Division of the First Corps.

The second day passed uneventfully until 4 o'clock, when the Confederate artillery on Benner's Hill — opposite Culp's Hill — opened a strong fire on the Union right, which was directed mostly against East Cemetery Hill. Battery K, Fifth U. S. Artillery, and Knap's Battery placed five guns in position in the woods on Culp's Hill, near the point in Greene's line held by the Seventy-eighth. In the artillery fight which followed, the batteries lost several gunners and drivers. The men of the Seventy-eighth volunteered to supply their places, and assisted during the entire engagement in carrying ammunition from the caissons to the guns. While engaged in this work one of the regiment was killed and another wounded.

The enemy's guns were silenced after a contest of an hour and a half, and at 6 o'clock in the evening Colonel Hammerstein received orders to take his regiment to the front in support of the skirmishers. Crossing the breastworks and moving down the slope through the woods, the regiment deployed on the skirmish line just in time to relieve the pickets, who were falling back before the advance of the enemy, which was being made in force. Johnson's Confederate Division having crossed Rock Creek was advancing to attack Greene's Brigade, which alone was holding Culp's Hill, the other troops of the Twelfth Corps having been ordered to the left in support of Sickles.

The Seventy-eighth made a stubborn resistance on the skirmish line, and as the shadows of evening deepened in the forest defiles of Rock Creek, the flashes from their rifles glowed with an angry light. Retreating slowly up the hill they joined the brigade behind the breastworks, taking position next to the One hundred and second New York. The Confederate advance was close behind; but as the men of the Seventy-eighth, leaping over the works on their return, uncovered their front, a line of fire ran along the whole front of Greene's Brigade, from which the assaulting column recoiled and fled to the base of the hill. Johnson's troops renewed the attack, making repeated efforts to dislodge the gallant brigade, whose regimental flags, one and all, bore the emblem of the Empire State. General Greene, assisted by small but timely reinforcements, held his ground, and at 9:30 p. m. the discomfited enemy withdrew to await daylight before attempting further efforts.

At 3:30 a. m. the men of the Seventy-eighth refilled their cartridge boxes, a fresh supply of ammunition having been brought up. They had no sooner done this, when Johnson's troops, reinforced during the night by three more brigades, raised their charging yell and rushed upon the works. But during the night the entire Twelfth Corps had returned, and the advancing Confederates encountered deadly volleys at all points of the line from Slocum's veterans. For seven hours the woods echoed with the crashing musketry. At 7:40 a. m. the Seventy-eighth was relieved and sent to the rear a short distance to clean their rifles and replenish their ammunition. At 9 a. m. the regiment resumed

Chatfield, broke camp at Stevenson, Ala., and marching via Bridgeport, Shellmound, Whiteside's and Chattanooga, joined the brigade,— at Lee's Mills, Ga., on May 5th,— which with Sherman's entire army was moving southward on the Atlanta campaign. The regiment was actively engaged at the battles of Resaca, Dallas, Pine Knob and Kolb's Farm. On June 20th Colonel Hammerstein reported for duty and resumed command. As the army advanced the men were under fire almost every day, fighting and skirmishing.

On July 12, 1864, by order of the War Department, the Seventy-eighth was consolidated with the One hundred and second New York, and from that time its honored name ceased to appear in the records of the campaign. Some of the officers were retained in service, Hammerstein and Chatfield taking command of the consolidated regiment without loss of rank. The subsequent history of the Seventy-eighth is identical with that of the One hundred and second New York, which served with honor and renown to the close of the war.

102D REGIMENT INFANTRY.

BY MAJOR HENRY M. MAGUIRE.

The One hundred and second New York Regiment was recruited in various parts of the State, although most of the men were enlisted in New York and Brooklyn. Two companies came from Rondout, and one from Sharon Springs; while squads of recruits were raised in Ogdensburg, Lima and Avoca.

A partial organization was effected January 27, 1862, by consolidating two embryo regiments — the Von Beck Rifles and McClellan Infantry — with the Van Buren Light Infantry. There were added, subsequently, two companies which were raised for the Seventy-eighth New York (Cameron Highlanders), and a company of the Twelfth Militia.

These high-sounding synonyms were self-adopted designations, which were seldom heard aside from the printed placards of the recruiting office; and after the One hundred and second went to the front it was known only by its numerical title, a number which became linked with a most honorable record.

The organization was perfected in March, 1862, although the men had been mustered in at various times during the five preceding months. While organizing, the men were encamped at New Lots, Kings County. The field officers first commissioned were: Thomas B. Van Buren, colonel; William B. Hayward, lieutenant colonel; and James C. Lane, major.

Eight companies left Brooklyn, March 10, 1862, and proceeded to Washington, the two remaining companies, I and K, following on April 7th. The eight companies, on March 15th, crossed the Potomac and marched to Langley, Va., where they were stationed on the outposts for ten days, after which they returned to Washington. Here they formed a part of Wadsworth's Division. In May the regiment was assigned to Doubleday's Brigade, of King's Division, McDowell's Corps, and was stationed at Aquia Creek.

On May 25th the One hundred and second was suddenly ordered to Harper's Ferry with other troops, on account of the threatened advance of Stone-

wall Jackson down the Shenandoah Valley. On arriving there the regiment reported to Gen. Rufus Saxton, under whose command it served at Harper's Ferry until June 1st, when it was placed in Cooper's Brigade, of Sigel's Division. With this command it served in the Shenandoah Valley during the ensuing campaign. This brigade was composed of the Third Maryland, One hundred and second New York, One hundred and ninth and One hundred and eleventh Pennsylvania, and the Eighth and Twelfth United States Infantry.

On June 26, 1862, the Army of Virginia, under command of Gen. John Pope, was organized, upon which the brigade became the Second Brigade, Gen. Henry E. Prince, of Augur's (Second) Division, Banks's Corps.

Under command of Major Lane the regiment participated in the battle of Cedar Mountain, August 9, 1862, where it lost 115 in killed and wounded, or over 50 per cent. of the number taken in action. Capt. Julius Spring was killed, and Capt. Arthur Cavanaugh mortally wounded in this battle. After taking part in the subsequent movement of Pope's retreat, including the battle of Second Bull Run, the regiment, in company with its corps, started on the Antietam campaign in Maryland. On September 12th, Banks's Corps was designated as the Twelfth Corps, Army of the Potomac, and General Mansfield was assigned to its command.

At the battle of South Mountain the corps was held in reserve, and was not under fire. Three days later it was actively engaged in the battle of Antietam. The One hundred and second New York was commanded in this action by Lieut. Col. James C. Lane, who had been promoted from major. The regiment entered the fight at 6:30 a. m. with the division, and was not relieved until 1:30 p. m. The division drove the enemy from the East Woods, and, crossing the Sharpsburg Pike, entered the West Woods around the Dunker Church, holding this advanced position several hours. Captain Cornell fell early in the action, being killed by a sharpshooter while the regiment was deploying from close column by division into line of battle.

After this battle, on October 27, 1862, some changes were made in the Second Division, and, as a result, the regiment was placed in the Third Brigade, commanded by Gen. George S. Greene. The brigade, as newly organized, contained the following commands:

60th New York,
78th New York,
102d New York,
137th New York,
149th New York,

Col. Abel Godard,
Maj. Henry R. Stagg,
Col. James C. Lane,
Col. David Ireland,
Col. Henry A. Barnum.

These regiments served together in the Third Brigade until the close of the war. Gen. John W. Geary was placed in command of the division, a position which he retained without change until the corps was disbanded in 1865. The division was encamped on Loudoun Heights, and, subsequently, on Bolivar Heights, near Harper's Ferry, for three months or more after the battle of Antietam. On November 9th General Geary, with his command, made a reconnoissance up the Shenandoah Valley as far as Rippon, near Berryville,

developing the information that the Confederate army had disappeared from General McClellan's front. On December 2d, the division made another reconnoissance in force up the valley, marching this time as far as Winchester, during which some skirmishing and fighting occurred.

General Slocum's Corps left its camps about Harper's Ferry on December 11, 1862, and, marching through the Loudoun Valley, moved by Leesburg, Fairfax Court House and Dumfries nearly to Fredericksburg, whither it had been ordered in support of Burnside. But the battle having been fought and the campaign ended before the corps could arrive, the corps returned to Fairfax Station where it encamped for a short time. Leaving Fairfax on January 19, 1863, the brigade made a "mud march" to Aquia Creek Landing, where it went into winter quarters and remained until the opening of the spring campaign. Colonel Van Buren having resigned his commission, Lieutenant Colonel Lane, who had commanded the regiment in nearly all its battles and campaigns, was commissioned to fill the vacancy, and Capt. Robert Avery was made lieutenant colonel.

The One hundred and second New York started on the Chancellorsville campaign April 26, 1863, leaving its camp at Aquia Creek and marching seventeen miles that day. It arrived at the Chancellor House on Thursday, April 30th. The next day — May 1st — the Twelfth Corps made a reconnoissance towards Fredericksburg, during which it encountered the enemy; after some skirmishing it returned to its place of bivouac. Here the regiment threw up log breastworks in the forest and dug intrenchments. The men used their bayonets for digging, and then, removing the dirt with their tin cups and plates, filled in the front of their breastworks with it.

During the 2d the division remained in its works, while the Third Corps and Williams's Division of the Twelfth Corps moved out to attack the enemy. But the attack on the Eleventh Corps by Stonewall Jackson's troops put Hooker's entire army on the defensive, and Sickles and Williams hastily returned to their positions in the general line.

On the following day, May 3d, the battle raged furiously along the whole front. During the action the One hundred and second captured several officers and men of the Twelfth Georgia, together with their colors. But, at 10 a. m., the Confederate batteries, having occupied Hazel Grove, were enabled to deliver a raking, flank fire on Geary's position, and his division was ordered to withdraw. The whole army was obliged to yield its ground and retreat. While doing so the regiment halted at the Chancellor House, which was then in flames, and supported a battery at that point until all the other infantry on that part of the field had retreated. The One hundred and second then moved off in perfect order. In this action the regiment lost 51 in killed and wounded, and 39 captured or missing; total, 90. Lieut. Francis Bacon was among the killed, and Col. Avery was severely wounded.

The division withdrew to a position on the Rappahannock River, covering the United States Ford, and on the 6th, recrossing the river, returned to its camps at Aquia Landing.

After resting for a month the regiment broke camp on June 13, 1863, and marched with the corps on the Gettysburg campaign. Passing through Vir-

ginia and Maryland the corps arrived at Littlestown, Pa., on June 30th. At a muster held here, the One hundred and second New York reported 16 officers and 232 men present for duty, including noncombatants.

On the following day, July 1st, the corps moved to Two Taverns where it was awaiting orders when General Slocum received the news that there was heavy fighting at Gettysburg and that General Reynolds was killed. Slocum put his corps in motion immediately, and marching along the Baltimore Pike, arrived at Rock Creek about the time that the Union troops were falling back through the town to Cemetery Hill. Two brigades of Geary's Division were ordered to occupy Little Round Top, and the One hundred and second bivouacked there at nightfall, with its pickets pushed forward to the Emmitsburg Road.

Early the next morning the two brigades — Candy's and Greene's — were ordered to rejoin their corps on Culp's Hill. The division formed line in the woods that covered the hill, and threw up a line of breastworks along its crest. The regiment lay here all day without going into action. About 6 in the evening the Twelfth Corps left its intrenchments and marched to the extreme left of the army to the support of General Sickles, leaving Greene's Brigade to hold the position on Culp's Hill. The brigade now held the extreme right of the Union line. In order to occupy the breastworks thus vacated by the corps, Greene formed his brigade in a single line, with spaces between the men, the regiments moving to the right as the line lengthened. The men had scarcely accomplished this extended formation when a sharp crackling fire on the skirmish line announced the approach of the enemy, and the dusky forest, already darkened with the shadows of approaching night, glowed with the red flashes of musketry.

Johnson's Confederate Division, composed of the brigades of Jones, Steuart and Nichols, was advancing to the attack. It was three brigades against one. But Greene's veterans lay quietly behind their breastworks, reserving their fire until the yelling Confederates were within a few yards, and then springing to their feet poured volley after volley into the ranks of their assailants. The assault was repulsed. The enemy made repeated attempts to carry the hill and for two hours the musketry was incessant. The firing ceased at 9:30 p. m., and the defeated Confederates withdrew to the foot of the hill where they awaited daylight. But on the right of the brigade the enemy occupied the vacant breastworks of the corps, Greene being unable to furnish men to hold the entire line.

At daybreak on the morning of the 3d, while the flashes from the rifles of the pickets still showed a red blaze in the shadowy dawn, Slocum's artillery opened with an appalling roar, and then the Twelfth Corps infantry, which had returned in the night, made a gallant effort to regain their lost intrenchments. At the same time, Johnson's Division, reinforced by four additional brigades, opened with heavy volleys of musketry and charged forward in an effort to seize the Baltimore Pike. Greene, by refusing his right regiment, still held his part of the breastworks and made it impossible for the enemy to advance at that part of the line. For seven hours the forest of Culp's Hill echoed with the crashing volleys, whose roar was doubled by the resounding echoes of the woods.

About 9 a. m. the One hundred and second was relieved by the One hundred and fiftieth New York, of Williams's Division, and the regiment fell back in order to clean the rifles and replenish their cartridge boxes. In less than half an hour the little regiment returned to its place in line and relieved the One hundred and fiftieth. About 10 a. m. the Twelfth Corps advanced its whole line, recaptured its works, and drove Johnson's defeated regiments back to the line of Rock Creek.

The losses of the Confederates in front of Greene's breastworks were terrible; at no place on the field of Gettysburg did the dead lie thicker than on the wooded slope below the line of this glorious New York brigade. The casualties in the regiment were not numerous, owing to the protection of the works. Two gallant officers, however, lost their lives. Capt. John Mead, and Adj. J. V. Upham fell while bravely cheering on their men. Colonel Lane was seriously wounded, and the command devolved on Capt. Lewis R. Stegman, who directed the movements of the regiment with cool deliberation and soldierly bearing during the rest of the battle.

Following slowly in pursuit of Lee's retreating army the regiment recrossed the Potomac July 19th on the pontoon bridge at Harper's Ferry, and marching through Ashby's Gap and Thoroughfare Gap, arrived on the 31st at Ellis's Ford, on the Rappahannock River, where it encamped. In the latter part of September the Twelfth Corps was ordered to Tennessee to relieve Rosecrans' army at Chattanooga.

Marching to Bealton Station, Va., the regiment was placed in freight cars and sent to Washington; thence over the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad to Bellaire; and thence via Indianapolis, Louisville and Nashville to Murfreesborough, Tenn., where it arrived October 6th. On the 28th it started for the front as guard for a wagon train, and arrived at Wauhatchie, near Chattanooga, on November 11th.

The regiment was conspicuously and honorably engaged in the famous "Battle above the Clouds" at Lookout Mountain, November 24, 1863. This battle was fought and won by Geary's "White Star" Division, of the Twelfth Corps, supported by a brigade (Whitaker's) of the Fourth Corps.

The One hundred and second, leaving its camp in the early morning, arrived at the foot of Lookout Mountain at 8 o'clock. The brigade was under the command of Colonel Ireland, of the One hundred and thirty-seventh New York, General Greene having been seriously wounded a few weeks previous at the battle in Wauhatchie Valley. Geary formed his division with Ireland's Brigade in the centre, and the One hundred and second New York, Colonel Lane, was ordered forward as skirmishers. Up the steep declivities of the mountain side, over rocks and fallen trees, the White Stars charged boldly, driving the enemy from their intrenchments and capturing entire regiments through skillful manoeuvres. The regiment was the first to reach the plateau at the Craven House, where the enemy made his principal defence. But this stronghold yielded also to the gallant impetuosity of the veterans of the Twelfth Corps, and the astonished Confederates, who had regarded the position as impregnable, were obliged to abandon the position. About 1 o'clock a portion of the enemy made a final assault on the left of Ireland's Brigade, but a detachment

of skirmishers, under Capt. Lewis R. Stegman (One hundred and second New York), and one regiment of Whitaker's veteran troops rushed to the support of the threatened point and the attack was repelled. During the battle the division captured 1,940 prisoners, 2,800 stand of arms, and 50 officers' swords. Ireland's Brigade captured 4 battle flags and 2 pieces of artillery.

During all this fighting heavy clouds of fog rolled up and along the mountain side, completely shutting out from view the valley at Chattanooga, and, at times, the summit of the mountain where the Union flag was planted after the battle. Around Chattanooga were encamped Union troops of the Army of the Cumberland, who watched anxiously the course of the battle. At times the movements of the contending forces were hidden by the clouds that drifted along the mountain slopes, and the upward tide of battle could be traced only by the crackling musketry, and the long, loud Northern cheer.

At intervals there were rifts in the clouds through which the Western soldiers saw with astonishment the regimental flags of the "Potomac men" floating proudly over the enemy's works at the Craven House. These Western troops had been led to believe that the many reverses of the Army of the Potomac were due to lack of good fighting material. But when they saw the pluck, enthusiasm and skill with which these men of the Twelfth Corps swept up the mountain side, they admitted freely that they had been deceived. And they were to have further convincing proofs before the Atlanta campaign was over.

Owing to its dash and discipline, combined with skillful manoeuvring, the loss in the White Star Division was comparatively small. Though the Confederates occupied strong positions they were repeatedly flanked out of their works, and forced to either surrender or hastily retreat without delivering their fire. The ascent was steep and difficult; but Geary's brigades advanced rapidly, changed front at times by half-wheels, and outflanked the enemy, all with the same precision with which they moved over the level fields at Antietam.

The flag of the Twenty-ninth Pennsylvania was planted at the summit of Lookout Mountain, and the defeated enemy disappeared in retreat. But the victory had cost the One hundred and second the usual price in blood and gallant lives. Maj. Gilbert M. Elliott was killed, the first man in the division to fall. The lieutenant colonel of the regiment, Robert Avery, fell, his thigh broken by a rifle ball, the wound necessitating amputation.

The victory was gained, but there was more fighting to be done,—more honor to be won. On the following day the regiment was engaged in the greater battle of Missionary Ridge, where it supported a battery. Two days later, November 27th, the enemy pushed on in pursuit of Bragg's retreating forces, encountering the enemy on the hills beyond Ringgold, Ga. Some Western troops having been driven back in confusion through the gap at Taylor's Ridge, the brigade was ordered forward to their relief. This advance was made at a double quick through a hot fire of musketry and artillery to the designated position, during which three charges of canister tore through its ranks. Captain Greene, Assistant Adjutant General of the brigade, and a son of General Greene, lost his leg by one of these artillery missiles. His father was desperately wounded at Wauhatchie, a month previous. The position was carried and held. Then Captain Stegman and Lieutenant Davis, of the One

hundred and second, advanced with a party of skirmishers, cleared the pass completely, and pushed on to the burning railroad bridges over the Catoosa Creek in time to extinguish the flames which had been kindled by the retreating enemy to check further pursuit.

In December, 1863, the regiment re-enlisted for three years more, and received the customary furlough granted to veterans for such enlistment. On January 3, 1864, under command of Captain Stegman, the bronzed and war-worn heroes boarded the cars for their journey to New York, happy over the prospect of a respite from toil and peril, short though it must be. Their furlough over, they returned to the front, arriving at Stevenson, Ala., March 17, 1864.

Prior to the opening of the Atlanta campaign the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps were consolidated, the new organization being designated as the Twentieth Corps, to the command of which Gen. Joseph Hooker was assigned. The corps retained the old flannel star of the Twelfth as its badge. Aside from the accession of new regiments no change was made in Geary's Division. Two regiments — the Twenty-ninth and One hundred and eleventh Pennsylvania — were added to the old Third Brigade. Colonel Ireland retained command of the brigade, General Greene being still incapacitated by his wound.

Bidding a final good-bye to its comfortable winter quarters at Stevenson, May 2, 1864, the One hundred and second started on its way to join the army, then moving on the Atlanta campaign. Though marching southward, the regiment was, in reality, on its homeward march. Its steps were not to be retraced, though its long route home lay by Atlanta and the Sea, and many months of fighting and privation were to elapse before the return of peace would enable it to encamp once more at Washington under the shadow of the dome of the National Capitol.

The four ensuing months were a period of constant marching or fighting. The regiment was engaged with honorable distinction at the battles of Resaca, Dallas, Kenesaw, Pine Mountain and Kolb's Farm. Colonel Lane led the regiment until June 15th, when sickness forced him to relinquish the command. Maj. Lewis R. Stegman, a brave and accomplished officer, succeeded him. But Stegman fell seriously wounded the next day, while gallantly leading a charge up the slope of Pine Mountain. The command then devolved on Capt. Barent Van Buren.

On July 12, 1864, while on the Atlanta campaign the Seventy-eighth New York was consolidated with the One hundred and second. The latter regiment retained its number, but the colonelcy and lieutenant colonelcy were awarded respectively to Colonel Hammerstein and Lieutenant Colonel Chatfield of the Seventy-eighth.

Under Colonel Hammerstein the One hundred and second fought well and bravely at Peach Tree Creek, Ga., July 20th, where the casualty list of the campaign was lengthened by 55 more, who fell killed or wounded on that bloody field. Then followed the Siege of Atlanta with almost daily losses in the trenches; and then on September 2d, the city was evacuated by the enemy, and the Twentieth Corps, now under General Slocum, entered the place. The victorious campaign was over, and for two months the regiment, together with the corps, enjoyed a period of well-earned rest and recuperation while encamped quietly in and around Atlanta.

Sherman's famous March to the Sea began November 15th. On that day the regiment packed knapsacks and went marching through Georgia. No battle occurred during the march; but there was some skirmishing, plenty of foraging, and considerable work in tearing up and destroying railroads.

A little over three weeks of marching, foraging, and skirmishing and the corps deployed in front of the enemy's earthworks at Savannah. The March to the Sea was over, and the investment and siege of that city began. On the day following its arrival the brigade, now under Colonel H. A. Barnum, of the One hundred and forty-ninth New York, formed for an assault; but the order was countermanded and siege operations were commenced. A Rebel gun-boat on the river threw some six and one-half and nine-inch shells into the works, wounding several of the regiment, but the casualties during the siege were not numerous. The Confederates evacuated Savannah on the 21st, whereupon Geary's Division took possession of the city, the skirmishers of the One hundred and second, followed by the regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Chatfield, being the first to engage the rear guard and enter the place.

After six weeks' rest at Savannah the army moved, February 4, 1865, on its northward march through the Carolinas, arriving at Goldsborough, N. C., March 24, 1865. The brigade did not participate in Slocum's battles at Averasborough and Bentonville; but the campaign was one in which the men underwent hardships and fatigues equal to any in their previous experience.

After encamping at Goldsborough for two weeks the regiment marched with the brigade to Raleigh, N. C., where it also remained for two weeks. On May 1, 1865, the war having ended, the corps took up its march to Washington. It passed through Richmond, across the Chickahominy and North Anna River, through the battlefields of Spotsylvania and the Wilderness, where the Union dead still lay unburied, over the ground where the regiment fought at Chancellorsville, across the Rappahannock, by the old camp grounds at Fairfax, to Alexandria, where it arrived May 19th. It had marched 380 miles after leaving Goldsborough, an average of sixteen miles a day. But the war was over; each step brought them nearer home, and the veterans moved along at a steady, swinging pace. Their hearts were no longer heavy with grim resolve, but light with happy anticipations.

On May 24th the regiment crossed the Potomac on the Long Bridge and participated in the final Grand Review at Washington.

At this time it was commanded by Col. Harvey S. Chatfield, who was commissioned colonel upon the discharge of Colonel Hammerstein, January 7, 1865. The regiment remained in service until July 21, 1865, when it was mustered out at Alexandria, Va.

The One hundred and second New York had a long and honorable record. It was never strong in numbers, and so its casualties in battle were not as numerous as in some other and larger regiments; still, its losses in action were very severe in proportion to the numbers engaged.

Its campaigns were wide and many; it fought in different armies and on the battlefields of widely distant States. Its dead filled many a hero's grave,—in Virginia, under the shadows of Cedar Mountain, and in the gloomy thickets of Chancellorsville; in Maryland, by the quiet flow of the Antietam; in Penn-

sylvania, under the forest-crowned slopes at Gettysburg; in Tennessee, beneath the beetling crags of Lookout Mountain; in Georgia, under the waving pines of Resaca and Dallas; and in the Carolinas, by the swamps and rivers that barred their toilsome march.

“Nor shall their glory be forgot
While Fame her record keeps,
Or Honor points the hallowed spot
Where Valor proudly sleeps.
Nor wreck, nor change, nor winter's blight,
Nor Time's remorseless doom,
Can dim one ray of holy light
That gilds their glorious tomb.”

Copy

NEW YORK AT GETTYSBURG

(INSCRIPTIONS)

(Front)

LESTER CLARD
20TH N. Y. STATE MILITIA

THIS HAND FOR OUR COUNTRY.

20TH N. Y. INFANTRY
1st BRIG. 2d DIV. 1st CORPS.

ORGANIZED 1861, AT KINGSTON, N. Y. AS 20TH N. Y. S. M.

AUG. 24, 1861, ENTERED U. S. SERVICE FOR 3 MONTHS.

SEPT. 4, 1861, HE ENTERED SERVICE FOR 3 YEARS.

SEPT. 4, 1861, HE ENTERED AS VETERAN FOR THE WAR.

JAN. 20, 1862, MUSTERED OUT OF SERVICE.

(Reverse)

Held advantageously this position
from 12:00 A. M. to 4 P. M.

JULY 2, ON CUMBERY HILL,

ON AUGUST 10, 1861,

JULY 2, ON FRONT LINE OF BATTLE

AS TO PICKETT'S ATTACK.

NUMBER KNOWNLY KILLED

NUMBER OF WOUNDED 111, MISSING 41.

(Right Side.)

NORMAN'S FORD,
WARRENTON SPRINGS,
CAINSVILLE,
CROFTON,
4th HILL RUN,
CHANDLER.



J. B. LYON PRINT.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

80TH NEW YORK INFANTRY.
On First Corps battlefield, west of Seminary Ridge.

DEDICATION OF MONUMENT.

(20TH N. Y. STATE MILITIA)

80TH REGIMENT INFANTRY—"ULSTER GUARD."

October 4, 1888.

ADDRESS OF COL. JOHN McENTEE.

FELLOW SOLDIERS AND FELLOW CITIZENS:

It devolves upon me, as presiding officer of the Veteran Association of the Twentieth New York State Militia, to call this meeting to order.

Comrades, after a lapse of twenty-five full round years we are met together on the scene of a great conflict in which you can feel, with pride, that you bore an important part.

Standing here to-day we cannot but compare the scenes of the present with the eager, high-wrought strife of those days of war. This clear, pure air, this gorgeous ripening foliage, this bright, beautiful October day, quiet and peaceful as a Sabbath morning—are in striking contrast with the roar of artillery, the rattle of musketry, the rumble of army wagons and ambulances, the groans of the wounded, and farewells of the dying. But high above all, through the smoke of battle and the mist of these years, in broad, clear light, shine the acts of valor, the heroic deeds, the glorious, self-sacrificing patriotism, the hardy manhood of those living and dead who, on this spot, offered and gave their lives that "this Government of the people shall not perish from the earth."

Fellow soldiers, that you bore your part well, is attested by this imposing monument. It was procured through an appropriation made by the people of your State, supplemented by a liberal gift from your fellow townsman—that high-minded, patriotic citizen, Hon. Thomas Cornell. The generous contribution of Mr. Cornell has enabled you to erect a more elaborate structure than the State allowance would purchase.

We are here to-day, my friends, for the purpose of dedicating this monument to the memory of those who fought and those who gave their lives on this memorable field, that the Nation might live.

ADDRESS OF GEN. THEODORE B. GATES.

COMRADES OF THE OLD TWENTIETH:

Once more a few of us congregate on this historic ridge, where, twenty-five years ago, we stood shoulder to shoulder in armed ranks to stay the march of a confident and valiant foe. How well we and our fallen comrades performed the perilous work assigned to us, it is meet we should leave for others to declare. But we may be permitted to say, without a violation of becoming modesty, that we ourselves, and these our friends who grace this ceremony

by their presence, may visit this spot and recall the scenes and events which twenty-five years ago made this ground forever famous, without a blush of shame for the behavior of the "Ulster Guard" on that occasion.

Then we came as soldiers, battling for the preservation of our national existence and for the perpetuity of this republican government. Then we constituted a unit in an army inspired by the noblest sentiments for which men can offer up their lives — loyalty to country. Then this ridge and these adjacent woods and fields, now so pastoral and peaceful, were trodden by the hurrying feet of armed men and swept by a merciless storm of lead and iron. The air, now so calm and clear and beautiful, was then thick with the smoke of battle and tremulous with the rattle of musketry and the roar of artillery.

But these and all like scenes long since faded into the quietude of unbroken peace, while over the war cloud arose the glorious sun of a recemented Union of indissoluble States, with but one national flag, one national government and one people. To commemorate the heroism and sacrifices of our comrades of the old Twentieth, who gave their lives for their country on this field, on the 1st day of July, 1863, and of those who fell in the succeeding conflicts on the adjacent battlefields, this granite and bronze monument has been erected, and we have traveled hither from our distant homes to pay this final token of comradeship to the memory of those who marched and fought in the ranks of the Ulster Guard, and who finished their patriotic work by paying on this battlefield of Gettysburg the highest price men can pay for their country.

Now as we unveil this monument, you see it surmounted by the sphere, or circle, representing the badge of the First Corps of the Army of the Potomac, whose commander, General Reynolds, was killed at the edge of the grove, a few hundred feet east of this spot, and where a monument to his memory now stands. Around the outer margin of this sphere are the words: "Ulster Guard — Twentieth N. Y. State Militia." Within the circle, formed by these words, is a solid bronze shield, on which are engraven the coat-of-arms of the regiment — an open raised-up right hand, palm to the front, and over it the legend: "This hand for our country." Under the sphere are the words: "Eightieth New York Infantry, First Brigade, Third Division, First Corps. Organized 1851, at Kingston, N. Y., as Twentieth N. Y. S. M. April 28, 1861, entered United States service for three months. September 5, 1861, re-entered service for three years. September 5, 1864, re-enlisted as veterans for the war. January 29, 1886, mustered out of service."

On the obverse of the die is the following memoranda: "Held substantially this position from about 12 m., July 1, 1863, to 4 p. m.; July 2, on Cemetery Hill, in support of Third Corps; July 3, in front line of battle, resisting Pickett's attack. Number engaged, 375; killed, 35; wounded, 111; missing, 24."

On the west end of the die is the following record of battles in which the Twentieth was engaged: "Norman's Ford, Warrenton Springs, Gainesville, Groveton, Second Bull Run, Chantilly."

On the east end: "South Mountain, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, Petersburg."

All these inscriptions undergo the scrutiny of the Board of Commissioners of the State of New York, having in charge these grounds and monuments,

at the head of which is Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles; and they must be justified by the proper official records.

Comrades, it was our fortune to escape the fate that befell so many of our brothers-in-arms on these fateful fields, and as we go hence let us carry in our hearts a renewed affection for the memory of the brave boys we left here, and a deeper love for the dear country they so freely gave their lives to preserve to us and to our posterity.

Maj. Gen. Abner Doubleday, in command of the First Division, First Corps, at Gettysburg, being unable to be present, sent the following letter, which was read by Dr. Robert Loughran, formerly surgeon of the Twentieth:

(General Doubleday's Letter.)

"Mendham, N. J., Sept. 25, 1888.

"Comrades:—

"This monument, consecrated to patriotic valor, commemorates the deeds of our comrades who fell here in the darkest hour of the war. An awful thunder storm brooded over the Republic; but amid the flashes of lightning, the roll of the thunder and the sweep of the hurricane, the men stood firm for liberty and law, for the Constitution, and for the right of every man to be paid for his labor. They did their manly part to obliterate the last vestiges of slavery and barbarism from the land.

"How nobly the Twentieth New York State Militia did their duty on this field is recorded in every history of the war. I recall them on the first day as they made our left secure, by holding the house and grounds of Harman, far out in advance of our main line and very near to that of the Confederates. This bold advance, which proved so perilous when the final charge was made, impressed the enemy and induced them to greatly overrate our strength. It almost realized the spirited lines of Tennyson:

'Charging an army while all the world wondered.'

"At the close of the severe contest, when only a third of the First Corps remained and when we were obliged to fall back to avoid being cut off by the overwhelming forces which were advancing from the west, northwest, north and northeast, the Twentieth still held the post of honor in rear of the column which passed along the railroad grading, defying Hill's Corps behind them, and Ewell's on their left flank. Yet so firm and orderly was their retreat that it deterred Ewell's troops from making a direct assault. They halted to throw out a line of skirmishers, and this delay enabled the Twentieth to make their way to the town in comparative safety.

"On the second day, when we were sent to aid in repelling the assault of Anderson's Division, the Twentieth was posted by the side of Stannard's Vermont Brigade, in the line nearest to the enemy. On the morning of the 3d, the regiment was exposed to a heavy artillery fire for two hours and again at

1 p. m., when, 135 guns having opened against our left centre, in order to demoralize it and make way for the great infantry charge which Lee hoped would decide the fate of the day, the Twentieth, although greatly exposed, took the blows without flinching. When the severe cannonade was over, and strong masses of infantry came forward to seize the little clump of trees on the bluff, which was their objective point, the Twentieth New York State Militia and the One hundred and fifty-first Pennsylvania, forming a demi-brigade under Colonel Gates, sprang forward and interposed between the enemy and the grove he was endeavoring to reach. Gates's efforts united to those of Stannard, who acted directly against the flank, doubled up that portion of the Confederate line, confused it, and greatly embarrassed and weakened the force of its assault. Before Pickett's command gave way entirely and fled, part of it took refuge among some trees, which had been felled earlier in the day, to clear the way for our guns, but Gates gave them no rest. He charged them with his demi-brigade and drove them from their last covert, and the plain was covered with fugitives and victory was complete.

"As a New Yorker, I am proud of the record of the Twentieth New York State Militia, and as an eye-witness of their courage and patriotic devotion at Gettysburg, I am happy to bear testimony to their achievements in the greatest historic battle of modern times. Their action contributed greatly to save the rich cities of the North from spoliation and the grasp of an iron despotism. Their descendants will come here in the future as to a sacred shrine, and forever appreciate the great sacrifice which brought back to a sorely afflicted country the placid days of peace, prosperity and contentment.

"As we look at the situation in Europe, where immense armies are organized to take possession of land which does not belong to them, and to force the unwilling inhabitants to become their vassals, we turn with admiration to men like our fallen comrades, who had no selfish end in view, but who fought for the liberty and well-being of all.

"And Freedom hallows with her tread,
This silent city of the dead;
For beautiful in death are they
Who proudly fall in her array,
And soon, O, Goddess, may we be,
Forever more with them and Thee."

ABNER DOUBLEDAY,
Brevet Major-General U. S. Army,
late Major-General U. S. Vols.

ORATION BY REV. CORNELIUS VAN SANTVOORD, D. D.

CHAPLAIN 20TH N. Y. S. M.

SURVIVORS OF THE ULSTER GUARD, COMRADES AND FRIENDS:

This is an occasion of unwonted interest. We are standing to-day on a battlefield renowned through all the world. On this spot a quarter of a century ago two great armies, composed of men who should never have been enemies, encountered each other in the deadly shock of war. The fierce conflict prolonged through three days, during which the result hung wavering in the balances, ended at last in victory crowning the Union arms.

The red field was won, but the triumph was purchased at a fearful cost. The soil drank deep of the best blood in the land, for the young men of a nation largely composing its armies — ardent, enthusiastic, generous — who lay down life in its defence, are the flower of a nation's nobility. A bereaved country deeply mourns their loss and will never cease to cherish them in grateful remembrance.

We come together, comrades, to do honor to these brave and true-hearted men who died that the country might live. The blood, poured out like water on these hills and plains, was shed in no ignoble cause, and for the attainment of no selfish or insignificant end. It flowed to keep the bright ensign of the Union unsoiled, to defend our majestic institutions from harm, to shield the Republic, the loving and beloved mother of us all, against the blows aimed to destroy it. We stand, therefore, on hallowed ground. It is consecrated forever by patriotic suffering and sacrifice. We tread it with reverence, as memory brings up before us the heroism and fidelity of those who counted not their lives dear unto themselves when duty to their country called them to give this supreme test of their devotion. And the reverence that we now feel will be shared by succeeding generations of our countrymen, who, visiting this spot and moving with solemn tread and tearful eye among these graves of patriots, will gratefully recount the valuable services they rendered to the country and draw inspiration to high and noble deeds from their example.

We look around us. We see scattered all over this historic field memorials reared by affection and gratitude to the fallen heroes whose bosoms were the bulwark of the Nation. These monumental structures are significant,— they are instructive too. They stand there silent, indeed, but how eloquent are they all. They speak with no audible voice, yet is their utterance more powerful and thrilling than that of the most magnetic living orator. They say to us with solemn emphasis that this vast and peerless country which Providence has made our home is well worth every sacrifice the citizen can make to preserve it;— that it is becoming and even sweet to die, if the exigency demand, in defending this more than royal legacy of civil and religious liberty left us by the fathers, and transmitting it safe to those who come after us,— that only as the Union remains unbroken can the perpetuity of this fair heritage be secured, and that when evil days come and men grow fearful and despondent by reason of dangers surging around the Nation, it is then for the eyes of the faint-hearted to turn to the brave men whose blood enriches these plains and

find in the record of their devoted lives, hope, strength and courage, fitted to meet and vanquish whatever perils, in the future, threaten the national safety.

We are here, comrades, to dedicate another of these mute but eloquent memorials. Our regard for the dead makes us heedful of the interests of the living; so that this monument, reared in honor of the former, will stand as a faithful monitor from whom lessons of loyalty and duty will be learned by the coming generations of freemen. The regiment we represent formed but a small part of the great Union host which stood marshalled here in battle array. All were animated by a common ardor and patriotism. All performed their several parts bravely, and are entitled to the plaudits of a grateful country which their joint valor and sacrifices contributed to save. We are here, with our surviving comrades elsewhere, and with patriotic fellow citizens over all the land, to honor the heroism of all who fell on these sanguinary days. But we pay these honors, not to the whole body of the fallen soldiers, brothers-in-arms though they all were, and attached to us by the strong ties which bind men to a kindred cause and a common country. This monument has been reared, and we now dedicate it to our immediate companions in arms, whose names and faces were and are familiar to us, whose toils and hardships we shared, and with whom we were constantly associated on the march, in the bivouac, and in the embattled army. It is natural that our memory should be stamped ineffaceably with the lineaments of these friends and comrades of other days, that we should feel towards them a regard and tenderness which intimate personal relations rarely fail to inspire, and that this monument should be the tribute which the heart fondly renders to the personal valor and worth of those with whom we were so closely connected.

As in a family, when one of its number dies, the last affectionate offices are not paid to the departed by strangers or acquaintances from without, but by those whose interest and sensibility are deepest, the surviving members of the family or those nearest of kin—so in a regiment which is one family in a great army. The members in it who die are objects of special interest and regard to comrades left behind. Survivors think and speak of former intercourse with the fallen. They recall the scenes witnessed and experiences shared together, and while they rejoice in being spared to hail the return of peace, and to share the good gifts strewn around them by the Divine bounty in this free and happy land, they think with emotion of their brothers-in-arms who died without seeing this auspicious day, and are prompted to feel and exclaim with

"Remembrance saddening o'er each brow,
How had the brave who fell exulted now."

It is proper, therefore, while we eulogize the valor and exalt the services of all who shed their blood on this field, that we pay special tribute to the departed worthies of our own regiment, members with us of one military family, and who, in the hour of their country's supreme peril, shrank not from the sacrifice of their own lives to rescue and save it.

The Twentieth New York State Militia has a history of which any State may well feel proud. It holds an honored place among the regiments which

rendered, each in its allotted sphere, the most active and efficient service throughout the war. It was one of the earliest to respond to the President's call for troops to maintain the national authority. When the assault upon Fort Sumter fell like a thunderbolt upon the land, firing every patriotic heart throughout the North, the sons of Ulster flew to arms. A regiment was speedily enrolled and went forward with ardor to join the loyal array of the nation's defenders. Having filled out its stipulated period with such honorable service as the emergency required, it returned and was disbanded. Not with a view, however, of abandoning the country's service. The enlistment of a new regiment to serve for three years was at once begun. Many who had served for the three months' term enlisted in its ranks, while others purposed to join kindred organizations soon to be formed. The work was entered upon with enthusiasm. Recruits came forward with alacrity. The requisite numbers were quickly supplied, so that the regiment, with full ranks, was ready to start in the closing days of October, 1861, for the seat of the war. It was incorporated in the Army of the Potomac, remaining for several months near Washington engaged in the preparatory drill and exercises calculated to fit the army for the sterner service in the field it would soon be called to perform. From the spring of 1862 till late in that summer it formed part of the corps which it was deemed necessary to hold between Washington and Richmond as a safeguard to the National Capital. After the Peninsular campaign had ended in failure, and General Pope had been placed in command of the Army of Virginia, and the Confederate leaders, freed from the fear of Richmond's fall, were concentrating their forces on the Bull Run battlefield, the Ulster Guard saw its first serious service in the field. The regiment was hotly engaged in the Second Bull Run battles running through the 29th and 30th of August. On the latter of these days it took part in the daring and desperate charge of King's Division — a charge made against obstacles which forbade any reasonable hope of success.

How sharply the regiment was engaged and how resolutely it performed the part assigned it, is apparent from the heavy losses it sustained. The number of killed and wounded amounted to 181, of whom 31 died on the field, and several of the wounded afterwards, from injuries there received. Among these was Col. George W. Pratt, the commander of the regiment. Struck down by a shot while encouraging his men, he was borne to his home in Albany, where his valued life came to a close on the 11th of the following month. He had promptly responded to his country's call. He had disregarded all inducements which high social position and attractive home surroundings presented, to dissuade him from the hardships and risks of a soldier's life. He heard only the voice of his country which summoned him to her defence, and taking his life in his hand he went forth prepared to make the extreme sacrifice, should this be demanded. He fell in his early prime, in the opening of the great conflict, without being permitted to see as we have seen the triumph of the cause to which he had devoted himself without reserve; without knowing, in fact, whether the struggle would result in success or failure.

As a brave man, a true soldier, a skillful commander, strict in discipline, yet considerate of the needs and welfare of those placed under his command,

as a genial companion, warm friend, a liberal-minded and courteous gentleman, he had won the respect and confidence of the whole regiment, and the affection of all who were brought into closest personal relations with him. His services and character will keep his name fragrant in the memory of his comrades and friends.

On the death of Colonel Pratt, Col. Theodore B. Gates succeeded to the command of the regiment, which in the battle of Chantilly on September 1st was again hotly engaged, the regiment being assigned to a perilous position and holding it with firmness, until the important service required of it had been manfully performed. Then came the swift reorganization of the discomfited and partly demoralized army under General McClellan, that prince of organizers, now restored to the chief command, and urgently bidden to do what no man save himself seemed so well fitted to accomplish.

The interval of rest for the army was short. By the 6th of September it was on the march to confront the Confederate foe who had crossed the Potomac, hoping to follow their recent successes by more signal successes on Northern territory. At South Mountain, a position of formidable strength held by the enemy, the armies met on the 14th of September, in a sharp and bloody collision. The Union assault, in which Patrick's Brigade, composed of the Twentieth, Twenty-first, Twenty-third, and Thirty-fifth New York Regiments, took efficient part, was brilliantly successful. The charge of our troops was irresistible, and the mountain was soon in their possession. The fleeing foe made a stand upon the hills overlooking the Antietam Creek, and there, three days after, one of the most severe and sanguinary battles of the war was fought. The conditions were such that Lee's army ought to have been overwhelmed instead of being permitted to recross the Potomac at its leisure, and with unbroken ranks stand ready to renew the combat. It is not the purpose of these remarks, however, to criticise the conduct of the war, but to trace the history of our own regiment, in honor of whose fallen braves this memorial is reared.

In the battle of Antietam the Ulster Guard was found in its customary place, in the front ranks and in the hottest of the conflict. Its numbers already reduced by battle, disease and hardship to 135 officers and men who shared the engagement, were reduced 30 per cent. by the loss of those who fell dead or wounded on this hard-fought field. No other record is needed to show with how much steadfastness and bravery they performed the work given them to do in the stern conflict on whose issues a nation hung in suspense.

After some weeks of inaction the army stood upon the soil of Virginia and advanced in hostile array and under another commander, the chivalrous but unfortunate Burnside, to the banks of the Rappahannock. The disastrous battle of Fredericksburg followed, and the Union troops, who had done all that it was possible for brave men to do to carry impregnable positions, were driven back with torn and diminished ranks, and obliged to seek their former position across the protecting river. Defeat did not daunt their courage nor quench their ardor, nor impair their confidence of ultimate success. They patiently bided their time, while during the wintry months the depleted ranks were filled, and preparations for a new campaign, under a new commander-in-

chief, the gallant Hooker, went steadily on, until at length the signal was given for another advance. The Rappahannock was again crossed with buoyant anticipations of a successful issue. But the result of the battle of Chancellorsville was hardly less disastrous than that of Fredericksburg had been, and the baffled Union army, defeated but not disheartened, was forced, as it had been after the former conflict, to place the friendly river once more between it and its more fortunate adversary. In this terrible engagement the Ulster Guard sustained its share of hardship and danger, though the burden laid upon it was less heavy than it had been on other fields.

Within a brief period the seat of hostilities was changed. Exultant over their successes the Rebel leaders determined to assume the offensive and to carry the war into the enemy's country. Their forces crossed the Potomac for the second time, and began to muster thick and fast on Pennsylvania soil, threatening the great cities of the North, not excepting Washington itself. This movement made it necessary for the Union army to direct its course northward. It went forward promptly to meet and repel the invasion.

Without dwelling upon the intervening period between these opening movements and the great battle that impended, I pass at once to the field of Gettysburg and the giant hosts preparing for the contest, on the decision of which, interests the most momentous to the whole country were depending. The battles of the three days I need not describe in detail even did it fall in with my purpose to do so. The repulse of the First and Eleventh Corps before overwhelming numbers and their falling back on the first day to the strong position of Cemetery Ridge, the terrific but indecisive conflict of the second day, the gallant and desperate but unavailing charge by Pickett's Division on the third, the rolling back of the assailing tide, the shouts which proclaimed the victory won, the retreat of the baffled adversary — these are all so familiar as to require but a passing glance.

Amid the stern demands, the perils and carnage of these terrible days, the Ulster Guard maintained its high character for constancy and devotion to duty, and for the prompt performance of whatever severe and hazardous service the exigencies of the combat required. The position assigned it in the first day's battle was on the extreme left of the line where, as a part of Doubleday's Division, the waves of the enemy's onset beat the heaviest for a time; and this position was held with tenacity for four hours and only abandoned when the numbers and force of the assailants had so increased as to make death or capture, or else retreat the only alternative. The last was chosen. Out of 8,200 in the corps who had gone into the battle, barely 2,450 remained at its close — the loss of the Twentieth in killed and wounded having been two-thirds of its officers and half of the men. What remained of the corps retired from the field, not in rout or confusion, but with steady step and unbroken ranks, withdrawing to the stronghold of Cemetery Ridge. Here the two corps that had been engaged took their stand, forming part of the Union line to be stretched along this famous ridge, against which on the following days the storms of battle were unavailingly to beat.

The main assault was borne by the Union left in the second day's battle, the opening attack falling upon the Third Corps, under General Sickles, which

This strong testimonial from one fully conversant with the details of the fight, whose own record is so high for skill and gallantry through all the vicissitudes of the battle, proclaims how faithfully the troops in question performed their appointed duty and may well perpetuate in each of the survivors an honest pride in having so served their country as to deserve such commendation.

This great victory was won at enormous cost. Of 16,000 who fell during the whole conflict nearly 3,000 died upon the field.

Speaking of the British victory at Waterloo, Sir Walter Scott says: "It required all the glory and the solid advantages of this immortal day to reconcile the mind to the high price at which it was purchased," that price being, he adds, "Six hundred officers and 15,000 men killed and wounded, throwing half Britain into mourning." The Gettysburg battle produced equally saddening effects, reaching to every corner of the land, while the reconciling "glory" was of a higher type and a more unequivocal value. For the former consisted largely in vanquishing the vanquisher of Europe and ending his desolating career. But at the same time it fixed the crowns of European sovereigns more securely on their heads, thus continuing, in many cases, the oppressions under which their subjects had long groaned, while the "glory" of the Gettysburg victory lay in the vindication and maintenance of a government of free institutions which confer equal rights and privileges upon the people.

One recalls Byron's sharp, sarcastic words, arraigning the victor of Waterloo for wearing pompous titles given him by his flatterers:—

"Call'd 'Saviour of the Nations'—not yet saved,
And 'Europe's Liberator'—still enslaved."

And Robert Hall, that profound thinker and famous orator, the peer of the greatest Englishmen of his age, declared "that the battle of Waterloo and its results put back the clock of the world six degrees." Gettysburg, therefore, surpasses Waterloo as much in the object fought for as in the fruits of the momentous victory; and the efforts and sacrifices made on this field to secure this grand result must give them a sacred character forever.

The battle of Gettysburg was the turning point of the Civil War. It was really decisive of the whole conflict. It embodied the supreme effort of the Confederacy to secure a separate government through a great victory on Northern ground, to be certainly followed, as it believed, by foreign recognition. The failure of the attempt was so disastrous that it could never be retrieved. No invading Southern army thenceforth crossed the Potomac. The struggle from that time forward was for simple preservation. It went on, it is true, for some months longer with more or less vigor, but the power of the revolt grew weaker and weaker and the end was seen, by the discerning, to be near and unavoidable. Under that great captain, whose fame is coextensive with the world, and whom Providence raised up to complete the gigantic task of suppressing all armed hostility to the government, the work went steadily forward step by step. The last Confederate defences before Richmond were at length abandoned, and disintegration and overthrow could no longer be delayed.

mand. All recognized his manly qualities, his fidelity to the trusts committed to him, and his earnest purpose to meet every duty and perform it well. His great kindness and lack of strict military training perhaps led him to be somewhat less exacting in his demands of punctilious observance of rules than thorough discipline requires. But he enjoyed the high respect and confidence of his command, whose sincere regrets followed him when he left it for the post of military governor of the District of Columbia. The duties of this position he discharged with great acceptance, zeal and fidelity. But he was restless here, in what he regarded as a comparatively tame and inert position, and thirsted to be at the head of soldiers in the field. He was appointed to a command, as he desired, and as the general of a division, rendered notable service in the battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. He was in the first day's battle at Gettysburg, being in command of a division of the First Corps. He was ever in the hottest of the fight, and by his example, as well as skillful dispositions, did much to keep the torn ranks steady, and the orderly retreat of the corps from becoming a rout. A braver man never buckled on armor. He exposed his troops to no danger he was not ready to share. This was shone in the second day's battle of the Wilderness, when, confronting every peril in discharge of his duty, and laboring strenuously to encourage and urge forward his troops, he fell mortally wounded, yielding up his noble life to the cause which he felt to be well worthy of every sacrifice.

His successor to the command of the brigade was Gen. M. R. Patrick, whose iron visage, deep-toned voice and military air rise up before us as I mention his name. He was a graduate of West Point, did good service in the Mexican War, and had the tastes as well as the education of a soldier. He was a rigid disciplinarian, holding implicit and unquestioning obedience to be a soldier's first duty, and determined at all hazards to exact it. By our own regiment he was not regarded very lovingly at first. The reins were drawn too tightly to make the pressure altogether pleasant, and there was wincing and uneasiness and some murmuring, mingled with sundry objurgations, not loud but deep, at what was looked upon as unnecessary vigor. But when the men came to know him better, and saw what a kindly heart beat under this stern exterior; how regardful he was of the best interests of the soldiers; how ready he was to share their hardships and dangers; how skillfully and bravely he led them on the battlefield, their aversion gave place to respect, confidence and even affection, and no leader had troops who rendered a more prompt and cheerful obedience. He was a Christian soldier,—a character not too common among the officers of the army,—and on occasion his strong voice would be uplifted before his brigade of a Sunday in a religious harangue whose point and force not many of the army chaplains could equal. The soldiers greatly regretted to part with him when he was appointed to the position of provost marshal general, whose duties he continued through the war to discharge with signal efficiency. After several years of useful service of various kinds, when the war had closed, he was appointed in 1880, to the command of the National Soldiers' Home at Dayton, Ohio, a large and responsible charge. He was invited to meet with us here, and it was hoped that he would have favored us with his presence and an address at these ceremonies. We know what a

what a bloody drama was enacted here, hardly any traces remain of the havoc and desolation attendant on every great battlefield as inseparable companions.

As it is here, so is it elsewhere. Peace when it spreads its fair pinions over a land does not do its rehabilitating work by halves, nor in some favored localities alone. Its benefits fall like the dews and rains of heaven upon all alike. And so it has come with cheer and healing in its wings, to restore the bruised and broken, to awaken courage in the timorous, and hope in the bosom of despair itself; to bid the hearts of the whole people look up to the All Merciful, who controls the destinies of nations, who will not always chide, but will bless the land that owns and trusts Him, with unmeasurable bounties.

We cannot but recall the stupendous losses which the recent Civil War inflicted on the land. A million of lives lost on both sides by wounds, disease and other fatalities growing directly out of the war, is not putting the aggregate too high. The amount of property destroyed is almost beyond the power of figures to write down with any accuracy. The suffering throughout countless homes, in bleeding hearts and blasted hopes, is still more impossible to compute. A debt was imposed upon the nation of such enormous magnitude as to make it seem certain when the war closed that its crippling burdens must rest upon the people for indefinite years. This prospect indeed has not been wholly realized. The resources of the nation are so vast and its recuperative energy so marvelous, that a large part of the burden has already been taken off, with the prospect at no distant day of its entire removal.

Then there are compensating gains which have arisen out of the war which go far to offset its losses and reconcile the people to the sufferings they have endured. Foremost among them is the destruction of slavery and the removal forever of this defacing blot from the escutcheon of the nation. We have become a free nation in fact as well as in name, and the incongruity of calling this country distinctively the land of liberty while millions were held in bondage, can no longer be urged by enemies and deplored by friends as a just reproach. This glorious consummation alone is worth all the cost it has taken to secure it. It marks a signal epoch not only in the history of the country but in that of the race. It is a grand move forward in the march of Christian civilization. The immensity of the achievement is seen in the light of the mighty obstacles to be overcome in reaching it, and which for a century defied the utmost efforts of the strongest arms to set them aside. The wisdom of the wisest seemed impotent to solve the intricate problem of how to do it, and the irrepressible attempts to do it were attended for wearisome years by discord, strife, wrath, hatred, and by agitations, social, political, religious, growing still in intensity, destroying not only the peace, but threatening constantly the very life of the Republic. Then all at once the fiat went forth to cut the Gordian knot with the sword, and these disorganizing and portentous agitations subsided through the destruction of their cause. And though this destruction was effected by a civil convulsion which shook the country to its centre, threatening even to overthrow it, now that the end has come without the disasters feared, and with the work which the fathers toiled at in vain fully accomplished, who will say, that the civil conflict was not the divinely provided remedy for a national disease, which could never be cured

the aspiration of every honest, humane heart must be that no necessity for war may ever again arise, but that the prophetic words, "They shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks," shall find here their constant realization.

So shall the people spread all over our broad and fruitful country, rejoicing in continuous peace and growing prosperity, exceptional among the nations of the earth, and acknowledging the Divine Hand which has constantly led and sustained us, echo, with grateful hearts, the exultant words so expressive of their own favored condition, "Happy is the people that is in such a case, yea, happy is that people whose God is the Lord."

[REDACTED]



J. D. EYON PHOTO.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

82d NEW YORK INFANTRY.

On Cemetery Ridge, looking towards the Emmitsburg Road.

(INSCRIPTIONS.)

(Front.)

82ND NEW YORK INFANTRY
(2ND N. Y. S. M.)
1ST BRIGADE 2ND DIVISION 2ND CORPS
JULY 2ND AND 3RD, 1863.

CASUALTIES.

KILLED 45 WOUNDED 132 MISSING 15.

(Reverse.)

TOTAL

ENLISTMENTS 1,452.

KILLED 129, WOUNDED 436,

MISSING 212;

TOTAL, 777.

THIS REGIMENT WAS MUSTERED IN SERVICE MAY 21, 1861;
SERVED WITH THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC IN ALL ITS CAMPAIGNS
FROM BULL RUN, JULY 21, 1861;
PARTICIPATING IN TWENTY-NINE GENERAL ENGAGEMENTS UNTIL
MUSTERED OUT JUNE 25, 1864. PRESENT FOR DUTY JULY 1, A. M.,
24 OFFICERS AND 331 ENLISTED MEN.

(Right Side.)

ON THE EVENING OF JULY 2, MOVED TO
THE EMMITSBURG ROAD TO PROTECT
FLANK OF THIRD CORPS. FOUGHT THERE
UNTIL OUT-FLANKED. RETURNING TO THIS
LINE THE REGIMENT REFORMED UNDER A
GALLING FIRE; THEN ADVANCED, DRIVING
THE ENEMY BEFORE THEM; REGAINED
THEIR FORMER POSITION, CAPTURING THE
COLORS OF THE 48TH GEORGIA. AMONG
THE KILLED WAS COLONEL HUSTON
COMMANDING THE REGIMENT.

(Left Side.)

AT THE TIME

OF THE ENEMY'S ASSAULT

ON THE AFTERNOON OF THE 3D,
THE REGIMENT MOVED TO THE RIGHT
TOWARD THE COPSE OF TREES
AND ASSISTED IN REPULSING THE ENEMY,
CAPTURING THE FLAGS OF THE
FIRST AND SEVENTH VIRGINIA REGIMENTS.

campaign which was soon to follow. In the latter part of March, 1862, Sedgwick's Division left Harper's Ferry, and proceeding to Alexandria embarked for the Peninsula.

The brigade at this time was composed of the Second New York Militia, First Minnesota, Fifteenth Massachusetts, Thirty-fourth New York, and a company of Massachusetts Sharpshooters. It was commanded by Gen. Willis A. Gorman. After participating in the siege of Yorktown, Sedgwick's Division embarked on transports and sailed up the York River to West Point, where it disembarked under fire during the battle which was being waged on that ground by Franklin's Division. Marching up the Peninsula the Second Corps went into position on the right of General McClellan's army, whose lines were then pressing close to Richmond.

On May 31, 1862, Sedgwick's Division, crossing the Chickahominy, was engaged in the battle of Fair Oaks. In this desperate, bloody battle the Second New York won honorable distinction in the official report, its gallant services on that field contributing materially to success. In this engagement the regiment was commanded by Lieut. Col. Henry W. Hudson, Colonel Tompkins having been mustered out of the service previously. The losses of the Second at Fair Oaks were 71, in killed and wounded, Lieut. Harvey P. Hawley being among the mortally wounded.

In the Seven Days battle, which occurred a month later, the regiment was engaged at Peach Orchard, Savage Station, White Oak Swamp, Glendale, and Malvern Hill. Its losses in these various battles amounted to 54 in killed, wounded and missing. Captain James J. Delaney was mortally wounded June 29th, at the battle of Savage Station.

After encamping six weeks at Harrison's Landing, on the James River, General McClellan's army was withdrawn from the Peninsula and ordered to Washington, where it was placed under command of General Pope. The Second Corps marched to the support of Pope's army at the battle of Manassas, and arrived on the field at Chantilly; but not until the fighting was over and the retreat of Pope's defeated troops had taken place.

General McClellan having been restored to his command, the Army of the Potomac started, a few days later, on the Maryland campaign, the Second New York being still in Gorman's Brigade. On Wednesday, September 17, 1862, McClellan's army confronted General Lee's forces on the banks of the Antietam, and the ensuing battle made that day the bloodiest one of the war. The regiment, under Colonel Hudson, left its place of bivouac at 7:30 a. m., and fording the Antietam Creek formed with the division on the high ground beyond the stream. General Sedgwick arranged his three brigades in three successive lines, fifty yards apart, with Gorman's Brigade in front. The Second New York State Militia was in the right centre of this first line.

Moving forward under a heavy artillery fire the division swept over the cornfield, then thickly strewn with the bodies of friend and foe, across the Hagerstown Pike, and into the woods around the Dunker Church. Here it encountered Jackson's Corps, and a musketry fire began which, in volume of sound and deadly effect, was unsurpassed in the war. Sedgwick's men held their ground bravely; but the division was allowed to make this advance alone and unsupported, save by a few troops of the Twelfth Corps, which had

already gained a lodgment in the woods south of the Dunker Church. The enemy, perceiving that no troops were coming to Sedgwick's support, soon enveloped his flank and poured into his ranks a withering fire. Sedgwick's third line changed front, and under cover of this movement the division was extricated from its perilous position. In all this terrible storm of death the regiment moved as steadily as if on parade. Although its ranks were shattered and broken by a loss of half its number, it reformed while the men were still falling, and, in company with the First Minnesota, slowly withdrew, contesting the ground as it went. The period of this fight of Sedgwick's Division did not exceed thirty minutes; yet, in that time the Second lost 128 of its men, killed and wounded.

General Lee with his forces having escaped across the river, the Army of the Potomac encamped a few weeks in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry in order to rest and recruit after the exhausting labors of the previous campaigns. It then recrossed into Virginia in pursuit of Lee, who, withdrawing through the passes of the Blue Ridge, took position on the heights in rear of Fredericksburg, on the Rappahannock, where the Union army, now under General Burnside, attacked him on December 13, 1862.

In this battle the Second New York was commanded by Lieut. Col. James Huston. The regiment crossed the pontoon bridge, and entered Fredericksburg with its division — Howard's — on the evening of the 11th. The First Brigade was now under the command of Gen. Alfred Sully, U. S. A. The next day, Friday, the 12th, the brigade moved forward to an elevated piece of ground, on which stood an unfinished monument to the mother of George Washington, where the regiment threw out a line of vedettes, with the reserve near the base of the hill next the city. At noon General Patrick asked the reserve to take possession of a paper mill on the right of the position, and to raise the gates so as to turn the water off from the upper canal. Captain Cummings, with Company H, drove the enemy's picket away from the mill and turned off the water, the affair being conducted with creditable coolness and resolute action. After being under occasional artillery fire all day, which caused some loss, the regiment was relieved in the evening by the First Minnesota of Sully's Brigade, after which it retired to a street in the rear of the position. On Saturday, the 13th, the day of the main assault on Marye's Heights, the regiment supported a battery part of the time, and was held in reserve during the bloody and unsuccessful charge against the enemy's intrenchments. Although in reserve it was exposed to artillery fire, during which part of the men were killed and 7 wounded. On Monday, the 15th, the regiment recrossed the river after dark, and proceeding to Falmouth, encamped there. After participating in Burnside's famous "Mud March," the regiment moved to winter quarters near Falmouth, where it remained until the opening of the Chancellorsville campaign.

The Second Corps accompanied the Army of the Potomac to Chancellorsville, where the Second Division — now under General John Gibbon — remained in reserve, ready to attack the heights at Fredericksburg. This battle was fought on May 3, 1863; but for three days previous the brigade was held in reserve, with eight days' rations and 140 rounds of ammunition. General Sully having been relieved of his command on

the 1st, Colonel Hudson of the Second New York Militia was assigned to the command of the brigade. At midnight on the 2d of May, the brigade reported to General Gibbon at the Lacy House, where a call was made for 100 volunteers to cross the river as a storming party, to dislodge the enemy in the town. Of those who stepped forward for this perilous duty, 25 were selected from each of the four regiments then present with the brigade. This forlorn hope was placed under the command of Capt. George W. Ryerson and Lieutenant Huggins of the Second New York, and two other lieutenants from the brigade. But the bridges having been laid the crossing was effected and the city entered without serious loss, the Sixth Corps in the meantime attacking the enemy on Marye's Heights and capturing that strong position. After the battle the regiment recrossed the river with the division, and reoccupied its old camp at Falmouth, where it remained during the next six weeks, or until the beginning of the Pennsylvania campaign.

On June 15, 1863, the Second Corps left its camps at Falmouth and started on its long march northward, passing by Aquia Creek, through Dumfries, Sangster's Station, Centreville, Gainesville, Thoroughfare Gap, Gum Springs, to Edwards Ferry on the Potomac, where it crossed the river, June 26th; thence, through Maryland to Poolesville, Barnesville, Monocacy Junction, Liberty, Johnsville, Uniontown, and Taneytown to Gettysburg, Pa., where it arrived on the morning of July 2d, the second day of the battle.

While resting at Uniontown, June 30th, the regiment was mustered for pay, at which time it reported 24 officers and 331 enlisted men as present for duty, including the noncombatants. Owing to the absence of detailed men, noncombatants and other causes the regiment took only 305 officers and men into action July 2d.

Under command of Lieutenant Colonel Huston the regiment took its place in line, in Gibbon's Division, along Cemetery Ridge, the centre of the Union line of battle. The old First Brigade was now commanded by Gen. William Harrow, U. S. A., and was composed of the following regiments: Second New York (Eighty-second Vols.), Lieut. Col. James Huston; Nineteenth Maine, Col. Francis E. Heath; First Minnesota, Col. William Colvill, Jr.; Fifteenth Massachusetts, Col. George H. Ward.

The second day of the battle was passed without any fighting and but little incident until 4 o'clock in the afternoon, when the battle opened on the extreme left, over a mile away from where the Second New York was in position, the enemy making its first attack on Sickles's Corps, at the Devil's Den. At this time Harrow's Brigade was formed in close column by regiments, 100 yards in rear of the Second and Third Brigades.

The right of the Third Corps, which was in line along the Emmitsburg Road, was a considerable distance in advance of the left of the Second Corps, with which it was intended to connect. To protect this opening and prevent the enemy from passing through at this point, General Gibbon ordered the Second New York and Fifteenth Massachusetts forward to the Emmitsburg Road, where the Second took position with its left resting at the brick farm house known as the Codori House, with the Fifteenth Massachusetts on its right. Both regiments immediately went to work building a breastwork of rails which they took from a fence near by, and which would furnish a partial,

though slight, protection. The battle, which commenced at 4 o'clock on the extreme left, was taken up successively by the brigades of the enemy from point to point along the line, and at 6 o'clock Wright's Georgia Brigade, driving back the Union pickets and skirmishers, advanced against the position at the Codori House, held by these two small regiments. The Second New York and Fifteenth Massachusetts maintained their position against superior numbers and in the face of a terrible musketry fire, while the enemy's artillery from the high ground on the left played havoc with the frail breastwork of rails and cut down the men by scores. Colonel Huston of the Second and Colonel Ward of the Fifteenth were killed here. Huston fell, shot through the head and the leg. In this affair the Second lost 13 officers and 140 men killed and wounded. Outnumbered and outflanked, the two regiments fell back to the main line, with the yelling, exultant Georgians close upon them. But the success of the enemy was only a temporary one. The other regiments from Gibbon's Division charged Wright's Brigade in turn, and drove it back past the Emmitsburg Road, inflicting a severe loss and capturing many prisoners. The Second, joining in this movement, advanced to its former position, capturing on the way the flag of the Forty-eighth Georgia. Upon the fall of Colonel Huston, Capt. John Darrow took command of the regiment.

With the repulse of Wright's Brigade the Confederates ceased their attack on Cemetery Ridge. The sun had already gone down, and as the combatants retired to their respective lines the shadows of nightfall were fast hiding the field from sight. Silence followed the roar and tumult of battle. Through the darkness the rifles of the distant pickets flashed like fire flies, while, nearer by, the night air was burdened with the plaintive moans of wounded men who were lying between the lines and begging for water. About 10 o'clock the full moon rose from behind Culp's Hill, and in its light the field took on a weird and ghastly aspect. The shattered remnant of the little regiment retired to the main line, where the men threw themselves down on the blood-stained sod to sleep, knowing full well that the dawn would usher in another day of bloody conflict and death.

The morning of the third day broke clear and cloudless. Nothing occurred along the front of the Second Corps, and the men rested idly in line as they listened to the incessant roll of musketry at Culp's Hill, where the Twelfth Corps was fighting. About 10 o'clock the cheering in that direction announced that Slocum's veteran regiments had achieved success, and then quiet prevailed along the entire line.

The Second New York was lying on Cemetery Ridge, near to and south of the famous clump of trees. The First Minnesota was resting on its left, while to the right lay the regiments of Hall's (Third) Brigade. In its rear and on higher ground stood the six ten-pounder Parrott guns of Pettit's Battery, now under command of Captain Rorty, who was soon to meet a soldier's fate on that same spot.

Across the valley, about three-quarters of a mile away, the Confederate batteries were going into position along the edge of the woods, and the Union soldiers watched with anxious eyes the long increasing line of cannon, which stretched away in either direction as far as they could see, with every gun trained on the position occupied by the Second New York and other regiments

of the division. The men viewed these direful preparations with dubious looks, and in their comments were heard to remark that the battle was not over,—that the hardest fight was yet to come.

The blazing July sun had passed the noonmark, and still the ominous silence pervaded the whole field and seemed to hush all sounds along the embattled line of the Union army. At 1 o'clock a soldier in the Second New York who was standing and looking off towards the Rogers House, on the Emmitsburg Road, shouted excitedly, "There she goes!" All eyes were turned in that direction. A puff of white smoke was darting across the meadow from the muzzle of a Napoleon gun, the glimmering brass of which was plainly visible across the field. Before the sound of its discharge could reach the eager spectators on the Union side, another stream of thick, white smoke, streaked with flame, shot out from the line of cannon. On either side of these signal guns the Confederate batteries took up the fire, until the line of Confederate artillery looked like the flashing fuse of some huge piece of fireworks. Then came the roar of the guns and crash of bursting shells. One hundred and fifty cannon were hurling their projectiles against the Union position on Cemetery Ridge; most of them aimed at the spot where Gibbon's Division and the Second New York were posted. The batteries of Meade's army replied promptly and fiercely, and the air was filled with the terrible tumult of sound. It was the greatest artillery combat since the invention of cannon.

In the rear of the Second New York the iron guns of Pettit's Battery were flaming fiercely. Just to the right and rear the brass pieces of Brown's Rhode Island Battery were bellowing hoarsely, while on the farther side of the clump of trees Cushing's three-inch rifles were adding to the tumult with their sharp detonations. Along the ridge behind the regiment was the wildest and most terrible scene that ever marked a battle field. Through the drifting smoke could be seen the batteries where the toiling gunners, bareheaded and coatless, were working their heated guns. Everywhere, overhead and along the ground, the enemy's shells were bursting rapidly with deadly effect and adding to the dire confusion. Behind the guns the battery horses were rearing and plunging frantically under the lashing of whips or pain of wounds. The shouting, swearing drivers were fast at work unhitching wounded horses and replacing them with spare teams. Here and there a thicker cloud of smoke would shoot up high in air with a louder roar, showing where a well-aimed shot of the enemy had exploded a caisson. In places cannon were up-ended or hurled over as some solid shot struck a wheel or axle, while on every side men were tossing their arms wildly and reeling to the ground as the jagged pieces of exploded shell tore through their quivering bodies. During all this tumultuous storm of missiles the regiment, like all the infantry, lay prone upon the ground for safety. The veterans of the Second had lain under artillery fire too often before to become demoralized by the demonstration, terrible as it was. They left it to their comrades of the artillery to fight it out, while they clutched their trusty rifles and waited for the deadlier strife of infantry, which their experience told them must soon follow.

And yet, when this artillery fire was at its height, when the bursting shells and storm of missiles were sweeping over the crest of Cemetery Ridge, when,

gathered around their colors, formed a line and marched back to their position exultant with victory.

But the joy of triumph was saddened by the terrible cost. Of the 300 men who had followed the colors of the Second New York the day before, 192 had fallen. Forty-five were killed outright, while a score or more had received their death wound. Others were lying on the field or in the hospital, torn and mangled, awaiting the surgeon's knife. Colonel Huston, a brave and gallant officer, Captain Hoyt, and Lieutenant McDonald were killed; Lieutenant Cranston was mortally wounded. With saddened hearts the men gathered their dead comrades for burial, and talked in mournful converse of the brave tentmates who would no longer keep them company in march and camp.

The regiment accompanied the army in its pursuit of Lee's defeated forces, and, recrossing the Potomac, found itself again in Virginia. On October 15, 1863, the battle of Bristoe Station occurred, an engagement in which the Second Corps only was engaged. In this battle the regiment, commanded by Maj. Thomas W. Baird, sustained a loss of 7 killed and 19 wounded, a severe loss in view of the small number engaged. It behaved with its usual gallantry, taking several prisoners. Corp. Thomas Cullen, of Company I, captured the colors of the Twenty-eighth North Carolina, wresting the flag from the hands of the color bearer. Gen. Alex. S. Webb, the division commander, says in his official report of this action: "The Eighty-second New York (Second Militia) suffered more severely than any other regiment from this fire, as they held the right of the line. The regiment held its ground well." Praise from General Webb was praise indeed.

Under command of Col. Henry W. Hudson, who had been reinstated by the President, the regiment participated in the Mine Run campaign, an affair in which there was little fighting, but plenty of hardship, owing to the bitter, inclement weather, this movement occurring in the latter part of November. Returning from this campaign the army went into winter quarters along the Rappahannock, the Second Corps encamping at Stevensburg. For five months the regiment remained quietly in camp, the time being spent in daily drills and light picket duty. Some recruits were received, and some of the men re-enlisted for three years more of service, receiving in reward a thirty days' furlough at home. The army was reorganized, and the old First Brigade, in which the regiment had served through the war, was strengthened by the addition of four regiments. The command of the brigade was given to Gen. Alexander S. Webb. It now contained the following regiments:

19th Maine,
15th Massachusetts,
19th Massachusetts,
20th Massachusetts,
7th Michigan,
42d New York,
59th New York,
2d New York S. M.,

Col. Selden Connor.
Maj. I. H. Hooper.
Maj. Edmund Rice.
Maj. Henry L. Abbott.
Maj. Sylvanus W. Curtis.
Maj. Patrick J. Downing.
Capt. William McFadden.
Col. Henry W. Hudson.

With this organization the brigade started May 4, 1864, on the Wilderness campaign.

The regiment was actively engaged in the battles of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, North Anna, Totopotomoy, and Cold Harbor; the assault on Petersburg, and the battle at the Weldon Railroad. During the first thirty days of the campaign it lost 99 in killed and wounded.

Lieut. John Kelly was killed at the Wilderness; Lieut. Edward Jackson fell mortally wounded at the North Anna; and Lieut. Michael Keating was killed at Cold Harbor.

In the battle at the Weldon Railroad, June 22, 1864, through the carelessness of superior officers, General Webb being absent wounded, the brigade was surrounded, and three regiments were captured almost entire. The Second New York lost 111 men, who were taken prisoners by the enemy in this unfortunate affair.

On May 22, 1864, while on the march from Spotsylvania to the North Anna, the term of service of the regiment expired, and the little band of veterans who were entitled to their discharge returned to New York and their homes. The men who had re-enlisted, together with the recruits whose enlistment had not expired, were consolidated into a battalion of five companies. On June 28th the men of the Forty-second New York, who were left in service when the regiment was mustered out, were transferred to the Second,—or Eighty-second Volunteers, as designated in orders,—and on July 10th, the Second, including the men from the Forty-second, were transferred to the Fifty-ninth New York Regiment.

During its term of service, 10 officers and 171 enlisted men were killed or mortally wounded in battle; 5 officers and 59 men died of disease and other causes; 24 men died in Confederate prisons; total deaths, 269. The casualties in its many battles aggregated 577 in killed and wounded, and 230 captured or missing; total, 807.

But the campaigns and fighting of the Second New York State Militia were ended. The old battle-stained colors which had waved in honor on so many hard-fought fields were furled at last, and the grand record of heroism and patriotic devotion was inscribed on the page of history.

[REDACTED]



J. B. LYON PRINT.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

83D NEW YORK INFANTRY.

On Seminary Ridge, south of the Mummasburg Road.

(INSCRIPTIONS.)

(Front.)

83RD N. Y. INFTRY.

NINTH

REGIMENT

N. Y. S. M.—N. G. S. N. Y.

2ND BRIG.

2ND DIV. 1ST CORPS

(Reverse.)

VOLUNTEERED APRIL 19, AND MUSTERED

INTO U. S. SERVICE, JUNE 8, 1861.

OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN 2278.

KILLED, DIED OF WOUNDS OR DISEASE, 261.

WOUNDED, 423.

PROMOTED, DISCHARGED, &c. 1764.

MUSTERED OUT JUNE 23, 1864, 253.

(Left Side.)

HARPER'S FERRY, VA.
CEDAR MOUNTAIN, VA.
RAPPAHANNOCK, VA.
THOROUGHFARE GAP, VA.
SECOND BULL RUN, VA.
CHANTILLY, VA.
SOUTH MOUNTAIN, MD.
ANTIETAM, MD.
FREDERICKSBURG, VA.

(Right Side.)

FITZHUGH'S CROSSING, VA.
CHANCELLORSVILLE, VA.
GETTYSBURG, PA.
MINE RUN, VA.
WILDERNESS, VA.
LAUREL HILL, VA.
SPOTSYLVANIA, VA.
NORTH ANNA RIVER, VA.
COLD HARBOR, VA.

ENGAGED ON THIS GROUND
JULY 1, 1863, 1 P. M. TO 3 P. M.
ASSISTING IN CAPTURE OF
IVERSON'S N. C. BRIG. C. S. A.

JULY 2 & 3, 1863,
AT ZIEGLER'S GROVE,
ALSO SUPPORTED BATTERIES
WITH 11TH 12TH AND 2D CORPS.

DEDICATION OF MONUMENT.

83D REGIMENT INFANTRY — 9TH N. Y. S. M.

July 1, 1888.

ADDRESS BY HON. ORLANDO B. POTTER.

VETERANS AND MEMBERS OF THE NINTH REGIMENT OF NEW YORK MILITIA,
AND OF THE EIGHTY-THIRD NEW YORK VOLUNTEERS:

After what has now been done on this spot, surrounded by this scene, there is but little need of speech by me. The spot upon which we are gathered, the scene which surrounds us, and the memories which they awaken and recall, are more eloquent and more stirring than any words I might utter. You are on the spot where, twenty-five years ago this day, you met and turned back, with others who participated with you in the struggle, perhaps the most determined and best organized assault ever made upon the flag and armies of your country. With the close of the work which this day commemorates, you and those who fought upon this field with you, had established the fact that no power upon this continent, however concentrated, impassioned and well directed, could carry a war of invasion to the heart of the loyal States of this Union. The work accomplished upon this field must ever remain a prominent and important, if not a decisive, part of your country's history. Here sleep the dead, who mingled their efforts and their blood with yours, in the struggle for the preservation of your country's liberties; and these hillsides and plains, the whole landscape upon which you look again afresh, are but the "solemn decorations" of the tombs of those who fell upon this field. How impotent is speech or attempt at description to those who here took part as actors in the struggle you now commemorate! I shall attempt no such description. The record of that struggle is made up; and these fields, and plains, and heights, which bore witness to its sacrifices, sufferings, efforts and victory, have kept and will faithfully keep this record in the tombs of the heroic dead until they shall be given up at the last trump.

Nor is it important to this occasion that I attempt to enter at all into details of the sufferings and sacrifices of the regiment, of which you are the honored remnant, upon other fields than this. These survive in your own memories. They, too, are a part of the history of your own country. You will live them over again and again while memory remains to you, and when you have passed away they will remain in that history, as the richest legacy to your children and your children's children, as your contribution by example, to stimulate and encourage the patriotism of those who may be hereafter called to serve their country on the field.

It is sufficient to say here that this regiment volunteered its services to the country early in the Rebellion (April 19, 1861), and *volunteered for the war*. Its members were sworn in and became part of the organized army June 8, 1861. Between that date and the discharge of all that remained of them, June 23, 1864, the regiment participated in eighteen battles, commencing with that at Harper's Ferry, July 4, 1861, and ending with the battle of Cold Harbor, June 2, 1864.

The regiment suffered loss in killed and wounded in fourteen of these battles; and lost in killed, wounded, and those who died of wounds, during its service, 684 in all. Upon this field the regiment, which had been before reduced by its heavy losses, lost in killed 7, and in wounded 18. When the remnant of the regiment was discharged, the army of the Rebellion had ceased to be an army of invasion, and the beginning of the end of the Rebellion was at hand.

Such services as volunteers for your country in any cause needing your arms or your lives, would more than entitle you to the commemoration of to-day and to this monument, to transmit to posterity the remembrance of your patriotism and devotion to country. But your service was rendered in no ordinary war. War against foreign nations is easy as compared with war in which all is put at hazard for the cause of country, in a contest against one's own countrymen. The service for which you volunteered, was a service against American citizens, your own countrymen, and was the most arduous and trying for which freemen can draw the sword. But it was a service necessary to save American liberty for yourselves and your children. Other forms of liberty have been known and enjoyed in other countries and by other people, but American liberty was the child of the American Constitution and the Union of these States, and had not before been known or enjoyed by man. It made the citizen a coequal sovereign with every other citizen, both of the community and State in which he lives, and also of the Nation formed by the Union of all the States, and endowed with such, and only such powers as were necessary to secure to the citizen the sacred right of self-government at home, and protection and security as a citizen of the Nation against and throughout the outside world. The American citizen, therefore, at the same time a sovereign and coequal member with every other citizen, both of the State in which he lives, and of the Nation, rightfully regards and cherishes every foot of the National domain, in whatever State or Territory, as part of his own country, while the State in which he lives is the immediate spot and territory whose government and laws, in all matters not delegated to the Nation, he with other citizens thereof ordains and controls. While he relies for protection and enjoyment of his fireside rights, primarily upon the State Government by which he is immediately surrounded, he finds those rights also doubly secured in the American Constitution; and more important to the permanence of his liberties, the American citizen finds only in the Constitution and the Union of the State under it, the sufficient guarantee of the ability of the State to maintain and make good the security and permanency of these domestic rights and liberties—the only adequate guarantee for the maintenance of Republican government by the State itself. But more and greater still the possessor of this double liberty of State and Nation finds, and shall forever find in the American Constitution alone, freedom with the *rights of a citizen* throughout every part of the National domain, freedom of the seas, freedom from disturbance by war, except such as shall be waged by the consent of the whole country, and for the welfare and security of the Nation, and freedom and all-sufficient protection of his liberties and rights as an American citizen under the flag of his country throughout the world. If the title of Roman citizen was valuable to *him* at home and abroad, what is the

wants and necessities arising from variety of climate, production and employment; and nothing in the experience of the world gives assurance or hope that a better system of government for a great, free and progressive Nation can ever exist.

It may be safely said that since the adoption of the Federal Constitution, the people of the United States, through their local state governments, have made more rapid progress in perfection of laws affecting and securing just and equal rights than any other portion of the world. Nor will it be doubted that this system of government, born of the American Constitution, will be found adequate for any degree of advancement in law and liberty of which man shall be capable. It was the overthrow of such a government which you, and those who fought with you, on this field successfully resisted. This government, then, I repeat, with all its vast possibilities for good to your own country, and to the world, in commending and assuring free self-government to mankind, shall be the fitting, undying monument to those whose valor and blood gave it triumph and perpetuity on this field.

But, fellow citizens, we may not tarry long upon this battlefield, great and glorious as were its achievements and as are its memories. The call to duty is to our own places as citizens of the Republic in the great march of peace. Commemorations of past events, however important, are chiefly valuable as incentives and motives giving purpose, courage and strength for present and future duty. It cannot be doubted that this Republic holds the advance of human progress in development of free self-government for mankind. Trustees of all achieved by our fathers in this cause, the weight of our responsibility is increased by all the blood and treasure poured out on this and other fields in the war we here recall. The declaration, "Government of the people, for the people, and by the people, shall not perish from the earth," thundered from this field, has been heard round the world and will go down the ages. Until the government of this great Republic, born of the American Constitution, shall depart from its purpose and fail of the end for which it was created, self-government cannot fail, but is within reach of all mankind having virtue to appreciate and maintain it. All hail, then, the future with its problems of state. However many and difficult, these shall all be solved when reached as the highest good of this great people shall require, and this "Government of the people, for the people, and by the people," shall conduct this and future generations, who are to occupy our places, to as high development and achievement as shall be permitted to man under human government.

DEDICATION POEM.

BY ROWLAND B. MAHANY.

What shall we say to crown the honored dead,
What voice of ours shall magnify their fame,
Who on this field for truth and country bled,
In storm of shot, in hell of battle's flame?

Weak were our words to sound the note of woe,
And vain the woven laurel of our praise,
If that high faith by which their memories grow,
Exalted not the spirit of our days!

We greet to-day the great majestic Past,
Wherein those heroes wrought their work sublime,
Whose glory never can be overcast,
While progress treads the broad highway of Time.

Here on this storied ground whose holy sod
Is fertile with the blood they nobly shed,
We gather now to consecrate to God,
The fame of His, and our, immortal dead.

Here on this spot where countless heroes fell,
We rear this fair memorial to their worth,
That to all generations it may tell
That Freedom everlasting here had birth!

Oh, hallowed shaft! that speaks the garnered grief
Of those whose tears forever silent fall
For their lost loved ones, whose existence brief,
A dream of glory seemed and that was all!

They went in strength to nevermore return;
Their dust was mingled with the myriad years;
But while high deeds make bosoms beat and burn,
Their names will grace the temple Fame uprears.

Through all the changing future's vast unknown,
Their valor points the length of Freedom's day:
We, for the love we bear them, raise this stone,
To mark the mightiest triumph on the way.

While now we glorify that matchless host,
Whose faith and courage spurned all doubts and fears,
Forgive us if we turn to honor most,
Our own brave NINTH, our peerless volunteers.

At Gettysburg — here on this very spot —
They checked o'erwhelming numbers — undismayed!
Ay, North Carolina felt their courage hot,
When down they swept on Iverson's Brigade.

But why recount the ceaseless roll of fame?
Their glory is as deathless as the stars!
Of those that fought, we see each shining name,
Where neither praise or censure makes or mars.

And, as our love's best love the Nation claims,
Let us forget the fury of past strife;
And North and South with reunited aims,
Move forward in the future's grander life.

Yea, that the South fought well, let us rejoice;
They were our brothers, chivalrous and brave;
And though they lost the battle, let our voice
Place Valor's wreath above each hero's grave.

We are too great to cherish olden wrongs;
The din of conflict dies within our ears,
As swelling on the breeze the festal songs
Of peace and friendship greet the coming years.

Oh North and South, Oh Nation one and free!
We lay our whole existence at thy feet,—
For here the hallowed dead who died for thee,
Have glorified and made thy fate complete.

HISTORICAL NOTES,

By CAPT. GEORGE A. HUSSEY.

On July 1, 1863, the stern chase of the Army of the Potomac after that of Lee was soon to result in another trial of battle, though few of the enlisted men knew at the time that the great struggle was imminent; at least such was the belief of the men of the Ninth New York. The regiment was then encamped at Emmitsburg, Md., and at about 8 o'clock a. m. started on the march towards Gettysburg, Penn., some nine miles distant. But a few miles had been covered when the well-known sounds of battle were heard, each step almost increasing the indications. The troops hurried along the pike without special orders until near the Codori House, when, turning into the fields to the left, they continued on towards the Seminary Building, which was reached about noon. The Ninety-seventh New York and Eleventh Pennsylvania, of the brigade, were almost immediately sent to the front, followed soon after by the remaining regiments, including the Ninth New York. Bu-

ford's Cavalry, with the First and Third Divisions of the First Corps had, up to then, sustained the brunt of the fight, and now the Second Division was placed to extend the line, in the expectation of covering the open ground to that point occupied by the Eleventh Corps, which, at this hour, 1 o'clock, was in position farther to the right and rear, on Oak Ridge.

The Ninth New York, under command of Lieut. Col. Joseph A. Moesch, belonged to Baxter's Brigade of Robinson's Division, First Corps. It was first put into line of battle facing the Mummasburg road; but the appearance of several brigades of the enemy, to the left and rear, necessitated a corresponding change of front, and it was then formed on the top of Seminary Ridge, protected by a stone wall which, for a while, concealed the men from the enemy's view.

The enemy, advancing in line of battle, opened fire on the Ninth, charging up the hill with desperation. The men of the Ninth stood their ground like heroes, encouraged by the bravery of their lieutenant colonel, who rode along the line cheering on his men. The men displayed great coolness, reserving their fire until the enemy came within fifty yards, when a murderous volley was poured into their ranks, which sent them reeling back in utter confusion, followed closely by the brigade, whose cheers rent the air.

The enemy at this point consisted of the North Carolina Brigade of Iverson, supported by Ramseur, and to the right by O'Neal, of Ewell's Corps, whose men marched as on parade towards the boys in blue. Such a concentrated fire was poured into Iverson's troops that they became at once totally demoralized, and lost a large number of prisoners.

At this time the regiment captured 150 prisoners, besides many officers. The enemy rallied, making another stand, when an incessant fire was kept up by both sides. After being engaged nearly three hours Baxter's Brigade was relieved by the First Brigade, commanded by General Paul, of the same division.

The Ninth took into this battle 148 men, including officers. Its loss, as far as ascertained, is 2 officers killed, 2 wounded, and 1 missing; 4 enlisted men killed, 15 wounded, and 44 missing. Many of the missing were taken prisoners while falling back through the town, where they were hotly pursued by the enemy, who had received heavy reinforcements. Captain Quirk and Lieutenant Clark were killed, Lieutenants Jacobs and Whitney wounded, and Lieutenant Barnes was taken prisoner.

Too much praise cannot be given to both officers and men for their bravery on this occasion, which was particularly noticed by General Baxter, who took occasion to thank the regiment. General Baxter won the admiration of every member of the Ninth Regiment for his bravery and coolness on the field, and stands in their estimation among the bravest of the brave.

Upon the retreat from Seminary Ridge the remnant of Robinson's Division stopped near the position of Stewart's U. S. Battery long enough to prevent its capture; then, with those who had preceded them, they took position at Ziegler's Grove, near Cemetery Hill, at about 5 p. m., and remained there for the night.

During July 2d the Ninth, about seventy-five strong, supported a battery

of the Eleventh Corps upon Cemetery Hill, going later to help patch out the line in rear of where Sickles' Third Corps was engaged, until that day's fight turned in favor of the Union army.

On July 3d, from 9 a. m. to 1 p. m., the regiment again supported a battery of the Twelfth Corps, being ordered at the latter hour into position on the right of Hays' Division, Second Corps, also this time to aid a battery. Here the handful of men were witnesses of Pickett's charge, which having failed of its object (to pierce the centre of the battle-line), the Ninth was sent out on picket duty.

During that night and the succeeding day the horrors of "after a battle" were on every side, and then came to notice the many instances of relief and kindness soldiers show towards disabled enemies, which few other wars have developed in so noticeable a degree.

Hill and Ewell are said to have believed the troops being brought to oppose them were only militia, whom they expected to soon brush from their paths. It is true a number of militia regiments were present, viz., the Second, Ninth, Fourteenth and Twentieth, from New York. Of their fighting qualities let the standard work, "Regimental Losses in the Civil War," by Col. William F. Fox, speak, which records all of them as belonging to the "Three Hundred Fighting Regiments." They, together with equally brave volunteer organizations of the army, handled Lee's veterans to their discomfiture and final retreat from Northern soil.

The Ninth Militia dates its origin from 1800, having been formed from the Second Regiment of that time; since which period it has taken part in the War of 1812, various riots in the city of New York, and the great War of the Rebellion.

Regimental orders No. 5, issued in March, 1861, directed the members to assemble at the City Armory for battalion drill. On April 19th, the regiment voted to enlist for the war. Meanwhile the firing upon Fort Sumter had taken place, and the proclamation calling for 75,000 militia was issued by President Lincoln.

Repeated efforts to obtain marching orders were at last successful, and on Monday, May 27th, the command started for the capital of the Nation. Such, though, was the mixed condition of military affairs there, it was not until twelve days after that the Government would officially accept the regiment's services. Then, on June 8th, 837 men were mustered in by Capt. William D. Whipple, U. S. A., as the Ninth New York Militia, to serve during the war, unless sooner discharged. At a later period, in 1862, the regiment was known as the Eighty-third New York Volunteers, but at no time were the men remustered for duty under this latter designation.

During the years 1861-1864, the Ninth served mainly in the First and Fifth Corps, Army of the Potomac, taking part in all the battles, engagements, marches, etc., which these corps shared in. Finally on June 7, 1864, the welcome notice came by special orders No. 156, Headquarters Fifth Corps, for the regiment to proceed to New York City to be mustered out.

On that day only 92 men were with it entitled to a discharge; but, with those away, wounded or detailed, the number was swelled to 254 by the time

they reached home. As proof that these men had been "at the front," the records show that 85 of them had been wounded. The Empire City has reason to feel proud of such sacrifices for the Union.

On June 11th the gallant survivors arrived in New York, and on the 23d they were released from further military service to the United States. Capt. Henry A. Ellis, U. S. A., mustered them out, after having served three years and twenty-seven days. Many, though, continued to do duty as a part of the militia for years afterwards, and even now a few of the old veterans are still in the ranks of the regiment.

[REDACTED]



J. B. LYON PRINT.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

84TH NEW YORK INFANTRY.

On the first day's battlefield, near the railroad cut.

(INSCRIPTIONS.)

(Right Side.)

14TH
REGT. N. Y. S. M.
2D BRIGADE
1ST DIVISION
1ST ARMY
CORPS.

ERECTED AND DEDICATED
A. D. 1887.

(Front.)

84TH N. Y. INFT.
ON THIS SPOT
AT 10:30 A. M., JULY 1, 1863, THIS REGIMENT
PARTICIPATED IN THE REPULSE OF DAVIS'
MISSISSIPPI BRIGADE AND THE CAPTURE
OF A LARGE PORTION OF THAT COMMAND.
TOOK INTO THE ENGAGEMENT
356 OFFICERS AND MEN, AND, BY
THE WAR DEPARTMENT RECORD,
LOST DURING THE THREE DAYS 217.

(Reverse.)

THE 14TH REGIMENT NEW YORK STATE MILITIA
(84TH N. Y. VOLS.) ENTERED THE U. S. VOLUNTEER
SERVICE APRIL 18, 1861. PARTICIPATED IN 22
ENGAGEMENTS WITH THE ENEMY AND
WAS DISCHARGED ON EXPIRATION OF TERM
OF SERVICE, JUNE 6, 1864.

(Left Side.)

14TH BROOKLYN REGIMENT.
JULY 1. FIRST ENGAGED THE ENEMY BETWEEN THE
McPHERSON HOUSE AND REYNOLDS GROVE;
SUBSEQUENTLY MOVED TO THIS PLACE AND
ENGAGED DAVIS' BRIGADE; REMAINED AT THE
RAILROAD CUT AT SEMINARY RIDGE UNTIL THE
FINAL RETREAT; HAD A RUNNING FIGHT
THROUGH GETTYSBURG TO CULP'S HILL. ON THE
EVENING OF THE 2D AND AGAIN ON THE MORNING
OF THE 3D WENT TO SUPPORT GREENE'S
BRIGADE AND WAS HEAVILY ENGAGED.

(TABLET NEAR REYNOLDS' GROVE)

14TH (BROOKLYN) INFANTRY N. Y. S. M.

(84TH N. Y. VOLUNTEERS)

2D BRIGADE, 1ST DIVISION, 1ST CORPS.

HERE IN THE FORENOON JULY 1, 1863, THE REGIMENT OPENED FIRE ON A. P. HILL'S CORPS; AFTERWARDS CHARGED SUCCESSFULLY ON DAVIS' BRIGADE AT THE RAILROAD TO THE RIGHT AND REAR OF THIS POSITION, AS INDICATED BY A MONUMENT THERE; LATER HAD A RUNNING FIGHT THROUGH GETTYSBURG TO CULP'S HILL, WHERE AT NIGHT, JULY 2, REPULSED THE ADVANCE OF JOHNSON'S DIVISION OF EWELL'S CORPS; THEN MOVED TO THE RIGHT TO REINFORCE THE 12TH CORPS AS RECORDED ON TABLET IN BOULDER TO THE RIGHT OF THE HILL. IT LOST IN THE BATTLE 13 KILLED, 105 WOUNDED, AND 99 MISSING.

(TABLET ON CULP'S HILL.)

"14TH (BROOKLYN) INFANTRY, N. Y. S. M. (84TH N. Y. VOLS.)

2D BRIGADE, 1ST DIVISION, 1ST CORPS.

HERE AT ABOUT 9 P. M., JULY 2, 1863, THE REGIMENT, WHILE MOVING FROM ITS POSITION TO THE LEFT OF THIS, TO REINFORCE GREENE'S BRIGADE, UNEXPECTEDLY ENCOUNTERED THE ADVANCE OF JOHNSON'S DIVISION OF EWELL'S CORPS, WHICH HAD CROSSED THE ABANDONED WORKS, AND WAS ADVANCING TOWARDS THE BALTIMORE PIKE. BY OPENING FIRE ON THEM, THE REGIMENT CAUSED THEM TO HALT UNTIL THE 12TH CORPS RETURNED AND DROVE THEM BACK.

AT DAYLIGHT, JULY 3, THE REGIMENT REJOINED THE BRIGADE, BUT SOON AFTERWARDS MOVED AGAIN TO THE RIGHT TO REINFORCE THE 12TH CORPS, AND FOUGHT IN THE TRENCHES, AND LAY IN RESERVE UNTIL THE REPULSE OF THE ENEMY.

IN THE FIRST DAY'S BATTLE THIS REGIMENT WAS HEAVILY ENGAGED WITH THE 1ST CORPS AT THE RAILROAD BEYOND THE SEMINARY AS INDICATED BY A MONUMENT THERE.

IT LOST IN THE BATTLE 13 KILLED, 105 WOUNDED, AND 99 MISSING.

DEDICATION OF MONUMENT.

84TH REGIMENT INFANTRY — "FOURTEENTH BROOKLYN."

October 19, 1887.

INVOCATION BY REV. J. O. PECK, D. D., CHAPLAIN, FOURTEENTH BROOKLYN.

O Lord! Father of the spirits of all men, and strength of nations, behold us in adoration and supplication and thanksgiving before Thee.

We reverently thank Thee for Thy good will and providential protection towards and over this Republic. Our fathers found their refuge and strength in Thee, as they found and defended and triumphantly established our nationality. On Thee they leaned in sore distress, and by Thy right arm were they delivered in dark and perilous hours.

And when in our generation danger beset our National Union, Thou wert again our refuge and deliverance. We thank Thee that the patriotism of the sires lived in vigor in the sons. Thou didst give us a heritage worthy of the sacrifice of noble citizens, and Thou didst give us noble citizens ready to make a sacrifice worthy of our heritage. And here this day, as we meet to commemorate the devotion and death of those of our number who fell on this field of conflict, we invoke Thy benediction upon our consecration of this monument. Let Thy blessing rest upon these living veterans, by whose affection and comradeship they were moved to cause the erection of this lasting and speaking memorial. Accept their offering, O Lord, as a tribute to Thy glory, The God of this Nation, as well as to the manhood and heroism of their fallen comrades.

May Thy blessing rest upon the widows and orphans of those who fell on this spot, now consecrated to the patriotism of their dead. May this monument ever speak to future generations of the sacredness of Liberty and the worth of native land! Add Thy blessing to the further services of this hour. Grant that the words of him who shall voice the great thoughts of this occasion may be wise and inspiring of noble sentiments in all who hear. Mercifully look upon us in our frailties, and graciously assist us to live in obedience to Thy holy will, that we, finally, may be accepted in Thy glorious kingdom, through JESUS CHRIST our LORD. Amen.

ORATION OF HON. SETH LOW.

VETERANS of the Brooklyn Fourteenth, Widows and Wives and Daughters of Veterans, you who endured at home while those you loved dared everything at the front, Members of the Regiment, Gentlemen of the Brooklyn City Government, and Fellow Citizens:

Standing here at Gettysburg, we seem to be standing on one of the mountain tops of history. Cemetery Ridge is but a little eminence, yet from its consecrated summit the eye commands a vision wider and more wonderful than

any to be seen from the loftiest Sierra. Here, looking backwards, we seem to see not alone the Nation's past, spreading beneath us like a map, but out of the shadowy distance we seem to see, converging here, the multitudinous roads along which men have struggled during all the ages towards the conception of a free State, existing for and maintained by a free people. Here, looking forward, "the distance beacons" to a glowing future, bright with hope for the multitudes of men. Not in vain have they fought and died whose fortunate mission it was to interpret the past and to bless the future.

Neither does it lack significance that this battle should have been fought on the soil of Pennsylvania. The popular faculty, which so often gives names with a deep insight into the real significance of things, long ago called Pennsylvania the Keystone State. Historically, no less than geographically, the name applies. In the majestic arch formed by this Union of independent states, Pennsylvania always has been the keystone. Upon the soil of Pennsylvania met the first and the second Continental Congress. Upon the soil of Pennsylvania George Washington was commissioned commander-in-chief of the Continental armies. Upon the soil of Pennsylvania was made the immortal Declaration of Independence. Upon the soil of Pennsylvania the Liberty Bell first of all rang out the joyful peals of liberty throughout the land. It was here that Franklin drew lightning from the sky, and it was here were forged the thunderbolts which made the Colonies independent states. Again at Gettysburg, in our own generation, were hurled the bolts which have made the Union free.

The Civil War, in which the battle of Gettysburg was the turning point, became inevitable when the Constitution of the United States recognized and permitted slavery within our borders. Whatever other issues or constitutional interpretation were involved, they all hinged upon slavery, as that which gave to them all their chief meaning and consequence. At the outbreak of the war men did not see this clearly, as they see it now. The preservation of the Union was the rallying cry; and men said it oftentimes without at all realizing how grand a cry it was. The preservation of the Union by no possibility could involve only the life of the Nation. It involved necessarily the freedom of a race and the best hopes of mankind. Without slavery the National life never would have been in danger. Without the abolition of slavery the preservation of the Union was a dream. Yet the war began with the most emphatic declarations that slavery should not be disturbed. In the beginning, 100 years ago, the Fathers admitted slavery into the Constitution, because without it the Union could not have been formed. For seventy years compromise after compromise was made with reference to slavery, for the preservation of the Union, in the vain hope of preserving a political fabric undisturbed, which had within itself forces as antagonistic as light and darkness. At last it was open war, and defeat followed defeat for the soldiers of the Union, until it became certain that the Union, when preserved, would be a Union wholly free. At Gettysburg were discerned, for the first time, the faint beginnings of the longed-for end. Here were pronounced at last, to the wild, swelling waves of slavery's great sea, the words of Omnipotence, "Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further."

Most fittingly, the army through which this decree was uttered was the Army of the Potomac. For two long, weary years that magnificent body of soldiers had endured defeat and disaster. Not always being worsted in isolated encounters, they still were exposed constantly to the most trying of all military experiences, where defeat brought disaster and victory brought small advantage. Still, though defeated often, they were invincible.

"Trampled and beaten were they as the sand,
And yet unshaken as the continent."

Commanders there have been sometimes who, by their overpowering genius, have led their conquering legions without a defeat from the first small victory to the complete triumph. Others, again, after a career of dazzling success, have marched to humiliating overthrow. Still others, by their intrepidity and unyielding courage, have held their shattered troops about them until despair turned into victory. But I can think of no other case where the army was of itself superior to the fate of its leaders. Commanders might come and commanders might go, but the Army of the Potomac could not be beaten. It could not, indeed, subdue its enemy, until a leader worthy of itself was at its head, but that enemy dashed itself in vain against its heroic columns until, under the lead of the great commander, the Army of the Potomac ground even its valiant antagonist to powder.

Here at Gettysburg the tide of war began to turn. The presence of these regimental monuments, in large numbers, reveals the popular recognition that this, in a sense peculiar to itself, was the pivotal battle of the war. Step with me for a moment to yonder cemetery, "where the bones of heroes rest." There you shall see the graves of men from eighteen of our States, from Maine, on the East, to Minnesota, on the West. Side by side with the graves, over whose heads the name of their State appears, breathing, as it were, a benison from home, you shall see almost 1,000 graves of the nameless dead. Comrades, how hard it seems! To die for one's country; to yield this last full measure of a patriot's devotion; and not even to have it known that you have died! Not known; not known, indeed here, but well known, I like to think, by Him who seeth in secret that He may reward openly.

You may have heard the anecdote of the Southern man who saw the great review of the Union armies in Washington at the end of the war. As the troops went marching by, carrying the banners of Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, the regimental numbers indicating the multitudes of soldiers that had come from all these States, he rubbed his eyes, and asked where those States were. When he had studied geography, he said, there were no such States. Soon he identified them as part of the Northwest Territory and its neighborhood, when he uttered this reflection: "If we could but have known—if we could but have known." The sagacity of Jefferson, he saw, in dedicating to Freedom, in 1787, this great Northwest Territory, after all had brought to naught in the end the slavery permitted in the Constitution. But if the new States did their part heroically, the old States were equally worthy of their traditions and their history. Yonder cemetery contains more men from the

State of New York than from any other State, and through the war she maintained her primacy. The other day I was in the Adirondacks, and in the little town of Keene, with its few hundreds of population, I found a Grand Army post numbering still thirty-nine members. So they came from the hillside and from the plain, from the forest and from the open, and so, with equal devotion, they came from the great cities of the State.

The official records show that from Brooklyn over 32,000 men went to the front, and the Brooklyn of that day was a city of little more than 200,000 people. Among this number the first to enlist, and the equal of any regiment in either army in gallantry and heroic service, was the regiment in whose honor this monument is erected. While known, also, as the Eighty-fourth New York State Volunteers, it always has been best known and best loved as the Brooklyn Fourteenth. For this reason, and by reason of its permanency as a militia regiment, both before and since the war, it has come to be looked upon as the typical Brooklyn war regiment. Never did city have a grander regiment upon which to bestow its affection and its pride. The fateful shot at Sumter went hurling through the frightened air on the 12th of April, 1861. Just six days thereafter report was made to headquarters that the Fourteenth Regiment was in readiness to be marched to the front. This was its answer to the call for volunteers — prompt, courageous, patriotic. It meant business.

When on the way to Washington, the colonel, then Alfred M. Wood, received a dispatch from the Governor of New York, asking him by what authority he had taken his regiment out of the State without orders. Colonel Wood replied: "By authority of Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, and we hope with your approval." This reply suggests the remark which Lincoln himself is said to have made to Secretary Chase at about the same period: "These Rebels are violating the Constitution to destroy the Union. I will violate the Constitution, if necessary, to save the Union." It needed no prophet to foretell that such a regiment would acquit itself with honor. It began its fighting at Bull Run. There Colonel Wood was wounded and taken prisoner. Colonel Wood's wound disabled him for further service, even after he was exchanged, and from that time the regiment fought under the command of our gallant and modest friend, Colonel Fowler, except for a brief period after the second battle of Bull Run, in which engagement Colonel Fowler also was seriously wounded. During this interval the regiment was commanded by Lieut. Col. William H. Debevoise. Colonel Wood's experiences as a prisoner were exceptional. About that time some Confederate privateers had been made prisoners, and it was proposed by some that they should be treated as pirates. In response to this proposition the Confederates authorized only Colonel Wood and others and held them as hostages in the country. And officers of the regiment, officers and men, found themselves on Liberty Prison. I have been much struck in reading a letter from one of this number with the description of a military prisoner's life. Leaving aside all question of cruelty, the monotony and weariness of it must have been almost beyond endurance to men full of vigor.

I wish to pay my tribute of grateful honor to the heroism which suffered in this form, and to the gallantry which on field after field dared every

chance of war. Soon most of these first prisoners were exchanged, and one can well imagine the scene when they found themselves once more under the Stars and Stripes. Of both those who were released and those who welcomed them, the contemporary account says, "every eye was dim with tears." So quickly did the Brooklyn Fourteenth sound the whole deep meaning of that horrid word, war.

When Colonel Wood found himself free, and within the Union lines again, the regiment was in camp near Washington. He repaired at once to his command to receive their congratulations upon his release. "The regiment appeared," so says the chronicler, "in the peculiar chasseur dress for which it has become famous — the red pants, dark blue jacket, with two rows of bell buttons, and red breast piece, having also a row of bell buttons, and red cap." "Colonel Wood assured the boys that they had established at Manassas a reputation which they might well strive to maintain, 'for,' said he, 'you are the dread of the enemy.'" "Everywhere he had been assured by Confederate officers that his regiment, the 'red legs,' had fought more desperately than any other at the field of Bull Run." This testimony is supported by the praise the regiment received from the Union commander, by whom it was named, with special mention, in General Orders. Thus, its first battle found the regiment already the "Fighting Fourteenth." I do not propose to follow the regiment from field to field, but I do desire at this time, as matter of historical record, to name the different engagements in which the regiment took part:

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|--------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Bull Run. | 12. Antietam. |
| 2. Binn's Hill. | 13. Fredericksburg. |
| 3. Falmouth. | 14. Port Royal. |
| 4. Spotsylvania, August, 1862. | 15. Fitzhugh's Crossing. |
| 5. Rappahannock Station. | 16. Chancellorsville. |
| 6. Sulphur Springs. | 17. Seminary Hill. |
| 7. Gainesville. | 18. Gettysburg. |
| 8. Groveton. | 19. Mine Run. |
| 9. Manassas Plains. | 20. Wilderness. |
| 10. Chantilly. | 21. Laurel Hill. |
| 11. South Mountain. | 22. Spotsylvania. |

A roll of honor long enough and splendid enough to satisfy the greatest cavalier.

From contemporary newspaper accounts sent to the journals of other cities than Brooklyn, which I quote as presumably impartial, as also by extracts from the official records, I am able to show, in a measure, how the regiment appeared at the time in the eyes of others.

Here is an item touching their services at Fredericksburg: "The brilliant feat of the Brooklyn Fourteenth in keeping up, without straggling, with the cavalry and artillery on a march of twenty-six miles, during the hottest day of the season, and then, with but three hours' rest, dashing on after the enemy's cavalry for four miles, is the subject of most flattering encomiums."

The regiment led the advance at the capture of Fredericksburg by General Augur. After the battle had been fought "anxiety was manifested," so reads the record, "to know by whom the Fourteenth Regiment of Brooklyn was led during the gallant advance upon the town."

I need not tell you, men of the Fourteenth, that it was led then, as so often on other fields, with equal bravery and skill, by Col. E. B. Fowler, since general by brevet for his services during the war. In the spring of 1863, General Reynolds, that superb fighter, issued a special order, thanking the Brooklyn Fourteenth and the Twenty-fourth Michigan, for their splendid services on the expedition to Port Royal. At South Mountain and Antietam, when under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Debevoise, the regiment signalized itself as usual by its brilliant charges. And so we come with them to Gettysburg. It was their fortune to be with General Reynolds in the heavy fighting of the first day, when a fragment of the Union army held the great body of Confederates in check, until the Union forces could be brought up in sufficient numbers to make a successful stand on Cemetery Ridge. They were among the first, if not themselves the first, to begin the infantry fighting of that memorable struggle.

The sad duty fell to them of removing from the field the body of the heroic Reynolds, when he fell directly behind their lines. Nothing daunted even by this disaster, they added lustre to their already glorious record. They flanked, and then, falling back and changing front, all the time under fire, they, in company with the Ninety-fifth New York and the Sixth Wisconsin, all under command at the moment of Colonel Fowler, drove back the enemy in their front, Davis's Mississippi Brigade, and upon this ground where we now stand compelled a large part of them to surrender. It is recorded that they took more prisoners here than the regiments engaged had men. Thus you will see this is indeed the proper spot upon which to place the monument we have dedicated to-day. The life blood of many of our brothers has enriched the underlying soil; the wounded in their agony have here looked up in prayer to the bending sky, and here the blessings of a grateful Nation have descended upon the brows of the living and the dead.

"Whene'er a noble deed is wrought,
Whene'er is spoken a noble thought,
Our hearts, in glad surprise,
To higher levels rise.

"The tidal wave of deeper souls
Into our inmost being rolls,
And lifts us unawares
Out of all meaner cares."

To commemorate and to perpetuate the memory of not one but many such noble deeds, this monument to the Fourteenth Regiment of Brooklyn is dedicated to-day, by the survivors of the regiment, by their comrades and friends, by the grateful State of New York, and by their fellow citizens of

Brooklyn. Still, let it be remembered that the services of the Fourteenth Regiment at Gettysburg were not confined to the fighting about this railroad cut. On the second day, and on the third, they engaged the enemy in the vicinity of Culp's Hill. After dark of the second day they were proceeding to position to reinforce General Greene on the right of our line, when Colonel Fowler was surprised to receive fire from a position within our lines which he supposed to be held by Union troops. Not being sure whether they were our own troops or the enemy, volunteers were called for to ascertain. One fell wounded, but one returned, reporting that it was the Tenth Virginia. A volley from the Fourteenth caused the Virginia Regiment to retire from the woods in which they were, and where they occupied a position in relation to our lines full of peril to our army. Thus, through small incidents and through great, the battle raged until the Union forces were everywhere successful.

The loss of the Fourteenth Regiment in the battle of Gettysburg was 217, out of 356 officers and men engaged.

A writer, at the time, to one of the New York papers says: "The heroic and gallant Second, Ninth and Fourteenth Regiments, N. Y. State National Guard, have been almost wiped out of existence in the recent bloody conflicts on the soil of Pennsylvania and Maryland. There remains but a small band of them now; but oh what scenes of carnage has that handful of veterans lived through. Always in the front, fearless and unflinching, they have stood where the havoc of war raged the wildest, and passed on through fire and sword into the enemy's works. No regulars that ever served on any field have won more imperishable honor than these three regiments of militia. Had a Napoleon lived and seen their deeds of daring, he would have chosen them for his Imperial Guard."

And these men of the Fourteenth Regiment, gentlemen, were our neighbors and friends.

After Gettysburg, the Fourteenth served until the 22d of May, 1864, taking heroic part, as always, in all the battles down to and including the battle of Spotsylvania, in the famous Wilderness campaign.

It was their singular honor to be the first regiment to receive General Grant when, as commander-in-chief, he joined the Army of the Potomac. I quote the following record of this period from the report of Colonel Fowler: "Although the time of the Fourteenth had nearly expired, the men stood the brunt of battle nobly. Not a case of desertion occurred, and but little murmuring. Many a brave spirit winged its flight heavenward, who in the body, had counted the days that would elapse ere he would be in the embrace of dear ones at home."

A Washington correspondent writes, under date of May 24, 1864: "The Fourteenth Brooklyn Regiment, Colonel Fowler, arrived here to-day from the front, and left to-night for New York. Of 2,100 men it has had in the service, but 91 officers and men return—a sad, but glorious commentary upon its achievements."

Well might the City of Brooklyn welcome it with every honor. "Welcome, the brave Fourteenth, out of the Wilderness!"

The regiment, having enlisted for three years, returned home, thin enough indeed in ranks, but full of honors. About 100 men, who had become members of the regiment at various dates, and whose terms of service had not yet expired, were incorporated into the Fifth Regiment of New York Veterans. Here they upheld their old credit with undiminished gallantry. Six, at least, became officers, two being promoted on the field of battle for bravery in action. The subsequent services of these men, no less than the record of the regiment as such, are lovingly commemorated by this monument. Circumstances prevented them from sharing in the triumphant return home of the regiment to whose glory they contributed so largely. It is fitting that at this hour glad recognition should be made of their services, and that they should be claimed by Brooklyn as an integral portion of her famous fighting regiment.

Now, four and twenty years after the mighty struggle of Gettysburg, we are gathered here, a handful of people out of the great multitudes of Brooklyn, to dedicate this monument to the Brooklyn Fourteenth. What does it signify? Abraham Lincoln said, in that marvelous address which he made in yonder cemetery, it was here decided that "government of the people, by the people and for the people should not perish from the earth." Certainly, then, the monument means this by way of history, that in that august decision, weighty with far-reaching consequences on both sides of the great sea, and in every quarter of the globe, the Fourteenth Regiment, and through them the City of Brooklyn, bore glorious part.

Who shall presume to say what the monument means to you who are veterans of the regiment? To you, and indeed to us, the spot whereon we stand is holy ground. Around and about us are similar monuments marking the fidelity and heroism of other men. But, to you, this monument has a sacred significance all its own. It tells you of comrades who were not afraid to die. It tells you of comrades who were not afraid to live, robbed of their health, crippled in limb, the wrecks of the men who went with you to the front. It tells you of yourselves, how that it is a sublime thing at such a time to have been true and brave.

But what shall the monument mean to me, and to others like me, who have come to manhood since the war, to all who, being nonparticipants in the fighting, have yet shared in the glorious results? What would you have it mean to us, you who here for our sakes looked in the eyes of death and were not afraid? Speaking for myself, and for the generation to which I belong, we stand in your presence with uncovered heads. We give you with full hearts the meed of gratitude and of glory that men have given always to those who have fought their battles. We look upon you and upon such as you with a touch of reverence, as upon those who have preserved all that as citizens of this great, free land, we hold most dear. God grant that the record of your deeds, and the memory of your self-sacrifices may inspire us and all your fellow citizens with a patriotic devotion to the country we all love so well. May the power of your example never die, but wax stronger and stronger with the growing years.

But beyond all this, what would you have us young men say of the war in

which you fought? And what shall we say of the men against whom you fought? Certainly let us say this, in any presence, that you fought for the right and that they fought for the wrong. But would you have us speak of the war only as a rebellion? Shall it seem to us only a causeless and wicked war, brought about for their own purposes by designing and ambitious men? "It must needs be that offenses come, but woe unto that man by whom the offense cometh." So shall we not rather admit, with the candor of truth, that the seeds of the war may be traced back to the constitution itself, to that constitution which, in the words of Fitz Hugh Lee the other day, as he sorrowfully said, permitted slavery, and was silent as to the right of secession? I bring no charge against the framers of the constitution. They did their part, and they were in nothing more wise than in not attempting to do what was beyond their power. The attempt to settle these questions then would have made the Union impossible. They rightly judged that if they could make the constitution of the Nation sound and strong, it would of itself cast out whatever was hostile to its life. And is not this what happened, and are not these the questions which you have decided once for all upon the supreme appeal to arms, you later Constitution-makers, fellow laborers with the fathers, Washington, Jefferson, Hamilton, Franklin, Madison, and all their goodly company? If this be so, if this be the view that placid history will take when she comes to record, with impartial pen, the story of these stirring years, then may not we, your countrymen and theirs, casting away all bitterness, rejoice that we are once more fellow citizens with them as well as with you, in a Union so much stronger and better than it was before?

And, indeed, my countrymen, let us thank God that it is so. "Government of the people, by the people and for the people," was not more strengthened by your victory than it was by the readmission into all their rights as fellow citizens of those who had been your foes. Without this crowning triumph your victory would have been meaningless. Had this been impossible, the Union would have perished on the same field where your enemies surrendered. But now are we all called, they as well as we, to make the renewed Union more glorious than before. Out of the war, unquestionably, has sprung a material growth and development unimagined in the earlier years. Out of the war, let a profounder faith in the whole people grow, and a deeper sense of fellowship between man and man! We need that faith and that fellowship every hour. Popular government rests, at all times, upon a just faith in the people, and upon their capacity for self-restraint, sometimes in self-surrender. The Civil War was the crowning effort of our people's self-surrender. Cheerfully, ungrudgingly, both sides marched to the front, facing death without a murmur. Cheerfully, ungrudgingly, they laid upon themselves a burden of taxation such as no tyrant would have dared to impose. Cheerfully, ungrudgingly, each have borne all the sad consequences of the conflict, until together they have come out into the brighter day. For such a people all things are possible while they retain the spirit of the men of the mighty generation to which you belong. This monument is Brooklyn's tribute to that spirit as it showed itself at Gettysburg. It shall speak to us not so much of strife as

of consequences, not so much of death as of life, not so much of suffering as of glory, not so much of loss as of gain. May it speak always to willing ears. To-night, comrades and fellow citizens, we leave this consecrated spot and return to our distant home. But we leave it, not as it has been, eloquent only to the few who knew its story. We leave behind us this beautiful memorial of our admiration and our love, a happiness to our own hearts and an inspiration to all others who shall pass this way.

ADDRESS OF GEN. EDWARD B. FOWLER.

MY COMRADES:

I congratulate you that here on this spot, once red with the life-blood of our brave comrades, now rises an enduring monument that for centuries to come will tell of the part taken in the great decisive battle of the war by the Fourteenth Brooklyn. We are honored at its dedication to-day by the presence of official representatives of our State and City, and comrades and fellow citizens not only from Brooklyn, but from all parts of our country. We are indebted to the liberality of the State of New York and our patriotic fellow citizens of Brooklyn for the funds to erect this structure, and now, at its completion, our best thanks are due to them that they have enabled us to finish it while so many of us are living to be present at its dedication. We welcome all, ladies and gentlemen, comrades and civilians, and heartily thank them for assisting us in the ceremonies by their presence here. These beautiful flowers, in memory of a brave comrade who died in yonder town from wounds received here, have just been handed me. I knew him well. He was one of three brothers who were my neighbors. Two of them were mustered in with the regiment; the third, then at sea, joined us immediately on his return. Two of the brothers gave their lives to their country in the ranks of this regiment; the third is now limping through life with an enemy's bullet in his knee.

I accept these flowers to be placed on the monument in memory of the comrade whose name appears on the card, and I accept them as a symbol in memory of all our brave comrades who died on this field.

[REDACTED]



J. B. LYON PRINT.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

86TH NEW YORK INFANTRY.

On the wooded ridge between the Devil's Den and the Wheatfield; line of Ward's Brigade, where the battle opened on the second day.

(INSCRIPTIONS.)

(Front.)

86TH NEW YORK
INFANTRY,
2D BRIG. 1ST DIV.
3RD CORPS.

(On lower border of bas relief)

I YIELD HIM UNTO HIS
COUNTRY AND HIS GOD.

(Reverse.)

THIS REGIMENT
HELD THIS POSITION
THE AFTERNOON OF

JULY 2, 1863.

CASUALTIES

KILLED 11

WOUNDED 51

MISSING 4

DEDICATION OF MONUMENT.

86TH REGIMENT INFANTRY — "STEUBEN RANGERS."

July 2, 1888.

ADDRESS OF CHARLES H. McMASTER.

VETERANS AND FELLOW CITIZENS:

Three battles are most famous in the world's history,— Marathon, Waterloo, and Gettysburg. The result of each was the elevation of mankind and the advancement of civilization.

The advance of the Greeks against the superior numbers of their enemy, the ascent of Mont St. Jean by the old guard of Napoleon, and the stand made by the Third Corps upon *this* ground, will remain conspicuous examples of sublime courage during all time. These struggles excite our interest on account of the courage and skill displayed by the combatants, and they are even *more* important for the direction which they have given to human affairs.

The overthrow of the Persians on the plain of Marathon preserved Greece and made possible the perfection of those works in literature and art which to this day excite the widest interest and study, and stand as models of beauty in every land.

The disaster to Napoleon's army at Waterloo destroyed the overshadowing power of the Conqueror of Europe, and paved the way for more liberal policies. The victory of Meade and his army upon this field established a nation. Seminary Ridge, Cemetery Hill, Culp's Hill, Little Round Top, the Devil's Den, this wood, the Wheatfield and the Peach Orchard, are household words which to-day thrill every American heart. They may well form the studio of young men who are being drilled in the art of war. But the chief significance of the whole battle rests in the issues which were here determined.

It has been remarked that the same principles underlie the ballot-box and the battlefield. The American ballot is the expression of the highest form of human liberty yet attained. The same principles underlie it which forced the fighting on the battlefields of the Dutch Republic, and during the civil war in England.

There is an ancient American fiction that "all men are created equal." Among savage tribes this statement may be literally true, but civilized man is born under the law of the land. And a very large majority of the human race created since the world began have been born in bondage, the subjects of an absolute monarch, holding their lives and fortunes, not in their own hands, but at the pleasure of a king or emperor. The fact is, that human freedom has ever been won only by Spartan valor and ever maintained only by superior courage and intelligence. Progress towards universal liberty is slow; but since the middle ages it has been steady. The past five centuries have marked a radical advance. From the Pacification of Ghent to the battle of Marston Moor is one step; from Marston Moor to the battle of Bunker

Hill is one more; from Bunker Hill to the Proclamation of Emancipation, sealed with the blood of 40,000 freemen at Gettysburg, is still another.

This field represents something more than a great battlefield, a Golgotha, whence the spirits of the slain may ride forth on the night wind, or cry out from the breast of every storm that sweeps the wood. Under the canopy of smoke that hung over this valley during three days of hard fighting, two ideas contended for the mastery. It was not the fierce struggle of conspirators, who, disgraced in the eyes of the world, are seeking the overthrow of a government; but a grand contest in a fair field for the domination of a principle. When our fathers framed this government they left intact, within the territory over which it was to rule, two systems of civilization.

One settled upon Plymouth Rock, all free; the other along the banks of the James River, founded upon the institution of slavery. Whatever their expectations may have been, the two systems flourished side by side. And as each drew to its boundaries increasing numbers, multiplying wealth and greater political power, the difference between them became more marked and radical, until, in their social relations, in religious faith and personal characteristics, the inhabitants of the two sections were as distinct and separate as if they had been the descendants of different races.

The constitution, when ratified, contained a provision that representatives and direct taxes should be apportioned among the several states included within the Union according to their respective numbers, which should be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons,—including those bound to service for a number of years, and excluding Indians not taxed,—three-fifths of all other persons. The adoption of this provision was secured by the threat of the representatives of South Carolina and Georgia in the Constitutional Convention, that, without it, those two States would not join the Union. Upon their further demand it was also provided by the convention that Congress should not interfere with the importation of slaves prior to 1808. These provisions gave an immediate impetus to the growth and development of the Southern States through slavery, and from that early period the slave power was omnipotent in the government. It furnished a majority of the Presidents. It made war and expanded its territory. It formed cabinets and dissolved them. From the first, turbulent, tyrannical and disloyal, whenever it encountered serious opposition either in Congress or on the stump, it threatened to secede from the Union.

For more than seventy years the representatives of the free North had retreated before this threat of the slave master. The demand of the slave power in 1787 for exemption from a prohibitory act until 1808, had in 1860, become a demand that slaves should be recognized as property in every State in the Union, and instead of two States and a few hundred slaves, it represented eleven great commonwealths and held in bondage 4,000,000 human beings.

At last the conscience of the North was touched. At last the dull patriotism of the large commercial centres of the Northern States, ever eager for gain, and anxious to postpone the disturbing influences of a conflict, however righteous, was aroused from a long sleep, and at the general election which

followed, the verdict of the American ballot was pronounced emphatically against the further advance of slavery. The spirit of compromise between the sections had been exhausted, and the last argument used. The political atmosphere was charged with an electric current which set towards the field of battle. Until the explosion occurred, all progress on this continent was at an end.

Upon this field was fought the most important engagement of the great war which followed. Here the Army of the Potomac struck a blow for freedom that will echo down the ages. It erased the word slave from the statutes of the great Republic, and wrote citizen. It struck a death blow to the Confederacy and completed a Nation. From yonder heights the slave power recoiled beaten and broken; and from their summits there dawned a new era in the history of man.

Veterans, to-day you revisit the scenes where twenty-five years ago you stood in might and majesty, — years down whose swift current you have passed so peacefully that to many of you the events of those fateful July days must seem like the vague phantoms of a vanished dream. A generation unborn then has grown to manhood since. To-day your fellow citizens throughout the length and breadth of this land greet you with reverence and joy; reverence for the glorious deeds you performed, — joy that the wearers of the blue and the gray can now mingle in a common throng and with true fealty to the general government, place the crown and wreath above the sacred spot that holds the remains of a fallen comrade.

What memories rise as you identify each familiar place, and recall the impressions of a quarter of a century ago! After the battle of Chancellorsville, and in June, 1863, the Army of Northern Virginia slipped the leash which had bound it as the guardian of the Confederate capital, crossed the Rappahannock River, and began its march northward. Its ranks had been swelled by the arrival of fresh recruits until it numbered 80,000 men equipped for battle. Its files were pervaded by the spirit of pride which all brave men feel in entering upon an enterprise of hazard on a grand scale. Above them floated banners that had been carried to victory in nearly every campaign since the Stars and Stripes were lowered at Sumter. Their leader possessed the confidence in his officers and men which continued success brings, and men and officers were devoted to their chief. The Army of the Potomac was slowly following up the invader, feeling its way to the trysting ground with deliberation, — now checked by the oft-enacted comedy of panic at Washington, and again moving on. Its fortunes had been most unhappy from its earliest organization; it had been doomed to meet the unexpected.

When a battle was imminent it was accustomed to change front and retreat, or having been pushed into a fight, to receive a crushing defeat, frequently with troops enough in reserve to have beaten the enemy in spite of bad generalship. Its "morale" was bad. In individual character it has never been equaled. The men who marched in its ranks were intelligent and thoughtful patriots. Having surrendered much for the sake of peace, when they left their shops, counters, farms and offices and took up arms, it was not to yield to seductive leadership, nor to make chase after the fitful shadow of military glory, but with the firm determination that with slavery or without,

the Union must and should be preserved. Defeat had tried their souls, but it had not shaken their purpose. The discipline of severe and disastrous campaigns had wrought of them the highest type of veterans. Its corps and division commanders were most able, well schooled, and eager for a day of reckoning with their foes.

On the night of June 27th, Colonel Jenkins with 2,000 cavalry was at Kingston, Longstreet's and Hill's Divisions were at Chambersburg, Ewell with two divisions occupied Carlisle, and Early had arrived at York. There was a panic at Philadelphia and Harrisburg, and dismay at New York. On the day that Early's skirmishers, stretching out from York toward Wrightsville, first saw the gleaming waters of the Susquehanna, Ewell fired the United States barracks at Carlisle, and the command of the Army of the Potomac was changed for the fifth time within a period of ten months; fortunately it devolved upon a man calm, wise and brave, and an officer who was willing to let his army fight under the circumstances without too much direction on his part. The excitement in Paris and Berlin, in London and St. Petersburg was intense. The horoscope of the future was about to be cast, and the fate of all free institutions determined.

On Tuesday, June 30th, the lines of the two armies were converging upon Gettysburg. Lee had his army well in hand. The scattered corps of the Northern army still lacked a definite objective, and Meade hesitated in his choice of a battleground. Each commander was ignorant of the immediate presence of the other in force. Both were without knowledge of the nature of the ground where the battle was finally fought. Towards the close of the day General Buford with a body of Federal horse occupied Gettysburg. The remaining hours of light revealed to the Federal officer that here nature had forged a great battleground. Immediately north and west of the village, a bold ridge stretched away to the south. South of the village a ridge still more prominent extended parallel to the other, the two separated by a rich valley a mile in width. Ten roads centered there and furnished the highways indispensable to the passage of a modern army with its equipments. His scouts informed him of the approach of Lee's army, and he resolved to give him battle.

On the following day at noon, General Sickles with the Third Corps was at Emmitsburg. A message from General Howard informed him that the battle of Gettysburg had begun, and urged him to hasten forward with his corps. The summons reached your regiment, the Eighty-sixth, just as the men had broken ranks to make coffee and rest after a forced march. Immediately the bugle sounded to fall in, and the march was resumed until your position on the field was reached that evening. As the sun dispersed the mist which hung like a thick veil between the two armies, and brought into picturesque relief the bold outlines of the South Mountain, you knew that the day of fate had come at last. You knew that the First and Eleventh Corps had had a sharp fight with the enemy; that the battle had opened with a brilliant success, but in the end they had been forced to yield to superior numbers, and retreat; that Lee had faltered in his pursuit, and the beaten army had been rallied by General Hancock, on the slopes of Cemetery Hill.

The Confederate line of battle, crescent-shaped, extended from a position opposite Little Round Top to Benner's Hill. Longstreet commanded its right wing, Early the centre, and Ewell the left wing. Meade had the inside on ground more elevated, and his line of battle was in the shape of a fish-hook. It was shorter, more compact, and more convenient to reinforce at any point than Lee's. Slocum commanded the right wing of Culp's Hill, Hancock the centre on Cemetery Hill, and Sickles the left wing. The line of the Third Corps extended across yon rocky den, through this wood and away to the Peach Orchard, whence Humphreys' Division was refused along the Emmitsburg Road.

Ward's Brigade of Burney's Division formed the extreme left of the line, the One hundred and twenty-fourth New York occupying a position near the "Den," and the Eighty-sixth New York, this wood. Again Lee faltered. Had a premonition of defeat chilled the heart of the Confederate chief, his direction of the battle could not have been more fatal. Slowly the long hours of the hot July day passed by. It was a delirium in the afternoon when the signal given was at last given. Longstreet's and Ewell's Divisions rushed forward upon the Third Corps and quickly overthrew it on three sides. The angle at the Peach Orchard becoming a severe point of attack from the enemy's batteries. The challenge to come now was to "hold up" the regiments of the extreme right wing, and here the Third Corps in complete shake the Northern army from its position. The struggle was on. Again, as on so many occasions before, the men of cold, phlegmatic temperament gave way to the more ardent of a warmer clime.

The attack of the Confederate forces on the left. A portion of Hood's Division, including the First, Second, and Third Texas, and Little Round Top. Anderson's Division, including the First, Second, and Third Alabama, and the Spanish Chivalry who fought round the Peach Orchard, and the Spanish Chivalry who fought round the Peach Orchard. They were resisted by men of great courage and precision which distinguished our army. The roar of battle swept on to the Peach Orchard, and the Third Corps, and Humphreys' Division. The Third Corps was completely wrecked, and the Third Corps was a complete wreck. Twelve thousand men were killed, and the Third Corps was a complete wreck. At such a time, commanded by an brave man, the Third Corps would have been easily destroyed. But General Lee, a braver man never graced a saddle. As active as Prince Rupert, he kept his army in the line which shook the earth about them, like a tempest at sea, turns the stern of the ship, and beats out the fury of the gale by running

the critical points of the critical day of the battle. Two hostile armies on a field of battle, they grasp at every aid. A corner of a wall is a brace for the shoulder; a depression upon a regiment loses its footing; a depression

in the plain, a movement of the soil, a convenient cross-path, a wood, a ravine may catch the heel of this Colossus which is called an army, and prevent him from falling."

In this wood, and across the Devil's Den, the heel of the Third Corps caught, and by gallant fighting, Ward's Brigade kept the whole army from falling. He clung to his position with grim energy, and repelled repeated attacks of the enemy, although against great odds, for two hours. The One hundred and twenty-fourth maintained its grip on the Den and touched bayonets with the enemy. None bore the test of those critical hours with greater steadiness than the Eighty-sixth Regiment of New York Volunteers. Recruited from the rock-ribbed hills of Steuben County, they brought to this fight the hardihood and courage of men reared on a rugged soil, and accustomed to the trials of a harsh climate. They brought the discipline of veterans whose quality had been tried on many a hard-fought field, at Manassas, at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville.

When the brigade was relieved, its position being no longer tenable, the two regiments marched out of the battle united as one, under the command of the late Colonel Lansing, of Corning. Both had suffered heavily. Colonel Ellis, of the One hundred and twenty-fourth, had been killed. A monument to his memory can be seen through the trees at our left. It marks the spot where a brave man and a good officer fell. Your own gallant colonel was severely, and it was then thought, fatally wounded, but he is with you, hale and hearty, to-day. And all will wish that Colonel Higgins may be permitted to enjoy many anniversaries of this day.

Meanwhile, General Warren had ascended Little Round Top and discovered that that hill, rising some 125 feet above the level of the valley, and two miles south of Cemetery Hill, was the key to the Federal position and the prize of the battle to whoever should win it. Vincent's Brigade of the Fifth Corps was detached to secure it. Hood also discovered its importance, and directed Law to take it. A desperate battle ensued for its possession. Law was defeated. The Fifth Corps occupied the hill in force, and the position of our army was rendered impregnable. Here was none of the pageantry of war, but the stern lock of battalions grappling in a death struggle. From the base of Little Round Top to the Emmitsburg Road "Swept the strong battle breakers o'er the green-sodded acres of the plain." "Hard pounding, gentlemen; let us see who will pound the longest," the Duke of Wellington is reported to have said at Waterloo, and won. "We have come to stay," cried Colonel Stone to his men in the first day's fight at Gettysburg.

The Third Corps made the supreme effort of the battle, staid during three hours of the severest fighting the world has ever known, and the Army of the Potomac triumphed.

HISTORICAL SKETCH BY MAJ. SAMUEL H. LEAVITT.

The Eighty-sixth Regiment New York Volunteer Infantry, Col. Benajah P. Bailey, commanding, was organized at Elmira, N. Y., November 23, 1861, and mustered into the United States service for three years. The different companies of the regiment were recruited as follows:

Company A, in Syracuse; B, at Addison; C and F, at Corning; D, at Hornellsville; E, at Elmira; G, at Canisteo; H, at Troupsburg; I, at Cooper's Plains; and K, at Woodhull. Eight of these companies were from Steuben County. We left Elmira for the seat of war, November 23, 1861, with 960 men, rank and file, and arrived at Washington, D. C., on the morning of the 24th. We marched immediately out to Bladensburg, where we went into camp; remained there but a short time when we were ordered to Good Hope, Md., where we were stationed until the following December. From Good Hope we moved to various places at which we were encamped for short intervals, finally going to Washington, where we remained on provost and guard duty until late in the month of August, 1862, when we were ordered to the front.

Our first engagement was at Manassas where our casualties were 13 killed, 67 wounded, and 38 missing. After the battle we fell back with the army to Alexandria, Va., remaining in that vicinity for several weeks. Just prior to the battle of Antietam the Eighty-sixth Regiment was at Fort Corcoran, opposite Georgetown, D. C. Our division was hurried off through Washington to Harper's Ferry, making a forced march from there through Pleasant Valley and over South Mountain, but arrived only in time to witness Lee's army in full retreat. We joined the Army of the Potomac in the pursuit.

At the battle of Fredericksburg, the Eighty-sixth was in Whipple's Division, Third Corps, and was stationed in the city on the extreme right of the line. While not seriously engaged in that contest we had a number of men wounded. After the battle we crossed the river on pontoons near the Lacy House and returned to our former quarters.

At the battle of Chancellorsville the regiment took part in three distinct engagements. On the evening of May 1st, after dark, we took position in line of battle in the grounds around the Chancellor House. We held this position until the second, when our division was moved up the Plank Road for the purpose of intercepting a Confederate wagon train, which was moving south on the old Furnace Road. In the rough country beyond Hazel Grove we came in collision with the enemy and after a severe engagement we were driven back to the Grove.

In the meantime General Jackson had struck the Eleventh Corps, doubled them up and driven them back in disorder. Our division was cut off from the main army by the Confederates, and the Eighty-sixth, with other regiments composing the division, had to do some steady fighting to get in touch with our army again. After three attempts we managed to cut our way through the enemy's lines, sustaining severe losses. On coming into the line of battle again with our own army on that Sunday morning, we were directed to support some pieces of artillery stationed south of the Plank Road.

The Confederates during the course of that day made many desperate charges for the capture of these guns, but were repulsed. In the afternoon, a more desperate effort than ever was made on that portion of General Sickles' line, west of the Chancellor House, in which attack Lieutenant Colonel Chapin, commanding the Eighty-sixth Regiment, was killed, as were also Capts. D. E. Ellsworth and W. W. Angel; Major Higgins, Adjutant Stafford, and Lieutenant Woodward were seriously wounded. The last-named officer died a few days later. In this battle the regiment was under fire continuously for three days, and lost heavily in killed and wounded.

In the forepart of June we were sent with three or four other regiments up the Rappahannock River to Beverly Ford to support the cavalry, a portion of which crossed the river near Brandy Station, on the 9th of June. Here we had a hot encounter with the enemy, losing 6 men killed and a number wounded. We joined the main army again at Bealton Station, and with diminished numbers took up the line of march to Gettysburg, which proved to be a long and tiresome tramp.

About 1 o'clock p. m., on July 1, 1863, our division of the Third Corps halted for dinner on the outskirts of Emmitsburg, Md., and about twelve miles from Gettysburg. The fires had been barely kindled when the bugle sounded "pack up." The booming of cannon could be heard in the distance, and we were hurried off at double-quick. The hot July sun was blazing down on us, and many fell by the wayside from the effects of the heat. We took position that night on the battlefield of July 2d, near the historic "Wheatfield." Some firing could be heard near the village of Gettysburg, and an occasional shell exploded rather near us. Early in the morning of the 2d we marched to the south and in rear of the rocky cavern known as the "Devil's Den." About noon our brigade (Ward's) was advanced to its position in line of battle, our regiment taking position in the woods beyond the Devil's Den, with the One hundred and twenty-fourth New York on our immediate left, and the Twentieth Indiana on our right. Between 3 and 4 o'clock p. m., the enemy, who had been pressing the right of the Third Corps, which was now far advanced to the front, moved forward in solid column, halting for a moment when they had reached the edge of the woods in our front. They immediately advanced again, rapidly and with fierce yells; but our ranks pouring out a deadly fire checked them, and they were driven back. Rallying again they reformed and fired a sharp volley at us which caused our line to waver some, but we hung on grimly and maintained our ground until 5 p. m. The enemy had pressed the brigade back from the Devil's Den, and had attacked Round Top. Those in our immediate front greatly outnumbered us. Our left flank had been turned and we were forced to fall back, which we did in good order. Our losses in this battle were 11 killed, 51 wounded, and 4 missing. Captain John Warner was among the killed, and Lieutenant Colonel Higgins was seriously wounded.

During the afternoon of the 3d of July, our regiment supported General Hancock and the Second Corps while sustaining the shock of Pickett's charge. No losses were sustained by the Eighty-sixth on that day. The regiment was highly commended by our respective division and brigade commanders,

Generals Birney and Ward, for its good conduct on the battlefield of Gettysburg.

On the 5th of July, we left the scene of that great battle to follow up General Lee's retreating army. We crossed the Potomac River at Berlin, and marched up through Loudoun Valley. Later on, and in the same month, we encountered Ewell's Corps at Manassas Gap, near its entrance, and drove him back into Shenandoah Valley. This battle is known as Wapping Heights. We afterwards marched on to Warrenton, Va., and were engaged with the enemy at Auburn, Kelly's Ford, Mine Run, and Locust Grove. In the winter of 1864, at Brandy Station, the army was reorganized and the Third Corps was consolidated into one division, making the Third Division of the Second Corps. In January, 1864, most of the men in the Eighty-sixth Regiment re-enlisted, and then went home on the customary veteran furlough of thirty days, returning to the army in February, and then joining the ranks of the Second Corps.

On the 3d of May, 1864, we broke camp at Brandy Station, crossed the Rapidan River at Ely's Ford and entered upon the campaign of the Wilderness, our regiment being made up of 450 men rank and file. On the night of May 4th, we bivouacked on the old battlefield of Chancellorsville, and the next day pressed on to the Wilderness. The survivors who participated in the trials and hardships of those eventful days will remember the desperate fighting at the Brock Road and Po River, in which our regiment had a fierce encounter with the enemy at close quarters, hand-to-hand. We lost 32 men killed, and had a large number wounded. In that engagement every member of our color guard was either killed or wounded, and it was the good fortune of the writer to be able to carry the colors from the field and to save them from capture by the Rebels. The regiment went into the engagement with 300 men, of which number 150 were numbered among the killed, wounded, or missing after the battle. Capt. John Phinney and Adj. James Cherry were among the killed; and Capt. Samuel Stone was killed the same day at Alsop's Farm, where Capt. Vincent was severely wounded.

At the battle of Spotsylvania, on May 12th, the Eighty-sixth with the Third Division of the Second Corps formed the first line in the attack upon the enemy's works, which were captured together with 16 pieces of artillery which were turned against their former owners. There was good hard fighting that day, and a Confederate division numbering 4,000 men were taken prisoners. On the morning of the 13th our regiment could muster only 75 men. As we had opened the campaign with 450 in active service it will be easily comprehended what rough treatment we received in that ten days of battle. From Spotsylvania we went to Anderson's Farm, North Anna, Totopotomoy, and Cold Harbor. We crossed the James River at Wilcox Landing, and arrived at Petersburg June 15th. We took part in the battles of the next four days.

On the morning of June 16th, we took possession of the enemy's abandoned works. On the morning of the 16th, a shell from a Rebel battery passed through the regiment, and exploding killed Lieutenant Stanton, and wounded several others. We remained in the vicinity for some time, constantly chang-

ing our position but all the while under fire, and losing many of our men killed and wounded. On the 27th of July, with the Second Corps, we marched to City Point, crossed the Appomattox at Point of Rocks, and at Deep Bottom crossed the James River. We encountered the enemy, and at night recrossed the river and fell back to the Petersburg front. And here followed the battle of Reams' Station. After another engagement at Deep Bottom in the month of August we relieved the Ninth Corps at City Point, the latter corps going into the fight at the explosion of the Mine.

On October 27th the regiment bore its part in the battle of Hatcher's Run, where it sustained a heavy loss in killed and wounded. In this action we were completely surrounded by the Rebels. Night came on, and a heavy rain set in; both armies were mixed up. About 1 o'clock in the morning we managed to extricate ourselves, and made our escape with the loss of a few men who were made prisoners by the enemy. Lieutenant Rathbone was among the missing when we made camp again, and he was never heard of afterwards.

We were then marched to the works at Petersburg where we relieved a brigade in Fort Hell. We remained there, living under ground and protected by our bomb-proof defences, until December. There was a constant shower of projectiles, big and little, from the Rebel works falling about us during these months. Col. M. B. Stafford, a brave and popular officer, was mortally wounded by the bursting of a shell, and died in the fort, December 1, 1864.

About that time the Eighty-sixth, being relieved from duty at Fort Hell, joined the Fifth Corps, which with the Third Division, Second Corps, took part in the Weldon Raid, going as far south as Weldon, N. C., or near there.

The men suffered intensely on this march from a cold storm of rain which turned to sleet and snow. On February 5 and 7, 1865, occurred the second battle of Hatcher's Run, in which the Eighty-sixth took part. In this position we were at the breaking through of the lines at Petersburg. We crossed through the lines just south of the Boydton Plank Road, marched through the woods in our front, but found that the enemy a short time previous had abandoned their works and were in full retreat. Imagine our joy on beholding our own cavalry passing down inside the enemy's works. We marched through to the left and upon the Boydton Plank Road to the outskirts of Petersburg.

In the morning we turned our backs to the city without having had the satisfaction of entering it. We marched after the retiring army, picking up stragglers and reviewing with satisfaction other unmistakable signs of "the beginning of the end."

The wake of Lee's fleeing columns was strewn with burning wagon trains, camp and garrison equipage, dead and dying horses, and maimed and broken-down soldiers in ragged uniforms of gray. So we marched on, frequently coming upon and skirmishing with the trailing Confederate brigades.

On the 28th, after several attempts to take a piece of artillery which had annoyed us throughout the day, the regiment made a final charge and captured it. Two men of Company C of our regiment pushed through a swamp of alders, within twenty feet of the gun, when the last shot was fired;

the enemy abandoned it, and the men took the piece before the smoke had cleared away.

On the next day, April 6th, General Lee surrendered. The excitement was intense, and the enthusiasm unbounded. Men who an hour before had been unable to stand from fatigue, capered about and cut "pigeon wings" with frantic glee. Bands played, flags waved, hats filled the air, the host of artillery and infantry joined in one grand, wild symphony of cannon and musketry that made those in the rear who had not yet heard the good news, think that the greatest battle of the war had commenced.

On the 11th of June we marched back to Burkesville Junction, and after a few weeks of rest made our way with the army to Washington. We marched through Richmond, passing Libby Prison, at that time full of Confederate soldiers; the city was also filled with paroled Confederate prisoners. We arrived about the middle of May at our last camp, at Bailey's Cross Roads, near Washington. We then took part in the greatest military pageant that this continent has yet seen, the Grand Review at Washington. On the 27th of June, 1865, the Eighty-sixth New York Regiment was duly mustered out of the service of the United States, after three years and eight months of active duty with the Army of the Potomac.

The total number of men who had been enrolled in the regiment was 1,318. The losses in battle were: killed, 13 officers and 159 men; total, 172. Number wounded, 641. On the 29th of June we broke camp, marched through the city of Washington, and boarded trains bound for our Northern homes.

At Clinton, July 2, 1865, we turned over our arms and accoutrements to Fort Sam at Barracks No. 1; received our last pay as soldiers, and were finally mustered out. We bade adieu to the stirring life of camp and field to return once more to the peaceful monotony of rural life.

We bade farewell to comrades as brave as any that wore the blue, and as old, strong as any knight that ever wore plate of Milan steel.

The following is a list of the battles in which the Eighty-sixth Regiment had part:

Second Bull Run, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Beverly Ford, Gettysburg, Wapping Heights, Auburn, Kelly's Ford, Locust Grove, Mine Run, Antietam, The River, Spotsylvania, Anderson's Farm, North Anna, Totopotomoy, Cold Harbor, Siege of Petersburg, Jones's House, Deep Bottom, First Hatcher's Run, Second Hatcher's Run, Five Forks, Amelia Springs, Farmville, surrender of Lee's Army, and many skirmishes not included.

[REDACTED]



J. B. LYON PRINT.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

93D NEW YORK INFANTRY.

On the Taneytown Road, near General Meade's headquarters.

(INSCRIPTIONS.)

(Front.)

93D

NEW YORK
INFANTRY,
HEAD-QUARTER GUARD,
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
JULY 2D AND 3D, 1863.

(Reverse.)

MUSTERED IN NOV. 7, 1861
MUSTERED OUT JUNE 29, 1865

BATTLES

WHILE IN 2D BRIG. 3D DIV. 2D CORPS.

WILDERNESS

PETERSBURG

SPOTSYLVANIA

DEEP BOTTOM

PO RIVER

POPLAR SPRING CHURCH

NORTH ANNA

BOYDTON ROAD

COLD HARBOR

SAILOR'S CREEK

APPOMATTOX.

DEDICATION OF MONUMENT.

89th REGIMENT INFANTRY,

JULY 3, 1894.

ADDRESS BY COL. JOHN S. GROCELL.

YE COMRADES AND VETERANS OF THE FIFTY-THIRD NEW YORK STATE
VOL. INFANTRY.

We have come to these historic grounds which are hallowed by the blood of thousands of martyred heroes, stood here that their country might be preserved in all the purity of its free institutions; to unveil and exhibit to the world a monument erected by the great State of New York to commemorate and perpetuate the remembrance of the gallant and heroic deeds of that grand old veteran regiment, the Fifty-third New York Volunteers.

From the earliest period of history man, to the present time, various methods have been devised by empires, kingdoms and dynasties to transmit to their posterity the memory of their great achievements and deeds accomplished by the distinguished characters whose wisdom in the affairs of State or whose valor in war has won the commendation and applause of their contemporaries. Among the many devices used for such purposes, the erection of pillars, columns and monuments, with various devices engraved thereon, have been generally preferred, and extend from age to age, and are more permanently and more effectively for such purposes by States and Nations of modern times. It is well, therefore, to be altogether appropriate for the Empire State of New York as well as her sister States that were loyal in the Union to erect here on this battlefield, where the Rebellion met its direst crushing repulse, to its gallant sons who here struggled and fought with valor and sacrifice to save the Union of States, and perpetuate to unborn millions the free institutions and the honor, glory and power of this great Republic.

Our government of ours was established by our revolutionary fathers and sustained by their blood. They based it upon the will of the people, and adopted a constitution designed to protect alike the interests of all classes of citizens. The whole structure was ratified by each of the states, and thus a union of states was formed by voluntary accord, which cemented them together inseparably and combined them into one Nation. The benign influence of the Nation thus brought into existence was of the most salutary character, and its blessings, like the bright rays of the sun, were equally diffused. Its citizens were quickened into great activity, and entered upon a career unparalleled in brilliancy and success. As they breathed the air of Freedom, they advanced in the state of being, and worshipped the living God in their new homes according to the dictates of their own consciences. Agriculture flourished, literature, the arts and sciences were carefully nurtured; commerce was kindly fostered, and its ships visited every sea, and were waited upon by breezes of every clime. Stretching away to the lakes of the North, the Gulf, and the Rio Grande of the South, and kissed by the waves of the

Atlantic and Pacific, our domain embraced the fairest portion of the continent and became an asylum for the oppressed of all lands. Boundless prosperity and untold wealth displayed their golden rays on every hand, and other nations admired as they gazed on this, the most prosperous people, with the most liberal government in the world. The gods seemed to smile upon all industries and enterprises within our borders.

But beneath the surface of all this existed the hideous form of slavery, which from small beginnings had insidiously grown and expanded until its baneful presence became a disturbing element among the people and in the councils of the Nation. In fifteen of the Southern States slavery was protected and encouraged by their laws. It had grown with their growth and strengthened with their strength, and was so universally diffused among the people of those States, and they had relied upon slave labor so long, that they had come to believe that it was necessary for their prosperity. As a matter of fact they depended upon it to produce their crops, and to perform the greatest bulk of manual labor required among them. They defended the institution strenuously and with great vehemence, and prepared to resist every seeming encroachment upon it by all the forces at their command.

On the other hand, the States of the great and free North had confined themselves to the employment of free labor, and had molded their laws and institutions by the standard of freedom to all classes of citizens. A sentiment in opposition to slavery had been inculcated, and a feeling that it should not be extended became paramount throughout the North. Therefore, they devised methods whereby under the constitution the extension of slavery could be prevented, and no more slave states created out of the remaining territories. In the meantime the slave states opposed all these methods.

They had fostered the doctrine of State rights, and claimed the right to carry slavery into the free territories, and bring them into the Union as additional slave states when such territories should have a sufficient population for that purpose. They also claimed as an inherent right the privilege to secede from the Union whenever, in their judgment, circumstances should render it advisable for them to do so. They found an excuse in the election of Abraham Lincoln to the Presidency in 1860.

During the canvass preceding the election, questions concerning slavery were largely discussed, and great excitement prevailed throughout the country. The election was free and fair; it was a fair and honest expression of the majority of the people, and was conducted as provided by the constitution. The people of the South chose to regard the result of the election as a menace to their peculiar institution. Many of their leaders were bold, desperate characters, who combined together to form the greatest conspiracy of modern times, to destroy the government and overthrow the Republic.

Led on by these men, thirteen of the slave-holding States resolved upon, and passed, ordinances of secession, and formed a government called a Confederacy, which was devoted to the protection and extension of slavery. They plundered the government treasuries, arsenals and shipyards; seized ships, forts, and other public property within their reach; raised large armies, fired upon the flag of the Union, threatened the capital of the country, and pro-

But you were equal to the task, and quickly went forth to fill the ranks of the regiment, so that its maximum number was reached before the end of December, 1861. Then came the guard duty at the barracks in Albany; the drills and active preparations for actual war, followed by the movement to New York, and a few days later to Riker's Island, where we arrived in the darkness of night in the midst of a blinding snow-storm, to be greeted by the cold blasts of winter and piles of snow, where no preparations had been made for our comfort. Three weeks' possession of the island, where our time was occupied with busy preparations, and we bid it adieu, and proceeded to Washington, reported the regiment to "Little Mac" for duty, and joined the Army of the Potomac.

With this grand army of heroic deeds it was our fortune to remain during the war. You will not forget the encampment on Meridian Hill and Kalorama Heights, and the warlike preparations that surrounded us amidst the picturesque environs of Washington; nor the joining of Casey's Division, followed by the midnight march across the Potomac to the sacred soil of Old Virginia, and the bivouac in an open field near Alexandria, Va., in a heavy snow-storm, where we lay on the ground without tents or other suitable protection. Then followed the boarding of steamers to be transported to Fortress Monroe, where we arrived the last of March, 1862.

The next day, pursuant to orders from division headquarters, the regiment commenced the line of march up the Peninsula, although it had not been furnished with means for transporting its provisions, tents, or other stores, and arrived during the darkness of night among the charred ruins of Hampton, where it bivouacked in an open space which, when daylight appeared, was found to be a graveyard. It continued its march up the Peninsula, and met its baptism of blood at the Siege of Yorktown, and battle of Williamsburg. Then it became detached from the brigade and division, and entered upon special duty at the general headquarters of the Army of the Potomac, a portion of the regiment, for the time being, serving under the direction of the provost marshal general, and the remainder under the orders of the quartermaster general.

These duties were of an arduous character, and very trying to the endurance of the entire command. You will never forget the White House Landing, Pamunkey, Chickahominy Swamp, nor the marchings, counter-marchings, and meanderings in front of Richmond, where you witnessed the battles of Fair Oaks, Seven Pines, and Malvern Hill, and shared in the sufferings, disease, and pestilence that devastated the army and wasted its strength by night and at noon-day; nor will you forget the masterly retreat to Harrison's Landing on the banks of the James, which, under the circumstances, was one of the marvelous achievements of the war.

A few weeks later you marched back down the Peninsula to Fortress Monroe, and took transports to Washington, where you arrived about the last of August, with ranks depleted by the loss of 300 men, which the regiment had suffered during the ill-fated Peninsula campaign. At Washington, again you camped on Meridian Hill for a few days' rest and recuperation. While here, the entire regiment was, by general orders, assigned to the headquarters of the Army

of the Potomac, a just and appropriate compliment and well-merited reward for its bravery, powers of endurance, fine discipline, and the intelligence and genteel bearing of its men.

In the capacity of headquarters guard you entered upon the Maryland campaign with "Little Mac," and you were with him at the battle of Antietam, where you had the satisfaction of mingling in the shouts of victory to our arms, and of seeing the Rebel flags trailing in the dust, and the Rebel hordes of "graybacks" fleeing in great confusion across the Potomac in full retreat. After this battle we rested with the army a few weeks for renewed preparations, and then again took the offensive; marched down the river to Berlin, then across the Potomac on pontoons into Virginia in victorious pursuit of Lee and his army. Then came the halt at Warrenton, where, with many regrets and great disappointment, we witnessed the last review made by our beloved General McClellan, and saw him when he bade his last farewell to the splendid army he had organized, disciplined and ably commanded through good and through evil report, amidst the frowns of defeat, as well as when gladdened by the shouts of victorious battle. He had been the star of hope and confidence of the army on many a sanguinary field, and we will cherish his memory with the warmest solicitude.

On the departure of General McClellan, we hailed with enthusiasm the appearance of his successor, the gallant and brave General Burnside, who had already become distinguished by meritorious service, and whose assignment to the command of the Army of the Potomac inspired the country with renewed hope and confidence. With him at the head of the army we marched to the banks of the Rappahannock, and then followed the desperate struggle of the battle of Fredericksburg. The army moved into this battle with high hopes, and displayed a degree of bravery and courage worthy of the best of soldiers. They moved undaunted into the fiery furnace of this bloody strife, and vainly strove to force the enemy from behind the strongholds of his ramparts, forts and breastworks, and, finally failing to accomplish an impossibility, and after severe losses which attested the desperate character of the fight, they retired in good order and with honor undimmed to the north bank of the river and again occupied their old quarters.

Next came the movement of the army up the Rappahannock, seeking an opportunity to meet and fight the Rebels in an open field and on equal grounds. The movements of the enemy were such as not to afford such an opportunity, and an ill-timed storm of great severity and long duration appeared and rendered the roads impassable, and the army became literally stuck in the mud, rendering any further movement impossible. Thus the object sought to be accomplished was abandoned, and the army, with crushed hopes, returned to its former position. This disappointment was followed, after a few weeks, by the leave-taking of the good and brave Burnside, who left this theatre of his disasters to win wreaths of fame on other fields.

Then came as our commander the gallant and serene General Hooker. On the appearance of this genial character, with noble military bearing and renown, our hopes revived and we became exalted with the idea that the days of disappointment had passed, and that brighter prospects awaited us. Then came

the terrific crash of arms at the battle of Chancellorsville, the results of which were so unsatisfactory, and the future prospects so uncertain that brave men began to despond. But, a few weeks later, with renewed confidence, we followed the gallant Hooker in pursuit of the Rebels among the valleys and mountains of Virginia, while they made their way across the upper Potomac into the great and free State of Pennsylvania. Here, much to our regret, and at a time when our prospects were most promising, the brave and princely Hooker turned over the chief command of the army to the already distinguished General Meade, who pressed the Rebel lines with such skill and tenacity that Lee was forced to come to battle in the open field of Gettysburg.

Then came the tug of war on the free soil of the North. Here the North and South met in battle array, and each with a determined will. So fearful was the strife that it seemed as though all the furies had combined to participate in the fearful carnage. There were no fortifications or breastworks to protect the lines of either army, and both met face to face in battle array, each to try its lead and steel against its adversary. The advantage of position was more evenly balanced than on other battlefields when the work of carnage commenced. Batteries bowled forth their shot and shell with fearful rapidity, cavalry was pitted against cavalry, while whole lines of infantry were hurled upon each other amid the myriads of missiles of death that filled the air. It was, indeed, a fight for the mastery, and one that was destined to be the turning point in the great Rebellion. For when the smoke of battle cleared away there were heard the shouts of victory from the loyal ranks, and the Star Spangled Banner in triumph did wave over the land of the free and the homes of the brave; and another wreath of fame, in which we shared, was contributed to the Army of the Potomac. The Rebels hastened back to Virginia, their flags drooping and their spirits sadly crushed, while we followed in quick pursuit. Arriving at Warrenton, Va., we rested several weeks to recuperate and replenish the army.

This was followed in the fall by a movement against the enemy's position at Mine Run, which miscarried, and like the King of Spain, the army having marched up the hill, marched down again. The Rebels then moved back across the Rapidan and intrenched their position. We advanced to Culpeper, and the campaign of 1863 was closed.

At Culpeper, Va., in December, 1863, the grand old Ninety-third re-enlisted as veterans, and had the distinguished honor of being the first regiment in the Army of the Potomac to complete its organization. This was followed by a veteran furlough, which permitted the officers and men of the regiment to visit their homes for a season of thirty-five days. During that time the regiment was filled up by new recruits, and with veterans who had served two years in other regiments. On the expiration of the leave, it returned with augmented ranks to the Army of the Potomac.

From the time the regiment was constituted the headquarters guard of the Army of the Potomac to the time of its return from veteran furlough, you filled the position with distinguished ability, and in a manner that reflected great credit upon yourselves, and won the expressed confidence and approval of each of the commanders of the Army of the Potomac under whom you had

served. But now you desired to enter upon new fields and share the perils of warfare in another branch of the service. To that end you applied to be relieved from further duty as headquarters guard, and to become attached to a brigade. Your request was granted, and in March, 1864, you were joined to the Second Brigade, Third Division, Second Corps, to serve with Birney and Hancock. The army was busy with preparations to enter upon the great campaign of the war, which was to be conducted under the personal direction of the most distinguished and successful military commander of the age, the illustrious Gen. Ulysses S. Grant. You were all eager for the fray, and followed Grant and Hancock into the Wilderness and to Spotsylvania, where the Ninety-third accomplished a herculean work, and won laurels and wreaths of fame which will not be dimmed by the march of time, and the remembrance of which will grow brighter and brighter as time wears away.

The battle of the Wilderness, in many respects, was the most remarkable of any that was fought during the war. The battle ground was a dense forest, containing an undergrowth of wild shrubbery, briars, vines and brambles, so densely interwoven as to offer a barrier to the regular movements of large bodies of troops, and at the same time prevented a view of the opposing forces. Hence each brigade or regiment, as the case might be, when once engaged in the Wilderness, became so secluded as to be obliged to conduct its manoeuvres independently, and frequently without special directions from the division or corps commanders. Such was our condition the day the battle commenced.

The Ninety-third was on the extreme right of the Second Corps as we moved along the old Brock Road towards the battlefield, to the sound of signal guns. Ours was the leading regiment, and the first to arrive at the critical point where the Brock Road crossed the Fredericksburg Plank Road, a point which Lee was closely pressing. Here, by the direct command of the immortal Hancock, the regiment formed line of battle and plunged into the wilderness, with its left on the plank road, and clambering through the underbrush and brambles it reached the spot designated by Hancock, being the first of that distinguished command to engage the enemy. You had been told to hold that position at all hazards, and that reinforcements would be sent in twenty minutes. You held the position without reinforcements during the day and until the sound of battle died away into the darkness of night. But, oh! with what a fearful loss of life. You met a whole brigade of Rebels who fought you in front and on your right and left flank. You never flinched, but poured among them an unceasing fire of well-aimed bullets that thinned their ranks, and finally compelled them to fall back up the hill.

At night you bivouacked on the ground where you had fought, and from that position the next morning, at early dawn, you, with the other regiments of our brigade, charged the enemy's line and drove them before you, they stoutly resisting and contesting every inch. You continued to act your part most nobly and bravely during the entire battle, and won the very highest commendations. Before the fight had fairly commenced, your brigade commander, the brave General Hays, was killed by a sharpshooter, and Colonel Crocker, of your regiment, was advanced to the command of the brigade. The day after the battle closed, your brigade was selected to make an important reconnois-

sance of the enemy's position, which required you to move over the battlefield to the opposite side, where you found the Rebels hastily strengthening their lines and preparing to act upon the defensive. After a short but sharp contest you succeeded in accomplishing the object of the reconnoissance, and received the thanks of the commander-in-chief for the brilliant manner in which the reconnoissance had been successfully accomplished.

Then commenced the flank movement which turned the enemy from his position; and our army with banners proudly floating to the breeze, but with depleted ranks, moved on to Spotsylvania. At Spotsylvania day after day you were under fire, at times hotly engaged in the fiercest strife, and on all occasions your conduct was most admirable. On the eventful day of the 12th of May, when Hancock's Corps made the most splendid and successful charge of the war, which resulted in the capture of a whole division of Rebels, twenty-four guns, and their breastworks and batteries, you were at the front, and among the first to reach the enemy's lines, enter his redoubts, rifle pits, and earthworks, and turn his guns upon him. During that splendid charge the Rebel general commanding the captured division, surrendered in person to you, and you carried your flag triumphantly farther, beyond the lines we had captured, in pursuit of his retreating battalions, than any other command.

Your brave and distinguished conduct in the battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania attracted the attention of your division and corps commanders, and won from them high testimonials, in writing, of an expression of their high appreciation of your gallant conduct and valuable services, placing you among the first of the fighting regiments of the Second Corps. You maintained your distinguished position most nobly during the next flank movement, and at the battles of the North Anna, Guiney's Station, Totopotomoy Creek, the Pamunkey, Strawberry Plains, Hanover Junction, Poplar Spring Church, Cold Harbor and Deep Bottom. At Cold Harbor especially, your courage was severely tested, as you were compelled to face an enemy who was lodged behind breastworks, where you were subject to their galling fire, without anything to shield you but the rapid discharge of your rifles at the daring foe. But here, as on former occasions, you bravely stood your ground and performed well your part in that bloody drama.

Then came the movement across the James River and the siege of Petersburg, where you lay in the trenches week after week, and participated in the movements, skirmishes and battles around that historic place. You fought at the battles of Boydton Road, the second battle of Boydton Road, and at Sailor's Creek with your accustomed zeal and bravery, and you were among the most eager in the chase and pursuit of the Rebels from Petersburg to their last ditch.

In all these battles and movements your courage and soldierly deportment continued to reflect credit upon your State and add laurels to your fame as a regiment. At the final surrender of the Rebel army at Appomattox you were there with your flags floating to the breeze, your feathers a little taller than usual, and your spirits echoing the tune of Yankee Doodle, while you witnessed the dying agony of the defunct Confederacy. You saw the Rebel battalions prostrated in their last ditch, their tattered and worn battle-flags

low in the dust, and with the cause they represented consigned to the oblivion of eternal night. There let them forever rest in that quietude which knows no resurrection. Thus I have given you a cursory review of some of the causes that led to the conflict of arms, and a hurried reference to a portion of the services rendered therein by the Ninety-third Regiment, New York Volunteers.

Comrades, it was your lot to share the fortunes of that grand old regiment. With it you many times performed with a true good will the most hazardous service; were often in the midst of the most fearful strife of battle and terrible carnage of devastating war, and yet you never flinched nor shirked a duty, nor did you, at any time during the war, exhibit your backs to the enemy. Whenever the enemy saw you, the regiment presented to him a bold front, with closed ranks, prepared for the fray. Your deeds were worthy of your country, and a credit to the great State that has erected, as a token of grateful remembrance, this fine monument of granite, and will live in the hearts of an appreciating people.

But, Oh! at what a cost of life was all this to our dear old regiment. More than 60 per cent. of our brave comrades fell in battle, fighting bravely for the just cause of their government and in defence of the honor and glory of their country. Many others died of wasting diseases contracted in the service. They have pitched their tents in that land where neither the bugle's blast, the cannon's roar, or the clarion voice of their illustrious commanders can call them into life again. They surrendered their young lives that their country might live. They entered its service at the time of its direst need, when dangers threatened and darkness and gloom overshadowed the land. They felt that to decline their services under these circumstances would have been the act of a coward's baseness. Their virtues and sacrifices will never fade from our memories, but will continue to be enshrined in our hearts as we march on to spread our tents, also, upon the eternal camping ground. They have joined the advance guard of patriots to receive the reward of the just, and recline in that beautiful encampment where angels dwell and guard with sacred care their last resting place. Theirs is a peaceful repose. No sound of battle will disturb them more, but they will rise and shine with the spirits of the just.

To you, my comrades, who survive, they have left a legacy to share in the honor of their glorious deeds and to perpetuate the memory of their virtues. You, too, have done your duty nobly, faithfully and well; you have fought bravely through many battles and carried the flag of your country amidst the fiercest strife and crash of arms, where your ears were saluted by the cannon's roar, the screeching shells, the whistling bullets, and the whirring and hissing of the missiles of death that filled the air in various forms, and yet you pushed on bravely to exultant victory. And when the sound of battle had died away from the land, and the blessings of peace, gentle peace, dawned upon the country you had helped to save, and spread her white wings over a united people, you returned to your State with your battle-worn flags floating proudly to the breeze, and were received by the plaudits of your grateful countrymen.

Well done, good and faithful comrades! May you long live in happiness and peace, to enjoy the blessings of kind and appreciative friends, and the homes and associations of the dear ones you love. And, as you are borne on down the stream of Time, you will carry with you the felicity of the assurance of having nobly performed your duty at the call of your country, whose blessings and prosperity will greet you on every hand and cheer you on as life wears away.

HISTORICAL SKETCH,

By LIEUT. DAVID H. KING.

The Ninety-third New York Volunteer Infantry was recruited and organized in the latter part of 1861, and mustered into the United States service early in 1862. The regiment was kept on duty at the barracks in Albany, N. Y., until February 14, 1862, when it was sent to Riker's Island, New York Harbor, where it was supplied with arms and camp equipage. On March 7th, it proceeded to Washington, D. C. It reported to General McClellan, and was assigned to Palmer's Brigade, Casey's Division, Fourth Corps, and became a portion of the Army of the Potomac.

On March 28th, it marched to Alexandria, Va.; 30th, embarked on steamers for Fortress Monroe, Va.; April 18th, at Lee's Mills, formed first actual line of battle; May 1st, first reconnoissance in force; May 5th, our first taste of actual war; May 19th, the regiment was detached from the brigade and sent to White House Landing for provost and guard duty, four companies with headquarters and six with General Ingalls; June 28th, White House Landing was evacuated, and at 3 p. m., a signal gun was fired upon which the torch was applied by Company B, and the great military depot, together with the White House went up in smoke; July 5th, the regiment was on duty at Harrison's Landing, Va., where we remained until August 16th, when the Landing was evacuated and we moved headquarters to Hampton, Va., where we remained until September 2d. We then embarked on steamer for Washington, D. C., and participated in the Maryland campaign.

After Antietam, besides the regular duty as headquarter guard, details were made almost daily to escort prisoners of war to the provost and to Washington. On November 19th, we arrived at Falmouth, Va., and pitched headquarter tents. After the battle of Fredericksburg, Va., December 13th, we settled down for the winter, doing routine duty until the battle of Chancellorsville. May 5, 1863, returned to camp where we remained until June 15th, when we started for Gettysburg, Pa.

During the battle of Gettysburg the regiment guarded the immense amount of property, consisting of ammunition, quartermaster and commissary supplies, besides sending details as follows: One with General Meade and staff on battlefield; one to do provost duty, picking up prisoners on the field; one guard to the medical purveyor of the army; and one at general headquarters. On July 3d, all that could be spared after reducing the guards to the minimum number were ordered to the field to take part in the battle,

but were not put into action. On July 8th, we commenced our march back to Brandy Station, Va., where we arrived on the 9th of November after a series of marches, manoeuvres, and campaigns, and went into winter quarters. Here the men re-enlisted as veterans, the Ninety-third being the first regiment in the Army of the Potomac to complete its veteran organization. January 1, 1864, the regiment arrived in Albany on return furlough, and after thirty days returned to the front recruited in health and numbers. April 20th, by order of General Meade, the regiment reported to Gen. D. B. Birney and was assigned to the Second Brigade, Third Division, Second Army Corps. The regiment had served as general headquarter guard, Army of the Potomac, for twenty-three months, faithfully performing all the duties required of it, during which time Generals McClellan, Burnside, Hooker and Meade respectively commanded the army.

On May 3d, we broke camp and marched, and at daylight halted to rest and cook coffee on the Chancellorsville battlefield. May 5th, the regiment received its baptism of blood. General Hancock personally ordered Colonel Crocker to form his regiment immediately, and move out at once as rapidly as possible until he met the enemy, engage him, and hold his position at all hazards, promising to send support at once.

In five minutes we were hotly engaged and were the first regiment belonging to the Second Corps to become engaged that day. We stubbornly held our position for about an hour during which time we lost one-half our number in killed and wounded. Brave men fell on either hand, but not a foot of ground was yielded, and not a man left the ranks except the wounded. We fought against fearful odds, anxiously waiting for the promised aid. At last we saw a line of blue advancing. They wore upon their caps the talismanic emblem of the "Red Diamond." Support had been delayed in consequence of the death of General Hays, our brigade commander, who was killed while forming the line to come to our support.

We lost in killed and wounded more than 50 per cent. of our men, and it is a wonder that the regiment was not annihilated. Night came. The remnant of the regiment was relieved and fell back to the second line, when we ate our scanty meal and then tenderly and with bleeding hearts we buried our dead comrades. We brought the wounded from the field and started thence for the rear; and then took our places in the line until morning, when we were to witness another day of carnage. Our losses during the two days were 4 commissioned officers killed and 13 wounded; 49 enlisted men killed and 196 wounded; total, 262.

May 7th, the regiment sustained a loss of 4 men killed, and 7 wounded; and from the 8th to the 10th, we lost 3 men killed and 6 wounded. May 12th, at Spotsylvania, we lost 2 commissioned officers wounded, 8 men killed, and 18 wounded. It was during this fight that an oak tree, twenty-two inches in diameter, was cut down by minie balls, and in falling it killed several members of a South Carolina regiment. May 23d, at the battle of North Anna River, our loss was 1 commissioned officer wounded; 8 enlisted killed, and 18 wounded. May 24th to June 2d, we were marching, skirmishing, or

building works, and our loss was 1 officer wounded and 4 enlisted men killed. June 3d to 9th, we were on the reserve, on picket, or building rifle pits continually. Our loss was 2 men killed and 1 wounded. The 9th of June was the thirty-sixth day of the campaign, and we were still in the woods.

June 15th, we crossed the James River, and on the 16th we took part in the assault on the works in front of Petersburg, where our loss was 7 men killed and 2 wounded. June 17th, we advanced our line with 1 man killed and 4 wounded. On the 18th, at noon, we made an assault and were repulsed. Brig. Gen. Pierce was wounded. Our loss was 1 officer wounded, 2 men killed, and 2 wounded. June 19th, at night, the regiment advanced to straighten the line, losing 2 commissioned officers wounded, 1 man killed, 4 wounded, and 12 missing. July 28th we occupied the trenches in front of the Ninth Corps, and soon after daylight on the 30th, the mine under the Rebel woods in our front was sprung. Oh! Oh! Oh! such a sight, may it never be our lot again to see.

July 31st, we returned to our old camp, where we remained, every day sending out details on picket and fatigue duty until August 13th, when we embarked for Deep Bottom and reported to the commander of the Tenth Corps. On the 15th and 16th we were engaged with the enemy, losing during the two days' skirmish and fight 19 men killed or mortally wounded, 18 wounded and sent to the hospital, and 28 captured by the enemy, many of whom died in Rebel prisons.

September 10th, we advanced our picket line, and lost 2 men killed, and 3 wounded. October 2d, made reconnoissance and lost 1 officer wounded, 1 man killed, and 6 wounded.

October 27th, we were engaged in the battle of Boydton Road, Va., and lost 18 enlisted men killed or mortally wounded, 24 wounded, and 30 missing.

This place was by many of the boys called the "Bull Pen," from the fact that we were completely surrounded. We returned to our old camp on the 31st, when quite a number were mustered out on account of expiration of term of service. December 7th to 13th, we went on the Weldon Raid, and assisted in destroying the Weldon Railroad. We returned to camp and remained there until February 5, 1865; but from that date to the surrender of Lee we did not get much rest. On April 6th, we were engaged with the enemy in a running fight and lost 1 commissioned officer killed, 5 enlisted men killed, and 12 wounded. We pressed forward, and on the 9th participated in the great joy over the surrender of Appomattox.

After a few days' rest we marched back towards Washington, and on May 23d took part in the Grand Review of the Army of the Potomac. We returned to our camp at night, and on June 29, 1865, we were mustered out of the United States service and sent to Albany for final discharge, which was given on July 14th, just three years and five months from the time the regiment left Albany for the seat of war. During its service the regiment participated in 28 battles; but I give the names of only those in which men were killed or wounded, to-wit:

Wilderness, Po River, Ny River, Spotsylvania, Fredericksburg, North Anna,

Totopotomoy, Cold Harbor, Deep Bottom (July), Siege of Petersburg, Deep Bottom (August), Boydton Road, Hatcher's Run, Sailor's Creek (Appomattox). The loss of the regiment during its term of service in the foregoing battles was as follows:

Killed in action	167
Died in Rebel prisons	18
Died of disease	115
Wounded and sent to hospital	688
Total	988

The actual strength of the regiment from muster-in to muster-out was 1,864, officers and men; but 2 officers and 85 men, only, of the original number were mustered out with the regiment at Albany, July 14, 1865. Total number mustered out was 580, including veterans and recruits.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(INSCRIPTIONS.)

(Front.)

94TH NEW YORK INF'Y
1ST BRIG 2ND DIV 1ST CORPS

JULY 1 1863

(Left Side.)

94TH N. Y. INF'Y, MUSTERED INTO SERVICE

AT SACKET HARBOR, N. Y., DEC. 9, 1861.

105TH N. Y. INF'Y, MUSTERED INTO SERVICE

AT LE ROY, N. Y., MAR. 21, 1862.

94TH AND 105TH N. Y. INF'Y. CONSOLIDATED

AS 94TH N. Y. INF'Y, AT WHITE OAK CHAPEL, VA.,

MAR. 19, 1863. RE-ENLISTED FOR THE WAR AS

94TH N. Y. VETERAN INF'Y, AT ANNAPOLIS, MD.,

JAN. 20, 1864. MUSTERED OUT OF SERVICE

AT BALL'S CROSS ROADS, VA., JULY 18, 1865.

CASUALTIES, 12 KILLED, 58 WOUNDED, AND

175 CAPTURED OR MISSING; TOTAL 245.

DULCE ET DECORUM

EST PRO PATRIA MORI

DEDICATION OF MONUMENT.

94th REGIMENT INFANTRY.

July 2, 1888.

HISTORICAL SKETCH BY ADJT. CHARLES H. SPRAGUE.*

The Ninety-fourth Regiment, New York Volunteers, was raised in Jefferson County. Company enlistments began in October, 1861, the regimental organization being completed in January, 1862.

Its rendezvous was at Sacket's Harbor, N. Y., where it was fully equipped, armed with the Enfield rifle, and mustered into the United States service for three years, with the following named field officers: Henry K. Viele, Colonel; Calvin Tuttlefield, Lieutenant Colonel; William R. Hanford, Major.

The regiment left Sacket's Harbor, March 14, 1862, with about 800 men, accompanied by its own brass band and drum corps. On the following day it suffered its first loss of life, by an accident near Tivoli, on the Hudson River Railroad, where by the breaking of a rail five cars filled with men were precipitated into the river. One car was turned over, and the entire train derailed. Four members of Company G, and one unknown recruit were instantly killed, and a large number wounded. The instruments of the band were destroyed, and most of the equipments ruined.

Much depressed by this ill fortune the regiment reached New York the next day, and at the Park Barracks was supplied with new equipments. It left on March 10th, by rail, for Washington, D. C., proceeding thence to Alexandria, Va., where it was assigned to permanent garrison duty at Fort Lytle, and Colonel Viele was appointed Military Governor of Alexandria.

On May 2d, Colonel Viele unexpectedly resigned and Lieut. Col. Adrian R. Root, of the Twenty-first Regiment New York Volunteers, serving in the Army of the Potomac, was ordered by the War Department to report at Alexandria and take command as colonel. He accepted the position on condition that the Ninety-fourth should enter active service, and was ordered to join McDowell's column at Fredericksburg, then enroute to Hanover, Va., to join McClellan's army.

On May 13th, the regiment left by steamer with 750 men, and arrived at Alexandria in a heavy rain, where Colonel Root was notified by an army officer that the Ninety-fourth would remain there to unload coal from the boats, leaving a regiment which would go to the front, written orders being received the morning. Colonel Root at once formed the regiment, and through the rain and mud, marched that night ten miles beyond Alexandria and bivouacked. May 14th, it marched to Fredericksburg, to join McDowell for duty, and was brigaded with the Twenty-first, Col. William H. Christian; Eighty-eighth Pennsylvania, Col. John A. McLean; Ninetieth Pennsylvania, Col. Peter Lyle, as the

* Adj. Gen. Secy. Ninety-fourth New York Association, Sergt. Wm. Thayer, Lieut. C. W. Sloat, and Lieut. S. C. De Marse.

Second Brigade, Second Division, McDowell's Corps, Brig. Gen. James B. Ricketts, commanding the division.

On May 25th, while awaiting marching orders for Hanover Court House — only two days' march — orders were received to make a forced march to Front Royal, in the Shenandoah Valley, to intercept General Jackson, who had defeated General Banks. This ill-timed abandonment of the march to Richmond was received with dismay. We marched to Aquia Creek, where we left 50 men in hospital, and took steamer to Alexandria and cars to Manassas. On May 27th, 28th, 29th and 30th, we marched through Thoroughfare Gap and Manassas, leaving knapsacks, blankets, etc., at Piedmont Station, and reached Front Royal at night in a hard rain-storm, only to find that General Jackson had returned to Richmond to attack McClellan's army. This foolish march caused the Ninety-fourth a loss of over 100 men, and McDowell's Corps about 4,000 men.

June 20th, Gen. Zebulon B. Tower assumed command of the First Brigade, relieving General Ricketts, who took command of the Second Division. During Pope's campaign, the Ninety-fourth took an active part, being present at the battle of Cedar Mountain, and the engagements at Rappahannock Bridge and Station, Thoroughfare Gap, and Gainesville. From August 14th to the 29th, Tower's Brigade served as the rear guard, while the Ninety-fourth was detailed as the final rear guard, much of the time deployed as skirmishers under fire, with such food as could be gleaned from corn fields, and with a constant loss of men killed, wounded, missing, or exhausted by hard service in the depressing heat of August.

In the second battle of Bull Run, August 29 and 30, 1862, the Ninety-fourth bore a conspicuous part. It entered the action with about 400 men, and lost 21 killed, 81 wounded, and 45 missing; total, 147. The regiment, with General Tower, held its position on Bald Hill after the rest of the brigade had retired. Several hand-to-hand encounters occurred. General Tower was severely wounded, Colonel Root was twice wounded, the second time in rescuing the regimental colors from a rush of the enemy, and was especially complimented for gallantry in the reports of Generals Ricketts and McDowell. Lieut. J. M. Woodward was mortally wounded.

In the official report of the Sixty-third Pennsylvania, the commandant of that regiment says: "I would here mention the names of two members of Company D, Ninety-fourth New York Volunteers, who asked permission to fight in our regiment, having become separated from their own. They attached themselves to Company B, of the Sixty-third Pennsylvania, and by their conduct showed themselves brave and good soldiers. The names of these two gallant fellows were First Sergt. Dexter C. Sears and Corp. Henry Sanders. Their conduct is certainly worthy of imitation." Sergeant Sears subsequently rose to the rank of captain and served during the remainder of the war with the Ninety-fourth New York. Lieutenant Colonel Littlefield succeeded to the command of the regiment, which was present at the battles of Chantilly, South Mountain and Antietam. Major Hanford resigned July 18, 1862, and Lieutenant Colonel Littlefield resigned November 1, 1862. They

were succeeded by Lieut. John A. Kress, U. S. A., as lieutenant colonel, and Capt. De Witt C. Tomlinson as major.

The Ninety-fourth was transferred November 15, 1862, from the Second to the First Brigade. Colonel Root was placed in command, and recommended for promotion to the rank of brigadier general. The brigade consisted of the

16th Maine,
94th New York,
104th New York,
105th New York,
107th Pennsylvania,

Lieut. Col. Charles W. Tilden.
Lieut. Col. John A. Kress,
Col. Gilbert G. Prey.
Col. John W. Shedd.
Col. Thomas F. McCoy.

At the battle of Fredericksburg, Lieut. Col. John A. Kress commanded the Ninety-fourth. On the day before the battle the regiment crossed the river and bivouacked near the Bernard Mansion. On the day of the battle, December 13, 1862, the corps moved down the river bank and went into action near Bowling Green Road. The brigade was hotly engaged, and about 2 o'clock made a determined bayonet charge on a line of breastworks at the railroad, in which affair the Ninety-fourth captured over 100 men of the Thirty-third North Carolina. In this battle the regiment lost 58, killed and wounded, while the brigade, which numbered about 1,300 men present, lost 52 killed, 369 wounded and 57 missing; total, 478.

The Fredericksburg movement and the subsequent "mud march" having ended, the latter costing as many men as a large battle, the regiment went into winter quarters at Fletcher Chapel, Va. Having become reduced in numbers it was consolidated March 17, 1863, into five companies,—A, B, C, D, and E, and the One hundred and fifth New York was transferred to it, the men thus transferred having been consolidated into five companies, which became F, G, H, I, and K of the Ninety-fourth. The field officers and some of the line officers belonging to the One hundred and fifth were mustered out upon this consolidation.

The One hundred and fifth New York was a regiment from the western part of the State—Rochester and vicinity—which had served honorably through the war up to this time. With the First Corps it had fought at Cedar Mountain, Rappahannock Station, Thoroughfare Gap, Second Bull Run, Chantilly, South Mountain, Antietam and Fredericksburg. Its colonel, Howard Carroll, was mortally wounded at Antietam, and during its short term of service in the field—from August to December, 1862,—it lost over 200 men, in killed and wounded. At the time of the consolidation it was commanded by Col. John W. Shedd.

Maj. De Witt C. Tomlinson resigned, April 13, 1863, and was succeeded by Capt. Samuel A. Moffett. Under his command the Ninety-fourth participated in the Chancellorsville campaign, moving from camp April 28th, and taking part in the engagement of the First Corps at Pollock's Mill, below Fredericksburg, April 30th. On May 2d, it marched ten miles up the Rappahannock River to United States Ford, and crossed. Colonel Root's brigade deployed and pushing back to the front several thousand fugitives, took position on the right, on the Ely's Ford Road. The First Corps recrossed the

Rappahannock without loss, May 6th, the First Brigade remaining at the front, covering the withdrawal as rear guard. On May 7th, the regiment marched to White Oak Chapel, Va., and encamped there. The three brigades of the Second Division were consolidated May 20, 1863, into two brigades. The Thirteenth Massachusetts, Col. Samuel H. Leonard, joined the First Brigade, the command of which was given to Gen. Gabriel R. Paul. Col. Adrian R. Root was assigned to the command of a provisional brigade consisting of the Ninety-fourth New York, Fifteenth New York (Engineers), and Twentieth New York Militia (Eightieth N. Y. Vols.), and stationed near Belle Plain, Va., in charge of the landings at that place and Aquia Creek, and for general provost guard under the direction of army headquarters.

General Lee's northern movement having begun in June, Colonel Root received orders to send all the sick and wounded from the field hospitals, and to ship all supplies of food and forage from depots to Washington, D. C., which was promptly done. The Fifteenth New York Engineers left for home June 17th, its term of service having expired.

On June 17th, we received orders from General Hooker to evacuate Belle Plain and Aquia Creek, take shipping to Washington, and march to the mouth of the Monocacy and drive away guerillas. We arrived at Washington at 5 p. m., when an interesting incident occurred at headquarters, where Colonel Root reported in order to ascertain the shortest road. President Abraham Lincoln was present and took much interest in the movement, assisted in searching the map, and received a marching salute accompanied with hearty cheers, as he stood on the sidewalk to see the brigade pass. Reached the Monocacy, June 20th, and picketed the river and roads. On June 22d, by telegraphic order from General Hooker, we moved down the river eleven miles to Edwards Ferry. On the 25th, the Eleventh Corps crossed the Potomac into Maryland, and on the 26th, the First Corps, under Gen. John F. Reynolds, crossed.

Colonel Root received orders to close up his duties at Edwards Ferry and follow the corps with the Ninety-fourth New York. We overtook the corps on the evening of the 28th, and were assigned to the First Brigade (General Paul), Second Division (Gen. John C. Robinson).

On the morning of July 1, 1863, the Ninety-fourth New York, numbering 30 officers and 415 men present for duty, was resting near Emmitsburg, Md., at a point about eight miles from Gettysburg, Robinson's Division having bivouacked there. The two other divisions of Reynolds' (First) Corps were resting at Marsh Creek, about four miles from Gettysburg. Robinson's Division started on its march for Gettysburg at 7 a. m., and when within four miles of the town heard the cannonading which announced that the enemy had been found and encountered. Arriving on the field General Robinson halted his troops at the Lutheran Seminary, where they were engaged in throwing up breastworks when they were ordered into action on the right of the First Corps. The position occupied by Paul's Brigade was on Seminary Ridge, near the Mummasburg Road. The Ninety-fourth assisted here in repelling several strong attacks, during which a large number of Confederate prisoners were captured and several battle flags taken. Eighty-one dead Confederates were counted the following day, lying in front of the Ninety-fourth's position.

temporarily, and where it remained on duty at Camp Parole until May 26, 1864, when it rejoined the army at the front. In the meantime most of the regiment re-enlisted for the war and went home on furlough, and the Ninety-fourth became the Ninety-fourth Veterans. Major Moffett was promoted lieutenant colonel, December 16, 1863, to fill the vacancy caused by the resignation of Lieutenant Colonel Kress, and was succeeded as major by Capt. John McMahon.

On rejoining the Army of the Potomac the regiment was assigned to its old brigade, which was now in the Second Division of the Fifth Corps, the old First Corps having been merged in the Fifth just before the opening of the spring campaign. On June 6, 1864, the brigade became the First Brigade of Crawford's (Third) Division, Fifth Corps. It was commanded by Colonel Peter Lyle, of the Ninetieth Pennsylvania.

The Ninety-fourth New York with Lieutenant Colonel Moffett at its head was ordered into action immediately on its arrival at the front, and was engaged May 26th at the battle of the North Anna, and a few days later, at Bethesda Church. Colonel Root at this time had been promoted to the command of the District of Annapolis, Md., with rank of brigadier general by brevet, and subsequently major general by brevet.

Leaving Cold Harbor the Ninety-fourth, now in Baxter's Second Brigade, of Crawford's Division, marched to Petersburg, where it took part in the assault on the enemy's works, and was subsequently present at the mine explosion. At the battle of the Weldon Railroad, August 19, 1864, the regiment was cut off, and lost 6 officers and 164 men, mostly captured by the enemy. October 21, 1864, Maj. John McMahon was promoted to the colonelcy of the One hundred and eighty-eighth New York, and was succeeded by Capt. Henry H. Fish. The Ninety-fourth was engaged in the movement made on the Weldon Railroad, December 7-12, 1864, known as the Hicksford Raid, during which the men suffered severely from cold and exposure.

At the battle of Hatcher's Run the regiment, led by Capt. George French, suffered a loss of 40 in killed and wounded out of 221 present on the field. It was in action again at Gravelly Run, on March 31st; and at Five Forks, April 1st, sustaining a loss of 12 killed, 49 wounded, and 24 missing or captured; total, 85. It only numbered 9 officers and 214 men present for duty on March 31st. Maj. Henry H. Fish, who was in command of the Ninety-fourth in this battle, was struck on March 31st, receiving a severe scalp wound, which would have justified him in leaving the field; but he remained with the regiment and fell, while gallantly leading it in action on April 1st. Capt. George French was killed in the same battle, and among others the stalwart color bearer, Porter Crawford.

Major Fish was succeeded by Capt. Byron Parsons, April 13, 1865. The Ninety-fourth was present at Lee's surrender at Appomattox, after which it marched to Washington, D. C., under the command of its old colonel, Gen. Adrian R. Root, who had been assigned to the command of the Third Brigade, Third Division, Fifth Corps. After the Grand Review at Washington, May 23, 1865, the Ninety-fourth remained in camp, while the Army of the Potomac was being mustered out of service.

During its service the regiment lost 116 killed and mortally wounded, 352 wounded, 103 who died of disease or from exposure, and 449 missing or captured; total, 1,020. Its last act was to contribute a liberal sum of money towards the erection of a monument to the memory of the late commander of the First Corps, Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds. At the close there were present 336 officers and men.

It was mustered out of service at Ball's Cross Roads, Va., July 18, 1865, and was the last volunteer regiment in the Army of the Potomac to be mustered out. Capt. Walter T. Chester, of the Ninety-fourth, who served on the division staff, during the latter part of the war, states:

"This is the reason why the Ninety-fourth New York was the last regiment in the Army of the Potomac. When the army was whittled down to a provisional division, the Ninety-fourth was in that division, and the order that constituted it, with General Ayres in command, assigned me to duty as mustering officer, and also directed me to muster it out. This I did, reserving the Ninety-fourth to the last, in order to remain in service myself, and even mustering out General Ayres and the volunteer officers of his staff before I did you, and then Captain Pond, of the regular army, mustered me out."

It is not too much to claim that the Ninety-fourth won a record for discipline, devotion to duty, and bravery in battle, unsurpassed by that of any other regiment.

Having been mustered out of service the regiment proceeded to Albany, N. Y., where it was paid off and disbanded July 31, 1865. The last of the rear guard!

SOME NOTES ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE NINETY-FOURTH NEW YORK INFANTRY.

BY COL. WALTER B. CAMP.

The Ninety-fourth Regiment Volunteer Infantry was organized in the fall and winter of 1861-1862. Madison Barracks, Sacket's Harbor, N. Y., was secured by Governor Morgan from the Secretary of War as quarters for a regiment of volunteers to be raised in Jefferson County, to be in command of W. B. Camp as colonel and commandant of the depot for organization.

Governor Morgan was opposed to opening any more depots in the State, at that time. Those already established in the cities were giving the State department a great deal of trouble, while the matter of finances, also, had become a question for serious consideration. Emphatic refusal to parties seeking to open Madison Barracks for a depot had been made, which fact being known the Governor was interviewed by Senator Bell, Judge Wright and W. B. Camp to place before him the propriety of reconsidering his refusal.

The latter gentleman made him acquainted with the patriotic sentiment in that locality, recalling to the Governor's attention the fact that Sacket's Harbor was the seat of war during the contest of 1812; that Madison Barracks was a place with military prestige; that in the navy yard the great ship *New Orleans* was preserved as a memento of the heroic deeds of the fathers; and

that upon our holidays thousands of their descendants visited this inspiring locality. Could Madison Barracks be secured, a regiment of splendid material would come forward, at once, to enlist for the war.

Upon the assurance of the Senator and Judge of the accuracy of these statements, the Governor was inclined to listen to the proposition. After a private interview with these two gentlemen he announced that "the only ground on which he would consent to opening the depot, as a finality, was that Mr. Camp should be charged with the command and its responsibilities." Mr. Camp had entertained no thought of occupying this position, and only consented on the earnest solicitation of his friends, although feeling complimented by the estimate of the Governor.

On the following day, October 18th, on his return to Sacket's Harbor, Mr. Camp was greatly surprised to find that one company, from Rodman, had already arrived to head the new regiment as Company A. On the 20th, the Governor transmitted to Mr. Camp the following permission received from the War Department:

Quartermaster General's Office,
Washington City, October 19, 1861.

SIR.—I have the honor to inform you that your telegram of the 18th instant to the Secretary of War,—requesting the use of the Madison Barracks for quartering a volunteer regiment, now being raised in that neighborhood under your authority,—having been referred to this office, I have this day directed Sergeant Gaines, in charge of the barracks and grounds, to grant their use, as requested by your Excellency, to Colonel Camp.

I fear that the barracks, owing to their dilapidated condition, will be of little service to the troops.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. SIBLEY,
Bvt. Col. U. S. A., Depy. Q. M. G.

To his Excellency,

E. D. MORGAN,
Gov. of New York.

Instructions had been handed Colonel Camp before leaving Albany, from Gen. John F. Rathbone's office, covering specific details for the management of his command.

The flattering statement made to the Governor, at the interview in Albany October 17th, was verified. In nineteen days a complete organization of the regiment was accomplished. The subsistence department adequately met all requirements, as did the hospital and quartermaster's. Discipline and drill were quite effectively put in execution, and out of twenty incipient companies that were offered, ten were organized for permanent existence in this short time.

During this month (November) a company of United States paroled troops, from Twiggs's command in Texas, were sent to Madison Barracks, and were directed to specially prepared quarters to which they were assigned on their arrival, an arrangement which was perfectly satisfactory and agreeable to the

officer in command of the company, as well as the commandant of the post. This harmonious condition continued until after the holidays, when the Copperhead element and its sympathizers poisoned the mind of the lieutenant in command of these paroled troops, and induced him to assume that he, being a United States army officer, consequently outranked all State commands; and that he should demand of Colonel Camp, commandant of the post (although being in possession by authority vested in him by Governor Morgan and the United States Secretary of War), such recognition.

Such a demand was made, and indignantly rejected; but under the poisonous influence of his pretended friends he took action by force of arms, and his paroled troops, at early daybreak, charged upon the guardhouse, dispossessed the guard and arrested the officer of the day. To punish this deluded aspirant, the maintenance of the post guard, and the officer of the day, and the guard captured by him in this memorable charge, were left on his hands awaiting future events.

The regiment at this time had reached its full strength and was awaiting orders for a movement to the front. Colonel Camp personally reported this insult to Governor Morgan, his commander-in-chief, at the same time advising the appointing of the future colonel, who would take command of the regiment for the field.

The Governor said that "Bull Run had taught us a sad lesson," and that none but the most experienced and capable officers should be in command of regiments in the future. He named three, either one of whom would meet these requirements, and placed upon Colonel Camp the honor and responsibility of making the choice. In consultation with General Patrick and mutual friends, Henry K. Viele, of Buffalo, was named, and vouched for as a man of marked ability, of splendid address and accomplishments. As a military leader he had won distinction in putting down the noted riots along the Erie Canal.

Colonel Viele arrived in camp January 14th, with orders to assist the commanding officers until the regiment moved from the barracks. The Ninety-fourth was complimented with a complete equipment of Enfield rifles, clothing and equipage, favors that had not been shown at that time to troops at other depots.

Our misguided lieutenant retired to his quarters, with orders from Washington to remain there until the Ninety-fourth should break camp. Subsequently he expressed regret for his hasty action. Not long after he was placed in command of a regiment of volunteers, and bravely met death in the first engagement upon the battlefield.

In splendid form the Ninety-fourth marched out of Madison Barracks, March 14, 1862, for Watertown, where transportation over the Rome, Watertown and Ogdensburg Railroad awaited their arrival. The next morning the regiment marched across the Hudson River at Albany, which was still frozen, to meet the sad accident which occurred soon after, at Tivoli, where four cars left a bridge, and were wholly or partly submerged in the stream below. Three soldiers were drowned, a father and son from Loraine, and an Englishman, John Sherman; also a lad not connected with the regiment.

Governor Morgan called upon Colonel Camp, who accompanied the regiment to Albany, to acquaint him with the accident, and remarked: "If it will be of consolation to you, I can say that the Sacket's Harbor Depot has given us little or no annoyance. The regiment is composed of men of high grade; instead of losing from twenty to thirty on departure, as is usual, it has gained three recruits, and the expenses of organization have been many thousands of dollars less."

On arriving at Washington Colonel Viele was put in command of the District of Alexandria as military governor, a compliment to his known ability and the standing of his regiment.

Here they were visited by Colonel Camp, who brought a full stand of colors, which he presented to the regiment on the 23d of April, 1862, from the ladies of Jefferson County. The ceremony took place under the venerable walls of the old church where General Washington once worshipped and reverently paid homage to his Maker.

The regiment was on provost duty in the City of Alexandria, Va., for about one month. On May 26, 1862, Colonel Viele having resigned, Adrian R. Root, of Buffalo, was made colonel of the regiment.

HISTORICAL NOTES.

THE 105TH NEW YORK VOLUNTEERS.

BY GEN. ADRIAN R. ROOT.

The One hundred and fifth Regiment of New York Volunteers was raised during the winter of 1861 and 1862, in the Counties of Cattaraugus, Genesee, Monroe and Niagara.

Companies A, B, C, D, E, F, and K, were organized and mustered into the United States service at Le Roy, N. Y. Companies G, H, and I, were organized and mustered into service at Rochester, N. Y. The regiment was concentrated and the officers commissioned in March, 1862. The field officers were:

James M. Fuller,	Colonel.
Henry L. Achilles,	Lieutenant Colonel.
John W. Shedd,	Major.

The regiment arrived in New York City, April 1, 1862, and was stationed at the Park Barracks, where it was armed with Austrian rifles.

It left New York April 5, 1862, via steamer to Elizabethport, N. J., and thence by rail to Washington, D. C., where it was quartered in the Seventh Street Barracks. April 10th the regiment crossed the Potomac River into Virginia, via the Long Bridge, and marched to Cloud's Mills, Fairfax County, where it was brigaded with the Ninety-seventh New York, Col. John Wheelock; the One hundred and fourth New York, Col. John Rohrbach, and the One hundred and seventh Pennsylvania, Col. Thomas F. McCoy, under the command of Brig. Gen. Abram Duryea. The command was known as the First Brigade, Second Division, McDowell's Corps.

The regiment participated in the various movements of McDowell's Corps during the campaign of the Army of the Potomac in 1862, being present at the battles of Cedar Mountain, Rappahannock Station, Thoroughfare Gap, Gainesville, Second Bull Run, Chantilly, South Mountain, Antietam and Fredericksburg.

Col. James M. Fuller resigned August 2, 1862, and was succeeded by Lieut. Col. Howard Carroll, who died September 29, 1862, of wounds received at the battle of Antietam. He was succeeded by Lieut. Col. John W. Shedd.

On November 15, 1862, the Ninety-fourth New York Volunteers was transferred from the Second to the First Brigade, and its colonel, Adrian R. Root, assumed command of the brigade.

In March, 1863, the Ninety-fourth and One hundred and fifth New York were each ordered reduced to five companies, the Ninety-fourth lettered from A to E, and the One hundred and fifth from F to K, and were then consolidated into one regiment, known as the Ninety-fourth New York. The field and staff of the One hundred and fifth New York, with the exception of Surg. David C. Chamberlain and Asst. Surg. John T. Brown, were honorably mustered out of service, as were also all supernumerary officers. The field and staff of the Ninety-fourth New York remained in service.

The five companies of the One hundred and fifth New York served with the Ninety-fourth in the campaign of 1863, being present at the battles of Chancellorsville, Gettysburg and Mine Run.

At the expiration of their term of service in January, 1864, the five companies re-enlisted for the war, and when the First Corps was consolidated with the Fifth Corps, were assigned with the Ninety-fourth to the Third Brigade, Third Division, in May, 1864. They took part in the remaining campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, and were present at the following battles:

Totopotomoy,
Bethesda Church,
Spotsylvania,
Deep Bottom,

Cold Harbor,
Siege of Petersburg,
Weldon Railroad,
Five Forks.

Lee's Surrender,

They were mustered out of service July 18, 1865, together with the Ninety-fourth New York Veteran Infantry.

The One hundred and fifth regiment was composed of a superior class of men, and their intelligence and patriotism enabled them to develop readily into efficient and reliable soldiers. Their bravery in battle, prompt obedience to orders, and fortitude and patient endurance under the hardships of active service, which included the entire term of their enlistment, could not be surpassed, while their discipline was so good that, as their brigade commander, I never found it necessary to bring one of their number before a general court-martial.

The survivors, together with those of the Ninety-fourth New York, were finally disbanded at the City of Albany, N. Y., July 31, 1865, when, having seen their efforts to sustain our Government crowned with success and victory,

they relinquished their arms, and with a farewell grasp of the hand separated to resume the avocations of peace.

Some have since attained prominence in public life, while all, as far as I know, have been good citizens and useful members of the community. Scattered as they now are, far and wide over this great country, it is occasionally my privilege to meet and greet them as comrades, and it is a source of pride and satisfaction to me, now that their number is rapidly lessening and old age is creeping upon us all, that some of the best and truest and most valued friendships of my life have been formed among the gallant men who composed the One hundred and fifth and Ninety-fourth New York Veteran Infantry.

(INSCRIPTIONS.)

(Front.)

84TH

NEW YORK

INFANTRY.

2ND BRIGADE

1ST DIVISION

1ST CORPS.

(Right Side.)

JULY 1, 1863.

THIS REGIMENT WAS FORMED
SOUTH OF THE MCPHERSON HOUSE
AND ENGAGED THE ENEMY AT 10 A. M.
AT 10:30 A. M. CHANGED FRONT,
ADVANCED TO THIS POSITION
WITH THE 84TH NEW YORK
AND 6TH WISCONSIN,
REPULSED AND CAPTURED
A LARGE PART OF
DAVIS' MISSISSIPPI BRIGADE
IN THE RAILROAD CUT.

(Left Side.)

AT NOON, JULY 1,
HELD POSITION ON OAK HILL
INDICATED BY MARKER;
BEING OUTFLANKED MOVED TO
THE RIGHT OF THE SEMINARY,
SUPPORTING BATTERY B, 4TH U. S.
RETIRED FROM THAT POSITION
TO CULP'S HILL WHERE IT REMAINED
DURING JULY 2 AND 3.

CASUALTIES.

KILLED 7 WOUNDED 62 MISSING 46
MUSTERED IN OCT. 15, 1861.
PARTICIPATED IN EIGHTEEN ENGAGEMENTS
MUSTERED OUT JULY 16, 1865



I. B. LYON PRINT.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

95TH NEW YORK INFANTRY.

On avenue north of Chambersburg Pike and near the railroad cut.

DEDICATION OF MONUMENT.

95TH REGIMENT INFANTRY,

July 1, 1893.

ADDRESS BY HON. IRA M. HEDGES.

COMRADES AND VETERANS OF THE NINETY-FIFTH NEW YORK VOLUNTEERS:

Being thus unexpectedly called upon to take the place of one who was to have made the formal dedicatory address, and without a moment for preparation, you will excuse the brief remarks I may make as being in no way commensurate with the occasion, or with the occurrences which this monument is erected to commemorate, of a regiment that in 1861 marched so proudly, upward of 1,000 strong, from New York to defend the Union against assault and to preserve intact the Union of States. The small number here present are a majority of all that now remain. Many battlefields attest your bravery, your patriotism and your loyalty; for a moment let us indulge a thought and drop a tear in memory of the loved and the fallen. How we all honor and revere the memory of Colonel Pye, Generals Doubleday, Rice, Cutler, Wadsworth, Newton, Reynolds, Warren, Meade and Grant under whom we fought!

This is the thirtieth anniversary of the terrific contest which took place on these grounds. How well do we recall the hot July day in 1863 when we stood where we now stand. But oh! under what different circumstances! What changes have thirty years wrought! Then we were in the pride and vigor of our early manhood, and now the heads of all about me are whitened with the frosts of years. How well do we recall the rapid march from Marsh Run that morning; how as we reached the town we realized that hot work was before us for that day, when we heard the guns of Buford's Cavalry; and as we came up near to the old Seminary yonder, when the order to "double quick" was given, how, as we were crossing yonder field, the order was given to Colonel Fowler, of the Fourteenth Brooklyn, by General Wadsworth, to deploy his regiment and the Ninety-fifth to the left!

From where we now stand, we can see the very spot where General Reynolds stood with his staff by yonder piece of timber, now known as Reynolds' Grove. How he hurriedly gave some direction to Colonel Fowler as we were advancing up into the orchard towards the crest of the ridge where the cavalry were skirmishing, and Calef's Battery was sending their compliments! How the cavalry, as they dropped back by our flank, called out to us, "We have got them now," and to "Go in and give them hell!" How little did we then realize how near they were to getting us! In less time than it has taken me to recite this, we were fiercely engaged with Archer's Brigade. How glad we were to see the old Iron Brigade filing by the left into the woods, quickly drawing the fire of Archer's Brigade, and soon making short work of them!

In the meantime, the other regiments of the brigade, the Seventy-sixth and One hundred and forty-seventh New York, and the Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania

(the Seventh Indiana being in the rear guarding trains), had continued direct across the fields and pike to the very place where we now stand, and soon became hotly engaged with Davis's Mississippi Brigade.* Rebels seemed to spring up as it were out of the ground. Regiments, brigades and divisions came from all directions, and for a time it seemed as if the old First Army Corps (of which we are all so justly proud) would be annihilated. How nearly the Ninety-fifth and Fourteenth came to being flanked from our position; and the change of front we made under fire, and how we charged across the plain to this point at the railroad cut! In this charge Corporal Ackerman and William F. Smith, of Company F (of which the president of the Regimental Association and myself were members, as were a number of others now here assembled) fell. Smith was killed, and now fills one of the graves on yonder hillside marked "Unknown." Ackerman fell mortally wounded and died two days later. Here at this spot, you will recall the fact of our capture of almost the entire Mississippi Brigade.

I will not dwell upon the details of the great battle, which is now regarded as the high-water mark of the Rebellion, nor speak of the many positions at length that the Ninety-fifth occupied in the three days' fight. You will all recognize the spot yonder in the oak grove where Colonel Biddle was wounded, and the terrific fire received here will never be forgotten. How well do we recall our falling back along the railroad track, and getting across the rear of the town to Cemetery Hill; how the Rebels had gained possession of the town, and had a battery planted at the head of one of the streets, which they swept with grape and canister, and of our division taking its position on Culp's Hill! Great as had been our loss of the day, first in the loss of our beloved commander, General Reynolds, and the hundreds of our comrades who here surrendered their lives, the corps was not disheartened or demoralized. The old First Corps had twenty-eight regiments engaged in the first day's battle, and it has since been officially ascertained that there were forty-eight Confederate regiments opposed to them. The loss of Cutler's Brigade, our old brigade, was in this first day's engagement nearly 1,000; of the corps about 4,000; and of the Ninety-fifth Regiment, 115.

I will simply, in passing, refer to the fierce night attack of the second day upon us as we lay at Culp's Hill, and the extension of the line to the right, which had previously been occupied by the Twelfth Corps; how the Rebels came in and took possession for a brief interval of the space between our position and Spangler's Spring. Fortunately for us, they little knew what a slim force lay between them and our reserve ammunition train, and practically nothing between them and General Meade's headquarters.

The great battle of the third day commenced by an early morning assault, about 4 o'clock, upon Culp's Hill, and the extension of the line to and beyond Spangler's Spring. The Twelfth Corps had returned to their position, and the whole line had been strengthened by additional troops sent from other parts of the field. Here for six or seven hours was waged the most terrific musketry engagement of the war. After 11 o'clock, a lull in the conflict took place until

*This brigade was not composed entirely of Mississippi troops. The Fifty-fifth North Carolina belonged to it.—Ed.

about 1 o'clock, when the most terrible artillery engagement took place that the world has ever experienced. The whole earth trembled, and seemed as if it were shaken to its very centre, while for two hours the air was filled with death-dealing missiles of every description. Then took place one of the bravest and most daring assaults of which history, ancient or modern, makes record, now world-renowned as Pickett's charge. What a magnificent spectacle it was! Incomparable, and we can all honor the brave, though misguided, men who took part therein. They were Americans. None other than Americans could make such a charge. No Caesar, no Wellington, no Napoleon commanded such armies as confronted each other during our Civil War. Thus ended the battle of Gettysburg, the greatest and most momentous battle of modern times, with a loss to the Federal army of about 23,000.

I have endeavored, my comrades of the Ninety-fifth Regiment, to but briefly glance at your services in this engagement, which the monument we now dedicate will commemorate. Our names will all soon be forgotten, but the imperishable records of your deeds will live. Hallowed, indeed, is the sacred spot. Here rest peacefully our young comrades, who marched and bivouacked with us, willingly giving their lives that in the words of the immortal Lincoln, "The government of the people, by the people, should not perish from the earth." All is now peace, and our old adversaries rejoice with us in the outcome of the struggle. They would not have it otherwise, and to-day would stand shoulder to shoulder with us to protect the Constitution and the glorious Flag, Emblem of Liberty.

HISTORICAL SKETCH.

On June 12, 1863, the First Army Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds left its camp near White Oak Church, Va., and started northward in pursuit of the Confederate army, which was also moving northward bent on the invasion of Pennsylvania. The Ninety-fifth New York at this time was in Cutler's (Second) Brigade, of Wadsworth's (First) Division, First Corps. The brigade roster stood as follows:

Second Brigade.

Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler.

7th Indiana	Col. Ira G. Grover.
76th New York	Maj. Andrew J. Grover.
84th New York	Col. Edward B. Fowler.
95th New York	Col. George H. Biddle.
147th New York	Lieut. Col. F. C. Miller.
56th Pennsylvania	Col. J. W. Hofmann.

After a series of marches and halts — the marches, long, hot, and tiresome — the division arrived on June 30, 1863, at Marsh Run, four miles south of Gettysburg, where it bivouacked that night. At a muster made that day the Ninety-fifth reported 24 officers and 239 men present for duty. This number,

however, included several who might properly be classed as noncombatants, as their duties did not require them to follow the colors into action.

Leaving Marsh Creek on the morning of July 1st, at 8 o'clock, Wadsworth's Division, which had the advance of the corps that day, started for Gettysburg, Cutler's Brigade leading the column. When within about one mile of the town information was received that the enemy was approaching Gettysburg on the Chambersburg Pike, and that Buford's Division of cavalry was already engaged with the Confederate skirmishers. General Reynolds ordered Wadsworth's Division to leave the Emmitsburg Road at the Codori House and march across the fields in the direction of the firing, which then could be distinctly heard. Pushing forward at a rapid pace Cutler's Brigade struck the Chambersburg Pike about three-quarters of a mile west of Gettysburg, at 10 o'clock, and went into action immediately, relieving Buford's hard-pressed cavalymen. Wadsworth arrived none too soon, for two strong Confederate divisions — Heth's and Pender's — were already moving to the attack.

General Wadsworth placed three of Cutler's regiments on the north side of the pike, and then sent the Ninety-fifth and Eighty-fourth (Fourteenth Brooklyn) New York along the south side of the McPherson farm buildings, where the two latter regiments became engaged immediately. The three regiments on the right of the road were driven back in time by the superior force of the enemy, whereupon Colonel Fowler of the Eighty-fourth, who was in command of the two detached regiments, ordered them to about face and fall back, a movement which was done slowly and in good order. After retiring a short distance the two regiments changed front, and attacking the successful Confederates on the flank drove them back to the line of an unfinished railroad grade, where they sought shelter in a deep cut, whose steep, rocky sides afforded no opportunity for escape after they were once penned up in it. Here several hundred Confederates, belonging to Davis's Mississippi Brigade, were captured with their colors and sent to the rear. In this brilliant affair the Eighty-fourth and Ninety-fifth New York were assisted by the Sixth Wisconsin, which formed in line on Fowler's right. Colonel Biddle, of the Ninety-fifth, was wounded early in the fight and retired from the field, the command devolving then on Maj. Edward Pye, who was ably assisted by Capt. James Creney, senior captain of the regiment.

The success at the railroad cut was only temporary, and the brigade retired to a position near the Lutheran Seminary, the men of the Ninety-fifth assisting in dragging off the field a piece of artillery from which the gunners had been driven by the enemy. The brigade reformed, and advancing again reoccupied the ground which the three right regiments occupied at the opening of the battle, and where they had delivered the opening volley of the battle of Gettysburg. Here they were outflanked for the second time, and obliged to fall back to Seminary Ridge where, by changing front, they delivered an effective fire which was of great assistance to the troops of Robinson's (Second) Division, and which contributed largely to the capture of Iverson's North Carolina Brigade.

Driven from the ground by largely superior numbers, the First and Eleventh Corps fell back through the streets of the town and occupied Cemetery Hill,

Wadsworth's Division occupying a line on the adjoining slope of Culp's Hill. Cutler's Brigade threw up breastworks here, in which the Ninety-fifth remained during the succeeding two days of fighting. The regiment lost 7 killed, 62 wounded, and 46 captured or missing; total, 115, out of less than 250 engaged. Nearly all these casualties occurred in the battle of the first day. Many of the missing were killed or wounded men who were left on the field, and who fell into the hands of the enemy when the Union troops were obliged to retreat. Some of the missing were men who, with one of the officers, were captured as they fell back through the town, and whose escape was cut off by the swiftly-pursuing Confederates.

The Ninety-fifth Regiment was raised in New York City. Recruiting for it commenced in November, 1861; but an organization was not effected until March 6, 1862, when George H. Biddle, who had been active in the work of recruiting, was commissioned colonel. Seven of the companies were raised in New York City, one at Haverstraw, one at Sing Sing, and one in Westchester County. James B. Post was commissioned lieutenant colonel, and Edward Pye, major.

Arriving in Washington March 19, 1862, the regiment was placed in General Wadsworth's command and stationed at Camp Thomas. After a short stay at the Capital it crossed the Potomac into Virginia and camped at Aquia Creek. In May, 1862, it was assigned to Doubleday's Brigade, with which it served in Pope's campaign. Under command of Lieutenant Colonel Post it was under fire for the first time in the fighting near Gainesville, Va., August 28, 1862, one of the actions connected with the second battle of Manassas or Bull Run. It was also engaged the same day in fighting at Groveton, and was under fire again on the 30th, its losses in this battle amounting to 23 killed and wounded, and 90 missing or captured, a total of 113. Many of the missing were also killed or wounded. Doubleday's Brigade at this time was in Hatch's (First) Division, of McDowell's Corps. Upon the reorganization of the army after Pope's defeat and retirement, McDowell's Corps became the First Corps of the Army of the Potomac. Doubleday's Brigade—Second Brigade, First Division—was composed of the Seventh Indiana, Seventy-sixth and Ninety-fifth New York, and Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania.

The brigade participated in the Maryland campaign, and the regiment, commanded by Maj. Edward Pye, was engaged at the battles of South Mountain and Antietam, although its casualties in these two battles were comparatively slight. Colonel Biddle commanded the regiment at Fredericksburg, December 13, 1862, where the regiment lay under a heavy artillery fire. Casualties: 1 killed and 3 wounded. After returning from the field of Fredericksburg the entire army went into winter quarters, the First Corps encamping near Belle Plain at Aquia Creek. Upon the opening of the Chancellorsville campaign, the Ninety-fifth accompanied the First Corps on its march down the river to Pollock's Mill, a place below Fredericksburg, where on April 29-May 1, there was some sharp skirmishing and considerable artillery firing, during which two men of the regiment were wounded. On the morning of May 2d (1863), the First Corps started for Chancellorsville to join the main army, and after a hard march arrived there at dark. Taking position on Hooker's extreme

right it was present, but not engaged in the great battle of May 3d. Some firing occurred along its picket line in which the Ninety-fifth lost two men wounded. Defeated and driven back from his selected position at the Chancellor House, Hooker withdrew his forces across the river, and his army returned to the abandoned camps from which they had started a few days before flushed with a confidence in success and coming victory.

Gettysburg having been fought and won, the Ninety-fifth accompanied Meade's army in pursuit of the retreating Confederates, and recrossing the Potomac shared in the numerous marches, counter-marches, and fruitless manoeuvres which occupied the army during the succeeding summer and fall. Colonel Biddle and Lieutenant Colonel Post resigned in October, 1863, whereupon Maj. Edward Pye was commissioned colonel, and Capt. James Creney was made lieutenant colonel, both of which were merited, well-deserved promotions.

The regiment took part in the movement on Mine Run, November 26-December 2, 1863, during which it encountered some fighting on the skirmish line, but with few casualties. After this campaign the Army of the Potomac went into winter quarters, and the men of the Ninety-fifth erected comfortable cabins at their camp near Culpeper, Va., in which they remained during the following winter and spring. The health of the regiment was good, and as the men had no severer duty than ordinary drill and dress parades, the winter passed quickly and pleasantly away. The most of the original members re-enlisted and went home on veteran furlough. Some recruits were received, and when the spring campaign opened the old regiment, although not strong numerically, was in the highest state of efficiency.

In April, 1864, the War Department ordered the organization of the First Corps discontinued and merged in that of the Fifth. The brilliant record of the First Corps, and the gallant services which it had rendered on so many hard-fought fields deserved better treatment from the Government than this. But the orders were final, and the First Corps flag was furled.

Under this new order of things the old brigade to which the Ninety-fifth belonged became the Second Brigade — under General James C. Rice — of Wadsworth's (Fourth) Division, Fifth Corps. The corps was commanded by Maj. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, one of the ablest and most brilliant generals in the Army of the Potomac.

On May 4, 1864, the regiment bid good-bye to the comfortable quarters in which they had passed a pleasant winter, and started on the long and bloody campaign which, under Grant's leadership, was to know no end until victory and peace were assured. Crossing the Rapidan at Germanna Ford the men bivouacked at 3 p. m. for the night. On the following day, May 5th, the march was resumed at 7 a. m., and about noon the brigade encountered the enemy in force in the Wilderness, near Parker's Store. Companies A, E, and I, of the Ninety-fifth were deployed as skirmishers, but the Union troops being driven back, the Confederates captured all of Company E, and part of Companies A and I. The brigade suffered severely in this fight, but did not abandon its ground until left without support on either flank. It was engaged again the next day, from 6 a. m. until 3 p. m., during which the Ninety-fifth made

a charge on the enemy's position, forcing the withdrawal of a battery which had proved very annoying. Captain Burn of the regiment was killed in this fighting. Later in the day General Wadsworth was killed while cheering on the brigade. Lieutenants Osburn and Woodrow, of the Ninety-fifth, were also killed in this battle.

The regiment marched to Todd's Tavern on the 7th, and on the 8th went into action at Spotsylvania, where it shared in the hard fighting each day from May 8th to May 12th. In the charge on the enemy's works, May 10th, General Rice, the brigade commander, was seriously wounded, and died after suffering amputation of his leg.

The regiment was engaged also at the battle of the North Anna, May 24th, and at Bethesda Church (near Cold Harbor) May 30-June 2. In the fighting at the latter place Colonel Pye, of the Ninety-fifth, was mortally wounded, dying ten days later of his injuries. In his death the regiment sustained a serious loss, as he was a gallant and efficient officer. The losses of the regiment during the month of May, 1864, were:

Date.	BATTLE.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
May 5-7,	Wilderness	18	64	92	174
May 8-12,	Spotsylvania	6	51	8	65
May 24-26,	North Anna	1	6	1	8
May 30-31,	Bethesda Church	1	11		12
Total		26	132	101	259

Leaving Cold Harbor, June 12th, the army marched to Petersburg, the regiment crossing the James River on the pontoons, June 16th, at 11 a. m.

The next day it arrived at Petersburg, and took position in front of the enemy's works. On the 18th it participated with the corps in the unsuccessful assault on the intrenchments, during which Lieutenant Colonel Creney, who was in command of the regiment, was severely wounded. Its casualties in this assault were 8 killed, 37 wounded, and 1 missing; total, 46; a severe loss in view of the small number carried into action. The command of the regiment now devolved on Maj. Robert W. Bard.

On August 18, 1864, the regiment marched with the Fifth Corps to the Yellow House, on the Weldon Railroad, where a severe engagement occurred on August 18th and 19th.

While holding this line on the 21st, the enemy attacked the pickets about eight in the morning, and drove in the left of the line, capturing Company E and part of Company C. Major Bard was severely wounded while engaged in withdrawing the pickets. During this affair on the picket line Priv. R. Smith, of the Ninety-fifth, a mounted orderly at brigade headquarters, succeeded in capturing 2 officers and 20 men of Hagood's (Confederate) Brigade who, having become separated from their command, were trying to make their way back through a piece of woods. For this meritorious act Private Smith was awarded a Medal of Honor by the War Department. The casualties in the

Ninety-fifth at the battle of the Weldon Railroad were: 6 killed, 20 wounded, and 52 captured; total, 78.

Colonel Creney, having recovered from his wound, rejoined the regiment in the latter part of August. The regiment, now numbering only 213 muskets, was present at the battle of the Boydton Road, October 27, 1864, and took part also in the Hicksford Raid, December 7-11, 1864, where it assisted in destroying a long piece of the Weldon Railroad, burning the ties and then twisting the rails after they had become heated in the fires thus built. During the intervals between these movements and engagements the regiment lay in the trenches before Petersburg engaged in the various duties and undergoing the dangers incidental to that long, memorable siege.

On February 6 and 7, 1865, the regiment took part in the battle of Hatcher's Run, or Dabney's Mill, an engagement which was fought almost entirely by the Fifth Corps. The Ninety-fifth numbered at this time 6 officers and 247 men. Gen. Henry A. Morrow, who commanded the brigade in this battle, speaks in terms of praise in his official report of Colonel Creney, who was severely wounded in this action. The loss in the regiment was 2 killed, 33 wounded, and 2 missing; total, 37.

But the campaigns of the Ninety-fifth were drawing to a close, and on March 31, and April 1, 1865, it fought its last battle. The fighting on March 31st is known as the battle of Gravelly Run, or White Oak Road, while the action on the following day (April 1st) is known as that of Five Forks. Under command of Capt. George D. Knight the regiment was engaged both days. On the second day, at Five Forks, it took into action only 6 officers and 88 men. Its casualties in the two days' fighting were 4 killed, 63 wounded, and 9 missing; total, 76.

The regiment, in company with the Fifth Corps, pushed on in pursuit of Lee's retreating army, and was present at the final surrender at Appomattox.

[REDACTED]



J. B. LYON PRINT.

97TH NEW YORK INFANTRY.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

On Seminary Ridge, looking west. Ground over which Iverson's, Ramseur's, and O'Neal's (Confederate) Brigades moved in their opening attack on the first day.

(INSCRIPTIONS.)

—
(Front.)

97TH

NEW YORK
INFANTRY,
2D BRIGADE
2D DIVISION
1ST CORPS.

(Reverse.)

HELD THE ENEMY
IN CHECK HERE FROM
12:30 TO 3 P. M.,
JULY 1, 1863.
DURING THIS TIME
CHARGED ACROSS
THE FIELD TO THE WEST,
ASSISTING IN CAPTURING
IVERSON'S BRIGADE,
AND SECURING FLAG
OF 20TH N. C.

(Left Side.)

JULY 2 AND 3
ENGAGED ON CEMETERY HILL,
AND AT ZIEGLER'S GROVE.
CASUALTIES
KILLED 12
WOUNDED 36
MISSING 78

(Right Side.)

(CONKLING RIFLES)
ORGANIZED AND
COMMANDED BY
COL. CHAS. WHEELOCK,
OF BOONVILLE, N. Y.

NEW YORK AT GETTYSBURG.

DEDICATION OF MONUMENT.

97TH REGIMENT INFANTRY,

July 1, 1889.

ADDRESS BY BREVT. MAJ. ISAAC HALL.

... OF THE NINETY-SEVENTH:

... of our country we left our homes for the field of con-
... our sanguine friends assured us that the war was almost over,
... never fired powder. This opinion was not confined to the
... we came: it was entertained by many eminent men
... Government had stopped enlistments, and some regiments
... discharged. But the Ninety-seventh soon learned
... to no holiday picnic. We experienced
... at Cedar Mountain, at Rappahannock,
... at Second Bull Run, and at Chantilly. Through the
... dust, and the disheartening marches of that
... its full part, and came in for a full share of
... these weary marches, these silent bivouacs, and these
... became inured to the realities of warfare, and
... the mutual confidence and strength of veterans,
... In a word, the regiment had learned to take

... and at Antietam, where more than 40 per cent. of its
... and wounded, no uninjured man thought of leaving the
... to carry off the wounded. Fredericksburg
... in succession, further admonishing us that we
... and that he was dead earnest in the con-
... strength of the Confederacy was put forth, either
... the Potomac, or to outmarch and elude it, and invade
... Ninety-seventh was thus, with other troops, called on
... to drive back the invaders. On this ground, twenty-
... in this great work began. And, now, after the lapse
... we who survive are here to solemnly dedicate to
... Ninety-seventh Regiment, New York Volunteers, or
... monument erected by the patriotic liberality of our
... and to inscribe thereon, for transmission to
... the heroic acts of those who here laid down their lives in
... bequeathed to us by our fathers.
... — furnished by the Empire State — shall per-
... our heroic dead upon this field, we do not forget the
... and Virginia, where the bones and mouldering re-
... the Ninety-seventh are strewn from the heights of
... field of Appomattox. Though no monument shall
... of the regiment over these fields, history will honor

the gallant patriots of these battles, and their memory shall be enshrined throughout all time in the hearts of the future generations of our country.

The blood of our comrades "has hallowed this ground." Stiles, Cady, Morrin, Downing, Brown, our color sergeant who bore aloft our flag — remembering also Corp. James McClaren, who saved the flag when our color bearer fell, and bore it off the field — Lloyd, and others, marked the traverse of this field by their life blood.

When the Ninety-seventh, assisted by others, had repelled the charge of Iverson's Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Spofford, whose eye at once caught the opportune moment, assumed the responsibility, and ordered a counter charge. The regiment as one man sprang forward on this brigade, and captured more men than were contained in its own organization; and Sylvester Riley, corporal of Company C, bore the flag of the Twentieth North Carolina Regiment, as a trophy, off the field. At last, when the outstretching lines and the overwhelming numbers of the enemy lapped nearly around the depleted ranks of the Ninety-seventh, it was ordered to withdraw to Cemetery Hill; but too late for all to escape. Some were killed, more were wounded, and Colonel Wheelock, Lieutenant Colonel Spofford, Captain Egleston, Lieutenant Murphy, and Captain Chamberlain, and many others who had fought so well, were borne away as prisoners of war.

The gallantry of other regiments constituting Robinson's Division, in connection with the Conkling Rifles, is remembered and honored, our achievements on this field being identified with theirs. It is to our honor that we met the enemy, fought him well and long; we assisted in delaying his advance one day, until our separated divisions could be concentrated upon this memorable field, and until the strong positions of Cemetery Ridge and Round Top could be seized and held, the possession of which, under Divine Providence, secured our final victory."

PRO REPUBLICA.

POEM BY CAPT. JOHN D. NORCROSS.

Never again in line to stand,
And watch the enemy's host advancing;
To wait the sharp word of command,
To see from hostile bayonets glancing,
The bright new dream of the early day;
Never again in the morning gray
To hear the bugles calling, calling
To battle, where men shall soon be falling.

No more the thrill of the headlong charge,
Never again the artillery's crashing,
As the blue-clad columns, grand and large,
Through the battle's smoke go onward dashing.

The battle days are but a memory now,
Yet we cannot forget how we took the vow,
When our hearts were young and we proudly swore
To defend with our lives the flag we bore.

As long as on earth the green grass grows,
The deeds of our soldiers shall live in story;
As long as the sea tide ebbs and flows,
The tale shall be told of our navy's glory;
As long as the day dispels the night,
Our flag shall shine in its beauty bright,
The radiant emblem by the shore and sea
Of a land whose sons can keep her free.

ADDRESS BY HON. C. D. PRESCOTT.

VETERANS OF THE NINETY-SEVENTH:

By the munificence of our beloved State, after a quarter of a century, the Ninety-seventh Regiment, Conkling Rifles, New York State Volunteers, is enabled, on this anniversary day of its conflict here, to unveil this enduring record of its presence and valor. Well it is said that the State should commemorate, and you, its survivors revere, the history of a regiment which is so replete with martial glory. Raised mainly in counties adjoining each other, (Oneida, Lewis and Herkimer,) it was mustered into service at Boonville, N. Y., February 18, 1862, with 928 men upon its muster-roll. On the 12th of March following, the regiment left for the seat of war, and knew no respite from the continued laborious service and endurance of the "Army of the Potomac," until it indorsed upon its battle record, Appomattox Court House, and Lee's surrender. Largely made up of the yeomanry of one of the best portions of New York, no regiment went into the field with truer or more patriotic men, or more competent or courageous officers. From the first, Colonel Wheelock, the peer of men, by his superb evidences of robust life, his energy, positiveness, perseverance, capacity, and courage, impressed his men with confidence, while his honest blue eye, social greeting, kind liberality, and constant thoughtfulness for their wants and woes won their hearts. His noble manhood crushed out rivalry and discontent, and bound the members of the regiment with steel. The men said, and evidently felt, that we were all a band of brothers, and Colonel Wheelock father of them all.

Such men, with such a leader, in such a cause, must in the nature of things have been well-nigh invincible. The record of the Ninety-seventh shows that they never hesitated or shrank. Colonel Wheelock dared to go where duty or necessity directed; the men never faltered where he led. With them it was truly:

"Theirs not to make reply,
Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to do and die."

June 28, 1863, found Lee with orders to invade the North, apparently ready to cross the Susquehanna at Harrisburg, and march on to Philadelphia.

He had an army under his command which General Longstreet said "was in a condition of strength and morale to undertake anything." The rulers of the Confederacy believed that a vigorous invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania would inaugurate a revolution in the free labor States, which would lead to a practical coalition between the Confederates and their political friends in the North, and a speedy peace on terms dictated by the servants of Jefferson Davis on the banks of the Susquehanna and the Ohio. General Lee having pushed so far, became alarmed at the massing of forces in his front and rear, and directed a retrograde movement. He abandoned the scheme of further invasion, and commenced concentrating his forces at Gettysburg for either offensive or defensive operations, as the circumstances should indicate most advisable.

Lee hoped to be able by such concentration to fall upon and crush the Army of the Potomac, and then march in triumph upon Baltimore and Washington. General Hooker, dissatisfied with what he deemed an unjust burden, (the protection of the same line,) on July 27, 1863, at his own request was relieved, and Gen. George G. Meade took command of the Army of the Potomac. This change of chief commanders in front of an enemy, on the eve of an inevitable and great battle, was a perilous act and calculated to demoralize the best disciplined troops. General Meade was relieved of the burden complained of by General Hooker, and the army placed under his absolute control. The Army of the Potomac was immediately put in motion northward, for the purpose of arresting and driving back the invaders or meeting them in battle. General Meade had intended to force the contest south-east of Gettysburg, near Pipe Creek, but the movement of the respective armies tended to and resulted in making Gettysburg the focal point and the theatre of the battle. At this time the Ninety-seventh was in General Baxter's Brigade, Robinson's Division of the First Army Corps, which was under General Doubleday. About 9 o'clock in the morning, twenty-five years ago, skirmishing commenced between the advanced lines of the armies. This by accident brought on a conflict in considerable force, and in which, General Reynolds being killed, the command devolved on General Doubleday, who had just arrived on the field. General Doubleday found the Union right, held by Cutler, seriously menaced by the enemy, and sent Robinson's Division to Cutler's aid, where Generals Baxter and Paul took position on his right near the Mummasburg Road. Of the exact part taken, or the fearful hour spent by the Ninety-seventh in that bloody conflict, time and knowledge do not suffice me to relate. July 21, 1863, in a letter written from Warrenton, Va., Colonel Wheelock thus tersely describes the result. He says: "I will not undertake to give you the details of the battle of Gettysburg, but will say that it was considered by all the hardest and most hotly contested battle yet fought in this war. The whole salvation of the Rebels seemed to depend on their success; and it also seemed that every Union soldier for himself was determined to win the victory or die. The Ninety-seventh made the first charge of the first day's fight, and captured more prisoners than we had men;

also a flag of the Twentieth North Carolina Regiment. Whether wise or not, I will not attempt to say, but we were put into the fight as soon as we arrived on the field, without waiting for our forces to come up, while the enemy were ready and waiting to receive us. We were engaged for four hours, and every round of ammunition was expended, and when surrounded on all sides, we yielded the ground. The Ninety-seventh had lost 2 officers killed, 7 wounded, and 6 taken prisoners. About 16 privates were killed, 40 wounded, 60 prisoners, besides many missing, whom I fear are killed. We have only a remnant of what left Boonville. We only numbered at this time fit for duty, 150 men."

The prisoners mentioned included Colonel Wheelock and Lieutenant Colonel Spofford, the former escaping on the march to Richmond, after six days' imprisonment, and the latter remaining several months in Libby. Such is the statement of one of the actors; and it is evident it must needs have been a fearful battle. It was a combat of desperation on both sides. To the invaders, success promised glory, rich plunder, and an early and successful termination of the war. A Union horseman who charged wildly down the lines in a critical juncture of the battle thundered what it meant to the Northern soldiers: "There are no troops behind you! You stand alone, between the Rebel army and your homes! Fight like hell!"

This monument, erected by a grateful State, commemorates not only the part taken in that battle by the Ninety-seventh Regiment collectively; but it also stands as a memorial for the blood shed by its officers and men here slain; for the agony of those here mangled who survived; for the worst torture of those here taken to become victims of Rebel prisons, and for the valor and endurance of the remnant that remained. It tells how with lion courage they met the enemy, and when overborne by numbers, fell back inch by inch, fighting, falling, dying, cheering the men, succumbing to the inevitable. The valor and sacrifices of the first day made the more equal contest of the second day, and the victory of the third possible. It records the progress of a regiment in this one battle, who have upon their battle flag the remembrance of their participation in the battles of Cedar Mountain, Rappahannock Station, Thoroughfare Gap, Second Bull Run, Chantilly, South Mountain, Antietam, First Fredericksburg, Second Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Mine Run, Raccoon Ford, Wilderness, Laurel Hill, Spotsylvania Court House, North Anna River, Totopotomoy, Bethesda Church, White Oak Swamp, Petersburg, Weldon Railroad, Hicksford, Hatcher's Run, Quaker Road, White Oak Road, Five Forks, Appomattox Court House, and Lee's surrender—a regiment that had 234 men killed or mortally wounded in battle, and 811 wounded; which had had by additions during the war, 2,200 men, but at its close mustered out only 322, of whom only 63 men and 3 officers were of the original muster of the regiment.

It is of inestimable influence for a Nation to have an heroic past. The names of their battlefields become the heritage of their people not only, but of humanity as well, and are quickeners to brave deeds and illustrious lives among all civilized people. It is wise and good to keep alive by monuments and memorial devices those passages of a Nation's history in which she acts

in the highest and noblest strains. The life and death struggle of a free people to preserve their country is an event over which angels might weep, and yet exult.

Heroism defying wounds and death, pouring out one's life blood freely, is the inspiration of having a country and a flag. Exactly what it is cannot be described. The soldiers who here met in dire conflict could not have told; but when the Stars and Stripes rustle over their heads, they felt its living presence in their hearts. They have in deeds and blood recorded that their country should not die, that the sun and the stars should continue to look down upon our great Republic, that it should live the incarnation of freedom, the embodiment of the power and majesty of a free people.

Comrades of the dead, whether present or absent, for you let it now be proclaimed that by this monument you and succeeding generations are obligated by a solemn oath to Heaven, that baptized anew, this Republic shall live a thousand years to become the Colossus of the nations of the earth, its feet upon the continents, its scepter over the seas, its forehead among the stars.

102D REGIMENT INFANTRY.

For picture of monument and inscription, see page 626.

For historical sketch of regiment see page 631.

[REDACTED]



J. B. LYON PRINT.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

104TH NEW YORK INFANTRY.

Easterly slope of Oak Ridge, near the Mummasburg Road. Right of the First Corps line. Village of Gettysburg in the distance.

(INSCRIPTIONS.)

(Front.)

104TH

NEW YORK

INFANTRY,

(WADSWORTH GUARDS)

FIRST BRIGADE,

SECOND DIVISION,

FIRST CORPS.

(Reverse.)

JULY 1, 1863.

(Left Side.)

REGIMENT RAISED

AT GENESEO AND TROY, N. Y.

ORGANIZED AT

ALBANY, N. Y. MARCH 8, 1862.

DISCHARGED AT

ELMIRA, N. Y., JULY 29, 1865.

(Right Side.)

CASUALTIES:

11 KILLED,

91 WOUNDED,

92 CAPTURED

AND MISSING.

4TH REGIMENT INFANTRY — "WADSWORTH GUARDS."

ORATION BY COL. JOHN R. STRANG.

It was fought here upon one of the great and historic battlefields of the American Revolution in the size of the armies engaged and the casualties they suffered. It was here the results of the contest here waged, which marked the final overthrow of treason and rebellion, and the restoration of peace to a divided country. Here the tide of armed rebellion reached its highest peak and, though nearing success, was flung back in ruin and defeat.

... our comrades, to have such a memory in our lives; ... not small nor un consequential, in the deeds which ... we did not win the fight; but none the less it is true ... heroic tenacity of the First Corps upon this ground, ... remainder of the Army of the Potomac to reach ... every fall which the keen eye and soldierly instanc ... field of battle, where the fight was fought and ... Corps the name of Gettysburg itself would ... the war, excepting as the location of a skirmish ... Lee's advancing forces.

...the First Corps of the Army of the Potomac
...as compared with the Rebel forces which
...which endowed it, and in the de-
...and the needed reinforcements should arrive.
...decimated, more than decimated, but not de-
...Reynolds, and many brave officers and
...wounds; but honor was preserved.
...of Lee's army pressed upon it from
...through the town to Cemetery Hill.
...courage and stubborn tenacity, that the
...more than three to one, did not dare
...and so hardly won.

the war of the Rebellion which has, by
been to signify by appropriate govern-
ment of the Union army. Grace-

ful States have vied with each other in the erection of monuments to commemorate the valor of the living, and to perpetuate the memory of the patriot dead; and ere long the principal positions of each distinct command which took part in this great conflict will be designated by monument and tablet of granite or of bronze. But even these monuments, enduring as the skill of man can make them, shall crumble into dust before the pen of history shall have ceased to record what was done here.

The One hundred and fourth Regiment of New York Infantry, whose monument we dedicate to-day, was a part of the First Brigade, Second Division, First Army Corps. Willing volunteers who came because their country needed them and called, its members left the farms, the fields, the shops, and the homes where their boyhood had been spent, and became true American soldiers. Veterans they had been made on the fields of Manassas, Antietam, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville; inured to the hardships of the march and camp, and the exposure of the picket line, on this field they illustrated the patriotism which possessed them, and with a devotion to their country and the cause for which they fought, clung to this hill until support to the right and left of them was gone, and then slowly retired, fighting as they went.

The regiment had become reduced in numbers, so that only about 330 officers and men were in line when the battle began; and of that number nearly two-thirds did not return with the corps over Cemetery Hill that night, but are accounted for by the figures upon this monument,—11 killed, 91 wounded, 92 captured and missing. These figures are taken from the official report made at that time, to which we are confined by the rules of the Commission, and before it was possible to ascertain the fate of many who were reported wounded or missing, as we had no access to this portion of the battlefield, nor to the hospitals in the town until the 5th day of July. The actual loss of the regiment, as finally ascertained, and including the casualties of the second and third days' battles, was: Killed in action or died of wounds, 25; other wounded officers, 8; enlisted men, 73; captured or missing, and not otherwise accounted for, 93; making a total of 199.

Of the killed and wounded 7 belonged to the color guard, which consisted of 8 men, one only escaping unhurt. Color Sergt. Maurice Buckingham of Company C, was shot dead early in the engagement, and Color Sergt. William H. Shea of Company I was mortally wounded. The State flag presented to the regiment by Mrs. General Wadsworth, was borne in safety from the field by Sergt. David E. Curtis of Company D, notwithstanding he was slightly wounded; and he afterwards carried it, until severely wounded, at Spotsylvania. The United States colors were passed from one to another as the bearers were successively killed or wounded, until they came into the hands of Sergt. Moses Wallace of Company E, by whom they were torn from the staff and destroyed to prevent capture by the enemy. Lieut. Thomas Johnston of Company D, was the only officer killed, and while it is impracticable here to give the names of all those who were killed or severely wounded, I may mention in the latter class the names of Lieut. Col. H. G. Tuthill, Capt. H. A. Wiley, and Lieut. James W. Dow, without invidious distinction.

It would be impossible for me to give, after so long a time, a clear and de-

tailed statement of the movements of the regiment during the whole of the battle, for on the second and third days the corps was used in fragments by brigades and divisions, here and there, as the pressing need for reinforcements seemed to require. On the evening of the second day our division had a part in recovering the line, and saving some of the artillery near the "Peach Orchard," where General Sickles' desperate engagement had taken place just before. On the third day we were just in rear of Cemetery Hill during the furious cannonade, which none of us who were there will ever forget, and at its close were rapidly moved to the right, and then across Cemetery Hill to the left, arriving there just in time to see Pettigrew's Rebel Division, which was to have supported Pickett, broken and put to flight by our artillery fire, and to witness as silent but anxious spectators a part of the splendid charge of Pickett's Division, and its crushing repulse by the Second Corps.

But my memory of the first day's scenes is tolerably clear, and having refreshed it by the recollection of others, among whom I may mention Colonel Prey and Captain Starr, it has seemed to me appropriate to recount those scenes more fully here. We had bivouacked, for a day or two before the battle, in the vicinity of Emmitsburg, Md., leaving there in the early morning of July 1st, under the command of Gen. John F. Reynolds, with orders to proceed to Gettysburg. Before reaching the town, General Reynolds learned that Buford's Cavalry was already engaged with Rebel infantry and needed support. So we were pushed on as rapidly as possible, our brigade having the rear of the corps that day, and coming in sight of Seminary Ridge about 11 o'clock in the forenoon, we learned that General Reynolds had been killed. Wadsworth's and Doubleday's Divisions were already all engaged, and our division, under General Robinson, was placed in reserve near the Seminary building, being employed for a part of the time until afternoon in the construction of temporary breastworks from rails and other movable materials, a little to the west of the building.

The rapid and continuous advance of the Rebel force under Gen. A. P. Hill, from the west, and General Ewell, from the north, soon made it necessary to extend our line of battle to the north in order to cover the Mummasburg Road, along which Ewell's forces, if unopposed, would gain the right and rear of the First Corps, and cut it off from the town. About 1 o'clock the Second Brigade of our division, under General Baxter, was thus used to prolong the line of battle to the right, along the ridge and to the west of it, finding the Rebel troops already nearing, and in position to prevent their further advance along the road. At about the same time the Eleventh Corps began to arrive upon the field, and leaving a division upon Cemetery Hill as a reserve, two of its divisions were pushed out on the north of the town to oppose the expected advance of Ewell's Corps from that direction. This disposition left a long space between the right of the First Corps and the left of the Eleventh, and right through the middle of that space ran this Mummasburg Road, by which Rodes' Division of Ewell's Corps was seeking to reach the town. Iverson's Rebel Brigade had the advance down the road, but was handsomely repulsed by Baxter's Brigade, aided by Cutler's Brigade of Wadsworth's Division, a large part of Iverson's men being killed, wounded

or captured. The check was, however, only temporary, and reinforced by the brigades of Daniel and O'Neal the Rebels again advanced, and partly seized the stone wall running along the ridge, southerly from the road.

To repel their attack and hold the line at this point, the First Brigade under General Paul, which was the sole remaining reserve of the First Corps, was double-quickened to the right, and ordered to take position to the right of Baxter's Brigade, facing partly to the west and partly to the north. The Thirteenth Massachusetts was on the right of the brigade, with our regiment next to it. Coming rapidly into line we encountered a destructive fire from the Rebel forces sheltered in the grove and behind the stone wall, and a considerable part of our loss in killed and wounded was sustained while we were in this position. Finally, under the personal lead of Colonel Prey, we charged over the stone wall, dislodging and driving back the Rebel forces in confusion, quite a number of prisoners being taken by the companies of our regiment under command of Captains Wiley and Dixon. It was now nearly 3 o'clock, and the whole plain to the north and west of the town seemed to be filled with the advancing Rebel forces. The angle between the First and Eleventh Corps was once more made the scene of a determined attack, but without success, the Rebels being driven back. We followed them for a short distance beyond the wall, retiring immediately, however, to our former position, in view of their overpowering numbers, and keeping up a constant and well-directed musketry fire upon such of them as were within reach. The brunt of this attack fell mainly upon our brigade; but we were aided in repulsing it by the enfilading fire from two of the regiments of Baxter's Brigade.

Prior to this time General Paul had been severely wounded, losing the sight of both eyes. The two senior colonels were successively wounded, and the brigade had been practically without any commander for some time, until at this point Colonel Prey took command, by order of General Robinson, and retained it until the close of the first day's engagement.

An open space of 300 yards or more still remained between the right of the First Corps and the left of the Eleventh, perceiving which, part of Rodes' Division was massed for attack under shelter of the McLean buildings and shrubbery, north of the Mummasburg Road. We had no reserve left to fill this gap, and I was now directed by Colonel Prey to find the nearest brigade or division commander of the Eleventh Corps, and represent to him the position of affairs, and the danger which was apparent, that the enemy thus massing at McLean's would penetrate our lines through this opening, which if done in sufficient force would immediately render the position of both corps untenable. I was unable to find either of those commanders, but delivered my message to a staff officer, and the commanding officer of the nearest Eleventh Corps troops and then returned to the regiment. Before reaching it, on looking back, I saw that the right of the Eleventh Corps was rapidly being driven back, and its brigade nearest us was changing front to the right in order to protect its flank and line of retreat, instead of coming to our aid. The anticipated advance upon our right immediately took place, and being left without any protection on that flank, we were subjected to a

MONUMENT TO THE GETTYSBURG
MEMORIAL ASSOCIATION.

OF COL. HENRY G. TUTHILL.

CITIZENS:

When I stood at this place was I made aware of the fact that I was making a presentation speech, consequently I am wholly unprepared, and it is with the utmost diffidence I now address you.

Today we meet on memorial ground, where a little more than a year ago, our gallant regiment led almost the advance of that army which achieved such signal victory.

Here our blood that the Nation might live. Here our comrades gave their lives in defence of that flag which is the emblem of liberty in which treason received its death blow. Here in this beautiful valley was fought one of the most momentous battles of history. Here the tide of battle stayed and turned back dismayed and discomfited; and it is with reasonable pride that we recount the valor of officers and men of the One hundred and fourth Regiment of New York Volunteers in that bloody battle.

The record imperishably engraved upon this monument of granite, speaks more eloquently than any words of mine of the valor of this gallant regiment. One hundred and ninety-nine officers and men, killed, wounded and missing, and 330 reported for duty upon the morning of the fight.

And now by the generosity of the State of New York, we come to dedicate this monument that has been erected to the memory of our fallen comrades.

And to you, sir, as the representative of the Gettysburg Monument Association, we intrust its keeping, trusting that these way-marks along the highway of life will ever be protected and cherished by a united and grateful people.

And as we shall make our pilgrimages to this spot in the years to come, may it be an incentive that shall keep our loyalty to the old flag unwavering while life shall last. And when we have answered to the last roll-call, and fought manfully the battles of life, may we be of that happy company who shall receive the welcome plaudit of "Well done, good and faithful servants."

THE 104TH NEW YORK AT GETTYSBURG,

BY COL. GILBERT G. PREY.

The 30th of June, 1863, found our corps near Emmitsburg, Md. Wadsworth's Division was within five miles of Gettysburg; Robinson's, with which was the One hundred and fourth, bivouacked that night at Emmitsburg. On the morning of July 1st, orders came to move. General Wadsworth's Division had the lead in the march. General Doubleday's followed, with General

Robinson's in the rear. Our march was north, towards Gettysburg, on the Emmitsburg Pike. A mile from Gettysburg we obliques to the left, crossing the field towards the Seminary and striking Seminary Ridge near the Hagerstown Road, taking position on the north side of the grove and on the west slope of the ridge. Here we were first under fire at Gettysburg. Soon we were moved farther north towards the railroad track, with order to keep our guns unloaded. The day had become quite showery. At this place Colonel Root of the Ninety-fourth was wounded by an exploding shell. From this point we moved still farther north. In this movement our brigade became so mixed with Baxter's that when we were across the railroad the Thirteenth Massachusetts Regiment was in line fronting the Mummasburg Road on the east slope of Seminary Ridge, the One hundred and fourth on the left of the Thirteenth, obliquing across the ridge westerly to a stone wall. This wall made an acute angle with the road, leaving a very obtuse angle in the battle lines. To our left on and along the ridge southerly was the Ninety-seventh New York of Baxter's Brigade. Joining the Ninety-seventh was the One hundred and seventh Pennsylvania, then the Sixteenth Maine, and the Ninety-fourth New York. The Ninety-fourth and the Ninety-seventh had exchanged brigades.

While the brigade was awaiting orders and the regiments were taking position I received an order from General Robinson in person to form on the right of the Thirteenth Massachusetts. I moved to form on the right, and so moved obliquely to the line of the Thirteenth, when there came from the crest of the ridge a stentorian voice: "Colonel Prey, — — you, where are you going? Form on the left." I glanced to the rear and saw at once that I was just in position so that by flanking to the left I would form on the left of the Thirteenth as nicely as if on brigade drill. Remembering that the guns were unloaded, and knowing that we would be engaged immediately, I gave the command to "March! Load at will!" The One hundred and fourth formed on the left of the Thirteenth on that occasion in as good style as General Robinson ever formed a regiment, or that he ever manoeuvred in a brigade drill.

Not until this time did General Paul appear on the field, and while riding up in the rear of the One hundred and fourth was shot through the face, destroying one eye and coming out under the other, but not injuring it. My horse was hit at the same time, obliging me to dismount, which General Robinson said he very much regretted as he wanted all his regimental commanders mounted; yet, I remember seeing all of the regimental commanders unmounted during that fight.

The brigade was getting demoralized by having no brigade commander. I saw General Robinson near where he had given me his forcible command, and asked who was in command of the brigade, as General Paul had been taken from the field wounded. He said, "Where is Colonel Root?" "Don't know; not here." "Where is Colonel Leonard?" "Not with his regiment." "You are next in rank, take command of the brigade!"

The firing was tremendous from the angle of the road and the stone wall. Seven color bearers had already been shot down. Upon coming up from

the right and reaching the angle I saw that in a few minutes we would have no men left, and gave the command to the left wing of the regiment to charge on the wall or they would all soon be dead men. Do you remember it, comrades? Do you remember that you hesitated? That was the only time I ever knew the One hundred and fourth to hesitate. I stepped in front and said, "I'll lead you, boys." You followed. The wall was taken and you were safe. I went back to the right wing; we made a similar charge on the Mummasburg Road, and not only took our position but captured over 60 prisoners, which we sent to the rear. Lieutenant Colonel Batchelder of the Thirteenth Massachusetts took them from our detail as they passed his regiment and reported them captured by the Thirteenth.

Upon passing up to the crest of the ridge I saw a column of Confederates passing into the McLean timber, and calculated they would be too many for us, as we had thus far three to one against us. I reported the fact to General Robinson, and that we would need reinforcement to hold our position. The Sixteenth Maine was sent to the angle, and while it was moving the order came to fall back to the timber, near the railroad leading to Chambersburg. We fell back, forming in good shape except the One hundred and seventh Pennsylvania, which was in command of its lieutenant colonel. We next received an order to fall back further, as the portion of the Eleventh Corps, north of Gettysburg, was running like scared sheep. We were obliged to fall back across the valley and just got through the lower part of the town "by the skin of our teeth," running the gauntlet through a storm of bullets. If General Howard had been on the plain with his men, and not allowed the Confederate troops to get in the rear of the First Corps, who were doing so splendidly, he would have been in better business than where he was on the ridge.

Let me tell you something. No man could then or can now, with any glass, stand on Cemetery Hill and see even the ground over which the First Corps fought that day, except one brigade on the extreme right. A strip of timber along the ridge from the Mummasburg Road to a point opposite the Round Tops hid the manoeuvring of Lee's forces. Besides, there were clumps of timber here and there along the whole ridge. General Howard told you over at Silver Lake that he commanded the First Corps while on Cemetery Hill with his glass, after General Reynolds was killed. As I remember, General Doubleday did. He told you that he it was who established the ground for fighting Lee's forces at Gettysburg. History says General Hancock did, being sent out for that purpose by General Meade.

If I hadn't been in the strife at Gettysburg I would have gone out from that lecture with the idea that General Howard fought the whole battle. Because a general outranks others, it's no reason he should assume to have done all the work. General Butterfield, at the meeting of the G. A. R. Posts of Livingston and Allegany, at Nunda, said that the private soldier did some of the work of putting down the Rebellion. He is the only general officer I ever heard talk who gave any credit to the men in the ranks. A little word is too often omitted after a general's name; it is "men," and the general's name should be followed by an apostrophe and an "s." Had there

been none to do the fighting but those who wore shoulder straps, there would have been small chance of putting down the Rebellion.

General Wadsworth's Division after the first day was in position east of Cemetery Hill, between the Eleventh and the Twelfth Corps, near Culp's Hill; Doubleday's, on the left of the Second Corps, toward Round Top; Robinson's, in Ziegler's Grove, south of the Cemetery, on the right of the Second Corps. General Robinson on arriving at the Cemetery Hill transferred Colonel Coulter with his regiment from Baxter's Brigade to Paul's, and Colonel Coulter, being superior in rank, replaced me in command of the brigade. In a few days he exchanged Colonel Coulter's regiment for the Ninetieth Pennsylvania, and Colonel Lyle took command of the brigade. Don't such things look a little like the shadow of Thoroughfare Gap?

At the close of the first day's fight the reported casualties in the One hundred and fourth was just one-half of its morning strength. During the second day we occupied a position along the Baltimore Pike on the east slope of the hill until the battle commenced, when we were moved to Ziegler's Grove. Near dark we and the Sixteenth Maine were moved up on the double-quick to help the Second Corps save their cannon, which were between the lines, with all the horses killed. They were hauled off by hand and all the pieces saved. As we arrived the last Confederate cannon was fired on that part of the field. It cut down two or three men of the Sixteenth Maine, and struck ground some five or six feet from where I stood. We were soon marched back to Ziegler's Grove. The One hundred and fourth was then moved to the rear of the batteries, and bivouacked for the night.

When the battle opened on the afternoon of the third day we were moved to the stone wall in front of the batteries and near the Emmitsburg Pike. We were in front of Pettigrew's Division, which moved with General Pickett on his famous charge.

The only casualty I am able to name on the third day was the wounding of Sergeant Gouber, of Company F, by a sharpshooter, when on his way to the picket line.

The monument of the One hundred and fourth Regiment says "eleven killed." I think it should say twenty-two. I understand the only casualties put on the monuments were those sent in on the first hasty report, instead of the full number for the three days' fighting.*

We remained at the Grove on the 4th and 5th, while the dead were being buried, and on the 6th followed the Confederates towards Williamsport, where they were allowed to cross the Potomac.

*The regimental report of its casualties, or "nominal list," was made after the third day. There were 11 killed and 18 mortally wounded in this regiment; but in reporting its losses the latter were necessarily included with the wounded, some of whom were probably killed. Had the corps retained possession of the ground the return could have been more accurately classified.— Ed.

[REDACTED]



J. B. LYON PRINT.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

107TH NEW YORK INFANTRY.

South slope of Culp's Hill, near Spangler's Spring. The open field in rear of monument is that over which the Twenty-seventh Indiana and Second Massachusetts made their memorable charge on July 3d. The marker in the centre of the field indicates the spot to which the Twenty-seventh advanced. At this time the ground where the One Hundred and Seventh monument stands was occupied by Smith's Virginia Brigade. The Second and Twenty-seventh started from the opposite side of the field.

(INSCRIPTIONS.)

(Front.)

107 N. Y. INFANTRY

3RD BRIGADE

1ST DIVISION,

12TH CORPS

(Reverse.)

OCCUPIED THIS POSITION
ON THE MORNING OF JULY 2,
WITHDRAWN AT 7 P. M., AND SENT TO NEAR
LITTLE ROUND TOP.
RETURNING DURING THE NIGHT
FOUND THESE WORKS
IN POSSESSION OF THE ENEMY.
DURING THE MORNING OF JULY 3,
WAS IN POSITION NEAR BALTIMORE PIKE.
REOCCUPIED THESE WORKS ABOUT 2 P. M.

(Right Side.)

ENGAGED IN ALL
THE OPERATIONS OF THE 12TH CORPS
IN THE EAST
AND
THE 20TH CORPS IN THE WEST,
FROM ANTIETAM
TO CLOSE OF THE WAR.

NEW YORK AT GETTYSBURG.

DEDICATION OF MONUMENT. 107TH REGIMENT INFANTRY.

September 17, 1888.

ADDRESS OF GEN. ALEX. S. DIVEN.

COMRADES AND CITIZENS:

Perhaps the period of greatest despondency in the struggle for the preservation of the Union was in the last days of June and on the 1st of July, 1862. On the 31 day of April, 1862, the Government was so sure of its strength as to order recruiting for the army to cease. This order must have been given either in ignorance of the strength of the enemy or without calculating the waste of the army from sickness, desertion and the casualties of battle. While other fields of contest were not overlooked, the great expectation of the Nation was centred on the occupation of Richmond and the capture of Lee's army as the ending of the struggle.

Early in the winter of 1862 an army considered by all, including its gallant commander, equal to the achievement, was in the field. A campaign was commenced that was confidently believed would meet this expectation. Why it then was not realized I do not consider, further than to say that it was not from want of courage, bravery, or skill on the part of the grand old Army of the Potomac, or the generalship of its commander. After the most heroic contest in a battle lasting from the 25th of June to the 2d of July, against unequalled numbers, instead of entering Richmond, all that was achieved was a base on the James River, from which Richmond might be besieged. However insignificant this advantage may have been regarded at that time, it took an equally protracted campaign and equally sanguinary series of battles to obtain the same base at a later date. Critics of the conduct of the war are, and perhaps always will be, divided as to the wisdom of abandoning this base of operations in 1862, to be obtained at a later day by a greater expenditure of time, money and life.

I allude to these events only to show the state of feeling throughout the country, from the fact that a campaign that was confidently expected to end the Rebellion had only obtained a base from which Richmond might be besieged. The whole country seemed paralyzed, if not in despair, by this disappointment. At this juncture the governors of most of the loyal States, at the suggestion of Governor Morgan of our own State, tendered to the President their aid to increase the army. Answering the address of these governors, the President issued a proclamation calling for volunteers to the number of xxxxxx, and indicating the proportion of each State. On the night of the 6th of July, sharing in common with almost everybody the gloom that seemed to envelop the Nation, at a late hour, sitting on the door-step of my lodgings, a boy came to me, saying the President wanted to see me at Mr. Seward's house. Never before having received so distinguished a summons I followed the messenger at once. Arriving at the Secretary's house, I found there none but the Secretary, Mr. Van Valkenburgh and Theodore Pomeroy. On enter-

ing the room, Mr. Seward, without the customary greeting, in what was for him a most abrupt manner, said: "Diven, can't you go home and raise a regiment?" To make my answer a little more curt than the question, I said "Yes." He then rose hastily and greeted me with more warmth than he had ever shown towards me before, and then told me that the President had been with him until a late hour; that he had sent for a number of the New York members of Congress, whom the President had asked to raise regiments; that they had not met with much encouragement, more than a promise to think of it; that Pomeroy and Van Valkenburgh had agreed to go home and try, and they at a late hour suggested that he send for me; that the President and all had left, as it was past 12, and that Van Valkenburgh and Pomeroy had waited to see what I would say. He then said: "Your promptness was somewhat a surprise, but nothing could gratify me more. Be off to-morrow."

By this time I began to consider the undertaking I had assumed so promptly. I asked him to give me a letter to Charles Cook, the value of whose influence I well understood. He at once sat down and wrote probably the most laconic letter of his life. It simply said, "Help Diven." I have alluded to the events leading up to this interview at the Secretary's house, because it was then and there the One hundred and seventh Regiment had its inception. Van Valkenburgh, Pomeroy, and myself, late as it was, went to Pomeroy's rooms and arranged that they should leave in the morning, and that I should remain until the session of the House, and ask leave of absence for each one. I desired to stay because a few days before I had prepared a bill for the enlistment of colored troops, giving notice of its introduction, and was waiting until, in the order of business, I could introduce it. The bill was in my desk in the House, and I wanted to commit it to some member friendly to its passage. In asking leave of absence I obtained leave for remarks, and used the privilege to allude to this bill, and to make an argument in its favor. I gave it to the care of Thaddeus Stevens, who greatly improved its provisions before its passage. I allude to this as a good excuse for disobeying Seward's order to leave in the morning. As it was, I reached home on the evening of the 8th, in time to forward my letter to Cook, with a letter of my own about as remarkable for brevity as the one forwarded, and, coming from me, not at all remarkable for some bad grammar. I had the satisfaction the next day but one to receive a printed handbill containing a copy of Seward's letter and mine, and calling a war meeting at the court-house in Havana. And that meeting opened the ball for recruiting the One hundred and seventh.

In the meantime, General Van Valkenburgh had convened what was called the senatorial committee for volunteer recruiting for the Twenty-seventh Senatorial District, and arranged for enlisting and officering a regiment, with Van Valkenburgh as colonel, myself as lieutenant colonel, and Colonel Smith as major. A series of meetings was arranged for Corning, Bath and Addison, which were attended and addressed by Van Valkenburgh, Smith, and others. There was no occasion for a meeting in Elmira. Every man, woman and child seemed to be a recruiting agent, and so rapid were the enlistments, that after the meetings alluded to, Van Valkenburgh had all he could do in attending to the mustering in and organizing the recruits, an office for which he

was thoroughly qualified, having discharged this duty in organizing the first volunteers for the service. On this occasion he was assisted by Colonel Smith. Meantime a series of war meetings for different places in the counties of Schuyler, Chemung, Steuben, and Allegany were advertised. The late Dr. Tracy Beadle, Rev. Thomas K. Beecher and myself addressed these meetings, Dr. Beadle furnishing his carriage for our conveyance.

I had more than once attended public meetings on political and other occasions when excitement ran high, but I never witnessed anything to compare with the enthusiasm attending these gatherings. There were no divisions, no politics, nothing but a united zeal to sustain the Government. These meetings were arranged for two each day, one by day and one by night. Most of our night meetings were out-door by torch-light, for want of halls large enough to contain the crowd. Appeals at these meetings were for enlistments for those willing to enlist, and for money from those that did not enlist, to be given as bounty to those that did. Our appeals in either case never went unanswered. We had gone through the program for Schuyler, Chemung, and Steuben, and were at our third meeting in Allegany, when I was telegraphed by Van Valkenburgh that the regiment was full, organization complete, and ordered at once to Washington. I left in the middle of a grand meeting at Friendship to join the regiment, and I always consider the service I rendered the country in raising the regiment much greater than commanding it. We had at these meetings not only recruited the quota for this regiment, but a surplus of 400 to be organized in another regiment.

In about four weeks from the time General Van Valkenburgh and myself left Washington, we were back with as fine a regiment as was ever mustered into service. On leaving the cars at Washington Station we were formed in line and reviewed by the President and Secretary Seward, who were there awaiting our arrival. This distinction was awarded us in consideration of our being the first to respond to the call for 300,000. In addition to this honor the Governor of our State presented us a banner. We, however, had little precedence in this exhibition of loyalty from our own and other States. New regiments from all parts of the country arrived faster than they could be assigned to brigades and divisions. Our own regiment was not assigned to a brigade until on the march to meet the enemy at Antietam, and when the order came assigning us to General Gordon's brigade, I spent half a day among a confused mass of moving troops trying to find him. I have no occasion to detail events known to you as well as to myself, between our arrival at Washington and our first battle at Antietam; but I am proud to say that at that first baptism of war the regiment acquitted itself, not as a regiment of raw recruits, but as tried veterans. And we were so reported by our commanding general. It was by accident that we were placed in a position that is most trying to real courage. We had been ordered by General Gordon to change our position, and while executing that order were stopped by General French and ordered to support a battery whose support had just retreated. And there for weary hours under fire from the enemy, without emptying a musket, we kept our position until the suspension of the fight.

I need not remind you of the weary life of the regiment from its participa-

tion in this, its first great battle, to that of its next at Chancellorsville, in which it lost nothing of the reputation gained at Antietam, other than to allude to our losses from sickness. Soon after Antietam, while encamped at Maryland Heights, we were first deprived of our honored, revered, and loved Colonel Van Valkenburgh, from a disease caused by exposure, from which he never fully recovered, resulting in his death a few months ago. Added to this was a prevailing disease, designated by the doctors as pneumonia, that continued with the regiment through the winter, and to which more than 100 of our comrades succumbed. At Fairfax Station, on a forced march to participate in the battle of Fredericksburg, we were ordered to send all unable to endure a forced march to Washington. Lieutenant Colonel Smith, being at that time on the sick-list, was detailed with about thirty disabled men in accordance with this order, and the regiment was thereafter deprived of his valuable services. It should be mentioned that on the resignation of Van Valkenburgh I was advanced to the colonelcy, and Major Smith to the lieutenant colonelcy, and on Smith's resignation, Captain Colby was advanced to lieutenant colonel, and Capt. William F. Fox to the rank of major. These were the only changes in the field and staff of the regiment during my command.

The battle of Chancellorsville, it seems to me, was the saddest event of the war. Our defeat arose from no want of bravery on the part of our troops, and few regiments exhibited more courage than the One hundred and seventh. There may have been a Providence in that defeat. It emboldened the enemy to take the offensive in leading to his overthrow on this battlefield. Soon after Chancellorsville I left the regiment, and its course after that can be better related by the officer succeeding me. I knew enough of it, however, to state that it lost none of its reputation, and that its service clearly entitled it to the recognition given it on this occasion. The field of no battle in the world is marked by mementos of events as this. Statues to mark the places where heroes fell, and monuments to tell where regiments fought and bled. Comrades, we that still survive may justly take pride in that our regiment is not left out in these testimonials of a Nation's gratitude.

TRANSFER OF MONUMENT.

ADDRESS BY GEN. N. M. CRANE.

COMRADES OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTH NEW YORK:

After over a quarter of a century we are again assembled upon this immortal battlefield, a small number of those who stood with us on that day. The circumstances by which we are surrounded are very different from those of July 2 and 3, 1863. We are assembled here to-day for the purpose of dedicating this beautiful monument, presented to us by the great and noble State of New York, to commemorate the bravery, valor and self-sacrifice made by you on that day in behalf of our State and Nation. It was upon this line that the glorious old Twelfth Corps stood, firm as the rocks by which we are sur-

rounded, for long hours resisting the assaults of our enemies directed upon this point for the purpose of turning this flank of our army. After twenty-six years I again see, in imagination, the long lines of gray rushing upon us with savage energy. Amid flame and smoke, amid the roar of musketry and storm of deadly missiles, with the dead and wounded falling around us, the gallant One hundred and seventh stood like a wall, firm and unfaltering, determined that no power should move us from our position. On our right and left the gallant men of other regiments resented the furious attack for hours, until the enemy was hurled back, shattered and bleeding from our determined front. At this point, on that memorable day, you assisted to repulse one of the famous fighting corps of Lee's army,—Jackson's old corps,—and sent them to the rear defeated, shattered, and demoralized. On this line was made one of the most ferocious assaults, with long and stubborn determination, that was made on this field, not excepting the famous charge of Pickett's Division at a later hour of the same day on another part of our lines, the defeat of which foreshadowed the result of this great battle.

This monument will be a lasting record of your devotion and bravery as long as granite will endure. Future generations will visit this famous field, and gaze with wonder and admiration upon this spot, made sacred by your blood and devotion. Many comrades who stood side by side with us on that day have found a bloody grave, from the Tennessee to Atlanta, from Atlanta to the Sea, and at Bentonville and Averasborough. Time has silvered the hair of all of us, and in a few more years all who are now present will have passed away. But you leave to your children a lasting legacy more valuable than all else on earth—the record of a faithful, brave devotion to your country, and the knowledge that by your deeds and suffering this grand and glorious Nation was preserved, and the liberties handed down to us by our forefathers were preserved and maintained; that the curse of slavery was forever wiped out from this continent, and millions of human beings forever made free; that the great principle was carried out that all men were born free and equal and shall have equal rights under the Constitution and laws; and that you demonstrated to the world that the government made by the people and for the people will be forever maintained.

Mr. Krauth, as the representative of the One hundred and seventh New York Volunteers, I hand over the custody of this monument to the Gettysburg Battlefield Association, which you represent, knowing it will be in safe-keeping, and forever preserved for the purposes intended.

HISTORICAL SKETCH,

BY CAPT. ARTHUR S. FITCH.

There were 400 of "ours" who awakened as the shrill notes of the reveille echoed among the Allatoona Hills in Georgia, at 3:30 o'clock on the morning of May 25, 1864. Four hundred seasoned veterans, young in years, but full-grown soldiers in experience. We had received our baptism of fire at bloody Antietam, faced the terror of those dark woods at Chancellorsville, and had

stood "where the earth trembled" at Gettysburg. We had come with Sherman's victorious armies from Middle Tennessee well into the interior of Georgia, and thus far success had been our constant companion. There was a buoyancy of feeling and a consciousness that we were invincible, and the sun arose that day on as confident and well-ordered an array of soldiers as anywhere marched beneath the flag.

I see them now, as they stood in line on that bright May morning, the breakfast of coffee, hard tack, and meat disposed of, accoutrements slung, guns taken from the stack and carefully wiped and examined, awaiting the command for another day's advance. There is no look of care or anxiety on their faces. Theirs but to obey whatever others commanded. "Theirs but to do." Alas! Alas! How little thought we that for more than two score of our number the "death watch" had already been set; that for many a loved comrade the last earthly bivouac had been broken, the last "harnessing up" and preparation for the day's march had been made; and that the day begun so blithely was to end in a night of death and sorrow. At 8:30 a. m. the word "forward" is given. Our 400 quickly fall into line, the old files of four again "touch elbows," and away they go with

"The loose disorder of the rout step march
The song, the shout, the witticism arch,"

marching on to new experiences. The sun shines warm and the air is that of June. There is a look of satisfaction on the face of every soldier, and a feeling of contentment in every heart. The "welcome noontide rest" comes. At 1:30 p. m. the column is again in motion; no enemy has appeared to dispute the advance; the roads are good, the marching easy. It is 3 o'clock in the afternoon and all is well. Suddenly a sharp "halt" passes down the line, and "the dust-brown ranks stood fast." "About face" and "march" is the command. At a quicker pace we now move back along the route just traversed; a look of eager curiosity is seen on each face; a murmur of speculation runs along the column; and as we turn from the road and cross a creek that skirts a wooded slope, and see orderlies hurrying hither and thither, cannon in position, generals in consultation, and other signs the old soldier knows so well how to interpret, there comes a seriousness of face and a silence that betokens a change in our thoughts. We press quickly on to the top of the slope, form line of battle, and stand quietly awaiting developments. The "White Star" boys of Geary's Division are there also, and the "Blue Stars" of General Butterfield's Division are ordered to join the array.

Suddenly bang, bang, bang, go the guns of a field battery, pointed into the shade of the forest that extends before us. The shriek of the flying shells and their explosions awaked with noisy echoes its gloomy recesses; but they provoke no response of hostile guns. Again and again they speak, but the result is the same. The day is waning. The "obstructions" must be brushed away, and Gen. "Pap" Williams's "Red Stars" must do it. The three brigades are drawn out in a long, straight line, stretching away to the right and left of us, aligned as if on dress parade, a living line of steel and blue. "Atten-

tion!" Then a bugle note, then sharp words of command, and as one man the division moves forward.

Never shall I forget that array. There was a mighty sound of tramping feet, quick cries of command: "Steady men!" "Guide on the colors!" "Steady on the right!" "Steady on the left!" "Forward there in the centre!" "Pap" Williams and his staff rode close behind us, and his bugler speaks in tones easily heard by all of us. Down the slope we go, across the narrow ravine, and up the other side. A thinly-wooded level stretches out far in front. We see our line of skirmishers pressing rapidly forward, and a moment later our peering eyes detect a skirmish line of men in gray as rapidly falling back before them. "Double-quick!" sounds the bugle. "Double-quick!" shout the officers; and with arms at a right-shoulder shift, away spring our eager men.

Never shall I forget that scene. Never before nor afterwards have my eyes witnessed such a sight. As far to the left and right as the eye could see stretched that dark line undulating with the cadence of the double-quick step, crashing into the forest in all the confidence of a victory already won.

But, look! The skirmishers have come to a stand. They are making frantic gestures to us to stop. But the line goes on over beyond them. A little farther and the pace slackens; our straining eyes see through the trees the outlines of fortifications, while the zip, zip, whiz, whiz, of leaden missiles attracts our attention. The line comes to a halt; from the front comes unmistakable evidence of an enemy in force awaiting us. We are fairly trapped. A frowning line of earthworks blocks the way, covering Stewart's whole division of "Joe" Johnston's army. Their fire is already getting uncomfortably hot. There ensues a brief moment of preparation along our ranks, and then down come the rifles of our 400 to a "ready," and out blazes a volley that tells the waiting enemy that we are there.

It was a sight thrilling beyond description,—one never forgotten. I did not hear a word of command to fire. I think none was given. By a common impulse each man saw the time had come, and that first volley was as simultaneous as if they had been practicing on drill.

But a terrible response came. From the dark covert in front leaped a fiery discharge of rifle and cannon, filling the air with the rushing sound of deadly missiles. Shot and shell, canister and minie balls came tearing over us and around us and through us, ploughing great gaps in our closed ranks, sweeping away our men by files and platoons, making by that one discharge skeletons of what a moment before had been solid companies.

How changed the scene. Two hours before these boys were marching with careless glee along the sunlit road towards Dallas, in the flush of manly vigor, without a thought of the cruel fate that lay so close before them. Now they are breasting the full tide of furious battle. As if in keeping, the sky is overcast and threatening, and the growing gloom adds to the terrors of the scene. The men see their comrades falling about them, they hear the groans of the wounded, the fierce din of the conflict; they realize the hopelessness of the struggle, and that there is no chance of victory. Mutely the survivors stand with grim and resolute faces, loading and firing, keeping up the unequal contest, but with no thought of retreat.

A long, long hour of this, and the remnant of our 400 are relieved; slowly they pick their way to the rear and safety. Scarcely more than half of those who answered at roll-call that morning are left. The rest are out there in the woods dead, or are lying maimed and bleeding in the hospital tents close by. Mournful the scene. The survivors gather in little groups, and relate the dreadful experiences of that fateful hour. They speak with broken voices of those who have fallen. None but has lost a friend, the companion of many a march, a comrade who had slept beneath the same blanket and shared with him his army mess.

The darkness gathers, the rain begins to fall, and far in our front we hear the exchange of picket shots. It disturbs us little more than our dead comrades. We lie down on the wet ground, with tired bodies and aching hearts, and the day and its terrors are forgotten in a merciful sleep.

Thus ended the 25th day of May, 1864. Twenty-four years have passed. There survives to-day a remnant of the men who shared its experiences. Is it any wonder that as they gather to pay a loving tribute to their dead comrades their faces wear a serious expression? Their thoughts are away amidst the woods of Dallas.

"Oh, band in the pine woods cease,
Cease with your splendid call;
The living are brave and noble,
But the dead were bravest of all.

"They throng to the martial summons,
To the loud triumphant strain,
And the dear, bright eyes of long dead friends
Appeal to the heart again.

"They come to the ringing bugle,
And the deep drum's mellow roar,
Till the soul is faint with longing
For the hands we shall clasp no more."

As we follow memory's chain back to the scene I have described, how vividly reappear the forms and names of those who there met a soldier's heroic death. I see Capt. John F. Knox, with drawn sword, leap to the front of Company F, and with all the emphasis that voice and action can give, urge the men a little farther forward. Then comes the fatal volley, and he is struck down with a mortal wound. Brave Knox, but a day or two before I marched by his side, and he uttered these prophetic words: "It is more than probable that we shall draw our supplies from the sea coast before Christmas." It was an inspiring thought, and some of us lived to see its realization.

The same tidal wave of death swept away his second lieutenant, John Hill,—quiet, modest, young, beloved of all. How well I remember his coming with a picket relief that first night at Gettysburg, and finding me overcome with fatigue and sound asleep (a dreadful dereliction of duty at such time), quietly

awakened me and sent me with my picket guard to camp, without chiding or report to his superiors. I loved him from that hour.

From the same devoted company fell Jones, Johnson, Kelley, Miller, Mollson, Nellis, Teft and Young,—all dead or mortally wounded. The only remaining commissioned officer, First Lieut. John Orr, was scarcely less fortunate, being desperately wounded, and the total of killed and disabled numbered full two-thirds of those present at roll-call that morning.

Next neighbor to them was Company B. And its ranks yielded scarcely less to the destroyer. The soldierly Hay Grieve (the best soldier in the company, so the inspection report said), the quiet Louis Vreeland, brave old Martin Maguire, the fearless Corporal Munson, of the color guard, "Charlie" Keener, Van Gelder, Cooper, Bright, and Root,—all good men and true. I recall chivalrous Sergt. "Billy" Van Auken, of D Company, scarcely eighteen years old, twice wounded, yet insisting upon staying to "give them one more shot," and while in the act of loading his rifle struck dead by a Rebel bullet, alongside of Sergeant Ford and Private Armstrong of the same company. Company A gave up her splendid orderly sergeant, Cornelius Hammond, and duty sergeant, Charles Bolton, with Capt. John M. Losie, and a long train of wounded to swell its casualty list.

Captain, afterwards Major, Charles J. Fox, manfully held old Company C about the colors, and sees Brockway, Dressler, and Steinbeck go down to death beneath its folds.

Left Company E gave one of its excellent sergeants, Peter Compton; while from Company G fell Corporal Tomes, Privates Alderman, Jackson, Long, Sanford, and Smith,—heroes all.

Company H mourns her noble sergeant, Benjamin Force, and the names of Couch, Youmans, and Van Vleet, are still cherished among the hills of Schuyler. None are more deserving in this brief mention than Orderly Sergeant Marcy and Sergt. Eugene Thatcher who, with Alden and Horton, represent the sacrifice made by Company K. The same may be said of Corporal Newberry, and Privates Carpenter and Decker, of Company I.

These all died, a voluntary offering on the altar of their country. It seems fitting on this occasion that this roll-call should be made. In the homes throughout Chemung, Steuben, and Schuyler, these names will invoke feelings of mingled pride and regret, as their heroism and tragic fate is recalled.

"What is there to be said or done?
They are departed, we remain;
Their race is run, their crowns are won;
They will not come to us again.

"Cut off by fate before their prime
Could harvest half the golden years,
All they could leave, they left us — time;
All we could give, we gave them — tears."

THE CAMPAIGNS OF THE 107TH,

By CAPT. H. G. BRIGHAM.

AUTUMN-LEAVED COMRADES OF THE OLD ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTH:

What a change has been wrought since last I met you in your spring leaves of years ago. Many an autumn has passed since then, and leaf after leaf has fallen from the grand old tree. Comrades, it has not been my pleasure to meet with you in all this time, and you cannot tell how strongly my heart has yearned to be with you. It has seemed to me as though I had been on detached service; and if I were to live this life over, I would say to the commander, "Please excuse me; I would prefer to stay with the boys; detail someone else."

Our first experience was on picket duty at Second Bull Run. Colonel Diven was then the officer of the day of our brigade; General French came along with his division, and I thought he was going to swallow Colonel Diven whole. He wanted to know whether or not he was in the enemy's country, or what those things were,—meaning the boys who had their coats unbuttoned, and were lying on the grass with their cartridge boxes beside them. I happened to be present and heard the conversation, whereupon I made the best time I knew over the hill to where I was doing my first duty as a lieutenant of the picket, hustled the boys up, told them to button up and get in shape. I said I guessed King Charles or General Jackson was coming, and as his august body came within saluting distance we gave it to him. Then he raised his hat and said: "Now I know we are protected by soldiers. Who commands that line, sir?" "Colonel Diven, sir," I replied.

We claim no action in this battle of Bull Run, other than the action on the drum of the ear. What green soldiers we were then! We could scarcely turn around without stepping on ourselves! September 5th finds us at Fort Albany; on the 6th we marched to join McClellan's army; on the 8th we were attached to Gordon's Brigade, Williams' Division; arrived at Frederick, Md., on the 13th; on the 14th we waded the Monocacy Creek, and soon after saw the shells bursting over South Mountain. After this comes the memorable Antietam, September 17th, which was in reality our opening chorus. Here, in my old company, G, eleven fell killed and wounded by one shell, among whom was poor little Willie Everts, merely a child of sixteen,—with both legs shot away. He soon died. His agonizing cries in the din of the battle I shall hear to my grave. Here we found war a reality. It was here that the noble General Mansfield was shot from his horse and soon died. I can see his gray beard now, as he reeled and fell from his horse into the hands of one of his aids. Proud are we of him! Our corps commander then!

From September 22d to December 10th we were encamped on Maryland Heights, and at Antietam Ford, where we listened to the daily sad dirge of the drum which answered to the havoc created in our ranks by typhoid fever. December 10th we again broke camp, marched through the Loudoun Valley, and thence for the battle of Fredericksburg via Wolf Run Shoals, where we received the compliments of a few of their stray shells. January 29, 1863,

we broke camp at Fairfax Station in a fearful storm, and again we marched,—our mud march. Think of mud in a brickyard before it goes to press, and you get some idea of it. We arrived at Stafford Court House on the 23d, left there on the 27th, and marched through streams, rain, and sleet until we arrived at Hope Landing, on Aquia Bay, where we encamped. The sleet turned to snow, and we awoke in the morning with at least six inches of snow over us. Here we encamped for the winter, and again the sad funeral dirge was heard, as we buried seventeen comrades who died of fever. We laid them in a neat little regimental graveyard, each with a headstone erected by his comrades.

April 26th we struck tents and marched via Stafford Court House to Kelly's Ford, on the Rappahannock, and on the 30th arrived at Germanna Ford on the Rapidan. Here we captured a lot of Confederates building a bridge, and drove their lines over the river. We crossed in water up to our necks, and advanced the line beyond a mile. On May 1st we reached the Chancellorsville House. In the afternoon we made a reconnoissance, and found the enemy in full force. We returned to our camp over night, built elegant breastworks, and on Saturday afternoon got ourselves in light marching order to go after and capture Lee's wagon train. While we were on a quick march after it, an orderly came riding up with orders for us to return at once, as the Eleventh Corps had broken, and the enemy had the works. Back we marched; and there we found them. Those works we built, and we wanted them. Stonewall Jackson's command was in them. Was there ever such lurid works of hell? Hand to hand, our shell into us, and then into them,—their shells into them, and then into us. We each had many cannon back of us, and we each became the objective of concentrated fires. Here was where the great Stonewall Jackson fell. Finally the darkness brought a lull. Here we lay, face to face, with videttes firing, until the light of day, when we again commenced that desperate fight which continued until nearly noon. We were then relieved by a Zouave command, but we had no sooner got twenty rods to the rear than they broke like a western cyclone, and again we had to face and hold our line with fixed bayonets until relieved by more reliable troops. This was an awful struggle for existence! How fortunate we were to have for our brigade commander Gen. Thomas A. Ruger, who fought so heroically against the stone wall of Jackson's Brigade, and who found the red stars invincible. And how sad the ending! Many of our killed and wounded were burned in the woods. It was here that poor Capt. Nat. Rutter was mangled by a shell, and soon died. Here many joined the silent camp. Of Company G, to which I then belonged, was killed poor Sergeant Hotchkiss, Corporal Stratton, and seven others wounded, one of whom was then little Jimmie Voorhees, and who has since carried a wooden leg. To this we gave on May 1st, 2d, and 3d, our especial attention, with about two days' grace before we crossed that pontoon at United States Ford. Thence that awful mud march to Stafford Court House. Here the Johnnies were very kind to have built houses and evergreen parks for us; all we had to do was to finish the roofs. Still, after one or two days' rest there, we became very active; but salt and soap put a quietus to it.

On June 13th, we headed for the Pennsylvania campaign. We marched to

Dumfries, thence to Fairfax Court House, and thence on the Pike to Leesburg, where Colonel Crane joined and commanded us from June 24, 1863. Then came out that fearful hot sun, and so many of our regiment were sun-struck, many of whom have never been the same men since. Thence on to Ball's Bluff, where we again put up rifle pits. On the 26th, we crossed the Potomac at Edwards Ferry, on pontoons. Thence to Poolesville, Maryland, Frederick City, Middletown, and Littlestown. Now came the great vibration of aerial notes at Gettysburg; and proud are we, the One hundred and seventh, to have been in it. It was America's great battle. While we were fortunate in it, we grandly did our duty, and faced hell. Fortunate? Yes, far more so than those who faced us. Here I received the compliments of some jolly Confederates on my knee; but was hurt only temporarily.

The One hundred and seventh was engaged as follows: July 1st we had a light skirmish and supported battery all night; on the 2d were building breast-works all day under a galling shell fire; at evening we left the works and went to support the Third Corps, which was hard pressed, and as they were holding their own, we were ordered back to our works. Here our brigade halted in double columns of divisions, en masse, ready for a deploy, about forty rods in the rear of our works. Colonel Crane said to me, "I guess we had better go down and see what is there before we advance the men." I told him I thought it would be well. It was too dark to distinguish troops, and as we got to our works, some command was just breaking ranks in them. The colonel said: "What command is this, Sir?" I think the answer was, "The Second Louisiana, sir." Colonel Crane said: "Oh, yes, sir; all right, sir." As we did not care to associate with them then and there, we changed direction to the rear and got back to our command. Whereupon the colonel ordered a deployment of the regiment, and I think it was the One hundred and forty-seventh Pennsylvania that fired on us, and the Forty-sixth Pennsylvania, Colonel Selfridge, fired on them, all mistaking each other. Here we arranged to retake the works on the morning of the 3d, which was done at such a fearful loss to the Second Massachusetts and Twenty-seventh Indiana regiments of our brigade.

In the morning, the 4th, it rained, and we made a reconnoissance in support of Pleasanton's Cavalry to the enemy's left, returning to the works that day. Sunday, the 5th, at 3 p. m., we left the works and marched through Littlestown, Frederick City, Crampton's Gap, crossed Antietam Bridge, and on the 10th encamped on the old Antietam battlefield. On the 11th formed line of battle at Fair Play and lay till noon, when the One hundred and seventh and the Third Wisconsin made a reconnoissance of two miles and found the enemy in force. July 12th, it threw up works in front of them; on the 14th, chased them to Williamsport and to the river at Falling Waters; and you all recollect the competitive drill, the heavens, the Johnnies, and us. First the clouds would burst with hail upon us, and we with hail on the Johnnies, and they on us. It was "Hail! Columbia!" And as we lay in that conflict it would seem as if an avalanche of mud would deluge us. Thunder, lightning, hail, mud, bullets! A grand spectacular scene.

From here we wound our way back over the Antietam grounds to Mary-

land Heights, crossed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, thence through the Blue Ridge, near Snickersville; thence to Ashby's Gap, Manassas, and Warrenton Junction, where we subsisted liberally on green corn and blackberries, until we went to Kelly's Ford, where we arrived August 1st, and remained there drilling and swapping coffee for tobacco with the Johnnies. Do you not recollect the old gray horse of the Confederate grand rounds, which we used to watch daily with our glasses? Again, on September 16th, we strike tents, and General Kilpatrick crosses at Kelly's Ford and General Buford at Rappahannock Ford. The old white horse with his rider must have been surprised, for he rides round and round in a circle until he is taken in. We now march to Raccoon Ford. Here the Confederate sharpshooters made it lively for us as we lay in the mud. On the 18th we witnessed a deserter shot; on the 24th of September we went to Brandy Station; thence on to Bealton, passing over the Manassas battle ground; thence to Alexandria, Washington, and on to the Relay House. Here we received Horace Greeley's favorite order, "Go west, young man." From this time on we were under the command of General Hooker, of whose name every man of the Twentieth Corps was proud; and he in return was proud of his fighting star corps.

At Baltimore we took the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad through Maryland, West Virginia, Ohio, Indiana, and into Kentucky and Tennessee, where we encamped on the Nashville Road. At each station in Ohio and Indiana it seemed as though the people could not do enough for us. These were the first real victuals we had seen since we left home, and we nearly foundered. Here many a pretty girl would catch it on the cheek, as our train would depart from the various depots; all good-naturedly, of course, for the love of country. Many a correspondent was made then by our brief depot flirtations. Poor Chaplain Crane! How many letters we signed his name to, and address, inclosing a photo purporting to be his, with a request to be answered. These letters were loaded with honey; for awhile he could not account for these strange epistles, but he finally "caught on." God bless the old chaplain.

Arriving at Nashville October 3d, we go down through Murfreesboro to Decherd, where we first guard railroad in the west. Thence to Tullahoma, Wartrace, and Fosterville, where Companies H and I were detached and garrisoned one mile from there. From here the regiments and headquarters were as follows: Brigade headquarters at Tullahoma, with headquarters of the regiment at Shelbyville. Some of the regiment at Wartrace, under the command of Lieut. Col. William F. Fox; a detachment at Bellbuckle, under command of Capt. John J. Lamon; and my command at Bragg's Bridge, where we put in as good a time as we could possibly desire. No neater, happier, better soldiers ever existed than here; the weather was such as to make us enjoy the drill, and if there was a game the boys were not onto, then I do not know it. Base ball, hunting quail and turkey, playing cards, fighting dogs, chickens, courting Confederate girls,—all had its many grand rounds. (If you question the latter, ask Maj. "Charlie" Fox or Captain Bachman.) Do you remember Col. William F. Fox's artillery practice, with a bursted piece, shelling the cavalry in the woods from Shelbyville? What a commotion it caused! How the orderlies flew from Tullahoma, for each commandant to be on the alert, as it was supposed the Johnnies had shelled our cavalry;

While here we received the broken remnants of the One hundred and forty-fifth New York to swell our shrunken columns. And a good acquisition were they to us, as they proved themselves good soldiers, and soon became a part and parcel of us. April 27, 1864, we break camp, and assemble on our colors at Shelbyville, preparatory to Sherman's Atlanta campaign. How proud our colonel must have then been to be the commander of such healthy, well-drilled, disciplined soldiers, as were assembled there again. And no regiment could have been more proud of their commander than we of the One hundred and seventh New York, of our loved, brave colonel, Nirom M. Crane. April 30th we are again on our way.

We now, May 14th, first crossed arms with Johnston's army at Snake Creek Gap, Ga. A division of the Fourth Corps here had been flanked from their works, and left to the enemy two field pieces, whereupon our brigade (Ruger's) was ordered to the conflict. We went in, advanced over a high hill, charged down through a valley on the double quick and recaptured the pieces. And then went up three times three and a tiger. You know what that means? Yes, the "stars" own the work. Right after this came our first recognition from the western army, which came in the form of "Bully for the paper collars, boys"—an article which they really believed we always wore in the eastern army, but which, in reality, to us was an unknown quantity. We were no feather beds, but drilled, disciplined, fighting soldiers of the Potomac; and ever after, in passing them, we could hear them say: "Oh, say! Those are Hooker's men!" The next day, May 15th, the battle of Resaca occurred. Here we double-quickened by the right flank for quite a distance, and for a while the Johnnies were all "pitchers" and no "catchers." This was where our lieutenant colonel, William F. Fox, was wounded by the explosion of a shell. We passed in the rear of Harrison's (Benjamin F.) Brigade, going on the right by file into line, and then moved solidly and steadily on the enemy like an endless chain carrying logs to a mill. Again it is three times three and a tiger! We had their works.

On May 16th we followed the enemy across the Oostenaula River to Pine Chapel, and on May 19th found them intrenched at Cassville. We drove them from their intrenchments, and, as they were retreating in the dark, their firing looked like fire-flies on the hillside. The 23d we crossed the Etowah River; and then came the sad May 25th, at Dallas, Ga. Here we lost nearly half of the regiment present, killed or wounded. Among the dead lay the noble Capt. John F. Knox, Lieutenant Hill, and scores of brave fellows. Here Captain Losie lost a leg; and here I lost Sergt. Bennie Force, Corp. Van Vleet, Myron Couch and John Morgenson, killed; and Ord. Charles H. Duryea badly wounded. Out of 44 present for duty of my loved Company H, 18 were either killed or wounded. May 26th, 27th, and 28th we were constantly under fire while supporting a battery. On the 29th the enemy made four distinct attacks upon our works, and each time was repulsed; on the 30th and 31st we were under heavy fire of artillery. On June 1st we moved three miles to the left and took a position under the hill near Dallas Gap. On June 2d we were again supporting battery ("Buckskin's"), which we did by skirmishing, getting under the enemy's works, and holding their guns still,

On the 10th, the enemy fell back and across the Chattahoochee. We followed them up to their works, at Peach Tree Creek. This is where our brave Major Baldwin was killed while commanding the skirmish line. His command was driven back and he remained, firing at the enemy, and in this position was pierced through the eye with a bullet. Soon the line rallied and recaptured his body, which had been robbed of his coat, boots and watch. He shortly after was relieved from his misery by death. In this fight our brigade was in the second line of battle. The first line was suffering greatly as could be seen by the wounded men coming out. As we were at the edge of a field, and the men engaged in our immediate front were in the woods, it made our men nervous, thinking there would be nothing left in front but dead. Of course they soon built works in our front. Here the men got more nervous, and began to get their guns in position to resist. General Hooker was there and said: "Keep cool, boys, keep cool; don't you see that little rise there?" I think it was Martin Ryan, a noble soldier of the regiment, who saluted and said, "Yes sir." Hooker replied and said: "Just wait until you see the whites of their eyes there. Its a d——n good place to bury them." It was here that Captain Bennett of our regiment, then on Williams's staff, was sitting on his horse, when a ball struck the ground, glanced, and hit him on the forehead. While it did not prove serious, it made him rather seasick for an hour or so. July 22d, was the battle of Atlanta. Here the Rebels charged our lines and were repulsed. This is where McPherson fell. He was to us what Stonewall Jackson was to the Rebels.

Here we lay besieging the city, getting more and more affectionate, and nearer and dearer to them, until we are in their works, under the mammoth forts. Here we go on and off picket in the still night, as it is not healthy to move around too much in the day-time. In consequence we lay there in the trenches on our sides, during rain, mud, and shine, not allowing our heads higher than our works, the top of which are made of emptied cartridge boxes filled with sand, and placed so as to permit a port view. We arranged them so as to prevent the enemy from running their guns out of their embrasures on us; and from this position we made it unhealthy for their cannoneers. Here in our main works we had a grand show at evening. Every five minutes we would give them a shell from our siege pieces. Then our bands played our National airs, and alternately they played theirs. The works of each army were close together. This was a play to which none had tickets except the soldiers; and they all had front seats.

September 2d, Atlanta was evacuated, and the One hundred and seventh were among the first to enter, for which they are given the position of honor in the city, that of guard duty, which to us was our first soft snap. It was here we had our club rooms, containing two billiard tables with about half a yard of cloth gone from each. The balls were three-quarters chipped. We used rake handles for cues, with leather nailed on the ends; and before we left the club at night we were generally left-handed, near-sighted, and cross-eyed.

Before leaving here we leveled the round-house, freight depot, and tore up all the track in the city, as a military necessity. November the 16th, at 6 o'clock a. m., we were up in line and commenced "The march to the sea." At our last view of the city, its flames were flaunting in the air, an act which

ember 6th. We crossed over to the island, and took possession of a rice mill which we worked with our Georgia contrabands. While here some of the skirmishers of the One hundred and fiftieth New York, with Battery M, First New York, captured the Confederate steamer *Ida*, and the Third Wisconsin Infantry captured the Confederate steamer *Resolute*, each of which were tenders to the Confederate ironclads. While here, Major Fox and myself thought it would be fun to go a fishing. So we got a yawl boat and went to the south side of the island, where we anchored to a torpedo timber which stuck out of the water. We thought it was the bow of some sunken craft. Here we saw a boat coming up the river from Savannah, and thought it was a merchant vessel. We noticed it broadside about 11 a. m., high tide, when she opened with a goose egg, and sent it over us and into the rice mill. What could of the black birds got out there and then. Major and I did not stay in the yawl much longer.

After this we (our brigade), crossed over to the South Carolina shore, where we had frequent skirmishes. We formed a crescent with our right and left resting on the river, and each day at high tide their gunboats would come up and shell us. On the 20th we could hear the Rebels retreating at evening over their pontoons, and we reported the same to headquarters; but in the morning we found them encircling friends. In the afternoon they afforded us one of the most beautiful and exciting skirmishes we had. They advanced on our right with cavalry; we held fire until they were in good range, and then dropped them most effectually from their saddles. We made it so hot for them they had to dismount, and march to the rear. Then their infantry tried it; but the dikes were to our and their disadvantage, and they were glad to quit. When their gunboats would shell us, the shells would go over us into them, and the Johnnies would holler over to us: "Lay down, Yanks; those darn fools of ours will kill the whole of us yet. Get down, get down; there comes another bucket of swill."

Our Second Division, Twentieth Army Corps, took possession of Savannah, it being the first to enter, and here we had orders to return. We withdrew the main forces to the island in the evening, and had to bring in the skirmish line the next. Here, after we returned to the island, Capt. Arthur S. Fitch was wounded. We spent our Christmas at Savannah. From this point we make a feint on Augusta, and go to Robertsville and Blackburn Turnout where they have a little cavalry brush with our pickets; and thence we go northeasterly until we begin to think we own the country.

Here Lieutenant Whitehorn came in one day, he being in command of the forage detail, having been something like twenty-five miles from the main column, though his orders were not to exceed five miles. I handed him my revolver, telling him not to go so far from the column or the Johnnies would take him. He said there were no Johnnies who could take him. This, I think, was March 8th. His detail consisted of himself and 22 men. Major Fox and Adjutant Benedict thought it would be fun to accompany them for the day. So, off they started, and got to a place near Solomon's Grove. Lieutenant Whitehorn met a body of men dressed in blue, and naturally thought they were Kilpatrick's. After passing flanks, the Rebs halted, fronted,

drew sabre, and ordered Whitehorn to surrender. He, thinking he could whip the whole Confederacy, refused to surrender. Many of his men had their guns strapped to their saddles; and the Rebs had the woods full back of them. Whitehorn was struck over the head with a sabre and shot through the arm. One man was killed and three wounded. Among the wounded was Cole, of Company E, shot through the lungs, and in this condition he made his way, I think, a distance of sixty miles, into our lines again. I hope he is living yet. Silas Grey, of Company H, was cut over the head with a sabre, and fell from his horse. He played possum on the Johnnies, and got into our lines. A truer, better soldier was never enlisted. After this conflict the Rebs sighted Major Fox and Adjutant Benedict, and they immediately started a race for our lines. Fox and Benedict were the winners. They got under the wire first, with the Johnnies shut out at the quarter post, or at our picket line. Except Grey and Cole, all of the command went to some Confederate prison.

From here we wound our way through the dense pines of the Carolinas, over the broad Salkahatchee, South and North Edisto Rivers, to Columbia on the Congaree, where we flanked to the west and north, and crossed the Congaree, thereby letting the Fifteenth Corps into Columbia. The city was burned that night. Thence we moved on to Winnsboro and Fayetteville. The whole of this march through the Carolinas was one of wonder, bringing our ordnance trains through these mammoth pines filled with pitch, all on fire, and the wagons nearly rubbing them. But no wagon caught on fire, nor was there a pound of powder lost. The fire adhered to the trees from the roots, thirty feet high, and all around was as bright and gay as a lawn party. Through all this grandeur each man's jaw was filled with pine gum, and I will venture to say the only ache or pain he then had was the over exertion of his jaw. All went merry as a marriage bell. Each night after we had gotten into camp those awful turpentine kilns would be set on fire, and seemingly the flames would leap 200 feet, resembling Niagara Falls reversed and illuminated, with a good share of that sound. It was not safe to approach within 150 feet of many of them.

Thus far, from Savannah, our conflicts were light, only that of skirmishing. And now we have about two days of fearful hard marching through cold rain and mud, over hills and hollows. Was there ever such a march on earth? Scarcely could you see your hand before you. The corduroy seemed to have the same action as a piano key. No sooner would you step on one end than the other would fly up. Some soldier would catch his toe in it, and down he would go, his gun coming over on his file leader's head; and it seemed to knock the whole file down for a space of ten men. No sooner did they recover than another windrow would go. We literally rolled in mud, and as the corduroy floated in it, and it froze as fast as it touched us,—we became pretty solid men, and nearly lost our identity.

On the 16th, our brigade overtook and supported Kilpatrick in his works, where we found ourselves completely enfiladed by Johnson. We changed direction to rear on left wing, and in this position, with Kilpatrick, had a hard, trying battle; but we held the enemy until the balance of our corps came

up, and we were the winners, and held the field of Aversborough. From there Johnson falls back to Bentonville, and again on March 18th to 21st we alternate from field to works, and works to field. Here several of the One hundred and seventh again catch it. You recollect one bad position we occupied when we charged the enemy's works, and found an abattis and creek intervening, whereupon we had to take it as plain as they sent it, until we gradually got up a small protection. Still the accuracy of our fire held them close to their works, until they were flanked. Later, a division of the Fourteenth Corps gives way before them, and on came the Rebs like an avalanche. Here our division — the red stars — comes to the rescue, with General Slocum in the midst of the charge urging us on. We soon rolled them back, and up went the three times three and a tiger. We won the day, and on the next we heard the noise as of rumbling thunder along the different parts of the line other than ours, and Johnston leaves us to Bentonville.

From here we move on to Goldsboro, a distance, I think, of about twenty-five miles, all the way over corduroy; and over this have to go our poor wounded comrades. Right here is a place where, if a soldier ever has any feeling for his comrades, it must develop itself. They had to be placed from five to seven in each ambulance. Some poor fellows with a leg off, some with an arm off, and some shot through and through, with every conceivable wound, and before we could reach Goldsboro, it would be a frequent matter to see from one to two dead in the different ambulances.

While at Goldsboro we heard of the surrender of Lee. Was there ever such another pandemonium on earth? Firing of cannon, guns, and every combustible thing. We even filled our canteens with powder and put them in the ground and burst them. A certain general sent down an order saying that any man who did not get full that day was no soldier.

We then wound our way around and up to Raleigh, and encamped near the asylum.

Shortly after this Johnston's army surrendered, and we were soon on our road home, via Richmond. Thence we moved on to Washington. While here, and before leaving for Elmira, Sergt. Nathan Dikeman was killed by the cars, after passing through every battle with his regiment. How sad! So brave! Well known by every man in the regiment; and every man liked to hear "Happy Nate" sing. From Washington we returned to Elmira. How grandly they received us. The ladies — God bless them — looked more beautiful than the angels; they literally covered us with beautiful flowers. Why was this? Because we were the One hundred and seventh New York, and never took a back seat.

Now, comrades, we shall never all meet on this side again. But when the last bugle calls, I hope we may find the advance guard happily encamped, the blue with the gray, and all singing praises to God and the Star Spangled Banner.

*(INSCRIPTIONS.)**(Front.)*

108TH N. Y. INFTRY
2ND BRIG. 3RD DIV. 2ND CORPS.

(Reverse.)

108TH N. Y. INFTRY OCCUPIED THIS
POSITION JULY 2 & 3, 1863,
SUPPORTING BATTERY I, 1ST U. S. ART.
DURING THE ARTILLERY DUEL ON THE
AFTERNOON OF JULY 3, IT
SUSTAINED A TERRIFIC FIRE
WITHOUT BEING ABLE TO RETURN A SHOT.
NUMBER ENGAGED, 200.

CASUALTIES:

KILLED 16, WOUNDED 86; TOTAL, 102.

DURING THE CHARGE THE LEFT OF THE CONFEDERATE LINE
LAPPED ITS FRONT AND CAME WITHIN 50 YARDS
OF IT BEFORE BREAKING. THE 108TH N. Y. INFTRY. WAS
RECRUITED AND MUSTERED INTO THE SERVICE AT
ROCHESTER N. Y., AUG. 16, 1862.

IT PARTICIPATED IN ALL THE BATTLES OF THE 2D CORPS
FROM ANTIETAM, SEPT. 17, 1862, TO THE SURRENDER
AT APPOMATTOX, APRIL 9, 1865, HAVING BEEN ACTIVELY
ENGAGED 28 TIMES

(Left Side.)

JULY 2 & 3, 1863.

(Right Side.)

JULY 2 & 3, 1863.



J. B. LYON PRINT.

108TH NEW YORK INFANTRY.
On the site of Ziegler's Grove, Cemetery Ridge.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

DEDICATION OF MONUMENT.
108TH REGIMENT INFANTRY.

September 4, 1888.

ORATION OF HON. JOHN M. DAVY.

COMRADES OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTH NEW YORK STATE VOLUNTEERS AND FELLOW CITIZENS:

In this place, hallowed and made glorious by the valor of our heroic dead, we assemble with mingled feelings of sadness and joy to dedicate this monument erected over the graves of our fallen comrades who gave their lives in defence of the Union. Among the Greeks it was the custom that the fathers of the most valiant of the slain, or the greatest statesmen, should pronounce eulogies of the dead. Would that a new Demosthenes or a second Pericles could rise and take my place to-day, for he would find a theme worthy of his most brilliant powers, of his most touching eloquence.

Through all past ages the people have fondly cherished the memory of the patriotic dead. Pyramids have been built for the tombs of the kings, and triumphal arches erected to preserve the name and fame of warrior chiefs. Poetry, history and orations of antiquity resound with the clank of arms; they dwell upon rough and cruel deeds of war, as well as the gentle arts of peace. They have preserved to us the names and deeds of their heroic dead. And as long as the warm blood courses in the veins of man, so long as the human heart beats, so long will the lesson still invite patriotic men to emulate the lesson of the past. In past ages nations idolized their kings, princes and chieftains; but in our Republic, the people, the State and the Nation recognize the valor and brave deeds of the private soldier, and erect enduring monuments over their graves as emblems of a people's gratitude and love. Our Nation, more than any other, loves to honor, as precious, her private soldiers, her common dead.

The private soldiers of this Republic have earned this eternal honor. Happy the State which has borne such sons. Thrice happy the people who appreciate their heroic deeds. History will immortalize their names, and your children's children will read with illumined faces the sketch of their patriotic devotion. The private soldiers who fought under the Stars and Stripes for the Union, left their homes, wives and children, their loved ones, and responded to the call of duty. Their heroic deeds, their exalted sacrifices, saved our country, and broke the fetters from four million bondsmen, and gave the people liberty and freedom.

The patriotism of the people of this and coming generations should never cease to exist, and our children should be taught the cost at which our present blessings were purchased by their fathers.

You will never forget the scenes when you marched from your homes on the 19th day of August, 1862. You look back and see fathers blessing their sons; wives and mothers stifling their sobs that husbands and sons might be of stout hearts; maidens with pallid lips bidding good-bye to lovers. You

look back and you see them in crowded cars on their way to the Capital of the Nation, and the people that greeted you in every city and village along the route. You will never forget the long and dreary marches, the bivouacs in overshadowing forests, the hunger and footsore of your comrades, the fearful battles of South Mountain, Antietam, Gettysburg, and the Wilderness, when you saw your comrades, weak and straggling, murdered by guerrillas. You saw them, starving and dying within the walls of Libby Prison and the pens of Andersonville and Salisbury. You saw them enfeebled by starvation; but notwithstanding all this suffering, their faces lighted up as they talked of dear ones at home. You saw them wounded and dying on the field of battle, as they gave you messages to carry to loved ones. Yet amid all these scenes, you never saw a look of sorrow or heard a word of regret at their fate.

You will never forget that lovely day in July, when you checked the advance of Lee's forces at Gettysburg. Poets could not portray a more lovely landscape than was presented to the eyes of the contending armies. The Confederate army lay along Seminary Ridge, and the Union forces were upon Cemetery Ridge. Nature was clothed in her brightest apparel. Well-cultivated fields stretched across the valley which separated the two great contending armies. All was calm and still; there was a balmy sweetness in the summer air; the bluebird and robin were singing their sweet notes in the woods. There was a beauty in the landscape. The valley was dotted with blooming orchards and smiling fields with ripening grain. Horses and cattle were grazing on the meadows, or lazily resting in the shade of the trees that skirted along the valley. Nature seemed unconscious of the tempest of human wrath which was about to burst from the contending forces, and which was so soon to convert those scenes of beauty, peace and happiness into scenes of tumult and horror, and to cover the hillsides and the valleys with the ghastly bodies of the slain, and to deluge these fields with blood.

As Lee's infantry emerged from the woods which crown Seminary Ridge, the enemy from left to right along the whole line commenced the fearful battle with their artillery, until the deadly missiles from a hundred cannons were hurtling through the air. How quickly the Union forces with an equal number of guns, answered the fearful challenge! The Confederates marched swiftly down the slope and across the plain in compact order. Never, upon any battlefield, could there have been a sight more imposing. The commanders of the contending forces were watching from the opposite crest as this great column pressed on. Their battle lines could be plainly seen stretching up and down the valley. With colors flying and banners waving they march bravely forward, and as they come a hundred Union cannons open upon them with canister and grape; but on they come, amidst the havoc of death. Great gaps were ploughed in their lines only to be closed again. Still the column pressed bravely on with the well-known yell which rang above the sound of musketry and artillery. Every discharge of our well-posted artillery crashed through their ranks, making great gaps therein; yet onward they come. Their line of march could be distinctly seen and marked by their killed and wounded; but they press on until they come within reach of our musketry, when along our whole line the Union rifles flashed, pouring forth

messengers of death into the ranks of the enemy until the dead and wounded that fell seemed to outnumber the living; but on they come and throw themselves with madness upon our lines. Our men stood firm, and with unflinching courage poured into the enemy a most murderous fire which hurled them back and strewed the ground with the dead and the wounded. Quickly recovering from their repulse and with fierceness they rush forward, fighting desperately at every step, and again they are met with the same deadly reception.

The last desperate charge was finally made,—the grand effort which was to sweep the Union lines in confusion, or result in the total defeat of the Confederate army. The heavy masses swept on as before with desperation of madness; they advanced until they were fairly upon our lines; but the Union ranks remained unbroken, and face to face, and bayonet to bayonet, the two great armies struggled for the victory. The waves of battle surged and roared for weary hours; victory now inclined to one side and now to the other. The Union forces realized that the life of the Nation was in peril, and on that battle hinged the future destiny of the Republic. Every throb of the pulse, every beat of the heart, every thought of loved ones at home, encouraged them to hold their ground and to fight with renewed vigor. Soon the lines of the enemy began to waver. In an instant their flanks were turned and their centre broken. They turned, demolished and defeated, and away they fled across the valley, leaving their dead and dying behind them.

Who can imagine the joy that sparkled in every eye and the happy thoughts that flashed through the minds of the Union soldiers as they rent the air with cheers and huzzas. The Nation which, but a moment before, hung, as it were, by a brittle thread, was saved by the heroic deeds of the boys in blue. Our regiment, which went into that engagement 200 strong, lost in killed and wounded 113 of its members. Where, O! Empire State, sprang that heroism which inspired your sons to such heroic deeds of valor, suffering and endurance? Could the mute lips of this marble monument, which represents a State's gratitude, speak from its granite pedestal, we should hear the proud exclamation, "It was for the Union of our States and the flag of our country."

Before closing, I must speak of the women of our beautiful city, county and State. Without their aid we never would have achieved such great results during the war. Never faltering in their devotion to the flag, at home, in camp, yea, even upon the field of battle, they proved their devotion. With tears in their eyes and broken hearts, they sent their fathers, husbands, brothers and sons to the front. With eyes heavy with watching, they nevertheless remained hopeful as they slept beneath the shadows of the future. The child that sat upon its mother's knee when you were fighting in defence of your country upon this battlefield, has often been told by its mother of your heroism, and has shouted for joy at your triumphs. Through all past ages, the history of nations has contained glowing accounts of the wars and achievements of their heroes. The historians of our age will send down to future generations a story which will rivet the attention of the student and tell of the wondrous achievements of our military heroes. There will be woven in the thrilling story of the conflict of arms,—as grand and terrific as historians ever recorded

or poets of olden times portrayed,—the names of heroes whose noble deeds were not excelled by Greek or Roman soldiers. In all the battles of the Rebellion, history will not record deeds of martial glory and acts of lofty heroism excelling those shown by the soldiers of the Empire State, composed of the brave sons of America and the patriots of the blue waters of the Rhine and the green banks of the Shannon, as they stood side by side in the great and fearful conflict for the Union; and wherever the battle was fierce and deadly, there could be seen the flashing sabre of Germania, and the bristling bayonets of Columbia. But notwithstanding the blood that was spilt and the lives that were lost, could the spirits of our departed comrades come back from that unknown world and speak to us, would they not repeat that lesson of old, that while error shall pass away like a shadow, truth shall endure forever? Would they not tell us that safe guidance is not found in passions, and that institutions can neither be built nor preserved by hatred or violence? Would they not impress upon us that divine precept, "Love," that sacred duty, "Charity?" But in doing all this let us not forget to give heed to the golden words of Abraham Lincoln spoken upon this sacred soil: "Let us here resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain, that the Nation under God shall have a new birth of freedom, and that government of the people and by the people shall not perish from the earth."

The trumpet's sound and the cannon's roar resound no longer from embattled plains; peace, prosperity and happiness reign throughout the land; and our comrades who sleep upon this battlefield and beneath the shade of the hemlock and the pine, and in unknown graves, have fought their last battle. The Union was saved by their heroic deeds, and to-day the flag of our country was unfurled in honor and pride upon every ocean and upon every sea and in every land where civilization has penetrated and advanced. It kisses every breeze that is wafted from the gulf to the frozen regions of the North, or that comes from the gold and silver mountains of the West to the shores of the Atlantic. To-day it is honored and respected by every nation upon the face of the globe; it stands side by side with the banners of the proudest empires of the world, and protects us wherever it floats.

But let us remember that the Republic paid dearly for the cherished principles which we to-day enjoy. Liberty has had a struggle ever since the little Mayflower touched the American soil. It was the love of liberty which gave us the victories of Valley Forge and Yorktown; it was the love of liberty which gave us the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the Government; it was the love of liberty which gave us our National independence; it was the love of liberty that induced that great statesman, Abraham Lincoln, to sign that memorable proclamation breaking the chains of slavery of 4,000,000 of people. Every battle fought by our fathers for American Independence, every battle fought by the Union forces from Gettysburg to New Orleans, and every victory which they achieved was for liberty. Liberty has made tyranny and oppression as insecure upon American soil as the snow would be under the scorching sun of a day in July. Liberty has triumphed in all her glory, and mankind in all parts of the civilized world looks with amazement at the greatness, sublimity and grandeur of our National career; and I

rejoice with you to-day that the progress of civilization daily brings the people of all sections of the Union closer together. The history of other nations tells of their rise, their progress, their fall, their ruin. Rome rose on the ruins of Greece to wave her proud sceptre over the subjugated world. In her archives hung the flags of nations captured by the armies of ambitious Caesar, and notwithstanding her greatness and grandeur she became lost in the whirlpool of anarchy. The bright sun of science that dawned upon the Grecian Empire was destined to shine upon the ruins of Rome. To-day this young Republic is known as the land of science and of song, and her history is as romantic as that of Greece or Rome. The structure of our Republic has been erected by architects of great skill and fidelity to the principles of liberty upon which rests the whole structure of our Republic. It has been reared for the benefit of generations yet unborn. But notwithstanding its grand and colossal structure, it may perish in a day by the folly or corruption of its keepers. It can be sustained for all time to come if the people obey the commandments of a Divine Providence, and adhere to the principles of honesty, integrity, loyalty and virtue. Let the children of our comrades never forget that they possess a noble inheritance, bought by the toils, sufferings and blood of their ancestors, and capable, if wisely and faithfully guarded, of being transmitted to their last posterity, and crowned with all its peaceful enjoyments of liberty, religion and independence. In the distant future, with our vast territory and unbounded resources and constant flood of immigration, new issues must arise; the far West already feels its growing power and strength in the Union. The Eastern and Southern States begin to feel that the sceptre and control of the government is fast passing into the hands of the young and powerful States of the West. The commerce of the Pacific coast is fast competing with the commercial interests of the East. It will require great wisdom on the part of statesmen of coming generations to so frame the laws as to prevent commercial strife, discord and disruption. Intelligence, morality and purity of the people are essential to the life and existence of the Republic. The past history of the world attests the correctness of these principles. Greece remained invincible for years. Rome trod down and subjugated nations to her imperial sway. They needed not the protection of armies so long as they adhered to the principles of justice and right; but when these great, powerful nations disregarded the teachings of Providence and the laws of justice and equality between nations and individuals, they crumbled to ruins and vanished like the morning dew before the sun. Let us be true to ourselves, true to the Constitution, true to the rights of all alike, and above all true and loyal to the Republic. If we are true to those great underlying principles, this Republic will continue to be the jewel of nations, that will sparkle with renewed lustre amid the constellation of monarchs, empires and republics.

It will be the beacon light for ages hence to guide other nations in the path of liberty. All honor to our forefathers who laid the foundation of this great Republic. All honor to the heroes who defended and saved it from ruin. Let us cherish with an affectionate remembrance those who fought and sacrificed their lives in its defence. Let us not forget to decorate their graves and to eulogize their roll of duty. We will not only eulogize the heroic dead,

but we will continue to erect monuments and strew roses and place bright garlands upon the green mounds of the sleeping warriors. And when time shall obliterate the monuments of the heroic dead and the past shall be forgotten, then God will take up the roll left by fair women and brave men. He will send at the dawn of the early morn the bluebird and the robin, the mocking-bird and the jay, to sing their sweet songs over the green sod that wraps the sacred clay of those who fought to establish our Republic and who fought to save it.

Cornelia is a name that ranks high in Roman annals. Her boast of her sons as her precious jewels has shone as one of the brightest sayings, the brightest gems for more than twenty centuries. When asked where are our jewels, we will point to the Union heroes of the war,—jewels whose bright and brilliant records cannot be dimmed for twenty centuries to come.

We receive this monument from our native State as a memento of her love and gratitude to our departed comrades. We feel proud that we have a grateful State, a grateful Nation; a State and a Nation to look to for the honors due our dead comrades. As we stand before this shrine let us pledge anew our fidelity and friendship to each other. Let us continue in the future as in the past, the guardians of each other's mutual happiness.

"Ye sons of York who bravely have fought
For those rights which unstained from your sires had descended,
May you long taste the blessings your valor has bought,
And your sons reap the soil their fathers defended."

TRANSFER OF MONUMENT TO THE GETTYSBURG BATTLE-FIELD ASSOCIATION.

ADDRESS OF HON. CORNELIUS R. PARSONS.

The occasion which calls us to this hallowed spot to-day is fraught with the deepest interest. Many of us who have journeyed from Rochester remember that bright day in summer, now many years ago, when the gallant One hundred and eighth Regiment left our city for the seat of war. It is not for me to recount at this time the brave deeds of that regiment, or tell you of its achievements, for they have passed into history, and form one of its brightest pages. But I would not have any of those who have never before visited this sacred field forget that here was fought one of the greatest battles ever known, and here was won for the cause of Liberty and Union, for the cause of Freedom and Justice, a most substantial victory.

But we stand here to-day in the garb and speech of civilians, representing the sentiment of the vast Union armies, in the interests of peace and good-will towards all men. The vital question of the issue decided, we meet to dedicate this monument, with no enmity for the foe lingering in our breasts; but with open arms and brotherly embrace we gladly welcome the brave survivors of the opposing hosts, and share with them the profits of our victory and the arts of peace.

The cloud of hatred darkens no longer the horizon of our National sky, and we meet, not in the light of camp fires, long since gone out (God grant, never to be rekindled), but in the halo of the companionship of affection at the shrines of Liberty and Peace. We gather to honor the brave men of our city and vicinity who fell here, and to mark the spot made sacred by the shedding of precious blood. Such a spectacle as this is one upon which the lights of Heaven never shone, save in this loved and favored land.

All honor to those who fought and died; all honor to those who fought and lived; all honor to those who so safely guided the ship of State amid the breakers, bringing it into the safe and quiet harbor of peace and prosperity.

On this day of uncommon interest, and one which may well be termed a memorial day, let us, on this memorable occasion, pledge anew our vows of devotion to our common country, and,

"May we be worthy sons of those
Who fought and conquered Freedom's foes
An hundred years ago;
And may we worthy brothers be
Of those who fought for you and me;
Of those who died
The flag beside,
That all the world might know
That Freedom's spirit still survives.
Of little worth, if Freedom's voice
Calls, make my life or yours the choice."

And now, sir, on behalf of the gallant survivors of those whose death it commemorates, and on behalf of the city and county whence they came, permit me to tender to you and the noble Commission you represent, this monument to the memory of those members of the One hundred and eighth Regiment of New York Volunteers, who here offered up their lives on the altar of our common country.

It will serve to mark their last resting place while its granite lasts. But, by their heroic sacrifices they truly reared in the hearts and memories of their fellow countrymen a "monument more lasting than brass."

THE CLOVER LEAF.

By COL. SHERMAN D. RICHARDSON.

Twice hath the sun, blood-red, gone down,
Thrice hath appeared the morn's red frown
O'er Gettysburg, of valleys green,
Of wooded slope in summer sheen,
Of broken spur and rocky steep,
Of dark ravine with chasm deep,
A field, whose dedicated sod
Shall bloom for aye, for Truth and God.

O'er Gettysburg, where chains of men
Adorn each hill and ragged glen,
Where guns in boulder settings wait
And rifles fringe her robes of state;
Where dead and dying, Blue and Gray
Marked well where rolled the bitter fray;
Where side by side the Gray and Blue
Shall wait in peace the Grand Review.

From where yon seething sea of gray
Hath ebb'd and flow'd the live-long day,
There soon will roll in billows great
A flood, impelled by bitter hate.
See! now, amid the trees, its foam,
Its mist hath darkened Heaven's dome,
The air is filled with gathering gloom —
The dread of an impending doom.

Well has been placed, one valiant chief.
Rich glory gilds the "Clover Leaf."
Upon the flags are Chancellorsville,
Antietam, Yorktown, Malvern Hill.
At Williamsburg he earned his name;
At Fredericksburg he garnered fame;
Yet, brighter stars will now be won
Upon this field, ere set of sun.

The storm! The storm! Two hundred shell
Come shrieking from a belching hell;
Above, below, around and past,
Each blast infernal, follows blast.
The tempest thickens! From its roar,
Like thunder bolts, the missiles pour.
The battle smoke doth all enshroud,
And Death rides fast upon the cloud.

"Down, down, each man!" The brave grow pale!
They, who have laughed at leaden hail!
The works are piled with mangled dead;
The trenches, with hot blood are red.
The right is wavering! O, what cost!
If it give way, the day is lost!
Then lost our Nation! God! draw nigh
And nerve each heart to stay and — die.

The prayer is answered! Thro' the storm
Of bursting shell there rides a form,
With face as calm and nerves as true
As though he led some grand review.
He passes slowly down the line;
All hearts grow brave, as tear-drops shine;
The hero chief, 'mid dangers dire,
Is now baptized with battle fire.

Ride, chieftain, ride! Thy path hath led,
Where soon will leap the foeman dread!
Ride, chieftain, ride! Thy life is charmed;
And now, thy soldiers, doubly armed,
Will meet yon madmen's deadly shock
As if just hewn from granite rock,
And send them whirling 'cross the plain,
Bereft of power to charge again.

Form, Pickett, form! Your soul of fire
To-day shall quaff its full desire.
Storm down the lines! O, Garnett! You
Shall lead to death with Armistead true,
And Kemper ready for the fray.
Remember! Lee commands to-day.
And, gray-haired chief! count well the cost,
If Gettysburg to you is lost.

Oh, grand the sight! From out the west
An army marches, breast to breast;
Like sunset glow, their banners stream;
Like noonday sheen, their banners gleam.
They move with silent, solemn tread,
To where their glory waits ahead;
A power, magnificent and great,
Whose eagles bear a Nation's fate.

They come! They come! With frenzied yell!
They come, where sweep the shot and shell!
They charge, to meet the deadly hail,
The bayonet's clash, the shrapnel's wail!
"Hold fast the guns! Tho' hell shall form,
To take this hill the devils storm!
Hold fast the wall! They can't prevail!
But curses on you if you fail!"

NEW YORK AT GETTYSBURG.

Like God of War, he rides the field,
His sword of battle now revealed.
Like lightning flashing in the west,
Is everywhere along the crest,
As, drunk with blood and fiendish ire,
They swarm within our lines of fire,
An army charges, brave and true —
A mob of men rolls back from view.

The spell is o'er! The battle's wrought,
The chieftain falls, where well he fought!
His blood, the glorious triumph seals!
The "Clover Leaf" again reveals
Its undimmed fame. The day is won!
No grander victory 'neath the sun!
And generations far away,
Will tell how Hancock saved the day.

[REDACTED]



J. B. LYON PRINT.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

111TH NEW YORK INFANTRY.
On Cemetery Ridge, near the Bryan House.

(INSCRIPTIONS.)

(Front.)

111TH NEW YORK INFANTRY,

3RD

3RD

BRIGADE,

DIVISION,

2ND CORPS.

(Reverse.)

111TH NEW YORK INFANTRY

ARRIVED EARLY MORNING JULY 2, 1863, POSITION NEAR

ZIEGLER'S GROVE. WENT TO RELIEF OF 3D CORPS IN AFTERNOON;

TOOK THIS POSITION THAT EVENING AND HELD IT TO CLOSE OF BATTLE.

NUMBER ENGAGED (8 COMPANIES) 390.

CASUALTIES:

KILLED 58, WOUNDED 177, MISSING 14; TOTAL 249.

RECRUITED IN CAYUGA AND WAYNE COUNTIES.

MUSTERED IN AT AUBURN, AUGUST 20, 1862.

ENGAGEMENTS — BOLIVAR HEIGHTS AND ALL BATTLES OF 2D

CORPS FROM GETTYSBURG TO APPOMATTOX.

TOTAL ENROLLMENT — 75 OFFICERS — 1730 MEN.

LOSSES — KILLED AND DIED — 12 OFFICERS, 394 MEN.

WOUNDED, 26 OFFICERS — 531 MEN

TOTAL 963.

MUSTERED OUT JUNE 5, 1865.

DEDICATION OF MONUMENT.
111TH REGIMENT INFANTRY.

June 26, 1891.

ORATION OF BENJAMIN B. SNOW.

GENERAL MAC DOUGALL AND VETERANS OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND ELEVENTH
REGIMENT:

You have come together once more upon the field of Gettysburg. After the lapse of more than a quarter of a century, you have journeyed hither from quiet homes whose peace you defended; from the haunts of the busy industries whose permanence you aided in establishing; from all quarters of the Union whose preservation you offered your lives to secure. You come not in martial equipment, for the calling of the soldier is to you only a day-dream of by-gone years. Your peaceful mission to-day is to consecrate this monument to the memory of the comrades who fell beside you here, and to mark the spot where, upon the famous Cemetery Ridge, the One hundred and eleventh bravely and steadily held its position at the front, in the third day's battle, against the terrible onslaught of the enemy twenty-eight years ago.

No one not of your number can conceive the emotions that must be aroused in you by the contrast between this peaceful scene and the fearful conflict that you witnessed here. Where are the contending hosts that on those fateful days fought fiercely for the mastery upon this now peaceful plain. The graves that crowd this field mark the last resting place of untold thousands of their number, while their surviving comrades are scattered far and wide throughout the land, engaged in the varied pursuits of peaceful industry. Where are the thundering engines of destruction that hurled their terrible burden of death-dealing missiles across this valley, furrowing these fields for the ghastly harvest of battle? The sentry paces idly by them, lazily reposing in our forts and arsenals. For lo! the swords are beaten into plow-shares and the spears into pruning hooks; neither learn we war any more!

The battle of Gettysburg justly ranks as the most important contest ever waged upon this continent. Nor should its importance be measured only by the great battles of our own land, for in many respects it surpasses in the issues involved the decisive battles of all preceding ages.

The student of history finds the record of the past abounding in details of conflicts between nations, upon the issue of which the civilization of the age hung trembling. It is a singular and noteworthy fact that, almost without exception, these contests have been waged for the supremacy of eastern despotism over the civilization of the west. It is still more noteworthy that in every instance the young, buoyant and progressive freedom of the west has triumphed over the fading and degenerate absolutism of the east. Scarcely had the course of empire taken up its westward way, before the paternal east stretched forth her blighting hand to stay the progress of the young civilization. All the way down through the centuries this conflict has been waged —

the irrepressible conflict between right and wrong, between the thralldom and degeneracy of the east, and the freedom and progress of the west. From the dawn of authentic history to our own time, from the plains of Greece, the fields of central and western Europe, to the valleys of our own land, from Marathon to Gettysburg, the strife between despotism and freedom has been unceasingly waged.

When the young Athenian republic drove the Asiatic invader in dismay from the plain of Marathon and rescued the liberties and civilization of Greece from the despotic sway of Persia; when on the field of Chalons, the Roman legions annihilated the Turanian hordes, who under the leadership of Attila, "The Scourge of God," sought to establish a barbarian dynasty upon the ruins of the temporal power of Rome; when, at the battle of Tours, the brave Franks, under Charles Martel, crushed the invading hosts of Mahomet, who were seeking to establish the crescent of the prophet for the cross of Judea, in the land that Christianity had made its own; when the dream of Universal Empire was dispelled at Waterloo,—a dream that had carried the hosts of Alexander to the farthest confines of Asia, had led the legions of the Caesars to victory throughout the then civilized world and was luring the armies of Napoleon to and fro across Europe, from the olive groves of Spain to the sterile plains of Russia,—the right to national integrity and the prerogative of personal freedom were at stake, a right and a prerogative which are the essentials of a higher civilization, and which were finally vindicated when the Blue and the Gray struggled for the mastery here at Gettysburg.

I have alluded to these few instances of important or decisive battles of the many that crowd the page of history, in support of the theory that the great contests of the world have been waged for the supremacy of some feature of eastern despotism over the broader civilization which had developed in the west, and that in every instance an overruling Providence has intervened in behalf of eternal right and justice. The battle of Gettysburg is the last and most notable illustration of the same principle.

An element in the social and political condition of our forefathers survived the ordeal of the Revolution, which for lack of a more appropriate designation, I may call the aristocratic element. So long as the struggle for the independence of the colonies was in progress, the representatives of this element entered zealously into the contest and contributed nobly to the common cause. But no sooner was our independent national existence assured, than this element asserted itself and became persistent in its claim for the recognition of its peculiar interests. A minority in our body politic, made up chiefly of those whose ancestors for a century and a half had subsisted upon the fruits of unrequited labor, it was still potent by an urgent demand for recognition in moulding in its interests the fundamental law of our government. The rapid growth of our national prosperity under the new auspices, particularly in the nonslaveholding States, and a manifest disposition to restrict an institution so discordant with the principles upon which our government is founded, with a view to its gradual extinction, alarmed the champions of the peculiar institution and incited them to renewed and vigorous efforts for its preservation and enlargement.

Engrossed in pursuits of worldly gain, the mass of our people paid little heed to the moral aspect of the question, content to stand aloof so long as their business prosperity was not perceptibly affected. Meantime the pro-slavery element viewed with alarm the rapid extension of the domain of freedom and the consequent restriction of its political supremacy. It thereupon became aggressive, insolent, and autocratic in its demands. It dictated national legislation in its interests; it accepted compromises to be bound by them only until those interests demanded a modification of the conditions; it invaded the halls of justice and exacted constructions of statutes which were a libel upon the fundamental principles of jurisprudence; it involved our Nation in an unjust war against a feeble neighbor for the acquisition of territory "to restore the balance of power;" it craftily adopted and persistently advocated the heresy of "state sovereignty," a doctrine which, carried to its logical conclusion, recognizes no government which may justly claim authority over those who do not choose to be governed; it forced the colonization of an incipient state with the design of wresting its polity from the control of *bona fide* settlers to its own ends; it disintegrated and disrupted political organizations, and for the first three quarters of a century of our National existence, directed the policy of our General Government to the preservation and upbuilding of its unrighteous cause. Exasperated in the end by the prospective failure of its supremacy, it disavowed and sought to annul the solemn compact into which it had entered, and proclaimed itself independent of the government whose destiny it could no longer control.

Reluctantly but unavoidably our Nation accepted the gage of battle to vindicate its integrity. With what misgivings did our people abandon the hope of an amicable adjustment of the difficulty; how carefully our policy was shaped to avoid a resort to the arbitrament of the sword; how tardy the preparations for the inevitable conflict seemed—no one who lived during those anxious months will fail to remember. And when at length the stern reality of war was upon us, how impatiently did we abide the slow progress of our arms during the early period of the struggle. Despondently did we witness the repeated reverses of our undisciplined troops, as battle succeeded battle; but to-day we realize in those delays and reverses the guidance of an unseen hand, leading on to the achievement of a complete and enduring victory for the cause of universal freedom and substantial government.

Never was there a more critical period in our history than that marked by the battle of Gettysburg. The Army of the Potomac, upon which the hopes of the friends of the Union centered, had failed to make any substantial progress towards the Confederate Capital and had repeatedly met with disaster in its attempts to force an advance. The blockade of the Southern ports by our scattered navy was scoffed at as a "paper blockade." The monarchies of Europe which had early and hastily recognized the Confederates as belligerents, openly expressed their sympathy with the rebellious States. The mother country even suffered Rebel privateers to be built and equipped, and sent forth from her ports to prey upon our defenceless mercantile marine. If there is one stain upon England's escutcheon that is deeper and darker than all others, it is the stain left by her policy towards our Nation in the hour of its

supreme trial! Dismal indeed was the prospect, and the loyal North was becoming disheartened and despondent, while the bolder sympathizers with the Confederate cause in Northern communities were openly clamoring for a recognition of the Confederacy and a discontinuance of the war.

Flushed with repeated successes the Confederate leaders determined to assume the aggressive, and transfer the devastation of war from their own homes to the peaceful communities of the North, not without hope of substantial aid from their sympathizers over the border. Crossing the Potomac the Confederate army of Virginia made its way unopposed across the narrow arm of reluctantly loyal Maryland into the rich farm lands and thrifty hamlets of southern Pennsylvania. Here it was confronted by the Army of the Potomac, which, under its recently appointed commander, had been hastened forward to ward off the advance upon our National Capital.

It is not my purpose, nor would it be desirable upon this occasion to recount the details of the immortal conflict that followed on the first, second, and third days of July, 1863, details which are more vividly pictured in your minds than any pen can trace. We who viewed the conflict from afar, whose hearts were bound up in the cause you were defending, whose personal interest in your command was of itself a source of anxious solicitude, tremblingly, almost breathlessly, listened for the freshest tidings of the fray. Far from reassuring were the reports of the first two days' battles, and an air of gloom and intense anxiety pervaded our community, which was dispelled only by the report of the signal victory achieved in the third and last day's struggle. Jubilant as we were at the success of our brave defenders, we little realized then what we distinctly see now, that the grave of the Confederacy lay here, at the foot of Cemetery Ridge! It was decreed by a Providence whose wisdom is not ours to question, that weary months of war were still before us. The brilliant victories in the southwest, Sherman's March to the Sea, the desperate struggle through the Wilderness, the terrible slaughter at Cold Harbor, the tedious siege of Petersburg, were all in the fated future; millions of dollars were to be expended and thousands of brave lives yielded up, before Appomattox was reached; but every drop of blood that was shed after the repulse of the charge of Pickett's Division on the 3d day of July, 1863, was a needless sacrifice in an unwarrantably prolonged contest.

The battle of Gettysburg is in many respects the great battle in the world's history. Rarely, if ever before, had so large bodies of troops been pitted against each other; certainly never before under similar conditions. Never before had two armies met in whose battalions were men of the character of those who fought here. No mercenaries swelled the ranks of either army; scarcely one in a thousand of the rank and file was a soldier by profession. They came from our farms, our work shops, our counting houses; our schools, our colleges, our professions contributed their abundant quotas. The flower of the youth, the manhood, even of those of advanced years, from every community in our land were gathered here. Unused to the arts of war, except from the brief experience of the two preceding years, they came here to engage in a contest that would have tried the mettle of the scarred veterans of the old world's armies. But the men of the Union army were terribly in

earnest. Their homes were invaded, and for the first time since the war opened, the safety of their hearthstones was seriously endangered. Exasperated, moreover, by the reverses in former conflicts, and realizing the disastrous consequences to their country that would follow upon defeat, they went forth to battle for victory or death. Their deluded antagonists, flushed with repeated successes and underrating the valor of the foe they were to encounter, rushed into the contest with the confident assurance of a victory that would secure the triumph of their cause. It was fiery Norman zeal pitted against cool Saxon nerve. It was no mean foe that swept down across the fields upon your lines. The flower of the Army of Virginia, which had witnessed the discomfiture of our arms at Bull Run, on the Peninsula, at Manassas, at Fredericksburg, at Chancellorsville, was hurled upon your lines in a supreme effort to force a passage through to our National Capital. I tremble when I think what might have been the consequences to my country had it been yours to charge across the valley of death in the face of such a foe.

Never had two opposing armies met with braver and more skillful commanders on either side; Meade, Howard, Hancock, Sickles, Warren, Slocum, Reynolds, Doubleday, Pleasanton, Kilpatrick, Gregg, Buford, and Custer; Hays, the gruff, daring, and lamented commander of your division; the brave Willard and the heroic Sherrill, your brigade commanders, who here fought their last battle; your own gallant Mac Dougall, who succeeded in command, and scores of others of lesser rank but no less worthy of honor! Across the plain, Lee, Longstreet, Hill, Ewell, Hood, Pickett, Early, Stuart,—it swelled your triumph to win where such men led the foe.

But not to the leaders alone is our meed of praise due. Gettysburg has been aptly styled the "Soldiers' Battle." It was not the sword of the officer, but the musket of the private, that turned the tide of battle. The countless graves stretching in radiant lines down yonder hillside tell the story of the heroism and the sacrifice of the private soldier. Unheralded is his fame; forgotten, except by few, is his name. In recalling an incident of the third day's battle, which reveals the metal of the men who stood in the ranks of the One hundred and eleventh, confronting the foe, I shall be pardoned a passing tribute to one of your number. When Sergt. Charles A. Hitchcock, taking his life in his hands, sped forth from your ranks across the open plain where the very air was quivering with deadly missiles and fired the building from which the enemy's sharpshooters were pouring an unerring, deadly fire into your ranks, his heroic daring shed a halo of glory upon your arms of which you may well be proud. A just recognition of this brave deed subsequently secured for him a merited promotion upon the recommendation of his division commander.

Again how marked the superiority in the equipment of the combatants to that of the armies in any former battle. It seemed as if the necessities of the struggle had given birth to the invention and perfection of every conceivable device for destructive warfare. No sword clashed upon helmet, no spear crashed against shield; but the shrill minie hissed its incessant errands of death, the screaming shell scattered its scathed victims by the score, while the thundering batteries hurled forth their devastating bolts with irresistible

fury. No coat of mail, nor shield nor helmet nor buckler, would have availed more than the spider's filmy web to protect from the mad storm of shot and shell which swept through your ranks on that day.

Finally, the importance of the issues at stake, the momentous consequences to the Union cause, which waited upon defeat, impart to the combat a significance not surpassed, if even equaled by that of any other battle in the world's history. As to the immediate consequences, the defeat of the Union army would have resulted in its utter demoralization, if not in its annihilation. The Army of the Potomac was the pride of the North. It was regarded as the right arm of the Nation in putting down the Rebellion. Its restoration, had it been overthrown, would have been of at least doubtful practicability; for in filling its ranks, the limit of availability and peaceful endurance had already been well nigh reached. Our Nation's Capital, and the rich, unprotected cities of the North would have been at the mercy of the invader. The scenes of carnage and bloodshed would have been transferred from the plantations of the South to the harvest fields of the North. When and what would have been the outcome, it is vain to attempt to imagine; enough, that it was ordered otherwise.

I have regarded the battle of Gettysburg as sealing the doom of the Rebellion; and it is upon this view that its crowning importance depends. The realm of no sovereign was at stake, the conquest of no territory was sought. The simple issue was the right of an undisputed majority to rule, as against the right of a factious minority to rebel. Incidental to this main issue, but inseparably connected therewith, was the question whether the fundamental principle upon which our government is founded, "that all men are created equal" is a sacred truth or merely "a glittering generality;" whether the right to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," is the indisputable birth-right of all conditions of mankind in our land, or simply the prerogative of a favored few. These grave issues which had for more than a generation distracted the councils of our Nation were definitely decided at Gettysburg. The principle of "the government of the people, by the people, for the people," challenged and here contested, was here established forever as the policy of the American Union. The cause of freedom was here rebaptized in blood, and the sole remaining relic of eastern barbarism in our land — human slavery — was forever shorn of its sway. I blush for shame when I think how narrowly our country escaped being the last civilized Nation of the globe to rid herself of this monstrous wrong! Only the decrepit old monarchy of Spain and the kindred empire of Brazil stood between us and the realms of universal freedom, and these two sovereignties, profiting by our experience, have since swept the degrading institution from their domains. And so upon the fields of Gettysburg, the last great contest between eastern despotism and western civilization was waged, and, as of old, victory perched upon the banner of freedom and progress.

But after all has been said, how feeble are words to deal with the sublime importance of this battle and the results which were to follow its successful issue. From the silent avenues of this city of the heroic dead we look forth upon a united people, glad to acknowledge a common flag as the proud symbol

of their nationality; upon a land where peace reigns supreme and prosperity bears to the humblest home the lavish fruits of unenthralled industry — a condition unparalleled in our former history — the wonder of the civilized world. Reverently we turn in gratitude to the silent dead upon this field and their surviving comrades, and recall the simple but eloquent words uttered by the immortal martyr when this plain was consecrated: "The world will little note nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here."

The field of Gettysburg has an especial interest for the locality from which your regiment was chiefly recruited. There was scarcely a man in your ranks who was not familiarly known and wholly respected in our community. A justifiable pride in our representation in the Union army, naturally fixed our attention upon the One hundred and eleventh as the especial contribution we had made to the band of the Union's defenders. It was here that you had your first opportunity to show of what material the regiment was composed. But at what a terrible cost of noble lives! It is a matter of history that in the charge of your brigade to the relief of the Third Corps in the second day's battle, and in the stubborn and successful defence of your position in the Second Corps, against Pickett's bold charge, the One hundred and eleventh lost in killed, wounded and missing, 249 men, or nearly 2 out of every 3 of its entire number engaged. Lamentable as was this sacrifice of brave men, it won for your regiment a place in the front rank of the renowned corps in the world's great battles. Added to this is the fact that the idea of purchasing this field "for a permanent burial place for the soldiers of our army who lost their lives in this battle" originated with your fellow townsman, Surgeon Theodore Dimon. To him is the credit due of initiating the movement which culminated in the consecration of these grounds as the hallowed resting place of the honored dead who here gave the last full measure of devotion to their country's defence. A grave at Gettysburg! What mausoleum more honorable! What monument more enduring!

It was the fortune of war that stationed the One hundred and eleventh here in the fore front of battle, where "the thin blue line of the Second Corps" was the sole barrier that stretched between Freedom and her assailants. How nobly you discharged the trust confided to you history has faithfully recorded, and the consecration of this proud and enduring monument is fittingly the closing scene of your part in the great drama of the Civil War. With pride we trace our ancestry back to the heroic men who fought at Lexington and Concord, at Bunker Hill, at Saratoga, at Yorktown — the Fathers of the Republic. You who fought at Gettysburg won a no less noble legacy for your descendants in the proud distinction of being the defenders of our Union, the preservers of our nationality. The lapse of years has thinned the ranks of the survivors of Gettysburg. One by one your comrades have gone out from your peaceful camp fires to be enrolled in the Grand Army of the departed. Year by year new-made graves appeal for your floral offering, the token of fraternal remembrance. You who have been spared to come hither, come with step less firm and elastic than when of yore you marched hither to battle. Your silvered hairs and furrowed brows tell the

story of declining years. But your hearts are no less loyal to the flag for which you fought than when in the pride of youth and early manhood you bore the Trefoil to victory at Gettysburg.

Yet a few more years and the last of the veterans of the One hundred and eleventh shall fail to respond when the reveille is sounded; but so long as life is spared, the memory of Gettysburg will thrill your hearts with patriotic emotion, and not the least of the hallowed associations will be in the recollection of the tribute you this day offer to the comrades who rest in the shadow of this monument.

ORATION OF GEN. CLINTON D. MAC DOUGALL.

COMRADES OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND ELEVENTH NEW YORK VOLUNTEERS,
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

The committee having in charge these services have invited me to speak some words on this occasion, recalling the story of the valor and the fortitude of the One hundred and eleventh Regiment; a duty that might have been more fittingly confided to some one who in language of eloquence and elegance could rehearse the tremendous deeds that you enacted under the same overbending Heavens and on the very spot where we now stand. But the invitation is a command; and as a soldier, I will obey the orders as best I can.

Comrades: Twenty-eight years ago this morning, having been assigned to the Third Brigade, Third Division, Second Army Corps, you struck tents at Centreville, Va., where you had encamped for nearly six months, and marched away in the direction of the old battlefield of Chantilly, so often visited by you that you might gaze on the spot where the chivalrous Kearny fell.

Our brigade was composed of the Thirty-ninth New York (Garibaldi Guard), a regiment from the city of New York, comprising men of several nationalities, commanded at that time by Maj. Hugo Hildebrandt, a Prussian officer of ability and courage; the One hundred and twenty-fifth New York Regiment, from Rensselaer County; the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York, from Ontario and Yates, commanded by Col. Eliakin Sherrill; and your own One hundred and eleventh Regiment, from Wayne and Cayuga, with occasionally a man from Seneca, Onondaga and Tompkins Counties. Our brigade commander was the senior colonel, George L. Willard of the One hundred and twenty-fifth, a captain in the regular army and an able and accomplished officer who had seen service in the Mexican War. Our division was commanded by Brigadier General Alexander Hays of Pennsylvania, than whom a braver man never drew sword; himself a graduate of West Point and an officer in the old army, he had won distinction in the Mexican War, and in the previous campaigns of the Army of the Potomac. Bluff, brave, generous, he was a great friend of the volunteer soldier and deservedly popular. The corps was commanded by that superb and intrepid soldier, Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock.

No one, not even the commander of the army, knew our destination or surmised that on this beautiful and now historic spot we were to meet the

and chatted and joked, even as if nothing had happened, none knowing whose summons would come next.

At daylight parties were sent out to bury the dead of the night previous and to ascertain if any of the wounded had escaped the vigilance of our ambulance corps and the faithful Chaplain Brown, who did most excellent service in burying the dead, in marking their graves, and in caring for the wounded. Nothing occurred of special mention until an hour after noon, when the report of two guns came from our left. In an instant the whole Heavens seemed filled with flying missiles. The aim of the enemy was perfect; they had our range completely, and in a few moments 150 guns belched forth their fury, sending shot and shell whirling into our midst like hail in a mid-summer's storm. Limbs of trees, splinters of rails, gravel and dirt, pieces of stone from the stone walls filled the air and wounded many. They had an enfilading fire on us, and men were literally torn to atoms by shot and shell. Our artillery at once replied. The One hundred and eleventh were at this time marched forward in line of battle to where your monument now stands,—your right resting by yonder tree and covering the lane; your left behind and overlapping for some little distance the Twelfth New Jersey of Smyth's Brigade, who hugged closely the low stone wall in your front.

Every soldier of experience knew that the murderous cannonade was but the precursor of the coming charge. For nearly two hours this terrible artillery duel lasted, and those of you who were here know too well the unearthly strain to which we were subjected, lying under the fierce and deadly pounding of nearly 200 pieces of artillery, all concentrated on this narrow space,—almost all on this small, greatly reduced division of General Hays. This was the salient point; the one coveted by that great soldier, Lee. His quick and practiced eye had seen from Seminary Ridge, that with this crest in his possession, victory was assured. With the same intuitive soldierly genius, the eagle glance of Hancock had determined two days before the importance of the position, and nobly had he held it. The flower of the Army of the Potomac, if such a distinction may be made, were upon this crest and lay along these stone walls,—the gallant Second Corps, a corps that up to this time had never given a color or a gun to the enemy; that body of troops with an esprit de corps unequaled, infused into them by the chivalrous conduct of their commander; the Third Division, which would have been sacrificed to a man rather than do an act that was not up to the standard of soldierly conduct as measured by the example of that prince of soldiers, Alexander Hays.

Hours seemed like days. It was a relief when the gray line was seen emerging from yonder forest. The crucial test of your courage was upon you; here you must stand and receive the shock. The favorite corps of Lee was advancing to wrest from your grasp, if possible, the position whose loss would have resulted disastrously to our Nation. The calmness and intrepidity with which their columns formed, won your admiration. Its numbers are variously stated; possibly about 14,000 men composed the assaulting column, with five or six thousand men in reserve. On came these brave men, as if marching in review. How impatiently you waited the onslaught, retaining your fire until they were within a few rods of you. Not until they were scaling the fence at the

Emmitsburg Road did you open the musketry fire. The artillery had previously made huge gaps in their ranks, but they closed up and came on like noble veterans, the brave men, the wild enthusiasts they were. The volley you gave them on the fence threw them into confusion; but they reformed, even rectifying their lines and advanced with redoubled fury. The fire now became general. As the effect of each volley could be seen, the cheers and the confusion were wild. Many of them came within a few feet of this low stone wall; but the fire was too severe, the resistance too great, and when you charged them in turn, hundreds of them threw down their arms and asked to surrender, while others fled in complete rout. Just at this point, General Hays mounted on his horse, held two captured Confederate flags by their staffs and dragging them in the dust, rode along your front cheering, while our men shouted with mad enthusiasm. "We were fierce for the right. They were fierce for the wrong."

The main point of attack seemed to be Ziegler's Grove, just on our right and rear. The great crowding of the attacking party seemed to be from their right to the left, showing conclusively that Ziegler's Grove was the point aimed at. The largest number of killed and wounded were in your immediate front. The greatest number of prisoners came in the lane on your right, being captured by your flank movement, in which you were at once joined by the gallant One hundred and twenty-sixth. When the smoke had cleared away, and the gallant Pickett* and his heroic followers had vanished from your front, the great battle of Gettysburg had become history; the high tide of the Rebellion had been reached and the fate of the CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA was sealed.

The story of Gettysburg has often been told; but it would be incomplete without the record of your glorious deeds. Many addresses have been delivered here at the dedication of the various monuments. Many claims have been made as to who bore the brunt of Pickett's charge. The Philadelphia Brigade laid claim to the most of the fighting and the greatest honor, while Colonel Potter, in his address, attributed most of the work to the Twelfth New Jersey. The most you have ever claimed was that you had assisted in repelling the greatest charge ever made upon a battlefield. In the language of the immortal Lincoln, you felt that "There was glory enough at Gettysburg to go all around."

In battles, the figures are as true as in commercial transactions, and relate as closely the story of this crest. Your rolls showed when you reached Gettysburg—present for duty, 390 men. That included men on extra duty, men detailed in commissary and quartermaster department, ambulance corps and noncombatants generally, so that it is safe to say, you took into battle 350 men. Of that number, there fell upon this fateful field 249, being 71 1-7 per cent. of the number engaged, losses compared with which those sustained by the celebrated charge of the "Light Brigade" at Balaklava sink into insignificance. When the last broken remnant of Pickett's shattered columns had

*It was Pettigrew's Division that attacked the position where the One hundred and eleventh New York stood. Pickett's Division struck the Union line to the left of the One hundred and eleventh.—Ed.

taken shelter under cover of those woods, from which an hour before they had marched full of hope and valor, you still held your position and your formation, and stood as firm as the rocks about you. Four color bearers and the brave, cool and self-poised Lieutenants Drake and Granger were killed on the spot where your monument now stands. These losses are the most convincing proof of your devotion to duty.

You, my comrades, and those devoted men who gave their lives that this Nation might not perish, moved about this field as coolly under the fire of the enemy as if you were on ordinary duty. It was my great privilege to have known each of you personally; to have drilled and commanded you in camp, and still my greater privilege and honor to have commanded you on this glorious and ever-memorable field. I shall, while memory lasts, recall with pride your conduct here, and hail as a patriot tried and true every man who wore the three "ones" on his cap.

There stands the monument erected by the grateful people of the Empire State, by your contributions and those of our generous and patriotic citizens at our homes. Its base and main shaft is of Massachusetts granite, firm as the rock of your courage, pure as your patriotism or the patriotism of the old Bay State from whose mountains it was quarried. The figure is of bronze, almost as enduring and indestructible as your fame. The design represents a skirmisher, with cap thrown back from his forehead that his vision may not be obscured. This was selected by your committee as peculiarly appropriate; because on that duty you entered the battle, and in the performance of that duty some of you remained to the close. It is erected on the spot where your colors stood during Pickett's charge, and where four color bearers grandly gave up their lives in their defence. At this point, where the onslaught was the heaviest, where the combat was the fiercest, where the slaughter was the greatest,—at the point where the onrush of the Rebellion was rolled back, baffled, crushed, defeated,—we dedicate this monument, not only to those who fell here, but to the others who gave up life at Bristoe Station, Mine Run, Robertson's Tavern, Reams' Station, in the jungles of the Wilderness, at Spotsylvania, North and South Anna, Totopotomoy Creek, in the fierce assaults at Cold Harbor and in the Siege of Petersburg, Farmville, Gravelly Run, Sutherland's Station, and all the battles and skirmishes of the Second Corps to Appomattox.

To the One hundred and eleventh is reserved the peculiar honor of being the only regiment of Hays' Division that is especially mentioned by Major General Hancock in his official report of the battle. "Praise from such a source is praise indeed." When it is remembered that you had joined the corps but five days previous to Gettysburg, your conduct must have been marked to have thus attracted his attention.

Upon a tablet on this monument is recapitulated the enlistments and casualties of the regiment from the date of muster-in, August 20, 1862, to the date of muster-out, June 5, 1865. Total of enlisted men, 1,730; officers, 75. Casualties: Killed, died of wounds and other causes, enlisted men, 394; officers, 12; total, 406. Wounded: Enlisted men, 531; officers, 26. Total casualties, 963; or 53 1-3 per cent. of the entire number of officers and men. Can any other

regiment show a more fearful record? Your service, be it remembered, was only from Gettysburg to Appomattox. Without the figures before me, I hazard the statement that the rolls of the War Department do not contain another such record.

But, my comrades, the war ended with all true soldiers when the enemy laid down their arms and ceased resistance to our government. When Lee tendered Grant his sword at Appomattox the latter bade him keep his sword, and gave him his hand. How grand, and yet how simple; how magnanimous, and yet how like the great soldier. The terms, how generous: "Every officer and soldier of the Confederacy to keep his horse, his side arms and all his personal effects, and to return to his home, not to be molested so long as he obeyed the laws in force there." No murmur was heard from Lee or his devoted followers; each accepted thankfully the terms made by the immortal Grant. Who is there to criticise the terms of that surrender? How well the conditions of that parole were kept, the new South of to-day fully demonstrates.

We have left our quiet homes and set apart this day to dedicate our monument to do honor to the heroes who gave up their lives here for their country. Any man who gives his life for a principle in which he believes is a hero; and in this great contest, no matter from whence they came or on which side they fought, they were soldiers. They died for the cause they thought just. They added lustre to the name of America. It was not the men who fought and died here that brought on the war. We cannot blame the men who bore the brunt of the battle on the Confederate side; the soldier did as he was commanded. We honor the men who wore the gray; we honor their splendid courage; we honor the "Wild charge they made" here; we honor their fidelity to the cause for which so many of them gave the last measure of devotion.

And, fellow soldiers, were it left for me, I would erect other monuments here. I would allow the Confederates to place a monument on the field commemorative of the charge of Pickett. I would erect a shaft on the spot where the gallant Armistead fell within our lines, his hat on his sword and leading his brave followers.

More than this; I would raise an arch commemorative of American valor across the chief avenue of our Nation's capital or at the entrance to the national cemetery at Arlington. On the keystone of the arch,—on one side I would carve the image of the world's greatest soldier,—Grant; on the reverse side, I would chisel the features of the great leader of the Confederate hosts, Lee; and on the sides, I would cut the faces of Sherman, Johnston, Meade, Albert Sidney Johnston, Sheridan, Jackson, McClellan, Hood, Hancock, Ewell, Hooker, Pickett, Thomas, Sedgwick, McPherson, Longstreet, Hays, Custer. I would cover the arch with the faces and names of the most illustrious officers on both sides of the great struggle. I would erect it to infuse the spirit of valor in the breasts of the youth of our land; to show to the nations of the earth, that he whom we once called "Rebel," we now hail as friend and brother, believing that he is as true to the old flag to-day, as you who fought to protect it; and to demonstrate that every vindictive and uncharitable recollection of

the unhappy strife is forever banished. I would rear that arch as a notice to the world that we have a united country, and that they who insult that banner, with its increasing stars, do it at their peril.

During the lull of the strife on the morning of the 3d, from a branch of a neighboring tree there came to my ear the clear, sweet, rippling notes of a song bird, telling of a joy and a peace that should dwell amid these hills and along this valley in the midsummer day when the harvest of plenty was ripening in these quickened fields. The boom of the cannon is hushed, the shout of the struggling soldier is stilled; the trampling horse, the mad rush of the combatants, the groans of the dying, the shriek of the wounded, and the quick volley of the musket, are remembered as in a fevered dream. But the song of the bird comes again from out the foliage this morning, full of the liquid notes that tell of harmony and quiet and restful peace. God grant that the song may never again be interrupted by internecine and fraternal strife, that it may still pour forth its unbroken melody, foretelling a peace that shall abide among these hills for evermore.

(INSCRIPTIONS.)

(Front.)

119TH

N. Y. INFTRY.

2ND BRIG. 3RD DIV. 11TH CORPS

JULY 1, 1863.

(Reverse.)

THE STATE OF NEW YORK

DEDICATES THIS MONUMENT

TO THE OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS

OF THE 119TH REGIMENT N. Y. INFTRY.

WHO, AS PATRIOTIC CITIZENS

OBEYED THE SUMMONS OF THEIR

COUNTRY, OFFERING THEIR LIVES FOR

THE CAUSE OF UNION AND LIBERTY.

CASUALTIES,

KILLED 11, WOUNDED 70,

CAPTURED OR MISSING 59: TOTAL, 140.

TAKEN INTO ACTION,

16 OFFICERS 284 MEN.



J. B. LYON PRINT.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

119TH NEW YORK INFANTRY.

On battlefield of Eleventh Corps, first day ; near the Carlisle Road, looking south. Gettysburg
in the background.

DEDICATION OF MONUMENT.

119TH REGIMENT INFANTRY.

July 3, 1888.

ADDRESS BY COL. THEODORE A. DODGE.

COMRADES:

Ever since tradition first handed down a record of the deeds of men, the history of the world has been a continuous recital of wars. A few only have been such as to affect the conditions of mankind. Almost all the struggles of which we have any knowledge, beginning with the ten years' siege of Troy, as sung to us by Homer, have arisen from the arrogance, selfishness or ambition of princes. Temporary gain has been won for the few, by such loss and suffering to the many as we to-day can scarce conceive. Only a few of these wars of the world, and only a few of these battles in these wars, have been such as permanently affected the welfare of mankind. Had the historian Creasy brought his list of the decisive battles of the world down to our day, he would have added to the twelve he has given, one more — the victory we have come here to celebrate. And why do we call the victory of Gettysburg the thirteenth decisive battle of the world? I will tell you.

While the populations of Europe have been struggling, all but in vain, during the past 250 years to wrest a small quota of personal and political freedom from the one-man power which holds them down, there has been going on in America that life and growth to which the future historian will point as the germ of the liberties of the twentieth century. The symptom of this life and growth is the idea of self-government,—the ability to hold a town-meeting,—as yet a quality resident only in America. The motto of this life and growth is, "The greatest good to the greatest number." And while in every other part of the habitable globe the doctrine obtains that the many must work that the few may refrain from working, that some may do or have what other men may not, that society may so remain organized that the greatest good may flow to the select few, the American has boldly worked on the theory of manhood's rights, and of so operating the government that not only shall it be "of the people, by the people and for the people," but that its results shall show the greatest good to the greatest number. This is the watchword of all social and political progress.

A quarter of a century ago there was danger that the Nation which had given birth to, and preached this doctrine, would lose its unity, its identity; that the people who had promulgated to mankind the rule of conduct which will yet make the whole world free, could not insure its own stability. This was indeed a grave danger. It is not essential to inquire how this danger came about; but the danger I have referred to already existed. For two years the Southerner had fought to break up the Union; the Northerner had fought to preserve it; and here on this field it was decided that the Union should be preserved. From and after the first three days of July, 1863, the tide of secession receded, until,

after another two years, a million and a half of soldiers melted back into the population from whence they came, and the Union was, for the eventual and now well-recognized good of all concerned, pronounced one and indivisible. It is for this that the battle of Gettysburg, which preserved to the world the integrity, the homogeneity of the people which had promulgated this doctrine of the greatest good to the greatest number, will always be one of the decisive battles of the world.

But, comrades, what have we here of personal recollections? Our well-loved regimental leader has asked me to speak to you to-day. I am scarcely the one to be selected for this task. You, all of you, saw strewn like leaves upon this spot, twenty-five years ago to-day, many of our comrades; some never to rise again, to whom, thanks to the munificence of the State of New York, we have assembled to dedicate this graceful monument; some soon again to join their fellow-soldiers, and to fight with you on other fields; some not again to hear the martial trump of war. Among this last number I, your ancient comrade, was. I had stood beside you on the murderous field of Chancellorsville, where fell the noble Peissner in his maiden fight. I stood beside you here. On both these fields the One hundred and nineteenth New York Regiment lost all save honor. We marched through yonder town out here to the front, a bare quarter of the gallant body of men which, less than a year before, had flaunted its banners down Broadway. But 300 men were under the colors as we filed out into the orchard, rested a few minutes, and then fell into line and advanced across the fields and fences to this spot. The enemy advanced upon us, and in a brief thirty minutes, so deadly was the fire, less than half that handful (130) were on hand to answer when the roll was called. Surely this is a record of which all of us may well be proud. I have always been sorry, comrades, that my lot was not cast with you in the more successful career of the regiment in the West and the Carolinas. Fain would I have fought with you at Wauhatchie, and have stormed with you up Missionary Ridge; gladly would I have joined with you in the arduous march to save the army of Knoxville from starvation. I could wish to call up to memory the stirring events of Rocky Face Ridge; the bold charge at Resaca, when gallant Lloyd laid down his life, and ever-ready Lockman headed the forlorn hope; the constant bickering of outpost duty and flanking movements, and the sharp and bitter fights of Cassville, Dallas, Pine Hill, Kolb's Farm, Kenesaw Mountain, Peach Tree Creek and Atlanta. I fain would feel that I, too, had marched to the sea and through the Atlantic States to the rear of Lee with William Tecumseh Sherman. But all this was denied me; and, while you were garlanding your brows with laurels on fresh and constant fields, I was compelled to rest on the few I had already won, in the less heroic duties of the War Department at Washington. It is because of this fact that I feel that I am not the proper one to address you to-day. But I can speak to you, comrades, with heartfelt warmth, of the brave souls who here sealed their devotion to the Union and the country a quarter of a century ago. Who are they? Not professional, not mercenary soldiers. These were men who took up arms in defence of what to them was dearer than life or fortune. Among them was the pale-faced lad of eighteen summers, who exchanged book for bayonet, to graduate in the school of war

instead of under the shady elms of his alma mater; who looking all too weak to carry his heavy load of musket, cartridge box, knapsack and rations, yet trudged bravely on beside his sturdier brother, an example and encouragement to all around him. Among them was the handsome, hearty fellow in early manhood, who had left behind him at home a wife just wedded, and had given up all which is dearest to man, and comes to man but once in life, for the sake of country. He fell here, pierced to the heart by a bullet, which, to reach its mark, bored its way through the last letter from the loved one at home. Among them was the sturdy father of a family, whose sons were too young to bear arms, but who felt that some one must repay the fatherland the benefits he and his had reaped. Among them was the gray-bearded man, just within the years of enlistment; and beside him stood two of his sons, while in the ranks of the drum corps, at the head of the regiment, plodded a third, the youngest scion of a noble, patriotic tribe. Among them was the light-haired, large-limbed Teuton, who sought to make up to his adopted country those gifts which she had so lavishly poured into his lap,—those gifts which he never did and never could have found in the home across the sea. Among them was the dark-haired, active Celt, who had come from the oppressed shores of the fairest island of the ocean, and made his home in a land where he was a man; and for the sake of that manhood he fought his last fight here.

All these, comrades, and many more of the same grand type, have here mixed with their native sod. We are here, not to a feast of the living, but to honor the memory of the gallant dead.

"Their bones are dust,
Their swords are rust,
Their souls are with the saints, we trust."

Not a virtue which man may boast, but is illustrated on this field by the brave and true who fell before our eyes. From the star of such as Reynolds, the pattern officer, a man of intellect unclouded, far-seeing, bold, faithful soldier in every fibre, true to the end, down to the simple blue blouse of the humbler private, who knew no more than to face death because it was duty, every grade of quality and devotion has been made illustrious; and it is to these noble traits of head and heart, comrades, that we here to-day dedicate this monument.

But a single thought more, my comrades. Happy as may be our circle of family and friends that each of us was here preserved, and that we are still spared to them, there will be a time, not many years hence, when our feet shall also have gone tottering to our last resting-place in the lap of Mother Earth, that the coming generations shall say, in praise of you and me, "He fought at Gettysburg."

But of each of those comrades whom we here to-day, with uncovered heads and grateful hearts, do honor with reverent earnestness, that far greater badge of honor shall be uttered, "He fell at Gettysburg."

For each and every one of these heroes, comrades, join me in the creedless prayer: "Rest to his ashes, peace to that nobler part which dieth not."

and stubbornly held the front, and thereby secured to the army under Meade that position of vantage which proved itself an impregnable citadel and fortress, from which the army of Lee sought in vain, day after day, to drive the forces of the Union.

With the clash of the two great contending armies, the one invading, and the other eager to repel, the sun of the 1st day of July, 1863, shone upon a bloody and persistent conflict on a grand field of battle, on which you and your comrades of the First and Eleventh Army Corps won immortal glory.

By fearlessly holding the enemy at bay, you enabled the chief to bring up the other army corps, and to intrench and array the Army of the Potomac for the struggles of the second and third days. The part you so valorously performed was vital and indispensable; because, without it, the battles of Gettysburg could not have been successfully fought, nor those grand victories won, that on the 1st, 2d and 3d days of July, 1863, crowned the Union arms with imperishable renown.

Allow me, as an actual spectator of that grand historical struggle, in receiving your monument for the association of which I have the peculiar privilege to have been the originator, to congratulate you upon your dedication of this handsome and appropriate memorial of your sufferings, struggles and triumphs.

That was a noble response of a distinguished and fearless champion of American freedom, when treading the soil of the old world, the proud consciousness of his birthright stirring within him, as, standing before an ancient and venerable archway, his guide recounted to him the sons of royalty and the crowned heads which had passed beneath it; interrupting him, he exclaimed, "I am above all the kings. I am a citizen of the greatest republic on earth. I am an American freeman!"

Fifty years have since passed. The wager of battle has been thrown down. The grandest of heroic struggles has been waged and won. The Republic has had a new birth. With what more intense national spirit and noble pride can each of you now exclaim, "I am an American citizen!" How will a grateful posterity in all the coming years delight to gaze upon this monument, and to recount your deeds of valor. Again I congratulate you, brave defenders of this grand Republic.

HISTORICAL SKETCH.

The One hundred and nineteenth Regiment was formed in August, 1862, under the auspices of the committee of citizens of the Fifth Senatorial District in the city of New York. It left this city under the command of Col. Elias Peissner, formerly professor of belles lettres at Union College, Schenectady. This officer commanded it at the battle of Chancellorsville where, notwithstanding the loss of its gallant colonel and one-third of its entire rank and file, the regiment retired from the field in good order. After the battle of Chancellorsville the command devolved on Col. John T. Lockman, by whom it was commanded at Gettysburg. Here the regiment lost in killed, wounded and missing 140 officers and men, out of 275 officers and men engaged in

[REDACTED]



J. B. LYON PRINT.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

120TH NEW YORK INFANTRY.

In the fields south of the Emmitsburg Road, showing part of the ground over which Humphreys' Division (Third Corps) fought. The Trostle farm buildings are in the background, and Little Round Top, in the distance, on the right.

(INSCRIPTIONS.)

(Front.)

120TH NEW YORK INFANTRY
2D BRIGADE, 2D DIVISION, 3D CORPS.

THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTIETH
NEW YORK INFANTRY
HELD THIS PART OF THE LINE
ON THE SECOND DAY OF JULY, 1863.
PRESENT FOR DUTY;
30 OFFICERS, 397 MEN; TOTAL, 427.

CASUALTIES:

(FROM THE WAR DEPARTMENT)

KILLED IN BATTLE,
8 OFFICERS, 25 MEN;
WOUNDED,
10 OFFICERS, 144 MEN;
MISSING, 17; TOTAL 204.

(Reverse.)

BATTLES

IN WHICH THE REGIMENT WAS ENGAGED.
(FROM THE WAR DEPARTMENT.)

FREDERICKSBURG; CHANCELLORSVILLE;
GETTYSBURG; JAMES CITY; MINE RUN;
WILDERNESS; SPOTSYLVANIA; NORTH ANNA;
TOTOPOTOMOY; COLD HARBOR; PETERSBURG;
STRAWBERRY PLAINS; DEEP BOTTOM;
POPLAR SPRING CHURCH;
BOYDTON PLANK ROAD (OCT. 27-28, 1864);
DABNEY'S MILL (OR HATCHER'S RUN);
PETERSBURG (OR TUCKER'S HOUSE, MARCH 25, 1865)
BOYDTON PLANK ROAD (MARCH 31, 1865);
WHITE OAK ROAD; AMELIA SPRINGS;
FARMVILLE; APPOMATTOX COURT HOUSE.

ON JULY 3,
SUPPORTED THE LEFT
CENTRE OF THE ARMY.

ORGANIZED AT
KINGSTON, N. Y.
MUSTERED INTO THE U. S. SERVICE
AUGUST 22, 1862.
MUSTERED OUT
JUNE 3, 1865.

beside the satisfaction of kindly offices to your brethren, you shall have other compensations. The local emotions excited on this spot are of the most elevated kind, unsurpassed in the world, except on the sacred spots of Palestine. Here the greatest deeds have been wrought, and here the most eloquent words have been spoken; for here on these heights at Gettysburg, contemporaneously with Vicksburg, were the crucial hours of that stupendous conflict, when it was settled, not for a day, but for all time, that government of the people, for the people, and by the people should not perish from the earth.

And here, too, when time had assuaged the bitterness of the strife, when twenty-five years had rolled by since these hills had groaned and rocked under the thunder of 300 guns, survivors of the Army of Northern Virginia came, by official invitation, to meet survivors of the Army of the Potomac, headed by two of Robert E. Lee's most illustrious commanders. On behalf of their comrades, who marched and fought under the Southern Cross, they came to accept the arbitrament and issues of the conflict; "and if there was joy in Heaven that day, it was in the heart of Abraham Lincoln, as he looked down upon that field of Gettysburg."

The state of New York — the proud mother of us all — has recognized the fitness of decorating this immortal ground. In the grim hour of trial those who were concerned in vast national and commercial interests trembled for the issue, and were profuse in their promises of reward to those who put life and limb in the balance. We will not seek to inquire whether these feelings have changed — whether the sordid love of money has resumed its sway, and frames excuses for broken pledges; certain it is that the comrades of the heroes of the war lead the way in the commemoration of their deeds. Our great Commonwealth provides a minimum sum of money to enable each regiment to at least mark its place in the line, and this is supplemented by the free-will offerings of those who still remember the sacrifices of the soldiers. We have appealed, and generally not in vain, for assistance in this fraternal obligation, and the result is shown in the impressive monument which stands before you. To all those who gave us aid out of their abundance, or out of their frugal competence, we here tender our sincere thanks.

The Pennsylvania campaign was a necessity to the Confederate army in Virginia. While its opponent had been beaten in two great battles within the preceding six months, the power of the North seemed to grow with its reverses, and the material resources of the South visibly declined. The inability of the insurgent section to repair and construct railroads was strikingly apparent. The mechanical energies and aptitudes of the North, which had been made the occasion of Southern taunt and sneer, were now coming forward to torment the insurgents, and the intelligent mechanics of the latter section, generally by birth Northern men, were the first to appreciate the coming dissolution of the slave power. It was rarely possible for General Lee to provide more than four days' rations ahead, even when his army was lying at Fredericksburg, and the helpless failure of the Confederate commissariat was already prefiguring the collapse which attended the break-up of Lee's lines about Petersburg and Richmond. One by one the Southern ports were closed by our gallant navy to the introduction of foreign supplies. Would that the same

gallantry and genius, animating our trained sailors of to-day, were provided with adequate means to compel respect for the Nation whose flag Farragut bore at his masthead!

The English people, under the leadership of John Bright,—revered name,—gave their unflagging support to the Northern cause; but the aristocracy sympathized with the slave owners, while the miserable harlequin who masqueraded on the throne of France, in the vestments of his suppositious uncle, was intriguing for the recognition of the Confederate States, if the concurrence of the British government could be obtained, and that government was mainly in the hands of the aristocracy.

It was believed that a successful invasion of the North would lead to co-operation by the French and English cabinets.

But a greater need was pressing at Richmond. Their people had been told that Vicksburg was an impregnable fortress; and it was certain that it was the last important point by which the Rebel government sought to control the Father of Waters, and maintain communication with the vast Trans-Mississippi department. The Confederate people were still fed with lies, but the Administration knew that the genius and persistence of Grant were nearing an overwhelming success, and that the days would be numbered when the Mississippi would go unvexed to the sea.

A great diversion was required, and if the Army of the Potomac, which was the breastplate of the Nation, could be shattered, the veterans of Grant and Sherman would be required to repair the disaster. If Baltimore or Philadelphia were taken before Grant's army could be transferred, the war might be expected to end in a compromise; and if Washington were captured, the Rebel cabinet would occupy the public buildings of the Capital, always the accepted evidence of ultimate authority in civil wars in Europe, and would be recognized as the government *de facto* of the United States of America.

So when the battle of the first day at Gettysburg was brought on by the collision of a large and overwhelming part of Lee's army with the inferior forces at the disposal of Reynolds, the same reasons compelled Lee to fight at a point farther from his base than he originally intended, provided Meade accepted the wager of battle. Lee could not go farther without giving his opponent a staggering blow, as he would then be more than one day's march from the South Mountains, through whose defiles he had a secure retreat, with the power to protect his columns and trains by small detachments if he failed in complete success; for, in any event, he must substantially save his army.

If he retired through Maryland into Virginia, he fell back again upon his scanty supplies; foreign recognition was abandoned, and Vicksburg was left to her fate.

Nor had Meade designed or desired to fight at Gettysburg. The line of Pipe Creek between Middleburg and Manchester was better adapted to cover Baltimore and Washington; and his depot, Westminster, would be in the direct rear of his centre.

The rank and file of Lee's army, no matter what he and Longstreet thought, believed profoundly in their power to whip their great antagonist to the point

of disintegration. They had repulsed the Army of the Potomac at Fredericksburg, after an obstinacy that seemed to admit of no denial; for the charge on Marye's Heights was equal in gallantry and devotion to that of Pickett's Division within our view. They had driven the same army across the Rappahannock when "Fighting Joe" Hooker, for inexplicable reasons, failed to fight his army.

Looking to great, and perhaps decisive results, every nerve had been strained to convert the Army of Northern Virginia into the most powerful weapon the Confederacy could forge. Its ranks comprised as good fighting material as the world has ever produced, in a good cause or in a bad cause. The reputation of Lee, so considerable in Mexico and afterwards, that he was considered the legitimate successor of Winfield Scott, had grown on the Peninsula, immeasurably advanced at the Second Manassas, had reached a dazzling altitude at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, and he was thought to be invincible.

His three great infantry corps, each counting far more than any of ours, were severally equalized to the number of 25,000 men; and his three lieutenant generals and nine division commanders were the product of West Point, veterans in service, and excepting two or three names, without professional rivals in the Confederacy.

They were already hailed with the prophecy of victory. The Confederate historian of the Lost Cause says:

"On the plains near Culpeper were the preparations made for the great campaign. It was the beautiful month of May. All was bustle and activity; the freshness of the air and the glow of expectation animated the busy scene. Trains were hurried up, filled with munitions of war; new and splendid batteries of artillery were added to the army; the troops, as far as possible, were newly equipped; the ordnance trains were filled to their utmost capacity.

"The cavalry, 15,000 strong, were reviewed at Brandy Station; crowds attended the display; and General Stuart, the gallant commander, whose only weakness was military foppery and an inordinate desire of female admiration, rode along the lines on a horse almost covered with bouquets. Nearly a week was consumed in reviewing cavalry, infantry and artillery. By the 1st of June all was in readiness, and the advance was ordered."

J. E. B. Stuart, the Confederate Murat, fought on many another field, until he fell mortally wounded in his disastrous combat with Sheridan, at Yellow Tavern,—

"In the lost battle, borne down by the flying,
Where mingles war's rattle with groans of the dying."

Lieutenant General Longstreet continued to be a tower of strength to Lee, until he was named by the latter as one of the commissioners to carry out the terms of the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia. Lieutenant General Ewell was captured, with five other general officers and the rank and file of his corps, by Sheridan at the desperate battle of Sailor's Creek, and Lieut. Gen. A. P. Hill sustained his great reputation on every battlefield until shot through the heart on the last day the Confederate lines were held before Rich-

When his body was carried to his home in Petersburg, a resting place was secured on the following morning by another lieutenant general, commanding the armies of the United States.

The moderate advance had been ordered on the 1st of June, and on the morning of the 1st of July this host stood mostly on the ground now within our lines, with hopes high advanced by successes in the Valley, and by the defeat of the corps of the Army of the Potomac, commanded by Reynolds. But although greatly outnumbered, had fought with a skill and obstinacy which induced the enemy to believe the greater part of the Army of the Potomac was here, and Lee paused when, perhaps, he could have seized those positions and his divisions in the rear.

General Meade sent Hancock to replace the lifeless Reynolds and to gain the propriety of accepting this as a battlefield, although whatever Meade looked to the line of Pipe Creek, for the reasons I have mentioned, was lying on the ground in a corner of General Meade's tent when Hancock's reply came, partially approving this line. The advantages of Pipe Creek were thought to be counterbalanced by the moral effect of our brave comrades who had fought here, instead of withdrawing and giving the impression of a retreat.

Meade decided to advance his converging corps. As soon as the signal was given and forwarded he mounted, and with his staff rode forward. It was a moonlight night. We started before midnight, and covered the distance of fourteen miles by 1 o'clock in the morning. And the solemnity of our reflections and discussions.

Had Meade retired to Pipe Creek, Lee, after the first day, might perhaps have withdrawn to his base with safety and without vital loss of prestige. But when Meade refused the gage, Lee must fight here, and he must fight at once, for he was compelled to lie in order of battle, his further accumulation was stopped, and his supplies were diminished; and you and I, when other things being considered, an army fights upon

presenting these general considerations, I shall now confine myself to the part enacted by our regiment in this contest of giants, and to the careful paper lately prepared by Colonel Westbrook, a lieutenant of that accomplished officer. His professional education prepared him for a topographical study, and his intelligent observation at Chambersville, and on this field, up to the time he was permanently disabled by his second wound, gave entire assurance of his accuracy.

Lee's left wing held the town of Gettysburg, and Ewell hoped to envelop on the right and rear of the Union line along the slopes, and the base of Culp's Hill. His plan of battle was a co-operating movement of his right and left wings, with menacing demonstrations on our centre, to prevent the troops there from reinforcing in front of his more serious attack. If his plans succeeded, Longstreet's and Ewell's Corps would have been in position on or near the Taneytown Road, in the rear of General

Meade's headquarters and of the centre of his army; in the vicinity of our reserves of artillery and ammunition; in reach of all our trains; and *we* should not have been here to dedicate a monument on the field of Gettysburg.

Longstreet's prescribed order of battle, in which he did not agree, was, on taking position with his magnificent corps on our left, to sweep up the Emmitsburg Road, under cover of his batteries, and roll up our lines in the direction of Cemetery Hill. It was to be an oblique order of battle, in which the attacking line formed obliquely to its opponent, marches directly forward, constantly breaking in the *end* of his enemy's line, and joining in his rear.

The Third Corps formation, in its second position, considerably thrown out in advance of the general line from Cemetery Hill to the Round Tops, with an angle at the Peach Orchard, favored the execution of such an order of battle. But, if in the progress of the attacking column, any physical or material obstacle is met, that cannot be overcome by the attacking column, the oblique order of battle fails, as would any other; and in the Providence of God, it was given to this regiment to make such an obstacle, for successive and bloody hours; melting away, but *holding the line* until other positions were sufficiently relieved to permit Hancock to prevent its complete sacrifice.

It was at 4 o'clock in the afternoon that the bugle sounded for the advance of the Third Corps, from the general line of battle of our army; and as Longstreet's dispositions had just been completed for his oblique order of battle, the terrific attack made by his corps seemed to be in response to the invitation of that bugle call. I shall not here attempt a detailed description of one of the most desperate assaults made by that great soldier, in all the history of the redoubtable Army of Northern Virginia. Our corps was struck at the southern base of Devil's Den, as if with the malignity of demons issuing from their fastness, and the attack then rolled up to the Peach Orchard and along the Emmitsburg Road to Codori's.

To support Graham at the Peach Orchard, Burling's Brigade of our division, and every regiment of our brigade, except our own, was removed; the last withdrawn being Burns with the Fourth Excelsior, who charged the enemy with ringing cheers, following the lines of Graham, whose angle was broken about 6 o'clock.

The One hundred and twentieth was left stark alone. Advancing some fifty feet at this hour, to gain the partial protection of a stone wall, the regiment laid down, and here some gallant spirits lost their lives while standing up to brave the fire and examine the movements of the enemy. Barksdale and Wofford, having broken the lines of Graham, the former next proceeded to get our regiment out of his way in time to make the combined movement a successful one in the two hours of daylight left. Though less than 100 of our men came unharmed out of that murderous fire, this regiment held the line until after 7 o'clock, when another regiment took its place, enabling the One hundred and twentieth to retire with Carr's Brigade; and it was while the two wings were being side-stepped to unmask the relieving force that Colonel Westbrook received his second wound and was carried from the field. He was succeeded in command by that fearless soldier, John Rudolph Tappen, who

left the army near the close of the war with a reputation for courage and capacity second to no other field officer in the Army of the Potomac.

At the ridge, to which our regiment retired with Carr's Brigade, it was confronted by the brigades of Wilcox, Perry and Wright; our own men being opposite to Perry.

Wright pierced our line on the right, and as this was the main line, the peril was extreme. But he was not supported; Wilcox leaves 500 of his 1,600 men on Carr's front; Pender hurrying up to the right to restore the attack is mortally wounded, Wright is hurled back by Webb and Stannard of the Second Corps; the hour is 7:45; darkness is approaching, *and the oblique order of battle has failed.*

In explanation of this failure no accounts of the battle tell us what Barksdale was doing between the hours of 6:30 and 7:15. During this time Barksdale disappears from history to reappear again at 7:30 in front of Willard, after marching a distance of 500 yards, over open fields, encountering nothing but stragglers.

During all the time the regiment was subjected to this fearful experience, there was but one movement and this was a refusal of the left. Doubleday says that when Birney assumed command of the Third Corps, after the wounding of Sickles, he ordered Humphreys to move his left wing back, to form a new oblique line to the ridge in connection with his own (Birney's) division, and that he (Humphreys) was obliged, while executing the difficult manoeuvre of a change of front to rear, to contend with Barksdale's Brigade; and Humphrey's was there, in the rear of our regiment *and with ours only.*

General Hunt, chief of artillery, says that the angle of the Peach Orchard was broken towards 6 o'clock, with great loss on both sides, that three of Anderson's brigades were advancing to Humphreys, who received orders from Birney to throw back his left, form an oblique line in his rear, and connect with the right of Birney's Division then retiring. *Our regiment alone executed that manoeuvre, and Humphreys and Brewster, our brigade commander, at once took positions personally in the rear of our lines, Humphreys being mounted and Brewster on foot.*

De Trobriand, writing lately, and after he had been able to examine all the other authorities, says that Humphreys' position was gravely compromised after Graham had been dislodged from the Peach Orchard. The Rebels outflanked his left, and they were moving to attack his front at the same time. Then with splendid coolness, and under a terrible fire, he effected a change of front without ceasing to carry on the combat. His right held on to the Emmitsburg Road (that was Carr's Brigade), and his left extended towards Round Top in the direction where Birney wished to form a new line, and this undaunted left was the One hundred and twentieth Regiment. And De Trobriand adds that this dangerous movement could not have been carried out, except with troops extremely firm, and at the cost of great sacrifice.

Bravo! De Trobriand!

Did our regiment have any assistance in this trying hour? From the shattered commands of Graham, there came a few who took position in our ranks, and some also with Brewster came to stand side by side with "the men who

held the line." But if any other regiment or battalion, or organized body, did take part in this holding of the line, or in this change of front so applauded by the historians, *let the claim be made*, and on fair proof, the One hundred and twentieth will ungrudgingly consent to share its laurels. We know something of Humphreys, and the country knows something of that great soldier when he afterwards became chief of staff, and succeeded Hancock in the command of the Second Corps. When in the general confusion of the field he placed himself in the rear of our ranks, standing alone on a line which had been stripped for the salvation of others, he proclaimed in the most affirmative manner that *this* was then the vital point. And while he was powerless to afford relief except by his presence and example,—while death stared him in the face, and it did not seem possible to those who watched him slowly riding in the rear of our formation that he should escape, he chose to take his part with "the men that held the line."

I can now add few incidents to illustrate the story. It is splendid in its simplicity; and it was a square stand-up fight from first to last. As Wellington said at Waterloo, "Hard pounding, this, gentlemen; but who will pound the longest?" The eye could not be turned in any direction along our line without seeing men fall at every moment. All the details to these colors that we bring with us to-day, were successively shot down, yet none shrank from the honor of carrying them. They went down from time to time, to be immediately raised in defiance, and were sometimes borne by officers, as in the case of Everett, until another detail could be made. The national color was last committed by Major Tappen to the hands of Sergt. John I. Spoor, who carried it throughout the remaining conflict, and was recommended for promotion for conspicuous gallantry, immediately after the battle. When the staff was broken by a shot, Spoor placed one hand above the fracture, and thus held the color erect.

Of the officers, Ketchum fell first, refusing to take cover and braving the enemy's fire. Then Barker came from the left to report Barksdale's advance, and, returning to his company, had no sooner ordered his men up, and to fire, than he was killed by the return fire of the Mississippians. Then came the crisis of fate for Creighton, and Hollister, and Freelewick, and Durhans, and Carle, chivalric specimens of the best native and adopted blood of Ulster and Greene. Of the last named, Carle, it is mournful to add that he was found two days later in a position where assistance had failed to reach him, still alive, but insensible; and so *he* passed to rejoin his companions. The last officer killed was our much loved Willie Cockburn. He had been wounded, and was being helped from the field by his tentmate, when another ball struck him, and he informed his companion gravely, but with a touch of the old vivacity, that the hurt was mortal.

In many cases wounds were concealed, and one officer was detailed to assist General Sickles, who had himself been injured, and was fit for no duty except to encourage his men. When the regiment retired at dark, Captain Snyder and Lieutenant Turner, together, were with those bringing off the colors when Turner lost his arm, and Snyder became commander of the improvised color guard. On reaching the point where the remains of the five Excelsior regi-

ments had gathered, Colonel Farnum was found in command, giving loud expression to the admiration of himself and comrades of that veteran brigade for the conspicuous gallantry and stubbornness of "the men who held the line," calling for the name of each officer and man for official recognition. The killed and wounded, 203 in number, of course made no answer, and of the rest some had gone in attendance upon wounded comrades, and others may have been looking for tentmates on the field; but the names of those present were taken, and Major Tappen, Captain Snyder and Lieutenants Everett and Simpkins, with eighteen men, made up the roll.

I would that I could name them all; all of those 203, who out of a total of 356 armed men and 27 officers, make a proportionate loss nearly unequaled on this immortal field.

But since this cannot be, we dedicate this monument to-day to their everlasting memory. We dedicate it also to their comrades who joined them from other fields of victory and defeat; to the memory of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville; of James City and Mine Run; of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania; of the North Anna and the Totopotomoy; of Cold Harbor and Petersburg; of Strawberry Plains and Deep Bottom; of Poplar Spring Church and the Boydton Plank Road; of Hatcher's Run and Tucker's House; of the White Oak Road and Amelia Springs; of Farmville and Appomattox Court House — to them and to their glories forever.

How rich are the treasures of the One hundred and twentieth in the clear upper sky! O, Brothers, whose valor is the occasion of this solemnity, bend an ear from the peaceful fields which are now your home, and pardon these last efforts of a voice which was not unknown to you!

And we, who remain, shall draw from your example fresh lessons of virtue and self-denial, and patriotic endeavor.

DEDICATION POEM.

"The Men Who Held the Line."

BY WILL CARLETON.

Right brave the clash of the cavalry's dash,
As it sweeps o'er hill and plain,
While bugles sing, and banners fling
Their smiles to the glorious slain;
With footsteps solemn the serried column
May grandly cross the field,
While red gaps made by the ball's round blade,
By heroes are swiftly healed;
The charge's story is full of glory,
In history-wreaths to shine;
But bravest of all, we still must call
The men who hold the line!

'Tis brave to rush, in the onset's flush,
With pride in the praise-strewn air,
And woo the smile of the great guns, while
You capture your rivals there;
The death-steep grade of the barricade
To climb, on steps blood bought,
And raise to the sight rich colors bright,
That tender hands have wrought;
'Tis grand to ride on the battle's tide,
And follow Victory's sign;
But bravest of all — to fight or fall —
And steadily hold the line!

O men out there in the July glare,
Who redden the green grass leaves!
This harvest-field gives bloody yield;
And dead men are the sheaves!
Your flags are dim in the smoke-clouds grim —
Or gleam with a costly stain;
At each gun's call, your brothers fall,
And die, with a moan of pain.
Ah, many a grief, past all relief,
Must e'en with victory twine;
But you who stand in that station grand,
For God's sake, hold the line!

You fight, 'tis plain, with hand and brain,
You strike with vision keen;
With every blow you feel and know
What 'tis that you stand between!
Grim malice and rage your homes engage;
Destruction looms in view;
And all that you prize beneath the skies,
May now depend on you!
For Heaven you fight, and defend the right;
Your blows are all divine;
O men that stand by the Union land —
For God's sake, hold the line!

They pray for you on hillsides blue;
By the river's sweet cold tide;
They hover by, and their hearts come nigh,
And fight here by your side!
Friends far away see you to-day —
The dead are looking on;
Angels are near; and Heaven will hear
By whom was this battle won.

To-day will our land more firmly stand,
Or sink towards decline;
A fame that endures forever is yours,
If you but hold the line!

The battle is done; the smoke-veiled sun
Creeps low to a misty west;
Fair Victory's crown sweeps grandly down
On those who have fought the best.
Once more the tide of the foeman's pride
Is rolled, like a torrent, back;
Rebellion's way, from this very day,
Will creep on a downward track.
Lift proud the head — O living and dead!
You have compassed Heaven's design!
In every zone you shall e'er be known
As the men who held the line!



J. B. LYON PRINT.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

121ST NEW YORK INFANTRY.
On the northerly slope of Little Round Top.

(INSCRIPTIONS.)

(Front.)

121ST

N. Y. INFANTRY,
(COL. EMORY UPTON)
2D BRIG. 1ST DIV.
6TH CORPS.

HELD THIS POSITION
FROM EVENING OF
JULY 2D 1863,
UNTIL CLOSE OF BATTLE.

(Left Side.)

CRAMPTON'S PASS,
FREDERICKSBURG,
MARYE'S HEIGHTS,
SALEM CHURCH
SALEM HEIGHTS,
GETTYSBURG
RAPPAHANNOCK STATION,
MINE RUN
WILDERNESS
SPOTSYLVANIA C. H.
NORTH ANNA
TOTOPOTOMOY
COLD HARBOR
PETERSBURG
FORT STEVENS, D. C.
SUMMIT POINT
WINCHESTER
FISHER'S HILL
NEW MARKET
CEDAR CREEK
HATCHER'S RUN
PETERSBURG (FORT FISHER)
PETERSBURG (ASSAULT)
SAILOR'S CREEK,
APPOMATTOX C. H. APRIL 9,

1862

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1863

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1864

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1865

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1865.

(Right Side.)

ORGANIZED IN HERKIMER
AND OTSEGO COUNTIES

MUSTERED IN AUG. 23, 1862.

OFFICERS 30, MEN 910.

JOINED BY TRANSFER,

RECRUITS, ETC.,

OFFICERS 21, MEN 425.

CASUALTIES

KILLED AND MORTALLY WOUNDED

OFFICERS 14, MEN 212.

WOUNDED

OFFICERS 27, MEN 596.

DIED OF DISEASE

OFFICERS 4, MEN 117.

DISCHARGED FOR WOUNDS,

DISEASE ETC.

OFFICERS 37, MEN 283.

TRANSFERRED TO OTHER COMMANDS

OFFICERS 12, MEN 262.

MUSTERED OUT JUNE 25, 1865

OFFICERS 25, MEN 283.

DEDICATION OF MONUMENT.

121ST REGIMENT INFANTRY.

October 19, 1889.

INVOCATION BY REV. J. R. DUNKERLEY.

Almighty God, our heavenly Father, we thank Thee for the privilege of being here to-day. We praise Thee that Thou hast spared the lives of so many of these soldiers during the years which have passed since their struggle on this field of battle, and that now, after being more or less separated in time of peace, they are permitted to come together in memory of their former fellowship and deeds.

We pray Thee to be with us and bless us in the exercises with which this monument shall be dedicated. May we be more than ever glad to-day because we had the opportunity to stand up for the right; and may we here reconsecrate ourselves to the well-being and permanence of our beloved Nation. Bless every member of this regiment that is here. As we go away from this spot, never again to meet here as we do to-day, may we all carry with us a blessed inspiration and hope. May we all with joy look forward to that greater gathering of Thy faithful ones, in the land of eternal peace, where the trophies of the triumph of our Christ shall be ours forever.

Wilt Thou graciously bless the widows and children of the deceased members of this regiment. As their hearts turn towards this hallowed place, may they not regret the great sacrifice they had to make for their country. Help them to feel that they are not unrewarded, not alone; for Thou, Lord, art with them always. Be especially precious to them to-day; and if it shall never be their privilege to come here and stand beside this monument which commemorates the heroism of their loved ones, may they rejoice because their names are written in the Book of Life.

Be with these Thy servants as they return to their homes; and after we have done meeting and parting in the various scenes which bring us together in this world, may we all meet again in the kingdom that will be forever immovable, where we will praise Thee, world without end. Amen.

DEDICATORY POEM.

"MEMORY OF THE FALLEN."

BY PROF. J. H. WATKINS.

What priceless glory! What unfeigned delight!
What depth of joy beyond expression quite
Is centered in a Nation's memory!
The patriot's heart forever seems to be
A sacred shrine, an urn of purity.

Surviving heroes mark as hallowed ground
The spots where fell their comrades; here abound
Reminders of the past; rock, hill and stream
Bring up the past before them like a dream."
They love to meet and to each other tell
How bravely this or that one fought and fell.
What do I read as in your eyes I look? —
I read the contents of an open book —
Love, faith and heartfelt gratitude for those
Who made their breasts a bulwark 'gainst our foes.
Your time, your pains, your means seem, in your eyes,
A trifling though befitting sacrifice.
It is not strange ye love this place the best,
For on this field was Freedom's crucial test.
We meet to-day that statue to unveil,
And to review the sad, though fruitful tale
That monument suggests. Could Upton speak
As from that mass of marble he looks forth,
He'd say, "No regiment in all the North
Was braver than the one I did command."
In twenty-five engagements did they stand,
Firm as the rock; nor did they ever quail
Under the fiercest charge of leaden hail.
Though oft hemmed in and worried by the foe,
They never lost their flag, the records show;
No matter whether victory or despair,
Their colors always floated in the air,
From Crampton's Pass to Fredericksburg, and then
From Salem Church and Heights to "Devil's Den,"
They bore the blood-red cross in Freedom's name.
At Rappahannock Station where the flame
Of war's red battle lit the very sky,
Their thought was only one — to win or die.
Mine Run came next, the bloody Wilderness,
With all its depth of shadow and distress,
At Spotsylvania Court House flashed their steel,
While Rebel hordes their force were made to feel;
North Anna saw their sure and deadly aim,
And Totopotomoy beheld the same;
Cold Harbor came and Petersburg in gloom,
Sending full many a brave boy to his doom.
Then came Fort Stevens, then came Summit Point,
Then Winchester, where Heaven did anoint
The black horse and rider. Upton brave
Was wounded on this field but at once gave,
Like Herkimer of old, command to place
Him at the front; here, bleeding did he face

At length our firing ceases; silence reigns,
 And suddenly across the open plains
 Come Pickett's forces led by Armistead.
 Now comes the tug of war. Are they misled?
 Our firing ceases; do they deem us worn,
 Our lines all broken and our courage gone?
 It is a sad mistake. With solid ball
 We mow them down, but as the columns fall
 Others reform in place, and onward still
 They march until they reach the fatal hill —
 The "Bloody Angle" (and the name is right
 For here is found the thickest of the fight.)
 Here is the contest that must tell the tale.
 If on this spot the Union army fail,
 No future contests will by us be won,
 The Stars and Bars will float o'er Washington.
 But God is in the conflict. Backward flee
 The battered lines of Southern chivalry.
 Backward they flee, but leave their leader dead,
 The gallant, though misguided, Armistead.
 Four hundred monuments like lines of light
 Stand on this field to mark the bloody fight.
 Here will the Nation come through future years
 To pay its honors and to shed its tears.
 'Tis well! This land, redeemed by blood, is ours
 Against the hopes of hostile foreign powers.

THE REGIMENTAL RECORD.

BY LIEUT. COL. J. W. CRONKITE.

Do you remember their record? These were the men who burst through the Rebel lines at Salem Church, on the Heights at Fredericksburg, although more than half the regiment were killed and wounded,—who swept over the works at Rappahannock Station, capturing guns, flags, "Louisiana Tigers," and "Hoke's North Carolinians" to more than double their own number,—who stemmed the tide of the Rebel onslaught the night of the 6th of May in the Wilderness, when Seymour's and Shaler's Brigades were swept away,—who, on the afternoon of the 10th of May, as the advance of a forlorn hope, carried by assault the enemy's position in their front, sweeping over Dole's Georgians, sending them prisoners to the rear, carrying their batteries and holding the ground stubbornly until after nightfall, waiting for reinforcements that never came, and then fighting back to their original position,—who, on the 12th of May in the "Bloody Angle," in what has passed into history as the most terrible encounter in the annals of war, stood like a rock all through that awful day and far into the night,—who, again at Cold Harbor, as skir-

No memory of deeds, or of men, distinguished this field from any other in our broad land. At that time, the name Gettysburg signified nothing whatever to us. We saw only the enemies of our country swarming over these heights and through these valleys. We saw only that chance had cast this to be the theatre of the crucial struggle of America. Our hearts and minds were filled with anxious solicitude for the outcome of the impending battle. We feared a Confederate victory, and the far-reaching consequences that would follow. The firm resolution of patriotic men to conquer in their country's cause, and the stirring enthusiasm of experienced soldiers, trained in the art and science of war, possessed every fibre of our being, and bore us resolutely forward — not to Gettysburg, but to a terrible and decisive conflict with the foes of American liberty, wherever it might chance to be.

To-day, how different! After the lapse of so many years in our lives we are assembled again, and come to Gettysburg. We come not as before, — not as soldiers to do battle, but as pilgrims to commemorate deeds and do reverence upon an enchanted field.

To the external eye, the natural features of this scene are not changed from what they were before the battle. The buildings and creations of man in this quiet town are much the same as ever; but a new light has spread over this region since the day upon which our eyes first beheld it. Now, we approach Gettysburg's field as sacred ground, illumed by the highest heroism, sanctified by the deepest devotion of our race. With pardonable pride we stand here again to revere this spot, to recount our deeds, and to partake of that light of glory that shines out from here, and which is destined to brighten and shine beyond our days, and through all the future ages of civilized man.

These stirring memories appeal to us as soldiers, and revive the ardor and patriotic valor of our army days; but to thoughtful patriots, Gettysburg is vastly more than a mere battlefield. This spot is immortalized as the scene of one of those decisive events that affect for all time the course of human history. Casting our eyes over the wondrous story of the progress of the human race from the earliest time to this day, we see that, scattered all along the great highway, there are striking landmarks to indicate the rapid strides of progress. At long intervals from each other, deeds are performed by men, upon which the welfare of the world seems to depend. On some chance field, a conflict takes place which seems to turn the tide of fate. No man selects or foretells it, but in the space of a few hours the deed is done, and from that date the spot is immortal.

Such is the place where we stand. A book has been written upon the decisive battles of the world. If it were to be written now, Gettysburg would be named among the first. Its name would be placed beside the names of Marathon, Arbella, Hastings, Tours, Waterloo, and Saratoga.

Until 1863, this was an obscure place, scarcely known on the map of a single State; when the battle had been fought, Gettysburg was famous as the theatre of immortal events. The interest excited in our minds by the occasion is not limited to a battle fought or a victory won. It reaches to, and even beyond the fact that this was the turning point in the War of the Rebellion. We are brought to a consideration of a chain of events which

led up to this decisive battle, and to the effects it produced upon the destinies of the Nation.

The rebellion that was inaugurated at Charleston in 1861 culminated at Gettysburg in 1863. Unlike other revolts against constituted authority, this rebellion was not an endeavor to throw off a tyranny or to secure a larger scope of human action, but it was organized to resist the progress of beneficent ideas; to perpetuate the enthrallment of men. Well do we remember, faithfully does history record, that this enormous conspiracy against human rights was prosperous at first. It seemed to flourish in the sunshine of the South. It was suddenly precipitated upon the Southern people. Its armies were rapidly organized, and fought bravely, and to more frequent victory than did ours. 'Two years' hard fighting and testing of strength preceded the Gettysburg campaign. Time and again, during those two years, we assailed the enemy in their homes, and most frequently were we not only repulsed in battle, but the eagles of positive victory sat upon the banners of our foe; finally, at the close of 1862, there came to our armies the disastrous battle of Fredericksburg, and shortly after, the defeat at Chancellorsville. These signal victories raised the confidence of the Confederate army to the highest pitch, and the idea that a Southerner was superior to a Northerner as a fighter, which, at the outset, was a mere provincial conceit, came to be the settled conviction of the soldiers and the subordinate officers of the Rebel army. The Confederate authorities fostered and flattered that confidence by every art within their reach. Not so with us. Our troops were not only repulsed in battle, but our army was the helpless victim of blundering civilians and greedy political hucksters, who traded on the misfortunes of their country. The public press, the Congress, and even the War Department, had only criticisms and recriminations for the Army of the Potomac, and as often as a battle was fought, sent a new and untried commander to lead us.

No wonder that the Rebels were elated and confident, while we were discouraged and chagrined. That was not all. The political horizon appeared to hold out hope to the South. A spirit of sympathy with the Rebellion, which was not fashionable at first, began to be active, and to find open organized expression at the North. These sentiments of disloyalty to our cause were not only expressed at home, but, exaggerated as to their extent, were communicated to the South, and the Confederates had come to believe that the Northern people were tired of war. Foreign nations were eagerly watching the conflict.

Great Britain was jealous of us and waiting the opportunity to pull down the fabric of our government. The Confederacy had successfully defended its own territory; if now it could demonstrate its power to strike aggressive blows at the Union and conquer our armies in the North, the British hand of recognition would be readily extended, and the Confederate States of America, with its foundation of slavery and the principle of secession established, would be welcomed among the nations of the earth.

Recognizing these conditions, and confident in their own powers, the Rebel leaders resolved upon an offensive campaign, and sent the strongest and best equipped army the Confederacy ever had to invade the North.

From the banks of the Rappahannock, through the gaps of the Blue Ridge Mountains, down the Shenandoah Valley, it moved into Pennsylvania and threatened the peaceful homes and the active industries of the Keystone State. It also menaced the capital of our Government, and the Army of the Potomac was obliged to keep its line well extended across Virginia and Maryland, to prevent the enemy from dropping into the dooryard of Washington. At last, when it was observed that Lee was bound for the North, we moved onto this ground.

On the morning of July 1, 1863, at the dawn of day, it happened to be my fortune to be out there beyond the Seminary, on the skirmish line, where began the greatest battle of the war. Well do I remember with what anxiety I contemplated the outcome of that contest, and the result that might follow. For three days the concentrated power of the Confederacy was locked in a death struggle with the forces of the Union, and when the conflict was over the hordes of the Rebellion, the flower and chivalry of the South, were whipped and beaten by the resolute courage and fighting valor of the soldiers of the North.

For many months prior to this conflict, the home of human liberty was rocked by a fearful storm. The experiment of self-government was seen to be in peril, and intelligent men feared its end had come; but when the battle of Gettysburg was over, the integrity of the American Union, which had been in doubt, was assured. When the smoke had drifted away from these hills, it was announced to the civilized world that the thralldom of men must cease forever. It was proclaimed by the voice of battle, that we in America were true to the liberty-loving spirit of our race; that we were not faithless depositaries of the greatest human benediction, a patient, orderly, self-restrained, universal liberty.

Your local and special pride very justly hovers about and clings to the particular organization to which you belonged, and in which you moved upon this glorious field, and also performed all your parts in the great drama of the Rebellion. It is that worthy pride that brings us here to-day, and impels us to erect this monument to show to our children who come after us, and to the never-ending line of pilgrims who, through all the generations, will continue to come here, where the One hundred and twenty-first New York Volunteers stood in the crucial day of their country's life.

This regiment has a conspicuous place in the grand history of the Army of the Potomac. Organized from Otsego and Herkimer Counties, in the State of New York, in 1862, it was made up from the most patriotic and excellent young men of these counties. At that time, the eager spirits who went to war for the sake of adventure had enlisted and gone, while large bounties and the conscriptions had not yet begun to bring into the ranks the sordid and unwilling ones of society. So that, for the most part, those that enlisted at that time, were thoughtful, patriotic men, who, not desiring to go to war, still saw their country's danger, knew their duty, and boldly went to the strange service of the soldier.

At Camp Schuyler in Herkimer, the regiment was mustered into service with 946 men and 30 officers. It came on to Washington early in September,

1862. Its probation in camp was short, and, in a few days, it was on its way to join the Fifth Corps, to which it had been assigned for the Antietam campaign.

On the march, there came to this regiment an episode which not only changed its destination, but gave the origin of its subsequent career and great renown. By the intervention of Gen. H. W. Slocum, the One hundred and twenty-first was put into the Second Brigade of the First Division of the Sixth Corps; and it was as one of the leading regiments in the grand old guard, the Sixth Army Corps, that this organization won its victories and gained imperishable fame.

In the Antietam campaign, this command had its baptism of fire. General Slocum did more for this regiment when he procured the assignment of Capt. Emory Upton of the Regular Army, as its first colonel.

No sketch of this organization, however brief, can be made without including Colonel Upton, who was the genius of its record, and the architect of its fortunes. Until his duty called him away from the Army of the Potomac, this regiment and its colonel were joined to each other, and inseparable through all the fortunes of war. From the time he first exhibited to you his superior qualities as a soldier until the sad day of his untimely death, the men of the One hundred and twenty-first were bound to Colonel Upton by the tenderest ties of that peculiar affection which grows up between men who are habitually placed in common danger, and look to each other for preservation and safety. Colonel Upton was only twenty-three years old when he took the responsibility of managing in battle, and caring for the lives of a thousand intelligent, patriotic men. But he was more than adequate to the task. Natural aptitude for arms, with untiring industry and diligence, had made him a proficient soldier. His discipline, promptitude, energy and skill soon brought his regiment to the notice of his superior officers, and caused him to be known as the "Model Colonel of the Army."

In camp, Upton was mild and genial in his bearing, but in battle he was a perfect whirlwind. Unlike too many professional soldiers, his habits and character were without reproach. A man of the highest integrity, with the best moral principles and a pure life, he belonged to the highest type of an able, upright and patriotic Christian soldier.

When Colonel Upton, with his command, first met the enemy, he immediately put in practice his peculiar kind of fighting, by fierce attacks upon the enemy in their works, and hand-to-hand conflicts. The One hundred and twenty-first quickly gained its reputation, and it soon came about that whenever the enemy's works were to be carried, or a desperate assault made, this regiment and its leader were put at the head of the charging column.

Much was said in the war about bayonet charges, but actual contact with the bayonet was exceedingly rare, and but few regiments ever experienced it. It is a significant fact that on several occasions, notably at Spotsylvania, many of the One hundred and twenty-first were wounded by bayonet thrusts. Many times the regiment charged with the order to carry fixed bayonets, and not to fire a shot. From the time the regiment joined the army to the close of the war it was constantly at the front, and saw fierce fighting,—at Salem

Church, in May, 1863, where the loss was 62 per cent. of its men, and 20 per cent. of all engaged were killed within twenty minutes,— at Gettysburg, where, upon this spot, it stood for hours the severest trial of a soldier's life, taking the slow fire of battery and sharpshooters, without being actively engaged or able to strike back,— at Rappahannock Station, one of the most brilliant assaults of the war,— at Spotsylvania, the Bloody Angle, and Cold Harbor,— at Opequon, where it turned the tide of the battle by the celerity with which a gap made by the retreat of the Nineteenth Corps was filled,— at Fisher's Hill, Winchester, Hatcher's Run, Fort Fisher, and, finally, at Sailor's Creek, the One hundred and twenty-first made for itself an indelible record in the history of America, as it has since been written by the great soldiers and actors of the war.

Statistics of the war tell the story better than any pen or tongue can describe. There were over 2,000 infantry regiments in the Union army. Some were exempt from any danger in battle; others were almost continuously at the front. The casualty list shows that the One hundred and twenty-first New York was in the thick of the battle. The record of killed or died of wounds in all the regiments in the United States service shows, that the One hundred and twenty-first stands number 19 on the roll of those suffering the heaviest losses in battle from that cause. It lost 14 officers and 212 men, in all, 226 killed, or died of wounds received in battle. The infantry regiment losing the largest number of any in the service was the Fifth New Hampshire Regiment.

There were but three regiments from New York State that exceeded the One hundred and twenty-first in the number killed. The Sixty-ninth lost 259 — only 32 more. The Fortieth lost 238 — only 12 more,— and the Forty-eighth lost 236 — only 10 more.

There were only forty-five infantry regiments in the entire Union armies, of 2,000 regiments, that lost over 200 men, killed or mortally wounded. If the total enrollment of each regiment is considered, then the One hundred and twenty-first is raised near to the head of the list, calculated by the percentage of loss. By the percentage of the total enrollment, killed and mortally wounded, the highest are the First Maine Heavy Artillery, which lost 19.2 per cent.; the Twenty-seventh Michigan, which lost 17.5 per cent.; the Fifty-seventh Massachusetts, which lost 19.1 per cent.; the Sixty-ninth New York, which lost 17.1 per cent.; and the One hundred and twenty-first New York, the fifth on the list — which lost 16.32 per cent. Only four regiments in the entire armies that exceeded its proportion of loss, and only one from New York State. The heaviest loss suffered by this regiment in any one battle was at Salem Church, May 3, 1863. Its loss there was nearly 62 per cent. of the total number who faced the enemy.

The superior rank and file of this regiment was most fortunate in being led by brave and noble commanders. After Colonel Upton was called to higher duty, Col. Egbert Olcott led the One hundred and twenty-first through fierce fighting. Upon his being a prisoner, Maj. H. N. Galpin commanded until he was disabled with wounds, when the lead fell upon Col. J. S. Kidder. He was severely wounded, and the command fell upon Capt. J. D. P. Douw, who was killed while leading the regiment. After him, Col. J. W. Cronkite

became the commander, and lost his leg in battle while in command. Of its leaders, Colonels Kidder and Cronkite alone survive, and to them we owe much of the success of this day, and its touching tribute to our braves.

Comrades, as we assemble here to-day and recount these deeds, do we not rejoice that in our youth we gave our best days to the service of the Republic? Is it not a grateful thought that of all this history we were a part; that this sacrifice and this crowning glory belong to us? Other objects may stir the ambition and nerve the efforts of men, but this is the highest human glory that is worthy the aspiration of a generous spirit. We are fortunate that we are permitted to live in this age and generation of the Republic,—permitted to be actors in the great war of the Union. The future of our Nation cannot be estimated. Others will come after us to glorify the land and cover themselves with renown, but no generation of this people can know more of heroic life and patriotic love than do we. We set up on this sacred ground a monumental stone, and dedicate it to mark the noble acts of our comrades—living and dead—because we come here not alone to celebrate. As we commemorate deeds, we remember with reverent sorrow our fallen ones. Our hearts are touched with grief and gratitude as we remember those noble companions who stood with us, even unto death, in the performance of their duties,—who laid down their lives that the Union might live. For them, this plain monument stands as a memorial stone. It is simple and unostentatious, but to us, and to the true American, it is full of meaning. It speaks in tones of eloquence, and tells of the glorious history of the Republic. It speaks in a tone of pathos, and tells of suffering and death endured, of sacrifice offered up to the shrine of Liberty.

As we gather here, briefly to relate these things, and renew our vows of loyalty and devotion to the country,—as we recall these days that are in the dead past, we see in the western horizon of our lives, further duty to the Nation, and duty to our fellowmen, pressing for our best judgment and our wisest action. That duty we must each, in his sphere, discharge, not in the same manner as in other days, on the field of battle amid the clash of resounding arms, but with the same courage and fidelity, and the same adherence to the right. The conditions of our society are different from those which our forefathers knew. New problems present themselves. There has been a rapid multiplication of people upon this continent, so that, instead of sparsely settled communities, with plenty of room, men begin to crowd each other, and singly, and in large organizations, they struggle for existence and fight to maintain their conflicting interests. The question is, whether our system of government is broad enough, and strong enough, to endure the added strain. Strange theories of social ethics are announced in our midst. The false doctrine that license is liberty, that property is robbery, that law is oppression, is transplanted from the seditious hotbeds of the Old World, and seeks to gain root in the virgin soil of the New. Anarchy, distinguished in the false colors of human rights, comes among us and seeks to be entertained in our hearts and in the homes of our people.

It devolves upon us to meet these evils, and to preserve intact the delicate fabric of social order and equal rights to all. It behooves us to re-ex-

amine the principles of our government, and the foundations upon which our institutions rest. The history of our country teaches us that liberty is a delicate plant which declines and dies in the darkness of ignorance and superstition, but flourishes and grows robust in the atmosphere of knowledge and a purer religion.

When America had been discovered, the nations of the Old World each sent out expeditions to possess and colonize the New. Spain sent her hordes of adventurers, who overran our genial tropical soil; but Spain knew nothing of liberty, and her settlements in America were stained with inhumanity and wrong. The aristocratic idlers of England came over and occupied the most generous part of our territory, but they brought no household gods with them. Theirs was a mad race for gold, and the colonies faded away in bickering and blood. A better element followed in their footsteps, and established a system of society which flourished and grew into the fabric of our government; but they planted the vicious principle of human slavery, and when liberty sternly demanded the only conditions in which she could exist, the system of the South tottered and fell. It was left for the humble Pilgrim, persecuted and driven from the Old World, to bring to America the pure seed of self-government and plant it in the stony New England soil, where it grew to a wide-spreading tree, sending out its branches to cover and protect all the oppressed of the earth.

The passengers that came by the Mayflower were not only intelligent beings, but they were devout and worshipful men and women, determined to be free. When that little craft set sail from Holland, fervent prayer besought for it the blessings of Heaven; and when it landed at Plymouth Rock, praises and thanksgiving to God mingled with the roar of the surf that beat upon that rock-bound coast, "and the sounding aisles of the dim woods rang with the anthems of the free." As they built their homes in the forest, they built the schoolhouse and the church. As they established their freedom, they spread their knowledge, and inculcated their religion. Ever since that glad day, the handmaids of liberty — knowledge and religion — have walked together in our midst, and blessed the millions of our land.

Taught by this retrospect, we cannot fail to appreciate the principles for which so many have died, nor to understand aright the requirements of the day. Let us then be true to the full performance of our remaining duty. Let us see to it that no harm comes to our society; that in this country, the majesty of the law is respected everywhere; that the fountains of knowledge are kept pure and uncontaminated; that the fires of Christian religion are kept brightly burning upon our national altars. Let us teach it to our fellow-men, inscribe it on the hearts of the people; write it in the history of the Nation, that truth and right must prevail in government, to the end that our descendants, to the last generation, shall enjoy the priceless blessings of American liberty.

Comrades, I see about me unmistakable indications of the advance of time. I see heads growing gray, and graves growing green, and am reminded that we must pass away. Our deeds and words of to-day will soon be forgotten. This votive stone which our hands have raised, may totter and fall. It may

LETTER OF COL. ANDREW COWAN.

Louisville, Ky., October 8, 1889.

My dear Colonel:

I received your esteemed favor of September 26th, inviting me to attend the dedication of the monument erected to the memory of the One hundred and twenty-first New York Regiment at Gettysburg.

Until yesterday I had indulged the hope of being with you, but important affairs compel me to remain here. You can understand how sincerely I regret this, for, like yourself, my heart warms at the thought of meeting with my old comrades of the glorious Sixth Corps.

I remember when young Upton, fresh from West Point, joined the corps. I remember him at the head of your regiment, on review, on the march, and on the battlefield. I recall him now, as he appeared at the head of the veterans, ready for the famous charge on Lee's intrenched line at Spotsylvania. Everywhere and on every occasion he was the ideal soldier, and his regiment was like him.

The One hundred and twenty-first New York Volunteers needs no monument to commemorate its valor. Its name is written deep in the hearts of the men whose deeds made it glorious, and wherever there lives to-day a soldier of the old Sixth Corps, the name and fame of "Upton's Regulars" are cherished and honored.

When I am dead I want the cross in red, white and blue, the emblem of our corps, and the colors of our country, placed next my heart; and when I wake on the other side of the river I know I shall not be alone, for have not tens of thousands of the same faith, with the same symbol on their hearts, marched through the deep waters to the other shore, where we shall find a comrade's welcome?

Your friend and comrade,

ANDREW COWAN.

HISTORICAL SKETCH.

The One hundred and twenty-first Regiment New York Volunteers was recruited mostly in Otsego and Herkimer Counties, in July and August, 1862. By special order of the Governor, dated July 19, 1862, Hon. Richard Franchot, then member of Congress from the Otsego district, was appointed colonel of a regiment of volunteers, and authorized to establish his headquarters at Richfield Springs, Otsego County, and directed to proceed without delay to organize a regiment of infantry. Colonel Franchot began the work at once, assisted by his capable adjutant, Alonzo Ferguson, and great credit is due them for the prompt and efficient manner in which they placed the regiment in the field. They had the entire regiment recruited, assembled at their rendezvous at Camp Schuyler, in Herkimer County, and mustered into the United States service August 23, 1862. The command at that time consisted of 39 officers and 946 enlisted men. It left its rendezvous August 30th, and

proceeded to Washington, arriving there on the morning of September 3d, and was assigned provisionally to a brigade under Colonel Gibson, with headquarters at Fort Lincoln.

On the march of the army to South Mountain and Antietam battlefields the regiment was assigned to the Second Brigade, First Division, Sixth Corps, and remained with the command during its entire term of service. The brigade was then commanded by Gen. J. J. Bartlett, the division by Gen. Henry W. Slocum, and the corps by Gen. Wm. B. Franklin. It bore its part in the battles of Crampton's Pass, September 14th, and, later, Antietam; but as it was a raw regiment it was assigned to duties that did not require any sacrifice of its men.

Colonel Franchot resigned September 25, 1862, to resume his seat in Congress, but before bidding his regiment adieu he performed a service which ever after received the grateful remembrance of the officers and men, in selecting as his successor Col. Emory Upton, at that time a first lieutenant in the Regular army, under whose command the regiment made a record second to none in the Army of the Potomac. From the start, casualties of various kinds began to thin the ranks of officers and men.

Our efficient surgeon, Dr. Wm. T. Basset, was personally known to many of us as a skillful and humane physician, and all felt that in his hands they would have the very best medical and surgical treatment; but camp exposure soon threatened his health and he was obliged to return home. Thereafter, Asst. Surg. Dr. Daniel M. Holt proved himself the most active, humane, and capable medical officer we had, until in June, 1863, when Dr. J. O. Slocum, then assistant surgeon of the One hundred and twenty-second New York, was commissioned as surgeon of the One hundred and twenty-first, and under his skillful and sympathetic treatment the health and efficiency of the men were kept at a high standard.

Our first chaplain, Rev. J. R. Sage, resigned in June, 1863, and for the next year the chaplain of the Fifth Maine, Rev. Dr. John R. Adams, voluntarily officiated on all necessary occasions as loyally as if assigned to the regiment. There was always a warm attachment between the officers and men of these two regiments, and for Dr. Adams all entertained a degree of profound respect, friendship and love.

In July, 1864, the term of service of the Fifth Maine having expired, the officers and men of the One hundred and twenty-first petitioned the Governor of New York to commission Dr. Adams as chaplain of the regiment, which he did, and the doctor remained with it to the close of the war.

He was just the kind of man to look after the moral and spiritual welfare of a fighting regiment like the Fifth Maine or One hundred and twenty-first New York. Often against the protest of the men, he was seen on the battle line coolly encouraging the men or assisting the wounded, sharing the soldiers' danger until the commanding officer felt obliged to order him to the rear to prevent him from being needlessly shot.

He was widely known in the army, and respected and loved by all. He was a man of profound thought, commanding presence, and possessed of superior mental attainments. As a loyal American, a warm-hearted and genial friend of the soldiers, and a devout, faithful and successful chaplain, we can

truly testify that Dr. John R. Adams had few equals and no superiors in the army; and while life lasts, his sweet memory will never fade from us.

After Colonel Upton assumed command of the brigade, the regiment was commanded at various periods by Lieutenant Colonel Olcott, Majors Mather and Galpin, Captains Kidder, Douw, Jackson, and Major Cronkite.

Very few regiments in the army sustained so great a loss of officers and men. The list of casualties is over 62 per cent. of the enlistment. It lost 16 officers killed, and 4 who died of disease as follows:

KILLED IN ACTION.

Capt. Nelson O. Wendell, Salem Church, May 3, 1863.

First Lieut. U. F. Doubleday, Salem Church, May 3, 1863.

Second Lieut. Frederick E. Ford, Salem Church, May 3, 1863.

Capt. Charles A. Butts, Spotsylvania, May 10, 1864.

Capt. John D. Fish, Spotsylvania, May 12, 1864.

First Lieut. Silas E. Pierce, Spotsylvania, May 12, 1864.

First Lieut. Edward P. Johnson, (not mustered,) Spotsylvania, May 10, 1864.

First Lieut. William H. Tucker, Cedar Creek, October 19, 1864.

Second Lieut. Charles F. Pettengill, (not mustered,) Spotsylvania, May 10, 1864.

First Lieut. Horatio N. Duro, Fort Fisher, Va., March 25, 1865.

Capt. Ten Eyck C. Howland, Sailor's Creek, Va., April 6, 1865.

First Lieut. John T. Morton, Sailor's Creek, Va., April 6, 1865.

DIED OF WOUNDS.

Capt. Thomas S. Arnold, died May 18, 1863, of wounds received at Salem Church, May 3, 1863.

Capt. Jonathan Burrell, died October 26, 1864, of wounds received at Cedar Creek, October 19, 1864.

Capt. John D. P. Douw, died November 11, 1864, of wounds received at Cedar Creek.

DIED OF DISEASE.

Second Lieut. George W. Davis, October 20, 1862.

First Lieut. Angus Cameron, November 9, 1862.

First Lieut. A. Clark Rice, September 20, 1863.

Second Lieut. Samuel B. Kelley, Annapolis, March, 1865.

During the battle of Antietam the regiment, together with a battery of artillery, guarded Crampton's Gap in the South Mountain range, and after the battle assisted in burying the dead on that field.

The loss of men from typhoid and camp fevers for the first three months was very large, the men being without tents for six weeks. The regiment followed the varying fortunes of the Army of the Potomac from that time until the surrender of Lee, excepting the period from July 10th, to December, 1864, when it served with the Sixth Corps under Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley

campaign. It sustained many losses in skirmishes and minor contests, which were never called battles; but the War Department officially records twenty-five battles in which the regiment was engaged, and credits it with the capture of seven battle flags. It had several color bearers shot, but its own standard never fell into the hands of the enemy. Some of its engagements were hand-to-hand, notably Upton's charge, May 10, 1864, at Spotsylvania, where many were killed in close combat, and several men received bayonet wounds. At Salem Church, May 3, 1863, its loss in killed and wounded was 62 per cent. of the men engaged, and the contest did not last more than fifteen or twenty minutes. At Rappahannock Station, November 7, 1863, it captured nearly 700 prisoners and 4 battle flags. At Winchester, Va., September 19, 1864, it, with Upton's Brigade, was credited by General Sheridan with saving the day when the enemy broke the left of the Nineteenth Corps. At Cedar Creek, October 19, 1864, the men saved from falling into the enemy's hands one of our batteries by hauling the guns back by hand.

After Lee was driven from Richmond and Petersburg, April 2d and 3d, the colors of the One hundred and twenty-first were the first to enter the latter city. At Sailor's Creek, April 6th, in the last desperate effort of Lee to save his army, the regiment, in close combat with a brigade of marines, suffered severely, but captured several hundred prisoners and two stand of colors. After Lee's surrender, the regiment remained in Virginia until the Sixth Corps was ordered to march to Washington to join in the grand review of the Army of the Potomac, in which it participated preparatory to disbandment. It was mustered out of the United States service June 25, 1865, at Washington, and was ordered to Albany, N. Y., for final payment and discharge. By special request, the War Department gave the regiment permission to carry their captured battle flags to New York with them, and they marched down Broadway with their own colors, tattered and torn by shot and shell, and triumphantly carrying their seven captured battle flags. Proceeding to Albany the regiment encamped on the Troy Road for about a week, there awaiting the order for final payment and muster-out.

For nearly three years the officers and men of this command had, according to their oath, implicitly and cheerfully obeyed every order of the War Department and their superior officers, but here for the first time, and just on the eve of their discharge, the officer in command of the Albany district gave the regimental officers justification to rebel against his authority by the unwise exercise of overzealous and arbitrary power, and thereby for a brief period incipient mutiny seemed imminent.

It occurred in this way: Colonel Olcott being quartered at a hotel in the city, Lieutenant Colonel Kidder was in command of the camp, and while necessary camp discipline was observed, the usual rigor of field service was relaxed and drills and dress parades omitted.

The officer in command at Albany, presumably not knowing the war was over, ordered a resumption of daily drills and dress parades. Colonel Olcott directed Lieutenant Colonel Kidder to ignore the order, which he gladly did. Then the same officer directed the regimental commander to report every officer and man absent without leave. Colonel Kidder reported promptly: "There are no officers or men in this regiment absent without leave."

Next an officer from headquarters came to the regiment's camp and demanded that the seven Rebel battle flags must be given to him to be turned over to the adjutant general of the State. Colonel Kidder, with emphasis, gave the officer to understand "that he would not obey the order, or recognize his authority, with all due respect for the adjutant general of the State; that the flags were the war trophies of his regiment; they were the property of the United States, and had been lent to the regiment by the Secretary of War in person, and they must be returned to that department; and that he declined to deliver them to anyone except on the order of the President, Secretary of War, or General Grant." The officer left in a huff, saying that he would return with troops and take them by force. He carried out his threat in so far as returning at the head of a company of soldiers, and again demanded the Rebel flags.

Colonel Kidder had anticipated him and instantly ordered a part of his regiment under arms, and replying again to the officer's demand said: "There are the Rebel flags, and here are the soldiers who captured them. If you must have them you can give your men the command to take them away from their captors, and if they cannot defend them I will call out the entire regiment." It is needless to say the officer, considerably crestfallen, reversed his men, and marched away to be seen no more by the One hundred and twenty-first New York Volunteers.

Learning the regiment could not be disbanded until after July 4th, citizens of Little Falls, N. Y., invited it to a banquet at their Fourth of July celebration, there to receive the thanks of the people of Herkimer County, and make their final parade in view of their numerous and admiring friends.

Once more they came in conflict with the Albany authorities. The Albany citizens wished the regiment to parade in that city July 4th, and obtained an order to that effect from the military commander. Colonel Olcott immediately telegraphed the situation to the Secretary of War, who informed the Albany authorities that the One hundred and twenty-first New York as a body was furloughed for forty-eight hours, and thus the Albany order was nullified, and the regiment proceeded to Little Falls by an early train, July 4th, where they received a royal welcome; and as a military organization made their final parade under their own shot-and-shell-riddled banner, triumphantly bearing their captured battle flags amidst the cheers and plaudits of the patriotic citizens.

Next morning early they boarded a special train for Albany, and on arriving there, found orders from the War Department to march the men to North Pearl Street for final payment and discharge.

With feelings of mingled sorrow and pleasure the men assembled under their war colors for the last time, and after saluting their old flag with cheer after cheer, it was turned in to the Adjutant General of the State for safe-keeping, by the adjutant of the regiment, Capt. Frank E. Low, who at the same time returned by express the Rebel battle-flags to the Secretary of War.

After final payment and discharge papers were received, the military organization of the One hundred and twenty-first New York Volunteers vanished from the field of military activity, each member thereof again to assume the individual citizen, but with patriotism quickened by experience, and a riper knowledge of the duties which American citizenship imposes.

(INSCRIPTIONS.)

(Front.)

122ND N. Y. INF'Y,
6TH ARMY CORPS.

(Right Side.)


3D DIVISION.

(Reverse.)

ASSISTED IN
REPULSING THE ATTACK
ON THE MORNING OF
JULY 3, 1863.
LOSS,
KILLED 10,
WOUNDED 34.

(Left Side.)

1ST BRIGADE.
ORGANIZED
ONONDAGA CO.,
NEW YORK.
MUSTERED INTO SERVICE
AT SYRACUSE, N. Y.,
AUGUST 28, 1862.
SERVED CONTINUOUSLY
WITH THE
SIXTH CORPS
UNTIL THE CLOSE
OF THE WAR.



J. B. LYON PRINT.

122D NEW YORK INFANTRY.
On Culp's Hill.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

DEDICATION OF MONUMENT
122D REGIMENT INFANTRY.

June 13, 1888.

ADDRESS OF MAJ. DAVID COSSITT.

COMRADES AND FRIENDS:

I need not take this occasion to remind you that the ground upon which we meet to-day, and the deeds which we are gathered here to honor and commemorate, are among the most interesting and important on the world's record; for by common consent of history, both military and civil, Gettysburg has been added to the number of those decisive contests that have influenced the course of events and made or marred the destinies of nations.

After repeatedly measuring its strength with the Army of Northern Virginia on the soil of the Old Dominion, with varied fortune, sometimes partially successful, more frequently encountering successful resistance or defeat and disaster, the Army of the Potomac did finally on this field of Gettysburg achieve a decisive, substantial victory.

There has been an impression somewhat prevalent that Culp's Hill was a mere outpost, of little consequence in the battle of Gettysburg. In reality it was one of the most important points in the Union lines. As anyone can see, had Johnson succeeded in establishing his strong division along this ridge, almost directly in rear of Cemetery Hill, supported as he was by the other divisions of Ewell's Corps, comprising at least one-third of the entire Confederate army, Meade would have been forced to retreat; he would have been flanked from his position without the firing of a shot, and the road to Baltimore and Washington left open to the invader. Retreat at that time meant nothing less than rout, disaster and ruin to the Union army.

No one general was great enough, no one army corps large enough to absorb quite all the glories of this, the great battle of the war. The record made by Shaler's Brigade is one to which all may point with pride. While in no wise desirous of arrogating to ourselves an undue share of the honors, we may justly claim that we contributed our full share towards securing the final glorious result.

At daylight, on the morning of the third day's fight, we moved from the foot of Round Top to this ravine, and among the rocks some fifteen rods back from the front line. By order of General Shaler, the One hundred and twenty-second dashed across the intervening space and took possession of the breastworks on our front. Here we found the One hundred and forty-ninth New York, of the Twelfth Corps, posted immediately on our left. Thus these two Onondaga regiments, fighting side by side, aided in dislodging Johnson from this portion of our line, and from the works of which he had partial possession.

While advancing this short distance over this ridge, and in defence of the breastworks, the One hundred and twenty-second lost, in killed and wounded,

The One hundred and twenty-second New York was enlisted entirely in the county of Onondaga, in the fair garden of Central New York, and mustered into service at Syracuse, N. Y., August 28, 1862. We left Syracuse August 31, 1862, 1,000 strong, under command of Col. Silas Titus, who is with us here to-day; A. W. Dwight, lieutenant colonel; Frank Lester, quartermaster; N. R. Tefft, surgeon; J. O. Slocum and E. A. Knapp, assistants; and L. M. Nickerson, chaplain.

Colonel Titus remained in command of the regiment until after the battle of Gettysburg, when compelled to leave on account of ill-health, Colonel Dwight assumed command, which he retained until he was killed in action before Petersburg, Va., in March, 1865. Major Brower, who succeeded Major Davis, was killed at the battle of Cedar Creek, October 19, 1864. Major Clapp, one of the best and bravest officers any regiment ever had, upon Colonel Dwight's death took command, and was succeeded by Captain Walpole, who had been promoted to colonel, and who brought the regiment home at the close of the war, which came soon after.

Our losses during our three years' service were: Killed in action, 5 officers, 59 enlisted men; died of wounds, 1 officer and 29 men; died of disease, 3 officers, 68 men; accidentally killed, 2 men; drowned, 1 man; died in Rebel prisons, 14 men; a total of 179 deaths. The number of wounded reached to nearly 500, making the total casualties of the regiment more than one-half of the original number.

While time forbids that a fitting tribute should be paid to many a gallant comrade who fell, I must pause for a moment to speak of two; the one, Col. A. W. Dwight, to whom the efficiency of the regiment was so largely due. Serving under him as adjutant, I can bear testimony to the good discipline he maintained, his courage and his faithfulness even unto death, which came just as we were to reap the fruits of our three years of trials and sufferings in the closing victory of the war. The other, Lieut. Frank Wooster, a brave and capable officer, for whom no march was long enough to stop the flow of his spirits, and who always was disposed to see the humorous side of even the trials of our army life. Never shall I forget my last sight of him, his face aglow with the ardor of battle, as we involuntarily clasped hands as we passed each other in that hastily formed line in the battle of the Wilderness, repelling the flank attack. In a few moments I was a prisoner, and the very day I succeeded in gaining our lines at Harper's Ferry, poor Wooster was killed at Cold Harbor. With a premonition of coming events he wrote May 14, 1864, to my mother after my capture: "If your son is alive and a prisoner, as I believe him to be, and I think of what we have been through for the last two weeks, and what we are likely to go through in the next few weeks to come, I feel that I have cause to congratulate you, rather than condole with you."

Upon our arrival at Washington we went into camp for a few days, when we were ordered to join the Army of the Potomac; and fortunately for us, were assigned to Cochrane's, soon to become Shaler's Brigade, composed of the Twenty-third, Sixty-first, and Eighty-second Pennsylvania, Sixty-fifth and Sixty-seventh New York.

I don't believe any of us will forget the day when we joined the brigade at Offutt's Cross Roads. The old regiments were so reduced in numbers by the

Halting only for the occasional five minutes rest, and twice to make coffee, we struggled on through that hot July day, nerved to renewed efforts as the sound of the battle grew louder and louder, reaching the banks of Rock Creek in the middle of the afternoon, and redeeming the promise our noble Sedgwick had made when he received his orders the night before: "Tell General Meade," he said to the staff officer who brought the order, "tell General Meade, I will be at Gettysburg with my corps at 2 o'clock to-morrow afternoon."

Part of our corps were engaged that night; dashing on to the field at a double-quick, after their long march, they assisted in relieving the Third Corps.

Our brigade went into bivouac in rear of Little Round Top, sleeping on our arms. We were aroused again before daylight and moved to Culp's Hill, reporting to General Geary, commanding the Twelfth Corps.

On that pleasant July morning, twenty-five years ago, these peaceful woods were filled with the angry sounds of war. Here might have been heard the whistle of the minie bullet or the shriek of the vindictive shell, as Lee made his last desperate attempt to turn the right of our army.

In yonder ravine lay Shaler's Brigade. When in the midst of the strife a regiment of the Twelfth Corps was compelled to fall back from these breastworks, their ammunition exhausted, under orders from General Shaler the One hundred and twenty-second sprang forward with a cheer to take their place. Charging across yon knoll we reoccupied these breastworks, and assisted by other regiments—notably the One hundred and forty-ninth New York, who were on our immediate left, a regiment from our own county of Onondaga, friends and neighbors fighting side by side,—we held this portion of the line against the repeated charges of the enemy until they abandoned their attack in despair.

In the gallant charge across yon knoll and in the subsequent defence of these breastworks, we lost 10 of our comrades killed or mortally wounded, and 34 more or less severely wounded, a very large proportion of the number actually engaged and one-third in number of killed, and one-sixth in wounded of the loss that day sustained by our corps.

Through the liberality of the Empire State we to-day dedicate this monument, surmounted by the cross we fought under, to the memory of our comrades who here gave their lives freely in the service of their country, and whose graves in yonder beautiful cemetery bear mute witness for them; to the memory, also, of those other comrades, some of whom have died, and others that live and still suffer from wounds received that day; and still further in commemoration of the gallant services of our regiment in the Sixth Army Corps, a tribute to those that are gone, as well as to the survivors who, as good citizens, maintain the reputation they won on the field.

As we gather year by year at our annual reunions, we find our fraternal bonds strengthened as our ranks decrease, and when we shall all have been mustered into that Grand Army above, may we find that the services we have rendered our country in her hour of need, on this and other memorable fields, will not be found to have been in vain.

HISTORICAL NOTES.

The One hundred and twenty-second New York Volunteers was recruited in the county of Onondaga in July and August, 1862, under the call of President Lincoln for 300,000 volunteers, and was mustered into service at Syracuse, N. Y., August 28, 1862.

The regiment left Syracuse August 31, 1862, and proceeded immediately to Washington. After two days' rest it was ordered to join the Army of the Potomac, and was assigned to Cochrane's Brigade — afterwards commanded by General Shaler,— Couch's Division, Sixth Army Corps, in which it served continuously until the close of the war.

The regiment joined the corps just before the battle of Antietam, and though not actually engaged was in reserve in that battle.

The regiment participated in the following battles, viz.: First Fredericksburg, Marye's Heights, Salem Church, Gettysburg, Rappahannock Station, Mine Run, Wilderness, Spotsylvania, North Anna, Cold Harbor, Weldon Railroad, Fort Stevens, in fortifications of Washington, Winchester, Fisher's Hill, Cedar Creek, Assault on Petersburg, Sailor's Creek, and was present at the surrender of Lee.

The regiment was commanded by Colonel Titus until after the battle of Gettysburg, when the command devolved upon Lieut. Col. A. W. Dwight, who was promoted to colonel February 28, 1865, and who was killed in action March 25, 1865, in the advance of the Sixth Corps picket line in front of the works at Petersburg, a few days previous to the final assault upon the works.

At the battle of Cedar Creek, October 19, 1864, Colonel Dwight having been wounded and Maj. J. M. Brower having been killed, Capt. A. H. Clapp ably commanded the regiment throughout the remainder of the battle.

Capt. J. M. Gere was promoted to lieutenant colonel, and Capt. H. H. Walpole to colonel just before the close of the war.

The regiment during its term of service lost the following officers killed in action, viz.:

Lieut. Col. A. W. Dwight, at Petersburg, Va., March 25, 1865.

Maj. J. M. Brower, at Cedar Creek, Va., October 19, 1864.

Lieut. W. H. Hoyt, at Petersburg, Va., June 21, 1864.

Lieut. Frank M. Wooster, at Cold Harbor, Va., June 1, 1864.

Lieut. John V. Sims, at Winchester, Va., September 19, 1864.

Lieut. Martin L. Wilson, died June 19, 1864, of wound received at the Wilderness, Va., May 6, 1864.

The regiment was mustered out of service at Syracuse, N. Y., June 23, 1865.





J. R. LYON PRINT.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

123d NEW YORK INFANTRY.

On Culp's Hill. The breastworks in rear of the monument are a part of the line thrown up by the Twelfth Corps.

*(INSCRIPTIONS.)**(Front.)*

123RD NEW YORK
INFANTRY
1ST BRIGADE 1ST DIVISION
12TH CORPS.

HISTORIC.

THE 123RD N. Y. WAS ENLISTED IN WASHINGTON CO., IN AUG. 1862; MUSTERED INTO THE U. S. SERVICE SEPT. 4; JOINED THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC AND WAS ENGAGED IN THE BATTLES OF CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG; IN SEPT. 1863, TRANSFERRED TO THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND; AND WAS ENGAGED IN THE CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA, THE MARCH TO THE SEA, AND THE CAMPAIGN OF THE CAROLINAS; MUSTERED OUT AT WASHINGTON AT THE CLOSE OF THE WAR, JUNE 8, 1865.

(Reverse.)

123RD NEW YORK
THE
WASHINGTON COUNTY
REGIMENT
12TH AND 20TH CORPS.

ABOUT 100 YARDS IN FRONT OF THE LINE OF WORKS, A MARKER INDICATES THE POSITION OCCUPIED BY THE SKIRMISHERS OF THIS REGIMENT ON THE AFTERNOON OF JULY 3.

(Right Side.)

ENGAGEMENTS.

CHANCELLORSVILLE,
GETTYSBURG,
RESACA,
CASSVILLE,
NEW HOPE CHURCH,
LOST MOUNTAIN,
PINE HILL,
KENESAW,

KOLB'S FARM,
CHATTAHOOCHEE RIVER,
PEACH TREE CREEK,
ATLANTA,
MONTEITH SWAMP,
SAVANNAH,
AVERASBOROUGH,
BENTONVILLE,

MOCCASIN SWAMP.

(Left Side.)

SERVICE AT GETTYSBURG

JULY 1; MARCHED FROM LITTLESTOWN; FORMED LINE OF BATTLE ON WOLF HILL; BIVOUACKED NEAR BALTIMORE PIKE; JULY 2, ADVANCED TO THIS LINE AND BUILT A HEAVY BREASTWORK OF LOGS. AT ABOUT 6 P. M. MOVED TO SUPPORT THE LEFT NEAR LITTLE ROUND TOP; RETURNING IN THE NIGHT, FOUND BREASTWORKS IN POSSESSION OF ENEMY, AS NO TROOPS WERE LEFT TO OCCUPY THEM. JULY 3, AT ABOUT 11 A. M. MADE A CHARGE AND RECOVERED THESE WORKS; ABOUT 4 P. M. MOVED TO SUPPORT LINE THEN REPELLING PICKETT'S CHARGE; A LITTLE LATER HAD A SHARP SKIRMISH IN FRONT OF THIS LINE; AT NIGHT REPELLED AN ATTACK WITH HEAVY LOSS TO THE ENEMY. JULY 4; MADE RECONNAISSANCE AROUND WOLF HILL AND THROUGH GETTYSBURG OVER THE HANOVER ROAD.

DEDICATION OF MONUMENT.

123D REGIMENT INFANTRY.

September 4, 1888.

ADDRESS OF ADJ. SETH C. CARY.

COMRADES AND FRIENDS:

We meet here on this sacred spot, on this twenty-sixth anniversary of our muster into the United States service, to dedicate this beautiful monument as a memorial of our comrades living and dead. These years have quickly gone, and, filled with other service,—the campaign of Atlanta, the March to the Sea, the campaign of the Carolinas, and since then with the duties of civil life,—other events have occupied our time and thought. But here we are once more. All the history of those memorable July days of so long ago rises up before us. The building of the heavy log breastworks; the rapid changes from right to left, and from left to right of the lines; our fallen comrades; the fierce contests on this spot; the retaking of this line at noon of the third day; the hurried movement to the left, and the broken lines of Pickett fading away in the distance! All these and other events now rush in upon us, and almost overwhelm us with emotion.

It is no wonder that your chairman has found it difficult to find any among us to voice the common feeling that animates every heart. You have found it far easier to give yourselves up to them, than to speak to others.

And now, here in the presence of scenes so familiar to these comrades, and with this magnificent monument to perpetuate what they and the dead accomplished, we all, comrades and citizens of this good county of Washington, dedicate this memorial and ourselves to Truth, Liberty, and Righteousness!

ORATION OF CHAPLAIN HENRY GORDON.

COMRADES:

We are met here to-day on this historic spot to dedicate a monument to the memory of brave men. The question may be raised, "What have these men done that their names and deeds should be handed down to coming generations?"

First: They have clearly demonstrated the strength of a republican form of government. When the war broke out, you could scarcely take up a paper from Europe in which you could not read a prophecy of the failure of the Republic. It may do very well in times of peace, said they, but it lacks that central power necessary to stand the strain of civil war. But how greatly were they mistaken. The war clearly proved the fact that the strength of government is in the intelligent attachment of the people to the principles on which it is based. The response to the call for men to defend the flag and

maintain the integrity of the Union, taking everything into consideration, was the finest exhibition of patriotism ever given by any nation. Men turned their backs on home, friends, and every worldly advantage, and with their lives in their hands, rushed to preserve the Union.

Position in the army was no evidence of social position. Professional men and college students could be found in the ranks doing duty nobly and with a cheerful spirit. Yes, the Union has been preserved; the flag raised higher than ever before without one dark spot on its folds. But at what a cost has this been accomplished! What tender ties were severed! How many children lisp the names of those they will never see! These men made their bodies a living breakwater to roll back the desolating tide of rebellion.

Second: They gave solidity to the credit of the country. There is much said about the demand on the Nation's treasury. But what was the condition of the treasury when the war broke out? Almost empty. What is its condition now? There is not a nation whose bonds bring the same premium. Who brought this about? I answer, without hesitation, the men whose deeds we are this day commemorating. As a cabinet minister said, "You may pass laws and print bonds, but you cannot sell them until it is clearly shown in the field you can preserve the Nation." The man who has lent money to the Nation has a legal claim on it, and it would be considered bad faith to repudiate the claim. But what claim is so strong as the claim of the father or mother who gave an only son, or the claim of children left orphans for the safety of the country?

The monuments erected here and elsewhere will have an educational influence. They will keep before successive generations the heroic self-denial of the men who laid their young lives on the altar of their country. The great Webster said, "I take my children once a year to the humble home of my ancestors that they may see the Puritan simplicity of the early founders of the Republic, and imbibe some of the same spirit that animated them." So will pilgrimages be made to this spot that men may understand what the liberties cost that are now enjoyed, and have their attachment increased to the principles on which the Republic rests.

The brightest page in American history is the page that records the deeds of the veterans that died in their country's service.

THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN.

BY SERGT. HENRY C. MORHOUS.

The boys had their camp at Stafford Court House, Va., fixed to suit them, when orders came to march. It was June 3d, about 3 o'clock in the morning, but they did not strike tents until the morning of June 13th, when they were aroused with orders to start at 5 o'clock. They were in line by that time, and marched to General Williams' headquarters, where was found the balance of the brigade; and then commenced the Gettysburg campaign, although they did not know it at the time. The day was very hot and the

was dusty, but they marched most of the time in the woods, and arrived within about two miles of Brooke's Station without being much fatigued, and were marched into a field. The boys thought this might be a change of location, or certainly a night's camp, and went to work putting up their tents and making themselves comfortable for the night, and had just got everything nicely arranged, when orders came to pack up and get ready to move in thirty minutes. There were a good many "cuss words" used, but that did not help matters any, and by 5 o'clock the column was marching back towards Stafford, going on the same road traveled in the morning. Reaching Stafford they did not stop, as many expected, but kept on until Dumfries was reached, which was at about 8 o'clock the next morning. This was a hard night's march for the boys. The roads were bad enough to march over in daylight, but at night it was much worse, and many a fall was taken, to the amusement of others. But there is an end to all things, and daylight put an end to their stumbles and falls.

At Dumfries the regiment remained until about 3 o'clock the next morning, the 15th, when they took up their line of march for Fairfax Court House. It was one of the hottest days ever experienced by the regiment while on a march. The men carried heavy loads with them.—clothing, tent, knapsack, haversack, canteen, coffee, kettle, gun and accoutrements, ammunition, etc. Many received a sunstroke that day, and some died. All through the long day they dragged themselves along. Here and there by the roadside could be seen great stout men who had become exhausted, could go no further, and had dropped out of the ranks. No good water was to be had along the line of march; but some drank too much of what they could get, and they were the first to succumb to the heat. One plucky soldier was determined to come into camp with his company, and so was put on a horse, and helped into camp in that way. Just at dark the regiment went into bivouac near Fairfax Court House; but not the whole regiment, for many had lain down by the roadside to sleep. Just as they marched into camp a brass band struck up a national air, which seemed to infuse new life into the weary and exhausted soldiers, for they cheered most lustily.

At Dumfries many of the boys supplied themselves with horses, which were abundant thereabouts, and as the regiment filed out of camp that morning it would have required some good judgment to have decided whether it was a regiment of cavalry or mounted infantry. Every few minutes a horse was brought in with a gun strap around his neck, and half-a-dozen knapsacks would be strapped on, much to the annoyance of the Secesh owners, and as much to the gratification of the weary and footsore soldiers. One man from whom a horse had been taken, came to General Slocum and complained piteously that he had been robbed by the Yankees. The General asked him if "he was a Union man." He replied, "Wa'll, no, not exactly." "Did they burn your house and barn, and kill all your cattle?" asked the General. "No." "Well, sir," said the General, "you ought to thank God, and consider yourself fortunate," shrugged his shoulders and rode off.

When the boys struck the road leading from the Occoquan to Fairfax Station it was almost like getting home, for they had marched over the same

road no less than five times in their journeyings to and from the river six months previous. But this brought up afresh the memory of companions who were then joyous and full of hope, but who now sleep their last sleep on the bloody field of Chancellorsville.

Wednesday morning the regiment left Fairfax Court House, moved about nine miles, and camped in the midst of a delightful country on Prospect Hill. Here the boys found good "foraging," and for a short time lived in clover.

Thursday morning they pushed on, passing a small village called Dranesville, and reached Goose Creek, which the boys had to ford, there being no bridge at the point where they crossed. Soon after crossing this creek a heavy rain came on, which continued until after they had made camp at Leesburg. The country in the vicinity of this place strikingly resembled Northern farms, rolling, fertile, well-wooded and watered, with fine crops of wheat, rye, oats, corn, potatoes, etc. The boys made good use of this abundance, and every night squads of half a dozen "skirmishers" came in loaded with fowls, milk, butter, flour, mutton, veal, pork, onions and other luxuries. One evening a few of Company A's men went out on an exploring expedition, and were rewarded by two large hives of honey, weighing nearly 100 pounds. About midnight they entered camp with the spoils. The whole company were waked up, a fire kindled, and for nearly two hours there was one of the most interesting "conference meetings" ever enjoyed. Jolly peals of laughter rang out again and again, until the officers sent word to "cease laughing." Next morning the honey market was dull, and toothache remedies were in good demand.

The town was a perfect nest of sneering Rebels. They insulted the soldiers in every way they thought safe. The people were the bitterest in their hatred of the "Northern Mudsills" of any we had met. Still, many of their houses were guarded; but these guards were more sensible than their officers, and had strange ways of not seeing things sometimes. The ladies were the most outspoken and bitter. They took every possible means to avoid a soldier. They would step into a yard and wait for a soldier to pass; and if there was no gate near for them to pass through, they would go in the middle of the road. One woman said she would not pass under the Stars and Stripes; so, in her absence from her house one day some one put a flag over her door, and she was compelled to either walk under the flag or remain out. She chose the former.

On Friday, June 19th, three men in the division, and two of them in the brigade, were shot for desertion; two in the Forty-sixth Pennsylvania, and one in the Thirteenth New Jersey. The scene was terribly impressive. They were busy writing to friends during the whole of the forenoon, and with one exception seemed penitent for their crime. At 12 o'clock the corps was formed into a hollow square in a large field near the camp. Generals Slocum, Williams, and Geary, with their staffs, were present. At 1 p. m., an ambulance, tightly closed, containing the criminals, made its appearance, surrounded and followed by a large guard. Immediately in front of it was an army wagon carrying the coffins which rattled a dismal dirge that must have grated pain-

The Rebel citizens cut the telegraph wire between Leeburg and Alexandria. General Strom issued an order that if the wire was again modified with he would burn the town. This order had its desired effect for the wire was not again disturbed.

[illegible]

miles and then passed under the canal; passed Slab City and Petersburg, and camped about two miles from the latter village for the night.

On the 27th of June, General Hooker was relieved of the command of the army of the Potomac, and General Meade appointed his successor. This change of commanding officer on the eve of battle, as it were, was something the soldiers could not understand. General Halleck says, in his report, that it was at Hooker's own request. We are of the opinion that the same glorious results would have been achieved at Gettysburg had General Hooker been in command. But the ways of the rulers at Washington were past finding out during those dark days of the war for the suppression of the Rebellion.

The 28th, the regiment made an early start, going back about three miles over the road marched the day before, and struck the Frederick City Road. They passed two small villages, Centreville and Jefferson, and camped a short distance from Frederick City, Md. On the 29th, they made a good march, passing through the city, and camped for the night near Ladiesburg. Nothing occurred during the march, but the boys were weary and footsore. The 30th, the regiment took up its line of march soon after 3 o'clock in the morning, and pushed rapidly forward, passing several villages. Crossing the line into Pennsylvania it passed Taneytown, and when in sight of Littlestown the boys discovered a commotion among the cavalymen in the field far in advance. Soon news came back that the cavalry had run on to the Rebel pickets. The troops were halted; Generals Slocum and Geary dashed forward and soon a battery came up the road and passed on to the front, the horses on a dead run. As soon as the battery had passed, the command "fall in" was heard, and every man was up and in his place in a moment. "Forward, double-quick," was given, and the boys went tearing along after the battery. Reaching Littlestown they found the entire population out. On every doorstep and on the walks in front of the houses were stationed men, women and children, each holding a pan or basket of cakes, pails of water, cold meats, etc., and on the upper piazza of the small hotel was congregated a crowd of ladies and gentlemen, singing that grand old tune, "Hail Columbia." Some of the ladies were in tears, and all waved their handkerchiefs. The boys appreciated, but did not have much time to enjoy the hospitalities of the people of Littlestown, nor the smiles of the ladies, but some of them did grab a handful of cake as they passed by. On through the village the regiment went, and never stopped until nearly one mile beyond, when it halted and was marched into a large field with the balance of the brigade. Here it remained for the night.

As the cavalry advance came into Littlestown, one old man volunteered to show them where a squad of Rebel cavalry were. True to his word the old man piloted them right, and soon the cavalry were engaged; but instead of retreating when the fight commenced the old man went in on his own hook. He dragged one Rebel from his horse and, having no arms, *choked him into submission.*

July 1st, the regiment retraced its steps about one mile, and struck the road leading to Gettysburg. The men had proceeded but a short distance on the way when cannonading was heard in front, and news soon came from the front that our forces were engaging the Rebels near Gettysburg. The

in time to see the broken masses of the enemy sullenly withdrawing from the field. In the twilight, as they were retiring to the right of their old position, and in crossing a ravine, they were fired upon by sharpshooters concealed in McAllister's Mill, beyond Rock Creek. Capt. Norman F. Weer, of Company E, received a wound in the knee from which he died. Crossing the ravine into the woods the boys prepared coffee, and remained there until after dusk. They then moved to their old position and lay on their arms. About midnight the pickets discovered the enemy advancing and fired on them, and then came into the breastworks. The line then opened a terrific fire on the advancing Rebels, driving them back with great slaughter.

The morning of July 4th dawned bright and beautiful. There being no evidence of the enemy in front the boys went over the works in quest of the wounded. Wesley P. Huntington of Company C was brought in dead. They buried him on the field beneath the shade of a large oak tree, there to remain until the roll-call of that day when all shall assemble at the order of the Great Commander. Among the many wounded Rebels brought in was one South Carolinian who was wounded severely. The boys did everything they could for him,—brought him hot coffee and the best of what they had to eat, and a doctor to dress his wounds. He received these acts of kindness with seeming astonishment, and with tears running down his face thanked them, and said he did not expect such kindness from the "Yanks." He expected to be treated with roughness and perhaps cruelty, and had tried to crawl away but was unable to do so. He said if he could only live to get home to his wife and children he should never raise a hand against the Yankees or the dear old flag again.

Many of the boys had very narrow escapes. One in particular, Thomas J. Wrangham, of Company C, was on the picket line, in charge of a section of the line. Being hard pressed the line fell back over the breastworks, and as he mounted the works a bullet struck the "U. S." brass plate on his cartridge box, passing through that and the thick leather flap, through the tin box which held the cartridges, and lodged in the leather next his hip. Had he been in any other position he would undoubtedly have been killed.

Early on the morning of July 4th, the regiment was ordered to "fall in." "Where now?" was the inquiry made by the boys; but none of them knowing, the inquiry remained unanswered. Out into the road they went, and there found three or four other regiments, a squad of cavalry and a battery. The line moved off, the cavalry in the lead, a piece of artillery being sandwiched in between the regiments. Around the right of the army they moved cautiously, every moment expecting to hear the Rebel shells in their midst. Making a reconnoissance of about eight miles they passed through Gettysburg, and by the Cemetery to their former position, without seeing a sign of the enemy. The boys then knew the enemy had been defeated and had left. It was then they thanked the "Giver of every good and perfect gift" that they had been spared through another terrible battle.

Large details were made to bury the dead, and this duty occupied the entire day. The corps to which the regiment belonged buried that day 1,500 dead Rebels. The dead lay in every imaginable shape. From the position

of some of the bodies inside of the works, near Spangler's Spring, it appeared as though the entire picket line had been shot down while in possession of the works vacated by the regiment. Beyond the breastworks the ground was literally covered with dead bodies. Several Rebel officers lay there in their handsome gray uniforms, and among others General Ewell's assistant adjutant general. He lay partly under his horse, and both were riddled with bullets.

In the National Cemetery, on Cemetery Hill, now sleep the brave boys who fell at Gettysburg. Here repose the precious offerings laid upon the altar of the country by the loyal States. Ordinarily the filling up of a cemetery is slow work,—the work of years. *Three days sufficed to fill this.* And what is the reward of those brave men for their weeks of weary marching, and days and nights of fearful fighting? "Two paces of the vilest earth." There they lie, those "unnamed demi-gods" of the rank and file. "Unknown!" "Unknown!" The only epitaph of hundreds. Yes, there they lie, "massed" with military precision, rank upon rank, as if awaiting the order to appear in review before the Great Commander-in-Chief of us all.

"Up many a fortress wall
They charged, those Boys in Blue,
'Mid surging smoke and volleying ball,
The bravest were the first to fall —
To fall for me and you."

*(INSCRIPTIONS.)**(Front.)*

124TH NEW YORK
INFANTRY
2ND BRIGADE, 1ST DIVISION,
3RD CORPS.
JULY 2, 1863.

(Reverse.)

THE ORANGE BLOSSOMS
WENT INTO ACTION ON
THIS SPOT WITH
18 OFFICERS AND 220 MEN.
LOST IN KILLED AND WOUNDED,
7 OFFICERS AND 85 MEN.
MUSTERED IN SEPT. 5, 1862.
MUSTERED OUT JUNE 2, 1865.
TOTAL ENLISTMENTS 1320.
TOTAL LOSSES 516.

(Left Side.)

KILLED

COL. A. VAN HORNE ELLIS
CAPT. ISAAC NICHOLS
SERGT. JOHN D. DRAKE
SERGT. WILLIAM H. COX
CORPL. JACOB LENT,
PRIV. WILLIAM LAMOREAUX
" BENJAMIN F. FLAGG,
" JAMES ROURKE
" JAMES E. HOMAN
" CHARLES EDWARDS
" JAMES PARTINGTON
" WILLIAM WHAN
" WILLIAM MOORE
" JOHN CARROLL
" CORNELIUS S. ALLEN
" GEORGE H. STEPHENS,
" AMBROSE S. HULBURT

OUR COMRADES THEY DIED
FOR THEIR COUNTRY.

(Right Side.)

KILLED

MAJOR JAMES CROMWELL
LIEUT. MILNOR BROWN
CORPL. ORLANDO U. KNAPP
CORPL. ISAAC DECKER
PRIV. HARRISON STORMS,
" ROBERT J. HOLLAND
" JOHN GLANZ
" JAMES PEMBLETON
" JAMES B. MOORE
" HEZEKIAH HARRIS
" JOHN SCOTT
" AMZI W. QUICK
" ISAAC G. GILLSON
" WILLIAM D. DAWKINS
" WILLIAM CAMPBELL
" THOMAS CORBETT
" WALTER BARTON

ORANGE COUNTY'S TRIBUTE
TO HER BRAVE DEFENDERS.



J. B. LYON PRINT.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

124TH NEW YORK INFANTRY.

On the hill north of the Devil's Den. This monument was erected by the Regimental Association and not by the State.

DEDICATION OF MONUMENT.

124TH REGIMENT INFANTRY — "ORANGE BLOSSOMS."

July 2, 1884.

ORATION OF GEN. STEWART L. WOODFORD.

COMRADES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

Twenty-one years ago to-day, among these rocks stood a regiment of New York Volunteers listening to the roar of battle which grew heavier each moment. On the right — you who were here can describe it, I cannot — the gray line grew plainer in the distance. Hour after hour the Rebels assailed this point, but, thank God, you were able to hold the left of the Union line. Here fell your colonel, and major, and other brave sons of Orange, and, when relieved by the Fifth Corps, you fell back for coffee. Of 238 officers and men who came upon the field, 95 were killed and wounded. Those words tell more than any orator how bravely you fought and died at Gettysburg.

Fitly do you come from the banks of the noble Hudson to see the place where your comrades died; fitly do you erect that noble monument to mark the place where they fell. I do not need to tell the story. Each heart is thinking of that day. You are thinking how you fought; how at night in the rainfall you gathered up the wounded. It were mockery to tell the story of your fight, or of the larger fight of the whole army; for in words that shall echo through the centuries Lincoln told the story when he said, "This is a government of the people and by the people, and shall not perish from the face of the earth." It, as said, was a struggle of war; it was a victory of the common people. I believe that history will intensify this criticism that it was a victory of the rank and file. Lee chose a wonderful position, where every ridge found natural breastworks. It was not skill or generalship that forced the fighting of the first day, but the courage of the Union soldiers. Nor did he gain victory on the third day. It was because each man fought with his heart in his gun, and a prayer in his bullet for Freedom and God.

As we went over the field yesterday we never before realized the courage of the men who fought. I don't believe history ever recorded a more brave and terrible charge than that of Pickett's men across the plain. I thank God that the men who fought bravely then are with us to-day. As sure as there is a God above us, the cause of the Union was eternally right, and the cause of Rebellion eternally wrong. We fought them that we might save the Union; we whipped them and preserved it; and, thank God, it is the most perfect Union on the face of the earth.

There comes to us a voice we should hear. Whoever gives a vote that is not cast with all the patriotic teaching of Gettysburg, is false to the blood of Gettysburg. By individual bullets the battle was won; by individual ballots the country is saved. God help us to carry with us the inspiration of this hour; God help us to be always true to the spirit of Gettysburg. Our country

is growing each hour. We build almost a city each year. We wrest another State from a wilderness; but with wealth comes greed. God only knows what danger is in store for each section filled with the different people of the old country, which is giving us its worst as well as best of its people. If we destroy evil from among us, all will go well; but if we allow political iniquity, greed and ambition to get the better of us, there will be civil war, famine and wretchedness. No doctrine of law is ever broken without its consequences; but if we remember to conform to the spirit of Gettysburg and the law of God, as a country of the people and by the people, we shall never perish from the face of the earth.

TRANSFER OF MONUMENT.

BY LIEUT. WOOD T. OGDEN.

GENTLEMEN OF THE GETTYSBURG MEMORIAL ASSOCIATION:

As the representative of the One hundred and twenty-fourth New York Monument Committee, I deliver into your keeping this beautiful offering from the people of Orange County, N. Y., erected to the memory of its gallant sons who fought, bled and died for their country on this blood-washed field twenty-one years ago to-day. But no words of mine, though I had the tongue of Lounsbury or Woodford, and a voice that could be heard above the roaring cannon of July 3, 1863, would appeal to you to care for and preserve it like the silent eloquence of the 867 dead sons of New York who sleep in their glory in yonder National Cemetery, under the green sod of the State of Pennsylvania, on whose sacred soil they offered up their lives on the altar of our common country.

"On Fame's eternal camping ground
Their silent tents are spread,
And glory guards with solemn round
The bivouac of the dead."

THE ORANGE BLOSSOMS.

BY LIEUT. ERWIN G. FOWLER, FIFTH NEW YORK INFANTRY.

Upon these storied grounds we meet to-day,
Not as before we met, in grim array,—
And peacefully, our tribute to the braves,
Who sleep by thousands here in patriot graves,
We humbly bring, with reverence and pride,
With loving memories that sweep aside
All discords from the harmonies that ring
From loyal comrades, who their praises sing.

Let us look back adown the path of years,
 And call to mind a Nation's hopes and fears;
 Let us recall the days of sixty-one,
 When mad secession had its work begun,
 When thousands of our bravest and our best
 Were laid beneath the Southern sod, at rest.
 And when, in eighteen hundred and sixty-two,
 Brave men were wanted, men to dare and do,

'Twas then the patriot Ellis drew his sword,
 And from the hills and valleys at his word
 The Orange Blossoms came—a Spartan band,
 Who loved their lives less than their native land,
 Within whose manly bosoms burned the fires
 Of patriotic fervor, which inspires
 To noble deeds, to altruistic zeal,
 To speed the cause of right, come woe or weal.

The struggle came; on Rappahannock's banks
 The reaper Death made havoc in their ranks.
 Near half a hundred patriotic men
 Passed from our sight, away from mortal ken.
 No murmurs e'er were heard. Their martyred dead
 Found 'neath the foeman's soil a gory bed,
 While each surviving hero, grim and stern,
 Resolved that ere the end the foe should learn
 Submission to our glorious Stripes and Stars—
 Should drop in homage forced, the Rebel bars.

The scene now changes; we have reached July;
 The sun is scorching from a cloudless sky,
 While on for Pennsylvania's hills of green
 The Orange Blossoms marched, calm and serene.
 At intervals the angry cannon's roar
 Far from the distance awful tidings bore.
 Enveloped in the drifting dust and smoke,
 Their numbers waning 'neath the sun's fierce stroke,
 They struggled onward, brave, determined men,
 Up hill, down dale, thro' valley, wood and glen.
 They slept beside their loaded guns that night,
 And when the morning sun dawned on their sight,
 The hills and vales of Gettysburg were seen,
 Not yet ensanguined,—still in peaceful green.

The deeds heroic done that dreadful day,
 No pen can e'er describe, no minstrel lay.
 The booming cannon and the bursting shell
 Made of these peaceful hills a raging hell.

NEW YORK AT GETTYSBURG

When Cromwell felt his life depart,
 A bullet through his manly heart
 In this doubly consecrated field
 Where the proudest foe was forced to yield,
 Where a host of martyrs shed their blood
 At the flowing of secession's flood,
 Bravely leading in the maddest strife,
 John Ellis yielded up his life.

Now that we perpetuate his fame,
 We honor Ellis' glorious name,
 We are his lie that Freedom should not lie,
 We cannot our gratitude deny.
 His counterpart among these hills
 In all time, patriotic thrills
 In hearts who love their country's name,
 We reverence brave Ellis' name.
 As we go on, as men shall trace
 His eyes you adamantine face
 On the battlefield they cast their eyes,
 They will remind them that the prize
 Is that boon beyond compare
 Which is part, by him whose figure there
 The grandeur overlooks the plain
 And by thousands, fellow patriots slain.

We have comrades of our martyred dead,
 Who followed him as nobly as he led,
 Whose grateful Nation owes its thanks,
 Whose shall close your decimated ranks.
 Your monument is yours, your fame is ours;
 Your brave hearts your meed of praise receive,
 Your children's children, pilgrims to this place,
 Shall gaze with reverence on this chiseled face,
 And to each, with patriotic pride,
 Shall declare bravely fought at Ellis' side."

We are comrades of the noble dead,
 On this the field o'er which your martial tread
 Led the jaws of death to victory,
 Won the prize for millions yet to be.
 The hands that bind you close are forged of steel,
 And comrade always will for comrade feel,
 A friendship formed as side by side you stood,
 A love cemented by brave comrades' blood,
 No private feud can break or draw apart;
 It will only cease when stops each throbbing heart.





J. B. LYON PRINT.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

124TH NEW YORK INFANTRY.

On Cemetery Ridge. This monument was erected by the State.

And now, that o'er our land the reign of peace
Has reunited all, let discords cease.
With charity for all the sword lay by,
Devoid of malice, drop the battle cry;
Meet our late foemen with a friendly hand,
Of warring factions, make a patriot band.
So shall our broad domain from shore to shore,
Pacific's strand to proud Atlantic's roar,
From tropic southern seas to northern frost,
Inclose a land to which the tempest-tossed
Of climes where tyranny still finds a home,
May hither with their loved ones safely come.

"WHAT THEY DID HERE."

BY COL. CHARLES H. WEYGANT.

"The world will little note, nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here."

The 1st day of July, 1863, broke clear and bright. The sun as it moved towards the zenith had an angry look, and sent down upon us blistering rays. We had bivouacked the night before in the open fields just off the Emmitsburg Pike, within two miles of the State line, and with haversacks slung and blankets rolled were awaiting orders. The First and Eleventh Corps had moved over into Pennsylvania the day before, and about 2 o'clock that afternoon, as we lay upon the ground, one after another declared they could hear the distant rumbling of artillery. A few moments later sharp bugle blasts from every direction called us into line. Our brigade then moved through Emmitsburg, and filed into a green field just beyond the village, where we remained until several other brigades had moved past, when we fell in again, and started off after them at quick time on a forced march for Gettysburg.

As we hurried along, the booming of cannon, at first scarcely heard, gradually became more distinct. Quickening our pace we pushed on through clouds of thick dust which continually rolled back, enveloped, and almost choked us, while the terrible rays of the sun seemed momentarily to grow more intense. Soon, strong men began to stagger from the ranks and fall fainting by the wayside, but our pace was not slackened. Louder and fiercer boomed the yet distant guns, and, "Forward, men, Forward!" shouted the officers. Every piece of woods we passed through was left almost filled with gasping, prostrate men; and all along the road, with no one to care for them, lay the dying, and in not a few instances the dead, who had fallen from the column ahead of us. But forward! forward! was the cry, and on, on we pushed. Blankets, tents, clothing and even food, guns and cartridge boxes lay strewn along the line of march. Two-thirds of the time our field and staff officers were dismounted and their horses loaded down with the guns of men who had become too weak to carry them; and when at length we reached the high ground just

south of Gettysburg, and the order to halt for the night was received, not over 100 men and but 5 or 6 officers appeared in our regimental line. But the conflict for that day was over. During the greater part of the afternoon the First and Eleventh Corps, composed of about 20,000 men, had, it was said, been engaged with a body of the enemy which had gradually increased in numbers during the bloody contest, from 5,000 to 30,000.

It was now generally understood, by both officers and private soldiers, that the two grand armies were concentrating in that vicinity; and it was believed by many that a general battle, upon the issue of which hung the destiny of America, would be fought there on the morrow.

All who had arrived upon the field slept that night with their loaded weapons lying beside them, and at roll-call the next morning the majority of those who had given out and fallen behind during our forced march from Emmitsburg, answered to their names; and when at 8 a. m., General Ward led his brigade forward to the position which had been assigned it, the One hundred and twenty-fourth was about 240 strong.

Sickles' Corps did not number that morning, over 9,000 men present for duty. It was composed of two divisions of three brigades each. Birney's Division formed the extreme left of the Union line, which was less than four miles in extent, drawn up nearly in the form of a horse-shoe. Ward's Brigade formed the left wing of Birney's Division and the One hundred and twenty-fourth, after being moved about considerably, was ordered to form battle line on the rocky ridge at Devil's Den. When the battle opened there was nothing to our left but a section of Smith's Battery, the remaining guns of which were in position a short distance to our rear. The Eighty-sixth New York was posted in a piece of woods on our right, but between the two regiments there was an unoccupied space of fifty yards or more.

We had not yet learned the inestimable value of breastworks, and instead of spending our time rolling the loose stones into a bullet-proof line, we lounged about on the grass and rocks, quietly awaiting the coming shock, which many declared themselves ready and anxious to receive. But there were undoubtedly those among us who ardently wished and perhaps secretly prayed that when the battle opened, it might rage the most furiously along some other portion of the line.

Two-thirds of the day was consumed by the opposing generals in endeavoring to discover the weak points in each other's position, and in getting ready for the dread encounter. During all this time an ominous silence prevailed, broken only by the occasional exchange of rifle shots by skirmishers or sharpshooters who, on crawling out in front of their respective lines, would unwittingly approach uncomfortably near each other, or the angry mutterings of a gun as a solitary shell went screeching through the air.

Early in the morning it was reported that Lee's entire army had arrived upon the field, but as they remained inactive hour after hour, it was positively asserted by the knowing ones that the Confederate chief, not having Stonewall with him, couldn't get a clear conception of the topography of that particular section, and preferred to have his adversary assume the offensive. But the Federal commander had no desire that the battle should begin until Sedgwick

arrived with the Sixth Corps, which at 10 o'clock on the previous evening, was at Manchester, thirty-two miles away.

General Lee, it appears, "at length selected that portion of the Union line held by Birney's Division, as the most practicable point of attack," and ordered Longstreet to open the battle by hurling against it his powerful corps of between twenty and thirty thousand men. At about 3 p. m. a dozen Confederate batteries opened upon us in a most furious manner, and Smith's guns, with other Federal batteries in the vicinity, forthwith began to reply. Presently long, solid lines of infantry appeared advancing directly against us.

Captain Silliman, who commanded our color company, stood where he had an unobstructed view of this advance, and I will insert here an account he gives of it in a published article concerning the death of Major Cromwell. "At length the enemy appeared in heavy columns of battalion, advancing on us from the opposite slope. As we held the position by a single line of battle unsupported, the enemy's superiority in numbers, as seen at a glance, seemed overwhelming. As they approached they deployed in four distinct lines of battle, and came resolutely on under a rapid fire from our batteries. All seemed lost; but in the steady lines of the Third Corps not a man flinched, and among them all, none were more ready for the fierce encounter than Major Cromwell.

"When the enemy's advance line drew near the base of the ridge we were on, it almost halted for a few seconds, as if to catch its breath, and then rushed forward with a fierce, charging yell, which was speedily answered by a fiercer crash of riflery from all along our front. This perceptibly thinned their ranks and brought them to a stand. After returning our fire for a few moments they resumed their determined advance. But the momentum of their first dash was wanting, and they could gain but a few feet at a time. And then, as they begin to show signs of wavering, our brave Cromwell hurries to Colonel Ellis, who stands behind the color company, and asks him to order a charge; but the colonel shakes his head and tells the major to go back to his post. Again the enemy is brought to a stand, but he is only a few rods away. Once more Cromwell walks towards Ellis. This time he is accompanied by Adjutant Ramsdell. Again he requests the colonel to order a charge, and again is told to go back to the left of the regiment; yet a moment later their horses are brought up, and against the remonstrances of Captain Silliman and several others they mount. The major's only reply is, 'The men must see us to-day,' and he rides slowly to the centre of the left wing, where with drawn sword and eyes fixed on the colonel, he impatiently awaits his superior's pleasure.

"Presently Ellis, by a simple nod, gives the desired permission; at which Cromwell waves his sword twice above his head, makes a lunge forward, shouts the charge, and, putting spurs to his horse, dashes forward through the lines. The men cease firing for a minute and with ready bayonets rush after him. Ellis sits still in his saddle and looks on as if in proud admiration of both his loved major and gallant sons of Orange, until the regiment is fairly under way, and then rushes with them into the thickest of the fray.

"The conflict at this point defied description. Roaring cannon, crashing rifles, screeching shots, bursting shells, hissing bullets, cheers, shouts, shrieks

and groans were the notes of the song of death which greeted the grim reaper, as with mighty sweeps he leveled down the richest field of human grain ever garnered on this continent.

"The enemy's line, unable to withstand our fierce onset, broke and fled, and Cromwell,—his noble face flushed with victory, and his extended right arm waving his flashing sabre,—uttered a shout of triumph. But it had barely escaped his lips when the second line of the foe poured into us a terrible fire which seemed in an instant to bring down a full quarter of our number.

"Once more we hear our loved Cromwell's shout, and once again we see amid the fire and smoke his noble form and flashing blade; but the next instant his brave heart is pierced by a Rebel bullet, his right arm drops powerless, his lifeless body falls backward from his saddle, and loud above the din of battle we hear Ellis shout, 'My God! My God, men! Your major's down; save him! save him.' Again the onset of Orange County's sons becomes irresistible, and the second line of the foe wavers and falls back; but another and solid line takes its place, whose fresh fire falls with frightful effect on our now skeleton ranks. So terrible is it that two-thirds of the artillerymen in our rear are either killed or wounded, and the balance driven from their guns by the shells and bullets which pass over our line."

Lieutenant Colonel Cummins, with the experience and eye of an old soldier, realizes that a skirmish line without reserves, be the men who compose it never so brave, must eventually be swept away by a continually renewed battle line, and unwilling the regiment should be disgraced by the loss of guns it is expected to protect, attempts to get them started to the rear, and while in the act is so badly injured by a shell—which striking a gun-carriage hurls it against him—that he is carried from the field. But our brave Ellis yet remains, now seen in bold relief, now lost amid the clouds of powder smoke. A moment longer the central figure, he directs his regiment. Again the Rebel line begins to waver, and we see his proud form rise in his stirrups. His long sharp sword is extended upward, a half-uttered order escapes his lips, when suddenly his trusty blade falls point downward, his chin drops on his breast, and his body with a weave pitches forward, head foremost among the rocks; at which his wounded beast rears, and with a mad plunge dashes away, staggering blindly through the ranks of the foe, who is now giving ground again, firing wildly as he goes. But we are too weak to follow him; yet with desperate effort the Orange Blossoms struggle forward until they recover the bodies of Ellis and Cromwell, and then, gathering up such as they can of the wounded, fall slowly and mournfully back to the main line, from which we never should have advanced. There we reform our shattered, bleeding ranks, and prepare to receive as best we may the next onset of the foe. Three times we have beaten him back, but now we are exhausted. For forty minutes the brigades of Ward and De Trobriand, at first scarce 3,000 strong and now reduced to but little more than half that number, have held their ground against Longstreet's entire corps. But what of his next assaults?

General Sickles has been seriously wounded. Birney now commands our corps, Ward our division, Berdan our brigade, and I find myself, who twenty minutes before was fourth officer in rank, in command of what is left of our

regiment. The battle has now become general, and is raging nearly all along the line. Two hundred cannon are rending the air and shaking the earth. From every knoll and hill-top, in front and rear, there come flashes of fire, and puffing clouds of smoke.

Our immediate foes keep up a brisk fire, but do not again attempt to ascend the hill in front of us. My ten little companies, now numbering but a trifle over 100 men, all told, are gathered together in little squads, like picket posts, along the front they are yet expected to hold; but their deliberate aim is not without its effect on the solid Confederate battle line at the foot of the hill below them.

Passing down the line, I notice that there is no commissioned officer in command of Company I, and ask, "Where is your plucky new lieutenant?" and the answer comes, "You will find him lying down yonder with four or five of I beside him." "What!" I answer, "Is he dead?" and I am told that he fell fighting nobly at the head of his company. Reaching Company K, I learn that Lieutenant Finnegan has been borne to the rear wounded in two places. Coming to G, which moved into line that morning with more men than any other company in the regiment, I see a corporal's guard in charge of a corporal, and learn that Captain Nicoll's dead body lies wedged in between two rocks at the farthest point of our advance. "Two of the boys tried to get him out," says one of the survivors, "but they both fell killed or wounded beside him." Lieut. J. O. Denniston, also of that company, had early in the action received two wounds and been carried from the field never to return to duty with the regiment.

The slope in front was strewn with our dead, and not a few of our severely wounded lay beyond the reach of their unscathed comrades, bleeding, helpless, and some of them dying. One of their number, who lay farthest away, among the rocks near the body of our truly noble and most esteemed Captain Nicoll, could be seen ever and anon, beneath the continually rising smoke of battle, to raise his arm, and feebly wave a blood-covered hand. It was James Scott, of Company B, one of the 10,000 heroes of that great battle. "When Cromwell dashed through the ranks to lead the charge," says one of his comrades, "Scotty was the first to spring forward after him, and when the major fell it seemed to me Scotty changed to a wild beast. He had been wounded in the arm, and his hand and face were covered with blood; but he did not seem to know anything about it, and kept on fighting until a ball hit him in the breast, and went clear through and came out of his back. That must have paralyzed him like, for his hands dropped, and, as his gun struck the ground, he fell heavily forward upon it as if he had been killed instantly." But no, Corp. James Scott yet lived. At the time he received the wound in his breast the foe were falling back, and before he recovered consciousness a piece of shell had struck his left arm, near the shoulder (the first wound he received was in the wrist of the same arm), another bullet had passed through his body — entering the left side, breaking two ribs and coming out of the right groin. And yet another piece of shell had struck him in the back, inflicting a most ugly wound and paralyzing every part of his body, except that right hand and arm which, as consciousness slowly returned, he was waving in token of victory.

The lifeless remains of Ellis and Cromwell were now lying on a huge boulder but a few yards to our rear, and in plain sight of all those remaining in our battle line who chanced to look that way. But the gallant boys fought on. If there were any cowards in our ranks when the battle began they were not there then. Every few moments a man would drop a rifle which had become clogged or so hot that he could not hold it steadily, and bidding those behind him be careful where they fire, rush forward and pick up, in place of it, one that had fallen from the hands of a dead or wounded comrade. Meantime the Ninety-ninth Pennsylvania, coming into action on our left, extended the line at right angles with our front down the eastern slope towards Little Round Top and connected with the Fortieth New York in the valley below.

Presently the foes in our front slackened their fire, and turning for a moment to view the bodies of our late leaders, I saw the brains protruding from a small round hole in Ellis's forehead, and discovered glistening on Cromwell's blood-stained breast a gold locket, which I knew contained the portrait of one who, but a few moments before, was his beloved young wife, but then, alas, his widow. Calling Lieutenant Ramsdell to me, I directed him to detail Bugler Ross and such other unarmed men as he could find, take charge of the bodies, have them carried to the rear, and if by any means he could get them North and deliver them to their friends, to do so.

As I turned towards the regiment I heard some one ahead of me say, "they're advancing," and glancing to the left saw that the Fortieth New York was retiring before a heavy battle line, and that a column of the foe had already moved past their flank. The Ninety-ninth Pennsylvania too was giving ground. The next instant Captain Cooney rode up with instructions to fall back without a moment's delay. Repeating the order to the regiment, and directing Captain Silliman to see it properly executed, I hastened to the woods at our right for the purpose of withdrawing several men of Company A, whom I had, before the action began, personally posted at intervals behind the trees and rocks along the otherwise unoccupied space between our regiment and the Eighty-sixth. As soon as I could get these men together I started with them after the regiment, which was now some distance away; but the enemy had, in the meantime, advanced to the top of the ledge our regiment had occupied, and it was by mere chance that we escaped capture.

When I reached the regiment, General Ward had halted and was haranguing it. He was saying that he had expected almost impossible things of his old troops; but that such a heroic, noble resistance as we had made, was beyond anything he had ever dared to hope for, even from them. Such praise, at such a time, was sweet indeed. But, alas! it did not bring back to us our trusted leaders, or resuscitate our most valiant comrades, who lay dead upon the bloody hillside, and along the rocky ledge we had just left.

The active part that the One hundred and twenty-fourth was to play in this great three days' battle had now been performed. Moving to a piece of woods about a mile in the rear of the Union line, we prepared and, with saddened hearts and gloomy thoughts, quietly partook of our evening meal.

That Sickles' entire corps fought most nobly, and that Ward's Brigade was left unsupported and held its own for over an hour and a half in a most

deadly contest with a force of the enemy which outnumbered it four to one — until its line of battle was reduced to a mere skeleton, and then, with the exception of one regiment, was not driven, but withdrawn, because there was no force at hand to prevent the enemy's moving past its flank, must be acknowledged by all honest writers who are acquainted with the facts.

General Lee, in his official report of the battle, referring to the second day's contest, says: "In front of General Longstreet the enemy held a position, from which if he could be driven it was thought that our army could be used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond. * * * After a severe struggle Longstreet succeeded in getting possession of and holding the desired ground."

General Meade, in his official report of Gettysburg, writes: "Notwithstanding the stubborn resistance of the Third Corps, under Major General Birney (Major General Sickles having been wounded early* in the action), the superiority in numbers of the enemy enabling him to outflank the corps in its advanced position, General Birney was compelled to fall back and reform behind the line originally desired to be held."

The Third Corps hospital, to which nearly all our wounded were taken, had been established in a grove about half a mile to the left and rear of where we were then lying. Just after dark I decided to walk over to it, and try and find the poor fellows and learn how they were being cared for. When about half way there I fell in with a party of stretcher-bearers with loaded stretchers. They were moving in single file along what appeared to be a beaten path, and said they belonged to the Third Corps. There were but two men to each stretcher; and they all seemed nearly worn out, and were trudging along very slowly with their heavy loads towards the hospital. As I hurried by one after another I stooped and peered into the faces of the wounded, to see if there were any of the One hundred and twenty-fourth among them, but it was too dark for me to determine positively in that way, and so I asked each one to what regiment he belonged. The first was a member of the Third Michigan; the second was a sergeant of the Sixty-third New York; the third was a Pennsylvanian; the fourth made no answer to my inquiry, though his eyes were wide open and I was sure he was looking at me. Instinctively I placed my hand on his forehead, expecting to find it hot and dry, but instead it was cold and clammy — he was dead.

The scene at the hospital was one of the most horrid imaginable. During the afternoon and evening nearly 3,000 wounded men had been brought there, and others were continually arriving. The ground of the entire grove, which was several acres in extent, seemed to be literally covered with them; and such noises filled the air as I had never heard before and trust may never reach my ears again. The wounded of our brigade had been among the first to arrive, and were lying, I had no doubt, near the centre of the grove. The thick foliage caused dark shadows to fall upon these acres of mangled, bleeding human forms. Away down through the trees flickering lights could be seen,

* There had been two hours or more of hard fighting before General Sickles was wounded. [Ed.]

the reflections of which fell with ghastly effect upon the corps of surgeons who, with coats off and sleeves rolled up, were gathered at, or moving rapidly to and fro about, the amputating tables. After a moment's hesitation at the edge of the woods I resolved to attempt to pick my way through towards where I hoped to find the objects of my search, but as I moved on among those, for the most part, prostrate men, their groans and piteous appeals for help appalled me. Several in a state of delirium were shouting as if upon the battlefield, and others, believing I was a surgeon, besought me to stop just a moment and bind up the wounds from which their life-blood was ebbing. Presently a man I was about stepping over, sprang to his feet, shook in front of me a bloody bandage he had just torn from a dreadful, gaping wound in his breast, and uttered a hideous, laughing shriek. This sent the hot blood spurting from his wound into my very face. Then he threw up his arms as if a bullet had just entered his heart, and fell heavily forward across a poor mangled fellow, whose piercing wails of anguish were heart-rending beyond description. I could endure no more, and wheeling about, hurried over the wounded and dying to the open field again, and returned to the regiment, glad that I had informed no one of my intended errand of mercy, for I was heartily ashamed of the weakness which had caused me to turn back.

Several times during the night we were awakened by the thunder of artillery and crash of small arms, and at 4 o'clock, on the morning of the 3d, the battle opened again with considerable fury and raged without cessation until about 9 a. m. Then an ominous silence prevailed for several hours, during which batteries and columns of troops were hurried hither and thither over the field, and towards the front, plainly indicating that the lines were being strengthened in anticipation of another determined onset of the now most desperate foe.

About 2 o'clock the enemy opened a most furious cannonade with 120 guns. The Union batteries soon began to reply, and for over two hours the earth seemed to tremble beneath us, and the air was filled with fire and smoke and iron. The enemy's infantry kept concealed, and our troops with loaded weapons hugged the ground, impatiently awaiting the opening of the less noisy but more deadly contest with small arms which they all knew was sure to follow. At 4 o'clock it came, grand, desperate, terrible. But the One hundred and twenty-fourth were not called to participate in it, and I will not, therefore, attempt to describe it. At 5 o'clock it was over. Pickett's Division, the flower of the Confederate army, had been annihilated, and Lee and his cohorts defeated — fairly and squarely whipped in open fight — not overpowered by a force superior in numbers, for the slight difference that existed in that particular was in favor of the Confederates.

For once the Army of Northern Virginia had met its old adversary even handed, and received a crushing defeat. For once the Army of the Potomac had gained a great and undisputed victory. The latest accounts, carefully drawn from the most reliable authorities on both sides, give 72,000 Unionists, and 76,000 Confederates, as the full number of *armed men* actually on the field. Of this number over 40,000 were either killed or wounded.

During the quiet hours which preceded this decisive and final struggle, my

thoughts very naturally reverted to wounded comrades, and about noon I decided to mount Colonel Cummins's "Old Bay," ride hurriedly over to the hospital, and make another attempt to see them. As I dismounted and tied my horse to a shrub at the edge of the grove, I noticed a short distance beyond me a company of about fifty men digging graves, and was informed by one of them that they had been busy since daybreak burying men who had died of their wounds during the night and morning.

On penetrating the woods I passed by several who were even then in the agonies of death, and saw two groups of men moving out with dead bodies; but the chaos of the previous evening had disappeared, and comparative order reigned. Nearly all had received attention, but the majority of the surgeons had not yet quit their posts to seek the rest their pale, haggard faces told they were much in need of. I did not see our surgeon, Dr. Thompson, but was informed by one of our wounded men, who lay near the amputating tables — and who said that for eighteen hours he had listened to the horrid noise made by saws gnawing away human bones — that the Doctor and Chaplain Bradner had worked faithfully all night, doing what they could for the Orange Blossoms.

At 4 o'clock, p. m., the regiment was ordered forward, and we spent the remainder of the day and following night, posted as a reserve about ten rods in rear of the main line. Hundreds of the wounded yet remained on a bloody strip of disputed ground between the opposing picket lines, and all night we could hear the distant piteous cry of "Water! water! water!"

Early on the morning of the 4th, it was discovered that the enemy's videttes had disappeared from our front, but Union skirmishers, who were forthwith advanced, soon came upon their pickets, posted behind a line of rifle pits.

About noon I walked out a short distance beyond the Union battle line over that harvest field of death. All the wounded who had fallen behind where our picket line then was, had been carried to the rear. But scores of blackened, distorted human faces lay in front of me, turn which way I would. The bodies of many of these had been torn most frightfully by pieces of shell. Interspersed among them lay the bloated carcasses of dead horses. The ground in all directions was strewn with the broken engines and paraphernalia of war, and here and there upon the grass could be seen dark spots which told of pools of blood.

As night came on a rain storm set in, and early on the morning of the 5th, I was ordered to send out a squad of men in charge of a commissioned officer to assist in burying the dead. About noon we moved a short distance to a piece of wood, where we pitched what tents we had and remained until the afternoon of the 6th.

The casualties in the regiment at Gettysburg amounted to 28 killed, 57 wounded and 5 missing; total, 90. The mortally wounded increased the number of fatalities to 34. Among the killed were Colonel Ellis, Major Cromwell, Captain Nicoll and Lieutenant Brown, four as brave officers as fell on that decisive field.

THE "ORANGE BLOSSOMS."

The regiment bearing this famous synonym was recruited in Orange County, in July and August, 1862, and rendezvoused at Goshen, N. Y., where it was mustered into the United States service on September 5, 1862. The field officers were Col. A. V. H. Ellis, Lieut. Col. Francis M. Cummins, and Maj. James Cromwell, all of whom had seen previous service in the war, Lieutenant Colonel Cummins having served also as a commissioned officer in the Mexican war.

Leaving the State, September 6, 1862, the regiment proceeded directly to Arlington Heights, Va., where it was assigned to Piatt's Brigade, Whipple's Division, Third (Heintzleman's) Corps. This brigade was composed of the Eighty-sixth and One hundred and twenty-fourth New York, the One hundred and twenty-second Pennsylvania (a nine-months regiment), and Battery H, First Ohio Light Artillery.

On October 16th the brigade left its camp at Miner's Hill, Va., and marching through Maryland joined General McClellan's army at Harper's Ferry. It accompanied the Army of the Potomac to Fredericksburg, where the One hundred and twenty-fourth had its first experience under fire, although suffering no loss.

At Chancellorsville, May 2 and 3, 1863, the regiment was actively engaged, sustaining a loss of 28 killed, 161 wounded and 15 captured or missing; total, 204, out of 550 engaged. Of the wounded, 29 died of their wounds, increasing the number of killed to 57. Lieutenants Denton and Gowdy were among the killed.

It was in this battle that the regiment, while receiving its baptism of fire, was christened by Colonel Ellis as his "Orange Blossoms." In ordering a charge during a desperate period of the fight he addressed the men by this term for the first time, with the added admonition,— "Let the little girls of old Orange hear a good report of this day's work." The One hundred and twenty-fourth were engaged at the time with the Twenty-third North Carolina of Iverson's Brigade, whose large casualty list showed how well the men from Orange County held their ground.

On May 7th, the remnant of the regiment reoccupied their old camp at Falmouth, from whence a week before they had started on the campaign with high hopes and expectations. It was a sad returning, for in every mess and in each cabin there were missing comrades who had been laid away in their graves at Chancellorsville.

On June 6th, the One hundred and twenty-fourth, in company with the Eighty-sixth New York of the brigade and six other picked infantry regiments started on the march to Beverly Ford, on the Rappahannock River, where they participated in the first cavalry battle of any importance that occurred during the war, the infantry acting in support of the mounted troops. In this action, which took place on the 9th, the regiment lost 2 killed and 15 wounded, and in company with the Eighty-sixth New York did the principal part of the infantry fighting.

After the engagement it encamped a few days at Bealton Station, from

whence it started on the Pennsylvania campaign. General Whipple was killed at Chancellorsville, and his division, which now contained only seven regiments, was broken up and transferred to the other divisions of the Third Corps. The One hundred and twenty-fourth was assigned to Ward's Brigade of Birney's Division, and the Eighty-sixth New York, with which it was destined to serve in company during the war, was placed in the same brigade.

At Gettysburg the regiment fought in the battle of the second day at the Devil's Den. Colonel Ellis and Major Cromwell were killed, and Lieutenant Colonel Cummins was wounded. Captain Nicoll and Lieutenant Brown were also among the killed. In this battle the little regiment lost 91 of its number, 34 of whom were killed or mortally wounded.

After Gettysburg, while returning through Virginia, the battle of Wapping Heights, an action fought by the Third Corps alone, occurred July 23, 1863, in which the regiment was engaged with the loss of one man killed and a few wounded. After a long campaign of manoeuvres, which included several minor actions, and during which the regiment was engaged at Locust Grove and Mine Run, the army went into winter quarters at Brandy Station and Culpeper, Va., where it remained inactive for five months.

In the meantime Lieutenant Colonel Cummins was promoted to the colonelcy, and Maj. Charles H. Weygant was commissioned lieutenant colonel. In March, 1864, the Third Corps, which had fought with glory and renown from the first organization of the Army of the Potomac, was transferred to the Second Corps, Ward's Brigade becoming, under this organization, the First Brigade of the Third Division (Birney's) of the Second Corps.

During the winter sixty recruits had been received, and the regiment entered the spring campaign of 1864 about 355 strong. Breaking camp on May 4th it crossed the Rapidan with the army, and was engaged during the next two days under command of Colonel Cummins at the battle of the Wilderness with a loss of sixty killed and wounded. Colonel Cummins was seriously wounded in this battle, and never rejoined the command. In the following week, at Spotsylvania, sixty-nine more fell dead or wounded in the desperate charges on the enemy's works, Lieutenant Colonel Weygant, who was in command, being among the wounded.

Under command of Maj. H. S. Murray the thinned ranks fought gallantly at North Anna, Totopotomoy, Cold Harbor, and in the deadly but ineffectual assault at Petersburg, during which thirty-five more went down. Captain Crist was killed at Totopotomoy Creek, falling dead with a bullet through his breast, and Captain Jackson met a soldier's death at Petersburg. In this last action the Orange Blossoms carried only eighty-two muskets to the assault. Colonel Weygant returned to the regiment while before Petersburg and resumed command.

Returning convalescents, with the addition of some recruits, enabled the regiment to enter the battle at the Boydton Road, October 27, 1864, with 248 officers and enlisted men. In this action, where it lost 20 men from its ranks, Captain Finnegan was killed and Colonel Weygant wounded.

During the siege of Petersburg the men were continually on duty in the trenches with frequent losses in killed and wounded. On October 29th a

new company, numbering 87 men, under Capt. Robert A. Malone, joined the regiment. A further accession of recruits was also received. In November, 19 officers and 362 enlisted men were present on inspection, a larger number than had mustered for duty since the fatal field of Chancellorsville. Active work continued on the picket line, and within forty-six days the men expended 122,870 rounds of ammunition.

In the final campaign, with Colonel Weygant still in command, the regiment was engaged at Hatcher's Run, March 31, 1865; fall of Petersburg, April 1st, and at Sailor's Creek, April 6th, in which it suffered severe losses, Captain Cormick being among the killed.

The regiment, during its entire service, lost 11 officers and 137 enlisted men killed or mortally wounded; 1 officer and 92 men who died of disease, accidents, or in Confederate prisons. Of the latter number 12 died in the enemy's hands. From first to last 1,320 names were borne on its rolls, some of whom, however, never joined the command. It was mustered out at Washington, June 3, 1865, after which it proceeded to Newburg, where a grand ovation was tendered the veterans on their arrival.

[REDACTED]

DEDICATION OF MONUMENT.
125TH REGIMENT INFANTRY.

October 3, 1888.

ADDRESS OF HON. MARTIN I. TOWNSEND.

MR. PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIFTH:

Please accept my thanks for the honor you have conferred on me to-day by selecting me to take part in the dedication of your monument. I have always felt a great interest in your regiment from the day of its organization; and, to-day, I feel proud that its members were largely my acquaintances and friends when they left their homes and loved ones and exposed themselves to the hardships and dangers of the camp and battlefield to save the honor, the integrity and the liberties of our country. And here to-day on this historic field where your gallant Willard gave his life, and so many of your comrades died that our country might live, it is proper that we should dedicate this monument to those who died that the Nation might live, and also to those who live, as an emblem of patriotism. The immortal Lincoln said, "We cannot consecrate, we cannot hallow this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it far above our power to add or detract; the world will little note or long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here."

It is proper that we dedicate this monument here on this field where the tide of Rebellion turned and never stopped until it reached the end at Appomattox.

The regiment did long and honorable service on many renowned battlefields; many of her bravest and best died upon the fields of honor; those who survived the dangers and hardships of the service returned to lead lives in social and business life full of honor and universal respect. Allow me to say that I feel it a great honor to speak to men and of men whose patriotism led them to make so great sacrifices for our common country, and who have, since the great war was over, by their watchfulness and good citizenship, done so much to help preserve what their valor defended.

"WHAT MEAN THESE STONES?"

"When your children shall ask their fathers in time to come, saying, 'What mean these stones?' Then ye shall let your children know."

BY CHAPLAIN EZRA D. SIMONS.*

After its long encampment at Centreville, Va., the One hundred and twenty-fifth New York entered upon a series of conflicts to be continued to the end of the war.

The order to march was published on the 24th of June, 1863. The next day we broke camp and joined the Second Army Corps at Gum Springs, Va.

* Deceased.

The One hundred and twenty-fifth Regiment, with the Thirty-ninth, One hundred and eleventh, and One hundred and twenty-sixth New York Volunteers, stationed together at Centreville, now formed the Third Brigade, Third Division, Second Army Corps. General Walker, in his History of the Second Corps, writing of the bivouac of the corps at Gum Springs, records:

"Here joined, for the first time, a body of troops destined to bear a conspicuous share in all the future labors and dangers of the Second Corps, from the fast-approaching conflict on the bloody slopes of Gettysburg to the final triumph of April, 1865. This was the brigade commanded by the dashing Alexander Hays. General Hays had been colonel of the Sixty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, and, as such, had greatly distinguished himself on the Peninsula." On joining the Second Corps, Hays took command of the Third Division, the conduct of his brigade devolving upon Colonel Willard, of the One hundred and twenty-fifth. Lieutenant Colonel Crandell was now placed in full command of the regiment.

On Friday, June 26th, we crossed the Potomac at Edwards Ferry and went into camp the next morning. From thence we marched June 27th, to Sugar Loaf Mountain, Md., and there bivouacked for the night. Sunday night, the 28th, found us at Monocacy. On Monday, June 29th, we made one of the severest marches of our entire term of service. The army seldom made a longer march in a single day; from Monocacy to Liberty — to Johnsville — to Union Bridge — to Uniontown, Md., a distance of thirty-three miles. There was no halting for meals. No coffee was cooked that day. Ere the camp was reached men fell out on the way by hundreds. When far into the night the head of the column halted at the appointed place, only a handful lay down to rest — to sleep, regardless of the rain which fell on our uncovered faces. The next day was devoted to rest and to mustering the corps.

Another day's march, via Taneytown, brought us within a short distance of Gettysburg. While halted for the night of July 1st, some of us learned for the first time of the new change of army commanders. A strange report was circulated, that General McClellan was again at the head of the army. This proved a mistake. The transfer of command from General Hooker to Gen. George G. Meade took place on the 28th of June.

On July 1st, occurred the battle on Seminary Ridge, along the western outskirts of the town of Gettysburg, a preliminary and unexpected encounter in which Buford's Cavalry Division, the First and Eleventh Corps of the Army of the Potomac did the fighting on the Union side. The contest was severe and prolonged. The First Corps sustained terrible losses, its commander, General Reynolds, falling dead at the beginning of the action. Overpowered by the superior numbers of Hill's and Ewell's Confederate forces the Union troops fell back through the town, and at nightfall occupied Cemetery Hill, which they held at the close of this, the first day's battle.

Early on the morning of the second day of this great battle, the One hundred and twenty-fifth was in the line of march of the Second Corps moving upon the field. As we neared this, an ambulance, with stretcher at side, turned out of the road into a field. The stretcher was half covered with blood. The sight awakened a sense of the bloody work at hand. Be it remembered,

that, although the regiment had been in service from August, 1862, until July, 1863, Harper's Ferry was its only record of service, and that was for the most part bloodless. Moving up the Taneytown Road we passed Round Top and Little Round Top to our left, and when near Cemetery Hill, we were first halted to the right of the road. Afterwards we were taken to the left of the centre of the main line, and placed on the left of Cemetery Hill, with the Bryan House and Ziegler's Grove to our right. The bands were playing down in the field. This was one of the very few times when any music was heard on a battlefield, save that of cannon and rifle, of shot and shell. In time of action men were needed for other purposes than to make pleasing music; and the musicians were utilized "to bear away the wounded, and to cover up the dead."

To the immediate right and left of our position in the line were batteries. Just to the right and north was Gettysburg, in the hands of the enemy. Off to the northwest, a mile or more away, was Gettysburg Seminary. In our immediate front was Seminary Ridge, covered with woods. The ground directly in front of us sloped down to the Emmitsburg road, running somewhat parallel with our line, and bordered with fence on either side. Beyond the road, the land stretched out in fields to Seminary Ridge. To our extreme left were Little Round Top and Big Round Top. We were in good position to see most of the conflicts which followed; and, during the progress of these, could note the waving of the signal flags on Little Round Top, where was stationed a part of the signal corps. We were in position, too, to have part in much of the fighting; and at the decisive point to aid in bearing the brunt of the battle. To our right, were the First, Eleventh and Twelfth Corps; to our left, the Third Corps. The Sixth Corps and Crawford's Division of the Fifth Corps were not yet on the field. It was a beautiful July morning. A summer peace was in the air. But the calm, the lull in nature, only preceded the fiercest storm of conflict, when the air should be torn by the rough hands of strife and be hoarse with the voice of passion. At first, from our position the enemy could not be seen, covered as they were by the woods and houses. The rumor passed among the officers that the enemy had retired; but as the morning lengthened, in the distance among some brush behind a fence, men were seen moving into position as skirmishers. The order was given for the Thirty-ninth to move to the front as skirmishers.

And now they pass down at our right; down into the field, and deploy as skirmishers. Brave fellows — brave or stupid, which is it? — there they stand in open field, and the crack of rifles is heard. The Rebels are down behind the fence and are sheltered. "Drop, Garibaldis!" Yes, they did drop, one after another, as the bullet did its work. Some to rise not again; and here come some of the poor fellows with shattered jaws and maimed limbs and cut faces.

And the battle is opened anew. Crack! Crack! sounds the skirmish-firing all morning; and the afternoon is advancing. To immediate left of us is a battery of steel guns; to immediate right of us, in Ziegler's Grove, is a battery of brass pieces. But the dark and bright lips are silent. It is midafternoon; and now from over by the Seminary comes hurling a shell. Right over our

heads it flies; and battery to left replies with quick, sharp note, and its shell explodes amid the smoke of the Rebel gun. Beautiful piece of artillery practice, that. "Boys, lie down!" The men are on the ground under the iron hail which now rattles over our heads. The time? Three o'clock, as the first shot from artillery is fired. How long the time seems! But it is only an hour; and the fire slackens.

And now off in the woods to our left, and west of the Emmitsburg Road, the skirmishers are at it. How the woods roar with the musketry, and now with the hurrahs of the Union soldiers and the yells of the Rebels! They have struck our line at the Peach Orchard; they sweep beyond it towards Round Top. Artillery is pouring flank fire along the Emmitsburg Road, and along the line leading at a right angle. Surely our men will not stand it; they could not stand it. No defences here. They are taking the fire with uncovered breasts and sides. The former they can endure, but the flank fire, not. Our men have yielded the angle, and the Rebels pour in. Now among the rocks of Devil's Den, how they fight — one side and the other! Out here, to the north of the Den, is a field of wheat. Over this, now to the right, now to the left, sweeps the bloody scythe. How the blade rings, rings, dulled with dripping blood! Blue and gray fall in the harvest of death! Upon Little Round Top General Warren stands in plain sight, with the signal corps. All day long we have seen the flags waving their silent but forceful language. It is 5:30 p. m., and over an hour has the noise of battle sounded, and now General Warren mounts his horse and is speeding down Round Top, for a line of Rebels has been seen creeping under cover of the trees towards the hill. Hurriedly detaching the One hundred and fortieth New York from Vincent's Brigade, these men, with Hazlett's Battery, are led hurriedly up the hill, among rocks and stones, and barely reach the summit in time to turn back at point of bayonet the Rebels rushing with victorious shouts up the hill. The position, a key of the field, is saved. But Vincent and Weed and Hazlett are mortally wounded or dead. Down, down the hill the Rebels are pressed, and the line of battle is drawn tight across the valley between Little and Big Round Top, and up the sides and over the summits of both.

But, look! The fire is creeping towards us along the Emmitsburg Road! See in the fields how the panting giants are wrestling! Their breath is aflame. Now one is pressed back, and now the other is forced to knee. "Help!" and down the hillside towards the combatants we march.

The sun is declining behind the hills in the west. The birds start up and fly away, singing in sweet discord with the hoarse music of battle. We are down on the bloody arena. Back, Third Corps; forward, the Second! Oh, it was grand! — awfully grand! — as with loud, brave cries we press them; as Barksdale, in vain seeking to rally his men, falls; as the Rebel line is driven back, broken and scattered. Blaze artillery from the hill beyond in our faces; sting, like serpents, bullets through the air; but, as night sets in, the living of our men rest in victory, as the dead sleep in a triumph henceforth unbroken by the turmoil of earthly strife.

What are these sounds to the right of us, over on East Cemetery Hill, where Ricketts' Battery is posted? Surely the enemy has broken in. His cries of

success are heard. The guns are in his hands. And now Carroll's Brigade from our division is sweeping proudly and quickly to right; on the double-quick they push forward. There is a brief struggle, and the Louisiana Tigers, that have dashed up the hill and among our guns, are swept out of existence. Of their 1,700, a third or more are cut down by the fire. Brave night-charge was that. But it was fatal to them.

Rebel writers have deplored that General Lee did not carry out his design of attacking in force early on the morning of July 2d; as at that time all of his army, save Pickett's Division of Longstreet's Corps, was on the field. It was his design so to do,—to strike the extreme left of the Union line. But his plan miscarried. General Longstreet, who has been charged with the responsibility of not opening the battle early in the day, indignantly denies having received any orders to that effect. Opposed as he was to fighting at the time on the offensive, and remonstrating against assaulting the Union forces, he nevertheless zealously carried out the orders when issued. He declares that the command to charge the left of our line came to him at 11 a. m. What, with waiting for troops, in arranging these, and in making a slow, circuitous path for the purpose of concealment—a course rendered possible by the wooded nature of Seminary Ridge—four hours passed ere his forces were at the appointed place and in readiness to strike. While the hours of the morning passed for the most part uneventfully on the Union side, save that the Sixth Corps was toiling bravely on in an unbroken march of nearly twenty-four hours,—out of our sight Longstreet was arranging and directing into position his men.

The line presented at the Peach Orchard a salient, exposing the Third Corps to a double enfilading fire. But, full bravely did the Union artillery and infantry fight on that day. The 10,000 men under Sickles withstood the 15,000 men under Longstreet; Sickles being aided, as time passed, by portions of the Second, Fifth and Twelfth Corps. General Lee judged that our extreme left was on the Emmitsburg Road. His purpose was to assault the left, and in event of success, to press our line towards Cemetery Hill. His order reads: "Envelop the enemy's left and begin the attack there, following up as near as possible the direction of the Emmitsburg Road." He wrote afterwards: "It appeared that if the position held by him (Sickles) could be carried, its possession would give facilities for assailing and carrying the more elevated ground and crest beyond."

To give a more detailed account of the battle on this day, as it appeared to those who with the writer watched it from our position on the left of Cemetery Hill, we need to go back to the morning and trace anew the events of the day. The skirmish-firing, with which the renewed contest opened, developed instances of valor. To recount one of these: "The Garibaldis," who had been sent on the skirmish line, took with them their colors. It was an event unusual. Colonel Willard saw the needless peril of their loss, and directed that the flag be recalled. To Lieut. L. H. Stevens, of G Company of the One hundred and twenty-fifth, serving as aid on Colonel Willard's staff, was assigned the duty. Bravely regardless of danger, he rode over the bullet swept field to the skirmish line and brought in the flag. He was a

fair target for 100 rifles and more; and he justly received words of commendation in an order from General Hays recounting the battle. Later in the day, Lieutenant Stevens was wounded and was taken from the field.

Lieutenant Stevens entered the Freshman class of the Troy University in 1860, and had just become a member of the Junior class when he aided in raising G Company of our regiment. He became second instead of first lieutenant in a novel way. He and Lieutenant Newcomb decided the question as to who should be first and who second lieutenant by tossing up a penny. Lieutenant Newcomb won the first rank.

The fighting along the Emmitsburg Road and in fields to the east was in open view of our position. Artillery and musketry were filling the air with fire and smoke, and were covering the ground with the wounded and dead. Through the thick smoke the belching of the cannon appeared to us like the fires of a furnace; as if Titans were at work; they were at work in a struggle of life and death.

That effort to gain Little Round Top was a masterly move. Gen. E. M. Law declares that he had sent scouts to the ground who had reported that it was unoccupied; and this led to that attempt to gain it which was on the edge of success. But Warren and Vincent turned back at the point of the bayonet the exultant Texans springing for the heights, hurrying "over rough steeps and over the precipitous crags."

For half an hour the fighting at Round Top was terrific; surging among the trees and huge stones; bodies falling among the rocks and ravines, and caught in most horrid positions. The trees, as the writer saw in passing over the ground after the battle, were perforated with bullets. General Longstreet subsequently wrote: "The defensive advantages of the ground enabled the Federals to delay our purposes until they could occupy Little Round Top, which they just then discovered was the key to their position. The force thrown upon this point was so strong as to seize our right, as it were, in a vise."

Fierce was the fighting in the Devil's Den below Round Top; and those charges over the Wheatfield,—at the farther end of which, behind a strong stone fence, was a Rebel line, almost as safely defended as Marye's Heights at Fredericksburg—cost us dearly and were fruitless. Looking down at the fearful struggle as this had continued for three hours, and noting that the fire was creeping nearer (for Humphreys' Division was letting go its hold upon the road), the writer was impressed that it could scarcely be possible that the One hundred and twenty-fifth should much longer remain out of the heat of the battle. So, he passed along the line of men who at the time were lying on the ground, and again urged them to be ready for the possibilities immediately before them. But he had not reached the farther end of the regiment when the ominous command was heard, "Fall in!" and, rising, the regiment with our brigade took up the line of march by the left flank down towards the scene of engagement—down into the fiercest of the fight—down into "the jaws of death," to close these with the strong hands and noble forms of our men.

It was now about 7 o'clock in the evening of a long, beautiful, warm, July day. As we moved down into the strife the writer looked to the west. The

sun was sinking low, and the heavens were ablaze with its splendors, in marked contrast with the lurid fires of death towards which we were marching. We were halted amid the smoke in front of some swale — a new growth of trees — in which we could see, dimly, because of the smoke covering the field — men moving. The brigade was dressed on the colors, an unusual thing under such circumstances. Our men commenced to fire, but the word was shouted: "Firing on your own men!" Upon which the command was given by Colonel Willard: "Cease firing!" Officers, as did the writer, rushed in front of our line repeating the order. But the interval permitted the enemy to reload, and we speedily learned our mistake. A man to the left of the writer fell in an instant prostrated by a bullet. Then, doubt removed, the men await no orders, but press on, firing as they move. On we rushed with loud cries! on — with bullets whizzing by our ears, as if messengers from the cold, icy region of the dead — with shells screaming and cannon balls tearing the air, like so many fiends bent on destruction; now bursting above and around us; now ploughing the ground at our feet and laying many of our noble men low in death or bleeding with wounds; on, on, we rushed, through storm of fire and death, thundering above and darting around us like the thunder and lightning of Heaven; on, driving the Rebels before us, mortally wounding General Barksdale at the head of the Rebel force who in vain sought to lash and lead his men onward, and who died in our hands.

The purpose was accomplished. The effort of the Rebels was doubly thwarted at Little Round Top, and at Cemetery Hill. "To urge my men onward under these circumstances," writes General Longstreet, "would have been madness, and I withdrew them in good order to the Peach Orchard, and we had taken from the Federals early in the afternoon." If it was in good order, at one point of the line certainly it was in quick order.

As night settled down upon the scene, our regiment was returned to its position on Cemetery Hill. But he returned not with us who had led us, as the writer was witness — down into that fiery vortex; and he did not come back who had gone forth. With over 100 of our brave men down in the brief space of a half hour, had fallen our brave, gallant colonel Willard was dead. He was struck just after the Rebels had been ordered, fallen back east of the swale through which it had been necessary to drive the Rebels. A piece of shell carried away a part of his breast-plate, and he fell from his horse instantly killed. His body was buried in a barn, the ground and barn of which were used as a place of refuge by many of the houses in near vicinity of the field. That house was hit by a shell, and were on the following day exposed to the fire of our guns, shells from which exploded on the premises. The body was wrapped in linen cloth; and was last seen by the writer as it lay on the ground ready for faithful and loving hands to bear it home to his loved wife and kindred.

On both sides in the entire afternoon's engagement were very heavy losses. In Longstreet's Corps, according to his own estimate, were 1,000 killed. Our regiment alone had lost more than one-fifth of its strength. Colonel Willard's entire brigade suffered in a larger ratio, losing 1,000 and 500 men out of a total of about 2,000.

As we passed on the charge through the swale, the color bearer, Sergt. Lewis Smith, was instantly killed; but ere the colors could touch the ground, Harrison Clark of E Company bent down and grasped them, bringing them out of the battle. For his gallantry, he was on the next day called to the front of the regiment, and was promoted to be color sergeant. To a brave man was given the place of one who had fallen bravely in a position always of greatest danger, and calling for highest valor. For in battle, the flag was always the first target of the enemy's fire. The flag and officers were coveted prizes.

The handling of the men in the charge by Colonel Willard was careful and skillful. On the left flank was placed the Thirty-ninth Regiment, which acquitted itself nobly, retaking, as reported, some captured guns. In reserve for a brief minute was held the One hundred and eleventh, which was quickly directed to the right, to prolong the line formed by the One hundred and twenty-fifth and the One hundred and twenty-sixth, to left and right. The charge was pressed until Barksdale's men, leaving their mortally wounded commander in our hands, were driven from the field; and the frowning Rebel batteries on high ground along the Emmitsburg Road were confronted. Question has been raised as to whether the order for the return of the brigade was wise. It had accomplished what was needed. Possibly it might have carried the batteries on the high ground, but it was not ordered so to do.

If we err not in the immediate connection of the event, it was the sight of the long line of our brigade moving down from Cemetery Hill that caused Longstreet to order his men back to the Peach Orchard. The movement and the charge had certainly to do in deciding, at a crisis point, the fortunes of that day. General Hancock, who himself accompanied the brigade from Cemetery Hill to the scene of action, spoke later in highest terms of its valor and service. He declared to Captain Vandenburg: "The Third Brigade, Third Division, of my old Second Corps, was equal to any regular brigade I ever saw. Their conduct at Gettysburg was superb. The rally of the Third Brigade on their colors at the time Colonel Willard was killed was a very gallant movement under such firing." This is the testimony of one than whom none stood higher among the line officers of the regiment, and who, ere he left this, was enrolled among its field officers, Gen. Samuel C. Armstrong. Declared Gen. W. S. Hancock of him: "George L. Willard was in my judgment one of the best officers of his age and rank."

In this chapter we lay a tribute upon the grave of the fallen soldier; a tribute, formed in part of record made in the press at the time of his death, and treasured from Gettysburg until now; a tribute whose fragrance lingers despite a score of winters have laid their snows above his ashes; a tribute that blossoms in yearly freshness, like the flowers built by the abiding sunlight above his grave. Those who came closest to him, in the days immediately preceding Gettysburg, noticed in him an unusually subdued manner, and some brought in contact with him the night before the battle, speak of premonitions expressed by him of his coming death, and of a subdued, almost tender kindness voiced by him in word and deed. But he knew not that, in event of his fall, so large honor would be poured forth above his encoffined form. He

arose upon our arms victorious and lit the way for the entrance into that town of General Grant and his triumphant troops. It was to set upon the hills of Gettysburg, with the Union banners waving in victory.

General Lee is resolved upon an attack upon our left centre, where was the Second Corps — upon the Second and Third Divisions of which must fall the force of the blow. Our regiment was in the Third Division.

The morning was consumed in the preparations. The plan of assault — General Longstreet says — was as follows: "Our artillery was to be massed in a wood from which Pickett was to charge, and it was to pour a continuous fire upon the Cemetery. Under cover of this fire and supported by it, Pickett was to charge. Our artillery was in charge of Gen. E. P. Alexander, a brave and gifted officer." "The arrangements were completed about 1 o'clock." "At exactly 1:30 p. m.," the order was penned: "Let the batteries open; order great precision in firing."

Hasten back within our lines. At the time mentioned, while many of our men were resting and sleeping on the ground, while some were eating and others smoking, suddenly the storm of death anew burst forth. From the southwest, west, north and northeast poured the missiles of death. A hundred and forty guns roared and spit from hot mouths the thunderbolts, to which our artillery from four score cannon sent lightning reply. For about an hour and a half the fiery storm throbs on. The air all over the wide field was fierce and heavy with the iron hail. The greater portion of the field was swept by the fiery shot. Horses and men dropped, crushed and dead. The main objective point was our left centre, where was our regiment, and near which were General Meade's headquarters.

About half-past 2, by order of the Union commander, our guns for the most part ceased firing, in order to give them an opportunity to cool; for the object of the Rebel bombardment was divined by our officers as the customary prelude to a charge.

Now, look through Union eyes from Cemetery Hill westward. See! from the woods covering Seminary Ridge that magnificent line of men — a mile long, three lines deep, and each line a double line — upwards of 15,000 strong, marching with banners flying, marching as on dress parade. One part overlaps to left, and another part to right the advancing lines. And they are coming towards us in a last desperate charge, coming over an open, undulating field a mile in width. Desperation of desperation! On the hill is the Second Corps; and the rest of the Union army is in good, strong position to right and left. Now, belch once more, Union guns! And the solid shot from left and right and front dart at the desperate men. As they come nearer, the shell burst among them; nearer still, and the canister rains upon them. They are at the Emmitsburg Road. They mount the fence. Now, at them, men! Commanded "to hold the fire until the enemy come near enough," the moment to strike has come. And the infantry, along the crest of the assaulted hill, arise and pour full into the faces of the foe the death-winged bullet. In front of us they fall, or surrender, or speed back. To our left they press forward; they touch, at "death angle," the stone wall. The brave Armistead and four score men at his call cross the wall, only to drop wounded

or dead; Armistead, soon to die. Another 2,000 surrender, the remainder, not dead or helpless, fly to their rear. And the glad shout of victory goes sweeping along the Union lines.

But, what of the regiment? Some of its number had been on the skirmish line all day. Lieut. Merritt Miller with others had served in command of the skirmishers during the morning; and another of our officers, Capt. Samuel C. Armstrong, was in charge of the brigade pickets, from before the cannonading and under its fierce progress. During the morning the men hugged the ground, for the firing was hot, the Rebels pouring in a flank fire on the picket line, from the houses of Gettysburg, killing and wounding some of our men. About noon, Captain Armstrong withdrew the line for rest to the reserve station on the Emmitsburg Road; and at this point they were under the artillery fire which preceded Pickett's charge. The shot and shell from both sides passed over their heads. Noticing a lull in the cannonading, Captain Armstrong looked around and saw the Confederate lines marching grandly down the slope towards our men. He immediately ordered the entire picket — reserve and all whom he could muster — about seventy-five all told — to fall in, and led them on the double-quick about 300 yards down the Emmitsburg Road, to get at the enemy in flank. Finding a rail fence at right angle to their advancing line, some sixty or seventy yards from their extreme left, he posted his men along the rail fence. They took position unflinchingly; and, resting their rifles on the top of the fence, took deliberate aim and poured a murderous fire into the Rebel flank, comprising Pettigrew's men. The Confederate leader afterwards confessed surprise that this part of the charging line should have been the first to break. To the Eighth Ohio has been given the credit for the flank fire which contributed efficiently to this result. But, distinct record should go into general history of Captain Armstrong's brave and skillful part of that important point of the battle. From Captain Armstrong's position the Confederate dead could be seen lying in heaps. Hundreds of the charging line prostrated themselves on their backs in the Emmitsburg Road, and waved their hats and handkerchiefs in token of surrender. Some of the bravest rushed close to the main Union line, and fell a few yards away. Of the five officers who served with Captain Armstrong in his brave action, which aided in the great victory secured, he was the only survivor. As he remembers, the first Confederate line near his position was nearly all shot down or captured; the second line did not support the first efficiently; and the third did not get at all into the thick of the fight.

The greater portion of the One hundred and twenty-fifth during Pickett's charge was immediately behind the stone wall, at the place occupied by the regiment during the second day and before the charge made in the swale, where Colonel Willard was killed. The position was directly to the left of the Bryan barn. Other troops were mingled with our regiment at the crucial point.

When the Rebel line broke, our color sergeant, Harrison Clark, sprang over the wall and bore the flag proudly down the slope to the fence skirting the Emmitsburg Road. In the shelling that preceded the charge, among others killed was John W. Defreest, a near relative of the writer; one who had passed with his brother and his captain, Ephraim Wood of H Company, through the Rebel lines investing Harper's Ferry.

Bravely standing behind that historic stone wall was the captain just named, who scorned the defence of even a low, field-marking fence, and with needless boldness faced death. And death came. A bullet pierced his abdomen, and he was borne from the field to the hospital at Rock Creek, there — the next day — to die. Willard D. Green, of H Company, saw him the moment he was struck. Sergt. Jacob Houck and the writer kneeled at the brave dying man's side, who, after intense suffering, passed away, speaking with last breath the name of his wife. Captain Wood was always much interested in military affairs. He was, before the war, captain of the Troy City Artillery Company. He was born May 14, 1818. He was a man of true, firm principle. He died a true Christian.

Capt. Thomas F. Sheldon was also among the wounded in the battle. A bullet pierced his arm. The wound was slow in healing. He returned to the regiment the following winter. Among others severely wounded were comrades Henry Wheeler and Eugene L. Demers. Both of these men were, previous to their enlistment, employees in the office of the Troy Times, the former returning to his old position and there remaining until the present. Each lost a leg at Gettysburg, and both have been honored since the war with positions of responsibility.

Lieuts. Donald Gillis, an accomplished officer and a brave man, and Aaron J. Goodrich, were among the wounded. Lieut. Lee Churchill, although receiving four wounds, held to his place, failing to go to the rear. He was a man of few words, but his fidelity and valor were proved in repeated battles, and his record continues with that of the regiment. Abner Quitterfield lost an arm in the battle. Lieutenant Colonel Crandell received several slight wounds, but refrained from making mention of them.

The fighting on both sides during the three days' battle was unsurpassed. General Longstreet declares of the engagement of the second afternoon, that it was "the best three hours' fighting ever done on any battlefield." But it was not a one-sided story. For two hours Sickles held his line, and the Peach Orchard, at the salient, was not fairly penetrated until 6 o'clock. General Graham, in command at that point, made a brave stand, and fell, severely wounded, into the hands of the enemy. General Sickles himself was shot down near the Trostle House, and has since walked a maimed man. The evening of that day found our men to the west of the Wheatfield, and the Rebels back at the Emmitsburg Road. Never did the Rebels make grander charge than on the afternoon of the third day, and never was valiant foe more valiantly repulsed. A thin line of men on Cemetery Hill, and along the stone wall turned back the charge, and gathered the large fruitage, in men and colors, of victory. Six thousand men defeated a force estimated at from 14,000 to 19,000 strong. As one Rebel officer came within our line, he looked about and asked, "Where are your men?" He was pointed to the line and told, "There they are," upon which he said: "If I had known that this is all you have, I would not have surrendered." General Alexander Hays, in speech more emphatic than pious, said to him: "Go back and try it over."

As the battle closed a shower came up, and on the eastern sky was painted by the hand of God a beautiful rainbow. It was a remembrancer of His

promises to the world; not only to the natural world, that the waters of the deluge should never return to destroy the earth, but of His gracious promise, that Truth and Right should triumph among men; and of His assurances given to the hearts of good men at the commencement of the war, that our country should prevail in its struggle for Nationality and Liberty; to which assurance true hearts clung with the tenacity of an earnest Christian faith through all the dark hours of strife in 1862 and the spring of 1863. The hope again inspired was fulfilled. The bow of promise, bent above the stormy waves of rebellion, was the forerunner of the final receding of the fierce strife. At Gettysburg the tide of rebellion was turned back never to rise so defiantly again. The battle of Gettysburg was the turning point of the war at the East, as the fall of Vicksburg was at the West; and in the double victory the East was joined to the West in that onward series of successes that overwhelmed the Rebellion and secured the continuance of the Union.

The shower alluded to was succeeded by a rain which fell freely, as if to wash the blood-stains from the earth, and heal the scarred ground, seamed with shot and shell and new-made graves. But oh, it did not heal the bruised men nor the wounded hearts in the tens of thousands of homes, North and South, of the killed and wounded in the awful strife.

If no pen can faithfully describe such a battle as Gettysburg, so no hand could picture the scenes between the lines and at the rear, after rifle and sword and artillery had concluded their work. Wrote one soldier, detailed to bury the dead: "They lay in great winrows on the ground." And at the rear were the dead, and the dying, and the suffering wounded. Barns and houses were crowded with wounded men. The outlying grounds were covered. On rude benches the surgeons wrought their needful, merciful work. The barn — on the Taneytown Road, on the very battlefield — that served as a hospital for the men of the One hundred and twenty-fifth and of other regiments, after the fighting of the second day, was full of the wounded. The stalls were full of them; the loft was full; the yard in front and rear was full. When, on the afternoon of the third day, the shelling opened and the barn was found exposed, the surgeons were directed to Rock Creek, and the wounded who could walk went with the surgeons, but many wounded remained. One man — whom the writer has recently learned was Hiram D. Clark — was lying unconscious, with leg just amputated, on the operating bench, midway on the floor of the barn, as the storm of shell burst around the place. But he aroused from the effects of the chloroform administered, with a smile on his lips, and remained uncomplainingly all that fearful afternoon. Dreadful was the night which followed. The rain now fell as in torrents. The densest darkness filled the woods by the creek, as the sad cries — the very wailings of the wounded — peopled the air with images of distress. That night, given to the care of hundreds of suffering men — Confederates and Union men mingled — remains a dark, dread memory. But, over against the darkness of the suffering was the brightness of victory; and the price paid in blood was none too great for the fruitage to the Nation and the world. Some things are evermore costly; and they are the more prized because their price is paid in blood and death.

HISTORICAL NOTES.

The One hundred and twenty-fifth New York Volunteers was recruited in Rensselaer County and organized at Troy, N. Y., where it was mustered into the United States service for three years on August 27, 1862. Maj. George L. Willard, of the Eighth U. S. Infantry, was appointed colonel. He had seen previous service in the War of the Rebellion and in the Mexican War as well. Levin Crandell was commissioned lieutenant colonel, and James C. Bush major.

The regiment left Troy, August 30, 1862, and proceeded by rail to Martinsburg, Va., whence a few days later it marched to Harper's Ferry. After participating in the defence of that point in which a few of its number were killed and wounded, the regiment together with the rest of the garrison, over 11,500 in all, was surrendered to the Confederates on September 15, 1862. With the other captured troops, the men were sent under parole to Camp Douglas, Chicago, to remain there while awaiting exchange, which was effected November 22d. The regiment was then ordered back to Virginia, where it was attached to Casey's Division, in the defences of Washington, and encamped at Centreville until June 24, 1863, when it joined the Second Corps, Army of the Potomac, and marched away to Gettysburg. Gen. Alex. Hays who commanded the brigade while at Centreville was placed in command of the division, and Colonel Willard succeeded to the command of the brigade, which was composed of four New York regiments,—the Thirty-ninth, One hundred and eleventh, One hundred and twenty-fifth, and One hundred and twenty-sixth.

Under command of Colonel Crandell the One hundred and twenty-fifth fought at Gettysburg where it lost 139 in killed and wounded. Colonel Willard was killed while in command of the brigade, and Crandell was promoted colonel. Maj. A. B. Myer was made lieutenant colonel, and Capt. S. C. Armstrong, major.

The regiment was actively engaged at Auburn and Bristoe Station, in October, losing 36 men in those affairs. Capt. William H. Plumb was mortally wounded at Bristoe Station.

Colonel Crandell being absent on recruiting service, Lieut. Col. Aaron B. Myer was in command at the battle of the Wilderness. He was mortally wounded in this engagement, and the command devolved on Capt. George E. Lemon. Color Sergt. Harrison Clark carried his flag within ten feet of the enemy's line, where he fell with his leg shattered by a rifle ball. Colonel Myer, who at that time had not yet fallen, assisted in binding Clark's wound and promoted him to a lieutenantcy on the field. As Clark fell the flag was seized by Philip Brady, of Company I, but he was soon killed while waving the colors in advance of the men.

A few days later, at Spotsylvania, the gallant old regiment was again in the thickest of the fight, forming part of the storming column that moved against the enemy's works at daybreak on the 12th of May, 1864. Capt. E. P. Jones, commanding the regiment, was killed in this assault, and Lieutenants Clapp and Clemenshaw were mortally wounded. Michael Burke, of Company D, captured a battle flag, but was shot down in the act, falling with a bullet through

his breast. In the two battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania the One hundred and twenty-fifth lost 118 in killed and wounded.

On May 26th, Colonel Crandell returned from recruiting service and resumed command. The regiment was engaged at the North Anna, Totopotomoy Creek, and Cold Harbor, with further losses in officers and men. Lieutenant Green was mortally wounded in the fight of May 30th at Totopotomoy.

In the assault on Petersburg, June 16th, the decimated ranks were thinned again. Forty-four good men went down, one-third of whom were killed. Another color sergeant, A. B. Green, was killed in this affair. Colonel Crandell was wounded by a piece of shell that struck him in the face. Lieutenants Bryan and Coleman were fatally wounded.

In the affair at the Weldon Railroad, June 22d, the regiment lost several men who were captured by the enemy, while three more officers.—Adjutant Miller, and Lieutenants Hull and Barnes,—received their death blow on that disastrous, ill-managed field.

In addition to the minor battles of Reams' Station, Deep Bottom, Strawberry Plains, and Hatcher's Run, the regiment was daily engaged during the siege of Petersburg—from July 16, 1864, to April 1, 1865—on the picket line and in the trenches with frequent and continuous losses of men from wounds or by sickness caused by constant exposure. After the affair at Reams' Station, Capt. Nelson Penfield was in command, the colonel having been placed previously in charge of the brigade.

Colonel Crandell resigned December 14, 1864, after a distinguished and honorable term of service. He was succeeded by Lieut. Col. Joseph Hyde, who had entered the regiment originally as a lieutenant in Company H.

On March 29, 1865, the men broke camp and, crossing Hatcher's Run, entered on their last campaign. The regiment was still in the Third Brigade (Madill's), First Division (Miles's), Second Corps (Humphreys's). On April 2d, the regiment took part in the charge of Miles's Division on the Confederate works at Sutherland's Station, a bloody affair in which Capt. John Quay was killed. The brigade suffered severely in this attack, Colonel Madill being badly wounded. In the subsequent battles of the Second Corps prior to Lee's surrender at Appomattox, the regiment was present but suffered only a slight loss.

After marching in the Grand Review at Washington it proceeded to Troy, N. Y., where the men received their final payment and muster-out on June 15, 1865.

During its various campaigns and battles the One hundred and twenty-fifth New York sustained a loss of 15 officers and 112 enlisted men, killed or mortally wounded; 1 officer and 112 enlisted men who died of disease, accidents, or in Confederate prisons; total deaths, 240, out of a total enrollment of 1,248. Of the 113 who died of disease, 58 died in the hands of the enemy. The total of killed and wounded in all its battles amounted to 464.

The regiment was engaged or present at Harper's Ferry, Gettysburg, Brittoe Station, Auburn, Mine Run, Morton's Ford, Wilderness, Po River, Spotsylvania, North Anna, Totopotomoy, Cold Harbor, Jerusalem Road, Petersburg Assault, Deep Bottom, Reams' Station, Strawberry Plains, Hatcher's Run, Siege of Petersburg, White Oak Road, Sutherland's Station, Fall of Petersburg, Sailor's Creek, Farmville, Appomattox.

[REDACTED]



J. B. LYON PRINT.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

126TH NEW YORK INFANTRY.
On Cemetery Ridge, at Ziegler's Grove.

*(INSCRIPTIONS.)**(Front.)*

126TH NEW YORK
INFANTRY
3D BRIG. 3D DIV.
2D CORPS
JULY 3D, 1863.

(Reverse.)

THE REGIMENT WAS IN POSITION TWO HUNDRED YARDS
AT THE LEFT, JULY 2, UNTIL 7 P. M., WHEN THE
BRIGADE WAS CONDUCTED THIRTEEN HUNDRED YARDS
FURTHER TO THE LEFT, AND THE REGIMENT WITH
THE 111TH N. Y. AND 125TH N. Y., CHARGED THE
ENEMY IN THE SWALE, NEAR THE SOURCE OF PLUM RUN,
DRIVING THEM THEREFROM AND ADVANCING ONE HUNDRED
AND SEVENTY-FIVE YARDS BEYOND, TOWARDS THE
EMMITSBURG ROAD, TO A POSITION INDICATED BY
A MONUMENT ON SICKLES AVENUE. AT DARK THE
REGIMENT RETURNED TO NEAR ITS FORMER POSITION.

IN THE AFTERNOON OF JULY 3, IT TOOK THIS
POSITION AND ASSISTED IN REPULSING THE
CHARGE OF THE ENEMY, CAPTURING THREE STANDS
OF COLORS AND MANY PRISONERS.

	NUMBER ENGAGED	KILLED	WOUNDED	MISSING
OFFICERS	30	5	9	—
ENLISTED MEN	425	35	172	10
TOTAL ENGAGED	455		TOTAL LOSSES	231

(Right Side.)

THE REGIMENT PARTICIPATED IN THE FOLLOWING ENGAGEMENTS:

HARPER'S FERRY,	PO RIVER,	STRAWBERRY PLAINS,
GETTYSBURG,	SPOTSylvania,	REAMS' STATION,
AUBURN FORD,	NORTH ANNA,	BOYDTON PLANK ROAD,
BRISTOE STATION,	TOTOPOTOMOY,	SUTHERLAND'S STATION,
MINE RUN,	COLD HARBOR,	FARMVILLE,
MORTON'S FORD,	PETERSBURG,	APPOMATTOX,
WILDERNESS,	DEEP BOTTOM,	

(Left Side.)

COLONEL ELIAKIM SHERRILL,

BORN FEBRUARY 16, 1813.

DIED JULY 4, 1863.

SERVED AS MEMBER OF CONGRESS
AND STATE SENATOR.

ENTERED THE U. S. MILITARY SERVICE
AS COLONEL OF THE 126TH N. Y.
INFANTRY IN 1862.

MORTALLY WOUNDED JULY 3, 1863.

WHILE IN COMMAND OF HIS BRIGADE.

DEDICATION OF MONUMENT.

126TH REGIMENT INFANTRY.

October 3, 1888.

ADDRESS OF HON. JOHN RAINES.

COMRADES:

It is not my purpose to recite the record of the One hundred and twenty-sixth Regiment. Its deeds of heroic valor are a part of the history of our country. Through disasters and struggles to a glorious triumph, every step of the way is marked by that fortitude and high courage which were characteristic of the true soldiers who composed its ranks.

From Harper's Ferry to Appomattox, on more than twenty battlefields, its dead are buried. During twenty-five years the sighing winds have sung none too sad a requiem above the graves where rest the remains of those who fell on this field of sad, yet glorious memories.

It was fifty years before the battle of Gettysburg that Eliakim Sherrill, the colonel of our regiment, was born.

Like Grant, he was the son of a farmer and tanner. Those who knew him best in civil life early recognized his worth. When but thirty-four years of age he was called to represent his district in Congress, and seven years later he occupied a seat in the Senate of the Empire State. When in 1860 he removed to Geneva, we knew we had received a valuable addition to the number of our public-spirited citizens.

I am proud to say he was my personal friend, and I well remember when in 1861, a year before the One hundred and twenty-sixth Regiment was organized, and immediately after the disaster at Bull Run, I went with his approval to Auburn, where the Seventy-fifth was being organized, to ascertain whether an arrangement could be made by which he could aid in placing some companies from Ontario County in that regiment, whose fortunes he should share.

Had that project been accomplished, the name and fame of Sherrill would not to-day be the pride and glory of the One hundred and twenty-sixth Regiment and of the old Twenty-sixth Senatorial District.

But the organization of the Seventy-fifth had been perfected, and so it came to pass that when the One hundred and twenty-sixth was formed, it had the benefit of his dignified and courteous intercourse, his moral example, and was inspired by his lofty courage, until on this fateful field, at the moment of triumph when the rising tide of rebellion broke against the solid rock of the Third Brigade of the Third Division of the Second Corps, and their comrades on either flank, and while in command of the brigade, the fatal bullet found its mark and Sherrill died; and there fell with him on this field 40 killed and 181 wounded of the sons of Yates, Seneca, and Ontario, who had followed the colors of the One hundred and twenty-sixth Regiment where Sherrill led.

To-day we have come from our distant homes, with hearts imbued with mingled feelings of gratitude for what was done here, and regret for the precious

blood shed here, to pay a tribute of respect and loving remembrance to those who were near and dear to us — our heroic dead.

In commemoration of their worth, of their valor, and of their gallant deeds, the State of New York, and the citizens of Seneca, Yates and Ontario have erected to their memory this monument, which shall stand through long years, to call afresh to the minds of the generations of our sons and daughters who shall come after us, thoughts of the heroic sacrifices and unconquerable valor of the men who, in the perilous days of '61 and '65, when, for a space, it seemed as though the foundation of our government would be destroyed, laid anew the corner-stone, cemented it with their blood, and by their courage and devotion secured to us an heritage of freedom, of equal laws, and just government.

As the years follow each other, the sun in its course shall shine upon it and the sentinel stars keep their silent watch above it. Yet far more enduring than the shaft we have erected, shall be that grandest of all monuments to their valor and patriotism — the land they and their comrades saved, the Nation they redeemed.

What hand shall paint, what mind shall conceive, or what tongue tell, the magnificent splendors of that creation, of that monument, whose base covers from ocean to ocean, from the lakes to the gulf, resting alike on East and West, and on North and South,— that monument, which shall stand "Amid the solitude of time, beneath whose shade worlds may moulder, and above whose summit eternity must play." As the years recede and the events of the past become a faint recollection, the curtain of forgetfulness is drawn closer and closer about the deeds which, as they transpired, filled the whole world with awe.

The achievements of great leaders may indeed be indelibly impressed upon the pages of the nation's annals, and the names of Washington, Lincoln and Grant be as household words through all time. Men will not, perhaps, forget that Vicksburg, Winchester, Gettysburg, and a hundred other glorious fields were fought and won, but who shall tell of the bravery, of the gallant deeds of individual daring, done by vast hosts of those who served as faithfully as Hancock or Meade, as Hooker or Thomas, and fell with a consciousness of a duty well performed? Aye, who of you to-day can tell me the names of one-tenth of the battles of the war, or make a correct roster of the officers of the regiment in which you served. To-day 145,000 of our dead, of the men who stood shoulder to shoulder as a bulwark between the North and the hosts of rebellion, rest in our national cemeteries, in graves at the head of which is inscribed the sad word "Unknown." Yes, of the 300,000 of our fathers, brothers, husbands, and sons, who marched from our presence in the full flush of lusty manhood — "bearing in strong right hands the safety of the land, the pride and glory of the North," but alas who never came back to the embrace of loved ones who waited for their coming — 145,000 sleep in graves, upon whose grassy mound, not eye of mother, wife or sister shall drop the tear of sorrow, nor hand of comrade strew the flowers of springtime, in patriotic remembrance, save as an offering to the "unknown dead."

"He was by my side as we marched at double-quick to the sound of the enemy's guns." "He was in front of me in line of battle as we made the fearful charge." "As the line was driven back I saw him fall." "He may have been killed, or if wounded is captured, but he never came back." Such is the brief record, such the message which, perchance sent by faithful comrades, reaches the eye and pierces the heart of wife or mother as she

"Stretches despairing hands
Out to the blood-red battlefields
Which crimson the Southern sands,
As she waiteth and watcheth for one
Who has never come back from that Southern land,
Though the terrible war is done."

To know his fate would be a relief; to know him dead by the sudden rifle shot, were not so terrible; but oh! to think him a prisoner, brings to the mind the awful thought of Andersonville and Salisbury, with their accumulation of horrors which can hardly be imagined, and have never been told — of Andersonville with 13,714 graves, of Salisbury with 12,126 graves, the occupants of 12,032 of which are "unknown dead" — 25,840 men to whom grim death even was welcome as a relief from torture. Some of your sons sleep there; some of the men from Yates, Seneca, and Ontario, who served with you, are at rest there.

There they await the reveille, which shall be sounded at the order of the "Great Commander," when shall be gathered the dust of all who sleep, and the vast army of the buried, no longer "unknown," shall pass in review before the "God of Battles."

Until that day shall come, let all the generations of men watch and pray that over them shall float no Rebel flag.

As memory flies back, let me draw for you a picture on the canvas of the past. It is a lovely day in June. The blue sky smiles above forests clad in the green vesture of summer; the fields, rich with the promise of an abundant harvest, gladden the eyes of the patient toilers, and from grassy meadow to tree-clad mountain top we seem to hear, as now, the echo of "that voice" proclaiming "peace on earth, good will to men." In the midst of this restful scene nestles a pleasant village. The merchant is busy at his desk; the student at his task, the laborer at his toil, the good housewife at her work, while the merry laughter of children at their play fall upon the ear. But in a few hours all this is changed. The merchant with startled look and foreboding heart abandons his counting-house, the student hastens from his task, the laborer ceases from his toil, the matron looks from the window with anxious gaze, the laughter of the children is hushed, as they gather with blanched faces within the shelter of the homes of Gettysburg.

Out upon the highway leading down to this old town, the rising columns of dust indicate that others than the solitary traveler are approaching, and soon the sound of rapidly beating hoofs and the rattle of sabres is heard, and in a moment there bursts upon the bewildered gaze the advance guard of the

"Army of the Potomac." On through the dusty streets they pass, and now the columns of blue, under the starry flag of the Union, follow with hurrying feet, out to the fruitful fields beyond, trampling to the earth the waving grain, and rapidly forming in battle array seeking the foe. Lee, with an audacity born of overconfidence and some successes, has abandoned his line of the Rappahannock, swept northward through the Valley, across the Potomac, over the mountains and has penetrated to the very banks of the Susquehanna. It seems for a brief space as if no power could stay the onward march of his columns. But at last he turns, and hoping with one grand effort to crush his ancient foe, the Army of the Potomac, and establish his Confederacy upon the wreck of the Union, he hazards all, and directs the march of his scattered divisions upon the village of Gettysburg. And now the storm of battle rages in all its fury.

"It is a glorious sight for one
Who has no son or brother there."

It is indeed a struggle of giants, and day after day with changing fortunes is it continued, until at last amid the roar of 300 cannons charged for slaughter, and with the furious onset of 18,000 men, the storm is over, and from this very spot hurled back, the beaten foe, with what haste he may, betakes himself to the fastnesses of the Wilderness, there to await the fate which culminates at Appomattox.

A few brief months have passed away and here, upon "Cemetery Ridge," which in those July days had been so thickly sown with cannon and rifle balls, has been prepared with loving hands, the last resting places of many who, in those three days of battle, had filled to the full the measure of the patriot soldier's devotion to his country and her flag.

Here have been gathered from the Peach Orchard and the Wheatfield, from Round Top and the Devil's Den, from Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill, from Ziegler's Grove, the Railroad Cut, and from all this gory field, the mangled bodies of 3,555 Union dead. Here they are at rest; above them floats the flag they and their comrades carried to victory. Here within this "city of the dead" are assembled many of the great men of the Nation.

Here is Lincoln, on whose rugged face seems to rest the shadow of a great sorrow; and whose heart is lifted to God in the prayer "that the dead there buried may not have died in vain." Can it be that, as with far-off look he scans the field where these men fought, he sees foreshadowed the fate that is before him, or can feel upon his brow the pressure of his crown of martyrdom? Here too are the members of his cabinet, his counsellors through all the weary years. Here also the eloquent Everett, whose silver tongue is to tell of the deeds of heroes themselves have made immortal. Here a vast concourse are met to rededicate this field of death, so lately sulphurous with the smoke of blazing cannon, and sodden with the blood of thousands, and so Lincoln speaks:

"Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth upon this continent a new Nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. Now we are engaged in a great civil war,

testing whether that Nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battlefield of that war. We are met to dedicate a portion of it as a final resting place of those who gave their lives that that Nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this.

"But in a larger sense we cannot dedicate, we cannot consecrate, we cannot hallow this ground. The brave men living and dead who struggled here have consecrated it far above our power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long remember what we say here; but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us, the living, rather to be dedicated here to the unfinished work that they have thus far so nobly carried on. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us; that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to the cause for which they here gave the last full measure of devotion; that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain; that the Nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom; and that the government of the people, by the people, and for the people, shall not perish from the earth."

Thus with imposing array and in grand presence was dedicated the field of Gettysburg. But the sentiment which moved the heart of Lincoln, which inspired Everett, and found expression in the acclaim of the people gathered there, has survived the fleeting years, and has prompted you to aid in erecting and dedicating this monument to the dead and living of the One hundred and twenty-sixth.

It is the same sentiment which has inspired the people of our Empire State to say that to every organization from our State which took part in this battle, a suitable monument shall be erected to commemorate the valor and sacrifices of her sons, and that all viewing this historic spot may know that here the men of New York stood shoulder to shoulder with those of Massachusetts, Ohio, and of all this Northland, in resisting to the death the desperate designs of a traitorous oligarchy. Who were they to whom this day we ascribe all honor, to whom we dedicate this monument? They were our kin, "our boys," who, when they went out from our firesides, were followed by our prayers, and whose death filled our homes with mourning. Of such were the million who composed our armies. They who stood with McClellan in the Seven Days, they who stormed Marye's Heights with Burnside, who won Vicksburg, who hurled back the veterans of Lee on this bloody field, who marched with Sherman from Atlanta to the Sea, and with Grant from the Wilderness to Appomattox, were not hired mercenaries who shed their blood for a price, and whose trade was slaughter. They were men who thought as they fought, men who knew the issue that depended on their valor. To them patriotism was not the last refuge of a scoundrel, or the flag of their country an unmeaning symbol.

They were face to face with the issue that for long years the wisest of the Nation had sought to avert. Compromise after compromise had been submitted to, in the vain hope that white-winged Peace might continue here to abide. For nearly a century the country had remained part slave and part free, and that this condition could not long endure seemed but an idle

prophecy. It was difficult to realize that God rules in the affairs of nations as of men; that for an act of injustice inflicted to-day compensation must be made to-morrow. It might have been remembered that as the groans and tears wrung from the Israelitish slaves by Egyptian taskmasters were by the fiat of the Almighty visited in judgment by all the plagues which swarmed upon the people, and the rushing waters of the Red Sea, so the accumulated wrongs of a century of oppression, piled upon the backs of sable bondmen and women, might in the wisdom of the Omniscient demand as an atonement the sacrifices of the first-born in all the homes of America; and so the sins of the fathers were visited upon the children, and there fell upon our generation the awful infliction of judgment. Surely the Angel of Death passed by but few households, and in the Red Sea of battle was overwhelmed not only the oppressor, but they who had complicity in the wrongs.

No army could have been raised to release the bondmen from their chains. Year after the year the rivets were tightened; but when the bondmen's masters reached out to the Ark of the Covenant—the Constitution—to destroy it, raised their hands against the Union and tore down the flag, there was heard, as it were, the sound of many waters. "We are coming, Father Abraham, three hundred thousand more." And amid the clash of sabres, the crash of musketry, the bursting of shells, and the roar of cannon, was born the new and better Union. And now, from the battlements of the skies, looking down on the piled shackles stricken from the limbs of 4,000,000 slaves, the souls of the martyred Lincoln and his brave boys in blue can realize at last that "a Nation conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal, can endure;" that this generation will transmit to its posterity unimpaired a government of the people, by the people, and for the people, while upon that flag,

Flag of our free hearts, hope, and home,
By Angel hands to valor given—

no stain of humiliation rests.

On every hand in public park and square, as well as in "God's Acre," and on this battlefield, monuments and statues to the honored dead are multiplied.

But now and again we hear the voice of some utilitarian, who sees no benefit in anything in the heavens above, or in the earth beneath, which yields not cent per cent on the investment, ask what is the use of this expenditure? What benefit do we or the world derive from these piles of monumental marble or granite? Is not this building of monuments a mere sentiment? True, my friend, this is only the expression of a sentiment, of an emotion of the soul of man. Do you not appreciate the fact that sentiment rules the world? It is the power which prompts to noble actions and great deeds. Tell me the motive which prompted the sons of the thrifty farmers of Yates, Seneca, and Ontario, heirs to your fruitful acres, the pride of your homes, who were to be the staff and comfort of your old age—your sons who enjoyed all the advantages your means could command—to abandon all for the privations of camp, the hardships of the march, the terrors of the hospital; to face the storm of battle and the horrors of the prison pen? It was nothing but a sentiment—

the sentiment of loyalty. Since the war what binds together the 300,000 members of the Grand Army, and prompts them each year to contribute of their meagre substance thousands upon thousands to the relief of their needy comrades? It is nothing but sentiment, the sentiment of fraternity and charity.

Pray tell me what but a sentiment for twenty years caused this great people from East to West, in every city, village, and hamlet, so often as the 30th of May recurs, to offer at the shrine of patriot graves the incense of grateful hearts? So the monuments we raise to commemorate great events, to perpetuate the names and deeds of heroes, are tributes paid through sentiment. But they teach important lessons.

In Trafalgar Square, in the city of London, stands a monument to England's great Admiral Nelson, and inscribed thereon are the words, "England expects every man to do his duty." This monument, these words, can have but one effect upon the generations. There, before the eyes of each Englishman, in more impressive form than speech of orator or record of historian, is an object lesson in patriotism. There he sees embodied the glory of grand achievement, of great victories, and as he looks his heart swells with pride at the thought that he, too, is an Englishman.

In the Capital City of this Nation there towers towards the heavens the grand shaft which a grateful people have erected in honor of the first President of the United States; and there it shall remain during the centuries to come, to speak to the millions who shall succeed us, of the wisdom, of the fortitude, the patriotism of Washington.

This monument which, as the result of the generosity of the State of New York, and of your efforts, we dedicate to-day, shall also teach the lessons of loyalty, of obedience to law—of the duty of sacrifice for country and the right. To those in whose honor it has been erected, life was as sweet as it is to you, home and loved ones as dear,—yet for country they gave up all. They suffered not alone, and to-day this shaft seems to me to commemorate also the bravery and the suffering of the mothers, wives, and sisters of your heroic dead.

To stand in the front rank of battle while the reaper Death claims his victims on either hand, to suffer on beds of pain in hospital, or to endure the tortures of the prison pen was indeed most terrible; but to feel the agony which crushes the heart of mother, wife, or sister, as month after month, year after year, she waits and watches for one of whom no tidings come, is torture almost unbearable. When the final history of these days shall be written the saddest page therein will be that which shall record her sufferings, blotted as it will be by the tears of mourners who can never be comforted, each word a sob, each line the record of a broken heart, while its brightest page will be that which shall be illumined by the record of the heroic self-sacrifice which marked the loyal women of the North.

My friends, our pleasant duty is nearly completed. We have spoken of our dead. Could those heroes speak to us to-day, they would in words of no uncertain sound remind us of our duty to the living. While we raise in their honor the enduring monument, we should hear in that solemn presence a voice exhorting us to renew our pledges to aid those whom they left among

us, a sacred charge upon the Nation's gratitude—the soldier's widow and orphan. Were they visible to mortal eye we should see them with unmoving finger point to the almshouses of the land, from within whose weary portals 12,000 veterans, forced by cruel necessity to find shelter from the tempests of adversity which beat upon their battered forms and have wrecked their hopes, hold out beseeching hands when, with a voice that should reach even the ear of dead conscience, they ask,—is it thus that a great Nation redeems its pledges to the men whose valor opened the Mississippi from Cairo to the Gulf, who marched with Sherman from Atlanta to the Sea, who rolled back the rising tide of rebellion from the heights of Gettysburg, and won victory with Grant at Appomattox?


Let those who should, heed the lesson. Let us all remember,

“Till memories fade,
Their loyalty the grand old Union saves,
And o'er each sacred mound the old flag waves;
Thank God, our dead, who sleep in Southern graves,
Rest 'neath its shade.”

(TABLET.)

WILLARD'S BRIGADE.

THE 3D BRIGADE OF THE 3D DIVISION, 2D CORPS WAS CONDUCTED BY GENERAL HANCOCK AT SEVEN O'CLOCK P. M., JULY 2, 1863, FROM NEAR ZIEGLER'S GROVE TO THE REAR OF A BUSHY SWALE ALONG PLUM RUN; THE 39TH N. Y., COMMANDED BY MAJOR HUGO HILDEBRANDT, FACED LEFT TO GUARD AGAINST A FLANK AND REAR ATTACK; THE 125TH N. Y. COMMANDED BY COL. LEVIN CRANDALL, TOOK POSITION ON THE LEFT; THE 126TH N. Y. COMMANDED BY COL. ELIAKIM SHERRILL, IN THE CENTER; AND THE 111TH N. Y., COMMANDED BY COL. C. D. MACDOUGALL ON THE RIGHT; AND CHARGED THE 13TH, 17TH AND 18TH MISS., REGIMENTS OF BARKSDALE'S BRIGADE IN LINE IN THE THICKET AND DROVE THEM THROUGH THE SWALE AND UP THE SLOPE TOWARDS THE ENMITSBURG ROAD TO WITHIN 317 YARDS DUE EAST FROM THIS POSITION, WHEN THE ENEMY'S ARTILLERY FIRE BECAME VERY SEVERE AND THE BRIGADE RETIRED TO THE SWALE WHERE COL. GEORGE L. WILLARD COMMANDING THE BRIGADE WAS KILLED. AFTER BEING RELIEVED AT DARK THE BRIGADE RETURNED TO NEAR ITS FORMER POSITION ON CEMETERY RIDGE.



J. B. LYON PRINT.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

WILLARD'S BRIGADE.

On Avenue, 630 yards northeast of the Peach Orchard, marking the direction of advance of Willard's Brigade in its fight with Barksdale's Brigade on the second day. Plum Run swale is in the background; also, on the extreme right, the Trostle Farm and Little Round Top.

HISTORICAL SKETCH.

BY MAJ. CHARLES A. RICHARDSON.

The One hundred and twenty-sixth New York Infantry was raised in 1862, in the counties of Ontario, Seneca, and Yates, under the call of the President, issued on the 1st day of July, 1862, for 300,000 men.

The regiment was mustered into the United States service at Geneva, N. Y., on the 22d day of August, 1862, with 39 officers and 956 enlisted men, and sent to Harper's Ferry, and there armed. On the 12th of September, a portion of the regiment was ordered to Maryland Heights, where on the following day it was engaged with Kershaw's South Carolina Brigade, supported by Barksdale's Mississippi Brigade of McLaws' Division, until ordered to retire. In this engagement it inflicted a severe loss on the enemy, much greater than it suffered, notwithstanding which, it was basely slandered by cowardly officers of other commands, who sought thereby to conceal their own guilt. In this engagement Colonel Sherrill was severely wounded.

On the 15th of September, 1862, the regiment was surrendered and paroled with the garrison at Harper's Ferry, in all a force of 11,000 men, including the Thirty-ninth, the One hundred and eleventh, and the One hundred and twenty-fifth New York Infantry.

The regiment was sent to Chicago, and being soon exchanged, was re-armed and went into camp and on duty at Union Mills, and afterwards at Centreville, Va., the Thirty-ninth, the One hundred and eleventh, the One hundred and twenty-fifth, and the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York, constituting a brigade in Casey's Division, afterwards the Third Brigade, commanded by Gen. Alexander Hays, in Abercrombie's Division.

On the 25th of June, 1863, the brigade was assigned as the Third Brigade of the Third Division of the Second Corps, Gen. Alexander Hays commanding the division, and Col. George Lamb Willard, of the One hundred and twenty-fifth New York, commanding the brigade.

The brigade thereafter participated in all the battles in which the Army of the Potomac was engaged until the close of the war.

The brigade reached Gettysburg at 8 o'clock, a. m., July 2, 1863, and was formed in line on the crest of the ridge south of Ziegler's Grove, and the Bryan House. At 3 o'clock, p. m., when the enemy's artillery, south of the Seminary, opened on our line, it was moved forward to the stone wall.

While here, Companies B, H, and K charged on and captured the Bliss barn, with quite a number of prisoners.

At about 7 o'clock in the afternoon, General Sickles having been wounded, General Hancock, who had been placed in command of the Third Corps with his own, personally conducted the brigade nearly a mile to the left, to the rear of a bushy swale, filled with boulders, near the source of Plum Run, through which a portion of Birney's Division of the Third Corps had just been driven. Here the One hundred and twenty-fifth New York on the left and the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York in the centre, and the

One hundred and eleventh New York on the right, charged into the thicket held by the Thirteenth, the Seventeenth, and the Eighteenth Mississippi Regiments of Barksdale's Brigade—the Thirty-ninth New York having been faced to the left to prevent a flank and rear attack on the other three New York regiments. The three New York regiments, although receiving a deadly volley at less than ten paces from the concealed enemy, charged and drove them to the farther edge of the swale, almost at arm's length, where large numbers of the enemy threw themselves down and raised their hands in token of surrender, and the rest fled up the hill pursued by our brigade 175 yards, towards the Emmitsburg Road, when the artillery fire from the front and the left became so hot that the brigade fell back to the swale, taking with them several pieces of artillery which had previously fallen into the hands of the enemy. Here Colonel Willard was instantly killed and the command devolved on Colonel Sherrill of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York. Lieutenant Colonel Bull took command of the regiment.

In the meantime the Twenty-first Mississippi of Barksdale's Brigade had swept down from the Peach Orchard, where they had wounded and captured General Graham (late engineer of our New York Commissioners for Gettysburg Monuments), past Bigelow's Battery and across Plum Run and captured Watson's Battery I, Fifth United States Artillery, which was wholly unsupported. Lieutenant Peeples of that battery, seeing our Thirty-ninth New York standing where it had been placed, ran over and induced it to attempt to retake his battery. The Thirty-ninth at once charged, and driving the enemy from the guns recaptured everything which had been lost, and conveyed it safely to the rear. Thus while our other three regiments were driving Barksdale's other three regiments back towards the Emmitsburg Road, our detached Thirty-ninth drove back Barksdale's detached Twenty-first, and recovered from them Watson's Battery.

General Hancock, in his official report, says of Willard's Brigade in this charge: "There were no other troops on its right or left, and the brigade soon became engaged, losing its commander, Colonel Willard, and many officers and men."

Farther on he says: "General Barksdale of the Rebel service was left on the field mortally wounded.

"The Third Brigade of the Third Division, commanded by Colonel Sherrill, after Colonel Willard's death, made a gallant advance on the enemy's batteries to the right of the brick house (Sherfy's), in which the One hundred and eleventh New York Volunteers, under Colonel MacDougall, bore a distinguished part. This brigade lost nearly one-half its numbers."

General Hays in his official report says: "Colonel Willard, One Hundred and twenty-fifth New York Volunteers, commanding the Third Brigade, was late in the day withdrawn from the division by the major general commanding (General Hancock), and took a prominent part in the engagement on our left. The history of this brigade's operations is written in blood. Colonel Willard was killed, and the next day after the brigade had rejoined the division his successor, Col. Eliakim Sherrill, One hundred and twenty-sixth New York Volunteers, also fell. Col. C. D. MacDougall, One hundred and eleventh

New York Volunteers, and Maj. Hugo Hildebrandt, Thirty-ninth New York Volunteers, were each severely wounded, leaving the brigade in command of a lieutenant colonel.

"The loss of this brigade amounts to one-half the casualties in the division. The acts of traitors at Harper's Ferry had not stained their patriotism."

At dusk the brigade returned to a position nearly in the rear of that occupied during the day, and there remained until the afternoon of the 3d. After the shelling had ceased on the 3d, and just before the charge of the enemy on the line of the Second Corps, the brigade, excepting the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York, was moved up to the line it occupied the preceding day, now occupied by the Twelfth New Jersey, First Delaware, and Fourteenth Connecticut, of the Second Brigade, so that the line was four ranks deep. The One hundred and twenty-sixth New York was moved to the right of the One hundred and eighth New York and of the Second Brigade, and just in front of the right of Woodruff's United States Battery, so that it was the right regiment of the corps and just opposite the left of the enemy's charging line. Brockenbrough's Brigade of Virginia regiments and Davis' Brigade of three Mississippi regiments and the Fifty-sixth North Carolina Regiment having broken, Lane's Brigade of North Carolina regiments, with the Thirty-third North Carolina on the left, advanced on the extreme left of the charging line.

It is proper to add here, that when the left of the enemy's line had reached the Emmitsburg Road, Captain Armstrong, of the One hundred and twenty-fifth New York, (now General Armstrong, of the Hampton School, Va.,) in command of a detail of skirmishers from the brigade, who had retired his command to the Emmitsburg Road, outside of the enemy's charging line, opened a sharp fire on the enemy's flank, and aided in throwing their left into confusion. This flank movement of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York, although not specially mentioned in the official reports, is well remembered by the officers and men of the regiment, and is fully established by the report of the Confederate General Lane, and the statements of the officers of the Thirty-third North Carolina, which was the left regiment of Lane's Brigade, and the left of the enemy's line at the last.

Col. Eliakim Sherrill of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York, commanding the brigade, fell mortally wounded near the position of the Thirty-ninth New York during the engagement, and was borne to the rear by two soldiers of that regiment—his own regiment not knowing that he was shot until after the repulse of the enemy. Lieutenant Colonel Bull of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York, then being the senior officer, assumed command of the brigade.

Colonel Sherrill died at the Eleventh Corps' hospital at 8 o'clock the following morning—July 4, 1863—and his body was taken to Baltimore by Surg. Charles S. Hoyt, and there embalmed and sent to his late home in Geneva, N. Y., where it was buried with military honors. His funeral was attended by fully 10,000 people.

The One hundred and twenty-sixth New York was by order advanced, and wheeling to the left it opened an enfilading fire on the enemy, who soon broke

in confusion, when the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York charged on their flank and captured many prisoners and several stands of colors, three of which were duly turned over, and the medals authorized by the act of Congress for the capture of colors were issued therefor to Private Jerry Wall, Company B, Private George H. Dore, Company D, and to Capt. Morris Brown, Jr., of Company A. The colors captured by Captain Brown had inscribed thereon twelve battles, one of which was Harper's Ferry.

General Hays in his official report says: "The division captured and turned into corps headquarters, fifteen battle flags or banners." Thus it appears that the One hundred and twenty-sixth captured and turned over three of the fifteen flags captured by the division of thirteen regiments.

In reference to the attack of the enemy on the third day, General Hancock says: "In front of Hays' Division it was not of very long duration; mowed down by canister from Woodruff's Battery and by the fire from two regiments judiciously posted by General Hays on his extreme front and right, and by the fire of different lines in the rear, the enemy broke in great disorder, leaving 15 colors and nearly 2,000 prisoners in the hands of this division. Those of the enemy's troops which did not fall into disorder in front of the Third Division were removed to the right, and reinforced the line attacking Gibbon's Division."

The One hundred and twenty-sixth New York lost in killed, 5 officers and 35 enlisted men; in wounded, 9 officers and 172 enlisted men; and in missing, 10 enlisted men. The missing, in fact, were all killed or wounded; total, 231.

According to the official reports there were only four regiments that lost in killed and wounded at Gettysburg more than the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York. The Twenty-fourth Michigan, First Corps, First Division, First Brigade, lost 272; the One hundred and eleventh New York, Second Corps, Third Division, Third Brigade, lost 235; the One hundred and fifty-first Pennsylvania, First Corps, Third Division, First Brigade, lost 223; the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York, Second Corps, Third Division, Third Brigade, lost 221.

It may be of interest to note briefly some other facts in the history of the regiment.

At Harper's Ferry its losses in killed were 1 officer and 15 enlisted men; in wounded, 4 officers and 35 enlisted men; total, 55. It went into the battle of Gettysburg on the 2d of July, with 30 officers and 425 enlisted men, bearing arms. Its loss was 231, as before stated.

On the 14th of October, 1863, when the battles of Auburn Ford and Bristoe Station were fought, there were present 2 field officers, 11 line officers, and 242 enlisted men.

At Auburn Ford the regiment lost 5 enlisted men killed, and 17 wounded, and on the same day at Bristoe Station, it lost 6 killed and 13 wounded; total on that day, 41. At Bristoe Station the brigade, with the aid of Arnold's Battery, nearly annihilated Cooke's North Carolina Brigade of Hill's Corps, and captured four guns of McIntosh's Artillery, each regiment drawing off one piece.

At Morton's Ford, February 6, 1864, 3 enlisted men were killed and 19 wounded. April 4, 1864, 2 line officers and 100 enlisted men were detailed for duty at corps headquarters, where they remained until the close of the war.

On the 6th of June, 1864, Lieutenant Colonel Baird, commanding the regiment, reported to General Hancock concerning the losses from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor as follows:

"At the opening of the campaign from the Rapidan, the strength of the regiment present and absent was 26 commissioned officers and 496 enlisted men; of whom 8 officers were on detached service, 2 absent sick, and 1 absent with leave, and 163 enlisted men on detached service, 111 absent sick (principally from wounds), 3 in arrest, making a total of 277 absent. The number for duty was 15 commissioned officers and 188 enlisted men, including 12 musicians.

"During the present campaign, of those present for duty, there have been killed, wounded, or missing, 8 commissioned officers and 121 enlisted men, but during the campaign, both officers and men have joined the regiment, so that at the present time the number present for duty is 1 lieutenant colonel, 1 adjutant, 1 acting quartermaster, 3 captains, 3 lieutenants, and 69 enlisted men."

After this the regiment lost in killed and wounded the first week before Petersburg, as follows: The lieutenant colonel, the adjutant, 1 captain, and 2 lieutenants, killed; and 1 captain and 1 lieutenant, wounded; leaving the 22d of June, no field officer in command, and only 1 of the line officers, which were reported present for duty on the 6th of the month. Its losses in enlisted men were also severe. During its term of service the regiment lost 16 commissioned officers, killed in action or died of wounds received in battle, a loss of officers in action greater in proportion to its number of officers than that suffered by any other regiment from this State, and exceeded by but few in the service.

While the regiment lost so heavily, there was no battle in which the regiment was engaged in which it did not inflict much greater losses on the enemy than it received, except at Totopotomoy, an engagement on the Weldon Railroad, and at Sutherland's Station, where the regiment took the offensive.

Of the officers who returned with the regiment, Surgeon Hammond, Chaplain Harrison, and Capt. T. E. Munson alone remained of the 39 original officers who were mustered into the service two years, nine months and twelve days before, and they have since died.

The regiment was mustered out of service on the 3d of June, 1865, with 221 men.

(DESCRIPTION.)

(Front.)

1347H

NEW YORK

INFANTRY,

1ST BRIGADE,

2D DIVISION,

11TH CORPS.

(Reverse.)

JULY 1, 1863,

THE REGIMENT

WAS ENGAGED ABOUT

ONE-QUARTER MILE

EAST OF GETTYSBURG

NEAR YORK ROAD.

JULY 20 AND 30

Held the position.

CASUALTIES

KILLED 40

WOUNDED 151

MISSING 30



J. E. LYON PRINT.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

134TH NEW YORK INFANTRY.

On Cemetery Hill, east of the Baltimore Pike and opposite the entrance to the National Cemetery Ground over which Hays' Louisiana Brigade charged on the evening of the second day. The fence on the left was erected since the battle.

DEDICATION OF MONUMENT.

134TH REGIMENT INFANTRY.

July 2, 1888.

ORATION BY HON. T. L. BARHYDT.

VETERANS OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FOURTH NEW YORK:

It matters not to any true American where he may be, at the mention of the name Gettysburg there arises within him a feeling akin to love of country. Gettysburg! Who can speak the name or even think it, without calling to mind the incidents that occurred upon this battlefield a quarter of a century ago.

Here rival armies contended; the one for national, the other for sectional supremacy. The one, for the preservation of a great Republic, the home of the oppressed of the earth, in all her greatness and grandeur, with the accursed institution of slavery wiped out forever; the other, to establish a new confederacy of states in which cotton would have been king, and traffic in human beings of no less prominence. The one to raise a flag, before unknown to the nations of the earth; the other to keep in place the old flag which for years had waved in peace and triumph o'er land and sea; which declares to the world that it is the flag of the free, and welcomes to its protection all who foster free institutions,—the flag for which our forefathers fought and which, as the years roll round, with star after star added to the field of blue, impresses all that the poet was right when he wrote,—“Emblem of sweet Liberty.”

What had you, veterans, in the dark days of the Rebellion to encourage you when thoughts of home and country crowded into your minds but that flag? When heartsick at the thought of never seeing friends left behind, and it seemed as if the God of battles had deserted the side for which you fought, the cloud of doubt and discomfort would for an instant be drifted away by the wind of hope, revealing the old flag, and infusing into your inmost soul the inspiration to more earnest endeavors that this government might be devoted to the preservation of liberty and equality to all men.

Twenty-five years ago you met upon this battlefield—made memorable by events of the past—those who were in full opposition to the government of our country; those who would have divided this beloved land and forever after lived at enmity with the North, and espoused all that was in direct opposition to free institutions as a corner stone upon which to establish a confederacy. To-day we meet, veteran and civilian, “Blue and Gray,” to dedicate to the memory of the dead of the late One hundred and thirty-fourth Regiment New York State Volunteers a suitable monument. Let it be said to the credit of the people of the Empire State that through her legislature there has been provided a way for surviving comrades to mark and ever keep in remembrance the spot where fell in the heat of battle those who were braving all for the preservation of our homes and a nation's life.

Here around us, in that peace which the world cannot give, sleep the Nation's dead. They died to perpetuate that precious boon, "Liberty," for which our forefathers contended so persistently and successfully. They sleep unmindful of the great achievements accomplished through their endeavors. Nowhere in the history of the great battles fought between armies of different nations do we read of so heavy fighting having taken place as upon this memorable battlefield. It was the attempt of General Lee and the forces under his command to invade Northern territory. The Southern army, jubilant at the success which had previously crowned its efforts, earnestly hoped upon this, the field of Gettysburg, that victory would again perch upon its banner. The whole South looked forward to that success which would cause the recognition of the Confederacy by unscrupulous England, who had been waiting for the decisive moment when she might espouse the cause so dear to her interest. The one product of the South was of vastly more importance to her interests than the life of a nation in which she was able to see and recognize a rival. Let it be said to England's shame that during the dark days of our national existence, when the brave boys upon the field of battle were pouring out their life blood or languishing in hospitals; while friends at home were making every effort in their power by sacrifices to alleviate their sufferings; while loved ones were mourning the dead and hoping against hope for those in the throes of death; while others were parting from home and dear ones that the Northern ranks might not be depleted,— she stood with her fingers at the throat of this nation's existence ready to throttle and choke out the existing spark. It was not to be thus; for the God of battles intervened and dashed aside the hand that would have performed its dastardly work. Victory perched upon our banner, and to-day this great Republic stands upon a foundation more solid than ever before.

The one State which figured most prominently upon this battlefield in number of troops engaged, in the loss of her sons, and whose troops were the most often engaged, was that of New York. For three days her sons marched side by side, shoulder to shoulder, and when the smoke of battle had cleared away, 7,000 brave boys were numbered with the dead and wounded. To the memory of the 252 members of the One hundred and thirty-fourth Regiment who laid down their lives here or were stricken with wounds or endured captivity in Rebel prisons — to-day we dedicate yonder monument.

The spot upon which it stands is the most important position occupied by the regiment during the memorable battle. As you, survivors, gaze upon that shaft rearing its top towards Heaven, how the many incidents of those three days' fighting crowd into your minds. The Eleventh Army Corps, to which you were attached, had been unsuccessfully engaged beyond and north of the town upon which they were retiring by the Mummasburg and Carlisle Roads, while to cut off their retreat through the town a strong force of Confederate troops, consisting of Hays' Louisiana and Hoke's North Carolina Brigades, were moving on their left flank. Between these two bodies of troops, three regiments (One hundred and thirty-fourth and One hundred and fifty-fourth New York, and Twenty-seventh Pennsylvania) under command of that brave leader whom the members of the One hundred and thirty-fourth

will never forget so long as one remains,— I allude to Gen. Charles R. Coster — were moved out by order of General Howard to take the position they did. By checking the advance of the Confederates they permitted the falling back of Northern troops through the town of Gettysburg at a great sacrifice to that body of brave men composed of these small regiments; but it was to be expected when pitted against eight regiments of the best Confederate troops, Hays' Brigade being the celebrated "Louisiana Tigers," and Hoke's, equally renowned North Carolina men. The incidents of the second day's fight, when your brigade occupied several positions on Cemetery Hill as the occasion required, and in the evening were hotly engaged in helping to repulse a most determined attack on East Cemetery Hill, occupied by Wiedrich's Battery; and other troops together with you occupying the square in the town which you barricaded and held on the third day and until the Confederates retired from the field on the fourth day, are fresh in your memory.

Too much praise cannot be given to the men and officers of the One hundred and thirty-fourth Regiment for their courageous and cool bearing on the battlefield, and for their patient endurance of all the harassing trials of a soldier in camp and field. Historians have vied with each other in describing the events of the three days' fighting upon this battlefield; but the whole has not been told. Who can give to the world all that transpired here? The movements of divisions and brigades are recorded. Generals and officers are extolled; but what in comparison is said in praise of those who lie silent in death, or of the veteran who to-day narrates the incidents of the late war which crowd thick and fast into his mind. It is right that our country should pay tribute to the armies and the leaders. The deeds of valor performed by them will be recounted so long as history records the events of men and nations. Upon their achievements rested the life of a nation, and by their success we are again a united country, more firmly cemented than before, one and inseparable.

Heroes of many battles! Not until generation after generation shall have passed away and the few survivors of the late Civil War are looked for in vain, will be given to you the credit you have so highly deserved. The people of this country will, as she advances year after year, more fully comprehend the inestimable results and benefits achieved by the success of Northern armies. A greater development of our resources has been one of the results of the late war; and to the nations of the earth has been made manifest the fact that we are self-supporting while they demand the products of our broad acres. To-day England knocks at the doors of our legislative halls and implores in behalf of her starving laboring classes that we throw down the barrier of "free trade," caring nothing for the mechanics and millions who enjoy comfortable homes in this land made so by the maintenance of that so-called barrier. The South, rich in her resources and continually developing those hidden treasures which would in all probability have remained buried at the present time were it not for the circumstances which arose to-day, stands out in all her magnificence. Her productive soil offers inducements to capitalists, and they have not been dilatory in taking advantage of the situation. She glories in her new birth. The feelings engendered during the war have been buried deep be-

neath the sod of reconciliation. To-day we stand upon this soil made sacred and doubly so by having been baptized in the blood of North and South alike, not as foe, but friend, all looking for the further prosperity of our country, and alike mourning those who here laid down their lives. Here would I tear down, never to be replaced, that "bloody shirt" from the masthead where it has been so long nailed, and which has been flaunted to the breeze in so many political campaigns, and place in its stead the memorable words — uttered upon this battlefield by him who with one stroke of his pen struck from the limbs of 4,000,000 of human beings the chains of slavery — "With malice toward none, with charity towards all."

As I look upon that flag, which bears upon it in letters of gold the names of the battles in which you were engaged, visions of the past and present pass before me. I behold among the events preparatory to the outbreak of the late war, the withdrawing of Southern delegates from Congress after the ordinance of secession had been passed by the Cotton States; the meeting of the representative men in the South, in Montgomery, to form a Confederacy; the perfection of a dual government styled the "Confederate States of America;" the election of Jefferson Davis as its President; the preparing and adopting of a constitution which gave each state the right to act in an independent character and protect the institution of slavery in its most malignant phase; the inaugural of their president in which he gave utterance to the mistaken idea, "If I mistake not the judgment and will of the people, a reunion with the states from which we have separated is neither practicable nor desirable." I pass on to the time when he whom the people of this great Nation — through Providence — called to the presidential chair, takes up his journey from his humble home towards the seat of the government, and the prayers of loyal men and women ascend to the great white throne for his safety. I see him standing on the steps of the Capitol at Washington, and in the closing of his inaugural address hear him say: "You can have no conflict, without being yourselves the aggressors. You have no oath registered in Heaven to destroy the government, while I have the most solemn one to preserve and defend it."

Methinks I hear the boom of cannon; and as the shot speeds on towards its destination, ere it has struck, rings out through the length and breadth of the land, — "Sumter fired upon!" And the exclamation comes from loyal men, — "My country!" I see that gallant band forced to succumb to the inevitable. I read the call for troops, and witness the outpouring from thousands of hamlets of sturdy men to battle that that flag shall wave, not over a section, but the whole of this land. I recall how with the "God speed" of friends thousands left comfortable homes; the mother's blessing; the wife's and sister's last farewell accompanied by a silent prayer to Heaven for preservation, and a safe return; the prattling infant clinging to the father's knee unmindful of the meaning of it all.

I see regiment after regiment march on the field of battle. I hear the boom of cannon and the crash of musketry, and when the smoke of battle is cleared away witness a field strewn with the dead and dying. I look in upon the homes of those who had fallen in defence of their country, and behold the

sorrow and desolation that followed. I behold a land clothed in the habiliments of mourning. As victory or defeat perches upon our banner I hear the supplications from a thousand pulpits arise to the throne of grace for the success of our armies. My mind passes rapidly over the great battlefields, and memory recalls the incidents which followed until I stand under the tree at Appomattox. There I witness the end of strife. He who had forsaken country for state, who had espoused the unholy cause instead of endeavoring to maintain the one for which he had been reared and sworn to defend, surrenders his sword to him who by loyalty to the cause he had espoused stood the hero of the hour. I behold a section of country which held the old flag in contempt, humiliated,—her credit gone, her homes desolate, her lands devastated.

But a brighter dawn follows, and as time rolls on I once more behold the old flag in its place. Out of the clouds of adversity comes the dawn of prosperity, and I see a land united and prosperous. Where poverty existed I see garners full and running over. Where ignorance held sway I see schools existing. Where I saw a divided country I see one united firmer than before, free in the full acceptance of the term.

While we feel exultant at all that has followed the close of the war we are frequently reminded that in the midst of joy and prosperity we are called upon to pause and pay the respect we owe to those who wrought out the great change. Witness the mounds throughout the length and breadth of this land; and are we not reminded that beneath their verdant covering sleep the illustrious dead? Witness the processions that march through your streets to the sound of martial music, and you will recognize those who survived the hardships of a soldier's life,—those who escaped death upon the field of battle only to carry the evidence through life—a body of men who have banded themselves together into that noble organization, "The Grand Army of the Republic," who can never forget their brothers-in-arms, and through whose endeavors these monuments have been erected on this battlefield symbolizing the affection of surviving comrades.

In honoring the dead we but perform a duty we owe the living. In the years to come, when the voices of those who took part in the late Civil War shall be hushed in death, when time and the hand of man shall have obliterated from the face of the earth the last mound and trace of earthwork behind which friend or foe sought refuge, when deeds of heroic valor shall be repeated only in history,—the monuments here raised to the illustrious dead will stand as living witnesses that upon this spot fell in that unholy war those who held principle and country dearer than life.

HISTORICAL SKETCH.

This regiment enlisted in the second year of the war under the second call for troops,—the call for "300,000 more,"—and was composed of exceptionally good material. It was recruited in the counties of Schoharie and Schenectady, which at that time composed the Fourteenth Senatorial District. The regiments that enlisted under the second call for troops were, for the most part, organized each from some senatorial district.

enemy's column which could be plainly seen moving along a road in the distance. But Jackson was not retreating. He was moving across the front of Hooker's army with 30,000 men, and, concealed by the screen of forests, was taking a circuitous route which would enable him to attack the Army of the Potomac on its right and rear, at the position held by the Eleventh Corps. Having made all his preparations Jackson commenced his attack about 5 p. m., and General Howard, the commander of the Eleventh Corps, was taken by surprise, although ample notice had been sent to him from his picket line that large bodies of the enemy were massing on his flank. The Eleventh Corps made a good fight in opposition to Jackson's attack; but, surprised, out-flanked and outnumbered three to one, they were obliged to retreat. The corps did not yield its ground, however, until over 1,500 of its number had fallen, and 900 were taken prisoners, while fighting in the dense forest which covered that part of the field.

During this fighting Barlow's Brigade, with the Third Corps, was absent at the extreme front hunting for the mythical rear guard of Jackson's "retreating army." When Barlow heard the heavy firing which accompanied Jackson's attack he joined the Third Corps with his brigade in response to orders from General Birney, taking position with that corps about 9 p. m., at a place near Chancellorsville.

On Sunday, May 3d, the One hundred and thirty-fourth with the rest of the brigade rejoined their own corps, the Eleventh, and formed line behind some rifle pits on the left of the army, where they remained until the retreat of the entire army on the 6th. The loss of the regiment during the battle was slight; 3 men were wounded, and 5 were captured or missing.

Shortly after the return from Chancellorsville the One hundred and thirty-fourth was transferred to the First Brigade—Buschbeck's. This brigade contained the following regiments:—

134th New York	Col. Charles R. Coster.
154th New York	Col. D. B. Allen.
27th Pennsylvania	Lieut. Col. L. Cantador.
73d Pennsylvania	Col. William Moore.

The Twenty-ninth New York also belonged to this brigade, but it was a two years' regiment and returned home in June, 1863.

On June 12, 1863, the Eleventh Corps left its camps at Brooke's Station, on the Aquia Creek Railroad, and the One hundred and thirty-fourth New York commenced its long march to Pennsylvania. It was a toilsome one, made in summer heat and dust, the roads changing at times to muddy ones under the heavy showers and rains that fell at intervals. On its way the regiment passed by Hartwood Church, Catlett's Station, Manassas Junction, Centreville, to Cow Horn Ford, on Goose Creek, Va., where it rested from June 17th to the 24th, when the corps crossed the Potomac at Edwards Ferry into Maryland. Thence the regiment marched through Jefferson, Md., Middletown, Frederick, to Emmitsburg, arriving at the latter place June 29th. The regiment was resting at Emmitsburg, Md., when, on the morning of Wednesday, July 1st, orders were received for the corps to march to Gettysburg, Penn., ten miles

distant, a place that scarcely a man in the column had ever heard of before. The Eleventh Corps was soon on the road, Steinwehr's Division bringing up the rear. When about half way the news spread along the line that the First Corps was fighting at Gettysburg, and that General Reynolds was killed. The rumor received ample confirmation in the increased pace at which the troops were hurried forward. Steinwehr's Division arrived at Gettysburg about 2 o'clock, and was immediately ordered to occupy Cemetery Hill. From this commanding position the men could look over and across the town to the fields and ridges on the farther side where a fierce battle was in progress, and where, in addition to the First Corps, their comrades of the First and Third Divisions of the Eleventh were already in action.

The First Brigade, under command of Colonel Coster in the absence of General Buschbeck, was placed on the northeast part of Cemetery Hill, in support of Wiedrich's Battery. General Schurz, who was in command of the corps, sent to Steinwehr an urgent call for reinforcements, as he was hard pressed by superior numbers, and Coster was ordered to take his brigade to Schurz's assistance. The brigade fell into line and, marching down Baltimore Street, passed through the town. On entering the fields on the farther side, Coster deployed three of his regiments in line of battle not far from the houses, and placed his fourth regiment, the Seventy-third Pennsylvania, in the edge of the town near the railway station. On the left of the brigade, Heckman's Ohio Battery unlimbered its guns and opened fire.

The Eleventh Corps was already falling back rapidly with the enemy in close pursuit. The most that Coster's Brigade could do would be to cover the retreat. To do this an effort was made to check the advance of Early's Confederate Division until the regiments of the Eleventh Corps could gain the cover of the town. The One hundred and thirty-fourth, under command of the lieutenant colonel, Allan H. Jackson, held the right of the brigade. It numbered about 430, officers and men. The three regiments had been deployed but a few minutes when two full brigades — Hays' and Hoke's — of Early's Division attacked them. The unequal contest could not be long sustained; but the One hundred and thirty-fourth remained after the other regiments of the brigade had joined in the general retreat, and from its exposed position on the flank of the brigade sustained a terrible loss, more than half of its men being shot down at this place. The remnant of the regiment then made its escape, and returned to Cemetery Hill, where the retreating troops of the First and Eleventh Corps were falling into line for the purpose of holding that important position.

The regiment remained on Cemetery Hill during the two succeeding days of the battle. It participated in the repulse of the Louisiana Brigade on the evening of the 2d, and was under a severe artillery fire during the grand artillery conflict of the 3d. Its losses during the battle were 42 killed, and 151 wounded, the latter including many who had received their death wounds; also, 59 who were missing or captured. The total loss in the regiment aggregated 252. Lieuts. Henry I. Palmer and Lucius Mead were among the killed. Colonel Jackson was captured in the retreat through the town, but made his escape and rejoined the regiment on Cemetery Hill.

The regiment accompanied the Army of the Potomac in its pursuit of Lee and return to Virginia. In August it was stationed at Alexandria, Va., on detached service, but in September it rejoined the corps and proceeded by rail to Tennessee, the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps having been transferred to the Army of the Cumberland. On arriving at its destination the regiment encamped at Bridgeport, Ala. On October 28, 1863, it was present at the battle of Wauhatchie, Tenn., but not actively engaged, as Buschbeck's Brigade was held in reserve.

Colonel Coster resigned his commission, November 4, 1863, and Lieutenant Colonel Jackson, a gallant and accomplished soldier, was promoted to the vacancy. The regiment was actively engaged in the battles around Chattanooga, November 23-25, 1863. At this time it numbered only 9 officers and 175 men present in action. The winter of 1863-64 was passed in camp at Lookout Valley. Upon the organization of the Twentieth Corps — formed by the consolidation of the Eleventh and Twelfth — the regiment was assigned to Buschbeck's (Second) Brigade, of Geary's (Second) Division. This brigade included the following commands:

33d New Jersey	Col. George W. Mindil.
119th New York	Col. John T. Lockman.
134th New York	Col. Allan H. Jackson.
154th New York	Col. Patrick H. Jones.
27th Pennsylvania	Lieut. Col. August Riedt.
109th Pennsylvania	Capt. Fred. L. Gimber.
73d Pennsylvania	Maj. Charles C. Cresson.

Leaving camp on May 4, 1864, the regiment marched away southward with Sherman's army on the Atlanta campaign. On May 8th, the One hundred and thirty-fourth was prominently engaged at Mill Creek Gap, Ga., in the storming of Rocky Face Ridge. It behaved with conspicuous gallantry, the men climbing the rocky, precipitous slopes under fire, and planting their colors on the crest of the ridge. But the position was an untenable one, and the movement in this direction was abandoned. The regiment lost in this affair, 11 killed and 25 wounded. Capt. Edwin Forrest, a brave and efficient officer, was mortally wounded in the assault, and died a few days later in the hospital at Chattanooga. Among the killed was Sergt. George R. Payne of Company E; also, Corporals Walters and Frederick, all noncommissioned officers of more than ordinary merit, whose deaths were a sad loss to the regiment.

On May 15th, the regiment was engaged at the battle of Resaca, Ga., where it sustained further losses. On July 20th, it fought at Peach Tree Creek, Ga., where 25 more of its number were killed or wounded, Colonel Jackson among the latter. It was also under fire daily during the siege of Atlanta. The city was evacuated by Hood's Army, September 2, 1864, and the regiment, marching with the brigade, entered and took possession.

The next two months were passed quietly in camp at Atlanta, the usual details of men being furnished for picket duty and foraging. On November 15th the regiment started with Sherman's army on the March to the Sea. Pass-

ing through the villages of Decatur, Stone Mountain, Social Circle, and Madison, the brigade arrived at Milledgeville, Ga., on the 22d. Thence, and still "marching through Georgia," the route lay through Sandersville, Davisborough, and Speir's Station to Louisville, Ga., the brigade stopping by the way at times to assist in tearing up the track of the Georgia Central Railroad. On December 11th, the brigade arrived at a point on the Charleston & Savannah Railroad about three miles from Savannah, and near the river. During the siege which followed the regiment was actively engaged in moving from place to place part of the time under the fire of the enemy's artillery. The city was evacuated December 21st, and the regiment, in company with Geary's Division, entered the place. During the operations in front of Savannah the One hundred and thirty-fourth lost 17, killed and wounded. Lieuts. Charles A. Ahreets and L. O. Fox were among the killed.

Leaving Savannah January 27, 1865, Sherman's army started on its northward and homeward march through the Carolinas, arriving at Goldsborough, N. C., on March 25th. The regiment left Goldsborough April 10th, and marching to Raleigh remained in that vicinity, countermarching and foraging until the 30th, when it started for Washington. Passing through Richmond and the old battlefields of the Army of the Potomac, the Twentieth Corps arrived at Alexandria, Va., May 19th.

The regiment participated in the Grand Review at Washington May 24th, after which it was mustered out at Bladensburg, Md., June 10, 1865, and its long and honorable record was brought to a close.

[REDACTED]



J. B. LYON PRINT.

F. J. SEVERENCE, PHOTO.

136TH NEW YORK INFANTRY.

On the Taneytown Road, foot of Cemetery Hill, west side. On line held by Colonel Orland Smith's Brigade, of Steinwehr's Division, Eleventh Corps

(INSCRIPTIONS.)

(Front.)

136TH NEW YORK

INFANTRY,

2D BRIG. 2D DIV.

11TH CORPS.

(Reverse.)

TRANSFERRED TO

THE ARMY OF

THE CUMBERLAND

OCT. 1863.

(Left Side.)

MUSTERED IN

SEPT. 26, 1862.

MUSTERED OUT

JUNE 13, 1865.

RECRUITED IN

ALLEGANY, LIVINGSTON

AND WYOMING COUNTIES

NEW YORK

(Right Side.)

JULY 1, 2, 3,

1863.

CASUALTIES.

KILLED 17

WOUNDED 89

MISSING 3

TOTAL 109

DEDICATION OF MONUMENT.

136TH REGIMENT INFANTRY.

October 16, 1888.

ORATION BY GEN. JAMES WOOD.

COMRADES:

Let us rejoice that we see this day. Let us thank Almighty God, our Heavenly Father, that, under His protecting aegis we passed safely through the fatigues and dangers of a destructive war; that He has preserved our lives through the years that have followed, and shielded us from "the pestilence that walketh in darkness and the destruction that wasteth at noonday;" that we are permitted to assemble on this battlefield, where was fought a terrific and sanguinary battle, the fame of which has extended throughout the world — a battle which exerted a momentous influence on the destiny of this Nation — to dedicate this appropriate monument to the memory of the living and the dead of our own One hundred and thirty-sixth New York Regiment, a regiment which took an active and honorable part in this battle. Our thanks and gratitude are due, and are here fitly acknowledged to the State of which we have the honor to be citizens, proudly designated the Empire State in this great and glorious Union, for providing means for the erection of this monument on the ground held and defended by the regiment through the battle in which it fought and bled, to keep in lasting remembrance the valiant and meritorious services here rendered; to the Legislature, through whose instrumentality the necessary money was raised and appropriated; and to the patriotic men who proposed, and, by their influence and exertions, induced the Legislature to take favorable action to effectuate the purpose advocated by them; and to the commissioners appointed by the Legislature from among those who had held high office in the volunteer army of the United States, from our own State, to carry out the legislative purpose; for the skill, ability and zeal which they voluntarily devoted to the purpose for which they were appointed, and to whose active exertions we are largely indebted for the appropriate and artistic monument which we now dedicate.

This monument does not alone represent the magnanimity which the State of New York has exhibited to keep in lasting remembrance her sons, the honored dead, who fell on the battlefield of Gettysburg. The records of her legislature show that it appropriated \$20,000 to the "Gettysburg Memorial Association," to secure the ground on which the battle was fought, to mark out the positions held by the different commands which composed the Union army, to preserve the lines and lineaments of the battlefield, and to protect the monuments to be erected thereon; and \$1,500 for a monument to each separate command engaged in the battle. Let us not forget that the patriotism of the State is not represented by money only. She furnished for the armies of the United States to repress the Rebellion and uphold the government, 448,850 men, of whom there were engaged in this battle, ninety-two separate commands. She furnished more men for the army, appropriated more money to hand

down to posterity the memory of this battle, and erected more monuments on the battlefield, than any other State in the Union.

It is a high honor to have been among those who were engaged in this battle. It is a source of self-gratulation that we are the survivors of those who fought and died here, and of profound gratification that this monument will preserve and hand down to posterity the name of this regiment and the part which it bore in this battle; and it is a cheering and inspiring thought that, when our mortal lives shall be ended and we shall join our comrades who died here, this monument will hand down to future ages the name, history and services of our regiment; and, when the inscriptions on this monument are read, the patriotism, courage, suffering and sacrifices which helped to secure the victory that crowned this battle.

In this battle, of the troops from our State, 77 officers and 888 enlisted men were killed; 288 officers and 3,737 enlisted men were wounded; and 69 officers and 1,708 enlisted men captured or missing. There is abundant reason, therefore, why we should be proud of our comrades, living and dead, who participated in this battle,—proud of our State for the liberality and munificence which she has manifested towards them. This, the Empire State, is great in population, great in wealth, great in material resources, great in enlightenment; but greater in the men and money which she furnished to put down the Rebellion, and uphold the government, and in the generous and bounteous hand with which she has provided for the comfort of the survivors, and to perpetuate the memory of those who died.

We are reminded by this beautiful and magnificent National Cemetery, with its inspiring monuments, erected on the very ground occupied by us, and in which, after the battle, we buried our dead,—of the paternal care of the United States Government for those who died in its defence. Not only in this particular is this paternal regard manifested, but in the pensions that have been granted to those who suffer from wounds or from disease contracted in its military service, and to the widows and families of the dead for the loss of those on whom they relied for support. More than this! The surviving soldiers, under the rules and regulations of the government, are a favored class, and first to be remembered in the dispensation of the honors and official emoluments it has to bestow.

What prouder title can one have, to hand down to his children and those who come after him, than that he was a soldier in the gigantic War of the Rebellion; of whom it is recorded, that, when secession lifted its hydra head, and rebellion threatened the integrity of the Government and the perpetuity of the Union, he sprang to arms and voluntarily enrolled himself in the army raised for its defence, and boldly marched to the front to encounter danger and death. Do not your hearts, comrades, swell within you with thankfulness, when you reflect that you were such soldiers; that you belonged to the army that maintained the Government and saved the Union; and that it was your privilege and good fortune to take part in the battle which we now commemorate. And do you not feel a sense of superiority over those, who, from inability, or want of courage, or lack of patriotism, you left behind you? When this generation shall have passed away, and other generations shall

occupy their places and visit this battlefield, what more eloquent eulogy, what more fitting epitaph can they have, who sleep the last sleep beneath the green sod that lies above them, in yon cemetery, than is there inscribed in imperishable letters: "These are the soldiers of the Union army, who fought and fell on the bloody but victorious battlefield of Gettysburg?" And we, who survive this battle and the fatigues and dangers of the campaigns that followed,—do we not experience a feeling of exaltation and solemn joy when we reflect that we will be remembered when we are gone; that, on our tombstones, will be inscribed: "Here lies one who was a soldier in the One hundred and thirty-sixth Regiment;" and that our comrades, while living, and their descendants after them when they are gone, will, annually, chant requiems to our memory, and strew flowers over our graves? Let us rejoice, therefore, that we are here. Let us be glad that it is permitted us to take part in this dedication. Let us remember with reverential thoughts the dead who died here, and let us return to our homes with feelings subdued and chastened by the solemnity of the occasion; with renewed determination to discharge the obligations which rest on us as citizens of this great Union which we helped to preserve; and, to the best of our ability and influence, strive to make it now, and for all time, "the land of the free and the home of the brave."

What vivid recollections rush upon and fill our memories as we stand on this consecrated ground! The long and weary march from Stafford Court House, in the State of Virginia, which preceded the battle; the bivouac at Emmitsburg; the announcement from army headquarters that we were in the vicinity of the Rebel army, and that a great battle was impending; the fatiguing march on the hot, dusty, first day of July, to the battlefield; the booming of cannon towards the sound of which we marched, indicating that the battle was already opened; the announcement, which met us on our march, that the First Corps was in conflict with the enemy, and that General Reynolds had been killed; the order to hurry forward to reinforce the First Corps, then contending with overwhelming numbers; our arrival and taking position on the ground where this cemetery now is, covered by the graves of those who fell in the battle which followed; the full view of the conflict on yonder hills beyond Gettysburg; the rattle of musketry and the rapid discharge of artillery; the repulse and rout of the First and Third Divisions of the Eleventh Corps; the retreat of the First Corps, badly damaged and weakened, within our lines on Cemetery Ridge; the halting of the victorious enemy in Gettysburg Village; the display of the Second Division of the Eleventh Corps in column by company on Cemetery Hill, with Buford's Cavalry deployed in front, successfully deceiving the enemy as to the strength of our forces; the presence on the ground of General Hancock, who led us to anticipate an attack, by inquiring if this regiment was reliable; the arrival on the Emmitsburg Road of General Sickles, with the advanced guard of the Third Corps; the arrival of General Meade on the field; the cessation of the battle at about 5 o'clock, p. m.; the anxiety that was felt, and the urgency that was apparent for the concentration of the whole army.

The second day opens bright and fair. There is a lull along the opposing lines. All is anxious expectation. The rattle of musketry and the rapid dis-

charge of cannon tell us that the battle is raging on our left. The "Peach Orchard," the "Wheatfield" and "Little Round Top" are the scenes of the conflict. The attack upon our right, weakened by taking troops to reinforce the left; the success of the enemy in getting possession of our intrenchments on Culp's Hill; and the attack in the evening on the Eleventh Corps, so gallantly repulsed. Night closed the conflict. The Rebel attack is everywhere repulsed, our lines preserved, and Little Round Top saved. The enemy retires to his camp, discomfited and disheartened. The shouts of victory run along our lines. Thus ended the second day.

On the morning of the third day, the fight commences on our right. Word is brought into our lines from General Ewell that he will break our lines on our right, or perish in the attempt. His threat was an idle one. He makes the attempt. He is repulsed, driven out of the intrenchments he had taken the night before. Our lines are intact from right to left. All now understand that Lee will attack us, and make his most powerful effort to break our lines on Cemetery Ridge, and drive us from our position. Each side prepared for the conflict. All along Seminary Ridge are seen the enemy's batteries deployed. Opposing him, our artillery is in position along Cemetery Ridge. At 1 o'clock the discharge of a cannon near Gettysburg gives the signal, and the enemy's artillery opened all along their line. Our artillery replies. A most terrific cannonade, the recollection of which is burned in our memories, continues for two hours. Deadly missiles fill the air, and shells burst all around us. The fire of the enemy is concentrated on Cemetery Hill. Suddenly the firing on our side ceases, not because it was silenced, but by order. Lee's attacking columns then emerge from yon woods on Seminary Ridge. Gallantly they marched to the assault. Onward in battle array they come. Their ranks are riddled by grape shot and shells from our artillery which reopened, and bullets from the muskets of our infantry. The scene is awfully grand, magnificently sublime. The Rebels fall, as autumnal leaves fall from a forest tree, and cover the ground. In our mind's eye we see it now, as we saw it then. Memory vividly recalls it. I will not attempt to describe it. It is indelibly impressed on our minds. No one but those who participated in it, can appreciate this grand, awful and sublime scene. The final assault, the supreme effort of Lee's army was made and repulsed. The battle of Gettysburg was fought and won. But at what a sacrifice? Of the Union army 547 officers and 2,816 men were killed, 1,137 officers and 13,430 men wounded, and 182 officers and 5,253 men captured, mostly on the second day, making the total casualties 22,960. The Confederate casualties, as near as can be ascertained, were 2,592 killed, 12,706 wounded and 5,150 captured; total, 20,448. This, probably, does not cover the enemy's losses. From many of his commands, engaged in the battle, no report of casualties has been obtained. It is supposed that his losses were much greater. The records of the prisoners of war, on file in Washington, bear the names of 12,227 Confederate prisoners captured at and around Gettysburg, from July 1st to July 5th, inclusive.

The battle of Gettysburg was the culminating point of the Southern Rebellion. The Southern States never recovered from the shock of this defeat. The secession serpent was scotched, not killed. He still raised his crest and stood

at bay, and, for two years more, resisted the attacks of the Union army. But he was now put on the defensive, and gallantly resisted until worn out and exhausted.

This monument records the fact that the One hundred and thirty-sixth Regiment, in October following this battle, was transferred to the Army of the Cumberland, then operating against Bragg's army at Chattanooga, Tenn.

Vividly memory calls up and reproduces the marches we made and the battles we fought in that Southern campaign. The march down Lookout Valley; the night fight opposite Chattanooga; the successful assault upon the enemy posted on Smith's Hill; the battle above the clouds upon Lookout Mountain; the attack and defeat of the enemy on Missionary Ridge; the march to Knoxville and back; the Atlanta campaign; the bloody assault delivered at Resaca; the battles and conflicts at Dallas, Kolb's Farm, Gilgal Church, Kenesaw Mountain; the assault by, and defeat of Hood's army at Peach Tree Creek; the affair at Turner's Ferry; the capture of Atlanta; the March to the Sea; the capture of Savannah; the march through South and North Carolina, and the battle of Bentonville, the last battle of the war in which this regiment took part; the surrender of the armies under Lee and Johnston; the final suppression of the Rebellion; and the march through Virginia to Washington. Thus terminated the military career of the One hundred and thirty-sixth Regiment. Then the regiment was mustered out, with a reputation for good conduct, sound discipline and unflinching bravery, second to none in the army. The survivors went to their respective homes, and mingled with their families and friends in civil life, from whom they had been separated.

It was the good fortune of this regiment never to have met with a repulse. Although in many battles, it took no steps backward. During its services it never had, what is known in army circles as a soft place, where the men could wear white gloves and paper collars. It was always found in the front, where the two armies impinged, where the fighting was hottest and the danger deadliest. The blood of its fallen heroes is mingled with the soil of every State, from Maryland to Mississippi. The national cemeteries contain but few of the bodies of the dead of our regiment. Loving hands have removed them from the field where they fell, and from the hospitals where they died, to local cemeteries and graveyards, where their families resided, and where their relatives are buried. Wherever they lie, they are not forgotten.

" On Fame's eternal camping ground
Their silent tents are spread,
And Glory guards with solemn round,
The bivouac of the dead."

Though the Rebellion was conquered; though the result of the war redounded to the glory of the Union arms; though the doctrine of secession has, by the high and convincing argument of arms, been suppressed and condemned; though we devoted our aid and our services to preserve the Union, to conquer the armed force that endeavored to subvert it; though "grim-visaged war has smoothed his wrinkled front;" though the flag of the Union floats peacefully

over every foot of territory within the bounds of the United States; though through the length and breadth of our land prosperity seems to abound; and though life and liberty to all seem to be secure, yet, our duties as citizens and soldiers did not end with the war, and have not ended, after the lapse of twenty-five years, "in these piping times of peace." The stability of the government rests upon the intelligence, honesty and patriotism of the people, of which the volunteer soldiers form so large and influential a part. It is for us so to discharge the responsible duties of citizens as to preserve the peace; to cultivate fraternal feelings of good neighborhood and friendship with all the people in all the States. Those who wore the Confederate gray are no longer our enemies, but fellow citizens, entitled to kind and fraternal feelings. The passions and enmities created and fostered by the war should be forgotten and buried out of sight; so that whenever our Southern brethren shall come to this battlefield, and view this cemetery of the dead, and these monuments erected thereon, it will be with no feelings of mortified pride, or the resentful sentiments of a conquered people; but of lofty patriotism, rather, as they reflect upon the heroism displayed and bravery evinced by two highly organized and brave armies, composed of soldiers enrolled from a people of the same lineage, and same Nation; that the conflict of these armies did not grow out of any hostility or enmity of the North against the South, but was the mighty effort of our common government to hold all the states of the Union within its jurisdiction, and to prevent its disruption; and to compel those who attempted to overturn it, to come home, as it were, to their father's house and partake of the benefits of one common government, organized and administered by a united people. To foster this feeling, to prevent enmities and hostile rivalries between the different sections of our now united country, is a duty that belongs especially to the survivors of the armies of the Union that conquered the Rebellion. While they, here and elsewhere, dedicate monuments to the memory of their dead comrades, they should not forget that they should consecrate themselves to the sacred duty of fostering the preservation of peace, friendship and good feeling, with those whom they once regarded as Rebels and enemies, with whom they once had heroic combats in the deadly conflict of arms. The thoughts so forcibly and eloquently expressed by our martyred President, on these very grounds, in dedicating this cemetery to those who fell on this battlefield, speak in as impressive and admonitory tones now, to those who survive the war, as they did to those to whom they were addressed, while rebellion was still rampant.

While we, as survivors of the war, should be advocates of peace, fraternal feeling and good will among all the states, we should not forget the principles upon which the war was conducted, and in the prosecution of which the people of the North poured out their blood and treasure with an unstinted hand. The Southern States were slave states, and had been such from the foundation of the government. To protect this institution from the anti-slavery sentiment of the people of the Northern States, and their right to extend it into free territory, the Southern States seceded from the Union, and submitted the question of freedom or slavery to the arbitrament of arms. They were beaten in the contest. The result of the war abolished slavery. The constitu-

tion of the United States now provides "that neither slavery or involuntary servitude, except for crime, whereof the party shall be duly convicted, shall exist within the United States or in any place subject to their jurisdiction." Freedom prevails throughout the land. The sentiment contained in the Declaration of Independence that "all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,"—which, before the war, existed only in theory, by the war has become an accomplished fact.

The perpetuity of a republican form of government depends upon the enactment and strict enforcement of laws for the protection of the rights and liberty of each and every citizen of the state and nation. This government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed, and one of the most important rights that should be safely guarded and protected is the right of each and every citizen, on whom the right of suffrage is conferred, without hindrance or opposition to deposit his vote in the ballot-box at every election, and freely to express his choice in the selection of the officers of the government, and the principles by which the government should be guided and controlled. The provision of the constitution of the United States, that "the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States, or any State, on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude," should be sedulously enforced. Free and fair elections and an honest count are absolutely essential to the perpetuity of the government; and when, by law, or by the combinations of individuals, a class of citizens is prevented from voting, by reason of race, color or previous condition of servitude, or for any reason or for no reason, the very fundamental principle of the government is invaded, and its existence endangered. Such a wrong will prove a canker in the body politic, which will gradually eat into its very vitals and produce dissolution. If this wrong is allowed to prevail, then "the government of the people, for the people, and by the people," will, surely, surely, "perish from the earth."

We have experienced the dangers and horrors of war. We have seen the blood of our comrades poured out like water to prevent the disruption of the Union, and to "proclaim liberty throughout the land." Baptized in blood, we are clothed with the authority, and commissioned to be preachers and advocates of peace and universal freedom; and, while we dedicate this monument to the honored dead of our regiment, let us consecrate ourselves to the cause for which they died. Let us keep in view the necessity for the enforcement of all the laws, and the honor and prosperity of the whole country. Let us endeavor, by voice and influence, to propagate the doctrine of loyalty to the union of the states and its government. Let our principles and our works be seen and known of all men. Let us inscribe on our banner "The right guaranteed by the Constitution must and shall be protected." "The Government must and shall be maintained." "The Union must and shall be preserved." So shall our national standard remain untarnished and its galaxy of stars undiminished, increased rather, as time rolls on. In the language of that eminent statesman and eloquent senator, Daniel Webster,—“When our eyes shall be turned for the last time to behold the sun in the heavens, may we not again

see him shining on the broken and dishonored fragments of a once glorious Union; on states dissevered, discordant, belligerent; on a land rent with civil commotions and drenched in fraternal blood. Let the last lingering glance rather behold the gorgeous ensign of the Republic, now known and honored throughout the world, still full high advanced, its arms and trophies streaming in their original lustre, not a stripe erased or polluted, not a single star obscured, bearing for its motto, everywhere spread all over in characters of living light, blazing on all its ample folds, as they float over the sea and over the land, in every wind under the whole heavens, now so dear to every American heart, *'Liberty and union, now and forever, one and inseparable.'*"

ADDRESS OF CLINTON H. MINER, PRESIDENT OF THE REGIMENTAL ASSOCIATION.

GENERAL:

Speaking for the Survivors' Association of the One hundred and thirty-sixth New York, I accept, and, in accepting, return to you and through you to your committee our warmest thanks for your labors, the result of which stands before us in the form of this beautiful monument which you have in such appropriate words presented; and as we look upon this memorial we can but feel a glow of pride in our own beloved commonwealth, the glorious Empire State, whose munificence has enabled not only our association, but every one of her organizations, who fought upon this sanguinary field, to appropriately mark the scene of their struggle, and to rear an imposing memorial to the memory of loved comrades who here died that liberty might live.

My comrades, standing upon this consecrated spot, consecrated by the blood of our brothers in arms, standing before this monument reverently as before an altar, we almost seem to hear the command given to Moses, "Put off thy shoes, for the place whereon thou standest is holy ground." And standing here how almost impossible it seems to speak of the present. What a flood of memories of the great yesterday here, sweep in upon us and crowd out the thoughts and events of to-day.

We see again that band of 500 stalwart, vigorous young men, pushing swiftly, eagerly to the front, where the booming of cannon, the sharp rattle of musketry, betokens that the battle is on once more.

They reach the brow of this eminence when suddenly, from the summit of yonder ridge, there bursts upon their vision the grand, the terrible panorama of battle. We see them take their position here, a position that through the rain of shot and shell of that terrible three days, "when cannon to the right of them, cannon to the left of them, cannon all around them volleyed and thundered," they maintained without faltering, but not without terrible cost, as the records upon this monument and the names and numbers upon headstones in yonder beautiful cemetery amply prove. We think and speak of other fields, where this our band of patriots won other laurels, but not as we think and speak of Gettysburg, for was it not here that rebellion reached its

flood tide, and bursting in mad fury upon this rock-ribbed ridge, was dashed into fragments and hurled back in the bitterness of defeat?

Was it not here that loyal and patriotic valor said to the flood of treason, "thus far but no farther, and here shall thy proud wave be stayed?" And is it not here that heart-strings centre, running out from homes scattered all over this fair land? Is it not here that the loyal American makes pious pilgrimage, and bowing at this consecrated shrine, is made stronger in his love of and devotion to his country? But we may not linger, and with numbers decimated our band of patriots pass on—some to die on other fields, many to suffer from terrible wounds, many more to succumb to sickness, until with ranks sadly thinned, their glad eyes behold the dawn of peace.

And to-day, after a lapse of a quarter of a century, my comrades, we gather here again, a shorter line 'tis true, than when last we held the Taneytown Road, but patriots still. Some of our number too widely scattered, some too feeble, some too poor to gather here, while many for whom the burden of life had grown all too heavy, have gladly laid it down and entered "that low, green tent, whose curtains never outward swing,"—where peacefully they await the bugle call of the last great reveille. And we are here the same, yet not the same. In place of those stalwart young men who twenty-five years ago marched over yonder ridge, strong to do and dare, aye, and die for country, we have come, a handful of men grown old and weary before their time, men whose locks are whitening for the grave, whose spirits laugh at the lengthening shadows of their years.

We are here to lovingly remember the comrades who fell, to dedicate to their memory this beautiful monument, to add one more to the long line of memorial stones which shall say to those who shall come after us, that here men died for country.

HISTORICAL SKETCH.

In the summer of 1862 the President of the United States called for "300,000 more" troops to suppress the Great Rebellion. This call met with a prompt response throughout the entire North. In the State of New York regiments were raised in each senatorial district. In the Thirtieth District, comprising the counties of Allegany, Livingston, and Wyoming, 1,000 patriotic young men rendezvoused at Portage where a regiment was quickly organized, which was designated by the state authorities as the One hundred and thirty-sixth New York Volunteers. It was mustered into the service of the United States on September 26, 1862, with the following field officers in command:

James Wood, Jr.,	Colonel,
Lester B. Faulkner,	Lieutenant Colonel,
David C. Hartshorn,	Major.

Leaving Portage October 2, 1862, the regiment moved to Virginia, where it was assigned to Smith's (Second) Brigade, Steinwehr's (Second) Division, Eleventh Corps, then encamped in the vicinity of Fairfax Court House. Its first experience under fire occurred at Chancellorsville, where it sustained a slight loss. It was not actively engaged in this battle, for the brigade, then

under command of Gen. F. C. Barlow, was absent on a reconnaissance at the time the Eleventh Corps was attacked. After the battle the regiment returned to its camp near Brooke's Station, on the Aquia Creek Railroad.

Remaining in camp about six weeks it started, June 12, 1863, on the Gettysburg campaign. After a series of long and toilsome marches the regiment arrived at Emmitsburg, Md., on June 29th, having marched twenty-two miles that day, and thirty-eight miles within the preceding twenty-four and one-half hours, over roads heavy with mud and rain, and blocked with wagon trains. Leaving Boonsboro Gap at 4:40 p. m., on Sunday, June 28th, and moving by way of Frederick, the column arrived at Emmitsburg at 5 p. m., on the 29th, having accomplished this remarkable march of thirty-eight miles without any straggling or murmurs of complaint. On the 30th there was a general muster of the army, at which the One hundred and thirty-sixth reported 23 officers and 529 men present for duty, including noncombatants.

On July 1st, the Eleventh Corps was ordered to Gettysburg, pursuant to a plan for a concentration of the left wing of the army at that point. The corps started in the morning, with Col. Orland Smith's Brigade—to which the One hundred and thirty-sixth New York belonged—bringing up the rear. This brigade was then composed of the following regiments:

33d Massachusetts	Col. A. B. Underwood,
136th New York	Col. James Wood, Jr.,
55th Ohio	Col. Charles B. Gambee,
73d Ohio	Lieut. Col. Richard Long.

On arriving at Gettysburg, General Steinwehr, the division commander, halted the brigade and formed it in line of battle, by battalions in mass, in rear of Cemetery Hill, the rest of the corps, except Wiedrich's Battery, having passed through the town and engaged the enemy in the open fields on the farther side. Smith's Brigade advanced through the cemetery to the front of the hill overlooking Gettysburg, from which position it was apparent that the Union troops—First and Eleventh Corps—were retreating, and falling back through the streets to Cemetery Hill. Colonel Smith placed his four regiments so as to resist any attack which might be made on the hill. But the long line of the brigade, with its waving colors and resolute appearance, caused the Confederate generals to hesitate until the opportunity for a successful attack was lost.

Smith's Brigade held this very important and exposed position at the base of Cemetery Hill during the fighting of the two succeeding days. The One hundred and thirty-sixth New York was on the left, where it held the extreme left of the Eleventh Corps line, and joined the right of the Second Corps. It lay along the Taneytown Road behind a stone wall that bounded the west side of the road, and at the base of the western slope of Cemetery Hill, from whose crest the Union batteries at times delivered a heavy fire over the regiment. From his position on the Taneytown Road, which at this point is very near the Emmitsburg Road, Colonel Wood sent out most of his men as skirmishers and sharpshooters who, during the second and third days' fighting, were subject to a continuous and deadly fire from the Confederate sharpshooters who occupied positions at close range. Some of the men of the One

hundred and thirty-sixth occupied houses in the outskirts of Gettysburg, the line of the Eleventh Corps running along the eastern edge of the town. This skirmishing and sharpshooting was so active and continuous that the regiment, without participating in any other fighting, lost 106 men killed and wounded during the second and third days. Some of these casualties occurred in the great cannonade which, on the third day, preceded Longstreet's assault on the Second Corps. Many of the Confederate gunners directed their fire against the Union batteries on West Cemetery Hill which, in turn, were firing over the heads of the men in the One hundred and thirty-sixth.

After Gettysburg the regiment participated in the pursuit of Lee's retreating army, and with its corps returned to Virginia. In September (1863) the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps were ordered to Tennessee to relieve General Rosecrans' army which was then shut up in Chattanooga without any line of supplies. Arriving in Tennessee the regiment was placed on guard duty along the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, between Anderson and Tanton. On October 26th it was relieved, and rejoined the brigade at Bridgeport. On the 28th it was engaged in the famous midnight battle at Wauhatchie, where the brigade marched to the relief of Geary's Division of the Twelfth Corps, but encountered the enemy on the way, the Confederate brigade of General Law — Hood's Division, Longstreet's Corps — having occupied a high hill that commanded the road. Under orders from General Steinwehr, three regiments of Smith's Brigade, numbering in all about 700 muskets, charged up the steep declivity in the darkness. They had received orders not to fire, but to use the bayonet only. The five Confederate regiments under Law, about 1,800 strong, abandoned the crest of the hill after a brief resistance, leaving the line of their retreat strewn with rifles, swords, hats, caps, and haversacks.

In the following month, on November 23d, the regiment was engaged in the battle of Missionary Ridge near Chattanooga, Tenn., in which Lieut. Charles F. Tresser was mortally wounded. It then marched with the Eleventh Corps to the relief of Burnside's army, which was besieged at Knoxville, Tenn. This was a long march, during which the men suffered for lack of tents and blankets, and were obliged to forage on the country through which they passed for rations and subsistence. One man died from exposure. The corps returned to Chattanooga on December 17th, and the men reoccupied their former camp in Lookout Valley, where they remained during the winter.

In April, 1864, the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps were consolidated, forming a new corps, the Twentieth, the command of which was given to Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker. Under this arrangement the regiment was placed in the Third Brigade, Third Division. The brigade, which was commanded by Colonel Wood, of the One hundred and thirty-sixth New York, was composed of the following commands:

20th Connecticut,	Col. Samuel Ross,
33d Massachusetts,	Lieut. Col. Godfrey Rider,
136th New York,	Lieut. Col. Lester B. Faulkner,
55th Ohio,	Col. Charles B. Gambee,
73d Ohio,	Maj. Samuel H. Hurst,
26th Wisconsin,	Lieut. Col. Fred. C. Winkler.

The division was commanded by Maj. Gen. Daniel Butterfield, formerly chief of staff, Army of the Potomac.

Breaking camp on May 1, 1864, the regiment started with Sherman's army on the Atlanta campaign. With faces turned southward the men commenced the long victorious march on which there was to be no retracing of their footsteps. The enemy's forces were first encountered at Buzzard Roost and Rocky Face Gap, Ga. They were driven from their position, an action in which the One hundred and thirty-sixth participated, but with slight loss.

On May 15, 1864, the regiment was actively engaged at the battle of Resaca, Ga., in which it sustained a loss of eighty-one in killed and wounded. In this battle Butterfield's Division captured a battery of four brass Napoleon guns,— twelve-pounders. After daily skirmishes, the principal ones occurring at Cassville, Dallas, New Hope Church, Kenesaw Mountain, Pine Knob, Lost Mountain, and other localities, in some of which the fighting involved the whole regiment, the division found itself in position July 20th, at Peach Tree Creek. Here the line of the Twentieth Corps was attacked by the Confederate army under General Hood, which made repeated and desperate assaults on the Union position, only to be repulsed with terrible loss. The men of the One hundred and thirty-sixth bore an honorable part in this battle, during which one of their number, Priv. Dennis Buckley, of Company G, captured the battle flag of the Thirty-first Mississippi, knocking down the Confederate color bearer with the butt of his musket and wrenching the colors from his grasp. While Buckley was waving the captured flag defiantly at the ranks of the enemy a bullet fired at him struck the flagstaff, glanced, and hit him in the forehead, killing him instantly. A year or more after the war closed the War Department gave a Medal of Honor to be delivered to the mother of Dennis Buckley, in recognition of his heroism at the battle of Peach Tree Creek and the capture by him of one of the enemy's flags.

On the morning of July 22d the brigade advanced within two miles of Atlanta, where it occupied various positions during the siege that followed. For six weeks the One hundred and thirty-sixth lay in the trenches before the city under fire daily, many of the men being killed or wounded while in the works, which, towards the close of the siege, were advanced to within close range of the enemy's lines. The Confederate troops evacuated Atlanta during the night on September 1st, and the Twentieth Corps, now under command of General Slocum, entered the city and took possession. "Atlanta was ours, and fairly won."

With the occupation of the city came a period of rest and quiet for ten weeks, a pleasing respite from the privations and dangers of the previous campaign. On November 15, 1864, refreshed and strengthened by its stay at Atlanta, the regiment started with Sherman's army on the March to the Sea. The corps was under the command of Gen. A. S. Williams, General Slocum having been placed in command of the left wing which, composed of the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps, was designated the Army of Georgia. The division was commanded by Gen. William T. Ward, who had succeeded General Butterfield, while on the Atlanta campaign; the regiment was under Lieutenant Colonel Faulkner.

The army arrived at Savannah, December 11, 1864, and immediately laid siege to the city, which was evacuated on the 21st.

After a month's stay at Savannah the army started northward January 16, 1865, on the campaign of the Carolinas, arriving at Goldsborough, N. C., on March 24th, after a march of 454 miles, part of which was made over difficult roads and over many rivers and swamps, some of which had to be waded through. In crossing the Edisto River the men waded half a mile in water from twelve to thirty-six inches deep. Skirmishing with the enemy was a frequent occurrence, while a general engagement with Johnston's army occurred at Averasborough, N. C., March 16, 1865, and at Bentonville, N. C., March 19-21, 1865. In the fighting at Bentonville, Maj. H. L. Arnold, who was in command of the regiment, was severely wounded. During the campaign in the Carolinas the brigade was commanded by Gen. William Cogswell, formerly colonel of the Second Massachusetts, an able and fearless officer.

Leaving its camp near Goldsborough, N. C., on April 10th, the regiment started on its last, homeward march. Passing through Richmond, Va., May 11th, and then the battlefields of Chancellorsville and Spotsylvania, it arrived at Alexandria on the 19th. On the 24th it marched proudly in the final Grand Review at Washington, and thence out the Bladensburg Pike, where it encamped while waiting for its muster out.



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
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**THE CAMPAIGN
OF
CHANCELLORSVILLE**

THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

A STRATEGIC AND
TACTICAL STUDY

BY
JOHN BIGELOW, JR.

MAJOR U. S. ARMY, RETIRED

AUTHOR OF "MARS-LA-TOUR AND GRAVELOTTE," "THE PRINCIPLES
OF STRATEGY," AND "REMINISCENCES OF THE
SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN "

WITH MAPS AND PLANS



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LONDON: HENRY FROWDE
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PREFACE

IN the summer of 1894 I was assigned by the government to serve as Professor of Military Science and Tactics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In the discharge of this duty I selected the campaign of Chancellorsville as the theme for a course of lectures to my classes. I made this selection because that campaign presented a greater variety of military problems and experiences than any other in which an army of the United States had taken part. In no other was there so rapid a succession of critical situations. Moreover, no other one, approaching it in importance, has been so imperfectly apprehended and described.

Its richness in military lessons warranted, in my judgment, a certain minuteness of detail in describing it; and the wealth of original matter rendered available by the official publication of the records of the Civil War has enabled me to realize this feature of the work. It is safe to say that no war that has been fought admits of such thorough investigation as our Civil War, for on no other has the light of such a mass of contemporaneous dispatches, orders, reports, and other documents, been shed. My object in describing the campaign has been not only to tell what was done, but also to show how it was done, to present a characteristic, or typical, view of the conditions and methods of troop-leading that obtained during our Civil War. By its variety of problems and solutions this single campaign affords the instruction of several campaigns, without requiring the reader to learn the organization, names of commanders, etc., of more than two opposing armies, or to familiarize himself with more than one theater of operations.

It is a common fault of military narration to fail to give the mental point of view and field of vision of the opposing commanders. I have sought especially to keep the reader informed as to how much or how little each commander knew about the tactical or strategic situation. In giving a commander's impressions, expectations, or intentions, I have, as far as possible, used his own words written or spoken at the time,

well knowing how difficult it is to paraphrase with absolute fidelity, and how unreliable are the commander's own words after the event. Military dispatches conjure up the mental impressions of the commanders. They reveal the working of minds under the trying conditions of the march and battle, and so present a realistic view of the intellectual side of war. Those that I have cited in this work are not all models of their kind. Many of them are examples to be shunned rather than copied. But as studies in form and style as well as in matter, they may prove a help to any one trying to perfect himself in the art of military correspondence.

One of the most important qualifications of a commander is the ability to sift the truth from conflicting rumors and reports, and deduce therefrom the dispositions, movements, and intentions of the enemy. The reader who may wish to test or perfect himself in this regard should occasionally pause to put his own construction on bits of information about the enemy, and consider what he would have done in the position of a particular commander. As a rule, he should not criticize without amending. Purely analytical criticism is easy, but comparatively unprofitable. Criticism should be positive rather than negative, synthetic rather than analytical. Where a plan or a movement seems faulty, a correct one should be substituted for it.

My work is divided into two parts. Part I, entitled *The Period of Preparation*, covers the time from the appointment of General Hooker as Commander of the Army of the Potomac, January 25, 1863, to the issuing of orders for the movement of the army, April 26, 1863. It treats of the reorganization and general improvement of the army preparatory to the campaign; of the scouts, raids, and forays of Mosby and Fitzhugh Lee; of the first battle of Kelley's Ford, and of other minor operations. Part II, entitled *The Period of Operation*, describes the march to Chancellorsville; the marching and fighting in the Wilderness; Sedgwick's attempt to march to Chancellorsville, including the battles of Marye's Heights and Salem Church; Stoneman's raid against Lee's communications; and Jones and Imboden's raid against the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.

Account is taken of the operations on and near the Peninsula of Virginia, so far as they seem to affect the situation of the main armies, and of the services of the navy in supporting the army on the Rappahannock, the James, and the York Rivers. From the issuing of the first order for

the movement of the Army of the Potomac, April 26, to the recrossing of the Rappahannock, May 6, the operations of the forces on both sides are described and discussed day by day.

In the Civil War the term *picket* was applied to a sentinel on outpost and to portions of an outpost in general; a *section* of artillery comprised two pieces instead of one as at present; a *rifle-pit* was what is now called a shelter trench. I have made some use of these terms, retaining for them, unless otherwise indicated, the meaning that they had in the Civil War. Certain geographical names of the theater of operations are variously spelled. To avoid the ambiguity that might result from such variety, I have adopted an orthography of my own, and have taken the liberty in my quotations of making the geographical names conform thereto. In doing this I make no pretension of determining the most correct form of spelling considered etymologically, historically, or otherwise.

I have tried to provide the reader with such maps as he will need, but am aware that I have not made his way a royal road. There is no comfortable way of reading military history. Whoever expects to follow a campaign reclining in an easy chair with a book in one hand and a cigar in the other is doomed to disappointment.

Should the map illustration seem anywhere insufficient, I would recommend that the reader represent the troop units by pieces of paper with pins put through them (fig. 1), and move them about on the map to correspond to the changes of position. Steel pins with glass heads seem to be the best for this purpose. Similar contrivances may be used for the representation of signal stations and military bridges, which should be moved about or put down and taken up in accordance with the narrative.




Fig. 1.

Map 1, The Theater of Operation, is traced and compiled from the Atlas of the published records of the war. Maps 2-5 and 7-10 are similarly obtained from maps of the Geological Survey, corrected according to contemporary maps for roads and other artificial features. Maps 11-39 are traced from the maps of General Michler made in 1867, as originally published in separate sheets entitled Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, The Wilderness. My maps are amplified according to various others, but especially those of Captain Hotchkiss as published in *Chancellorsville*, by Hotchkiss and Allan.

The correspondence of the campaign of Chancellorsville comprised in the official publication of the *Records* is contained for the greater part in Volume 40 (serial number). For documents taken from the body of this volume I usually give no references. For those taken from the supplement, or from other volumes, or from other works, I have tried to refer the reader to book and page. The official reports of the commanders are contained in Volume 39 of the *Records*. Other volumes of the *Records* which may interest students of the campaign of Chancellorsville are Nos. 26, 107, and 108. For the operations of the navy, Volumes 5 and 8 of the *Naval War Records* have been largely drawn upon.

The following illustrations will serve to explain a system of notation which I have used in the text and on the maps:

- $\frac{143}{2.1.1}$ 143d (Pennsylvania) Regiment, 2d Brigade, 3d Division, 1st Corps.¹
- $\frac{1}{2.6}$ 1st Brigade, 2d Division, Cavalry Corps (Federal).
- $\frac{3}{2.6}$ 3d (Virginia) Regiment, 2d Brigade, Cavalry Division (Confederate).¹
- $\frac{2.3}{1.11}$ 2d and 3d Brigades, 1st Division, 2d Corps.
- $\frac{7}{1.2.11}$ 7th (Ohio) Regiment, 1st Brigade, 2d Division, 12th Corps.¹
2. III Belonging to 2d Division, 3d Corps.
- $\frac{2}{1.61}$ 2d Brigade (or battery), 1st Division, 6th Corps.
- $\frac{2}{21}$ 2d Division (or battery, Corps Artillery), 11th Corps.²
- A General Artillery Reserve.

In giving references, I use the following abbreviations:

W. R.—The War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, War Department. Volumes of this work are designated by their serial numbers.

Naval W. R.—Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion, Navy Department.

Rep. of Com.—Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War at the Second Session, Thirty-eighth Congress.

B. and L.—Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (The Century Company).

¹ The regiments are designated by number only. The state may be determined by referring to the Statement of Organization published in the *War Records*, Vol. 39, pp. 156, 789.

² The batteries are designated by the numbers given them serially in the Statements of Artillery, *Appendix 11*, to which the reader is referred for states and other designations.

Besides the works above mentioned, I have freely consulted the histories of the campaign of Chancellorsville by Hotchkiss and Allan, T. A. Dodge, S. P. Bates, and A. C. Hamlin. Other sources of information, including periodicals and manuscripts, will be found recognized in the body of the work.

My acknowledgments for courtesies and assistance are due to Major-General George B. Davis, Judge-Advocate-General of the Army, and to his successor in charge of the *War Records* of the Army, Major-General George W. Davis, and to Professor E. K. Rawson, U. S. Navy, Superintendent of the *Naval War Records*.

I wish to express my deep obligation to Mr. J. W. Kirkley of the Army Board of Publication, for providing me with documents, extracts, and compilations, and especially for giving me the benefit of his expert knowledge in interpreting obscure passages and doubtful figures. My labors were the lighter for privileges accorded me by the late Justin Winsor, librarian of Harvard University, and for free access to the valuable collection of books, manuscripts, maps, etc., relating to the Civil War, contained in the libraries of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts and of the Boston Commandery of the Loyal Legion of the United States. Valuable suggestions and information were furnished me by General Luther Stephenson of Hingham Center and Colonel T. L. Livermore of Boston. For important data on the artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia, I am indebted to the following officers of that army: Colonel T. H. Carter, General E. P. Alexander, Captain W. G. McCabe, Major Robert Stiles, Colonel H. P. Jones, Captain S. V. Southall, Colonel R. P. Chew, Colonel D. G. McIntosh, Colonel D. M. Cardwell, Colonel John C. Haskell, and Colonel J. B. Richardson.

As a stranger in Fredericksburg I was assisted in familiarizing myself with the theater of operations, and enlightened on the operations themselves, by Colonel Charles Richardson and Captain S. J. Quinn. Among the other officers of the Confederate army to whom I am indebted for suggestion and information are: General John Gill, Colonel T. T. Munford, Colonel W. H. Taylor, Captain F. M. Colston, Captain W. W. Chamberlaine, Captain R. E. Park, and Captain R. J. Barton.

With the highest appreciation of the services rendered me by each of these gentlemen, I would express my particular indebtedness to Colonel W. R. Livermore of the Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, for invaluable suggestions on the plan, and comments on my execution, of this work;

for accommodating me with copies of the Michler maps, now quite rare, as well as the Geological Survey maps; and for placing at my disposal his notes on the campaign, and a series of drawings, the result of his painstaking research and masterly calculation, showing the positions of troops at successive stages of the operations that I describe.

Las Delicias,
Newport, September 19, 1909.

PART I

PERIOD OF PREPARATION

THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

CHAPTER I

THE GENERAL SITUATION. A CHANGE OF COMMANDERS.
CERTAIN PROMINENT OFFICERS

BY the end of the year 1862 our Civil War had lasted a year and nearly nine months. In this time the North had wrested from the South the border states of Kentucky and Tennessee, and secured the possession of the Mississippi River. But while these advantages were gained in the West no corresponding progress was made by the Federal forces in the East. The Army of the Potomac, under General Burnside, lay checkmated by the Army of Northern Virginia, under General Lee, on the bank of the Rappahannock, not a good day's march across the frontier formed by the Potomac River. The Federal navy had the whole seacoast of the Confederacy under blockade, but on the high seas the Confederate cruisers were making havoc of the Northern merchant marine; and beyond the seas the agents of the Confederate government had anticipated the North in enlisting the sympathies of the ruling and influential classes of European countries. At the same time a formidable anti-war or peace party in the North was causing serious embarrassment to the Federal administration. Such was the situation when, on the 1st of January, 1863, Abraham Lincoln, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, issued his Proclamation of Emancipation, giving freedom to the slaves of secession masters. Although officially a war measure, this act was generally hailed in Europe and in America as a philanthropic one, and made for the President and his administration a small number of enemies or critics and myriads of friends. Its influence abroad was decisive in turning the tide of sympathy from South to North.

In the prosecution of the war each section had both a political and a military end to attain. Secession being an accomplished fact, the political object of the South was the vindication of its sovereignty, or the securing of recognition as a nation; that of the North was the restora-

tion of the Union. The military object of the South was the defence of its territory, and that of the North the conquest of the South. The South, and perhaps the North, did not realize what a blow at European recognition was struck by the Emancipation Proclamation. The popular sympathy which it awakened for the North made it practically impossible for any European government openly to side with the South. But there was danger of individuals, with the connivance perhaps of their governments, fitting out and manning Confederate vessels of war, and subscribing to Confederate loans. During the month of January the Confederate government conceived the plan of supplying means of carrying on the war by floating a European loan of about \$15,000,000. This plan depended for its success upon the military prestige of the Confederacy.

Burnside's bloody repulse at Fredericksburg and the criticism which it evoked led him to tender his resignation as commander of the Army of the Potomac. The President accepted it, and charged himself with the task of appointing as Burnside's successor a commander who should retrieve the disaster of Fredericksburg, and give confidence to people both at home and abroad whose hearts were with the North. After carefully considering all the eligible officers and thoroughly discussing, with his cabinet, their military and political records, he settled upon one of them as apparently the best qualified to meet these requirements; on the 25th of January, 1863, a general order from the War Department announced to the armies of the United States that Major-General A. E. Burnside was, at his own request, relieved from command of the Army of the Potomac, and Major-General "J. Hooker" appointed in his stead.

Joseph Hooker was born of old Puritan stock in Hadley, Mass., on the 13th of November, 1814. His youth gave no indications of a military destiny. It is said that he was intended for the church. Graduating from the U. S. Military Academy at West Point in 1837, he became a commissioned officer in the artillery. He served with distinction in the Mexican War from 1846 to 1848. For a period of about two years (1850, 1851) he was in California as assistant adjutant-general of the Pacific Division. He afterward received a two years' leave of absence; at the end of that time, or in 1853, being unable to reconcile his energetic and ambitious nature to inactive service and slow promotion, and experiencing perhaps an attack of the "California fever," he resigned his commission as an officer of the army, purchased a mile of land in Sonoma County, improved it by substantial inclosures, and tilled the soil, laboring with his own hands. In this enterprise he was not very successful. The living that he made by it was a precarious one. In 1853 he was appointed road overseer of the county, and for two years he held the office of superintendent of military roads in Oregon. In 1859, expecting the war cloud soon to burst, he became the colonel of a

regiment of California militia. When in 1861 his expectation of war was realized, he found himself pecuniarily involved through his indorsement of notes for friends, and reduced to such poverty that he could not pay his way to the Atlantic coast. As he expressed an earnest desire to resume his connection with the army, his friends subscribed the necessary funds, to the amount of \$1000, and sent him to Washington.

Hooker was no politician and was addicted to criticizing his military superiors. This propensity had nearly caused his dismissal from the Military Academy at West Point. In the Mexican War he had allowed himself to criticize General Winfield Scott, which brought upon him that general's lifelong enmity. Scott being now in command of the army, Hooker was allowed to kick his heels in the anterooms of the War Department.

He witnessed the first battle of Bull Run without participating in it. In an interview which he had soon afterward with President Lincoln, having been presented to him as Captain Hooker, he said:

"Mr. President, I am not 'Captain' Hooker, but was once Lieutenant-Colonel Hooker of the regular army. I was lately a farmer in California, but since the Rebellion broke out I have been here trying to get into the service, and I find that I am not wanted. I am about to return home, but before going I was anxious to pay my respects to you, and to express my wishes for your personal welfare and success in quelling this Rebellion. And I want to say one word more," seeing that the President was about to speak. "I was at Bull Run the other day, Mr. President, and it is no vanity in me to say that I am a d—— sight better general than any you had on that field."

Hooker was at once made a brigadier-general of volunteers. He was one of the first appointments to that grade, his commission dating from May 17, 1861. In 1862 he was given the command of the Second Division, III Army Corps, Army of the Potomac. He fought as division commander through the Peninsula campaign; as corps commander, in the Antietam campaign; and as commander of the Center Grand Division, constituting about one third of the Army of the Potomac, in the Fredericksburg campaign.¹

In person Hooker was about six feet tall, well proportioned, and soldierly in bearing. His features were clear cut, and handsome, but for a rather weak chin. He had a slight fringe of side whiskers, a rosy complexion, as delicate as a woman's, abundant blond or sandy hair, and great speaking gray or steel-blue eyes. He was spoken of as the handsomest man in the army.² Though of Puritan stock, he had

¹ *San Francisco Chronicle*, Nov. 1, 1879; *Appletons' Cyclopædia of American Biography*; *Circular No. 16*, 1903, *Thirteenth Mass. Regiment Assoc.*

² *Memoirs of Henry Villard*, I, 347, 348; *Obituary of J. W. de Peyster*, by "Anchor," New York, 1881; *General Hancock*, by General Francis A. Walker, p. 73.

in his temperament more of the cavalier than of the roundhead. He at times precipitated an engagement when he should not have done so, and had not the great qualities necessary to lead or direct an army of over 100,000 men. Up to a certain point of responsibility which he had not yet reached, he was capable of brilliant achievement, but at that point, if he reached it, he would break down. He was more mortified than gratified at being known both in and out of the army as Fighting Joe Hooker. "It sounds to me like Fighting Fool," he once said. "People," he used to say, "will think I am a highwayman or a bandit."¹ How he came by this distasteful sobriquet is thus told by one of the chief actors in the incident, the proof-reader of the *New York Courier and Enquirer*:

It was three o'clock in the morning . . . McClellan had come to grips with the Confederate forces, and was pressing them back upon Richmond. Every two or three hours through the night had come from the Associated Press Reporters' Agency sheets of manifold, that is, tissue paper upon which a dozen sheets (by the use of carbon sheets interleaved) could be written at once—one for each newspaper. These sheets told of desperate fighting all along McClellan's line. Among his Corps Commanders was General Hooker, whose command had been perhaps too gravely engaged.

Just as the forms—indeed the last form, was being locked, that is, the type firmly held together in a great frame that the impression might be taken for printing, came another dispatch from the reporters with the Union army. It was a continuation of the report of the fighting in which General Hooker's Corps had been so gravely involved. At the top was written "Fighting—Joe Hooker." I knew that this was so written to indicate that it should be added to what we had had before. The compositor (typesetter) who had set it up (put it in type) had known nothing about the previous matter, however, and had set it up as a heading, "FIGHTING JOE HOOKER."

I rapidly considered what to do; as if it were yesterday I can remember the responsibility I felt and how the thing struck me. Well, I said to myself, it makes a good heading—let it go. I fully realized that if a few other proof-readers beside myself acted as I did it would mean that Hooker would thenceforth live and die as "Fighting Joe Hooker." Some did and some did not, but enough did as I did to do the business. (Sidney V. Lowell, Brooklyn, N. Y.)²

Hooker's reputation for courage and his soldierly appearance made him more or less of a hero to the rank and file, but among the higher officers who had grown up in the service with him, and judged him critically, he was not generally admired. He had bitterly denounced Lincoln as an incompetent, and suggested that the safety of the government required a military dictator, and he was accused of having failed

¹ Circular No. 16, 1903, *Thirteenth Mass. Reg. Assoc.; Men and Things I Saw in Civil War Days*, by J. F. Rusling, p. 54; Hooker's Comments on Chancellorsville, B. and L., III, 217. This and other incidents of Hooker's career will be found in *Harper's Monthly*, Vol. 31, pp. 639-645.

² Manuscript in possession of the author.

to give Burnside honest support in the Fredericksburg campaign.¹ His appointment was not received with enthusiasm except by the men of his old division.² The day before his appointment his predecessor recommended him to the President for dismissal from the army on the grounds set forth in the following draft of an order to be issued from the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac:

General Joseph Hooker, major-general of volunteers and brigadier-general U. S. Army, having been guilty of unjust and unnecessary criticism of the actions of his superior officers, and of the authorities, and having by the general tone of his conversation endeavored to create distrust in the minds of officers who have associated with him, and having, by omissions and otherwise, made reports and statements which were calculated to create incorrect impressions, and for habitually speaking in disparaging terms of other officers, is hereby dismissed the service of the United States as a man unfit to hold an important commission during a crisis like the present, when so much patience, charity, confidence, consideration, and patriotism are due from every soldier in the field. This order is issued subject to the approval of the President of the United States.

The remainder of the order disposes in an equally summary manner of a number of other officers of high rank who, in Burnside's judgment, had proved themselves unworthy of the honor of being officers in the army of the United States or had outlived their usefulness in the Army of the Potomac. Burnside was competent to issue this order on his own responsibility, and would doubtless have done so, but for the judicious advice of his associates to submit it to the President for approval. The President disapproved of it. His selection of Hooker to succeed Burnside was due not so much to his estimate of Hooker's military qualities as to the preference of his cabinet for Hooker as the only eligible general who was free from political aspirations, and therefore not a possible rival candidate for the Presidency.³ The President had his misgivings as to the consequences of the appointment. So accompanying the order making it, or close on its heels, went the following dispatch from Halleck, General-in-Chief, to the new commander of the Army of the Potomac. It was dated January 25:

The President directs me to say that he wishes an interview with you at the Executive Mansion as early as possible.

In compliance with this request Hooker repaired on the following day to Washington. But before doing so he formally assumed his new command.

It may interest the reader to observe how Burnside acquitted himself

¹ *Recollections of Half a Century*, by A. K. McClure, p. 347.

² *The 20th Regt. of Mass. Vol. Infantry*, by G. A. Bruce, p. 229.

³ For details of Burnside's removal see *B. and L.*, III, 239; *Mag. of American History*, XV, 52-54.

of the delicate task of saying something appropriate to the army that he was about to leave, which in its two years of campaigning had known nothing but failure except when defending its own soil, and which was now to be commanded by an officer whom Burnside deemed unworthy of holding a commission in the army of the United States.

Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
Camp near Falmouth, Va., January 26, 1863.

General Orders, No. 9:

By direction of the President of the United States, the commanding general this day transfers the command of this army to Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker.

The short time that he has directed your movements has not been fruitful of victory, or any considerable advancement of our lines, but it has again demonstrated an amount of courage, patience, and endurance that under more favorable circumstances would have accomplished great results. Continue to exercise these virtues; be true to your country, and the principles you have sworn to maintain; *give to the brave and skilful general who has so long been identified with your organization, and who is now to command you, your full and cordial support and coöperation, and you will deserve success.*¹

In taking an affectionate leave of the entire army, from which he separates with so much regret, he may be pardoned if he bids an especial farewell to his long-tried associates of the Ninth Corps.²

His prayers are that God may be with you and grant you continual success until the rebellion is crushed.

By command of Major-General BURNSIDE:

LEWIS RICHMOND,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

Hooker replied, with his first order:

By direction of the President of the United States, the undersigned assumes command of the Army of the Potomac. He enters upon the discharge of the duties imposed by this trust with a just appreciation of their responsibility. Since the formation of this army he has been identified with its history. He has shared with you its glories and reverses with no other desire than that these relations might remain unchanged until its destiny should be accomplished. In the record of your achievements there is much to be proud of, and with the blessing of God, we will contribute something to the renown of our arms and the success of our cause. To secure these ends, your commander will require the cheerful and zealous coöperation of every officer and soldier in this army.

In equipment, intelligence, and valor the enemy is our inferior; let us never hesitate to give him battle wherever we can find him.

*The undersigned only gives expression to the feelings of this army when he conveys to our late commander, Major-General Burnside, the most cordial good wishes for his future.*³

My staff will be announced as soon as organized.

¹ The italics are mine. J. B. Jr.

² Burnside's former command.

³ The italics are mine. J. B. Jr.

Burnside tells the army how it may deserve success under its new commander, but does not promise its realization; and Hooker says nothing about Burnside's efforts in the past, but wishes him success in the future.

On the morning of the 27th, Hooker reported in person to the Secretary of War and the President. In the meantime the following letter from the general commanding the defences of Washington had been received at the headquarters of the army:

Heintzelman to Halleck, January 26

There does not appear to be much connection between the Army of the Potomac and the troops for the defence of Washington. Scarcely an order issued from the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac applies here. On the contrary the commander acts under orders from the General-in-Chief or from the War Department. The duties being so different, cannot the defences be made into a separate department, with such limits as may be convenient?

Hooker was asked by the Secretary of War whether he desired to have command of the troops in and about Washington, and declined, assigning as his reason that it would require all his time to place the Army of the Potomac in proper condition for field service before the coming of spring.

His experience the previous winter under Burnside had satisfied him that a winter campaign would be unwise and more likely to be ruinous to himself than to the enemy. Accordingly on the 2d of February the garrison of Washington with its dependencies was constituted a separate department and designated the Department of Washington, with Major-General S. P. Heintzelman in command.

In his interview with the President, Hooker said that he hoped to succeed, provided the President would stand between him and Halleck, the commanding general of the army. He stated that he deemed this necessary for various reasons. The commanding general had, to a limited extent, been identified with the army of the West and seemed to think that there was no other army in the republic. He wrote and spoke freely of the army he had commanded at the expense of one he had never seen. His disparaging comparisons and reflections had been communicated to the Army of the Potomac, and neither it, nor its commander, expected justice at his hands. Besides, he continued, he had been reliably informed that Halleck had opposed his appointment to the command of the army on two occasions when the removal of Major-General McClellan from command was in contemplation, and again on the removal of General Burnside.¹

What the President said to all this is not known. But it appears that

¹ *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 112.

Hooker went away satisfied that he would be fully supported by the President and the War Department, including the general-in-chief. On his return to the Army of the Potomac he received from the President an expression of his mind in the form of the following characteristic letter:

Executive Mansion, Washington, D. C.,
January 26, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL HOOKER.

General:

I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course I have done this upon what appear to me to be sufficient reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know that there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and skilful soldier, which, of course, I like. I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself, which is a valuable, if not an indispensable, quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm; but I think that during General Burnside's command of the army you have taken counsel of your ambition, and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer. I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the Army and the Government needed a dictator. Of course it is not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain successes can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done and will do for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit which you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticizing their commander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now beware of rashness. Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance, go forward and give us victories.

Yours very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

Hooker was deeply impressed by the tone and spirit of this communication. To a group of officers who were with him when he read it, he said,—“He talks to me like a father. I shall not answer this letter until I have won him a great victory.”¹

His choice for chief of staff was General Charles P. Stone, one of the few officers in the U. S. Army who were well qualified to perform the duties of that office.

Charles Pomeroy Stone was a graduate of West Point with a record of varied and efficient service as a staff officer. In 1861 he was appointed Colonel and Inspector-General of the District of Columbia

¹ *Abraham Lincoln*, by Nicolay and Hay, VII, 88. :

Militia, and later, Colonel of the 14 U. S. Infantry, and given charge of the outposts and defences of Washington. Being ordered by General McClellan to make a feint of crossing the Potomac at Ball's Bluff, he naturally caused a part of his command to cross. This fraction was attacked in force, and pushed into the river with great loss. Among the killed was Colonel Baker, who had been an influential member of Congress. On the 9th of February, 1862, Colonel Stone was suddenly arrested, and without trial or charges, confined in Fort Lafayette, where he was kept until the 16th of August. He was then released, and placed on waiting orders, in which status he remained until the campaign of Chancellorsville was practically over.¹ The simple justice of an investigation by a court of inquiry was denied him on grounds of political expediency. Secretary of War Stanton, who doubted General Stone's loyalty, was strongly opposed to his being Chief of Staff of the Army of the Potomac. So Hooker took as his second choice Major-General Daniel Butterfield, then commanding the V Army Corps. Butterfield was not a graduate of West Point, nor had he, like Stone, studied the art of war in Europe, but he had done good service before and during the Civil War. Entering the militia early, he obtained the command of a regiment at the age of twenty-eight. His regiment was among the first to enlist for three months; at the expiration of this term of service he was appointed a lieutenant-colonel in the regular army and a brigadier-general of volunteers. In 1862 he was made a major-general of volunteers. He took part in the Peninsula campaign, the second Bull Run campaign, and the campaign of Fredericksburg, in which he commanded the V Corps. Hooker's entire staff was announced to the army in his second general order, dated January 29:

Maj. Gen. Daniel Butterfield, chief of staff.
 Brig. Gen. Seth Williams,² assistant adjutant-general.
 Lieut. Col. Joseph Dickinson, assistant adjutant-general.
 Brig. Gen. James A. Hardie, judge-advocate-general.
 Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt, chief of artillery.
 Brig. Gen. M. R. Patrick, provost-marshal-general.
 Col. Rufus Ingalls, chief quartermaster.
 Lieut. Col. F. Myers, deputy chief quartermaster.
 Col. H. F. Clarke, chief commissary.
 Surg. Jonathan Letterman, medical director.
 Capt. Samuel T. Cushing, chief signal officer.
 Lieut. D. W. Flagler, chief ordnance officer.
 Maj. William H. Lawrence, }
 Capt. William L. Candler, } aides-de-camp.
 Capt. Alexander Moore, }
 Capt. Harry Russell, }

¹ *Appletons' Cyclopædia of American Biography.*

² Adjutant-General of the Army of the Potomac.

There was an officer practically holding a very important position on Hooker's staff who is not named in the foregoing order. This was Brigadier-General Herman Haupt, Chief of Construction and Transportation, U. S. Military Railroads, who was nominally in charge of all the military railroads of the United States, but really only of those used by the Army of the Potomac. He wrote to Hooker on the 27th of January:

. . . It will be my effort, so far as the Department of Military Railroads is concerned, to coöperate efficiently in your movements, and I am well aware that the success or failure of a movement is often a question of prompt supply.

The existing organization and arrangements work very satisfactorily. J. H. Devereux is Superintendent of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad; William W. Wright, Superintendent of the Fredericksburg Railroad; Adna Anderson, engineer of construction on both roads. I have directed Mr. Anderson, who is a very efficient and experienced civil engineer, to report to you and keep you advised of his whereabouts, so that in the event of any movement, you can communicate with him. Colonel McCallum attends to the routine and red tape business of the Department.

For myself I am generally present when active operations are in progress, organizing and directing where my presence seems essential.

I may be absent for some weeks during the present session of the Massachusetts Legislature, but my arrangements are such that nothing will suffer in my absence. In everything pertaining to railroad transportation consult with or direct Mr. Wright, and in all that pertains to construction, Mr. Anderson.¹

In Robert E. Lee, Hooker had as opponent one of the world's great military leaders. McClellan, Pope, and Burnside had in turn recoiled from him in failure or defeat. No other commander, North or South, at this or any later stage of the war, had such a creditable military record as his. Lee was seven years older than Hooker. If he had not as fresh a complexion as the latter, he had equally regular, handsome features, not only free from every suggestion of weakness, but telling unmistakably of strength. An erect, muscular figure, and a graceful, dignified bearing, united with his noble countenance to give him a pleasing, distinguished, and commanding appearance.

He was graduated from the U. S. Military Academy second in his class, in 1829. During his whole four years' course he never received a demerit mark for any breach of rules or neglect of duty.² But in those days the rules of the Military Academy were less numerous and exacting than they have been of late years. This is said not in derogation, but in vindication of Lee's military character. "Throughout his whole life he never used tobacco, and though in rare cases he would drink a

¹ *Reminiscences of General Herman Haupt*, pp. 184, 185.

² *Memoirs of Robert E. Lee*, by A. L. Long, p. 29.

glass of wine, he strictly avoided whisky or brandy, and did his utmost to favor temperance in others. The intemperate habits of many of the persons under his command were always a source of pain to him."¹

Upon graduation he was appointed a lieutenant in the U. S. Corps of Engineers. He served on the staff of General Wool and of General Scott in Mexico, distinguishing himself especially by his daring and skilful reconnaissances. Perhaps his most notable performance was his determination and preparation of the line of march by which Scott turned the position of Cerro Gordo.

In 1852 he was appointed superintendent of the U. S. Military Academy. He filled this position with eminent success for three years, when under the law of that day he was forced to relinquish it by accepting an appointment in the line. He became lieutenant-colonel of the newly created 2d regiment of cavalry, of which Albert Sidney Johnston was colonel, and joining it in 1856, spent, with intervals of leave and detached service, five years in the rough practical school of frontier service, pursuing and fighting Apaches, Comanches, and kindred tribes of Indians in northern Texas. In 1859, being in Washington on leave of absence, he was designated to arrest John Brown and his fellow agitators, which he accomplished with the assistance of Lieutenant (later Major-General) J. E. B. Stuart.

He was opposed to secession, but also to the coercion of the Southern states. He refused to allow his name to be proposed for appointment to the command of the Northern armies, and the first call of the North for troops determined him to resign his commission. Had his own state not seceded, and been permitted to remain neutral, he would probably have remained neutral himself. On his resignation he wrote to his sister,—“ . . . save in the defence of my native state, with the sincere hope that my poor services may never be needed, I hope I may never be called on to draw my sword.” But if it came to the defence of his native state, he was resolved to take part in it. A month before the people of Virginia ratified the ordinance of secession that was passed by its convention, Lee had accepted from the governor a commission as major-general and commander-in-chief of the naval and military forces of the state. In this capacity he superintended the organization, equipment, and instruction of the first levies of Virginia soldiery, and sent some 50,000 more or less trained troops to the front. This force, known as the Virginia State Line, was still nominally in existence in the spring of 1863. But the Confederacy having passed a conscription law, it became advisable for Virginia to transfer her state army to the Confederacy, that she might be credited with it in the determination of her quota for future drafts. This transfer was effected by an act of the Virginia legislature passed February 28, 1863.

¹ *Memoirs of Robert E. Lee*, by A. L. Long, p. 29.

ANNELOORSVILLE

in 1861 remained loyal to the
 graduates went with the South.
 among the officers of the Northern
 as great as among the officers
 of the Potomac and in the Army
 general, the chief of artillery,
 chief commissary, and chief
 adjutant-general and the chief of
 the Army of Northern Virginia they
 graduates of the Virginia Military Insti-
 West Point of the South. Among the
 commanders the proportion of West Point-

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC	ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA
71%	100%
63%	83%
32%	18%
42%	31%

South in respect to officers was due only indi-
 cally at West Point. It was due directly to
 its military schools and militia. Dis-
 Annapolis, the military schools in the United
 as follows:¹

	SOUTH
1 Alabama	1
Kentucky	1
Louisiana	1
Mississippi	1
South Carolina	2
Tennessee	1
Virginia	2
	9

the originator of secession, had an earlier and clearer
 "irrepressible conflict" than the North. In this
 of an uprising among the blacks, it had two
 organization and training of its militia that were
 in the North. As a consequence the militia of the

of 1860, Miscellaneous Statistics, p. 510.

South was in a higher state of efficiency, and, in proportion to the population, more numerous than that of the North.

The South had a military advantage in the comparative homogeneity of its population. The census of 1890 divides the surviving white soldiers and sailors of the Civil War into native-born (of native or of foreign parents) and foreign-born, as follows:

FEDERAL		CONFEDERATE	
Native	82%	Native	97%
Foreign	18%	Foreign	3%

According to this indication the proportion of foreigners in the Federal army was about six times as great as it was in the Confederate.

The moving spirit of each army was loyalty to the section of country in which it grew up, and with which its destiny was cast. Each side considered the other as the aggressor. The North looked upon the South as a political renegade, aiming or working directly or indirectly for the destruction of the Union; the South looked upon the North as a military invader and would-be conqueror and oppressor.

Now that the North and the South, having fought their fight and shaken hands, know each other again as friends and brothers, it is hardly possible to realize the animosity with which they then clutched and held each other by the throat. Each side believed in the perfect justice of its cause, and could hardly find terms opprobrious enough with which to express its abhorrence of that of the other, and its hatred of those who upheld and defended it. It was *Yankees, hirelings, and mudsills* on one side, and *rebels, traitors, and slave-drivers* on the other.

The political and the military situations combined to relieve the South of the responsibility of the initiative and impose it upon the North. To secure recognition and preserve its territory, with the possible exception of strips along the border actually occupied by Federal troops, all that the Confederacy had to do was to hold its own. Every day that passed without a military success for the North was an encouragement to the friends of secession abroad, and a discouragement to the war party in the North.

While the Federals were still dependent for recruits upon volunteering, the Confederates were enforcing a conscription law, so stringent that it necessarily provided for the exemption of a portion of the military population for work in certain important industries, such as mining, railroading, farming, etc. These *details*, as such exemptions were called, gave rise to differences of opinion between the civil and military authorities, and between the administrative and combatant branches of the military establishment. A case in point is the following communication from Seddon to Lee, dated February 10:

General Lee visited the War Department frequently to get the latest news from the front. His tall form could be seen crossing the lawns between the White House and the War Department regularly from noon and evening. He often walked around among the officers, looking over their shoulders, as they translated from cipher to plain, and asking questions about the messages.¹

The Federal Signal Corps was a part of the regular army. For service in the field, signal troops were formed into parties usually of four officers and eight men, one such party being assigned to a division or brigade. The code was given to the officers only, and when they had memorized the characters it was destroyed. A soldier worked the flag, while an officer called the numbers indicating the letters. There was a cipher disk by means of which all messages were sent in cipher. The counterpane, or the cipher, was changed daily, sometimes oftener. In sending a long message it would be changed a number of times.

Lines of flag and torch communication were often gotten up from one part of an army to another 20 or 30 miles long, and maintained day and night for months, except during a fog, when neither flag nor torch could be seen. Usually a line longer than 10 miles had repeating-stations by which messages were received and transmitted. Regular reliefs were taken at the telescope by the officers and men watching the next station, and two minutes would not pass without an eye at the glass.

The Army of the Potomac made use of three stationary balloons for purposes of observation. Under each one was a detail of men who had charge of the cables that held the balloon in position, and a number of couriers, all under the command of an officer. Written messages from a balloon were dropped, with a stone or other weight wrapped up in them, to the officer below, who sent them on to their destinations.

The Confederate War Department had an Engineer Bureau, and there were engineer officers in the several Confederate armies, but among these officers there was a lack of training in field work and of the organization and direction necessary to the efficient coördination of effort. On the 27th of March Lee wrote to the Chief Engineer, C. S. A.: "If I had an experienced engineer capable of conducting the professional operations of that department in this army, young officers could be advantageously employed, but as I am now situated, they give no assistance. . . ."

In the Army of Northern Virginia there was no battalion or corresponding organization of engineers at general headquarters. The duties of such troops were performed by staff officers at the various other headquarters and by officers and men detailed from the line, and

¹ E. M. Stanton, by F. A. Flower, pp. 216, 217; *Lincoln in the Telegraph Office*, by D. H. Bates, in the *Century*, May, 1907.

civilian labor hired or impressed. In the Army of the Potomac the engineer force was divided into three parts, all attached to the headquarters of the army: the Topographical Engineers; the Engineers, including the Engineer Battalion (a regular force); and the Engineer Brigade (a volunteer force). The Chief of Topographical Engineers was Brigadier-General Gouverneur K. Warren, U. S. Volunteers. The Engineers were commanded by Lieutenant (later Captain) Cyrus B. Comstock, U. S. Engineers; and the Engineer Brigade, by Brigadier-General D. P. Woodbury, U. S. Volunteers. These separate branches had no common head. General Warren, in his report of the campaign, says that he was placed in charge of the Topographical Engineers on the 2d of February.¹ It appears, however, that he was not announced to the army as serving on Hooker's staff until the 30th of March.² In the Federal, as well as in the Confederate army, the work of pioneers of the ordnance department, Signal Corps, train guards, and ambulance corps was done largely by troops of the line serving with their regiments or attached to higher headquarters. As a rule each regiment had its corps of pioneers or axemen, whose work it was to open up and corduroy roads, to clear or "slash" the front of a position, to construct or repair bridges, barricades, log works, etc.

The Army of Northern Virginia numbered 62,800 officers and men present for duty. An army corps numbered about 30,000 officers and men present for duty.

It will be observed that in the Federal army the cavalry was assigned to grand divisions or army corps. There was no independent cavalry. In the Confederate army the cavalry was all independent, constituting Stuart's cavalry division.

In the Confederate army the grade of commander might be said to be commensurate with his responsibility. Lee had the rank of general; his corps commanders, of lieutenant-general; his division commanders, of major-general; and his brigade commanders, of brigadier-general. In the Federal army there was no grade above that of major-general. *Three army corps and thirteen divisions were commanded by brigadier-generals.*

In each army the artillery was assigned for the greater part to divisions. In the Army of the Potomac two batteries were assigned, as a corps reserve or corps artillery, to the II Corps; the remainder of the artillery was organized as a general artillery reserve for the army. In the Army of Northern Virginia there was no corps artillery. Batteries not assigned to divisions constituted a sort of general artillery reserve without being regularly organized as such. This force was officially referred to as "artillery in the rear."³

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 194.

² *Ib.*, 40, p. 167.

³ *Ib.*, 40, pp. 602, 650.

In the Army of the Potomac the senior artillery officer of each corps was required by law, "in addition to his other duties," to act "as chief of artillery and ordnance at the headquarters of the corps."¹ This required a captain to command his battery while acting as chief of artillery and ordnance, a practical impossibility, which was not attempted. By order or custom, the senior artillery officers of divisions acted as chiefs of artillery and ordnance for their divisions.

The General Artillery Reserve was commanded, in the Army of Northern Virginia, by the chief of artillery of the army, Brigadier-General William N. Pendleton, and in the Army of the Potomac by a special chief.² The artillery had practically no regimental organization in either army. The pieces were muzzle-loading, and made of wrought or cast iron or brass. There was not a steel or a breech-loading piece in either army.³

The principal varieties used are given in the following table:

DESCRIPTION OF PIECE	RANGE IN YARDS	USED IN
<i>Rifles</i>		
20-pounder Parrott gun .	4,500	Both armies
10-pounder Parrott gun .	6,200	Both armies
3-inch ordnance gun . .	4,180	Both armies
<i>Smooth-bores</i>		
12-pounder gun	1,660	Army of the Potomac
Light 12-pounder gun (Napoleon)	1,300	Both armies
6-pounder gun	1,525	Army of Northern Virginia
12-pounder howitzer . .	1,070	Army of Northern Virginia

In addition to the guns above mentioned there were in the Army of the Potomac a few 4½-inch "ordnance" guns, and in the Army of Northern Virginia a few Whitworth guns.

The proportion of rifles to smooth-bores was in the Army of the Potomac about as 7 to 3 and in the Army of Northern Virginia about as 2 to 3. To fully appreciate the consequent advantage of the Federal artillery, one must consider, not only that the effective range of a rifle was from twice to three times that of a smooth-bore, but also that the Federal smooth-bore artillery was more homogeneous, and on an average heavier, than the Confederate (see foregoing table). The Confederate ammunition, moreover, was largely defective, while that of the Federals was generally good. In *personnel* the Federals had an advantage in the superiority of their men as artisans or mechanics.

¹ Act of July 17, 1862.

² In Vol. 40 of the *War Records* this chief is given on page 15 as Captain G. A. de Russy, and on page 16 as Brigadier-General William Hays.

³ At this time the Prussian artillery was partially armed with breech-loading rifled steel pieces of Krupp's manufacture.

"Whilst the South had at the beginning of the war a better raw material for infantry and cavalry, the North had the best for artillery. It has been well said that 'a battery carries with it all that goes to make up civilization.' It requires many mechanics with their tools and stores, and also what are called 'handy men,' intelligent and self-reliant, for no two men at a gun do the same work. No country furnishes better men for the artillery proper than our Northern, and particularly our New England States, and if, as in other armies, the best fitted for this service were assigned to it, we would lead the world in this arm."¹

The principal projectiles used were the solid shot—which has been discarded in recent years by field artillery—percussion shell, shrapnel, and canister. The time shell was used with rifled pieces. A piece could be loaded and fired from twice to three times a minute. The 3-inch field-piece in the U. S. Army to-day has fired fifteen aimed shots a minute.

In the formation of cavalry from raw material, the North and the South had each its peculiar advantages and disadvantages. The North was rich in men, money, and draft-horses, but comparatively poor in riding-horses, riders, and marksmen. During the first year of the war the Confederate cavalry surpassed the Federal in nearly everything that went to make good soldiers. The Confederate cavalymen came mostly from the best families in the South, were nearly all accomplished horsemen, and more or less accustomed to the use of firearms. It took but little drilling to convert the Confederate cavalry recruit into an efficient trooper. The Federal cavalry was recruited from offices, mines, and workshops, many of the men having never been on a horse or handled a firearm. The Confederate cavalry was mounted for the greater part on well-bred horses, well broken to the saddle; the Federal, on indifferent horses imperfectly broken. Time worked a change in both of the opposing services which brought them in the course of the war to a practical equality. But as late as January 15, 1863, General Ingalls, Chief Quartermaster of the Army of the Potomac, wrote to General Meigs, Quartermaster-General:

The cavalry and artillery horses are in fair condition, considering that the quality of the animals never was first-rate. First-class horses have never yet found their way into this army. Many of them have been "doctored up" by contractors, and sold into our hands, and the first service has discovered their unfitness.²

While the horses of the Confederate cavalry were generally better blooded than those of the Federal, they began early in the war to fall behind the latter in number and condition.

¹ *Our Experience in Artillery Administration*, by Brevet Major-General Henry J. Hunt, in *Journal of Military Service Institution*, XII, 214.

² *W. R.*, 31, p. 983.

At the beginning of the war, the Confederate government, charged as it was with the creation of an army and of war material of all kinds, felt itself unable to provide horses for the numerous cavalry companies which offered their services, especially from the state of Virginia. Many companies organized as cavalry were rejected. With those that were enrolled the government entered into a contract, the substance of which was that the cavalymen should supply and own their horses, which would be mustered into service at a fair valuation; that the government should provide feed, shoes, and a smith to do the shoeing, and should pay the men a *per diem* of forty cents for the use of their horses. Should a horse be *killed in action*, the government agreed to pay to the owner the muster valuation. Should the horse be captured in battle, worn out or disabled by any of the many other causes which were incident to the service, the loss fell upon the owner, who was compelled to furnish another horse under the same conditions, or be transferred to some other arm of the service.

"That the government should have adopted such a policy at the beginning of the war was a misfortune; that it should have adhered to it to the very end was a calamity against which no amount of zeal or patriotism could successfully contend."¹

In no case was the sum paid for a horse killed in action sufficient to replace it, for the price of horses constantly advanced as the demand for them increased. To replace a horse that was only wounded or otherwise disabled without losing the disabled one, it was usually necessary to get the latter home, for only one horse could be kept by a soldier at the public expense. Taking a horse home involved the rider's leading it there from the point where his regiment might be stationed, not unfrequently a hundred miles or more, at his own expense. Many Confederate troopers mortgaged their land on account of their horses. Not uncommonly it appeared to the men that their only chance of supplying themselves with horses lay in taking them from the enemy, and instead of getting a furlough, they obtained permission to scout. If a stray picket or straggler could then be captured, it was done. This accounts for much of the small war carried on by the Confederate cavalry against the Federal outposts.

Each Confederate trooper had to take care of the horse which he hired to the government, and in case the soldier was disabled, unless some friend looked after the riderless horse, the chances were that it would fall a victim to starvation and want of care, or become a total loss to the owner.²

¹ *Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry*, by H. B. McClellan, late Major and Chief of Staff of the Cavalry Corps, Army of Northern Virginia, pp. 257, 258.

² These particulars of the service in the

Confederate cavalry are drawn from an article by Thomas T. Munford, Esq., of Lynchburg, Va., late colonel 2 Va. Cavalry, in the *Journal of the U. S. Cavalry Association* for June, 1891.

The Federal cavalry was generally armed with the Smith's and the Sharp's carbines, both breech-loading, the Colt's revolver, and the saber. The Confederate cavalry had tried, but unsuccessfully, to provide itself with the same arms. It was generally armed with the pistol, many troopers carrying two or three. Not so large a proportion had a carbine in addition to a pistol. The carbines and pistols were not of uniform pattern as in the Federal service. Many troopers for lack of a carbine carried an infantry rifle or musket. A small number only were armed with a pistol, carbine, and saber. The Colt's revolver held its place to the end of the war, and although seldom used as a charging weapon was invaluable in the *mêlée*, and as a defensive arm for patrols and couriers. The confidence which the regulars had long felt in the saber was shared by the volunteers as soon as some training and experience in its use had rendered its grasp familiar.¹

In connection with the cavalry, notice should be taken of the irregular mounted troops of the Confederacy, which were generally called Partisan Rangers. The several Partisan bands were recruited mainly among men who could not be compelled or induced to serve in the line. They were attracted to the Partisan service chiefly by the reward in money guaranteed them for whatever plunder they might secure. It was practically the application of the prize principle of nautical warfare to war on land. The Partisan Ranger Act, which was passed April 21, 1862, contained the following provisions:

289. That the President be and he is hereby authorized to commission such officers as he may deem proper, with authority to form bands of partisan rangers in companies, battalions, or regiments, either as infantry or [as] cavalry, the companies, battalions, or regiments to be composed each of such numbers as the President may approve.

290. That such partisan rangers, after being regularly received into service, shall be entitled to the same pay, rations, and quarters during their term of service, and be subject to the same regulations, as other soldiers.

291. That for any arms and munitions of war captured from the enemy by any body of partisan rangers, and delivered to any quartermaster at such place or places as may be designated by a commanding general, the rangers shall be paid their full value in such manner as the Secretary of War may prescribe.

Prize money, varied and exciting service, comparative freedom from the restraints of discipline, frequent and lengthy sojourns at home, these advantages could not but attract men already enlisted in the cavalry of the line. They caused considerable dissatisfaction, leading to more or less desertion among Stuart's troops. Stuart, while

¹ Captain Moses Harris, U. S. A., in *War Papers of Commandery of Wisc., Mil. Order Loyal Legion*, I, 354.

wishing success to the Partisans, was anxious to put a stop to their evil influence upon his command. The problem in his mind was to take from the Partisan service as many as possible of the attractions which it possessed for men of the line without depriving it of the attractions necessary for its recruitment among men not available for the line. Both Lee and Stuart wanted the Partisans to remain continuously in service, going into camp instead of disbanding and returning to their homes between operations; in other words, they wanted the so-called Partisans to cease being guerillas and be Partisans. But this they were never able to bring about.

When General Hunt was appointed the first Chief of Artillery of the Army of the Potomac, General Stoneman was appointed the first Chief of Cavalry; the functions of each at that time were purely administrative.¹

Under General Pope and General Burnside, however, Hunt had been intrusted with the command as well as with the administration of the artillery.

The Federal infantry was armed generally with the Springfield muzzle-loading rifled musket, caliber 59; with here and there a regiment with breech-loaders, and more rarely one with smooth-bores. The Confederate infantry was armed in a heterogeneous fashion. Many of the men had smooth-bore muskets, caliber 69. Others had rifled muskets, caliber 54; and others still the Springfield rifled musket of the Federals. The latter could be loaded and fired from once to twice a minute. In 1862 the Prussian infantry was armed throughout with the breech-loading needle-gun, firing six aimed shots a minute. The rifle with which the U. S. infantry is armed to-day will fire thirty-three aimed shots a minute.²

In the Army of Northern Virginia the brigades were formed, as a rule, of regiments of the same state. In the Army of the Potomac there were a number of brigades similarly formed, or state brigades—for instance, Phelps', Keyser's, O'Rourke's, and Greene's New York; Rowley's, Brown's, and Graham's, Tyler's, Allabach's, and Kane's Pennsylvania. As a rule, the brigades were formed of regiments of different states. In the Army of Northern Virginia the infantry of every

that they are properly equipped and supplied. They will not exercise command of the troops of their arms unless specially ordered by the commanding general, but they will, when practicable, be selected to communicate the orders of the general to their respective corps. . . ."

²The U. S. infantry was not armed throughout with breech-loaders until 1869.

division comprised brigades of different states; in the Army of the Potomac there were two divisions in which the infantry was all of one state. These were Doubleday's and Humphreys' of Pennsylvania. Sykes' division, which was known as the regular division, consisted of two regular brigades (parts of ten regular regiments) and two batteries (one regular and one volunteer).

The Fourth Division of the VI Corps (Burnham's) consisted of one brigade of five regiments of infantry and one battery of artillery.¹ With this exception, the Federal divisions consisted on an average of three brigades of infantry with from two to four batteries of artillery. In this narrative the batteries will be designated generally by the names of their respective commanders at the beginning of the campaign.

In both armies the infantry regiments were formed of ten companies and the cavalry regiments generally of ten or twelve companies.² The average regiment of infantry numbered in the Army of the Potomac about 433 and in the Army of Northern Virginia about 409 officers and men present for duty equipped, or effectives.³ The average brigade of infantry consisted in the Army of the Potomac of about 4.7 regiments, aggregating about 2000 effectives, and in the Army of Northern Virginia of about 4.5 regiments, aggregating about 1850 effectives. In the latter army each brigade of infantry and cavalry had its battalion of sharpshooters. In the Army of the Potomac there was a brigade of sharpshooters named after its commander "Berdan's sharpshooters"; a company known as the "1st Company, Massachusetts Sharpshooters," attached to Gibbon's division; and other organizations of the kind. But the Federal sharpshooters were not so regularly organized as the Confederate. The average Federal division comprised about 6200 and the average Confederate division about 8700 infantry. In the Army of the Potomac the average corps, numbering about 16,000, was about equivalent to two Confederate divisions.

The reader may need to be informed or reminded of the difference in power between the firearms of 1861-1865 and those of the present day. Modern field artillery has a maximum effective range of 6000 yards; it will rarely seek a shorter range than 1500 yards, except in accompany-

¹ On the 3d of February, 1863, the 61 Pa. was chosen, together with four other regiments, the 31 and 43 N. Y., 6 Me., 5 Wisc., and Harn's light battery, 3 N. Y., to form the Light Division of the VI Corps, organized for special service, and designed to act in emergencies with great celerity (*History of Pennsylvania Volunteers*, by S. P. Bates, II, 410). After the campaign this division, greatly crippled, was broken up, and its regiments were distributed among other organizations.

In the Confederate army A. P. Hill's division ($\frac{1}{11}$) was known as the Light Division.

² A number of the Federal regiments were formed of squadrons of two companies each, others were formed of battalions of four companies each.

³ These and the following figures of strength are based upon the returns for March and April, 1863 (see Chapter X, *post*, and *W. R.*, 40, pp. 696, 320).

ing victorious infantry or pursuing a beaten enemy. In our Civil War the greatest effective range of field artillery was about 2500 yards, and this was attained only with rifled pieces. For smooth-bores the maximum effective range was about 1500 yards, or the minimum artillery range of the present day. Solid shot was used from 350 yards out; shrapnel from 500 yards to 1000 yards out, and canister from 500 yards in.

Modern infantry fire is annoying at 2000 yards, effective at 1200, and decisive at 600. In our Civil War the fire of lines of battle usually commenced at a range of about 300 yards, although skirmishers and sharpshooters would not uncommonly try their skill at 500 and even 1000 yards.

CHAPTER III

THE MILITARY SITUATION

THE Army of the Potomac was at this time substantially in the position it occupied before and immediately after the battle of Fredericksburg—on the Stafford Heights, on the left bank of the Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg (Map 1, sheet A). The railroad to Aquia Creek Station, together with the Potomac River between that point and Washington, constituted its main line of communication. Its supplies came mainly from Washington. At Alexandria the loaded cars were run on floats, which carried them to Aquia Creek Station, where they took the tracks on which they proceeded to Falmouth.¹ The army communicated with Washington overland by the Telegraph Road, which went through Stafford Court-House, Aquia, Dumfries, Occoquan, and Alexandria. Its advance depots were at Falmouth, Brooke's Station, Stafford Court-House, Aquia Creek Station, Belle Plain, and Dumfries; its headquarters were at Falmouth.

The Army of Northern Virginia confronted the Army of the Potomac, as it did at the battle of Fredericksburg, on the heights back of that town. Lee's line of supply was the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad, together with the Virginia Central Railroad. The latter, running almost across the theater of operations, constituted a sort of advanced base. Lee might retire upon it practically at any point, and find or procure supplies. But there were only two points on this base from which he could further retire and keep on a line of railroad connecting him with the interior of the Confederacy. These two points were Hanover Junction and Gordonsville. If compelled to retreat he must fall back, if possible, upon the former in order to cover Richmond, which the Confederate government was determined to hold to the last extremity. In this case the North and South Anna Rivers were to be used as lines of defence. Should he be severed from Richmond he would make for Gordonsville. He had advanced depots at Hamilton's Crossing and Guiney's Station. His headquarters were about three miles below Fredericksburg.

A Confederate force under Brigadier-General W. E. Jones occupied

¹ *Reminiscences of General Herman Haupt*, pp. 165, 179, 180.

the upper part of the Shenandoah Valley, known as the Valley District, with headquarters at Newmarket (Map 1, sheet B); and a Federal force under Brigadier-General R. H. Milroy held the lower part, with headquarters at Winchester. Brigadier-General B. F. Kelley commanded the defences of the Upper Potomac, with headquarters at Harper's Ferry. He and Milroy reported to Major-General R. C. Schenck, commanding the Middle Department, with headquarters at Baltimore. West of the Shenandoah Valley, the Confederates held a section of country designated as the Department of Northwestern Virginia, which was commanded by Brigadier-General J. D. Imboden, with headquarters at Staunton, Va., on the Virginia Central Railroad (Map 1, sheet B). Brigadier-Generals Imboden and W. E. Jones reported to Major-General Samuel Jones, commanding the Trans-Alleghany Department, or Department of Western Virginia, with headquarters at Dublin, Va., on the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. The Federals constituted West Virginia a district in the Department of the Ohio, and gave the command of this district to Brigadier-General J. D. Cox, whose headquarters were at Marietta, O., on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Ohio River.

On the 17th of March West Virginia was transferred from the Department of the Ohio to the Middle Department, Schenck's; and on the 28th this state was announced by the department commander to constitute a separate district of the department under the command of Brigadier-General B. S. Roberts. The first headquarters of the new district were established at Clarksburg.¹

The Federals commanded the whole line of the Potomac River and the sea. The approaches to Hooker's army by water were guarded by the Potomac Flotilla, under direction of Commodore A. A. Harwood, commanding the Washington Navy Yard. The flotilla consisted of two divisions. The first division, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Magaw, was stationed in the Potomac River off Aquia Creek. The second, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander McCrea, was stationed at the mouth of the Rappahannock River (*Appendix 1*). The Potomac is navigable to Washington; the Rappahannock, to Fredericksburg; the York, which is formed by the junction of the Pamunkey and the Mattaponi, is navigable to West Point, whence vessels proceed under exceptional conditions up the Pamunkey to White House. The James is navigable to Richmond, which is connected by the James River Canal with Buchanan, on the James River, about 40 miles above Lynchburg.

The Federals had posts at Fort Monroe, Norfolk, Suffolk, Yorktown, Gloucester, and Williamsburg.

Fort Monroe was regarded as the Gibraltar of the Chesapeake, the key to the bay and its tributaries.

¹ *W. R.*, 40, pp. 159, 163.

Norfolk was held chiefly to keep the enemy from using it as a naval base.

Suffolk was held to cover Norfolk, insure the inland communication to Albemarle Sound, and to keep the enemy at a distance.¹

Yorktown gave control of the Peninsula up to that point, keeping the enemy at a distance from Fort Monroe, and commanded the York River in case it were needed for the movement of troops.

Gloucester, though commanded by Yorktown, might in the hands of an enemy have proved an annoyance to that post or to vessels on the river. It was regarded as auxiliary to Yorktown in controlling the navigation of the river.

Williamsburg was an advance post for watching movements of the enemy up the Peninsula. Though 13 miles from Yorktown, it was used as an outpost of the latter.

Fort Monroe was connected by cable with Sewell's Point, on the south shore of the James River, and with Cape Charles, on the north shore of Chesapeake Bay. All the Federal troops in this quarter were under the command of Major-General John A. Dix, commanding the Department of Virginia, with headquarters at Fort Monroe. The adjacent waters were guarded by the North Atlantic blockading squadron, under the command of Acting Rear-Admiral S. P. Lee, whose flag-ship was in Hampton Roads.

Generals Dix, Schenck, and Hooker reported to Major-General W. H. Halleck, General-in-Chief, whose headquarters were at Washington. The relations between Hooker and Halleck grew so unpleasant that Hooker ceased to consult Halleck regarding plans of operation, and conferred on them almost exclusively with the President.² The Confederates had no general-in-chief, but all the troops in Virginia and North Carolina were under the command of General Robert E. Lee. In both armies the commander-in-chief was the President. The Federal Secretary of War was E. M. Stanton; the Confederate was J. S. Seddon.

The plateau of the Stafford Heights is broken by numerous gullies in which streams, called by the people of the country *runs*, make their way on one side toward the Potomac and on the other toward the Rapahannock. By one of these gullies the railroad from Aquia ascends to

¹ Situated at the head of the Nansemond River, with the railroads to Petersburg and Weldon, Suffolk was regarded as the key to all the approaches to the mouth of the James River on the north of the Dismal Swamp (*W. R.*, 26, p. 275).

² Testifying, March 11, 1865, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Hooker stated as his conviction that if the general-in-chief had been in the rebel interest, it would have been impossible for

him to have added to the embarrassment he caused Hooker from the moment he took command of the Army of the Potomac to the time when he surrendered it. "It was often remarked," he said, "that it was no use for me to make a request, as that of itself would be sufficient cause for General Halleck to refuse it." See also Halleck to Stanton, *W. R.*, 39, p. 156, and 40, pp. 506, 516; and to Dix, *ib.*, 26, pp. 730, 731.

Falmouth, and by another a road descends from that point to the river, where it appears at a ford, to reappear on the opposite side leading to Fredericksburg.

This place, at the head of tide-water as well as of the navigation of the Rappahannock, was once the shipping-point of a considerable coasting trade, but had been gradually reduced to comparative inactivity by railroads diverting its trade to Richmond. Its genteel colonial houses, with their shining white door-steps, suggested Philadelphia and Baltimore to persons acquainted with these cities. It had been almost abandoned by its population since the Federals in 1862 threatened to bombard it.

The site of the city of Fredericksburg rises but slightly near the river, but a mile south of it there are considerable heights, forming a curve like the arc of a circle, with the river as a chord. The intervening lowland, about a mile wide and two miles long, was traversed by several highways, the Richmond Railroad, and three streams, of which the Massaponax, the farthest down the Rappahannock, was the largest.

The Stafford Heights command the hills back of Fredericksburg as well as the low ground between them and the river. But here and there they stand so close to the river that the Federal guns on their crest can not be sufficiently depressed to fire into the water.

The position of the Army of the Potomac on these heights was considered impregnable.¹ That of the Army of Northern Virginia was hardly inferior to it in natural and artificial strength. But Lee was compelled by the proximity of his powerful opponent to maintain a defensive line about 25 miles long and correspondingly thin. His I Corps (Longstreet's) held a range of hills back of Fredericksburg and one below as far as Hamilton's Crossing, also the crossings above at Banks' Ford and United States Ford. His II Corps (Jackson's) occupied a position extending from Hamilton's Crossing to Port Royal. Above the United States Ford the crossings of the Rappahannock were watched by cavalry. On the day on which Hooker assumed command of the Army of the Potomac, orders were issued in Longstreet's corps for Pickett's division to take position at Salem Church, about 6 miles back of Fredericksburg, and intrench itself. Pickett was to form a position on which the troops along the river might rally in case of their being forced to abandon that line. A position was prepared facing Fredericksburg, on what was destined to be the battle-field of Salem Church.² The winter, although the inhabitants called it mild, proved to the Southern soldiers, and even to the Northern, quite severe. Until the latter part of January the cold was not particularly intense, nor

¹ The topography is shown in its main features on Map 2. The position of the troops at this time is indicated approximately on Map 1 (sheet A).

² *W. R.*, 108, pp. 673, 674.

was snow or rain frequent, but at that time the snow fell often and once or twice to the depth of a foot. The rains became continual and heavy. The Confederates were generally quartered in log huts daubed with mud. Most of these were too close to one another and damp. As the spring set in they were ventilated by knocking out the daubing. The clothing of Lee's soldiers was insufficient in quantity and poor in quality. Men would rub out a jacket in two or three months—a pair of trousers in one. Sometimes even cotton trousers were offered them in midwinter. Scarcely a particle of flannel was to be had. Shoes were scarce, blankets were curiosities and overcoats phenomena.

In the Confederate army there was little drilling, and that was done carelessly. Picket duty was light.

Amusements were rare in number and of very mild quality. The principal one was snow fighting between regiments and brigades.¹

The condition of the Confederate commissariat may be judged from the following correspondence:

Lee to Seddon, Secretary of War, January 26

Sir:

. . . As far as I can learn, we have now about one week's supply, four days' fresh beef and four days' salt meat, of the reduced ration.² After that is exhausted, I know not whence further supplies can be drawn. The question of provisioning the army is becoming one of greater difficulty every day. The country north of us is pretty well drained of everything the people are willing to part with, except some grain and hay in Loudon [County],³ nor can impressment be resorted to with advantage, inasmuch as any provisions retained for domestic use are concealed. A resort to impressment would, in my opinion, in this region, produce aggravation and suffering among the people without much benefit to the army. But I think if the citizens in the whole county were appealed to, they would be willing to restrict themselves and furnish what they have to the army.

I am more than usually anxious about the supplies of the army, as it will be impossible to keep it together without food.

Indorsement on Lee to Seddon, January 26

Subsistence Department, January 28, 1863.

Fifteen months ago this Bureau foresaw that the supply of cattle in Virginia would be exhausted. . . . The meat has held out longer than was expected. . . . Last winter the Commissary-General of Subsistence urged that the necks and shanks of beeves, usually excluded by regulations, should be used so as to make the most of what was obtained. . . . The order of the War Department, dated April 28, reducing the rations [*sic*] of meat and increasing that of flour, as above referred to, has not been observed in the Army of [Northern] Virginia for a

¹ *History of McGowan's Brigade*, by J. F. J. Caldwell, p. 71.

² $\frac{1}{4}$ pound. Lee to Seddon, April 17, 1863.

³ Between Lee's position and the Shenandoah Valley.

period of between three and four months, by order of General Lee, and the use of the whole beef (necks and shanks included), which was attempted to be instituted by the Commissary-General of Subsistence, has not been observed in that army, the discontent and other obstacles being urged as insurmountable in the field. . . . Supplies can not be gathered in the country southwest of General Lee's army. It has been or is being drained already. Nor can they be had on the south side of James River. That country is held tributary in commissary supplies to Petersburg [Map 1, sheet A] and the south (except in hogs), and even if they were there (as they are not) in quantity to feed General Lee's army they could not be had; neither time nor transportation will allow it. All the transportation that can be begged will be needed to get wheat to be converted into flour for the same army that now wants meat. General Lee's suggestion that an appeal be made to the citizens to forward supplies is noted by this Bureau, and is not approved. . . .

Respectfully,

L. B. NORTHROP,

Commissary-General of Subsistence.¹

The Federals, while in many respects better off than the Confederates, had also to endure discomforts and privation. Uncertainty as to how long the army would remain inactive prevented the troops from being properly protected from the inclemencies of the weather. The army was considered as in the field, and not as in winter quarters. The only shelter provided by the government was the shelter tent.² The men were left to burrow and shelter themselves as well as they were able. In some cases they occupied the log huts constructed by the enemy when he held and occupied the site of the camp; in others they excavated the earth from six to eighteen inches, built a pen of logs two or three feet high, and on this inclosure as the walls, set up their shelter tents as roofs, or built roofs of brush and dirt. Many regimental commanders took little interest in the welfare of their men.

As the weather in the latter part of the winter turned cold, the timber, which had been abundant, became scarce and difficult to obtain by reason of the sea of mud and mire with which the camp was surrounded. On the 22d of February Major James F. Rusling, Assistant Quartermaster, of the Second Division of Sickles' (III) corps, wrote home from Falmouth:

This morning there was a foot of snow everywhere. It has snowed ever since; and as I write, 2 p.m., the storm still continues. Woke up this morning with my blanket covered with snow that had drifted in under my tent, and altogether felt rather blue. . . .

It is a gay "Washington's birthday" here. We would have had a great time

¹ W. R., 108, pp. 674, 675.

² In general form the same as is used in the army to-day. Each man carries a half of one in his kit. Two men combine to make and occupy a tent.

had it not snowed so savagely. His "Farewell Address" was to have been read at the heads of the regiments, and salutes fired at noon. The salutes were duly fired, the hoarse voice of the cannon roaring in all directions. But the reading of the "Address" will have to be postponed until another year.

Washington's birthday was celebrated also in the Army of Northern Virginia. General Lee wrote to his wife:

[The snow] was nearly up to my knees as I stepped out this morning [22d], and our poor horses were enveloped. We have dug them out, and opened our avenues a little, but it will be terrible, and the roads impassable. No cars from Richmond yesterday. I fear our short rations for man and horse will have to be curtailed.

The subsistence of the Army of the Potomac was not deficient in quantity, but it was in quality. The soldier regularly received a full field ration, which was more than he could eat. The portion not consumed was wasted or went to form a regimental fund.¹ But there was suffering among the officers as well as among the men for lack of fresh food and sufficient variety. The law provided for variety as well as quantity, but it was not carried out.²

Supplies that belonged to the regiments were disposed of to cash customers and itinerant purchasers, and the money thus obtained was appropriated by the commissaries. The system enriched many a "captain and assistant commissary" for the rest of his life.³

During the latter part of January diarrhoea and a fever of a typhoid type prevailed to a greater extent than was warranted by the situation of the army. Symptoms of scurvy also began to appear. The patients, moreover, did not recover as rapidly as the medical director of the army thought that they should. The low vitality of the army was caused, in his opinion, by the want of fresh vegetables. Large quantities of potatoes issued at the principal depot of commissary supplies for the army were not drawn by the corps commissaries.

In both armies there was a dearth of forage, due mainly to bad roads and broken-down or inefficient transportation, and, as a result, the horses and mules were generally poor.⁴

A considerable portion of the Federal army was dissatisfied with President Lincoln's proclamation emancipating the slaves in Southern

¹ About a year later the ration was reduced on the ground that it was greater than was necessary.

² Section 13 of "An act for the better organization of the military establishment," approved August 3, 1861.

³ *History of the 9 Mass. Vol. Inf.*, by D. G. Macnamara, p. 276.

⁴ "The roads are in so bad a condition that hay can not be procured. The mules are suffering badly. They will eat the hair off each other, and devour paper and rags" (Letter of Nathan Haywood, M.D., Surgeon 20 Mass. Volunteers, manuscript, Mil. Hist. Soc. of Mass.).

territory, issued January 1, 1863. The Army of the Potomac had not been paid for six months. Men who had enlisted under the conviction that their pay would enable them to support their families were daily receiving letters from the latter representing their destitution and distress. Friends and relatives of these men sent them packages of civilian clothing and did everything else that they could to assist them in escaping from the service and returning to their homes. The troops were deserting at an alarming rate.

On the 15th of February Hooker wrote to Army Headquarters, Washington, inclosing a statement of the absentees based upon the returns rendered him under his general order No. 3, copies of which he inclosed:

I would respectfully request that these returns may be placed in the hands of some bureau at Washington, with a view of informing the provost-marshals of the different states, or the proper authorities, of the names of all parties absent, and where they are likely to be found, in order that they may be returned to duty.

This return shows a total of 85,123 officers and men absent from this command when first placed in my charge.

The inclosure has never been published, but is on file in the War Department. The totals show that about one man in every ten on the rolls was in desertion or absent without leave.¹ The several corps, arranged inversely to their ratios of desertion, made the following showing. The commanders are those of January 31.

CORPS		DESERTERS PER 1000
1.	XI Corps (Stahel)	43
2.	II " (Howard)	90
3.	V " (Sykes)	91
4.	I " (Reynolds)	108
5.	III " (Sickles)	119
6.	VI " (Newton)	122
7.	XII " (Slocum)	136

Unauthorized intercourse between the pickets of the opposing armies had grown into a "custom of the service." Soldiers would cross the river to visit one another and trade, the usual exchange being Federal coffee for Confederate tobacco, or Northern for Southern newspapers. Such transactions were carried on, too, without crossing in person. The men would keep boats that they had fitted with square-rigged sails, and having loaded them, would head them for the opposite shore, and let them make their voyages alone.

¹ Hooker testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War: "At the time the army was turned over to me desertions were at the rate of about 200 a day" (*Rep. of Com., IV, 112*).

On the 20th of January the *Richmond Enquirer* published the following epistle as received by a Confederate picket:

January 17, 1863.

Gents on Confederate States duty:

We had the pleasure to receive your letter, and were very glad to find you in good spirits. We are sorry not to have any newspapers on hand, but will get some as soon as possible. We send you coffee whenever the wind permits us to do so. Can't one of you come over this evening in that little boat you have there? —we will not keep you. In the hope that Jeff Davis and Abe Lincoln will soon give us peace, we send best respects.

Co. A, 46TH REG'T, N. Y. S. V.

It may be that between armies as between nations trade is productive of mutual good will, and that messages more or less friendly passed between the opposing pickets, but the genuineness of this one is open to doubt for the reason that there was no such regiment in the Army of the Potomac as the 46th New York Volunteers.

A typical instance of how the racial kinship of the armies responded to touches of nature is here presented in the poetic form in which it has been happily commemorated:

MUSIC IN CAMP (DECEMBER 15-31, 1862)

.
A Federal band, which eve and morn
Played measures brave and nimble,
Had just struck up with flute and horn
And lively clash of cymbal.

Down flocked the soldiers to the bank,
Till margined by its pebbles
One wooded shore was blue with "Yanks,"
And one was gray with "Rebels."

Then all was still; and then the band,
With movements light and tricky,
Made stream and forest, hill and strand,
Reverberate with "Dixie."

The conscious stream, with burnished glów,
Went proudly o'er its pebbles,
But thrilled throughout its deepest flow
With yelling of the Rebels.

Again a pause, and then again
The trumpet pealed sonorous,
And "Yankee Doodle" was the strain
To which the shore gave chorus.

The laughing ripple shoreward flew
 To kiss the shining pebbles—
 Loud shrieked the crowding Boys in Blue
 Defiance to the Rebels.

And yet once more the bugle sang
 Above the stormy riot;
 No shout upon the evening rang,
 There reigned a holy quiet.

The sad, lone stream its noiseless tread
 Spread o'er the glistening pebbles;
 All silent now the Yankees stood;
 All silent stood the Rebels:

For each responsive soul had heard
 That plaintive note's appealing,
 So deeply "Home, Sweet Home" had stirred
 The hidden founts of feeling.¹

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¹ *Poems of American Patriotism*, chosen by J. Brander Matthews, p. 211.

CHAPTER IV

CHANGES IN THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. THE ABOLITION OF GRAND DIVISIONS. THE INTRODUCTION OF PACK-TRAINS. THE FORMATION OF ARTILLERY BATTALIONS IN THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. DISCIPLINE IN BOTH ARMIES. ADOPTION OF CORPS BADGES. SIGEL RELIEVED

HOOVER and his chief of staff applied themselves energetically to the improvement of the army in organization, equipment, and *morale*; they commenced by altering its organization as indicated in the following order issued February 5:

I. The division of the army into grand divisions, impeding rather than facilitating the dispatch of its current business; and the character of the service it is liable to be called upon to perform being adverse to the movement and operations of heavy columns, it is discontinued, and the corps organization is adopted in its stead. They will be commanded as follows:¹

First Corps, Major-General John F. Reynolds.
Second Corps, Major-General D. N. Couch.
Third Corps, Brigadier-General D. E. Sickles (temporarily).
Fifth Corps, Major-General George G. Meade.
Sixth Corps, Major-General John Sedgwick.
Eleventh Corps, Major-General Franz Sigel.
Twelfth Corps, Major-General H. W. Slocum.

II. Hereafter the corps will be considered as a unit for the organization of the artillery, and no transfers of batteries will be made from one corps or division to others except for purposes of equalization, and then only under the authority of the chief of artillery.

III. The cavalry of the army will be consolidated into one corps, under the command of Brigadier-General Stoneman, who will make the necessary assignments for detached duty.

The most noteworthy of these changes was the multiplication of the strategic or grand tactical units, the substitution of seven corps (eight, including the cavalry corps) for four grand divisions. If rightly viewed and interpreted, it augured ill for Hooker's generalship. The two reasons which he assigns for the change may be distinguished as adminis-

¹ These assignments to the command of the several corps were, by law, subject to approval by the President, and had yet to receive such approval.

THE REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY

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15,000. In 1852 he came to the United States, and became a teacher and the editor of a military magazine, first in New York and then in St. Louis.

At the outbreak of the war he was the rallying-point of the Germans of Missouri and the Northwest, raising the first German regiment. He was commissioned a brigadier-general in 1861, and major-general in 1862; participated in the fighting for the possession and control of Missouri, and commanded a corps under Pope in the second Bull Run campaign.¹

General Sigel was popular, not only in the large German element of the XI Corps and of the Army of the Potomac, but among Germans in all the armies and throughout the country. "I fights mit Sigel" was a shibboleth of German-Americans.

Hooker indorsed Sigel's request with the remarks:

Respectfully forwarded and reluctantly approved, as Major-General Sigel requests it. This officer is my senior, and feels that he should have the largest corps to command. In breaking up the grand divisions, I preserved the corps organizations, for in that seemed to be strength. The officers knew the men, and the men their officers.

The Major-General commanding the Eleventh Corps desires that the action of the proper authorities may be telegraphed as soon as made.

On the 19th this paper was referred by Halleck to the Secretary of War, and submitted by him to the President. His action thereon was telegraphed to Hooker in the form of the statement: "He has given General Sigel as good a command as he can, and desires him to do the best he can with it."² Sigel was not satisfied. He left the army on leave, and the command of his corps devolved temporarily upon Brigadier-General Julius Stahel, who had held it under him in the grand division.

The assignment of Brigadier-General Sickles, though "temporarily," to the command of the III Corps, gave offence to Major-General Howard, who commanded the Second Division of the II Corps. He wrote to Hooker requesting that he be assigned to command according to his rank. Sickles and Howard were both commissioned as major-generals on the 29th of November, 1862. Howard accepted his commission, thus becoming a major-general on that date; Sickles did not accept his, and so did not become a major-general until March 29, 1863. Not wishing to relieve Sickles, Hooker telegraphed on the 20th to the Secretary of War:

Has the resignation of Major-General Sigel been accepted, or is that officer to be removed from command of the XI Corps? I desire to ascertain in order that.

¹ *Appletons' Cyclopædia of American Biography.*

² *W. R.*, 40, pp. 70, 71.

ing fifty years, one year more than Hooker; the youngest was Howard, numbering but thirty-three. All were graduates of West Point, except Sickles, who was a well-known Democratic politician and member of Congress from New York. No two of these West Pointers were classmates, but Sedgwick was a classmate of Hooker's. Reynolds, Couch, Meade, and Sedgwick had served in the war with Mexico, and fought Indians either in Florida or on the Plains. Sickles, Howard, and Slocum had not the advantage of such experience. Stoneman was not in the Mexican War, but had served in the field against Indians. As commanding officer of Fort Brown, on the Lower Rio Grande, he refused to obey the order of his department commander, General Twiggs, to surrender the government property to the secessionists. He evacuated the fort, and went to New York by steamer. Meade, Couch, and Slocum had resigned from the army. Meade returned to it, however, in 1842. At the outbreak of the war Couch had been in civil life six years, and Slocum five. All were in the military service of the United States or came into it in 1861, and had participated in various campaigns of the Civil War.¹

Lee's two corps commanders, Jackson and Longstreet, were both graduates of West Point, and both served with distinction in the Mexican War. Longstreet served on the Plains before and after the Mexican War. Jackson had no such experience. In 1851, after a few years of garrison duty in the East, Jackson resigned from the army to accept a professorship of Natural and Experimental Philosophy, or Physics, at the Virginia Military Institute. He filled this position until 1861, when he exchanged it for a colonelcy in the Virginia State Line. The same year he was appointed a brigadier-general in the Provisional Army of the Confederacy. For distinguished service at the first Bull Run, where he won the name of Stonewall, he was promoted to major-general and given the independent command of the Valley District, comprising the Shenandoah Valley. His brilliant operations in this region, his masterly march from the Valley to the railroad north of Richmond and from the Rappahannock to the rear of Pope's army, and his able handling of a wing of Lee's army in the campaign of Antietam, brought him in October, 1862, promotion to lieutenant-general and appointment to the command of the II Army Corps. With this command he held the right of Lee's line at Fredericksburg. At the beginning of the Civil War he had less military experience than most, if not all, of the commanders on either side who had served in the "old army." But there were few, if any, who had mastered so much of the theory of war, and so perfectly disciplined their minds by the study of military and mathematical problems. By 1863 he had gained more war ex-

¹*Appletons' Cyclopædia of American Biography.*

...than any of them, with the single exception of R. E. Lee, and ...in the hearts of the people and the soldiers of the South.

...resigning from the army in 1861, was appointed a lieutenant-general in the Provisional Army of the Confederacy. He commanded a brigade at the first Bull Run. In 1862 he was made major-general. He commanded a division in the Peninsula campaign, a wing of Lee's army—Jackson commanding the other—in the second Bull Run campaign, and in the Antietam campaign. He was promoted to lieutenant-general and given command of a corps at the same time as Jackson, and with his corps held the left of Lee's line at Fredericksburg. In 1862 Longstreet was forty-two and Jackson thirty-nine years of age.

J. B. Stueart, Lee's chief of cavalry, was at this time but thirty years of age. Graduating from West Point six years after the Mexican War, he had no experience in regular warfare, but had served on the Texas and been wounded in an encounter with Indians. Resigning when his native state, Virginia, passed its ordinance of secession, he was appointed a lieutenant-colonel of infantry in the Virginia State Army. In July, 1862, he was appointed a colonel of cavalry in the Provisional Army of the Confederacy, and in September of the same year, a brigadier-general of cavalry. In July, 1862, he was promoted to major-general of cavalry. He had proved himself a master of the art of screening and reconnoitering, and had distinguished himself especially in two raids, one on the Peninsula, the Chickahominy raid, and one in Pennsylvania, the Chambersburg raid, in each of which he marched completely around McClellan's army.

General Hooker was the first commander of the Army of the Potomac, and the last one, to substitute pack-mules for army wagons extensively in that army. The coming of the pack-mule was announced by a special order, March 19, providing for the distribution of 2000 pack-saddles (Appendix 2). It made no mention of the cavalry corps or the artillery reserve, from which it was inferred that these commands were not to march with the army.

As compared with wagons, pack-mules require more men, and more animals to a given freight, take up more room on a road (if kept on it), and by leakage and drainage waste more of the freight. At every halt, wagon-mules can rest without being unharnessed or even unhitched—not perfectly, but far better than pack-mules can without being unpacked. To unpack a train of mules and afterward repack them, consumes so much time that it does not pay in halts of less than an hour's duration. It is harder on pack-mules to make the ordinary halts of five or ten minutes per hour than to keep going. Pack-trains are capable of traveling faster than wagon-trains, but to do this for any length of time without hardship they must be allowed to travel their own gait;

the troops must conform to the movements of the train or allow the train to travel independently, which in active campaigning is often inconvenient or unsafe. In a country covered with woods and underbrush, pack-mules straying off the roads will rub their loads loose and the packers exhaust themselves running after them. To obviate this, the mules in this campaign were tied together in strings of two or three, and led. Thus secured, they did not stray away, but instead of rubbing against trees, they rubbed against each other, with about the same effect upon the loads, and a worse effect upon their poor bodies. This arrangement must have been a cause of many of the sore backs engendered during the campaign.¹ The abolition of the grand divisions was unfortunate, but perhaps necessary. The introduction of the pack-trains was unfortunate and unnecessary, or ill advised. Another change made by Hooker to the detriment of the efficiency of his army was to strip his chief of artillery of all executive functions and so reduce him to his original purely administrative usefulness. He was not to take command of the troops, or to give any orders to the artillery, unless specially authorized to do so, and all such authority would "expire with the occasion."²

In the Army of Northern Virginia the only material change of organization took place in the artillery. The batteries were grouped into battalions generally of four batteries each, and these battalions assigned to corps. It was provided that all the artillery in both corps should "be superintended by, and report to, the general chief of artillery."³

There was no express provision for a general reserve of artillery, but one was formed of the batteries not assigned to an army corps or to the cavalry division.

The chiefs of artillery of the several corps assigned battalions to the divisions and to the reserves of the corps; that is, they determined the composition of the divisional artillery and corps artillery, and could change it by the transfer of battalions at their discretion. They had tactical as well as administrative control of the artillery; in the absence of specific instructions from the army commander, or their corps commanders, they were in action to direct the posting and firing of their batteries or battalions, as well as at all times to keep them properly supplied and instructed, and generally serviceable and efficient.

The Federals had no unit corresponding exactly to the artillery battalion of the Confederates, but the groups of batteries attached to the Federal corps and divisions served the purpose of battalions. They were, however, considerably weaker than the latter. The corps and divisional groups (including the single divisional batteries) of the Army

¹ For a full discussion of the transportation of the Army of the Potomac, the reader is referred to *W. R.*, 40, pp. 544-563.

² Hunt's testimony, *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 91-93.

³ *W. R.*, 40, p. 625.

of the Potomac numbered, on an average, but two batteries, or twelve pieces.

In the Army of Northern Virginia each corps had its reserve, or corps artillery; in the Army of the Potomac, corps artillery existed only in the II and XI Corps. The Federal drill regulations for artillery issued March 1, 1863, contained the following statement: "The *artillery reserve* is commanded by a superior officer of artillery, and constitutes a distinct arm of battle under the immediate orders of the general commanding." This artillery was to be kept in rear of the infantry until the enemy's force had been fully developed, then to be brought up and its fire concentrated upon the point selected for the decisive attack.

In the cavalry the Smith's carbines were condemned at this time, and replaced by the Sharp's. The latter had not the range and penetration of the infantry rifle, nor the rapidity of fire of the Spencer repeating carbine, which was later to take its place, but its fire was so much more rapid than that of the infantry rifle that the Federal cavalry dismounted would confidently withstand the attacks of much more numerous forces of infantry.

Under Hooker the inspector-general's department was not so much reorganized as created.¹ Vacancies were filled by competent officers, and the corps increased so as liberally to provide inspectors for all arms. Colonel E. Schriener was announced as inspector-general and Lieutenant-Colonel N. H. Davis as assistant inspector-general. There were inspectors of infantry, inspectors of cavalry, and inspectors of artillery. Each brigade had an inspector, and the inspectors themselves were organized thoroughly under the head of the inspector-general of the Army of the Potomac. There were frequent formal inspections of the regiments, and these inspections were extended to the outposts and pickets, which up to this time had been under the supervision simply of the officers commanding the troops (*Appendix 3*).

A proclamation of President Lincoln issued on the 10th of March held out a promise of complete amnesty to all absentees who should rejoin their regiments before the 1st of April. The President had relinquished his right to review the sentences of courts-martial. It was with his approval that Hooker, on the 14th of March, issued the following order:

III. Officers reviewing the proceedings of court-martial will hereafter withhold their approval from sentences which cannot be carried into effect within the limits of this army. When such [sentences] are awarded the court will be directed to reconsider its action.²

There were no more delays in the execution of military law, no more appeals to Washington, which Lincoln's humanity always terminated

¹ *History of the II Army Corps*, by F. A. Walker, pp. 202, 203.

² *W. R.*, 40, p. 137.

by a commutation of penalty. Deserters were arrested, and promptly tried, sentenced, and punished accordingly. The spectacle of a few of them shot to death in the presence of the troops produced a most salutary effect.¹

Capital punishment was at this time familiar also to the Army of Northern Virginia. General Paxton, commanding the "Stonewall" brigade, wrote home on the 15th:

To-day I had a visit from the father and mother of a poor fellow who has been tried by a court-martial for cowardice. She was in great distress and said it would be bad enough to have her boy shot by the enemy, but she did not think she could survive his being shot by our own men. . . . I have about twenty of my men in close confinement, whose sentences have not been published, many of whom are condemned to death. It is for General Lee to determine what shall be done with them.²

A creation of Hooker's hardly less important than the inspector-general's department was his service of information.

When General Hooker assumed command of the army there was not a record or document of any kind at headquarters of the army that gave any information at all in regard to the enemy. There was no means, no organization, and no apparent effort, to obtain such information. And we were almost as ignorant of the enemy in our immediate front as if they had been in China. An efficient organization for that purpose was established, by which we were soon enabled to get correct and proper information of the enemy, their strength, and their movements. . . . I called Colonel [G. H.] Sharpe, commanding a regiment of New York troops [120th], to headquarters, and put him in charge of that bureau [Military Information] as a separate and special bureau.³

Colonel Sharpe was appointed deputy provost-marshal-general. This appointment, together with a number of others, was published to the army in a general order on the 30th of March.

Flags were prescribed for the designation of army-corps headquarters, and badges to be worn on the caps of officers and soldiers to indicate the corps and division to which they belonged (*Appendix 4*).

The provision regarding flags to designate corps headquarters was not generally carried out, but the badges became popular among both officers and men. They may be said to have originated with General Kearney on the Peninsula in 1862. That officer, experiencing the disadvantage of not being able readily to recognize the men and officers of his corps, required them to wear for their identification a patch of red cloth

¹ *History of the Civil War in America*, by Comte de Paris, III, 3, 4; *Mag. of Am. Hist.*, XV, 193.

² *Memoir and Memorials of Brigadier-*

General E. F. Paxton, by his son J. G. Paxton, pp. 92, 93.

³ *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 74.

on their caps, which came to be known as "Kearney's patch." The idea of corps badges to be worn throughout the army was suggested to Hooker by Butterfield, who devised the badges in detail.

How the vitally important problem of supplying ammunition was to be solved was prescribed in an order issued on the 25th of March.¹ We shall see that it did not prove an effective solution.

The evils of discomfort and disease among the men, due largely to neglect and ignorance on the part of their regimental officers, were remedied pursuant to recommendations made by the medical director.²

On the 7th of February the following order was issued at the request of the chief commissary:

Flour or soft bread will be issued at the depots to commissaries for at least four issues per week to the troops. Fresh potatoes or onions, if practicable, for two issues per week. Dried mixed vegetables or potatoes for one issue per week.

Commanders of army corps, divisions, brigades, and separate commands will require any commissary under their orders who fails to issue the above-named stores to the command to which he is attached, and as often as stated, to produce written statement of his supplies to the effect that they were not on hand at the depot for issue to him, or otherwise to satisfactorily account for his failure.

The soldiers' fare was further improved by an act of Congress providing for the supervision of the cooking by both medical and line officers; for the detailing of privates as cooks, and the enlistment, in each company, of "two under-cooks of African descent," who should receive for their compensation ten dollars per month and one ration per day. The same act provided for the issue of pepper in the proportion of four ounces to every hundred rations.³

By these measures and others the health of the army was improved (Appendix 3).

¹ See the 10th reg. 104th reg. Extracts from this order will be found in foot-note, pp. 103, 104, 105.

² *Memorandum to Hooker, March 3*

"I have the honor to invite the attention of the Commanding General to a positive rule prevalent in this army: that of excavating the earth building a hut over the hole, and covering it over with board and dirt or canvas. This system is exceedingly pernicious, and must have a disastrous effect upon the health of the troops occupying these miserable habitations. They are liable to the loss of their lives, and when not immediate of such disease, the health of the men is undoubtedly lost if they are

not compelled to report sick. I strongly recommend that all troops that are using such huts be directed at once to discontinue their use, and that they be moved to new ground, and either build new huts or live in tents. I also recommend that, in huts covered by canvas, the covering be removed at least twice a week, if the weather will permit, and that the men throughout the Army be compelled to hang their bedding in the open air every clear day" (*Medical Recollections of the Army of the Potomac*, pp. 103, 104).

³ "An act to improve the efficiency of the corps of engineers and of the ordnance department, and for other purposes, approved March 3, 1863," Sections 8-11.

Tobacco, the soldier's solace, was regularly issued, and an occasional issue of whisky was made upon return from severe exposure on picket or fatigue duty. The clothing, often before of shoddy material, was carefully inspected and furnished of better quality.¹

The general state of the opposing armies as to numbers and efficiency at the end of the first month of spring is shown in the following table:²

*State of the Army of the Potomac and of the Army of Northern Virginia,
Officers and Men, March 31, 1863*

PRESENT					
	FOR DUTY	SPECIAL EXTRA OR DAILY DUTY	SICK	IN ARREST OR CONFINEMENT	AGGRE- GATE
Army of the Potomac . . .	136,724	13,000	11,936	1,345	163,005
Army of Northern Virginia . .	64,799	5,050	6,308	1,222	77,379
ABSENT					
	DETACHED SERVICE	WITH LEAVE	SICK	WITHOUT LEAVE	AGGRE- GATE
Army of the Potomac . . .	20,188	3,058	26,575	1,941	51,762
Army of Northern Virginia . .	6,251	4,140	16,136	5,953	32,480
PRESENT AND ABSENT					
Army of the Potomac	214,767				
Army of Northern Virginia	109,859				

The figures for the Army of Northern Virginia include Hampton's brigade, which was absent recruiting and remounting, and Jones' troops in the Valley District. They do not include the artillery of Jackson's corps,³ but on the whole they are somewhat larger than they should be for the army confronting Hooker. They show, however, that the ratio of sickness, the ratio of absence (with and without leave), and the ratio of punishment were smaller in the Federal army than in the Confederate.

One of the most potent causes of desertion in the Army of the Potomac was the scarcity of furloughs and leaves of absence. Hooker, under some difficulties, did much to satisfy the natural desire of officers and men for such privileges (*Appendix 6*).

One of his chief measures for reforming the Army of the Potomac was the institution of regular theoretical and practical instruction. Both seem, however, to have been conducted on narrow lines, the theoretical instruction being limited to recitations on the drill regulations, or tactics, as they were then called; and the practical instruction, to drills in the school of the company, battalion, regiment, and brigade.⁴ Field exercises, it seems, were few and far between, and on

¹ *Mag. of Am. Hist.*, XV, 190.

³ *W. R.*, 39, p. 695.

² Unpublished record of the War Department.

⁴ *Reminiscences of Service in the 1 R. I. Cavalry*, by G. N. Bliss, p. 14.

a small scale. There was practically nothing done for the training of corps and division commanders and their staffs under conditions of battle; no manœuvering of large units in the presence of a marked or represented enemy. The author can find nothing corroborative of Hooker's testimony on this point before the Committee on the Conduct of the War:

Believing idleness to be the great evil of all armies, every effort was made to keep the troops employed; and whenever the weather would permit it, they were engaged in field exercises, and whenever the state of the roads and the river would admit of a movement, expeditions were fitted out to attack the enemy's pickets and outposts, and gather supplies from the country in their possession; my object being to encourage and stimulate in the breasts of our men, by successes, however small, a feeling of superiority over our adversaries.

Both Hooker and Lee attended to fostering and developing the martial spirit of their armies by the bestowing of medals, the inscription of the names of battles on the flags, etc. (*Appendix 7*).

A weak point of the Army of the Potomac, to which Hooker and his chief of staff gave special attention, was the performance of outpost duty. Its improvement was slow and difficult of achievement (*Appendix 8*).

The boundary line between Maryland and Virginia, commencing on the seacoast, divides a peninsula into two parts, known as the "Eastern Shore" of Maryland and the "Eastern Shore" of Virginia. The latter region, which would seem geographically to belong to Maryland, was included in the act of secession by which Virginia joined the Confederacy. A portion of its population carried on regular traffic in contraband goods with people of the mainland of Virginia. By a system of daily communication between the Confederate commanders and their allies in Baltimore, full information was obtained of the disposition and movement of the Federal forces and the designs of the Federal government. To put a stop to these practices a Federal force marched into the Eastern Shore of Virginia in 1861. Though the country was occupied by Federal troops from that time on, it was not so controlled but that the Confederates whom it continued to harbor could ply their hostile vocation, as the following correspondence shows:

Haupt to Wells, Secretary of the Navy, January 31

I am informed that an extensive smuggling business is done near the mouth of the Potomac, opposite St. George's Island, in small boats, which are secreted in the creeks or drawn up in the bushes and used at night; that in this way mails are carried and many wagon-loads of shoes and other necessities transported to Richmond. The trade could be broken up, or seriously interfered with, by

searching for and seizing all the boats and by the establishment of an efficient river patrol.¹

Butterfield to Magaw, February 1

General Hooker desires that you should use every exertion to stop the passage of small boats conveying deserters from the army across the Potomac. It is believed that large numbers cross the Potomac in small boats above and below Aquia Creek. Any person detected in this occupation by your efforts, he requests be turned over to the provost-marshal at Aquia Creek, with written memoranda of the circumstances attending their capture.

I believe that spies and contraband information are conveyed across the Rappahannock below the lines of our army.

¹ *Naval W. R.*, Series I, Vol. V, p. 226.

CHAPTER V

MOVEMENT OF A DETACHMENT TO RAPPAHANNOCK BRIDGE. THE IX CORPS AND HOOD'S AND PICKETT'S DIVISIONS DETACHED. LEE'S AND HOOKER'S CONJECTURES

ON the 5th of February a Federal force of three regiments of cavalry and a battery of artillery, supported by a division of infantry (altogether about 15,800 men), started from Falmouth under orders to go up the river and destroy the Rappahannock Bridge. The purpose of this destruction was probably a twofold one—to check the enterprises of the Confederate cavalry against the Federal outposts, and to sever one of the lines of communication between Lee's army and the Shenandoah Valley. The bridge had been destroyed by Federal troops the summer before and been rebuilt by the enemy.

The weather was exceedingly bad. Snow, hail, and rain succeeded one another all day and all night, and half of the next day. The expedition camped the first night at Grove Church in a rain which froze as it fell.

The following day, while the infantry and artillery guarded the lower fords, the cavalry pushed on to the bridge. A vigorous fire was opened on the enemy in rifle-pits on the south side of the river. Under cover of this fire and of a stone pier near the north side, a party got under the bridge and cut a number of the posts. Its attempt to fire the bridge failed on account of the dampness of the timber, together with the fact that the troops were not provided with combustibles, or incendiary material. To make a success it was necessary to drive the enemy away from his position on the south bank and gain at least temporary possession of the bridge. This was more than the cavalry alone was equal to, and it was not attempted. The work of destruction having been thus imperfectly accomplished, the whole expedition returned to Falmouth, where it arrived on the 8th. The causes of its failure were the bad weather, the lack of combustibles, and the resistance offered or threatened at the crossing by Wade Hampton's brigade of cavalry, which the Federals thought to be two brigades and to number about 4000 men.¹ The little damage done to the bridge was soon repaired.

¹ For reports, see W. R., 38, pp. 7-9; for orders and correspondence, 39, 40, pp. 45-49.

The Confederate horsemen continued to prowl about the Federal outposts and made occasional dashes at them, but the progress which Hooker made in the instruction of his army and the improvement of its *morale* caused a diminution in the frequency and effectiveness of such enterprises. General Lee found increasing difficulty in keeping himself posted as to what was going on in the Federal camp.

When Burnside resigned his position as army commander he went North on leave of absence. The following order was issued February 4:

II. The Ninth Corps, under Major-General William F. Smith, will embark for Fort Monroe without delay. . . . On arriving at Fort Monroe, Major-General Smith will report to Major-General Dix for further orders. . . .

It was not until after the movement was well under way that Dix received the following communication from Halleck, dated the 9th instant:

The Ninth Army Corps, ordered to your command, will be used as you may deem proper. It, however, should be kept together as much as possible. A portion of it may be ordered farther south immediately.

By the 11th most of the corps, numbering about 15,000 men, arrived and disembarked at Newport News. Lee wrote as follows:

To Seddon, February 14

This evening I received information from scouts on the enemy's right up to the 12th instant. Two report that the Ninth Army Corps of General Hooker's army had embarked at Belle Plain, and sailed for Suffolk; that a large fleet of transports was at Aquia Creek, and there was other evidence of a general move. I have directed General Pickett's division¹ to march to-morrow for Richmond, and General Hood's division² to be held in readiness. One of the scouts reported that it was the Second Army Corps which had embarked for Suffolk. Although it is stated that their destination is Suffolk [Virginia], should no other troops follow, I think it probable that this corps is intended to reënforce their army in South Carolina. . . .

February 15

. . . demonstrations by the enemy upon points of our communications through North Carolina are to be expected, to prevent reënforcements reaching Charleston [South Carolina].³

It seems to me to be the policy of the enemy now to apply his whole strength to take Charleston, and it is proper for us to expect him to do what he ought to do. Unless therefore his conduct enables us to draw a different conclusion, we ought, if possible, to be prepared for him there.⁴

¹ Longstreet's corps.

² *Ib.*

³ The principal port of entry of Confederate blockade-runners.

⁴ The Federals were in fact preparing an operation against Charleston to be executed by Admiral Dupont. It was afterward known as the Dupont expedition.

On the 15th he ordered Hood's division to follow Pickett's, and wrote to Stuart that, if on his arrival at Culpeper he should find that the opportunity of striking a damaging blow was greater on the Potomac than in the Shenandoah Valley, he should "give precedence to the former, and take measures accordingly."

The movement of the Federal IX Corps south had, perhaps naturally, given more apprehension to Davis than to Lee. It was only to comply with Davis' wish expressed in a letter from Seddon dated and received to-day that Lee ordered the movement of Hood's division.¹ While Lee was responsible for detaching one of his divisions at this time, Davis was responsible for his detaching two.

Following is the composition and organization of these detachments as given in field returns of March 9 and 10.² The numbers stand for officers and men Present for Duty.

Hood's division ($\frac{1}{2}$)	6,965
Pickett's division ($\frac{1}{2}$)	6,169
Lane's battery, unattached	133
Grand total	13,267

Thus the departure of the IX Corps from the Army of the Potomac had caused the departure of about an equal force, but a considerably larger portion, from the Army of Northern Virginia. Would the IX Corps keep this detachment from rejoining Lee's army? It was too soon for Hooker to be forming conjectures in this regard, as he had not yet learned that the detachment was made.

The serious question in Lee's mind was how much, if any, of the remainder of Hooker's army was to withdraw from his front. Was the IX Corps only an advance-guard to be followed by the main body of the Army of the Potomac, or was the remainder of the army to go elsewhere? On these points he kept up an active correspondence with the authorities in Richmond.

It appears therefrom that both Lee and Seddon were in doubt as to how much of Hooker's army was in front of Lee, and what it was doing or preparing to do (*Appendix 9*). Reconnoitering below Fredericksburg was obstructed by the broad Rappahannock and the Federal vessels that occasionally patrolled it. On the 21st Brigadier-General W. H. F. Lee, with his brigade of cavalry, appeared opposite a couple of gunboats and cannonaded them with two pieces of horse artillery. One of the vessels was hit twice and injured beyond repair outside of a navy yard.³ But the affair yielded no information of any value to General

¹ Lee to Seddon and to Davis, February 16, 1863, *W. R.*, 40, p. 627.

² *Ib.*, 26, pp. 915, 916.

³ *Naval W. R.*, Series I, Vol. V, p. 235; *Mag. of Am. Hist.*, XV, 193; *W. R.*, 39, p. 20.

Lee. An attempt made to force the Federal picket at United States Ford with the cavalry posted opposite to it failed. Spies did not furnish the information wanted; there was nothing left but to make a vigorous dash through the Federal outposts. This operation was intrusted to General Fitzhugh Lee. His execution of it, which will be described under the title *The Skirmish at Hartwood Church*, was so far successful that it satisfied Lee as to the presence of Hooker's army in his front and the general disposition of its masses, but it did not set him right as to the force that had been detached.¹

On the 26th of February, Lee heard unofficially of the result of Fitzhugh Lee's reconnaissance and wrote to President Davis:

. . . I have only learned positively of three army corps of the enemy having descended the Potomac. . . . Franklin's former grand division, detached to Newport News, is probably intended for Burnside, and I see it announced in Northern papers that he is to repair immediately to his new command without stating where. I think the scene of his operations will be south of James River. . . . I believe for the present the purpose on the part of Hooker of crossing the Rappahannock is abandoned, and that the late storms or other causes have suspended the movements recently in progress down the river. The disposition I have described may be intended to continue the remainder of the winter, or until their conscript law becomes operative.²

With better information, he wrote on the 28th to the Secretary of War:

One of my scouts, who has been on the Potomac for the past ten days, reports on the 26th that everything has been quiet on the river for the past week, only three or four steamers passing up and down during the day. A great many sail-vessels and a great deal of hay descending. From the number of transports and their capacity, he estimates that 15,000 or 20,000 troops have passed down since the 9th.³ I think it probable this is Burnside's command, with which he will endeavor to advance south of James River, while General Hooker pursues this route. The army in front of us at present is certainly very large. . . .

The design, which Lee attributes to Burnside, of pushing into Virginia to the south of the James River, does not appear to have been entertained by any Federal commander. Hooker knew that the Army of Northern Virginia had been weakened by detachments, but was deceived as to the strength and purposes of the detachments, and as to the

¹ Only the IX Corps had been detached. It had been reported to Lee that, in addition to Burnside's corps, Franklin's former grand division, which consisted of the I and VI Corps, had moved down the Potomac. Burnside had no command at this time.

² Lee refers here doubtless to the draft, the law for which was not passed until March 3, and did not go into effect until October 17.

³ The IX Corps actually numbered about 15,000 men (*W. R.*, 40, p. 538).

impression made upon Lee by the transfer of the IX Corps. He telegraphed

To Kelton, about 2:30 p.m., February 25

Information from deserters, contraband, and citizens, received within the past two or three days, when compared and collated, seems to corroborate the following statement: That the enemy have decreased their forces in our front; that two or more divisions of Longstreet's corps have gone to Tennessee and South Carolina; that the enemy are under the impression that we are evacuating from Aquia, leaving a sufficient force to keep Lee's army in front of us. . . . Jackson's corps is left to guard the passage of the river. Ransom's division, of Longstreet's corps, is one mentioned as gone to Tennessee or South Carolina.¹ Pickett's division is one gone to Charleston, commencing their departure February 17.² . . .

Lee had now a fairly correct estimate of the detachment made from Hooker's army and knew where the detachment was. Hooker had greatly overestimated the detachment made from Lee's army, and had very erroneous ideas as to its location or distribution. But neither Lee nor Hooker doubted that he would have to do with his opponent's main force on the Rappahannock.

The officers and men present for duty at this time in the Southern Section of the theater of war were disposed as follows:³

FEDERAL

<i>Department of Virginia, under Dix, headquarters Fort Monroe, Va. . . .</i>	35,187
<i>Department of North Carolina, under Foster, headquarters New Berne, N. C.</i>	15,808
	50,995

CONFEDERATE

<i>Department of Virginia and North Carolina, under Longstreet, headquarters Petersburg, Va.</i>	43,239
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While 50,995 Federals were divided between two separate departments, powerless to move from one to the other without permission or orders from Washington, the 43,239 Confederates were included in a single department, within which the department commander could move them at his discretion.

On the 1st of April the command of Lieutenant-General Longstreet was reorganized as three departments, all under the supervision and general direction of General Lee: the Department of Richmond, under

¹ Ransom's division was in North Carolina.

² Pickett's division and Hood's were in front of Suffolk, Va., under Longstreet.

³ *W. R.*, 38, 135, 346, 347, 388, 900, 901, 915, 916.

Major-General Elzey, headquarters Richmond; the Department of Southern Virginia, under Major-General French, headquarters at some central point near Blackwater; and the Department of North Carolina, under Major-General D. H. Hill, headquarters Goldsboro.¹

General Longstreet was authorized to transfer troops from any one of these new departments to another.

Lee's conviction as to the location of the IX Corps was probably not disturbed until he received the following communication from Longstreet, dated March 17:

The force at Newport News is reported to-day as moving to reënforce Suffolk. I fear that the real object is to join Foster at New Berne. If this is the intention I shall be obliged to move all of Pickett's division down to Goldsboro.

At this time the First and Second Divisions of the IX Corps were at Newport News, and the Third Division had been sent by General Dix to Suffolk.² The divisions at Newport News were ordered to move to the Department of the Ohio, to the command of which General Burnside was assigned on the 16th.

On the 30th Lee wrote to Longstreet:

One of our scouts reports, under date of 29th instant, that he was in Washington and Baltimore the first of last week, and that Burnside's corps left Newport News at that time for the West. . . . The *New York Times* of the 25th and the *Washington Chronicle* of the 26th state that Burnside was in Cincinnati on the 24th and is charged with the defence of Kentucky, but do not mention his troops. Can you not ascertain definitely whether these statements are correct?³

Longstreet replied the same day:

The troops have left Newport News; embarked on Friday and Saturday [27th and 28th]; supposed to have gone to North Carolina. My informant says they sailed for North Carolina.⁴

Longstreet's informant was mistaken; there was no such movement. Lee seems to have known it, for he wrote to Davis on the 2d of April:

I believe General Burnside with his corps has gone to Kentucky.⁵

On the 4th Longstreet wrote to Lee:

All my information is to the effect that half at least of Burnside's command is still at Suffolk.⁶

¹ *W. R.*, 26, p. 953.

² *Ib.*, 26, pp. 558, 562.

³ *Ib.*, 26, pp. 949, 950.

⁴ *Ib.*, 26, p. 948.

⁵ Burnside was at this time in command of the Department of the Ohio, which comprised, besides the state of Ohio, the states of Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan, eastern

Kentucky, and so much of eastern Tennessee as the Federals had possession of. Two divisions of his corps were moving from Newport News, Va., to serve under him. His headquarters were at Cincinnati, O.

⁶ *W. R.*, 26, pp. 959, 960.

Lee replied on the 6th:

I think you will find none of Burnside's corps opposed to you. . . . Burnside's corps has certainly gone west.¹

Here Longstreet was nearer right than Lee, as one of Burnside's divisions was still in Virginia, in front of Longstreet.

¹ W. R., 26, pp. 966, 967.

CHAPTER VI

THE SKIRMISH AT HARTWOOD CHURCH. CHANGES IN THE FEDERAL OUTPOSTS.
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN AVERELL AND FITZHUGH LEE. "WHO EVER SAW
A DEAD CAVALRYMAN?"

THIS chapter is devoted for the greater part to an affair of outposts, which had no effect upon either army as a whole, but which throws light upon the *morale* and the tactical efficiency of the cavalry in each one. For this reason the operation is described in some detail.

On the 23d of February Lee telegraphed to Fitzhugh Lee at Culpeper Court-House to take his brigade and break through the Federal outposts on the Falmouth Road, and ascertain what was occurring behind them (Map 2). The Federal outposts were of extra strength. On the right and rear a double cordon, formed of an inner one of infantry and an outer one of cavalry, extended from west of Dumfries to west of Falmouth; along the front a cordon of infantry connected the double cordon on the right with another double cordon on the left; the latter covered the left flank of the army from the Rappahannock to the Potomac. Each cordon was formed in three lines. The outer or picket line consisted of sentinels or videttes (mounted sentinels) backed up at a distance of a few hundred yards by picket posts or picket reliefs. The sentinels or videttes were commonly spoken of as pickets. The second or middle line, stationed one to two miles in rear of the picket line, consisted of the main reserves, called supports, or line of resistance. The third line was formed of the Grand or General Reserve, now called the Reserve. The pickets were changed every three days, or, including a day for going and coming, every four days. The sentinels were posted mounted—in other words, as videttes—and relieved every two hours, being two hours on post and four hours off. The posts were single or double. The videttes were instructed to keep their revolvers or carbines always in hand, prepared to fire instantly, if necessary. The officers of the picket visited the line frequently by day and by night, and a visiting patrol passed up and down the line every hour. The supports were posted in deep hollows or other concealed places where fires were allowed, the men remaining dismounted, with the privilege of making themselves as comfortable as possible, but always keeping themselves ready for action. The horses were not allowed to be unsaddled except a few at a time, for the purpose of being cleaned, and when this was done the saddles were at once replaced.

The general cordon of outposts was divided into sections and assigned by section to particular commands to guard. The cavalry outposts were assigned by General Stoneman to divisions as follows:

From the Occoquan River and Cedar Run (Map 1, sheet A) to Aquia Creek, to the First Division (Pleasanton).

From Aquia Creek to the vicinity of Falmouth, to the Second Division (Averell).

From Corbin, on the Rappahannock, to the Potomac, to the Third Division (Gregg).¹

These division sections were subdivided into minor sections which were assigned to brigades.

Describing the cavalry outposts, Captain Frank W. Hess, 3 Artillery, U. S. Army, formerly first lieutenant, 3 Pa. Cavalry, says:

Much of this line was through a densely wooded country. These forests had once been cultivated land, but had been abandoned as such, and were now thickly studded with a dense growth of small pines, the foliage of which was so dense as to prevent one from seeing for more than a rod or two through them, and they were threaded by innumerable paths. The enemy's cavalry was on the opposite bank of the Rappahannock—right bank—which in the low stage of the water could be forded in many places. From these camps it was an easy matter for him to detach commands of from two to five hundred men, send them across the river at various places; and, by the hidden roads which his men knew so well, concentrate on any given point on the line, and drive in or capture our pickets. These forays were numerous during the winter and very annoying to our people. Every inhabitant in this country was in full sympathy with the enemy, and no matter how frequently the posts of our videttes were changed and the reserves moved, it was but a short time until the precise location was known at the headquarters on the other side of the river. Women and children as well as men took a patriotic pride in giving information as to our movements, and vied with each other in schemes and ruses by which to discover and convey to the enemy facts which we strove to conceal. On the other hand, information of the enemy's position and intentions could be procured by us only by personal observation, and for this purpose frequent reconnaissances were made in considerable force, before which he always gave way, retiring to his own side of the river.²

In compliance with his instructions, Fitzhugh Lee set out at 9 a.m. on the 24th with detachments of the 1st, 2d, and 3d regiments of Virginia Cavalry, numbering together about 400 men, provided with three days' rations and as much corn as the men could well carry on their horses, marched through Stevensburg, and crossed the Rappahannock at Kelley's Ford.³

¹ *W. R.*, 40, pp. 62, 72, 79, 91, 96, 97.

² *First Maine Bugle*, 1893.

³ The strength given above of Fitzhugh Lee's command is taken from his report to R. E. Lee (*W. R.*, 39, p. 25).

At least one other regiment of his brigade (4 Va.) probably supported the brigade by covering its flank or rear. One of the companies of this regiment (the Black Horse Cavalry) participated in the attack which

The river was so high as to swim low horses; the ground covered with about fifteen inches of snow; and the roads almost impassable. But there was no opposition. Confederate scouts pushed on to the Federal outposts. About noon there was some firing between them and the Federal pickets. The commander of the outpost near Hartwood Church, Lieutenant-Colonel Jones of the 3 Pa. Cavalry, reported to Averell at brigade headquarters that he felt satisfied that the enemy would attack at some point on his line (some 10 or 11 miles long) and asked for reinforcements. Averell's reply was: "If the enemy attack, whip him." Jones directed the utmost care and vigilance to be observed during the night, and only lay down himself two or three hours, giving orders that he be waked before daylight.¹ Fitzhugh Lee bivouacked at Morrisville. About 8 a.m. on the 25th he resumed his march by the Warrenton Post Road. About 9:30 four of his troopers were seen at the Federal outposts and fired on.² After the usual breakfast hour at Jones' headquarters a report was brought to him, probably in the vicinity of Berea Church, that the left of his line had been attacked³ and had repulsed the attacking force. He detailed a party of 2 officers and 20 men of the support to go out beyond the picket line, follow the enemy, and bring back a report of what his force was. The party came upon a company of the enemy and had a slight skirmish with him in a ravine. It narrowly escaped being surrounded and captured, but slipped away and returned toward the support. On the way, marching by file along a narrow path through mud and snow, it fell in with six companies of the 4 Va. Cavalry, and was captured to a man.

Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, after detaching this party, ordered the support to form line, standing to horse, and await developments. With one or two orderlies he rode out toward Hartwood Church.

Lee's column, approaching by the Warrenton Post Road, passed Grove Church and Hartwood Church without incident worth mentioning. About 11:30 a.m., not far from Hartwood Church, his advance came upon three of Jones' videttes (probably forming what is now called a Cossack post). Three of his own men, wearing Federal overcoats, approached them without being required to dismount. Immediately these videttes were themselves made to dismount and march off as prisoners.⁴ This was all done without the discharge of a firearm. Through the opening thus quietly made the column dashed down the road, past or over the picket reserve, or picket post, without drawing its fire.

Jones was in the vicinity of Hamet when he was met by an officer

was made on the Federal outposts (Letter of Lieutenant-Colonel Carter in McClellan's *Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry*, p. 205).

¹ *History of the 3 Pa. Cav.*, by Committee, pp. 189, 190.

² *Sabres and Spurs*, by Chaplain Frederic Denison, p. 204.

³ *History of the 3 Pa. Cav.*, by Committee, p. 190.

⁴ *Ib.*

shouting that the enemy was charging down the road. Immediately a squad came toward him at full speed, filling the road, and commenced firing at him.

It was now about noon. The outpost was about to be changed. The new detail was with the General Reserve. Portions were being told off for the supports, when firing was heard in the direction of Hartwood Church, and Lieutenant-Colonel Jones came in from the front with the report that his line was being driven in.

Lee's command was pushing on in two columns after the fleeing pickets: one column, consisting of the 1 and part of the 2 Va., by the Ridge Road; the other, consisting of the 3 Va. and the remainder of the 2, by the Warrenton Road. The new detail for this part of the Federal outpost consisted of six squadrons of various regiments, numbering about 600 men, under Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson of the 1 R. I. The colonel at once forwarded a squadron, about 100 men, to the relief of the old pickets. With the remainder of his force he moved forward about half a mile by the Ridge Road and rapidly formed line. He had hardly done so when Lee's right column was heard charging with loud yells past his left. Seeing his rear thus threatened, he detached two squadrons, about 200 men, by the Warrenton Road, against the charging column, retaining in hand three squadrons, one of the 4 N. Y. and two of the 16 Pa., altogether about 300 men. The two squadrons which he last detached had hardly gotten under way when Lee's left column came dashing upon his (Thompson's) three squadrons.

Two of the squadrons [those of the 16 Pa.] had never been under fire; the other [the 4 N. Y., a German regiment] had been, but had not been known to stay long under such circumstances; and the present occasion did not seem to be the one upon which to vary the rule. Accordingly, with the greatest alacrity, they [of the 4 N. Y.] broke by individuals to run to the rear. The other two squadrons [16 Pa.], after firing a few shots from their carbines, instead of obeying Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson's order to charge, followed the example of the departed squadron, and, considering the condition of the roads, made very good time to the rear.¹

The two squadrons detached to the Warrenton Road were also driven back. Lee penetrated with his right column to a point about a mile beyond Hamet, where he was repulsed by the infantry outpost of the III Corps; and with his left as far as Wallace, where he was checked by a dismounted party of the 3 Pa. Cavalry.² Thereupon, finding himself assailed by mounted troops and apprehending an attack in force, he rallied his columns and commenced retiring by echelon, making occasional

¹ *Sabres and Spurs*, by F. Denison, p. 202.

² McClellan, in his *Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry* (p. 204), says that Fitzhugh Lee came in sight of the camp of the V Corps.

Fitzhugh Lee's memorandum of the information which he obtained, inclosed in his report to Robert E. Lee, can not be found (*W. R.*, 39, p. 25).

counter-attacks upon his pursuers. About 7 p.m., having shaken off the Federal cavalry, he took up the march for Morrisville.

About 3 o'clock in the afternoon Averell received a report that the enemy was in force in front of his line of videttes, and in the vicinity of Hartwood Church. *Boots and saddles* was immediately sounded in his camp. He transmitted the report by courier to Stoneman, with the statement that he had sent to find out what was happening, and would let him know the result. He also reported by telegraph to Williams, Hooker's adjutant-general, and in reply was instructed to send a brigade to the point attacked. At 3:30 his 2d brigade was on the march for Hartwood Church.¹

Stoneman forwarded the report which he received to Williams by courier, and before he heard from Averell as to "the result of his investigation," was called to Hooker's headquarters. When he arrived there Hooker had received further information, among which was the following from Sickles, commanding the III Corps:

About 2 o'clock [this p.m.] the enemy's cavalry in force drove in our videttes and approached within twenty yards of my infantry sentinels. Lieutenant-Colonel Cummins, 124 New York, opened fire on the assailants, and drove them back with loss. The attack was not renewed. Considerable firing was heard on the right of Colonel Bailey [general officer of Sickles' outposts]. It was reported that a considerable detachment of our cavalry, estimated from 60 to 100, was cut off by the enemy and made prisoners.

General Whipple, commanding 3 Division, III Corps, informs me that Colonel Bailey has taken a prisoner who states that he belongs to Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, five regiments of which crossed the river this morning and made this attack. This man will be sent immediately to headquarters as soon as he arrives. Shall I go out with a brigade or so, to support my line?²

The reports received at general headquarters created the impression that the enemy was not confining his operations to the vicinity of Hartwood Church; that he was aiming, and perhaps more seriously, at Stafford Court-House and Dumfries. Averell was directed to assemble his division at Hartwood Church, and the following exaggerated statement with accompanying instructions was sent to Williams, commanding the XII Corps, at Stafford Court-House:

Telegraphic advices report three brigades of the enemy's cavalry moving in the vicinity of your front. Advise the force at Dumfries to be vigilant. Our infantry there can whip the cavalry if they come.

The cautioning of the force at Dumfries was hardly necessary, judging from a communication of this date from the commanding officer at Dumfries to the Adjutant-General of the XII Corps.³

¹ *History of the 3 Pa. Cav.*, by Committee, p. 165.

² *W. R.*, 39, p. 21.

³ "Our scout brought in information this evening that he was told by a citizen that the enemy's cavalry intend making a raid

Hooker telegraphed to Heintzelman at 6:30 p.m.:

A large cavalry force has made its appearance in front of our right, said now to be moving toward Stafford Court-House. We send out up the river to try and get between them and the Rappahannock. Can you send out from Catlett's and Rappahannock Stations to intercept them if they move that way? . . .

There were no troops at this time at Catlett's or Rappahannock Station.

To the Commander of the II Corps Butterfield wrote at 7:30 p.m.:

. . . send a good brigade of infantry up to Berea Church. The enemy have a force of cavalry in front of our picket lines on the right. General Stoneman will endeavor to capture them. Averell is following them up, and a cavalry force from here will move to get between them and the river.

By Hooker's direction, Stoneman directed Pleasonton to hold his command in readiness at daylight to move from his camp, and sent for Captain Cram, commanding the reserve brigade, in order to issue the same instructions to him. Before the latter arrived, Stoneman was directed to have his whole available force (Pleasanton's and Averell's divisions and Cram's reserve brigade) in readiness to move at 1 a.m. Further instructions were issued to Averell on Potomac Run at 7:45 p.m., as follows:

The commanding general directs that you follow the enemy's force; that you do not come in until the force which General Stoneman is directed to send out at 1 a.m. gets up with the enemy, and you have captured him or found it utterly impossible to do so. Stoneman will endeavor to get between them and the river.

Shortly afterward, on the receipt, it would seem, of a dispatch from Stafford Court-House transmitting the forequoted message from the commanding officer at Dumfries, the order to Stoneman was changed to "Move at once."

Stoneman telegraphed to Pleasonton, commanding First Division:

Move with the whole of your division, and be in position on the Telegraph road, near Aquia Church, as soon as you can. . . .

Inform General Butterfield the hour you will be in the position indicated. . . .

This dispatch was duly received. Captain Cram was directed by Stoneman in person to push his brigade on to Hartwood Church.

on this place, to capture the commissary stores, etc., supposing that the new picket line established last Saturday was simply a ruse, and supposing that we have left this

[place]. . . . We will be on the alert, and are able to repel any attack from their cavalry."

Butterfield telegraphed to Averell:

8 p.m.

Stoneman has been instructed to move the forces from here at once. Pleasonton to be in position at Aquia Church to coöperate, or execute any order.

About 8 p.m.

. . . General Hooker says that a major-general's commission is staring somebody in the face in this affair, and that the enemy should not be allowed to get away from us.¹

Hooker telegraphed to Stanton:

. . . The rebels have a cavalry force on this side of the river outside of my exterior line of pickets, which I hope to hve before morning.

This dispatch was received at 9 p.m. At this hour Butterfield transmitted to Heintzelman information received from Dumfries, through Stafford Court-House, and added:

We are pushing our forces from here up the Rappahannock and toward Warrenton. Answer what coöperation we may expect from above.

Before this dispatch was received Heintzelman telegraphed to Butterfield in reply to Hooker's dispatch of 6:30:

I have sent out a force of cavalry 2000 strong, toward Catlett's and Rappahannock Stations, by the way of Fairfax [Court-House] to intercept the enemy. This force will leave by 8 o'clock [a.m.] February 26; if possible, sooner. . . .

The necessity of concentrating somewhat scattered forces accounts for the tardiness of the hour (8 a.m. on the 26th) when the promised movement was to commence.

Averell arrived with his division near Hartwood Church and went into bivouac about 9 p.m.² Butterfield telegraphed to the commander of the XII Corps:

9 p.m.

Dispatch from Colonel Creighton [Dumfries] received. Inform General Pleasonton of its contents. Averell has gone up with a division of cavalry toward Hartwood. The division [brigade] of Regulars will go up the river road. Pleasonton will be in position within a few hours at Aquia Church. A brigade of infantry has gone up to Berea Church.³ Inform Pleasonton of all these arrangements. . . . Send a brigade of infantry to Aquia Church to support Pleasonton, if desired.

¹ Copies of this dispatch were furnished to General Pleasonton and Captain Cram.

² *Sabres and Spurs*, by Chaplain F. Denison, p. 205.

³ This movement had not commenced. The order prescribing it had not come down through corps and division headquarters to brigade headquarters.

9:10 p.m.

. . . Prisoners captured and brought in report the force as Fitzhugh Lee's and Hampton's brigades.¹ Marched from 12 miles the other side of the Rappahannock last night, made a long circuit to-day, and horses very tired. We ought to capture every one of them. . . .

The 2d brigade, Second Division, II Corps (Couch's) got under arms at 9:30 p.m., and started for Berea Church at 10 p.m. It had just about 2½ miles to march, but, owing to the darkness of the night and the bad condition of the roads, did not reach its destination until about 11:15, nor complete its dispositions for holding the cross-roads until about 12 p.m. Guards were placed over the surrounding houses to prevent communication with the enemy; an escort of cavalry which was attached to the brigade was used for patrolling the roads and establishing and maintaining communication with the main body and the outposts.²

After these measures were taken, Stoneman left Hooker's headquarters for Hartford Church. At Falmouth he overtook the rear of the reserve brigade and sent forward to direct Captain Cram to push on as fast as the state of the roads would permit, getting through, if possible, to Hartwood Church before daylight, and if Stoneman should not be there, to report to General Averell. By daylight Averell was to be up the river as far possibly as Deep Run—thus, it was thought, effectually cutting off the enemy's retreat by the way that he had come by, and rendering his escape very difficult, if not impossible; Pleasonton was to be on the enemy's trail.

Learning that Averell had arrived with his division at Hartwood Church, Stoneman, at 11 p.m., wrote and telegraphed to Pleasonton:

. . . It is very possible the enemy is making for Dumfries. Get off at once, and if you can find out where the enemy is, push him to the utmost of your ability wherever he may go. Be sure to get between the enemy and the river.

Pleasonton had not yet started for Aquia Church. This dispatch was probably carried there, and from there back to Hooker's headquarters. At any rate, it was not delivered to Pleasonton. Soon apprehending that it would be too late on the following day for Heintzelman's cavalry to coöperate to any purpose, Butterfield telegraphed to Heintzelman at 11:15 p.m.:

The force is F. Lee's and Hampton's brigades. . . . Their horses are well tired. We are pushing all out to-night. Can not you push out to-night and push this side of the railroad and Rappahannock Station? . . .

¹ Hampton's brigade was south of the James River, recruiting.

It did not return during the campaign.

² Report of brigade commander, *W. R.*, 107, p. 175.

This dispatch was received at midnight.¹ At this time Pleasonton's adjutant-general wrote to the commander of the XII Corps declining the support of a brigade of infantry and stating:

This division has been ordered to move at daylight to Aquia Church, by the Telegraph road. . . .

While these preparations were going on for the interception and *hiving* of Fitzhugh Lee, that chieftain, with his exultant troopers and a string of about 150 prisoners, marched back to Morrisville, and again went into camp there for the night. He left behind him 14 killed, wounded, and missing, and a surgeon to take care of his wounded. The Federals lost 36 killed, wounded, and missing.

About midnight, Butterfield telegraphed to Couch:

1

. . . The enemy are supposed to be lying around the vicinity of Hartwood. . . .

2

General Stoneman will be at Hartwood at daylight. Let the commanding officer [of the brigade at Berea Church] communicate with him and take his orders from him. . . .

At 3 a.m. on the 26th Pleasonton wrote to Butterfield:

General Stoneman directed me to inform you when I should leave for Aquia Church.² I have therefore the honor to report that the Second Brigade left its camp at 2:30 this morning and the First is about leaving. I shall move with the latter. One regiment of the Second is already at the Church, which is some 8 miles from here by the road which can now be traveled. . . . I shall not move beyond Aquia Church until I hear further concerning the rebel movements. I have requested General Williams to keep me informed.

This dispatch, it seems, was not received. The reserve cavalry brigade commenced passing through Berea Church about 3:30 a.m. The head of the column arrived at a point in the vicinity of Hartwood, where Averell was in bivouac, about 4:30. The rear was closed up about 6. Soon afterward Averell started out with his division and the greater part of the reserve brigade in search of the enemy. Stoneman himself remained at Hartwood Church with the remainder of the reserve brigade. About 7 a.m. he ordered the infantry brigade at Berea Church to march about 2 miles further up the Warrenton Road and take a position at that point, which it did. The rain which commenced falling about midnight, and continued all night, was coming down in torrents.

Stoneman sent a squadron to Richards Ferry and learned that a

¹ *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 196.

he would be there, or "in position on the

² He was directed to report, not when he would leave for Aquia Church, but when Stoneman's first order to Pleasonton).

party of the enemy had crossed there by swimming. This party was perhaps the scouts that had felt the left of Averell's line on the morning of the 25th. Another squadron was sent out on the road to Warrenton to see whether any parties had gone directly from Kelley's Ford toward Dumfries. Having gone beyond Spotted Tavern, it returned without finding any trail, which it would easily have found had any troops passed that way, the ground being covered with snow. Having learned from undoubted authority that the enemy had recrossed the river and that the river was swimming and rising fast, Stoneman decided to abandon the pursuit. He sent out three officers with small parties to intercept Pleasonton and order him to return to his camp, supposing that he had received and acted on the orders sent him last night. At this time the following dispatch of 10:15 to-day from Butterfield to Stoneman was probably on its way:

The accompanying dispatch just received from Pleasonton. His brilliant dash and rapid movements will undoubtedly immortalize him.

"8 a.m. In position at Aquia Church."

It is fair to presume that he failed to receive your orders to push on, otherwise I cannot account for his movements at all. I sent him a dispatch, of which I inclose a copy [following]. General Couch has been ordered to withdraw his infantry.

Inclosure

Butterfield to Pleasonton, Aquia Church, February 26, 10:15 a.m.

I don't know what you are doing there. Orders were sent you at 11 p.m. last night, by telegraph and orderlies, to push for the enemy without delay, and to communicate with General Stoneman at Hartwood. The enemy have recrossed the river, at Kelley's Ford probably, and Averell is pursuing them. Get your orders from Stoneman.

Stoneman intended, with General Hooker's permission, to resort to the miserable protective measure of destroying the Rappahannock Railroad Bridge. He sent to General Couch, commanding the II Corps, for axes, which were promptly forwarded, but before they arrived, he received the following order from Butterfield, dated 6:30 a.m.:

. . . in the event of your inability to cut off the enemy's cavalry, you will follow them to their camp and destroy them.¹

He moved with all the force that he had at Hartwood, except 500 men, to the vicinity of Kelley's Ford, determined to cross the river, if possible, the following morning. On the march he learned from Pleasonton that he and Averell were at Morrisville with their divisions. About 4:45 he was freed of the unpleasant prospect of a morning swim in the Rappahannock by the receipt of the following order dated 12:30 p.m.:

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 23.

The major-general commanding directs that in case the enemy has recrossed the Rappahannock and are [*sic*] on the other side, you will return with all your command to camp.¹

He communicated this order to Pleasonton and Averell, with instructions to carry it into effect after it had been ascertained beyond a doubt that "the enemy had recrossed the river and was on the other side." On receiving a note from Pleasonton assuring him that there was no doubt on that point, he ordered all the troops to return at once to camp.

A correspondent of the New York *Herald* wrote from Falmouth with reference to these operations:

. . . enough is known, Feb. 26, to establish the opinion that it was the determination of General Stuart to make his way to Potomac Creek, and destroy the expensive railroad bridge over which the supplies of this army are now conveyed in most part.

In this he was successfully foiled, and his retreat across the river was accomplished just in time to save his force from destruction, inasmuch as the rain of last night had caused a rise in the stream, rendering it impossible to ford.

Whether or not such a view was generally held in the Army of the Potomac, it does not appear to have been justified. Fitzhugh Lee's object was to locate the masses of Hooker's troops. In this he seems to have been successful.

The following dispatch of 12 m. from the commander of the III Corps to the Adjutant-General of the Army of the Potomac throws an interesting light on the fight made by the Federal outposts:

Colonel Bailey, commanding outposts, reports that after examining the dragoons whom he arrested yesterday for shamefully passing through his lines to the rear when attacked by the enemy, and finding some of them hurt by falling from their horses and one wounded, he let them go. The orders received last night will be strictly observed in the case of other stampeders who fall into Colonel Bailey's hands.²

Probably before daylight Butterfield was in receipt of the following dispatch from Heintzelman:

I have ordered the cavalry at Fairfax Court-House, about 600 strong, to leave camp immediately for Rappahannock Station, to be supported by the force leaving camp to-morrow [8 a.m., 26th].

What this cavalry, 600 strong, did is not known. The main force of 2000, which was to start this morning, consumed the day getting together at Centreville and rebuilding a bridge across Bull Run.³ This

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 24.

² *Ib.*, 107, p. 988.

³ Scout from Centreville to Falmouth,

Va., W. R., 39, pp. 38-40; *Historic Records of the 5 N. Y. Cavalry*, by Rev. L. N. Boudrye, p. 51.

force, which was placed under the command of Colonel Wyndham, started from Centreville (Map 1, sheet A) about 6 a.m. on the 27th, or about twenty-four hours after Fitzhugh Lee recrossed the Rappahannock. Wyndham was ordered "to move toward Catlett's and Rappahannock Stations for the purpose of intercepting the enemy."¹ He followed the Warrenton Road across Bull Run and then halted until 10 o'clock to await the arrival of the remainder of his force. On account of the flooded state of the country he kept on by the Warrenton Road, a much better one than any leading to the railroad. He arrived at Warrenton about 3:30 p.m., and met a small squad of the enemy's cavalry, who dispersed after exchanging a few shots with his advance. Taking the Falmouth Stage Road, he pushed on to the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and turning to the right, followed the railroad for about a mile, which brought him to Licking Creek (Map 6). This stream being too deep to be forded, he went into camp for the night, and shortly afterward noticed squads and videttes of the enemy on the opposite side of it. In the course of the night he heard that there was a force of the enemy at Elkton and Spotted Tavern, but did not learn that Fitzhugh Lee had recrossed the Rappahannock. So at 6 o'clock on the morning of the 28th he took up the march for Elkton. On the way there he learned "that the main force of the enemy had already crossed the Rappahannock, taking with them 100 prisoners,"² and that therefore the accomplishment of the object prescribed to him, the interception of the enemy, was impossible. He did not think, it would seem, of following the enemy across the Rappahannock. His forage had given out, a portion of his command not having brought any with it. So instead of returning directly to Fairfax Court-House, he continued his march to Falmouth, where he arrived about 2 p.m., having marched about 90 miles over roads heavy with mud and snow.³ Later in the day the following report of his movements and intentions was telegraphed by Butterfield to Heintzelman:

Colonel Wyndham arrived here this morning with his force, *via* Warrenton, Rappahannock Station, and the Post road. Reports his command in good condition. Has a few prisoners—a corporal and 6 privates. Lost 1 horse only, by accident. He has been provided with rations and forage. Proposes to rest tomorrow, and return on Monday [March 2]. Please inform General Hooker, if he is still in Washington.⁴

With reference to certain statements in this dispatch, it may be remarked that Wyndham did not go within 7 miles of Rappahannock

¹ W. R., 107, p. 988.

² *Ib.*, 39, p. 38.

³ Wyndham's report, and report of Colo-

nel Gray, 6 Mich. Cavalry, W. R., 39, pp. 39, 40.

⁴ Hooker went to Washington on the 27th.

Station, and that when he reached Falmouth, his command could not have been "in good condition."

On the 1st of March he sent the following report to Heintzelman's adjutant-general from Falmouth:

Having marched 90 miles in less than 48 hours¹ in endeavoring to accomplish the object for which I was sent out, it would be advisable to let my command rest for the day, where they have plenty of forage, at Falmouth Station. Will march at 6 o'clock to-morrow. If absolutely necessary can start immediately. If so, please telegraph. Roads very bad.²

About 7:30 a.m. on the 2d the command started on the return march. It proceeded through Stafford Court-House and halted for the night about 4 miles south of Wolf Shoals (Map 1, sheet A).

The next day, March 3, Wyndham crossed the Occoquan at Wolf Shoals, and returned to his camp, having broken down many horses and accomplished nothing.

This dash of Confederate cavalry, designated in the *War Records* as the Skirmish at Hartwood Church, and the manner in which it was met, are interesting evidence as to the relative efficiency of the two opposing cavalries. They show that Hooker's and Heintzelman's horsemen, and their commanders, had something to learn before they would be up to the standard of Lee's. It is plain that the country beyond the Federal outposts was not adequately patrolled, and that the troops were not proficient in turning out suddenly and promptly and getting on the march. There appeared, too, to be something wrong about the ways and means of transmitting orders and intelligence. This circumstance accounts for the issuing of the following order:

Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
Camp near Falmouth, Va., March 3, 1863.

General Orders, No. 18:

III. Citizens, non-residents, will not be allowed to remain within the lines of this army without a permit from the provost-marshal-general.

XIII. Important information from the outposts or advices regarding movements of the enemy must not be delayed in transmission. All reports of this character must be marked upon the envelope "important," and exertions made to hasten their arrival at headquarters. While the telegraph must be made use

¹ In his final report, Wyndham gives the distance marched as 80 miles and the time as 31 hours (*W. R.*, 39, p. 39). Colonel Gray, 6 Mich. Cavalry, says regarding this part of the operation: "During the march from Centreville to Falmouth Station, we made frequent deviations from the direct road. The distance thus marched was said

to be 96 miles. The time occupied was less than 30 hours, allowing for the halt at Bull Run, Friday morning (27th), and including about 12 hours' halt on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, Friday night. . . . On Saturday morning (28th) we marched 25 miles without any halt."

² *W. R.*, 107, p. 988.

it, together with the reasons therefor."¹ In compliance with these instructions he submitted a report on the 4th of March, inclosing a report by General Averell, which has disappeared from the official records. Stoneman says:

The movements of General Averell, until I found him near Hartwood Church, were made in accordance with instructions received from headquarters, and I presumed there was no delay.

The movements of Captain Cram, commanding Reserve Brigade, were extremely prompt and satisfactory. Those of General Pleasonton were delayed, as he reports, by the non-arrival of the telegram directing him to push forward, though the two previous telegrams reached him with dispatch.²

Fitzhugh Lee and Averell had been at West Point together three years and were warm personal friends. When Lee withdrew he left with his surgeon a note to Averell, which the surgeon, as he recrossed the Federal lines, delivered to a picket. It read about as follows:

I wish you would put up your sword, leave my state, and go home. You ride a good horse, I ride a better. Yours can beat mine running.³ If you won't go home, return my visit, and bring me a sack of coffee.⁴

Fitzhugh Lee's note was promptly delivered, and General Averell determined to answer it at the first opportunity. Hooker heard of this note being sent to Averell, and rode over to the latter's headquarters to pay him a visit. The conversation turned upon the dash made by the enemy's cavalry against Hartwood Church, and Averell, somewhat nettled by it, asked Hooker for an order to cross the river and settle accounts with Fitzhugh Lee. Hooker realized that no system of outposts would prove efficient protection against an aggressive and enterprising enemy who was determined to penetrate them, and that the only way to put a stop to the harassing of his pickets, and alarming of his camps, was to retaliate by vigorously attacking the enemy's cavalry. He assured Averell that his request would be granted, and that very soon. How far Hooker sympathized with Averell's impatience to get even with Fitzhugh Lee, and how much he desired on his own part to settle the question of relative prowess and efficiency between his newly created cavalry corps and Stuart's veteran cavalry division, or to inform himself regarding the terrain and the enemy south of the Upper Rappahannock, are debatable questions. It may be asserted, however, that not one of these objects was viewed by Hooker as an end in itself, and that so far as he considered any of them he regarded them as means to giving rest to his pickets and security to his army.

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 22.

² *Ib.*, 39, p. 24.

³ Referring to the speed with which the Federal pickets gave way when attacked.

⁴ *Glimpses of the Nation's Struggle*, 2d Series, pp. 38-44.

CHAPTER VII

OF GENERAL STOUGHTON. TRANSFER OF GENERAL STAHEL

tending the preparation for a general
a more prominent part than John S.
ater of war as a commander a few weeks
necement of the war Mosby was a prac-
e army as a private of cavalry, and rose
f his regiment. Being thrown out of that
of the regiment, he was selected by J. E.
at scout. He was the first Confederate to
an's army while in front of Richmond, and
quired he enabled Stuart to make his cele-
, accompanying him as a guide.

of the American Civil War had no counter-
e. He seems to have done most of the service
ies devolved, and still devolves, upon the
s not uncommonly dressed in the uniform of
ntly when caught plying his vocation, a spy
oses.¹ Mosby says in his *War Reminiscences*
wore the Confederate uniform with the insignia
was the case, he wore that uniform when he was

of 1862, not holding any commission in the
he asked Stuart from time to time to let him have
n to operate against the enemy's communications.
granted until Stuart was about going into winter
campaign of Fredericksburg, when he gave him
these Mosby afterward added three or four civilian
mongrel squad (a guerilla chief, a few guerilla fol-
ldiers) commenced on the 10th of January operating
sts of Washington. In a few days it succeeded in
of half a dozen men and sixteen horses. These were

soldiers, if disguised within, or lurking about, the lines of the
untry, or in the uni- captor, are treated as spies, and suffer
stle to their own, em- death" (General Orders, No. 100, War De-
information, if found partment, Washington, April 24, 1863).

sent to General Fitzhugh Lee, who was stationed with his brigade at Culpeper Court-House. Mosby then reported to Stuart in the vicinity of Fredericksburg, and obtained from him a detail of 15 men, with whom and a few guerillas he started again on the 15th of January to harry the Federal pickets. He succeeded again in taking a number of prisoners, and caused the commander of the outposts, Colonel Percy Wyndham, to advance with 200 men against him before he retired.¹

Hereafter Mosby's men were habitually recruited by himself from the country. They wore as uniform when on duty "something gray,"² but when off duty they lived at or near their homes, wearing usually the dress of the country or a semi-uniform that could hardly be distinguished from it. Their homes were known to Mosby, and generally to one another. When a meet was desired that had not been appointed at the last disbanding, word of the time and place was sent to one house, and the men who were there would bear it to others. In this way a hundred men could be gathered together in a few hours.

As to arms, each of Mosby's men habitually carried two Colt's revolvers. None carried a carbine, and very few a saber. They were expert pistol-shots, but had practically no training in the use of the saber. They naturally had the greatest confidence in the former weapon, and little or none in the latter. Their expertness with the pistol gave them, especially in the early part of the war, a great advantage over their enemies. Their irregular tactics, too, had peculiar advantages. "During the twelve months of my service," writes a Mosby veteran, "I learned but four commands—fall in and count off by fours, march, close up, and charge. There was another movement which we were not altogether unfamiliar with, an order technically known as the 'skedaddle,' but I never heard the command given. The rangers seemed to know instinctively when that movement was appropriate; . . . when the Yankees broke they would always run in a bunch, and all we had to do was to follow and pick them up. . . . But when we found it necessary to leave the scene of action, each man found his own salvation, and 'struck for home and fireside' by his own particular path."³ When Mosby's men were routed they would dissolve, leaving nothing to follow.

On his last expedition, Mosby had a number of men who had accompanied him on his first raid and in the meantime had lived as peaceful

¹ For Wyndham's and Mosby's reports, see *W. R.*, 39, p. 5. Wyndham says that he captured 24 of Mosby's men. Mosby says that he lost but 3. According to Mosby, he inflicted a loss on Wyndham of 1 killed and 12 captured. Wyndham gives his loss as 1 wounded and 9 captured. In *Historical Records of the 5 N. Y. Cavalry*

(p. 50) Chaplain L. N. Boudrye gives the number of Federals captured as 11, and the number of Confederates as 25.

² *Reminiscences of a Mosby Guerilla*, by J. W. Munson, p. 25.

³ *Mosby's Men*, by John H. Alexander, pp. 19, 20.

citizens at their homes. Such combatants are not Partisans, but guerillas. Mosby himself, not holding any commission from the Confederate government, nor being enrolled in any Confederate army, had no right, if captured, to the treatment due to a prisoner of war.¹

Against a mode of warfare such as he was instituting there was no defence but devastation; and the Federal commander, Colonel Wyndham, naturally, and properly, threatened to resort to it. As a consequence, a number of prominent Southern citizens united in presenting to Mosby a petition requesting him to depart from their section of country, but it only drew from him the following reply:

Fauquier County, February 4, 1863.

Gentlemen:

I have just received your petition requesting me to discontinue my warfare on the Yankees, because they have threatened to burn your town and destroy your property in retaliation for my acts. Not being prepared for any such degrading compromise with the Yankees, I unhesitatingly refuse to comply. My attacks on scouts, patrols, and pickets, which have provoked this threat, are sanctioned both by the custom of war and the practice of the enemy, and you are at liberty to inform them that no such clamors shall deter me from employing whatever legitimate weapon I can most efficiently use for their annoyance.²

There was no sanction either in a "custom of war" or in a "practice of the enemy" for disbanding to live in the guise of civilians between operations or for serving without a commission. But Wyndham did not carry his threat into execution, and Mosby pursued his career with impunity.

About 4 o'clock on the morning of the 26th of February, with 27 men, he drove in a Federal outpost at Thompson's Corner, about 5 miles from Fairfax Court-House (Map 1, sheet A), capturing about 50 men. He was driven off and pursued as far as Middleburg, but not punished.³

¹ "81. Partisans are soldiers armed and wearing the uniform of their army, but belonging to a corps which acts detached from the main body for the purpose of making inroads into the territory occupied by the enemy. If captured, they are entitled to all the privileges of the prisoners of war.

"Men or squads of men who commit hostilities, whether by fighting or inroads for destruction or plunder, or by raids of any kind, without commission, without being part and portion of the organized hostile army, and without sharing continuously in the war, but who do so with intermitting returns to their homes and avocations or with the occasional assumption of the semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting themselves of the character or appearance of

soldiers—such men or squads of men are not public enemies, and therefore, if captured, are not entitled to the privilege of prisoners of war, but shall be treated summarily as highway robbers or pirates" (General Orders, No. 100, War Department, Washington, April 24, 1863).

² *Partisan Life with Colonel John S. Mosby*, by Major John Scott, p. 27. This letter is not published in the *War Records*, but is apparently referred to along with other documents in Mosby's report, *W. R.*, 39, p. 5.

³ *W. R.*, 39, p. 37; *Partisan Life with Colonel John S. Mosby*, by Major John Scott, p. 35; *Camp and Field Life of the 5 N. Y. Volunteer Infantry*, Duryee Zouaves, by Alfred Davenport, p. 371.

On the 2d of March two companies of the 1 Vermont Cavalry, which had gone in search of Mosby, were surprised by their intended captive at Aldie while they were feeding their horses. The captains of both companies and about 200 horses and men were captured.¹ Mosby relieved himself of his prisoners and booty by sending them to Culpeper Court-House, where they were turned over to Fitzhugh Lee, and then proceeded to an enterprise which was to prove the most remarkable foray of the war.

Between Centreville and Fairfax Court-House was a brigade of Federal infantry, with artillery and cavalry. At Centreville was the extreme outpost of Washington. From this point the line extended to the right by Frying Pan and Dranesville to the Potomac, and to the left to Union Mills and Fairfax Station. The force manning and supporting it was under the command of Brigadier-General Henry E. Stoughton, U. S. Volunteers. This officer was not twenty-five years old. He graduated from West Point in 1859 and served in the 6 U. S. Infantry until 1861, when he resigned from the regular army and became colonel of the 4 Vt. Volunteers. He won his brigadier-generalcy in the Peninsula campaign. His appointment dated from the 5th of November, 1862, but not being confirmed by the Senate, it was to expire by constitutional limitation on the 4th of March. His headquarters were at Fairfax Station, his quarters at Fairfax Court-House. Both were about 2 miles in rear of the main body of his command and about 8 miles in rear of his outer line of sentinels, or pickets. The line of the Federal pickets was not continuous. As if under a presentiment of what was going to happen, Stoughton wrote to Heintzelman's adjutant-general March 1:

I have discovered that our cavalry pickets do not keep up a connected line on our right. Thus, the right picket of Colonel Wyndham's right rests on the Ox road; then there is an opening of a mile or two before reaching the left picket of the command at Dranesville. This should be remedied, as it gives free ingress and egress to any wishing to give intelligence to the enemy. If anything transpires I will inform you. Last night about 9 o'clock, while I was at headquarters, at the station, a man, undoubtedly a spy, was at the court-house, dressed as a captain. He interrogated all my servants minutely respecting the troops in the vicinity, asking if I kept my horse saddled in the night, and other suspicious questions.

And again at 9:55 p.m. the same day:

. . . it is absolutely essential to the entire security of the commands in this vicinity that the women and other irresponsible persons in this neighborhood be compelled to take the oath, or placed outside the lines. I cannot fix upon any person or persons who are culpable, yet I am perfectly satisfied that there are

¹ W. R., 39, pp. 41, 42, 1121.

those here who, by means known to themselves, keep the enemy informed of all our movements. Soldiers in the Southern service have even gone so far as to pay their families in the vicinity visits, for a week at a time, without its being discovered; and the few Union people there fear to give the intelligence they would like to, lest the rebels should be informed of it, should they again get possession of this country, by their neighbors, who are watchful spies, notwithstanding they have subscribed to the oath.

No attention, it seems, was paid to these representations; at any rate, the changes which they suggested, or called for, were not made. Stoughton was perhaps imprudent under the circumstances in not taking quarters further within his lines.

On the 8th of March Mosby was joined at Aldie, his appointed rendezvous, by 29 men, and with this force he started late in the afternoon and in a drizzling rain for Fairfax Court-House. He had as guide a deserter by the name of Ames, lately a sergeant in the 5 N. Y. Cavalry, stationed at Fairfax Court-House. Having followed the turnpike about 8 miles, he halted to await the approach of night. When he resumed his march, darkness, combined with rain, furnished him an impenetrable screen, and a melting snow deadened the sound of his horses' hoofs. About 3 miles from Chantilly he turned off the turnpike to the right, slipped through the opening in the outer picket line of the cavalry, and gained the Warrenton Turnpike about half-way between Centreville and Fairfax Court-House. Here he cut the telegraph wires by which the force at Centreville might communicate with its support at Fairfax Court-House. He had no difficulty in pursuing his way. Nowhere did he meet with resistance. In the inky darkness it was impossible to tell from their appearance to which side his men belonged. The names of the cavalry regiments stationed along the line were known to him. Whenever he was challenged the answer was, "Fifth New York Cavalry," and it was all right. There was no countersign out.¹ Proceeding a short distance toward the court-house, he turned off to the right, passed around to the left of a corps directly in his front, continued past the town, and came into the latter by the eastern or near entrance about 2 o'clock in the morning. He had intended to reach the court-house at 12 o'clock, but in the darkness of the night a portion of his command had become separated from him and caused him a loss of two hours before he could reunite with it.

On reaching the court-house square the men were detailed in squads which were sent, some to the stables to collect the horses which were known to be there, others to the different quarters of the officers. Mosby was particularly anxious to capture Colonel Wyndham. He says:

¹ Report of Lieutenant D. L. O'Connor, Provost-Marshal, published in *Mosby's Rangers*, by J. J. Williamson, pp. 46, 47.

The commander of the Union cavalry at that time was Colonel Percy Wyndham, an English adventurer, who, it was said, had served with Garibaldi. He had been greatly exasperated by my midnight forays on his outposts and mortified at his own unsuccessful attempts at reprisal. In consequence he had sent me many insulting messages. I thought I would put a stop to his talk by gobbling him up in bed and sending him off to Richmond.¹

It was found that Colonel Wyndham had gone to Washington that evening by the railroad, and so was not to be caught. The irony of fate made Ames the captor of his former commander (Captain Barker of the 5 N. Y. Cavalry). Brigadier-General Stoughton was found asleep in his bed, and required to get up and dress himself and go along. After spending about an hour making captures, Mosby started with his prisoners and booty toward Fairfax Station to deceive his pursuers. Having gone about half a mile, he turned off at right angles, and made for the pike leading from the court-house to Centreville (the Warrenton Pike), cutting telegraph wires as he went. He reached the pike about 4 miles from Centreville, and followed it at a fast trot about 3½ miles, when he came upon the smouldering camp-fire of a Federal picket abandoned a short time before. Dawn was just beginning to break. He passed the deserted picket, turned off the pike to his right, and proceeded past Centreville, leaving that place on his left. The camps were all quiet; there was no sign of alarm; his men could see the cannon bristling through the embrasures of the redoubts not more than two or three hundred yards away, and heard a sentinel on the parapet call them to halt, but paid no attention to him. As Mosby's prisoners outnumbered his own men, and he was coming from the direction of the cavalry camp, the sentinels doubtless mistook his column for a body of Federal cavalry going out on a scout.²

Soon after he had passed out of the Federal lines he came upon Cub Run, which was so swollen by the melting snow and rain that he was compelled to swim it. Proceeding through Sudley Springs, he came back into the Warrenton Turnpike at Groveton, and followed it to Warrenton.

Early this morning an expedition was fitted out by the Federals to capture Mosby by stratagem. Four men from each of the ten companies of the 42 Pa. Volunteers (Bucktails) were detailed for this service. They were formed in four squads and placed in four army wagons, in which they were concealed by the canvas sheets. The train of wagons was escorted by a plainly insufficient detachment of cavalry (1 R. I.).

¹ Mosby's account published in the *Bel-ford Magazine* (no longer extant), 1892, and quoted at length in *Mosby's Rangers*, by J. J. Williamson. None of the "insulting messages" have come under my eye, but

I surmise that their offensiveness lay in a just characterization of Mosby's methods as those of a guerilla and bushwhacker. J. B. Jr.

² Mosby's account.

Proceeding down the pike under the guidance of a civilian Unionist called "Yankee" Davidson, everything went peacefully; the party put up for the night in a barn. Hardly, however, was the expedition under way the next morning (March 10) when the cavalry in the advance ran into some of Mosby's men, and immediately retreated upon the wagons. The Bucktails, lying in their places of concealment, heard the cavalry come racing back, and naturally judged that the guerillas were in full pursuit. Leaping to their feet, they threw back the curtains of the wagons and blazed away. Instantly the Confederates realized the trap set for them, and not being too near, wheeled about and escaped. The hook having been seen, it was not to be expected that the prey would bite a second time, so this attempt to catch it was given up. The wagons, with their disappointed passengers and escort, returned to Fairfax Court-House.¹

The same day Mosby reported with his command, and prisoners, and booty, to Fitzhugh Lee at Culpeper Court-House, where Stuart arrived in the course of the day from Fredericksburg. Some of his prisoners had escaped. He turned over to Fitzhugh Lee, besides Stoughton, 1 captain and 30 privates.² It is probable that at the time of his capture Stoughton had not received notification of his non-confirmation, and so was still practically a brigadier-general. The vacant colonelcy in the 4 Vt. had been filled.³ Referring to the capture of Stoughton, Mosby says:

I was never able to duplicate this adventure; it was one of those things a man can do only once in a lifetime. The Northern cavalry got too smart to allow the repetition. My calculation of success was based upon the theory that, to all appearances, it was impossible. It was charged at the time that citizens of the place were in collusion with me, and had given the information on which I had acted. It was not true; I had had no communication with any one there.⁴

At Fairfax Court-House there resided a Mr. Ford, with whom several of Stoughton's staff officers boarded. Mr. Ford had a young, good-looking daughter. Whether this had anything to do with the patronage of Mr. Ford's board by the officers must be left to conjecture. At any rate, Miss Ford made herself very agreeable to her guests, impressing them as a loyal Union woman. She was permitted to visit a lady cousin outside of the Federal lines; and this cousin was permitted to visit her at Fairfax Court-House. On one of these visits, the cousin made a diagram of the house in which Stoughton was quartered and the surroundings, showing the positions of the troops, and this diagram, it seems, she gave to Mosby.

¹ *History of the Bucktails*, by O. K. Thomson and W. R. Ranch, pp. 247, 248.

² *W. R.*, 39, p. 44.

³ Editorial foot-note, *History of the Civil War in America*, by Comte de Paris, III, 12.

⁴ *Belford Magazine*, 1892; and *Mosby's Rangers*, by J. J. Williamson, p. 46.

Miss Ford was arrested on suspicion by the Federal Detective Police, and sent North. On her person or at her residence were found a number of private letters from officers and other persons in the Confederate service, eighty-seven dollars in Confederate bank-bills, and a commission as honorary aide-de-camp to General Stuart.¹

Stoughton was taken South and confined in Libby Prison. He was released several weeks afterward, but the ridicule excited by his capture had destroyed his military prospects. He resigned from the army, and entered upon the practice of law in New York City, where he died in 1868.

The showing made by the Federals in this affair mortified both the army and the public. The *New York Times*, in its issue of March 16, commented on it as follows:

The capture of General Stoughton in his bed by a party of rebel cavalry at Fairfax Court-House is another of those utterly disgraceful incidents with which this war has abounded. . . . Colonel Johnson,² the cavalry officer in command of the post, was himself in bed, and undressed, and escaped in his shirt³ by taking refuge in the roof of a barn. . . .

We believe that in the regular army of any other country such a thing as a cavalry officer in command of an outpost undressing and going to bed at night is unknown; we believe, moreover, that there are but few military men in any well-ordered service who ever think under such circumstances of doing more than taking their coats off.

One can at least understand Lincoln's remarking when informed that Mosby carried off a number of horses:

Well, I am sorry for that, for I can make brigadier-generals, but I can't make horses.⁴

This exploit of Mosby's elicited from General J. E. B. Stuart the following complimentary notice:

Headquarters Cavalry Division, March 12, 1863.

General Orders, No. 7:

Captain John S. Mosby⁵ has for a long time attracted the attention of his generals by his boldness, skill, and success, so signally displayed in his numerous

¹ *History of the U. S. Secret Service*, by General L. C. Baker, pp. 170 et seq.; *History of the Army of the Potomac*, by J. H. Stine, p. 316.

² Lieutenant-Colonel Johnstone, commanding cavalry brigade.

³ The report of Provost-Marshal O'Connor says, "in a nude state" (*W. R.*, 39, p. 43). The Comte de Paris says, "without

clothes under a stack of hay" (*History of the Civil War in America*, III, 13).

⁴ *History of the U. S. Secret Service*, by General L. C. Baker, p. 170.

⁵ The title is purely honorary. Mosby held no commission at this time. He had been offered by Governor Letcher a captaincy in the Provisional Army of Virginia, an organization which had practically

forays upon the invaders of his native state. None know his daring enterprise and dashing heroism better than those foul invaders, though strangers themselves to such noble traits.

His late brilliant exploit, the capture of Brigadier-General Stoughton, U. S. Army, 2 captains,¹ 30 other prisoners, together with arms, equipments, and 58 horses, justifies this recognition in general orders. The feat, unparalleled in the war, was performed, in the midst of the enemy's troops at Fairfax Court-House, without loss or injury.

The gallant band of Captain Mosby share the glory, as they did the danger, of this enterprise, and are worthy of such a leader.²

In order to strengthen his command for another foray Mosby proposed to take the dismounted men of Fitzhugh Lee's brigade, promising to mount and equip them in return for a short term of service. His proposition was declined, and the dismounted men were sent under charge of one of their own officers to get horses and equipments from the enemy. The result was that they were all captured.³

On the 20th of March Major-General Stahel, promoted from Brigadier-General on the 17th, was relieved from duty with the Army of the Potomac, and ordered to report to Major-General Heintzelman, commanding the Department of Washington. He was temporarily succeeded in the command of the XI Corps by Major-General Carl Schurz, lately commanding its Third Division. On the 25th the three brigades of cavalry in the Department of Washington were organized as a division, which, together with the outposts lately commanded by Stoughton, was placed under the command of General Stahel. Colonel Wyndham was transferred to the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac.

Mosby was not content to rest on his laurels. On the 16th he wrote to Stuart from near Middleburg, Va.:

I start with my command to-day, to go down in the neighborhood of Dranesville. I expect to flush some game before returning. I have received several more recruits.

Public sentiment seems now entirely changed, and I think it is the universal desire here for me to remain.

Accordingly on the 16th, with about 50 men, he attacked a Federal outpost between Middleburg and Dranesville. The pickets gave the alarm, which brought up about 200 of their supporting cavalry. Mosby was driven off and pursued about 2 miles. Being then suitably

ceased to exist, and this empty honor he had declined (*Partisan Life with Colonel John S. Mosby*, by Major John Scott, p. 51).

¹ Fitzhugh Lee said one.

² *W. R.*, 40, p. 856. For Federal reports, see *ib.*, 39, p. 43, and *Mosby's Rangers*,

by J. J. Williamson, p. 47. For Confederate reports, see *W. R.*, 39, pp. 44, 1121; and 40, p. 667.

³ *Partisan Life with Colonel John S. Mosby*, by Major John Scott, p. 53.

situated, he halted and prepared an ambush. His pursuers ran into it, were fired upon from front and flank, charged, and routed, with a loss according to Mosby of 5 killed, a considerable number wounded, and 1 lieutenant and 35 men captured.¹

On the 17th he made a dash at Herndon Station on the Loudon and Hampton Railroad, surprised a picket of 1 officer and 25 men, and captured the whole of it, with 3 officers who happened to be visiting the post.² Before this exploit came to the knowledge of President Davis, the latter had appointed him a Captain of Partisan Rangers in the Provisional Army of the Confederate States.

Lee, hearing unofficially of this appointment, wrote to Davis on the 21st, inclosing Mosby's report of the affair at Herndon Station:

You will, I know, be gratified to learn by the inclosed dispatch that the appointment you conferred a few days since on Capt. J. S. Mosby was not unworthily bestowed. . . . I wish I could receive his appointment, or some official notification of it, that I might announce it to him.

A few days later Mosby received the following communications:

From the Adjutant-General, Army of Northern Virginia, March 23

. . . the President has appointed you captain of Partisan Rangers. . . . it is desired that you proceed at once to organize your company, with the understanding that it is to be placed on a footing with all troops of the line, and to be mustered unconditionally into the Confederate service for and during the war.

Though you are to be its captain, the men will have the privilege of selecting the lieutenants so soon as its numbers reach the legal standard. You will report your progress from time to time, and when the requisite number of men are enrolled, an officer will be designated to muster the company into the service.³

From Stuart, March 25, 1863

. . . you will be continued in your present sphere of conduct and enterprise, and already a captain, you will proceed to organize a band of permanent followers for the war, but by all means ignore the term "Partisan Rangers." It is in bad repute. Call your command "Mosby's Regulars," and it will give it a tone of meaning and solid worth which all the world will soon recognize, and you will inscribe that name of a fearless band of heroes on the pages of our country's history, and enshrine it in the hearts of a grateful people. Let "Mosby's Regulars" be a name of pride with friends and respectful trepidation with enemies.

You will have to be very much on your guard against incorporating in your command deserters from other branches of the service. Insist upon the most unequivocal evidence of honorable discharge in all cases. Non-conscripts under and over age will be very advantageous. Their entry into service must be unconditional, excepting that you are their captain, and their lieutenants to be chosen by the men, provided no unworthy man be so chosen. As there is no time within which

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 72.

² *Ib.*, 39, pp. 65, 66.

³ *Ib.*, 40, pp. 856, 857.

you are required to raise this command, you ought to be very fastidious in choosing your men, and make them always stand the test of battle and temptation to neglect duty before acceptance.

I was greatly obliged to you for the saddle of Stoughton. I wish you would send me whatever evidence you may be able to furnish of Miss Ford's innocence of the charge of having guided you in your exploit at Fairfax, so that I can insist upon her unconditional release.

We must have that unprincipled scoundrel Wyndham. Can you catch him? Do not get caught.

Be vigilant about your own safety, and do not have any established headquarters anywhere but "in the saddle."

Your praise is on every lip, and the compliment the President has paid you is as marked as it is deserved.

Mosby was quite willing to have the title and commission of Captain of Partisan Rangers, provided it would not prevent his being a guerilla, but nothing was further from his thoughts than being a Partisan—say nothing of being a regular. He knew that if he discarded the character of a guerilla he would greatly diminish, perhaps wholly stop, recruiting for his command; and that the numerous cavalry of the enemy would soon capture it. He wrote to Stuart:

I have received from the War Office a notice of my appointment as Captain of Partisan Rangers. The letter of Captain Taylor [Adjutant-General] says that they are to be organized with the understanding that they are to be on the same footing with other cavalry. The men who have joined me have done so under the impression that they are to be entitled to the privileges allowed in the Partisan Ranger Act. If they are to be denied them, I can not accept the appointment. Please let me know.¹

This letter was forwarded to Lee.

On the 16th Pleasonton reported to Hooker the capture, between Dumfries and Occoquan, of a Federal cavalry patrol consisting of a corporal and 6 privates. "It is recommended," he wrote, "that the rebel partisans and bushwhackers be cleared out from the vicinity of Occoquan and Brentsville by a command from this division. One brigade and a couple of guns would be sufficient." Referring to this occurrence, General Stoneman wrote Hooker on the 17th:

These annoyances will continue until some stringent measures are taken to clear that section of country of every male inhabitant, either by shooting, hanging, banishment, or incarceration. I had a party organized some time ago to do this, but the commanding general did not at that time think it advisable to send it out. A great portion of the country is of such a nature that it is impossible for

¹ *Partisan Life with Colonel John S. Mosby*, by Major John Scott, p. 76.

cavalry to operate in it, and to perform the duty properly will require the coöperation of an infantry force. The country is infested by a set of bushwhacking thieves and smugglers who should be eradicated root and branch.

Regarding these recommendations Hooker, on the 26th, wrote to Pleasonton:

If there are any of the male portion of the community operating as bushwhackers or guerillas against our troops, and the facts can be proven, let them be arrested and brought in. The commanding general can not understand why our cavalry can not operate where the enemy's cavalry prove so active.¹

In the meantime a blow had been struck by the Federal cavalry which brought some relief to Hooker's vexed and troubled outposts. This was the battle of Kelley's Ford, to be described in the next chapter.

On the 23d of March Mosby was again on the war-path. He had learned on his raid to Fairfax Court-House that the Federals had a force of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, about 3000 strong, posted at Ox Hill (Map 1, sheet A), with outposts at Frying Pan and Chantilly, each composed of about 100 men of the 5 N. Y. Cavalry. The force at Ox Hill was the General Reserve; the forces at Frying Pan and Chantilly were the main reserves, or what we now call the supports. The latter were covered by pickets. Mosby's object was to surprise the posts at Frying Pan and Chantilly. Starting from Rector's Cross-Roads, he followed the turnpike in the direction of Chantilly to within 6 miles of that point, and there turned off the road to the right. Proceeding across country to within about a mile of Chantilly, he surprised a picket of 10 men, killing 1 and capturing 7. Perceiving that the enemy was turning out to attack him, he withdrew precipitately, as if really retreating, to a point between the Toll Gate and Cub Run, where the Federals had closed the turnpike with a barricade. Here he halted and formed a portion of his force dismounted behind the obstruction, and the remainder mounted in the woods lining the road. He was hotly pursued by the 5 N. Y. Cavalry. As the column, strung out along the road, approached the barricade, it was arrested by a fire of carbines and pistols in front and flank. It wavered and the next moment was charged and broken. Its fragments were chased about 3 miles, when they were reënforced by a reserve from Frying Pan, and Mosby was in turn put to flight. He was pursued about 8 miles, but not overtaken.²

¹ *W. R.*, 39, pp. 45, 46.

² A historian of the 5 N. Y. Cavalry says with reference to that organization in this affair: "For some reason the regiment never acted with so little concert, and was never so badly beaten by so small a force, sup-

posed to be about 80 strong. Every one felt mortified at the result of this day's work, and resolved to retrieve our fortunes on some more fortunate occasion."

For Federal and Confederate reports, see *W. R.*, 39, pp. 70-73. The affair is desig-

For this affair Mosby was rewarded with the following commendation sent him by Stuart on the 27th:

Captain:

Your telegram announcing your brilliant achievement near Chantilly was duly received and forwarded to General Lee. He exclaimed upon reading it,—“Hurrah for Mosby! I wish I had a hundred like him.”¹

At the instance of General Lee he was appointed a major. He had not yet accepted his captain's commission, as he had not received any answer to the letter he had addressed to Stuart and which the latter had forwarded to Lee. The answer came in the form of the following indorsement by Lee:

No authority has been given Major Mosby to raise partisan troops, nor has it been so intended. He was commissioned as such [major] to give him rank, pay, and command, until he could organize companies that could be mustered regularly into the service. He was so informed when his commission was sent him, to prevent mistake. His commission was limited to himself, and did not extend to his troops.²

Not satisfied with Lee's view of the matter, Mosby appealed to the Secretary of War, who decided that Mosby's commission entitled him to recruit a command for the Partisan service.³ Mosby thereupon accepted his commission as captain. He did not receive his commission as major.⁴

On the 31st of March, returning from a scouting expedition, he arrived with 65 men at Miskell's Farm, near Dranesville. It was 10 o'clock at night. Having ridden over 40 miles through snow and mud, his men and horses were exhausted. They went into a barn-yard surrounded by a high board fence, outside of which was another board fence encircling the farm. The men tumbled in upon the hay and under the eaves outside of the barn and fell asleep. None of the horses were saddled or bridled. No precautions were taken against surprise. There must have been some friend of the Federals, perhaps a negro, about the place, for that night Mosby's location and numbers were

nated as *Skirmish on the Little River Turnpike near Chantilly, Va.*

¹ *Partisan Life with Colonel John S. Mosby*, by Major John Scott, p. 62.

² *Ib.*, p. 76.

³ *Ib.*, pp. 76, 77.

⁴ The evils of Partisan service led to the repeal of the Partisan Ranger Act on the 17th of February, 1864. But the repealing act assured the maintenance of Mosby's command and one or more similar bodies by the following provision:

“294. The Secretary of War shall be authorized, if he deems proper, for a time or permanently, to exempt from the operation of this act such companies as are serving within the lines of the enemy, and under such conditions as he may prescribe.”

Mosby continued a guerilla under the name of Partisan to the end of the war. For the purpose of surrender, his command was recognized by the Federals as a part of the Army of Northern Virginia, although it was never so regarded by the Confederates.

reported to Major Taggart, commanding the Federal outpost at Union Church, who immediately dispatched Captain Flint, with 150 men of the 1 Vt. Cavalry, to rout or capture Mosby and his force.

Early the following morning one of Mosby's men, who had been out looking around on his own account, came dashing into the barn-yard at Miskell's Farm, yelling: "Mount your horses! the Yankees are coming!" Before most of the sleepers had raised their weary heads Captain Flint with his men tore through the farm gate, and opened fire upon them with carbines. The fire, it seems, was delivered mounted; at any rate it was ineffective, and Flint, perceiving the fact, ordered a charge. When this was checked by the fence inclosing the barn-yard, Mosby opened upon the disordered Federals with pistols, and pouring out of the gate of the barn-yard charged them with the Mosby yell. The Federals were panic-struck, and ran for the farm fence through which they had entered. The Confederates followed, shooting and yelling. They poured a murderous fire into the struggling, howling mob jammed in the narrow farm gate, and followed its fleeing fragments 7 or 8 miles down the pike. Captain Flint was killed and a lieutenant mortally wounded. Mosby says that he left 25 killed and wounded on the field and brought off 82 prisoners. General Stahel, reporting the affair, says: "In comparison to the number engaged, our loss was very heavy." He also says: "I regret to be obliged to inform the commanding general that the forces sent out by Major Taggart missed so good an opportunity of capturing this rebel guerilla. It is only to be ascribed to the bad management on the part of the officers and the cowardice of the men." In reporting the affair to President Davis, General Lee said: "I had the pleasure to send by return courier to Major Mosby his commission of major of Partisan Rangers. . . ."

CHAPTER VIII

THE BATTLE OF KELLEY'S FORD

ABOUT the 14th of March, Hooker gave Averell an order to take 3000 cavalry and six pieces of artillery, and with that force to attack and rout or destroy "the cavalry forces of the enemy reported to be in the vicinity of Culpeper Court-House."¹

The 17th of March, 1863, was a red-letter day for the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac; for on this day was fought at Kelley's Ford the first purely cavalry fight east of the Mississippi River in which more than one battalion was engaged on each side. In preparation for the event, Averell, the Federal commander, had instructed his men to have their sabers sharpened, and to use them. He promised them a victory.² Pursuant to Hooker's order, he left the main body of the army about 8 a.m. on the 16th of March with portions of the 1st and 2d brigades of his division and of the reserve brigade, aggregating about 3000 men, and provided with four days' rations and one day's forage. About dark he arrived at Morrisville, 16 miles from camp. Here he bivouacked for the night, and, about 11 p.m., was joined by Martin's 6-gun battery of horse artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Browne, from the artillery camp near Aquia Creek.

His orders were accompanied by reports of operations of the Confederate cavalry in the vicinity of Brentsville, in which the number of the enemy was represented as from 250 to 1000 men. As a precaution he requested that a regiment of cavalry be sent to Catlett's Station (Map 1, sheet A), which he regarded as the key-point to the "middle" fords of the Rappahannock, to throw out pickets in the direction of Warrenton, Greenwich, and Brentsville; but as this request was not granted, he detailed the 1 Mass. and the greater part of the 4 Pa., together about 900 men, to guard the fords and observe the enemy on the north side of the Rappahannock. It is hard to justify this weakening of his active force. He had no train or depot between himself and the Army

¹ The text of the order can not be found. The gist of it is given as above in Averell's report of March 20 (*W. R.*, 39, p. 47) and in Hooker's letter of May 13, transmitting it to Kelton (*ib.*, p. 1073).

² Captain D. M. Gilmore, 3 Pa. Cavalry, in *Glimpses of the Nation's Struggle*, 2d Series, pp. 38-44.

of the Potomac. There was nothing to be guarded in his rear except his line of retreat, and that he should have been able to open, if any force which the enemy could spare from his front had presumed to close it. He may have apprehended a movement in some force against his rear from the direction of the Shenandoah Valley. In that case he should, it seems, have contented himself with communicating his apprehensions to Hooker, leaving it to him to provide such protection as might be necessary.

Captain Hart of the 4 N. Y., with 100 picked men taken partly from that regiment and partly from the 5 U. S. Regulars, was ordered to proceed to Kelley's Ford as an advance-guard, and at the first glimpse of dawn on the 17th to dash across the river and capture the pickets on the south bank. His command was to be supported by the remainder of the 4 N. Y. In the course of the evening this regiment and the detachment of the 5 U. S. took position near the river. The advance was thus formed almost wholly of the 4 N. Y. (first New York German regiment). The reader may ask why Averell selected for so dangerous, difficult, and important a service, a command which bore, to say the least, an unenviable reputation as to fighting, and which disgraced itself in the action at Hartwood Church only about three weeks before.

About 11 a.m. on the 16th, Fitzhugh Lee, at Culpeper Court-House, received a telegram from R. E. Lee informing him that "a large body of cavalry had left the Federal army, and was marching up the Rappahannock."¹ By 6 p.m. his scouts had located this force at Morrisville, and reported the fact to him, but they left him in doubt as to whether the Federals would cross at Kelley's Ford or at Rappahannock Ford, or pursue their march toward Warrenton. He reënforced his picket of 20 sharpshooters at Kelley's Ford with 40 more, and ordered the remainder of his sharpshooters to be stationed at daylight where the road to the ford leaves the railroad and held ready to move to either crossing. About 4 a.m. on the 17th Averell started from Morrisville with the following command:

	MEN
1st brigade, Second Division (4 N. Y., 6 O., 1 R. I.), Colonel Duffié . . .	775
2d brigade, Second Division (3 Pa., two squadrons of the 4 Pa., 16 Pa.), Colonel McIntosh	565
Reserve brigade (1 U. S. and three squadrons of 5 U. S. ²), Captain Reno ³ .	760
6 N. Y. Battery, First Division, Lieutenant Browne (6 pieces)	100
Total	2,200

The force left behind—1 Mass. and four squadrons of the 4 Pa.—took post along the railroad between Bealeton and Catlett's Stations,

¹ Fitzhugh Lee's report, *W. R.*, 39, p. 61.

² Companies C, E, G, H, I, K.

³ Who commanded a detachment of the 7 U. S. Cavalry at the Custer massacre, 1876.

with a reserve at Morrisville, and pickets at the fords and beyond the railroad.

The Confederate force available to oppose Averell's consisted of Fitzhugh Lee's brigade of cavalry and Breathed's battery of horse artillery (4 pieces). The brigade comprised at this time the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th regiments of Virginia Cavalry. There were thus 5 regiments to oppose to Averell's 6% regiments; and 4 pieces to oppose to his 6. The Confederate regiments, however, were not as strong as the Federal. The author hesitates to state the numerical strength of the Confederates, there being a wide disagreement among authorities who have expressed themselves regarding it. Fitzhugh Lee does not give it in his official report, but in his *Chancellorsville Address* he says that he had less than 800 men in the saddle, and "less than 800" is the expression used by Stuart in his report to R. E. Lee for the number of men in action.¹ The Comte de Paris says that Fitzhugh Lee could not put more than 1000 sabers in line.² Major D. A. Grimsley, 6 Va. Cavalry, says, "Lee's brigade numbered perhaps 1200 in all," but he refers to it as occupying Culpeper Court-House and encamped in the vicinity of Brandy Station and Stevensburg, and does not state how much of it was assembled for this engagement.³ Major Frank W. Hess, 3 Artillery, who was a captain in the 3 Pa. Cavalry, calculates Fitzhugh Lee's force as about 1500 sabers.⁴ Rev. Frederic Denison, the historian of the 1 R. I. Cavalry, says that Lee's five regiments and horse artillery must have given him about 3000 effective men.⁵ D. M. Gilmore, late captain of the 3 Pa. Cavalry and a participant in the action, says: "The forces were nearly equal, about 3500 men and a battery on each side."⁶ The correct number will probably be found between that of the Comte de Paris and that of Major Grimsley. Let us assume that, including the artillery (which did not arrive until the action was about half over) and the men at the ford, Fitzhugh Lee's force aggregated 1100, or half as many as Averell's.

Averell selected Kelley's Ford as the place of crossing because the country beyond it was better known to him than that beyond any other crossing, and it afforded the shortest route to the enemy's camp. When his column arrived near the ford, the cracking of carbines told that the passage of the river by the advance under Hart had not been effected. The head of the main column reached the ford about 6 a.m.⁷ The river at this point was about 100 yards wide, four feet deep, and running

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 59.

² *History of the Civil War in America*, V, 25, 26.

³ *Battles in Culpeper County, Virginia*, by D. A. Grimsley, p. 7.

⁴ *The First Battle of Kelley's Ford, First Maine Bugle*, 1893.

⁵ *Sabres and Spurs*, by F. Denison, p. 213.

⁶ *Glimpses of the Nation's Struggle*, 2d Series, p. 42.

⁷ Averell gives the hour as 8 a.m. (*W. R.*, 39, p. 48); Lieutenant Browne as 6:30 a.m.; Colonel McIntosh as 6 a.m.; General Fitz-

swiftly. The approach on both banks was obstructed by abatis. The southern bank was manned by the detachment of Fitzhugh Lee's sharpshooters under Captain Breckinridge of the 2 Va. Cavalry and Company K of the 4 Va. Cavalry, commanded by Captain Moss, the latter having come up this morning.¹ These troops were in rifle-pits or in a dry mill-race, which in the present instance may be regarded and referred to as a rifle-pit. Deduction being made for horse-holders, Captain Breckinridge's command numbered about 45 and Captain Moss' about 85 men, or the two together about 130 men.

Averell was indignant at finding that the surprise of the enemy's picket had not been attempted. The left bank of the river was traversed here for a short distance by a road which had been worn down to the depth of about three feet by long usage. Under cover afforded by this road, Hart's command was firing at Moss' men in the rifle-pits.

On catching sight of the Federal column, Captain Breckinridge, commanding the remainder of the Confederate force, had mounted his men, and marched them to the rear to place his horses in a safe place. The first thing that suggested itself to Averell was to detach a small force to steal a passage above or below the ford, and take the enemy in rear. This he accordingly did, directing the movement below the ford. Major Chamberlain of the 1 Mass. Cavalry, his chief of staff, dashed down in the meantime to Captain Hart's command, and ordered it, including the main body of the 4 N. Y., to mount, form in column of fours, and follow him across the river. On reaching the river's bank he was arrested by the abatis and his command overwhelmed with fire. His horse was shot in three places and he himself in the face. His men recoiled and retreated rapidly up the bank. Sending to Averell for pioneers, he obtained 20 men of the 16 Pa. with axes, whom he put to work cutting away the abatis. Two dismounted squadrons were placed by Averell in the sunken road to cover the axemen with their fire. By this time a couple of field-pieces were unlimbered, and it would have been easy with their fire to demolish the enemy's defences and drive him beyond the range of his carbines. But to do this would have been to announce the point of crossing and the magnitude of the expedition to Fitzhugh Lee. So Averell contented himself with keeping up the fire of his two squadrons, numbering 100 men, with a view to preventing the enemy from rising to take aim. Under cover of this fire Major Chamberlain

hugh Lee as about 5 a.m. (*W. R.*, 39, pp. 48-61), and Frederic Denison as about daylight (*Sabres and Spurs*, p. 208).

¹ General Fitzhugh Lee in his official report (*W. R.*, 39, p. 61) makes no mention of Captain Moss' company, and says regarding Breckinridge's men: "Only about 11 or 12 of them got into the rifle-pits in

time for the attack of the enemy (owing to an unnecessary delay in carrying their horses to the rear), which commenced about 5 a.m." But see the letter of Captain Moss in *The Battle of Kelley's Ford*, by J. B. Cooke, published by the Soldiers' and Sailors' Historical Society of Rhode Island.

again ordered the 4 N. Y. to follow him, and dashed at the river. The trees had been only partially removed, for the fire from the sunken road had not sufficed to protect the Federal axemen; and the fire from the enemy's rifle-pits had driven them from their work. It proved too hot for the men of the 4 N. Y., and they returned at breakneck speed.

General Averell had placed himself on a little knoll to the left of the approach to the ford, and from this point overlooked and directed operations. His division stood in column of fours stretched out along the road, eagerly and anxiously looking for a chance to "mix in." The force detached to try a crossing below the ford had returned baffled by the depth and swiftness of the water and the precipitous character of the banks. There was nothing left to do but to force a crossing in the face of the enemy at the ford.

It was impossible to get into or out of the river until the abatis was removed, and the work of cutting it away had to be done under the fire of the enemy's carbines or rifles at the very short range of from 50 to 100 yards.

Major Chamberlain again showed himself the man for the occasion. Giving his valuables to a staff officer, he rode up to the main column and called for volunteers to carry the crossing, offering the first opportunity to the regiment at the head of the column, the 1 R. I. The whole regiment replied by moving to the front. The nearest platoon, which was commanded by Lieutenant S. A. Browne, was selected and made ready for the dash. The fire from the sunken road was now keeping down that from the pits, and under its protection the axemen resumed their work, and made some progress toward opening the approach to the ford. They now ceased working and formed mounted in rear of Browne's platoon. The main body of the 1 R. I. and the 6 O. were moved up in support. The first dash was to be made by Browne with his 18 troopers. Major Chamberlain placed himself at the post of danger and honor in front of Browne. The signal was given, and away they went. As soon as they entered the road they were subjected to a withering fire. Browne's men broke, and came back in confusion. Major Chamberlain's horse was mortally wounded just as it reached the water, and at the same moment the major himself received a second wound. A ball struck him in the left cheek and ranged down through the neck, the shock throwing him from his horse. He was dragged up the bank by the pioneers. There, sitting on the ground partially blinded with blood, he emptied the chambers of his revolver, firing first, it is said, at the fleeing Rhode Islanders, and then at the enemy on the opposite side of the river. The men, however, were soon rallied and brought back. With a cheer they went forward again, and dashed into the ice-cold water. Close behind them went the mounted axemen. The latter had left their carbines behind, and had their sabers

ADVANCE FROM KELLEY'S FORD

spent in removing the obstructions on the south bank and getting remainder of the force across. The ammunition for the artillery taken out of the limbers and carried over by a squadron of cavalry nose-bags, which was necessary in order to prevent its being wet. This precaution would be unnecessary with the fixed ammunition of the present day. The guns were dragged through the water, which came to the tops of the limber-boxes. The division was formed up so as to meet the enemy in any direction. The horses were watered. On account of the narrowness of the ford this had to be done by squadrons, which caused considerable delay. In the meantime General Averell galloped to the front with a detachment, and made a hasty reconnaissance, which satisfied him that the proper place for the expected battle was an open field which he could see about $\frac{3}{4}$ of a mile from the river. From what he had learned about Lee's position, and what he knew of him personally, he was confident that he would not await an attack in his camp but would come out and attack Averell wherever he might be. So, at 10:10 a.m., everything being ready, Averell put his whole command in motion toward the forementioned field. The column marched through the hamlet of Kelleysville, consisting of six houses and a grist-mill which the Confederates kept constantly employed; and took the road leading northwestward past R. Dean's to the railroad (Map 3). The advance was formed of Duffié's brigade, the 6 O. being deployed as skirmishers, the 4 N. Y. and 1 R. I. following as supports. The movement was conducted with caution and as slowly as if made with infantry. The ground scouts dismounting to search the woods. A squadron was left at the ford as picket, or rear-guard.

While Averell was crossing the river, Fitzhugh Lee was at Culpeper Court-House, awaiting news from the front. A report of the attack at the ford was sent to him, but failed to reach him.¹ The first intimation he received of an attempt to cross was at 7:30 a.m., to the effect that the enemy had succeeded in crossing, capturing 25 of his men who were unable to reach their horses.² Fitzhugh Lee at once moved his brigade at a rapid trot to the road junction about a mile and a half

¹ This statement is made on the authority of Fitzhugh Lee, who makes it in his report (*W. R.*, 39, p. 61). It implies that the dispatch was delivered to the bearer or courier before the rifle-pits were abandoned. If this was the case and the courier started promptly on his mission, he could hardly have been captured. It can not be supposed that he lost his way, for the route which he had to travel must have been generally known and easy to find or ascertain. He must have been exceedingly derelict.

² "This occasion as well as many others

demonstrated the fact that the horse-holder in a cavalry fight should be the coolest and bravest men in the company. 'Number Four' has no right to be exempt from perils of the battle. He holds the horses of his comrades only in order that they may more efficiently fight on foot; and he should always be near at hand to give whatever assistance the occasion demands. In the present instance several brave men were captured simply because their horses were so far from the front." (*The Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry*, by H. B. McClellan, pp. 207, 208).

northeast of Brandy Station, ordering his wagons and disabled horses back to Rapidan Station.

Some time having elapsed, and the enemy not appearing, he pushed on rapidly toward the ford. About 12 m., as the Federal skirmishers emerged from a belt of timber about a mile from the ford, they received a volley from a dismounted squadron which Lee, thinking he had to do only with an advance-guard, had posted behind a stone fence a short distance from the wood. Averell at once deployed the 4 N. Y. dismounted on the right of the road, the 4 Pa. on the left, placed a section of artillery between them, and ordered the line to advance "to the edge of the woods and use carbines." The two dismounted regiments exhibited some unsteadiness; it required the exertions of General Averell and his staff to bring them under the carbine fire which was now sweeping the woods. But they soon regained their firmness, and opened an effective fire in return.¹

Averell ordered McIntosh to deploy his two regiments ($\frac{3 \text{ Pa.}, 16 \text{ Pa.}}{2, 2, 0}$) on the right, and Reno to send three squadrons to act as reserve for the right wing (McIntosh's command), and one squadron up the road to support the left (4 N. Y., 4 Pa., and 1 R. I.); he also ordered a section of artillery to operate with the right wing. The remainder of Reno's command, consisting of the greater part of the 1 and 5 U. S., he retained as a general reserve (Map 3).

As the 4 N. Y. and 4 Pa. advanced with a cheer against the stone fence, about 100 dismounted men of the 16 Pa., who were smelling powder for the first time, double-timed through the woods on the right, and came in the rear of the stone fence, causing the force that occupied it to beat a hasty retreat. The 4 Pa. and the 4 N. Y. established themselves behind the stone fence. The Confederates were seen advancing covered by mounted skirmishers, whose fire soon made itself felt. But Lee was not going to content himself with mounted skirmishing. At the head of his main column was the 3 Va. This regiment threw down a rail fence about 100 yards below Brannin's House, and moved to near J. Brown's House to form. Here Lee ordered it to charge. It did so in column of fours, directing the movement against the stone fence. Underestimating Averell's force and the extent of his front, Lee meant that this regiment should gain the right flank or rear of the Federal line. The Confederate troopers, finding that they were heading into a line of men firing dismounted with carbines, veered to their left, across the front of the Federal line, looking in vain for an opening, discharging their pistols with little or no effect, and receiving a withering fire from the Federal carbines. As they came opposite the Federal right they were joined by the 5 Va. The two regiments tried to gain the

¹ W. R., 39, p. 49; *Hist. of the 3 Pa. Cavalry*, by the Regimental Association, p. 208.

cover of the Wheatley House (Wheatleyville) to strike from there against the Federal right and rear, and cut the force off from the ford. But McIntosh, commanding Averell's brigade, was too quick for them. He had the building occupied by dismounted men of the 16 Pa., who with their carbine fire compelled them to fall back. Among the losses sustained by the enemy was John Pelham, the "Boy Major," Stuart's young and capable chief of artillery, killed by a piece of shell.¹

The 3 and 5 Va. were badly shaken up, and should have been charged as they retired, but General Averell had no troops in position from which an effective charge could be made; besides, Lee's strength had not yet been developed, and the charging force might, he thought, be exposed to a destructive counter-attack. About this time Colonel Duffié, on the Federal left, started on his own responsibility to lead his brigade out in front of Averell's line as an invitation to the enemy to advance. The colonel was a Frenchman, formerly an officer of the 4 Chasseurs d'Afrique. He was a good swordsman, believing in the efficacy of the saber and the mounted charge, and had imbued his command with his own dashing spirit. Duffié was hurrying his regiment (1 R. I.) "front into line" on the head of his column, when a line of sabers was seen flashing along the edge of the woods immediately in his front. It was the 1, 2, and 4 Va. regiments, which, requiring no invitation, were advancing in three lines under Lee at a trot. The Federals awaited at a halt their approach to within 50 or 100 yards, when the 1 R. I. dashed forward to the charge, followed on its right by the 6 O. and the two squadrons of the 4 Pa., and on its left by two squadrons of the 5 U. S. At the same time the 3 Pa., clearing the ground lately covered by the 3 and 5 Va., threatened to take Lee's lines in flank and rear. There were thus nearly 4 Federal regiments in action against the 3 Confederate. The former were not only numerically stronger and in better condition than the latter, but, with their broader front, had a better formation for attack. The Confederates, perceiving the hopeless disadvantage at which they were placed, fired a few shots with their pistols, wheeled rather irregularly by fours and platoons to the right, and immediately repeating the manœuvre, made off in haste, pursued principally by the 1 R. I. Among the prisoners taken by the latter was Major Breckinridge, a cousin of the Vice-President of the Confederacy. A portion of the 1 R. I. carried the pursuit too far. A fresh squadron of the enemy being thrown into the running fight, 2 officers and 18 men of the Federals were captured.

¹ His body was borne to the rear on the bow of the saddle of a fleeing Confederate trooper (*The Life and Campaigns of Major J. E. B. Stuart*, by Major H. B. McClellan, p. 217). In his purse was found, folded away, a slip of paper on which was written

by a Federal officer, once his companion and friend: "After long absence I write,— 'God bless you, dear Pelham; I am proud of your success'" (*New York Times*, May 3, 1863).

This squadron of the enemy was met by a charge of two squadrons of the 5 Regulars. Lieutenant Nathaniel Bowditch, of the 1 Mass. Cavalry, an assistant adjutant-general on Duffié's staff, was mortally wounded after having cut down three men. A squadron of the 3 Pa. on the right spontaneously rushed forward to join in the pursuit, but was promptly recalled. Averell then and there issued a very emphatic order, that troops once assigned a position in line should under no circumstances leave it without orders from himself or some one designated by him as competent to act for him. Such an order is prohibitive of effective cavalry action.

The 3 Pa. crossed the field in echelon of squadrons at a walk, annoying the retreating enemy with volleys from the saddle, and as it neared the next wood, formed "front into line" at the trot. The 16 Pa. accompanied this movement on the extreme right. The 1 U. S. was, for the greater part, still in reserve under Reno.

Prisoners taken in the last charge stated that Stuart himself, with his chief of artillery, was on the field, from which Averell apprehended that more than Fitzhugh Lee's brigade would soon be before him. Stuart's chief of artillery, as already stated, had fallen. Stuart was indeed on the field, but he had brought no troops with him. He and Pelham, happening to be at Culpeper Court-House on court-martial duty, had simply come out with Fitzhugh Lee to see the fight.

Being driven at every point, Lee withdrew about a mile, rallied his command, and formed line across the road on the north side of Carter's Run, with mounted skirmishers in front (Map 4). Behind his right wing stood a battery of four guns, which had not been able to come up in time to take part in the first encounter. Averell spent a half-hour or more preparing to advance. He marched in line of columns. His left, formed of the 1 R. I. and 6 O., rested its left on the road, the ground on the left of the road being impracticable. The scattered sections of artillery were assembled, and the battery advanced with the cavalry to the further edge of the next strip of wood, where it formed in battery to receive the enemy, who was expected to make a charge. Here two of the pieces were sent to the rear, their ammunition being nearly exhausted. After an appreciable delay the battery advanced in column of pieces, following and overtaking the cavalry. The latter in the meantime had come under the fire of the enemy's battery. Emerging from the strip of wood, and discovering the enemy, the Federal cavalry halted and formed line. The two lines were separated by an open field about 600 yards wide, sloping gently down from each side toward Carter's Run. The ground beyond the Federal left was now practicable, so it was necessary to extend the line in that direction. This was done by the 5 U. S. under a heavy fire of artillery and small arms (Map 4). In his present position Averell again waited to be attacked.

on them with shell at 1500 yards, with shrapnel at about 1000 yards and with double-shotted canister at about 400 yards. The leading squadron had begun to waver, files were breaking off from its right left. Simultaneously with the first belch of canister rang out the command—"Charge!" The expectant horsemen, giving sudden vent to their pent-up feelings and energy, shot forward. The enemy could stand up to the impending shock. The Federal force comprised 1 R. I. and parts of the 5 U. S., 6 O., and 1 U. S.¹ Lee's dashing horsemen had again to give way before Averell's superior numbers. The line broke and ran in disorder, leaving a number of dead, wounded, and prisoners. The pursuit was conducted by Reno. He did not return to the line, but halted about a mile in advance of it, or about on the ground vacated by the enemy, where he was joined by the rest of the Federal cavalry. The Confederate cavalry halted about half a mile in rear of their late position, where it was concealed for the greater part by woods or swells in the ground. The artillery on both sides remained in its late position (Map 5). For a considerable time there was not a formed body of Confederate cavalry on the field. The Confederate battery was engaged with the Federal battery. All that Averell had to do to rid the country of Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry was to launch his own after it, reckless of everything but speed, to pulverize the fragments of Lee's shattered regiments, and scatter the particles far and wide. But he did not attempt it. About this time he heard that infantry had been seen at a distance on his right moving toward his rear, and he himself heard cars running on the railroad in rear of the enemy, which he supposed were bringing reinforcements. As a matter of fact there was no infantry nearer his opponent than the Confederate army about Fredericksburg; and the cars which he heard were moving back and forth by Fitzhugh Lee's order to discourage the Federals, and perhaps to encourage his own men. Averell got the idea that the enemy's line was covered with earthworks; it had no protection but what was afforded by the terrain. He says in his report:

It was 5:30 p.m., and it was necessary to advance my cavalry upon their intrenched positions, to make a direct and desperate attack, or to withdraw across the river. Either operation would be attended with immediate hazard. My horses were very much exhausted. We had been successful thus far. I deemed it proper to withdraw.

Detachments of cavalry were deployed in front of the artillery, and the division commenced its return march. Captain Reno, with the 1 and 5 U. S., covered the rear. His task was anything but an easy one, the battery having almost exhausted its ammunition, and having there-

¹ *Battle of Kelley's Ford*, by J. B. Cooke, p. 28; *History of the 3 Pa. Cavalry*, by Committee, p. 213.

fore to fire very slowly. The enemy, taking advantage of this fact, followed it up with the fire of his battery. Once or twice Reno halted to allow him to come up, but the latter contented himself with long-range firing. The enemy's object was to drive away the cavalry escort with artillery fire, and then charge the battery. The Federal cavalry had therefore to stand this fire, and stay with the battery. To have left it would have been to surrender it to the enemy. The battery lost heavily in horses, but, under the protection of its gallant escort, brought off all its guns. The sound of the artillery firing reached the ears of the Federal troops celebrating St. Patrick's day in their camps about Falmouth.¹

Among Averell's wounded were two officers who could not be removed and were consequently left at a farm-house with a surgeon and some medical supplies. The surgeon was intrusted with a part of a sack of coffee and a note hastily written in about the following words:

Dear Fitz:

Here 's your coffee. Here 's your visit. How do you like it? How 's that horse?

AVARELL.²

A few weeks afterward Averell received from Fitzhugh Lee the following message:

Your two officers are well enough to go home, where they ought to be. Send an ambulance to Kelley's and you can have them.

This was done. The officers were sent across the river without being paroled, and went to their homes.

The Federal cavalry had crossed the river about 2200 strong, with supplies for four days and orders to rout or destroy an enemy about half as numerous as itself. About twelve hours later it returned; it had advanced but about 2½ miles (to R. Dean's Shop), or less than one fourth of the distance to the enemy's camp (Culpeper Court-House, Map 2), and had done him no serious injury.

Averell says in his report:

The principal result achieved by this expedition has been that our cavalry has been brought to feel their superiority in battle; they have learned the value of discipline and the use of their arms. At the first view I must confess that two regiments [4 N. Y., 4 Pa.] wavered, but they did not lose their senses, and a few energetic remarks brought them to a sense of their duty. After that the feeling

¹ New York Times, March 22, 1863.

² This letter is taken from the forementioned newspaper account in the library of the Massachusetts Historical Society. Following

is the version of it given by Captain Hess, 3 Artillery: "Dear Fitz: Here 's your coffee. How is your horse? AVARELL."

became stronger throughout the day that it was our fight, and the manœuvres were performed with a precision which the enemy did not fail to observe.

Averell's claim that the action elevated the *morale* of his command was undoubtedly well founded.¹ But it was not for this that he had been given 3000 troopers and four days' rations and ordered across the Rappahannock. He was to rout or destroy the enemy. As it was, the gain of his force in *morale* was probably offset by that of the enemy. For Fitzhugh Lee and his command felt that it was they and not the Federals who carried off the honors of the day. And it could hardly have been otherwise, unless they had been driven to their camp and captured or at least run out of it. The fight seems to have demonstrated that the Federal regiments were at least as well drilled and disciplined as the Confederate, but that Averell had not the aggressiveness essential to the effective command of cavalry. His plan of action was based upon what he expected the enemy to do, rather than upon what he himself was ordered or determined to do. When he met the enemy, instead of proceeding to attack him, he took up a position and awaited his attack. This he did three times. In his third position neither side attacked, and he decided to withdraw. He did not make a single general attack.

To attain his object, he would have been justified in sacrificing half of his command. How much of a loss did he incur? According to his own report, 56 in killed and wounded, and 22 in captured and missing. Lee claims to have captured 29. Accepting the latter number, we have a total of 85, which is less than four per cent. of the force with which he crossed the river. Although on the offensive, he suffered less absolutely and proportionately than the enemy. Fitzhugh Lee gives his killed and wounded as 99, and his loss by capture as 34. Averell claims to have captured 47. Accepting the latter number, we have for Lee's total loss 146, or more than eleven per cent. of his force.

Averell's order depriving his subordinates of all initiative appears to have been caused by injudicious aggression on the part of Duffié and other officers, which would show that the Federal officers were deficient in instruction and discipline. While Averell erred from excess of caution, Fitzhugh Lee may be criticized for excess of daring. His attacks were practically all directed against the enemy's front. This was just what Averell expected and wanted. Had Lee known Averell's tactical

¹"The cavalry are in good spirits over their affair. . . . The enemy are not inclined to talk about it, and no slurs or insinuations come from their pickets" (New York *Herald*, March 20). "Rebel officers who have since met our own under the flag of truce seem to be very sore about the

affair, and express astonishment at the splendid fighting of our cavalry. Fully one third of our wounded show marks of the saber, so close was the contest. The effect of the fight upon the tone of our entire army has been admirable" (New York *Tribune*, March 21).

temperament as well as Averell knew his, or knowing it, taken advantage of it to make proper reconnaissances and execute flanking and turning movements, he might have struck Averell a disastrous blow. As it was, he did not strike an effective one. His every attack was followed, or might have been, by an advance of his adversary. It is hardly unjust to Lee or to Averell to say that Averell gave Lee a victory by retiring when he should not have done so.

The result of the contest was communicated to R. E. Lee by the following dispatches:

Headquarters, Two miles from Kelley's Ford,
March 17, 1863, 7 p.m.

General R. E. Lee, Richmond, Va.:

Enemy is retiring. We are after him. His dead men and horses strew the roads.

J. E. B. STUART,
Major-General.¹

Headquarters, Culpeper, March 18, 1863.

General R. E. Lee, Richmond, Va.:

I telegraphed you last night enemy had retired [to] north bank of Rappahannock. From the best information it was Averell's division, 3000 in the saddle. Pork and hard bread packed in boxes. He was very badly hurt, and left a hospital on this side. It was undoubtedly intended as a great expedition, but, thanks to the superior conduct of General Fitzhugh Lee and his noble brigade, it has failed. . . .

J. E. B. STUART.²

The following congratulatory orders were issued from Stuart's and Fitzhugh Lee's headquarters:

Stuart

The series of fierce contests in which Brig. Gen. Fitz Lee's brigade was engaged on the 17th instant, with an enemy greatly superior in numbers, resulting in entire success to us, reflects the highest credit on its commander, its officers, and its men. On no occasion have I seen more instances of individual prowess—never such heroic firmness in the presence of danger the most appalling. The enemy, afraid to contest the palm as cavalry, preferred to rely upon his artillery, ensconcing his cavalry, dismounted, behind stone fences and other barriers, which alone saved him from capture or annihilation, thus converting the long-vaunted raid, which was "to break the backbone of the rebellion" with preparations complete for an extensive expedition, into a feeble advance and a defensive operation.

Fitzhugh Lee

The general commanding the brigade announces to his command his high gratification and proud appreciation of their heroic achievements upon the ever-

¹ *W. R.*, 108, p. 865. For similar dispatch see Richmond *Enquirer*, March 19, 1863.

² *W. R.*, 108, p. 686.

memorable 17th instant. The enemy crossed the Rappahannock at Kelley's Ford with a force of certainly not less than 3000 cavalry and a battery of artillery. Confident in numbers and equipments, it was their purpose to penetrate the interior, to destroy our railroads, to burn, rob, and devastate, and to commit their customary depredations upon the property of our peaceful citizens. Soldiers of the brigade! you have been taught a lesson, and the enemy have also profited. . . . Rebel cavalry have been taught that a determined rush upon the foe is the part of sound policy as it is the part of true courage. Rebel cavalry have taught an insolent enemy that, notwithstanding they may possess advantages of chosen position, superiority in numbers and weapons, they cannot overwhelm soldiers fighting for the holiest cause that ever nerved the arm of a freeman or fired the breast of a patriot. . . . You have repeatedly charged an enemy sheltered by stone fences and impassable ditches, in the face of his artillery and volleys from thousands of his carbines. You checked his triumphant advance, and caused a precipitate retreat, with the legacy of his dead and wounded. . . .

Averell's congratulatory order, if he issued one, is not to be found. Colonel Duffié, whose brigade may be said to have decided the first encounter, congratulated his command as follows:

Again we have met the enemy, and beaten him at all points. . . . the enemy appeared in force, with their boasted 4 Virginia Cavalry in advance at a charge, supported in their flank and rear by three full regiments. Here was an opportunity—so long sought for—of meeting the rebel cavalry in a fair and square fight in an open field.

The Rhode Island squadron dashed at their column, broke the head of it in a moment, and sent the whole body back to their reserves, capturing nearly all the charging regiment with its commander. Again the enemy came thundering down, and these squadrons, nobly supported by the 6 Ohio, again showed the chivalrous sons of the "sacred soil" that on an open field they were no match for the hated Yankees. Although they were five to our one, a third time the lines were formed and this time by their famous Stuart, who had determined, if possible, to retrieve his evil fortune. On they came. And then took place that terrible hand-to-hand fight—man to man—horse to horse—saber to saber—which ended in their utter defeat, and our most glorious victory. . . .¹

Butterfield wrote to the commanders of the I, XI, and XII Corps:

I send, for your information, the following synopsis of Averell's affair.

He sent in a large number of prisoners (about 80), including 1 major. Captain Moore, of General Hooker's staff, who accompanied him, reports it as a brilliant and splendid fight—the best cavalry fight of the war—lasting five hours, charging and recharging on both sides, our men using their sabers handsomely and with effect, driving the enemy 3 miles into cover of earthworks and heavy guns. Forces about equal.

Hooker's judgment of the affair was decidedly different. He remarked:

¹ *Sabres and Spurs*, by F. Denison, pp. 315, 316.

. . . After the brigadier-general commanding had permitted one third of his force to remain on the north bank of the Rappahannock, his passage of the river with the residue of his force appears to have been eminently soldierlike, and his dispositions for engaging and following the enemy, up to the time of his recrossing the river, were made with skill and judgment; and had he followed his instructions and persevered in his success, he could easily have routed the enemy, fallen upon his camp, and inflicted a severe blow upon him. The enemy was inferior to the command he had in hand in all respects. The reason assigned—that he heard cars arriving at Culpeper, and not knowing but that they might be bringing reënforcements to the enemy—is very unsatisfactory, and should have had no influence in determining the line of that officer's conduct. He was sent to perform a certain duty, and failed to accomplish it from imaginary apprehensions.¹

That Averell's generalship on this occasion was satisfactory to the powers at Washington was forcibly, if not elegantly, attested by the following communication from Stanton:

Major-General Hooker:

I congratulate you upon the success of General Averell's expedition. It is good for the first lick. You have drawn the first blood, and I hope now soon to see "the boys up and at them." Give my compliments and thanks to Averell and his command.

How the conduct of Fitzhugh Lee's command was regarded by R. E. Lee is shown in the following letter of March 27 from Lee to Stuart:

. . . I am much gratified at the noble conduct of the officers and men in repulsing a greatly superior force of the enemy, and compelling him to give up the attempt to strike a blow at our line of communication. The reports have been forwarded for the information of the Department, and as an evidence of the merit and gallantry of Fitz Lee and his brigade. I regret with you the loss of our noble dead, and concur in your commendations of the living.

So it would seem that everybody was satisfied except Hooker, and he was perhaps too severe in his criticism of Averell.²

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 1073.

² For a defence of Averell's generalship, see *History of the 3 Pa. Cav.*, by Committee, pp. 216-225.

CHAPTER IX

PREPARATIONS FOR A GENERAL MOVEMENT. PLANS OF OPERATION. BREAD
RIOT IN RICHMOND. THE JONES AND IMBODEN EXPEDITION

WHILE attending to the improvement of his army, Hooker be-
thought himself of what he should do to satisfy the President's
and the country's desire for a successful campaign. On this subject he
obtained the views of others but did not give his own. He "kept his
intentions an entire secret from every one, fearing that otherwise what
he intended to do might come to the knowledge of the enemy."¹ In the
letter from the President already cited, dated January 26, he had an
intimation that the administration wanted a victory and did not care in
what form. On the 31st of January he received a letter from General
Halleck expressing his views as follows:

In regard to the operations of your army, you can best judge when and where
it can move to the greatest advantage, keeping in view always the importance of
covering Washington and Harper's Ferry, either directly or by so operating as
to be able to punish any force of the enemy sent against them.

I inclose herewith a copy of my letter of the 7th instant to Major-General
Burnside. . . . That letter was submitted to the President and approved by
him. . . .

In the inclosure Halleck says to Burnside:

. . . When the attempt at Fredericksburg was abandoned, I advised you to
renew the attempt at some other point, either in whole or in part, to turn the
enemy's works, or to threaten their wings or communications; in other words, to
keep the enemy occupied until a favorable opportunity offered to strike a decisive
blow. I particularly advised you to use your cavalry and light artillery upon his
communications, and attempt to cut off his supplies, and engage him at an advan-
tage. In all our interviews I have urged that our first object was not Richmond,
but the defeat or scattering of Lee's army, which threatened Washington and the
line of the upper Potomac.

I now recur to these things simply to remind you of the general views which I
have expressed, and which I still hold. The circumstances of the case, however,
have somewhat changed since the early part of November. The chances of an
extended line of operations² are now, on account of the advanced season, much

¹ Butterfield, *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 74.

² Of operating far from one's base. Halleck seems to refer especially to the execution
of wide turning movements. J. B. Jr.

less than then. But the chances are still in our favor to meet and defeat the enemy on the Rappahannock if we can effect a crossing in a position where we can meet the enemy on favorable or even equal terms. I therefore still advise a movement against him.

The character of that movement, however, must depend upon circumstances, which may change every day and almost every hour. . . . It will not do to keep your large army inactive. As you yourself admit, it devolves upon you to decide upon the time, place, and character of the crossing which you attempt. I can only advise that an early attempt be made and as early as possible.

This communication is made up of hints and suggestions, except for the two positive directions:

(1) That the Army of the Potomac shall assume the offensive without any unnecessary delay.

(2) That it shall not uncover Washington.

With these sole limitations, Hooker was free to plan and direct the operations of his army according to his own ideas.

On the 2d of February Lieutenant Comstock, Chief Engineer Officer, recommended to Hooker the fortification of his base at Aquia Creek Landing as a protection to his rear-guard in case of an embarkation, and to his depot against raiding parties in case of an advance. This recommendation was adopted; the construction of the necessary works commenced on the 8th of February and terminated on or before the 9th of March. On the 3d of February the same officer submitted to Butterfield a report on the topographical and tactical features of the following points of crossing (Map 2), commencing down-stream: Skinker's Neck, Hayfield's, Seddon's, Franklin's Crossing, Banks' Ford, and United States Ford, without recommending any of them.¹ On the 6th he wrote to Butterfield suggesting for consideration "the propriety of thoroughly preparing the approaches which would be needed if a crossing of the river were attempted either at United States Ford or at Seddon's."

On the 8th he submitted to Hooker a memorandum for bringing the material for a bridge from Baltimore by water to and up the Rappahannock and throwing the bridge at Seddon's or Skinker's Neck. Hooker was thinking at this time of turning Lee's right flank, and forcing it from the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad. He intended then to defeat his army in battle, and compel him to retreat toward Gordonsville, thus uncovering Richmond.²

He spent the 11th of March in Washington with the President, the Secretary of War, General Halleck, and the Committee on the Conduct of the War. What passed between him and the other members of this council is not known, but it may be assumed that he discussed with them

¹ *W. R.*, 107, pp. 980, 981.

² *Across the Continent with the 5 Cavalry*, by Captain G. F. Price, pp. 113, 114.

his plan for getting around Lee below Fredericksburg. On this visit, and on others of similar character, he exhibited great enthusiasm for his prospective campaign.

At Falmouth on the 19th he reviewed the XII Corps. Meeting the officers afterward at Slocum's headquarters, he expressed to them his reliance upon their assistance and hearty coöperation in the impending campaign, and his determination that, so far as he was concerned, there should be no more mistakes or doubtful results. "If the enemy does not run," he said, "God help them."¹

Again on the 29th, he remarked to a party of officers whom he was entertaining in his tent: "I have the finest army the sun ever shone on. I can march this army to New Orleans. My plans are perfect, and when I start to carry them out, may God have mercy on General Lee, for I will have none."²

A few days later he received the following instigation to action:

Washington, D. C., March 27, 1863, 2:30 p.m.

Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, Falmouth, Va.:

Dispatches from Generals Dix, Foster,³ and Hunter,⁴ and from the west, indicate that the rebel troops formerly under Lee are now much scattered for supplies, and for operations elsewhere. It would seem, under these circumstances, advisable that a blow be struck by the Army of the Potomac as early as practicable. It is believed that during the next few days several conflicts will take place, both south and west, which may attract the enemy's attention particularly to those points.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

Hooker was influenced, moreover, to initiate operations at an early date by the thought that he had in his army a number of regiments enlisted, some for two years and others for nine months, mostly from New York State, whose time would be up in the course of the spring. It was important that the services of these men should be utilized before the time when they would have to be sent home to be mustered out, for they were entitled to be mustered out at the place where they were mustered in.

Concerning a general plan of operations, he realized that it was impossible to assail the enemy in front. The mere passage of the river presented no serious difficulty, for Lee, adhering to his usual policy, inclined rather than threatened that operation; but his line of intrenchments stretching along the sides of the crest of the heights, was in

¹ *New York Tribune*, March 23, 1863.
² *New York Tribune*, March 29, 1863.
³ Major-General J. G. Foster, commanding Department of the South, headquarters at Fort Mifflin, North Carolina, head-

⁴ Major-General D. Hunter, commanding Department of the South, headquarters at Port Royal.

plain view, and the hopelessness of attacking it was a conviction in the mind of even the privates in the ranks. The enemy could then be assailed only by turning his position. The river increased so rapidly in width that to cross it below Port Royal, where Lee's right rested (Map 1, sheet A), would require 1000 feet of bridging, and the pontoon trains and artillery must march 20 miles over a broken and wooded country by roads of clayey mud. The march of an army under such conditions would be extremely slow. Lee's spy system was so efficient that the movement could not be kept from him, and his intrenchments might be extended down the river to keep pace with it. Furthermore, a movement of the army in this direction would uncover Washington.

Above Fredericksburg the roads were comparatively firm and of easy grade, and the rivers narrower. A movement in this direction need not uncover Washington, unless, on account of the precautions taken by the enemy to prevent it, such a movement would have to be much more extensive than one below.

About $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles above Fredericksburg, as one ascends the river, the bluffs on each side of the Rappahannock close in upon it. They rise about 150 feet above the water, the right bank attaining a somewhat greater height than the left. Their slopes are generally well wooded, very steep, and deeply cut by ravines. Good ground for approaching the river from either side first presents itself at Banks' Ford. Here a foothold on the opposite hills gives command of the enemy's line. This important point was guarded by Wilcox's brigade and Penick's battery of Anderson's division, and presumably could not be surprised. Owing to the bend in the river, it is twice as far from the Federal position as it is from the Confederate, and, moreover, is just now impassable.

The next point that offers a practicable approach is United States Ford. Here, also, the river was at this time unfordable; the approach, moreover, was covered by long lines of works, to be manned whenever necessary by troops of Mahone's and Posey's brigades of Anderson's division, camped near by. Just above United States Ford is the junction of the Rapidan with the Rappahannock. Any attempt to turn the enemy's left above this point involves the passage of both streams, each of which is from 200 to 300 feet in width.

General Haupt was summoned from Washington to confer with Hooker. Describing the interview, Haupt says:

[Hooker] handed me a paper to read, saying that it contained his plan of operations, but I must not on any consideration open my lips to any living soul; that even the members of his staff did not know what his plans were, and would not know until the time arrived for putting them in execution; he had left them under the impression that a very different movement was contemplated. He added that when he did move he expected to advance very rapidly, and as he

would depend upon me for his supplies, I had a very important duty to perform; that upon its performance success or failure might depend, and he had concluded to advise me fully, so that I might make the necessary preparations.¹

Having read the paper, Haupt said that he would be ready. With this in view, he issued the following instructions, a copy of which was forwarded to Hooker:

War Department, U. S. Military Railroads,
Washington, D. C., March 26, 1863.

A. ANDERSON, Esq., Chief Engineer Military Railroads of Virginia.

Sir:

You will take measures to have everything in readiness to meet the wishes and second the movements of the commander of the Army of the Potomac, sparing no labor or necessary expense to secure the most effective action when called upon, and to provide the materials and men necessary for the purpose.

You will have a well-organized force of skilled men, complete in its appointments, and fully provided with every means and appliance to facilitate the work it may have to do. You will apply to the commander of the army for such details of soldiers as you may want, and to the chief quartermaster for transportation of all kinds and forage for animals.

While endeavoring to consult a judicious economy in expenditures, avoid that false economy which is purchased at the expense of efficiency. When active forward operations are resumed, the all-important object will be to secure the reconstruction of roads and bridges and the reopening of communications in the shortest possible time.

Very respectfully,

H. HAUPT,

Chief of Construction and Transportation, U. S. Mil. R. R.

General Haupt had a profile of the line from Fredericksburg to Richmond, and knew the dimensions of all the bridges on it. He had a large number of bridge trusses prepared in spans of 60 feet to be transported on flat cars, hauled from the cars by oxen to the sites of the bridges, and hoisted bodily into position by suitable machinery.²

The prospect of active operations occasioned, too, the following communication of the 31st instant from Comstock to Butterfield:

In case a siege of Richmond is deemed among the possibilities of the coming campaign, I think the chief quartermaster should be notified that he may be called on to furnish on our arrival in front of Richmond 10,000 shovels, 5000 picks, 5000 axes, and 2000 shingling hatchets; that the Engineer Department should hold in readiness 30,000 sand-bags; and the secret service should, if possible, obtain authentic maps of the defences of Richmond, either through their agents or by the public offer of large rewards. Such maps would be of no less

¹ *Reminiscences of General Herman Haupt*, p. 193.

² *Ib.*, p. 178.

value in case of an assault than in case of a siege. In the first case they would save valuable time that would otherwise be spent in selecting the proper point of attack, or might indicate at once that point. Such maps are undoubtedly in existence. Copies or originals may perhaps be obtained. It is believed to be impossible to compile such maps here from information given by persons who enter our lines, so as to obtain with sufficient accuracy either the strength of the works or the character of the ground around them.¹

The following day, April 2, Hooker wrote to Stanton:

I send you our last advices from Richmond. The papers contained but little news. Lieutenant-General Longstreet [himself] was on the opposite side of the river night before last. It is reported that his command is returning. . . . Why is not the Second Regiment New Hampshire Volunteers on its way back?²

It looked as if the IX Corps was not a sufficient attraction to keep Longstreet away from Lee. But the following letter from Peck, dated April 4, put a new face on the matter:

. . . My information from various sources has been that Longstreet had within 20 or 30 miles of this place [Suffolk] 15,000 [men], and 15,000 along the railway this side of Petersburg, which he could concentrate [at an intermediate point] in 12 hours, and I was advised from headquarters [Fort Monroe] a few days since that one of our spies had a list of the regiments and the strength, and they amounted to 28,000. . . .

Ever since my arrival the enemy has been impressed with the idea that an army [Federal] would attempt this route, and they have watched very closely.³

The expectations expressed in the following letter of Lieutenant Henry Ropes, 20 Mass. Volunteers,⁴ dated March 31, were perhaps shared by a large portion of the Army of the Potomac:

. . . it appears likely that our corps [II] will remain to cover this front and conceal our movement from the enemy, in whatever direction the army goes. . . .

¹ *W. R.*, 107, p. 999

² The 2 N. H. had been furloughed to go home and carry an election for the Republican party. It did not return until after the campaign (*Hist. of the 2d Regiment of N. H. Vol. Infantry*, by M. A. Haynes, pp. 152, 153).

³ The Richmond *Enquirer* of March 25, discussing the strategic deployment of the Federal armies, said: "Another great army is now threatening our communications, distributed between Suffolk in Virginia, and New Berne in North Carolina; it may amount in the whole to 60,000 men; and is intended to take possession of the railroad somewhere between Goldsboro and the Vir-

ginia line, thus cutting our communication with a great part of the Confederacy." Goldsboro and New Berne are south of Weldon and nearer the coast. They are not shown on the map.

⁴ I shall take occasion again to quote from this young officer's letters home, using the manuscript copies deposited in the library of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, by John C. Ropes, Esq., of Boston, the founder of the society and distinguished military historian, and a brother of Lieutenant Ropes. The II Corps sustained a heavier loss than any other at the battle of Fredericksburg, December 13, 1862. J. B. Jr.

On the south side of the Rappahannock the planning for a general movement looked less to the offensive than to the defensive. In answer to two letters from General Trimble proposing an attempt in force on the Federal camp at Falmouth, Lee wrote on the 8th of March:

. . . I know the pleasure experienced in shaping campaigns and battles according to our wishes, and have enjoyed the ease with which obstacles to their accomplishment (in effigy) can be overcome. The movements you suggest in both letters have been at various times studied, canvassed with those who would be engaged in their execution, but no practicable solution of the difficulties to be overcome has yet been reasonably reached. The weather, roads, streams, provisions, transportation, etc., are all powerful elements in the calculation, as you know. . . . The idea of securing the provisions, wagons, guns, of the enemy, is truly tempting, and the desire has haunted me since December. Personally I would run any risk for their attainment, but I cannot jeopardize this army.

I consider it impossible to throw a trestle bridge over the Rappahannock below the Rapidan, with a view to a surprise. Our first appearance at any point would be the signal for the concentration of their army, and their superior artillery would render its accomplishment impossible without great loss of life. A bridge might be thrown over the Rapidan above the Germanna Mills, and has been contemplated. Our movements might be concealed until we crossed the Rappahannock, but the distance from there to Aquia is great; no forage in the country; everything would have to be hauled. The route by Orange and Alexandria Railroad is the most feasible. The bridge is passable at Rappahannock Station. We must talk about it some time.

On the 12th he wrote to Stuart:

. . . I have written to W. H. F. Lee [commanding cavalry below Port Royal] to be prepared to move at short notice, and to select one regiment to remain in that section. . . . I will send Captain Johnson [of the Engineers] up to Rapidan Station [Map 1, sheet A] to see if rifle-pits can be constructed there to protect the bridge. I think it probable that a dash may be made at it to destroy it, in connection with other movements. What can you put there to guard it?

The information from Falmouth is that the enemy will, as soon as roads permit, cross at *United States Ford, Falmouth, and some point below*, the attempt at Falmouth to be a feint. . . .

I have told Johnson to throw up some works at Gordonsville, so that Major Boyle's men [posted there] might make a stand against cavalry.¹

Under acts of the Virginia legislature, application was made by the chief of the Engineer Bureau at Richmond, to the Secretary of War, for 2832 slaves to labor on the fortifications and complete them "within the time desired by General Lee."²

¹ The italics are mine. J. B. Jr.

² Gilmer to Seddon, March 4.

On the 16th of March, Lee wrote to Longstreet:

I am led to believe that none of the army of General Hooker have left the vicinity of Aquia, except the corps of General Smith,¹ which went to Newport News. It is also reported that it is General Hooker's intention to cross the river and advance as soon as the state of the roads will permit, and that in fact he has issued repeated orders to that effect. I am not fully informed as to their apparent intentions, strength, etc., on the south side of the James River, but we should be prepared to concentrate to meet him wherever he should advance in force. From present indications it is fair to presume that we shall be called upon to engage him first on the Rappahannock, and I desire you to be prepared for this movement, and make endeavors to keep yourself advised of the disposition and preparations of the enemy on our front for moving the troops recently detached from the First Corps [Confederate], or such of them or others as may be necessary in that direction.²

Lee took the incursion of the Federal cavalry under Averell to be a preparation for a general advance of the Army of the Potomac; by a letter to Longstreet, dated 10:30 p.m. the 17th, he ordered Hood's and Pickett's divisions to return to Fredericksburg. Longstreet replied under date of the 18th:

I do not think it would be well to draw off any portion of Pickett's division at present. All of it can not well be taken from here as long as the enemy holds this line of his so near Richmond.³

On the same day Lee learned that the Federal cavalry had recrossed. He concluded that he had mistaken the character of the enemy's operations and telegraphed the Adjutant-General at Richmond:

Do not detain Hood's and Pickett's divisions until further notice. No infantry crossing reported to be crossing. Cavalry retiring. Stuart pursuing. Divisions can either resume former or take more convenient positions. No more recommended here.

Holmes's and Posey's brigades of Anderson's division ($\frac{1}{1.1}$), both under command of Mahone, were posted to dispute the passage of the Rappahannock. At United States Ford a detail of 120 men was made from the two brigades to report to Captain Collins, Chief Engineer of General J. E. B. Stuart's staff, at Germanna Ford, on the Rapidan River, for the purpose of rebuilding a bridge across the river at that point. The double object of this work was to improve the communication between Lee's army and Stuart's cavalry and horse artillery at

¹ Gen. B. left the Army of the Potomac for Newport News on the 10th of March, accompanied by Major-General W. F. Smith.

² Vol. II, pp. 321, 322.

³ Vol. II, p. 323.

Culpeper Court-House; and to facilitate a raid which Stuart was contemplating upon the Federal depots at Falmouth.¹

On the 17th, the day of the battle of Kelley's Ford, Anderson wrote to Mahone:

General:

I wish you to place the forces under your command in the best position for checking any attempt of the enemy to cross at United States Ford, to examine the river above and below you for some distance, and to ascertain whether any practicable ford exists. I have been informed that there is one, called the Blind Ford,² just below the junction of the rivers.

If your position can be strengthened, have all needful work done. Have the road repaired. Learn all that you can about United States Ford. This may be effected by inducing one of the enemy's cavalry picket to come over to exchange papers or to trade.³

Let me have timely notice of any movement of the enemy. Keep up communication with our cavalry picket at Ely's Ford, on the Rapidan.

On the 17th Longstreet wrote to Lee:

. . . I shall be ready to join you with Hood's division at any moment, and trust to your being able to hold the force in your front in check until I can join you.⁴

One of the criticisms made since the war on the strategy of the Southern generals is that the Confederate armies did not generally withdraw from their frontiers so as to realize the advantage of prolonging the Federal, while shortening the Confederate lines of communication. Whatever might be said for this manœuvre in an inland country, as illustrated, for instance, in the campaign of Atlanta, it offered no such advantage on the coast. As the Federals commanded the sea, their army would supply itself, as Grant's did during the Wilderness campaign, from its transports and its advanced bases established therefrom. Hence in the plea which Longstreet now enters for a withdrawal from the Rappahannock, and Lee's answer thereto, there is no reference to the Federal communications.

Longstreet wrote to Lee on the 19th of March:

. . . It seems to me to be a matter of prime necessity with us to keep the enemy out of North Carolina in order that we may draw all the supplies there, and if we give him ground at all it would be better to do so from the Rappahan-

¹ *Magazine of Am. Hist.*, XX, 378. This raid, it would seem, was to be made, as a sort of counter-offensive, when the Federal army should advance.

² There seems to have been a ford by this name just above the junction of the rivers, but none for some distance below. J. B. Jr.

³ The following instruction was issued on the 27th of February, from Hooker's head-

quarters, relative to communications under flags of truce:

"Newspapers may be received; but not exchanged except under special approval from these Headquarters."

⁴ *W. R.*, 26, pp. 558, 562. Messages of similar import were sent on the 21st and 22d (*ib.*, 26, pp. 926, 927, 933).

nock. It is right, as you say, to concentrate and crush him; but will it be better to concentrate [first] upon his grand army rather than on his detachments, and then make a grand concentration on the grand army? If we draw off from the front of his grand army we ought to be able to crush rapidly his detachments, and at the same time hold the grand army in check as far back [from Richmond] as South Anna at least, particularly while the roads are so very bad, then concentrate on the grand army and try and dispose of that.¹

On the 24th he wrote informing Lee that certain counties of Virginia and North Carolina, containing abundant supplies for the Confederate armies, were within the Federal lines, and representing that he could occupy these if he had another division of his corps.²

Lee replied on the 27th:

You have about 40,000 effective men; the enemy can bring out no more.³ I feel sure that with equal numbers you can go where you choose.

The latter statement is striking evidence of Lee's belief in the superiority of the Confederate troops over the Federal, and is incomprehensible without an appreciation of his readiness to trust to sheer valor for overcoming the advantages which inhere in the defensive. He went on to say:

If this army is further weakened we must retire to the line of the Annas,⁴ and trust to a battle near Richmond for the defence of the capital. It throws open a broad margin of our frontier and renders our railroad communications⁵ more hazardous and more difficult to secure. Unless, therefore, a retrograde movement becomes necessary, I deem it advantageous to keep the enemy at a distance and trust to striking him on his line of advance.

While not strong enough to attack Hooker in position, he might strike him an effective blow on the march. Recurring to Longstreet's situation, he added:

A sudden, vigorous attack on Suffolk would doubtless give you that place. Of the propriety of this step, you can best judge. . . . If operations in that quarter should draw reënforcements from General Hooker, more troops could be spared from this army.⁶

Longstreet wrote back on the 17th:

. . . I think it utterly impossible for the enemy to move against your position until the roads are sufficiently dry for him to move around you and turn

¹ *W. R.*, 26, pp. 926, 927.

² *Ib.*, 26, p. 944.

³ The Federals present for duty numbered: in southern Virginia, under Dix, 24,031, and in North Carolina, under Foster, 14,671; total 38,702 (*W. R.*, 26, pp. 573, 576). Longstreet's command numbered

at the end of February (*ante*) 43,239 present for duty.

⁴ North and South Anna Rivers.

⁵ Virginia Central Railroad, Richmond and Danville Railroad, and South Side Railroad.

⁶ *W. R.*, 26, pp. 943, 944.

your position. By reënforcing here we might destroy the enemy and get our forces together again in time to resist him at the Rappahannock. But if we succeed in destroying him here and have to retire to the Annas before we can give him a general battle, we will accomplish a great deal and really have the enemy in a better position for our operations than the one he now occupies.¹

By this time the information which Lee had acquired from the skirmish at Hartwood Church seemed no longer reliable. He was doubting again whether Hooker's army or only a fraction of it was in his front. On the 2d of April he wrote to President Davis:

. . . their lines are so closely guarded that it is difficult to penetrate them. Their pickets [mounted] are placed within sight of each other, with dismounted men in the intervals.² . . . I have apprehended, from the jealous manner of guarding their lines and the systematic propagation of reports of an intended advance of their armies on the Rappahannock and Blackwater [south of the James River], that their object is to deceive us, and that they may, while intending to act on the defensive, have reënforced other points for offensive operations, but I have no means of ascertaining the truth of my suspicions until we are able to make some aggressive movements. It was with this view that General Fitz Lee was ordered some time since to penetrate General Hooker's lines, and from his report I judge that his whole army was then in position.

Being on the defensive, Lee could afford to bide Hooker's time for commencing operations, but what if Hooker's objective were elsewhere? Lee must try to meet him or send aid to those who were to do so. Not knowing Hooker's designs, he replied to Longstreet on the 2d of April:

. . . unless General Hooker soon takes the aggressive I must endeavor to operate to draw him out.³

But he had another reason for thinking of taking the offensive, or wishing that he could do so. Foreshadowing the campaign of Gettysburg, he wrote on the 9th to the Secretary of War:

Should General Hooker's army assume the defensive, the readiest method of relieving the pressure upon General Johnston⁴ and General Beauregard⁵ would be for this army to cross into Maryland. This can not be done, however, in the present condition of the roads, nor unless I can obtain a certain amount of provisions and suitable transportation. But this is what I would recommend, if practicable.

¹ *W. R.*, 26, p. 950.

² This is a mistake as to the pickets in general. *J. B. Jr.*

³ *W. R.*, 26, p. 954.

⁴ Commanding the Department of the West, which included a portion of western North Carolina and northern Georgia, the

states of Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi, and part of the state of Louisiana east of the Mississippi River (*W. R.*, 36, pp. 202, 203, 213).

⁵ Commanding Department of South Carolina.

Longstreet, returning to the subject of withdrawing from the Rappahannock, wrote on the 3d:

. . . I have thought since about January 23 last (when I made the same suggestion to you) that one army corps could hold the line of the Rappahannock while the other was operating elsewhere.

I cannot now appreciate the necessity of your retiring to the Annas in case you send off more troops from the Rappahannock. There you are fortified on the river and on the heights; on the Annas you would have neither. Besides, you would lose *morale* and encourage the enemy.¹

On the other hand, according to Longstreet's message of the 30th ultimo, the Federals, on the Annas, would be in a better position for Lee's and Longstreet's operations than they were in on the Rappahannock. He added on the 4th:

I hope to be able to finish with the operations in this section in time to join you as soon as the roads are in condition for you to operate.²

Lee replied on the 6th:

. . . I cannot say whether General Hooker will advance or not, though, as before stated, all the information I receive from every source goes to show that it is his intention to do so, and that he is prepared. It may be a part of their general plan to deceive us while reënforcing their general armies; but as soon as I can move I will find out. In the meantime I do not think it prudent to weaken the force here.³

On the 7th Longstreet wrote to Lee:

I do not propose to do anything more than draw out the supplies from that country unless something very favorable should offer. . . . If I find that I can do no more than haul off supplies, I shall hurry one of my divisions [Hood's] back, so as to be within reach of you, unless the force is much stronger than you suppose it to be.⁴

The remark, "I do not propose to do anything more than draw out the supplies," etc., was thrown out to excuse a possible failure in offensive operations.⁵ General Longstreet had set his heart upon the investment and capture of Suffolk, for which he had a qualified approval from Lee.⁶

The remark, "unless the force is much stronger than you suppose it

¹ W. R., 26, p. 959.

² *ib.*, 26, p. 960.

³ *ib.*, 26, p. 967.

⁴ *ib.*, 26, p. 970. For Longstreet to Seddon, April 6, see *ib.*, 26, p. 910.

⁵ *The Siege of Suffolk*, by Brevet Brigadier-General Hagard Stevens (manuscript, Mil. Hist. Soc. of Mass.).

⁶ Lee to Longstreet, March 27 (*ante*).

to be," seems intended to make Lee responsible for the siege which Longstreet was then carrying on. Lee had only sanctioned "a sudden vigorous attack on Suffolk," and that only at the discretion of General Longstreet.

On the 6th of April, Lee wrote to his chief of artillery at Chesterfield Station that as soon as the roads were sufficiently improved, he might, with advantage, post the artillery "in part, if not the whole, about 3 miles west of Guiney's Station, where it would be about equidistant from Port Royal, Fredericksburg, and United States Mine Ford, *embracing the limits of the Rappahannock within which an attempt to cross by the enemy may be expected.*"

The italics are the author's. It is important to note this evidence of Lee's expectations as to Hooker's movements. On account of the bad condition of the roads, the artillery remained in its winter quarters until the campaign was fairly begun.

The unsatisfactory manner in which outpost duty was still performed and the habitual deportment of the Army of the Potomac on the march, together with the prospect of an early resumption of operations, caused the following order to be issued on the 10th:

II. . . . Officers of outposts are expected to inform themselves accurately of all events transpiring in their vicinity, and those whose fears magnify trifling squads into large bodies of the enemy as richly deserve death as the base wretch who deserts his country's flag, or his comrades in battle. It has been too much a practice, upon outposts and battle-fields, to send back reports and calls for reënforcements, founded upon imagination or the tales of a frightened or cowardly shirk. The fate of battle may be changed by such reports.

III. Upon the march straggling must not be permitted. Corps commanders will take effectual measures to prevent it. Officers who fail to prevent it in their respective commands must be relieved and sent to the rear, and their names and the number of their regiments forwarded for publication in orders. Leaves of absence and furloughs must also be withheld from regiments in which straggling is tolerated. Drumhead court-martial, if necessary, can be held for the punishment of this class of offenders.

IV. Corps and division commanders, and assistant inspectors-general, should watch the conduct and behavior of officers and men on the march as well as in battle. Regiments not moving promptly as ordered, permitting straggling, or where the officers show a lack of capacity and zeal in pushing forward and overcoming obstacles, must be specially reported for such neglect, in addition to other measures that may be taken by commanders in such cases for the enforcement of discipline.

Three days later the following order was issued by General Stonewall Jackson for the government of his corps:

The batteries will carry eight days' subsistence for the troops and their full capacity of forage, at least six days' grain, as much as possible on the guns.

The general hospital for those unable to move will be designated by the medical director, who will give all the necessary directions in the premises.

The surplus clothing of the troops, beyond the extra shirt, pair of socks and drawers [which each soldier is to take with him], should be stored under the supervision of the quartermaster's department.

Corps commanders will require every serviceable man to march with the column.¹

There was perhaps some encouragement for the Federal administration in a report which had reached Washington of a riot in Richmond. About 10 o'clock in the morning of April 2, a crowd of about 4000 women collected in a park in front of the Capitol, and clamorously demanded bread for their starving families. President Davis appeared on the steps of the Capitol, and made a speech promising them money. They declared it worthless and drowned his voice with cries of "Bread!" "The Union!" "No more starvation!" etc. The crowd then proceeded to the general commissary depot, broke into it, and carried off a large quantity of stores. Davis remarked that such disgraceful affairs were worse than Union victories.² At the Confederate War Department the affair was thought serious enough to call for the following communications:

Richmond, April 2, 1863.

TO THE RICHMOND PRESS.

Gentlemen:

The unfortunate disturbance which occurred to-day in this city is so liable to misconstruction and misrepresentation abroad that I am desired by the Secretary of War to make a special appeal to the editors and reporters of the press at Richmond and earnestly to request them to avoid all reference directly or indirectly to the affair. The reasons for this are so obvious that it is unnecessary to state them, and the Secretary indulges the hope that his own views in this connection will be approved by the press generally. Any other course must tend to embarrass our cause, and to encourage our enemies in their inhuman policy.

Very respectfully, etc.,

JNO. WITHERS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.³

¹ "... the articles of clothing which each man was to carry were minutely specified. It was evident that in the move about to be made wagon-trains were to be kept out of the way of capture. The soldiers likewise gained the impression that more attention was being paid to the details of their necessities, and that their

commanders knew just how much ought to be expected of them" (Goss, *Recollections of a Private*). The event is to prove that the commanders miscalculated what their men would carry. J. B. Jr.

² *W. R.*, 107, p. 1002.

³ *Ib.*, 26, p. 958.

Richmond, April 2, 1863.

W. S. Harris, Esq.,

President Telegraph Company:

I am desired by the Secretary of War to request that you will permit nothing relative to the unfortunate disturbance which occurred in the city to-day to be sent over the telegraph lines in any direction for any purpose.

Very respectfully, etc.,

JNO. WITHERS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.¹

The *Richmond Enquirer* of the 4th made light of the affair with a zeal and vigor which betokened disingenuousness. It said in part:

A handful of prostitutes, professional thieves, Irish and Yankee hags, gallows-birds from all lands but our own, congregated in Richmond with a woman huckster at their head, who buys veal at the toll-gate for 100 and sells the same for 200 in the morning market, undertook the other day to put into private practice the principles of the commissary department. Swearing that they would have "goods at government prices," they broke open half a dozen shoe-stores, hat-stores, and tobacco-houses, and robbed them of everything but bread, which was just the thing they wanted least. . . .

On the 6th General Elzey said in a letter to Longstreet:

Owing to the continually threatened riots in Richmond, it would not do to move any of Rhett's command [garrisoning the city].²

The Jones and Imboden Expedition

The Shenandoah Valley (Map 1, sheet A) was the great granary of Virginia, and it was the object of the Confederate forces to control as much of it as possible. The lower, or northern, portion of the Valley was connected with the open country east of it by the Manassas Gap Railroad, which joins the Orange and Alexandria Railroad at Manassas Junction. These two roads would have been most useful in transferring the produce of the Valley to Lee's army could the Confederate authorities have operated them. But this they were prevented from doing by the Federal troops defending Washington. The Orange and Alexandria Railroad was held by the Federals as far as Centreville. Between that point and the Rappahannock River the two roads were a sort of disputed territory which each army could keep the other from occupying, but could not occupy itself. The Confederate supplies going from Manassas Gap to Rappahannock Bridge would cut off the bend of

¹ W. R., 26, p. 958.

² Referring to these disturbances, General Pleasanton wrote to the Assistant Secretary of War (dispatch of April 10 previously

quoted): "The bread riots in Richmond were gotten up by Union men, of whom there are as many as ever."

the railroad by leaving the Manassas Gap Railroad at Salem and going by ordinary road over the mountain to Warrenton.

Referring to Milroy, Lee wrote to W. E. Jones in the Shenandoah Valley:

February 2

I am very anxious to expel him from the Valley, and nothing but the immediate presence of General Burnside's large army (now commanded by General Hooker) and its threatened movements have prevented me from detaching a portion of the cavalry of this army to aid in effecting this object.

As I think it probable that General Hooker will not be able to move for some time, should the weather and roads not prevent, I wish now to carry this plan into effect. I wish you therefore to be prepared with all your available force to move at short notice against the enemy in front, while the forces from this side of the [Blue] Ridge will gain his rear and cut off his communications from Martinsburg and endeavor to destroy or capture the force in Winchester. I hope, therefore, you will be able to provide beforehand subsistence and forage for your troops, and, if possible, collect enough for 2000 men in addition, in case it should be required.

February 13

. . . I have . . . directed General Stuart, with select detachments from Hampton's and Fitz Lee's brigades, to cross the Blue Ridge should no unforeseen circumstances prevent, and I desire you with your whole available force to be in readiness to join him. As I cannot now detach any infantry from this army, it is hoped, by a combination of the cavalry with your command, that the enemy's [Milroy's] communication with the railroad and his depot of supplies may be cut off, if not destroyed. . . .

On the 9th of February Fitzhugh Lee's brigade broke camp below Fredericksburg and moved toward Culpeper Court-House, where on the 12th it relieved Hampton's brigade, and assumed the duty of picketing the Upper Rappahannock. Hampton's brigade was detached to the south side of the James River to recruit.

On the 2d of March, General Imboden, commanding the Department of Northwestern Virginia, wrote to General Lee, setting forth a plan which he had formed for operations to be conducted by himself, with the double object, first, of destroying the bridges and trestling on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from Oakland to Grafton, and, second, of defeating and capturing the enemy's forces at Beverly, Philippi, and Buckhannon, enlisting in the Confederate army the young men of that section, and holding the country long enough, if possible, to overthrow the local government, of which four fifths of the people, he said, were heartily tired. "The movement," he remarked, "must be a dash from its commencement to its conclusion, and . . . can not be safely undertaken before about the 1st of April on account of the swollen streams."

Imboden should strike the railroad and apply themselves to its destruction at the same time, Jones at Oakland and Imboden at Grafton.¹ In reply, Lee wrote on the 7th of April:

Two simultaneous attacks on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, at the points proposed [Oakland and Grafton], will certainly increase the probabilities of success, and facilitate a more complete destruction of the road. I therefore agree to the arrangement, and assent to the part to be undertaken by you. . . .

About the time appointed for your departure, I will cause some demonstration to be made [by Stuart] east of the mountains, which may serve to fix his [Millyroy's] attention upon his lines of communication, and thus give you time to make your blow.

I feel it unnecessary to advise you that your movement must be expeditious and bold, but that you must take every precaution against discovery and failure. . . . The utmost secrecy in regard to your expedition must be observed, and I consider that the collection of cattle, horses, and provisions will be of as much importance to us, and, under certain contingencies, even more, than the destruction of the railroad. I hope, therefore, that what so primarily concerns us may not be neglected. . . .

At this time Jones was at Lacy Springs, and Imboden at Staunton, whence he moved to Shenandoah Mountain (Map 1, sheet B). We will leave these officers and their commands thus located, while we follow the preparations and operations of the opposing armies.²

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 119.

² The Jones-Imboden expedition will be described in Chapter XXIX.

CHAPTER X

MINOR PREPARATIONS. LINCOLN VISITS THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. NUMBERS OF BOTH ARMIES. HOOKER'S SECOND PLAN OF OPERATION

HOOKER wrote on the 23d of March to Kelton:

. . . I would respectfully suggest that hereafter the permits to visit this army be restricted to absolute positive necessity, and that the permission heretofore granted to females is denied.

It is advisable that these restrictions be gradually introduced within the next few days, and not upon the ground that anything is likely to occur here requiring such a course. It cannot be foreseen at what moment this army will move, and the action in respect to the stoppage of travel heretofore has invariably been such as to indicate to the country pretty nearly the precise time of a movement.

The Army of the Potomac was soon stripping for the march. How this was done is partially indicated in the following regimental order:

Headquarters Thirteenth Mass. Vols., April 1, 1863.

Company commanders, in accordance with previous orders, will turn in to the A. B. Q. M.,¹ on or before 11 a.m., April 2, all wall tents, flies, and poles, and all other surplus camp and garrison equipage.

One shelter tent will be furnished to each commissioned officer.² Transportation for line officers will be furnished for five-mess³ kits only.

Rations, cooking utensils, and all other appurtenances of each mess must be properly packed in one case not larger than a hard-bread box.

Trunks will not be carried, neither blankets nor shelter tents, on wagons.

Company books and blanks will be well packed in strong boxes, and distinctly marked—the boxes to be of the size of company clothing books, and not over five inches deep in the clear.

The pack-mules will carry one shelter tent, two wool [blankets] and one rubber blanket for each officer, also (if possible) the officers' rations needed on the march.

Transportation will be furnished for all surplus private baggage, under charge of an officer detailed from the brigade.⁴

Lee issued the following orders:

March 21

With a view to a resumption of active operations by the 1st of April, the army will at once prepare for the approaching campaign.

¹ Acting Brigade Quartermaster.

² Messes of five members.

³ The officers had heretofore been allowed wall tents.

⁴ *Three Years in the Army*, by C. E. Davis, Jr., p. 197.

I. All surplus baggage, public and private, properly marked, will be sent to Richmond, under charge of a responsible officer from each brigade. . . .

II. No further leaves of absence will be given, to extend beyond the 31st instant, except on surgeon's certificate of disability, as prescribed in Regulations, or in cases of extraordinary urgency.

IV. It will be necessary to reduce the transportation of the army to the lowest limit. . . . The commanding general regrets the necessity for curtailing the comforts of an army which has evinced so much self-denial in the endurance of privations, but feels satisfied that ready acquiescence will be shown in all measures tending to secure success and the more speedy conclusion of the war, and appeals to officers and men to aid him in the accomplishment of this greatly desired object by the strict observance of orders and careful preservation of the property in their hands, daily becoming more valuable by the difficulty of replacing it.

On the 23d of March Lee issued an order for the observance of the 27th of March as Thanksgiving Day, in accordance with a proclamation by President Davis.¹ The dinners promised to be short. Supplies of all kinds were growing scarcer and consequently dearer. Acts passed by the Confederate Congress March 26 and April 27, 1863, empowered the government to take whatever was necessary to the army, wherever it might find it, and pay for it whatever a joint board appointed by the President and the governor of the state should appraise it at. The trials of the army and the people which led to the adoption of these drastic measures appear in the contemporary correspondence of General Lee (*Appendix 10*).

About the beginning of the month of April President Lincoln accepted an invitation from Hooker to visit the Army of the Potomac. His party comprised, besides himself and Mrs. Lincoln, his youngest son "Tad," Attorney-General Bates, Dr. A. G. Henry of Washington Territory, who was an old friend of Mr. Lincoln, and Noah Brooks. It began to snow furiously soon after the President's little steamer, the

¹ "In obedience to the proclamation of the President of the Confederate States, setting apart Friday, the 27th of March, as a day of fasting and prayer for the nation, all duties will be suspended on that day in the Army of Northern Virginia, except such as are necessary for its safety and subsistence. Religious services appropriate to the occasion will be performed by the chaplains in their respective regiments.

"Soldiers! no portion of our people have greater cause to be thankful to Almighty God than yourselves. He has preserved your lives amidst countless dangers; He has been with you in all your trials; He has

given you fortitude under hardships, and courage in the shock of battle; He has cheered you by the example and by the deeds of your martyred comrades; He has enabled you to defend your country successfully against the assaults of a powerful oppressor. Devoutly thankful for His signal mercies, let us bow before the Lord of Hosts, and join our hearts with millions in our land in prayer that He will continue His merciful protection over our cause; that He will scatter our enemies and set at naught their evil designs, and that He will graciously restore to our beloved country the blessings of peace and security."

Quincy Morris, left the Washington Navy Yard. Noah Brooks, describing the experience of the party, says:

So thick was the weather, and so difficult the navigation, that we were forced to anchor for the night in a little cove in the Potomac opposite Indian Head, where we remained until the following morning [April 5]. I could not help thinking that if the rebels had made a raid on the Potomac at that time, the capture of the chief magistrate of the United States would have been a very simple matter. So far as I could see, there were no guards on board the boat, and no precautions were taken against a surprise. After the rest of the party had retired for the night, the President, Dr. Henry, and I sat up until long after midnight, telling stories and discussing matters, political or military, in the most free and easy way. During the conversation, after Dr. Henry had left us, Mr. Lincoln, dropping his voice almost to a confidential whisper, said: "How many of our ironclads, do you suppose, are at the bottom of the Charleston harbor?" This was the first intimation I had had that the long-talked-of naval attack on Fort Sumter was to be made that day; and the President, who had been jocular and cheerful during the evening, began despondently to discuss the probabilities of defeat.

Our landing-place, when *en route* for Falmouth, was at Aquia Creek, which we reached next morning [April 5], the untimely snow still falling. "The Creek," as it was called, was a village of hastily constructed warehouses, and its water-front was lined with transports and government steamers; enormous freight-trains were continually running from it to the army. . . .

The President and his party were provided with an ordinary freight-car fitted up with rough plank benches, and profusely decorated with flags and bunting. A great crowd of army people saluted the President with cheers when he landed from the steamer, and with "three times three" when his unpretentious railway carriage rolled away.¹

The ravages of war were visible all the way from Aquia to Falmouth. In the frequent clearings where farming had been carried on, there was nothing to be seen but half-destroyed fences, and the ruins of dwellings and outhouses without any inhabitants. At Falmouth Station the party was met by two ambulances and an escort of 200 mounted officers. The honors were done by General Butterfield.

Lincoln was not a soldier. He could not critically inspect or test the great machine which he had come to see. Nor was it exhibited to him in a way to show its essential excellencies or deficiencies. One might suppose that the army would have shown itself off as in battle or on the march, that corps or divisions would have manœvered against each other, displaying their proficiency in reconnoitering and deploying, in guarding and attacking and defending positions. Instead of that, it gave itself up to a kind of a "circus." The military exercises consisted chiefly of reviews. The 6th was cavalry day. The corps marched past under Stoneman at a walk and at a trot. Then the 6 Pa. (Rush's

¹ *Washington in Lincoln's Time*, by Noah Brooks, pp. 45-57.

Lancers) came alone on the ground in column of squadrons at a gallop, and elicited applause by its execution of the useless evolution of wheeling at a gallop into line and halting. This seems to have been the only organization that showed that it was capable of galloping. There was no charging, no dismounting to fight on foot, no firing. The 7th was devoted to a walk through the camps of several divisions and a collation at the headquarters of General Sickles, commanding the III Corps. The camps covered an undulating plain, with here and there a grove of trees in the green of an early Southern spring. Arches of evergreens decorated with flowers were thrown at intervals over the roadway. It did the army good to see the chief magistrate of the nation and commander-in-chief. Officers and men who came in contact with him were impressed by his earnest, care-worn, and kindly countenance, his rugged manliness and native dignity. As he passed through the camps the bands played, and the men gave cheer after cheer. Thousands of them crowded around his horse, hoping to touch his hand or hear his voice. These demonstrations affected the President deeply, awakening fresh life in his pale, anxious face. Wherever he went he had a hearty shake of the hand and a warm "God bless you" for the lowest in rank as well as the highest. In the camps of the Second Division of the V Corps, Sykes' regulars, the *orphans* of the army, beyond the pale of Sanitary Commission and spiritual salvation—for they had no chaplains—the President's visit and attentions were especially appreciated.¹ The President was escorted by the staff officers of the corps, and the division, brigade, regimental, and battery commanders, all mounted and in full uniform.

It was at the collation at General Sickles' that the Princess Salm-Salm, the beautiful wife of the colonel of a New York regiment, won a wager and a unique reputation by stealing a kiss from President Lincoln. Her example was quickly followed by a bevy of female companions. Mrs. Lincoln was not present, but of course she learned of it. The next day it was generally known in camp that the President had been subjected to an unhappy quarter of an hour for allowing the princess and other ladies to kiss him, and that General Sickles was quite out of favor with Mrs. Lincoln.

On this day, the 8th, came a joint review of four corps, the II, III, V, and VI, and the General Artillery Reserve. The President sat his small but handsome black horse with ease, his long legs hanging straight down, the feet nearly reaching to the ground. He was dressed in a suit of plain black clothes, with a much-worn black silk hat. His pale, sad face contrasted strongly with the florid countenance of General Hooker, who rode by his side.² The general's military seat and carriage, his

¹ *Mag. of Am. Hist.*, XV, 195.

² *Abraham Lincoln*, by W. H. Ward, D.D., p. 188; *History of the Tenth Regiment of Cavalry*, N. Y. State Volunteers, by N. D. Preston, p. 64.

glittering uniform and equipments, and shining white horse, combined to accentuate the plain, somber appearance of the President. The long and tiresome ceremony was followed by an exhibition given by the 5 N. Y. (Duryee Zouaves) in battalion drill, quick and double time, and the manual of arms, and bayonet exercise. In the course of the visit Hooker remarked to the President: "I have under my command the finest army on the planet." He gave a dinner-party to the President and Mrs. Lincoln, which was attended by all the corps commanders.

"I recall with sadness," says Noah Brooks, "the easy confidence and nonchalance which Hooker showed in all his conversations with the President and his little party while we were at headquarters. . . . One of his most frequent expressions when talking with the President was 'When I get to Richmond,' or 'After we have taken Richmond,' etc. The President, noting this, said to me confidentially, and with a sigh: 'That is the most depressing thing about Hooker. It seems to me that he is overconfident.'"¹

On the day after the President's arrival, Hooker received the following communication from G. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy. It was dated April 6, 8 p.m.

There is reasonable ground to expect important news hourly from Charleston via Richmond. Will you be on the *qui vive* for anything from the enemy opposite?²

On the 9th it was halloosed across the river to Couch's pickets: "You have taken Charleston." The news was sent to Hooker's headquarters. President Lincoln, hearing of it, invited Couch to come up and talk the matter over. Arriving at headquarters, Couch was ushered into a side tent in which there was no one but Hooker and the President. His entrance apparently interrupted a weighty conversation, for both were looking grave. The President's manner was kindly, while Hooker, usually courteous, forgot to be conventionally polite. The Charleston rumor having been briefly discussed, Lincoln remarked that it was time for him to leave. As he stepped toward Hooker, who had risen from his seat as well as Couch, he said: "I want to impress upon you two gentlemen—in your next fight"—and turning to Couch, he completed the sentence—"put in all your men."³

The report of the capture of Charleston was a canard. The defences were attacked on the 7th by Dupont's fleet of ironclads, but an hour's engagement sufficed to prove that vessels were no match for forts, that it was useless to try to carry the place without the coöperation of a land force. As no such coöperation was possible, the attack was abandoned. On the 9th the presidential party reviewed the I Corps, made a visit to the XI and XII Corps, and embarked for Washington.

¹ *Washington in Lincoln's Time*, by Noah Brooks, pp. 51, 52.

² *W. R.*, 107, p. 1001.

³ General Couch in *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, III, 155.

The President had on the whole been favorably impressed. The bands and banners, the tramping columns, the precise wheels and alignments, the streets of tents, the general method and smartness pleased him. He was particularly impressed with the soldierly appearance of Schurz's division of the XI Corps.¹ He was delighted with the great and wonderful improvement in the *morale* of the army,² but he saw nothing that demonstrated the inurement of the troops to marching, their proficiency in the duties of advance and rear guards, nothing that showed how the army commander and his corps and division commanders would act in the presence of an enemy, how orders would be framed and transmitted, ammunition supplied, and sick and wounded cared for. His judgment of the tactical proficiency of the army, if he formed any, must have been based on its appearance at review, and the showing made by companies and regiments at drill. He had yet by bitter disappointment to learn that a collection of well-drilled regiments is not necessarily a well-trained army.

In the course of his stay with the army he had sent for General Averell and expressed great interest in the fight which had taken place at Kelley's Ford, inquiring particularly about the Confederate Commanders. Averell told him how the fight came to pass, and showed him the note which he received from General Fitzhugh Lee with reference to the Federal wounded. Lincoln put on his spectacles, and read it carefully, then he asked:

"Were you and General Lee friends?"

"Certainly," said Averell, "and always have been."

"What would happen should you meet on the battle-field?"

"One or both of us would be badly hurt, or killed."

After a pause Lincoln said, with emotion:

"Oh, my God, what a dreadful thing is a war like this, in which personal friends must slay each other, and die like fiends! General Averell, I wish you would give me this letter of Lee's."

It is said that for a long time afterward President Lincoln carried that note about with him, and would frequently take it out of his pocket and show it.

Hooker had intended to have Butterfield escort the presidential party back to Washington, but he changed his mind and charged Sickles with this act of courtesy in order that he might make his peace with Mrs. Lincoln. Sickles got along very well with the President, but do what he would, he could not soften the freezing look with which Mrs. Lincoln met his advances. At supper the President tried his capital storytelling to bring about a reconciliation, but without success. Turning finally to General Sickles, he said: "I never knew until last night that you were a very pious man." Sickles, taken aback, replied that he

¹ *Washington in Lincoln's Time*, by Noah Brooks, p. 51.

² *Mag. of Am. History*, XV, 195.

feared that the President had been misinformed. "Not at all," said the President, gravely; "Mother [Mrs. Lincoln] says you are the greatest Psalmist in the army. She says you are more than a Psalmist, you are a Salm-Salmist." Mrs. Lincoln joined in the hearty laughter about the table, and forgave the general.¹

After the departure of the President the preparations for a general movement proceeded with increased vigor.

On the 13th of April the Medical Director of the Army of the Potomac ordered the establishment of division hospitals (formed of tents) for the II, III, V, and VI Corps near Potomac Creek Bridge;² for the XI and XII Corps near Brooke's Station; and for the I Corps, and the Cavalry Corps, on the Potomac River near the mouth of Aquia Creek. An officer of the line was detailed to act as quartermaster and commissary for all these hospitals.³

The commander of the Engineer Brigade was directed to have his command ready for a move in any direction at short notice.

The cavalry pickets, while retaining in general the lines that they had held, were reduced in strength about one half.

Before taking up Hooker's plan of operation, let us consider somewhat in detail the composition and strength of the opposing armies:

THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA

Effective Strength

COMMANDS		INFANTRY OFFICERS AND MEN	ARTILLERY OFFICERS AND MEN	PIECES	CAVALRY OFFICERS AND MEN	TOTAL OFFICERS AND MEN
I Corps, Longstreet:						
1 Division, Anderson	1 Brigade, Mahone	8,050	320	16		8,370
	2 " Posey					
	3 " Perry					
	4 " Wilcox					
	5 " Wright					
Artillery, Hardaway ⁴						
2 Division, McLaws	1 Brigade, Kershaw	8,345	320	16		8,665
	2 " Semmes					
	3 " Wofford					
	4 " Barksdale					
	Artillery, Cabell ⁵					
Artillery Reserve (no chief) . .			720	36		720
Total		16,395	1,360	68		17,755

¹ *A Biographical Memorial of General Daniel Butterfield*, edited by Julia L. Butterfield, pp. 161, 162.

² The railroad bridge across Potomac Creek.

³ *Medical Recollections of the Army of the Potomac*, by Jonathan Letterman, pp. 113, 114.

⁴ Commanded also by Garnett.

⁵ Commanded also by Hamilton.

THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA—Continued

COMMANDS		INFANTRY OFFICERS AND MEN	ARTILLERY OFFICERS AND MEN	PIECES	CAVALRY OFFICERS AND MEN	TOTAL OFFICERS AND MEN
II Corps, Jackson:						
1 Division, A. P. Hill	1 Brigade, Heth ¹	11,351	400	20		11,751
	2 " Pender					
	3 " McGowan					
	4 " Lane					
	5 " Archer					
	6 " Thomas					
Artillery, Walker ²						
2 Division, Rodes ³	1 Brigade, O'Neal ³	9,663	400	20		10,063
	2 " Doles					
	3 " Iverson					
	4 " Colquitt					
	5 " Ramseur					
Artillery, Carter						
3 Division, Early	1 Brigade, Gordon	8,276	320	16		8,596
	2 " Hoke					
	3 " Smith					
	4 " Hays					
Artillery, Andrews						
4 Division, Colston ⁷	1 Brigade, Paxton	6,669	320	16		6,989
	2 " Jones ⁵					
	3 " Warren ⁶					
	4 " Nicholls ⁸					
Artillery, Jones						
Artillery Reserve, Crutchfield ⁹			800	40		800
Total		35,959	2,240	112		38,199
General Artillery Reserve, Pendleton			480	24		480
Cavalry Division, Stuart	1 Brigade, Fitzhugh Lee		320	16	4,138	4,458
	2 " W. H. F. Lee					
	Artillery, Beckham					

¹ Commanded also by Brockenbrough.

² Commanded also by Pegram.

³ In the absence of Rodes, permanent commander; commanded also by Hall.

⁴ In the absence of D. H. Hill, permanent commander.

⁵ Commanded also by Garnett and by Vandeventer.

⁶ In the absence of Colston, permanent commander; commanded also by T. V. Williams and by Brown.

⁷ In the absence of Trimble, permanent commander.

⁸ Commanded also by J. M. Williams.

⁹ Commanded also by Alexander.

THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA—Continued

SUMMARY	COMMANDS	INFANTRY	ARTILLERY		CAVALRY	TOTAL
		OFFICERS AND MEN	OFFICERS AND MEN	PIECES	OFFICERS AND MEN	OFFICERS AND MEN
I Corps		16,395	1,360	68		17,755
II Corps		35,959	2,240	112		38,199
General Artillery Reserve			480	24		480
Cavalry Division			320	16	4,138	4,458
Total		52,354	4,400	220	4,138	60,892

This table is based mainly upon the return of the Army of Northern Virginia for the month of March, 1863.¹ There is no corresponding return for April, 1863. The figures stand for effective officers and men, and include about 1500 recruits supposed to have joined during the month of April.² The strength of the Confederate artillery can not be determined solely from the official records. The author has supplemented what information he could gather therefrom with the results of inquiry among ex-officers of the Confederate artillery regarding the number of pieces. Where the *personnel* was not otherwise to be determined, he computed it on the basis of 20 officers and men to a piece.³ The author is assured by Mr. Kirkley, of the *War Records* office, that the numbers given in the abstract⁴ for Stuart's cavalry division do not include Jones' brigade, in the Valley; that they stand for three brigades: Hampton's, which was absent recruiting, and W. H. F. Lee's, and Fitzhugh Lee's. Hampton's brigade numbered five regiments and those of the two Lees ten. The abstract gives Stuart but twelve pieces of artillery. During the campaign he had sixteen, as appears from the reports of various commanders.⁵ Deducting 240 officers and men, for twelve pieces of artillery, from the 6967 officers and men present for duty in the division, as given in the abstract, and taking $\frac{2}{3}$ of the result, we have 4138 officers and men for Stuart's two brigades of cavalry. It should be borne in mind that this is only the *personnel*. It does not represent the number of serviceable horses, or number of mounted men, or effectives. Three fourths of the number of men, or about 3000, would be a liberal estimate of the number of effective cavalymen in Stuart's command on the Rapahannock. The Confederate brigades and divisions were generally designated solely by the names of their commanders. They are numbered in the foregoing table for convenience of reference and notation.

¹ *W. R.*, 40, p. 696.

² This gain is given as about 3500 by General Alexander (*Memoirs*, p. 322), and as 4000 by Colonel Henderson (*Stonewall Jackson*, II, 508). General Longstreet gives it as possibly 1000 (*From Manassas to Appomattox*, p. 328).

³ For official authority, see *W. R.*, 39, p. 789 (Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia), also reports of chief of artillery and of artillery commanders, same volume.

⁴ *W. R.*, 40, p. 696.

⁵ *Ib.*, 39, p. 794.

The two divisions of Longstreet's corps (Anderson's and McLaws') were commanded directly by General Lee. Both Federal and Confederate returns commonly give in separate columns the officers and men *Present for Duty*, from whom men on *Extra Duty* (teamsters, etc.), the sick, and the officers and men in arrest or in confinement, are excluded. The Federal returns give, in addition to the *Present for Duty*, the officers and men *Present for Duty Equipped*. The Confederate returns give nothing that exactly corresponds to the latter, but give a column of *Total Effective Present*.

The statement of *Present for Duty*, being compiled in the same way in both of the opposing armies, is the best standard for their numerical comparison according to the records. But to get nearer to the fighting strength, I have obtained the figures resulting from the deduction of certain non-combatants. The term *Present for Duty Equipped* is defined to be "those officers and men who are actually available for the line of battle at the date of the regimental report,"¹ and the term *Total Effective Present*, or *Total Effective*, to be the "total enlisted men present, less sum of enlisted men sick and on extra duty."² The first of these definitions was not strictly observed, if indeed it was adopted, at the time of the campaign of Chancellorsville. In Hooker's tri-monthly return for April 30 we find the Provost Guard included in this category, while the Engineer Brigade and Signal Corps, to whom the definition would better apply, are not.

The *Aggregate* (officers and men) *Effective Present* can be obtained with practical accuracy by adding the officers *Present for Duty* to the *Total Effective*. According to the definition above given for *Total Effective*, the Confederates included in their effective strength the officers and men in arrest or confinement. They did not, nor did the Federals, include them in the *Present for Duty*. The return of the Army of Northern Virginia for March³ gives the *Effective Total* as exactly equal to the *Men Present for Duty*, though the table given in Chapter IV of this volume shows 1222 officers and men *In Arrest or Confinement*. During the period covered by this narrative the number of *Present for Duty Equipped* was generally about ten per cent. less than the number of *Present for Duty*, and the *Effective* or *Effective Present* (officers and men) about equal to the *Present for Duty*. Henceforth in this work, numbers expressing the strength of bodies of troops in *personnel* stand for officers and men of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, *Effective* or *Present for Duty Equipped*, according as the forces are Confederate or Federal. In a statement like "5000 men with 16 pieces of artillery" the word *men* includes officers and men of artillery as well as of infantry and cavalry. To determine the latter without the artillery, deduct about 20 men for each piece.

¹ *W. R.*, 40, p. 320.

² *Ib.*, 45, p. 947.

³ *Ib.*, 40, p. 696.

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC

Effective Strength (Present for Duty Equipped)

COMMANDS	INFANTRY			ARTILLERY		CAVALRY OFFICERS AND MEN	TOTAL OFFICERS AND MEN
	OFFICERS AND MEN	OFFICERS AND MEN	PIECES	OFFICERS AND MEN	PIECES		
I Corps, Longstreet:						60 ¹	60
I Corps, Reynolds { 1 Division, Wadsworth 2 " Robinson 3 " Doubleday }	15,782	1,061	51	65			16,908
II Corps, Couch { 1 Division, Hancock 2 " Gibbon 3 " French Artillery Reserve, Kirby }	15,907	977	48	9			16,893
III Corps, Sickles { 1 Division, Birney 2 " Berry 3 " Whipple }	17,568	1,153	60				18,721
V Corps, Meade { 1 Division, Griffin 2 " Sykes 3 " Humphreys }	14,867	857	42	100 ²			15,824
VI Corps, Sedgwick { 1 Division, Brooks 2 " Howe 3 " Newton 4 " Burnham }	22,427	1,136	54	104			23,667
XI Corps, Howard { 1 Division, Devens 2 " von Steinwehr 3 " Schurz Artillery Reserve, Schirmer }	12,170	757	36	50			12,977
XII Corps, Slocum { 1 Division, Williams 2 " Geary }	12,929	521	28				13,450
General Artillery Reserve, Graham	320	1,290	56				1,610
Cavalry Corps, Stoneman { 1 Division, Pleasonton 2 " Averell 3 " Gregg Reserve Brigade, Buford Reserve Regiment (6 Pa.), Morris Artillery Reserve, Robertson }		462	28	11,079 ³			11,541
Provost Guard, Patrick	1,868	254	10	95			2,217
Total	113,838	8,468	413	11,562			133,868

¹ In Hooker's return (*W. R.*, 40, p. 320) the cavalry attached to his headquarters as guards and orderlies, or escort, is not reported as *Present for Duty Equipped*, or "available for the line of battle," while that attached in the same capacity to the headquarters of his corps commanders is. I can see no good reason for this distinction, and have accordingly included Hooker's escort

(Companies E and I, 6 Pa. Cav.) in my figures for the *Present for Duty Equipped* (see *History of Pennsylvania Volunteers*, by S. P. Bates, IV, 1002).

² *History of Pennsylvania Volunteers*, by S. P. Bates, IV, 1002.

³ According to return of April 10, the latest available (*W. R.*, 40, p. 320).

This table is based upon the return of the Army of the Potomac for April, 1863.¹ The figures stand for officers and men *Present for Duty Equipped*.²

As in the table of the Army of Northern Virginia, the cavalry is given in number of men. The Federal cavalry could mount about 11,000 men.

The foregoing tables give with satisfactory accuracy the strength of the larger units of both armies at the beginning of operations. But as the operations proceed, deductions have to be made on account of losses. Unfortunately, the tables in the official records do not give the losses from day to day; they give them only for the whole campaign, which may be considered as lasting from the 28th of April to the 6th of May, both dates inclusive. The daily loss in killed, wounded, and missing may be gathered in a small number of cases from the reports of commanders. The data afforded by these cases the author has compiled into a table and used as a basis for the calculation or estimation of losses of the three classes mentioned from day to day (*Appendix 12*). But the killed, wounded, and missing are not all the losses that may deserve consideration. The effective strength of an army marching and fighting for seven days is diminished more or less by the loss or deterioration of arms and equipment, by sickness, and by straggling and skulking, detected as such and consequently not included in the missing, to say nothing of possible arrests and confinement for punishment, or of formal transfers from combatant to non-combatant branches of the service. The most reliable figures as to the numbers taken into action are reports based upon roll-calls, held immediately before the action, but such figures are very rare. Here and there in the official records commanding officers report the numbers that they took into action, but without indicating how the numbers were arrived at. These statements the author has tabulated as a basis for calculating or estimating the effective strength from day to day (*Appendix 13*). There are then two ways of determining the effective strength for a particular engagement. One is to take the figures from the returns,³ and deduct the losses incurred between the dates of the returns and the engagement

¹ *W. R.*, 40, p. 320.

² For official authority see Organization of the Army of the Potomac (*W. R.*, 39, p. 156). I have taken the batteries as given in the forementioned statement, and determined—generally from official reports, but always from good authority—the number of pieces composing them. It will be seen that my total is somewhat greater than that given in the abstract of return on p. 320 of Vol. 40 of the *War Records*. Mine differs only by one piece from that given by General Hunt, the Chief of Artillery, in

his report (*ib.*, 39, p. 252). The considerable disparity between my total and that of the abstract of return may be attributed to the fact that the army return was compiled from regimental and battery returns made up some time before the compilation, while my total is determined from reports corresponding in date to the compilation. The composition of the units of artillery and their assignments in both armies are given in *Appendix 11*.

³ *W. R.*, 40, pp. 320, 696.

THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

Appendix 12. This may be called the method by Return. Its inaccuracy is due chiefly to the following circumstances:

1. The returns are compiled weeks before the engagement.
2. The figures in the returns are for corps and divisions; those for regiments have to be computed.

3. The losses are given in the records only for the whole campaign.
4. Losses have to be estimated or computed.¹

Another, which may be called the method by Report, is based upon reports of regimental and higher commanders as to the number of men they took into action (*Appendix 13*). Such reports being obtained, the total or aggregate is obtained by generalization from the reports and meager data. The inaccuracy of this method is due, not to the process of generalization, but also to the disposition of commanders in their reports to minimize the numbers that they reported. The most accurate figures obtainable are perhaps a compromise between those furnished by these two methods. For the purpose of this report, however, the method by return is generally preferable, and will be employed unless otherwise indicated.²

The general condition and efficiency of the Army of the Potomac were testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the

War. It was allowed us for the preparation, the army made rapid strides in its organization, and morale, and early in April was in a condition to meet the expectations. Its ranks had been filled by the return of the soldiers, who were actuated by feelings of confidence and devotion to the cause, and it was a living army, and one well worthy of the republic.

Lincoln's views of the strategic situation were substantiated by Halleck to Burnside and to Hooker. They were expressed by the President himself on the 11th of April in the form of a memorandum:

That, just now with the enemy directly ahead of us, there is no question as to our going into Richmond; and consequently a question of preference as to the route.

120-102, 800-809.

In calculations the regiments of infantry averaged in the larger units the strength indicated in the following table (J. B. Jr.):

The Potomac		Army of Northern Virginia	
	405 men	I Corps:	
	350 "	1 Division	383 men
	420 "	2 "	452 "
	390 "	II Corps:	
	520 "	1 Division	405 men
	450 "	2 "	439 "
	440 "	3 "	414 "
	433 "	4 "	233 "
		Army	409 "

between the Rappahannock route¹ and the James river route is a contest about nothing. Hence our primary object is the enemy's army in front of us, and is not with or about Richmond at all, unless it be incidental to the main object.

What then? The two armies are face to face, with a narrow river between them. Our communications are shorter and safer than are those of the enemy. For this reason we can with equal powers fret him more than he can us. I do not think that by raids toward Washington he can derange the Army of the Potomac at all. He has no distant operations which can call any of the Army of the Potomac away; we have such operations which may call him away, at least in part. While he remains intact, I do not think we should take the disadvantage of attacking him in his intrenchments, but we should continually harass and menace him, so that he shall have no leisure nor safety in sending away detachments. If he weakens himself then pitch into him.²

Assuming that the enemy did weaken himself, and that Hooker did "pitch into him," what was to be accomplished? What was Lincoln's "general idea"? It was simply to score a victory and thereby encourage the war party at home and discourage the intervention, or recognition, party abroad. Beyond that he did not pretend to look.

Though the roads were hardly practicable for artillery and wagons, Hooker believed that the time had come for operations to commence; that the army was in condition to march on the enemy.³ His plan was communicated to the President in the following letter:

Camp near Falmouth, Va., April 11, 1863.

His Excellency the President of the United States:

After giving the subject my best reflection, I have concluded that I will have more chance of inflicting a heavier blow upon the enemy by turning his position to my right, and if practicable, to sever his communications with Richmond, with my dragoon force and such light batteries as it may be advisable to send with him. I am apprehensive that he will retire from before me the moment I should succeed in crossing the river, and over the shortest line to Richmond, and thus escape being seriously crippled. I hope that when the cavalry have established themselves on the line between him and Richmond, they will be able to hold him and check his retreat until I can fall on his rear, or, if not, that I will compel him to fall back by the way of Culpeper and Gordonsville, over a longer line than my own, with his supplies cut off. The cavalry will probably cross the river above the Rappahannock Bridge, thence to Culpeper and Gordonsville and across the Aquia [Richmond and Fredericksburg] Railroad, somewhere in the vicinity of Hanover Court-House. They will probably have a fight in the vicinity of Culpeper, but not one that should cause them much delay or embarrassment. I have given directions for the cavalry to be in readiness to commence the movement on Monday morning next [April 13]. While the cavalry are moving I shall threaten the passage of the river at various points, and after they have passed

¹ By water to Urbana, on the Lower Rappahannock, and thence overland to Richmond.

² *Abraham Lincoln*, by J. G. Nicolay and John Hay, VII, 90.

³ Hooker, *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 113.

To deliver the foregoing letter to Lincoln, Butterfield was sent on a special mission to Washington. Incidents of the interview between the President and Hooker's chief of staff on this occasion are related in *A Biographical Memorial of General Daniel Butterfield*, edited by Julia Lorillard Butterfield, pp. 153 *et seq.*; and in the *History of the Army of the Potomac*, by J. H. Stine, pp. 329, 325. If they are correctly presented, Butterfield was at this time thoroughly informed as to Hooker's plan, and discussed it freely with Lincoln, but not in the presence of any one else. The President signified his approval of Hooker's plan by the following telegram of 12:10 a.m., April 12:

Your letter, by the hand of General Butterfield, is received, and will be conformed to. The thing you dispense with [detaching a force from Washington in the direction of Warrenton] would have been ready by midday to-morrow.

Hooker expected that if Lee was cut off from Richmond, or abandoned it, he would take that place himself. But why should not Lee, while Hooker was doing this, throw himself upon the latter's communications with the North? To provide for this contingency, Hooker was to have a million and a half rations, over ten days' supply for his army, on board lighters; these were to be towed by gunboats down the Potomac and up the Pamunkey, so that his advance should not be impeded by the loss of his land communications, nor by slowness in the movement of his trains.¹

¹ Hooker to Colonel Ross, Feb. 28, 1864, in *B. and L.*, III, 223; *ib.*, *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 145.

river. To divert suspicion it may not be amiss to have word given out that you are in pursuit of [W. E.] Jones' guerillas, as they are operating extensively in the Shenandoah Valley, in the direction of Winchester.

He further suggests that you select for your place of crossing the Rappahannock some point to the west of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, which can only be determined by the circumstances as they are found on the arrival of your advance. In the vicinity of Culpeper you will be likely to come against Fitzhugh Lee's brigade of cavalry, consisting of about 2000 men, which it is expected that you will be able to disperse and destroy without delay to your advance or detriment to any considerable number of your command.

At Gordonsville the enemy had [has] a small provost guard of infantry, which it is expected you will destroy, if it can be done without delaying your forward movement. From there it is expected that you will be able to push forward to the Aquia and Richmond Railroad, somewhere in the vicinity of Saxton's [Hanover] Junction, destroying along your whole route the railroad bridges, trains, cars, depots of provisions, lines of telegraph communication, etc. The general directs that you go prepared with all the means necessary to accomplish this work effectually. As the line of the railroad from Aquia to Richmond presents the shortest one for the enemy to retire on, it is more than probable that the enemy may avail himself of it and the usually traveled highways on each side of it for this purpose, in which event you will select the strongest positions, such as banks of streams, commanding heights, etc., in order to check or prevent it, and, if unsuccessful, you will fall upon his flank, attack his artillery and trains, and harass and delay him until he is exhausted and out of supplies. Moments of delay will be hours and days to the army in pursuit. If the enemy should retire by Culpeper and Gordonsville, you will endeavor to hold your force in his front, and harass him night and day on the march and in camp unceasingly. If you can not cut off from his columns large slices, the general desires that you will not fail to take small ones. Let your watchword be, fight, fight, fight, bearing in mind that time is as valuable to the general as the rebel carcasses. It is not in the power of the rebels to oppose you with more than 5000 sabers, and those badly mounted, and—after they leave Culpeper—without forage or rations; keep them from Richmond, and, sooner or later, they must fall in our hands.

The general desires you to understand that he considers the primary object of your movement the cutting of the enemy's connections with Richmond by the Fredericksburg route, checking his retreat over those lines, and he wishes to make everything subservient to that object. He desires that you keep yourself informed of the enemy's whereabouts and attack him wherever you find him. If, in your operations, any opportunity should present itself for you to detach a force to Charlottesville, which is almost unguarded, and destroy the depot of supplies said to be there, or along the Aquia Railroad in the direction of Richmond, to destroy the bridges, etc., or the crossing of the Pamunkey in the direction of West Point, destroying the ferries, felling trees to prevent or check the crossing, they will all greatly contribute to our complete success. You may rely upon the general being in connection with you before your supplies are exhausted. Let him hear from you as often as necessary and practicable.

A brigade of infantry will march to-morrow morning at 8 o'clock for Kelley's Ford, with one battery and a regiment to the United States and Banks' Fords, to threaten and hold those places.

It devolves upon you, general, to take the initiative in the forward movement of this grand army, and on you and your noble command must depend in a great measure the extent and brilliancy of our success. Bear in mind that celerity, audacity, and resolution are everything in war, and especially is it the case with the command you have and the enterprise upon which you are about to embark.

The gist of all this is that the cavalry corps is to cross the Rappahannock above the railroad bridge, and operate against the communications and resources of the enemy, and against his marching columns. The instructions relative to the latter are based upon the expectation that the enemy will retreat as Stoneman proceeds with the destruction of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad, and will direct his march either toward Richmond or toward Gordonsville. If toward Richmond, Stoneman will be in position to oppose him in front; if toward Gordonsville, he is, if possible, to place himself across the enemy's front, and if not, to hang on his flank and rear. While in respect to time the work of demolition is expected to precede the operation of interception, in respect to importance demolition is subordinated to interception. "Keep them from Richmond," said Hooker, "and sooner or later they must fall in our hands." How was a cavalry corps that should not have been expected to muster more than 10,000 effectives to keep an army estimated at from 60,000 to 80,000 men from going where it chose to; and how was keeping the enemy from Richmond to make him fall into the hands of the Army of the Potomac? Hooker may have had answers to these questions, but it is hard to believe that, if he had, he would not have given expression to them.

Should Lee not retreat, Stoneman's operations would be a blow in the air or, at best, an effective raid.

The only provision made for communication between Stoneman and Hooker was the injunction: "Let him [Hooker] hear from you as often as necessary and practicable." What if it should not be practicable for Stoneman to get a message to Hooker? In that case he could not expect to be in communication with the latter until the army and the cavalry were reunited. "You may rely," says the letter, "upon the general being in communication with you before your supplies are exhausted." How soon was this to be? The order did not prescribe the amount of supplies to be carried. Stoneman's circular required the pack-trains to be loaded with five days' rations and each trooper to carry on his horse not less than three days' rations and "as much more as shall be judged practicable for him to take on short marches." It also provided that the animals should be rationed to the same date as the men. The expedition may

therefore be considered as supplied for a period of from eight to ten days—a long time to be possibly without news or instructions from army headquarters.

Neither Hooker's order nor Stoneman's circular makes any reference to subsisting off the country. Stoneman was to decide for himself whether he should fraction his command or keep it united.

The following force of cavalry was to remain with the army:

Of the First Division—the commanding general (Pleasanton), the 2d brigade (Devin), and the battery (Martin).

Of the Third Division—the 1 Pa. of the 2d brigade.

As diminished by the deduction of this force and the dismounted men, the cavalry corps marched on the 13th to Morrisville (21 miles). It numbered 9895 cavalymen and 22 guns manned by 427 artillerymen:¹

CAVALRY CORPS—Stoneman

First Division, 1st brigade (8 Ill., 3 Ind., 8 and 9 N. Y.)—Davis.

Second Division—Averell.

1st brigade (1 Mass., 4 N. Y., 6 O., 1 R. I.)—Sargent.

2d brigade (3, 4, and 16 Pa.)—McIntosh.

Battery A, 2 U. S. (horse artillery)—Tidball.

Third Division—Gregg.

1st brigade (1 Me., 2 and 10 N. Y.)—Kilpatrick.

2d brigade (12 Ill., 1 Md., 1 N. J.)—Wyndham.

Reserve Brigade (1, 2, 5, and 6 U. S.)—Buford.

Reserve Regiment (6 Pa. Lancers)—Rush.

Corps Artillery (horse)—Robertson.

Battery B and L,² 2 U. S.—Vincent.

Battery M, 2 U. S.—Clark.

Battery E, 4 U. S.—Elder.

The command had with it six days' rations and five days' short forage, carried on the horses or on pack-mules or in a wagon-train which was to accompany the column during the first two days. An extra supply-train of 275 wagons, carrying three days' rations and three days' short forage, was sent by the chief quartermaster of the army (Lieutenant-Colonel Ingalls) to Bealeton. The command was thus provided with nine days' subsistence and eight days' short forage.

The only force available to oppose it was four regiments of W. H. F. Lee's cavalry brigade³ and a portion of Stuart's horse artillery. The

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 1067.

² Formed by the consolidation of two depleted batteries.

³ 2 N. Ca., 5, 9, and 13 Va. The 10 and 15 Va. of this brigade were detached; the

former was near Beaver Dam, on the Virginia Central Railroad, and the latter on the Lower Rappahannock below Fredericksburg.

former numbered about 1200 men. The latter consisted probably of two batteries, or eight pieces, manned by about 150 men. This force was assembled about Culpeper Court-House, with outposts along the Rappahannock. Fitzhugh Lee's brigade (1, 2, 3, and 4 Va.), with perhaps a battery of horse artillery, was at Sperryville (Map 1, sheet A). It numbered about 1000 sabers. Of Stuart's remaining battery one or two pieces were probably with the 15 Va. Cavalry below Fredericksburg, and the others detached between the Rappahan and the Virginia Central Railroad.

For the concealment and protection of the Federal movement, infantry was ordered to take post as intimated to Stoneman—the 91 Pa. (1. 3. V) at Banks' Ford, and Buschbeck's brigade ($\frac{1}{2}$ VI) at Kelley's Ford, each with instructions to prevent a crossing by the enemy or any communication across the river, and to keep as far as practicable from being seen.¹

Stoneman issued the following order (Map 6):

Three² squadrons of Davis' brigade will cross the North Fork of the Rappahannock at Sulphur Springs about 12 o'clock to-night [13th], and follow down the south bank of this fork, and clear out any enemy's force met with between the point of crossing and Freeman's Ford, at which point Colonel Davis will be with the head of his brigade. As soon as Colonel Davis opens up communication with these three squadrons, he will cross with the whole of his brigade, and turn Beverly Ford, where General Averell will be with the head of his division.

General Averell will cross with his division at Beverly Ford, followed by General Gregg with his division. General Buford, with his Reserve Brigade, will cross at the ford in the vicinity of the Rappahannock railroad bridge simultaneously with General Averell. As soon as General Averell and General Buford are across the river and both have formed their commands a short distance beyond the river, Averell will push on to Culpeper Court-House, keeping to the right of the railroad, if possible to transport his artillery, or if there is no road leading along the right and near the railroad, then by the nearest road. Gregg will cross the river as soon after Averell as possible, and follow him well closed up on his rear.

If there should be a route practicable for artillery, and running parallel to the route pursued by Averell, Buford will follow it, provided it does not lead too far to the left. If there is no such route, the artillery of Buford will be sent to the rear of Gregg, and the Reserve Brigade will march through the country, irrespective of roads, keeping at such distance from Averell as to give room for Averell to form his division front into line of battle. Averell will move on in the direction of the enemy, who is supposed to be a mile or so this side of Culpeper Court-House. In case Averell comes upon the enemy, Gregg will form his division at once, and hold it in readiness to move to the right of Averell's division, and Buford will act looking to the left, and Davis will endeavor to turn the

¹ W. R., 40, p. 202.

² In the official publication this word reads *the*; it should evidently read *three*. J. B. Jr.

MAP 6

MAP OF A PORTION OF THE UPPER RAPPAHANNOCK, 1863.

illustrating Stoneman's Project for a Passage, April 14 and 15.



Scale
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Miles

enemy's left flank. If the enemy is encountered he will be attacked at once and with the utmost vigor, pouring in upon him every available man, excepting a limited reserve in each command.

Colonel Rush, commanding Lancers [6 Pa.], will report in person at daylight, April 15, to these headquarters, for special service.

The major-general commanding expects to be kept informed of all that may be deemed by commanding officers as important, and commanding officers will keep themselves posted as to what is transpiring on their right and left.

Corps headquarters will be, after to-night, with headquarters Gregg's division, until further orders.

The night of the 13th was quite cold. In spite of the heavy frost, Stoneman's cavalry bivouacked without fires, and consequently without sleep.

The following communication was addressed to-day (13th) to the commander of the XII Corps, and one of the same tenor to the commander of the III Corps:

A large portion of General Stoneman's cavalry force have gone in the direction of the Shenandoah Valley, and will be absent some days. Your infantry pickets must be vigilant and strong, as they will have no cavalry force of any account to rely upon.

It does not appear whether this dispatch was intended to be intercepted, but seems well adapted to deceive in case it should be. However this may have been, W. H. F. Lee, near Culpeper Court-House, received information in the course of the night from Lieutenant Payne—commanding the famous company of the 4 Va. Cavalry known as the Black Horse Cavalry—that the Federal cavalry and artillery, in heavy force, were moving up from Fredericksburg in the direction of Kelley's Ford.¹ Lee reënforced the picket at the ford with a company of sharpshooters and awaited developments.

The Federal movements for effecting a passage were then in progress. Davis took up the march for Sulphur Springs at 11 p.m., and marched on through the night. Buschbeck not having come up, Buford was sent with his brigade and a battery of horse artillery to Kelley's Ford, where he was to make a demonstration in the morning as a diversion in favor of Davis. It was contemplated that the 14th would be consumed by the movement of Davis' brigade down the river, and that the crossing of the remainder of the corps and the pack-train would take place on the morning of the 15th.

On the 14th, a clear, fine day, the cavalry proceeded to Bealeton, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, about 6 miles from Morrisville (Map 6). Here its wagons were unloaded and sent back to Morrisville.

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 85.

At daylight General Buford made a demonstration, as ordered, at Kelley's Ford, which had the desired effect of drawing the greater part of W. H. F. Lee's brigade from Culpeper to Kelley's Ford. Davis crossed the river at Sulphur Springs and Freeman's Ford, and marched for Beverly Ford. His brigade numbered about 1500 men. To avoid unnecessary delay in crossing the river, an attempt was made to-day to force it without the coöperation of Davis' brigade. Gregg's division went to the Rappahannock Bridge, leaving Averell's division and the artillery at Bealeton. The position at the river was examined, and it was found that a small body of the enemy was strongly posted on the opposite side to dispute the crossing, a part at the far end of the bridge, the remainder in a blockhouse and a line of rifle-pits beyond the bridge. While two companies forded the river below the bridge under a sharp fire, three companies charged across the bridge, and after a slight skirmish with the men in the blockhouse and line of rifle-pits, went back across the river. Gregg then examined Beverly Ford, and finding the south bank occupied by dismounted men, posted two squadrons opposite them on the north bank, and went into camp between Bealeton and Rappahannock Station.

A determined effort on the part of General Gregg's command could not have failed to secure the passage of his division at the railroad and at Beverly Ford; and success at these points would have caused the withdrawal of the Confederates at Kelley's Ford.¹

Buschbeck's brigade, ordered to take post at Kelley's Ford, arrived there about 3 p.m. to-day. One of its regiments (29 N. Y.) was detached to Rappahannock Station to guard the bridge and the train which was thought to be at that point. The following letter from Stoneman's chief of staff was on its way to Buschbeck:

The major-general commanding desires that as soon as the cavalry shall have crossed the river to-morrow morning, you direct the regiment of your brigade now at the Rappahannock railroad bridge to rejoin you at Kelley's Ford. After it has joined you, you will send one regiment back to Morrisville, to guard your right and rear and protect the wagon-train which will be left at that point. At early dawn to-morrow morning [15th] the major-general commanding desires you to make a vigorous demonstration at Kelley's Ford, so as to induce the enemy to believe that you intend crossing at that point. Extend your pickets well down the river, so as to prevent the enemy crossing below and cutting you off.

At 4 p.m. Buford's brigade and battery withdrew from Kelley's Ford and went into camp probably near Gregg's division, between Bealeton Station and Rappahannock Bridge.

¹ *Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry*, by McClellan, p. 222. See also *History of the 10th Regiment of Cavalry, N. Y. State Volunteers*, by N. D. Preston, pp. 68, 69.

The following dispatch was received in Washington at 10:20 a.m.:

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, April 14, 1863.

Postmaster, Washington, D. C.:

Major-General Hooker, commanding this army, would like to have the entire mails of to-day from his army detained twenty-four hours in your office, if you can do so with propriety. He has very urgent reasons for making this request, as you may readily imagine. Inform me whether or not you will comply.

RUFUS INGALLS,
Colonel and Quartermaster.¹

At 9:20 p.m. on the 13th Hooker telegraphed to Halleck:

If it is deemed of importance to keep open the telegraph communication to this point, it will require that a regiment of cavalry be sent from Washington to patrol and guard the line *via* Occoquan to Dumfries. My cavalry have other duties that will prevent their attending to this. The force should be sent without delay.

This dispatch was received at 9:35 and answered at 10:45 as follows:²

I do not think that the safety of Washington depends upon the maintenance of communication with your army, but I think it is your duty to maintain your communications with Washington, and to keep the War Department advised of all your movements and intended movements. You therefore have my orders to keep up such communications.

At 7:30 a.m. on the 14th the Secretary of War received the following dispatch of the same day from Hooker:³

I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of my telegram to Major-General Halleck [9:20 p.m., April 13, and his reply thereto, 10:45 p.m., April 13]. I respectfully request that these be laid before the President of the United States without delay.

The President took the part of Hooker and caused Halleck to reply at 11 a.m.:⁴

¹ The author wrote to the Postmaster-General for information as to the action taken on this dispatch, and received the following answer:

"... the Postmaster at Washington informs me that there are no records in his office to show that any reply was made to the dispatch mentioned, but he learns from employees who were in the office at the time, that such requests to hold mail were not infrequent. It is probable that the telegram was complied with without any record being made of the fact."

² The hours are taken from the *Report of*

the Committee on the Conduct of the War (IV, 214). The dispatch, it seems, was repeated on the 14th (*ib.*, p. 215).

³ The *War Records* give the hour as 7:50 p.m., which is in all probability erroneous. The hour is a.m. in the *Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War* (IV, 214).

⁴ The *War Records* give the hour as 11 p.m., which is in all probability erroneous. The hour is a.m. in the *Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War* (IV, 215), from which the text is taken.

From the Rappahannock, if he should meet with no unusual delay, he will strike the Aquia and Richmond Railroad on the night of the second day [17th].

Meanwhile I shall do what I can to keep the enemy up to their works in my front, and if they should fall back, shall pursue with all the vigor practicable.

Up to date last night the enemy appeared to have no suspicions of our designs.

This morning I can see nothing from the storm.

I am rejoiced that Stoneman had two good days to go up the river, and was enabled to cross it before it had become too much swollen. If he can reach his position [on the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad], the storm and mud will not damage our prospects. . . .

Alas for these fond hopes and fair promises. The heavy rain, which set in about 2 o'clock in the morning, and the consequent rapid rise of the river, put a sudden end to the crossing. Rush's Lancers reported to the corps commander at daylight, and received their orders "for special service." This regiment was to cross the Rappahannock with the main command, and while the latter did the heavy work on Lee's communications, was to make a dash at Richmond, and by forced marches rejoin the main command at Suffolk or Fort Monroe. It marched down to the river, and finding it so swollen as to be impassable, returned to camp.¹ Buford was at Rappahannock Bridge with his brigade at 6:30 a.m., ready to cross. He received orders to await further instructions. But no "further instructions" came, except to return to camp.

Buschbeck did not receive the order for him to make a demonstration until about 7:30 o'clock. Having heard no firing above, he judged that the cavalry had not attempted to cross, and that it would be useless to make a demonstration. So he made none. He dispatched his adjutant to the headquarters of General Stoneman at Bealeton "to examine into the state of affairs and to receive further orders," and received from Stoneman an order to remain at Kelley's Ford, and let the regiment at Rappahannock Station remain at that point to guard the bridge.

Davis' brigade, which was working its way down toward the bridge by the south bank, was recalled, and before it finished crossing, had to swim its horses. Its rear-guard was charged by about 50 cavalymen. One lieutenant and 24 men were captured and several men and horses drowned in the rapid waters. The Confederates sustained a loss of 1 killed, 2 wounded, and 6 captured or missing. They also lost 20 horses, killed, wounded, and captured.² W. H. F. Lee explains this loss by the statement that the men "were separated some distance from their horses, and being partially surprised, they had to make their escape without their horses, as they were in great danger of themselves being captured."³

¹ *Annals of the 6 Pa. Cavalry*, by S. L. Gracey.

² *W. R.*, 39, pp. 85, 86, 88.

³ *Ib.*, 39, p. 86.

The following communications went to Stoneman on the 15th:

From Hooker's Chief of Staff

. . . The tenor of your dispatches might indicate that you were manœuvering your whole force against the command of Fitz Lee, numbering not over 2000 men. The commanding general does not expect, nor do your instructions indicate, that you are to act from any base or depot. . . .

From Hooker's Adjutant-General

. . . As you state in your communication of yesterday that you would be over the river with your command at daylight this morning, it was so communicated to Washington, and it was hoped that the crossing had been made in advance of the rise in the river. If your artillery is your only hindrance to your advance, the major-general commanding directs that you order it to return, and proceed to the execution of your orders without it. It is but reasonable to suppose that if you can not make use of that arm of the service, the enemy can not. If it is practicable to carry into execution the general instructions communicated to you on the 12th instant, the major-general commanding expects you to make use of such means as will, in your opinion, enable you to accomplish them, and that as speedily as possible. This army is now awaiting your movement. I am directed to add that, in view of the swollen condition of the streams, it is not probable, in the event of your being able to advance, that you will be troubled by the infantry of the enemy.

Regarding Stoneman's movements Hooker telegraphed to President Lincoln at 8 p.m.:

Just heard from General Stoneman. His artillery has been brought to a halt by the mud, one division only having crossed the river.¹ If practicable, he will proceed without it. All the streams are swimming.

He received the following reply, same date:

It is now 10:15 p.m. An hour ago I received your letter of this morning, and a few moments later your dispatch of this evening. The latter gives me considerable uneasiness. The rain and mud, of course, were to be calculated upon. General S. is not moving rapidly enough to make the expedition come to anything. He has now been out three days, two of which were unusually fair weather, and all three without hindrance from the enemy, and yet he is not 25 miles from where he started. To reach his point [on the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad] he still has 60 miles to go, another river (the Rapidan) to cross, and will be hindered by the enemy. By arithmetic, how many days will it take him to do it? I do not know that any better can be done, but I greatly fear it is another failure already. Write me often; I am very anxious.

Even had Gregg's division remained across, and cleared the south bank of the river, Stoneman could not have begun a general movement until about midnight, as it took until then to get the wagons unloaded

¹ The troops that crossed were Gregg's division and Davis' brigade. J. B. Jr.

and their contents issued. By this time Davis with his brigade was within striking distance of Beverly Ford. But his coöperation could perhaps not be counted upon before the morning of the 15th. A crossing might have been made, however, without assistance from Davis. It should again have been attempted. Stoneman must have known from indications in the sky that a storm was brewing, and before it could break and cause the river to rise, he might have forced the position of Beverly Ford or Rappahannock Bridge, and got his whole command across the river. No delay was caused by, or involved in, Davis' wide turning movement, as it was accomplished by the time the main force was ready to advance, which, under the circumstances, could hardly have been earlier than it was—the morning of the 15th. The cause of Stoneman's tardiness is to be found, not in the elements, nor in any one's failing him under fire or on the march, but in his having handicapped himself with a column of wagons the contents of which had to be transferred to pack-mules before he could cross the river. He should have packed his mules before leaving Morrisville, and have crossed the river with his whole force on the 15th, ascending it, if necessary, still further for a practicable crossing. He might have dispensed with the supplies that he put on his pack-mules, and carried such supplies as he could in saddle-pockets, trusting to the enemy's country for the remainder.

At the same time that Stoneman was to cross the Rappahannock, Jones and Imboden were to start on their raid to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.¹ Imboden, who had moved to Shenandoah Mountain, was to proceed from there on the 15th; W. E. Jones was to take up the march from Lacy Spring about the same time. Thus, as Hooker was coming out of his winter quarters of his own accord, these commanders were starting to "draw him out."

With a view to the demonstration which was to fix Milroy's attention upon his communications while W. E. Jones and Imboden struck at the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, Fitzhugh Lee put his brigade in motion (14th) from Sperryville toward Salem, on the Manassas Gap Railroad; but hearing that a large force of "Yankee" cavalry was at Morrisville, preparing to cross at Kelley's Ford and attack W. H. F. Lee, he abandoned this movement and marched back to Amissville, where he encamped for the night.²

W. E. Jones received the following dispatches of this day from R. E. Lee:

1

I learn enemy's cavalry are moving against you in Shenandoah Valley; will attack Fitz Lee in passing. They have crossed at Rappahannock Station. Gen-

¹ Lee to W. E. Jones, March 25 and April 7.

² *Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry*, by H. B. McClellan, p. 220.

eral Stuart, with two brigades, will attend [to] them. Collect your forces and be on your guard.

2

The dispatch I sent you is confirmed; main body of enemy's cavalry is moving *via* Liberty [north of Bealeton Station, Map 6] toward Warrenton, with the intention to march into Shenandoah Valley against you. General Stuart, at Rappahannock Bridge, is apprised; directed to join you. Be prepared.

The Jones-Imboden expedition was consequently suspended. S. Jones wrote to W. E. Jones:

I countermand the movement of troops. Meet an advance of Hooker's cavalry into the Valley; will detain me here for the present.

The late attempt of the Army of the Potomac to advance was to have been supported by its naval auxiliary. On the 13th of April Hooker requested Magaw, commanding the first division of the Potomac Flotilla, to send two of his gunboats up the Rappahannock as far as Port Royal and further if possible, having reason to believe that the Confederate batteries below Port Royal had been withdrawn. "It is desired," he said, "that your demonstrations shall hold the enemy in that vicinity, and keep them from retiring. If the batteries are there, the purposes for which you go would be favored by exchanging a few shots with them. It is hoped that this movement will be made as soon as possible."¹

On the 14th Magaw wrote to Harwood, commanding the Potomac Flotilla:

I shall make an effort to reach Port Royal by to-morrow night (15th). . . . If we had some transports with [even] raw troops on board, the enemy's attention might be attracted, but without a coöperating force, I fear "General W. P. [W. H. F.] Lee" will laugh at us.²

On the 15th the U. S. ships *Anacostia* and *Dragon* went up the Rappahannock as far as Briscoe Mines, a distance of 110 miles, without receiving any shots. Arriving too late in the day to proceed with safety, they anchored for the night. From reports received, the commander believed "that the enemy were in strong force and with heavy batteries from Port Tobacco to Fredericksburg." He consequently renounced the idea of reaching Port Royal, and to prevent being cut off, dropped down during the night below Leedsburg. He did not advance again. "I am convinced," he said in his report, "that squads of the enemy's cavalry cross the river above and below Briscoe Mines almost daily."³

¹ *Naval W. R.*, Series I, Vol. V, pp. 255, 256.

² *Ib.*, p. 256.

³ *Ib.*, pp. 258, 259.

The line of cavalry outposts from Falmouth westward and northward was now dispensed with. Devin's brigade ($\frac{2}{1.6}$) remained in camp resting up. The brigade of the XII Corps at Dumfries ($\frac{1}{2.12}$) was relieved by dismounted cavalry. The 1 Pa. Cavalry, with headquarters at King George Court-House, picketed the Rappahannock from Falmouth down to Port Conway, and thence across country at right angles with the river a distance of about 3 miles, making occasional reconnaissances beyond the picket line.¹

The withdrawal of the old line of cavalry on the 13th was noticed by the residents on the north side, and probably by those on the south side, of the Rappahannock when they rose the following morning, as they had the pickets and some of the reserves in full view. On the 14th a Confederate picket called over: "You need not be so still; we know all about it; you have got orders to move." Lieutenant Ropes, 20 Mass., wrote home:

We have every reason to expect an immediate move, but in what direction, no one can tell.

The correspondents of the *Richmond Whig* and *Richmond Examiner* wrote from Fredericksburg:

1

Report says that the enemy have been massing troops in the vicinity of U. S. Ford for several days past. Yesterday and to-day considerable bodies of cavalry and immense wagon-trains were moving up the river. . . .

2

. . . It is hoped that Hooker will advance. His coming is anxiously awaited by the Army of Northern Virginia, who now regard the destruction of the Army of the Potomac as a military necessity; and believing that the war is near its termination, they desire to give it a brilliant *coup de grâce*. . . .

It was now understood in both armies that Hooker was about to move, but whether he would try to cross the Rappahannock, and if so where, were still matters of conjecture. In Lee's army it was generally supposed that, if he attempted a crossing, it would be at or near United States Ford. There was not a suspicion of Hooker's purpose of placing the cavalry corps on Lee's line of retreat. As has been shown, the Federal cavalry was believed to be aiming at the Shenandoah Valley.

On the night of the 15th the following conversation was carried on across the river:

Confederate: "Any signs of a move?"

Federal: "Yes, we have got eight days' rations, and expect to move in a few days. We have three days' rations in our haversacks and five in our knapsacks."

¹ *History of the First Reg't Pa. Reserve Cav.*, by W. P. Lloyd, p. 45.

Confederate: "Where is the move to be?"

Federal: "Up to the right."¹

General Longstreet says:

Long and close study of the field from the Potomac to the James River, and the experiences of former campaigns, made it clear that the Army of the Potomac had been drawn into a false position, and it became manifest that there were but two moves left open for its spring campaign: first, by crossing the upper fords of the Rappahannock; secondly, by detaching forces to the south side of the James, and by that route moving against Richmond.

To guard against the former, I laid out lines for field works and rifle-pits covering all approaches by the upper fords *as far as the road leading from United States Ford*. From that point the line broke to the rear, crossing the Plank Road and extending back half a mile to command the road from Chancellorsville to Spottsylvania Court-House.²

By "upper fords" Longstreet meant the fords between Fredericksburg and the United States Ford. The lines that he mentions can not be located with any accuracy, but, on careful consideration, seem to have extended from the vicinity of Banks' Ford westward to the old Mine Road in the vicinity of Childs, thence southwestward to some point between Chandler's and Chancellorsville, on the road to Ely's Ford, and thence southward toward the Plank Road. These lines, be it observed, were not intrenched; they were only "laid out."

¹ *W. R.*, 40, p. 219.

² *From Manassas to Appomattox*, pp. 323, 324. The italics are mine. J. B. Jr.

CHAPTER XII

HOOKER'S THIRD PLAN OF OPERATION

THE rain continued with short intervals, making the river impassable, for about two weeks. The Federal cavalry remained near Warrenton Junction, confronted on the south side of the river by W. H. F. Lee's cavalry brigade and Beckham's horse artillery, and on the north side by Fitzhugh Lee's brigade, Mosby's guerillas, the Black Horse Cavalry, and a portion of the 2 N. Ca. Cavalry.

W. E. Jones wrote to Imboden:

There is no sign of the enemy in the Valley. News has reached me from Sperryville just now, but no tidings of the move anticipated [into the Valley]. . . . My opinion is, the attack on the Valley has been abandoned, if ever entertained, by the enemy. . . .

R. E. Lee wrote

To President Davis, April 16

The last dispatches from General Stuart, dated yesterday, report the enemy's cavalry north of the Rappahannock, massed opposite Kelley's and Beverly Fords and Rappahannock Bridge. Prisoners report they were rationed for eight days. The cavalry were accompanied by artillery and wagons. General Stuart thinks the movement a feint to cover other operations. He can learn of no force moving toward the Blue Ridge, but thinks from the reports of his scouts that General Hooker intends to transfer his army to White House, on the Pamunkey, or to the south side of James River. My own impression has been that the movement was intended to draw us to the Upper Rappahannock, that Fredericksburg might be seized, and the bridges across the river rebuilt. I do not think General Hooker will venture to uncover Washington City by transferring his army to James River, unless the force in front of Alexandria is greater than I suppose, or unless he believes this army incapable of advancing to the Potomac. My only anxiety arises from the present immobility of the army [of Northern Virginia], owing to the condition of our horses and the scarcity of forage and provisions. I think it all-important that we should assume the aggressive by the 1st of May, when we may expect General Hooker's army to be weakened by the expiration of the term of service of many of his regiments, and before new recruits can be received. If we could be placed in a condition to make a vigorous advance at that time, I think the Valley [of the Shenandoah] could be swept of Milroy, and the army opposite me be thrown north of the Potomac. . . .

P.S. A dispatch from General Stuart, dated 9 p.m. yesterday, just received, states that the heavy rains and swollen streams have entirely arrested military operations on the Upper Rappahannock.

To Cooper, April 16

. . . I doubt whether General Hooker will be quiescent. There is some movement in agitation now not yet developed. By the last report he was drawing rations for 90,000 men. . . . Making a liberal deduction, I should think this would give from 65,000 to 70,000 effectives.¹

To Seddon, April 17

I am informed by the chief commissary of the army [of Northern Virginia] that he has been unable to issue the sugar ration to the troops for the last ten days. Their ration consequently consists of $\frac{1}{4}$ pound of bacon, 18 ounces of flour, 10 pounds of rice to each 100 men about every third day, with some few peas and a small amount of dried fruit occasionally, as they can be obtained. This may give existence to the troops while idle, but will certainly cause them to break down when called upon for exertion. . . . The time has come when it is necessary the men should have full rations. Their health is failing, scurvy and typhus fever are making their appearance, and it is necessary for them to have a more generous diet.

Lieutenant Ropes wrote home on the 16th:

. . . The river has risen tremendously, say 12 feet. Roads muddy, of course. We do not in the least know what to expect. . . . Hooker seems to be about a great thing now, if the impossible order to carry eight days' rations means anything. If this is often repeated, we shall lose half the army by sickness; but it may be only for a great march and a great strike and then a rest.

Hooker wrote to President Lincoln on the 17th:

His [Stoneman's] failure to accomplish speedily the objects of his expedition is a source of deep regret to me, but I can find nothing in his conduct of it requiring my animadversion or censure. We can not control the elements. . . .

While a commander can not control the elements, he can, within limits, regulate his movements by them. It is rather surprising after reading Hooker's defence of Stoneman in this letter to find his adjutant-general writing to him on the same day:

. . . it was not expected that you would embarrass yourself with wagons in your present expedition. It was supposed that your pack-mules would furnish a sufficient amount of transportation for your purpose.

¹ This is about the strength at which Hooker estimated Lee's army (Halleck to Stanton, *W. R.*, 40, p. 505). It seems that throughout the operations to be described

Lee underestimated the strength of Hooker's army, and Hooker overestimated that of Lee's.

The general fears that your artillery is so strong that it will detract from the rapidity of your movements. He desires that you will use your discretion in returning to camp such portions of it as will embarrass you.

These comments should have been made when Stoneman was starting from Falmouth with his wagons and artillery.

Hooker's adjutant-general wrote to Stoneman at 9 a.m. on the 18th:

No evidence exists here that the enemy has made any change in the disposition of his forces from the United States Ford down the river in consequence of your movement. Your delay in consequence of the storm may enable him to bring up a small force to dispute the passage of the river. It can only be a small one, and must be knocked out of the way.

The major-general commanding directs that you bear in mind that a part of your route lies along the line over which the enemy receives his supplies, and it may be with reason expected that some portion of them will fall into your hands. From the character of your movement, it should not be expected that you will be provided with full rations every hour in the day. Such never has been and never will be the case.

If, from your delay, Culpeper or Gordonsville should be found to have been reënforced with infantry of considerable number, he suggests that you go around them.

The same day Lee wrote to W. E. Jones:

I wish you to keep General J. E. B. Stuart informed of all movements of importance of the enemy in the Valley, while he [Stuart] is operating on your right flank. He is now near Culpeper Court-House.

The Special Correspondent of the *Richmond Whig* wrote from Fredericksburg:

The improving condition of the roads and thoroughfares, rendering military operations practicable, and particularly the demonstrations of the cavalry recently, warranted the expectation that Hooker would ere this have attempted a passage of the Rappahannock at one or more points simultaneously. . . . If we may form an opinion from appearances, the enemy have been moving up the river for several days. . . .

Lieutenant Ropes wrote home:

I incline to think the movement is for the present given up, or at any rate is to be altered. The Rebels know all about it now, and are shouting to our pickets in a derisive manner about the eight days' rations they are to carry.

On the 19th Lee wrote to Stuart:

. . . It appears to me that he [Hooker] is rather fearful of an attack from us than preparing to attack. His operations in front of you look rather to prevent your moving against his right or getting in his rear.

direction of Hicksford or Weldon, to destroy the railroads connecting with the south. But would that be a safe operation? . . . Would it not be more in accordance with principles for you and Hooker to act as nearly together as possible, and at the same time to secure your smaller force from the enemy's heavy blows? Suppose, while General Hooker operates against the enemy's front, you threaten his flank and rear by the Pamunkey and Mattaponi in such a way as to secure your own retreat, would there not be greater chance of success? It seems to me that West Point furnishes you a most excellent base for such an operation. . . .

Dix to Halleck, April 18, about 1:30 p.m.

. . . I have long been in favor of occupying the point referred to [West Point].¹

Peck to Hooker, April 21

. . . I hold everything yet. How do you get along?

Hooker to Peck, 10 p.m.

I am glad to hear good tidings from you. You must be patient with me. I must play with these devils before I can spring. Remember that my army is at the bottom of a well, and the enemy holds the top.

On the 21st Hooker wrote to President Lincoln:

. . . As I can only cross the river by stratagem, without great loss, which I wish to avoid, it may be a few days before I make it. I must threaten several points, and be in readiness to spring when a suitable opportunity presents itself.

Deserters inform me that the talk in the rebel camp is that when we cross the river it is their intention to fall in our rear and attack our depot at Aquia. The recent arrival of a pontoon train at Hamilton's Crossing lends plausibility to these reports.²

The sanguine temperament of the commander of the Army of the Potomac stood him in good stead through the trying period of boggy roads and swollen streams and consequent inaction. At perhaps its darkest moment he expressed himself as follows:

Camp near Falmouth, Va., April 21, 1863, 9 a.m.

His Excellency the President of the United States:

My latest advices from Major-General Stoneman were up to 9 o'clock yesterday morning. At that time his command was moving to ascertain whether or not the fords were practicable. If he had crossed, I can not but feel that I should have been informed of it ere this. . . .

The weather appears to continue averse to the execution of my plans as first formed, as, in fact, for all others; but if these do not admit of speedy solution, I feel that I must modify them to conform to the condition of things as they are.

¹ *W. R.*, 26, p. 1002.

² This is probably a reference to a pontoon train reported by Couch, which had no existence (*Appendix 8*). At any rate,

there is no evidence of the presence of a pontoon train at Hamilton's Crossing at this time. J. B. Jr.

I was attached to the movement as first projected, as it promised unusual success; but if it fails, I will project a movement which I trust will secure us success, but not to so great an extent, and one in the execution of which I shall be able to exercise personal supervision.

Very respectfully, etc.,

JOSEPH HOOKER,

Major-General Commanding.

The last sentence shows Hooker's characteristic distrust of his subordinates. His concern for the secrecy of his plan had received a rude shock. A letter of April 4 from his medical director (*Appendix 5*) was published in full in the *Washington Morning Chronicle* of the 17th. It contained the statements: "*The paper marked A shows the whole number of sick in this army to be on the 28th of March ultimo 10,777,*" and "*The ratio of sick for the whole army is 67.64 per 1000.*" From these it was easy, by simple proportion, to determine the strength of the whole army in officers and men present as 159,329. Such calculation is alluded to by Lee in a letter to Davis dated April 27 and in one to Seddon dated May 10.¹ According to the consolidated morning report the aggregate present on the 31st of March was 163,005. Lee was getting near the truth, but not quite as near as these figures would indicate. He discounted them too much on account of non-effectives. On the 7th of May he wrote to President Davis:

The strength of the enemy seems to be greater than I had estimated, as from various sources it is stated that they crossed the Rappahannock with 120,000 men.

If from Hooker's effective strength we deduct for the cavalry and horse artillery left behind 2400 men, for the 20 Me. Infantry 400 men, for the General Artillery Reserve, less Brooker's battery, 1500 men, and for the Provost Guard 2200 men, we get as about the force which, first and last, crossed the Rappahannock 127,460. On the 21st Hooker wrote to his friend in Washington, the Secretary of War, inviting his attention to the newspaper article and remarking:

Already all the arithmeticians in the army have figured up the strength of the sick and well, as shown in this published extract, as belonging to the army. Its complete organization is given, and in the case of two corps [I, VI] the number of regiments. The chief of my secret service department would have willingly paid \$1000 for such information in regard to the enemy at the commencement of his operations, and even now would give that sum for it to verify the statements which he has been at great trouble to collect and systematize.

On the 21st the pickets of Devin's brigade of cavalry were ordered in, and at 8 p.m. the three regiments proceeded to Potomac Bridge.²

¹ *W. R.*, 40, pp. 752, 790.

² *The Cavalry at Chancellorsville*, by J. E. Carpenter, in *Philadelphia Weekly Times*.

On the 22d Stoneman received another set of long, rambling instructions in which the following points are to be observed (*Appendix 14*):

1. He is to be ready to move on short notice.
2. He may subdivide his force, but if he does, he must have the several parts come together at some point in the enemy's country which he is to designate.
3. He is, if necessary, to subsist off the country.

They contain nothing about intercepting the enemy's retreat upon Richmond, which in the instructions issued on the 12th was made the "primary object" of Stoneman's movement. True, those instructions had not been revoked, but those of the 22d, not referring to this object, and dwelling upon certain other objects, might give the impression that the latter had been substituted for the former.¹

To confuse the enemy as much as possible Hooker made demonstrations as if to attack at both ends of his line. On the 19th Doubleday's division of the I Corps marched to Port Conway (Map 2), 21 miles below Fredericksburg, where it made a pretence of crossing, and at night built fires in every direction to make the impression of a large force. It returned on the 22d.² On the 20th the cavalry corps moved toward the Rappahannock to ascertain whether it was fordable; and about this time the small infantry force ordered to Rappahannock Ford and Beverly Ford showed itself at both points.

On the 23d Lee wrote to General Jackson:

. . . I think that, if a real attempt is made to cross the river, it will be above Fredericksburg.³

On the same day he wrote to the Adjutant and Inspector General:

As regards the reported movement of General Hooker toward Richmond, I know of no direct route which he can take, shorter than the line which we now

¹ Writing from Warrenton Junction, Stoneman reported his situation as follows. It should be premised that the enemy had evacuated Warrenton, and that Stoneman was drawing his supplies from Alexandria:

"April 22

"Averell's division and Davis' brigade are on the railroad, half-way between Warrenton and the Junction. Gregg's division and Buford's brigade are at the Junction. All are on the railroad. As we have not, nor, by being there, do we require, wagons to transport our supplies, I shall make arrangements to keep on hand two days' rations of long, and six of short forage, and eight of subsistence stores. I patrol the road to Bristoe Station, and have telegraphed the commanding officer of Alexandria of the fact, and requested that the force at Washington be sent out as far as

Bristoe, where I will connect with it by patrol from Cedar Run. I am sorry to say that the horses have suffered considerably for want of forage and from exposure to rain and wind. A few days, I hope, will bring them up again. The railroad is in good order up to the Rappahannock railroad bridge and to Warrenton. The construction train is now at the bridge. Three trains have arrived with stores.

"April 23

"The command is now separated [divided?] by impassable streams, and I am unable to communicate with the different portions of it, owing to the small streams being swimming. The pickets are cut off by high water."

² Itinerary of the I Army Corps, *W. R.*, 39, p. 256.

³ *W. R.*, 40, p. 859.

occupy, and should he attempt such a movement when the army is able to operate, I think he will find it very difficult to reach his destination.

On the 22d another demonstration was made below Fredericksburg. Two regiments of infantry ($\frac{24}{4.1.1}$, $\frac{84}{1.1.1}$) left their camp near Belle Plain at 1:30 p.m., and about 10 p.m. bivouacked about half a mile in rear of the village of Port Conway. About 3 a.m. on the 23d, the 24 Mich. was under arms and marched into the village. Twenty men were picked from each company to set up canvas boats and cross the river to Port Royal. Owing to a heavy rain, and the entire ignorance of the men as to the manner of constructing the boats, the work was not completed and the crossing effected until nearly 6 a.m. At that hour, thirteen boats crossed the Rappahannock without opposition. Parties were sent in different directions through the village of Port Royal. A wagon-train was captured and destroyed, several prisoners taken, and a mail seized. The boats returned to Port Conway about 9 a.m.² The expedition commenced its march toward camp about 11 a.m. and arrived there about 7:30 p.m. It rained all day, and the roads were almost impassable.³

"It seems," said Captain Candler, an aide on Hooker's staff, writing home on the 24th, "as though it were never to stop raining; the longer it rains the harder it seems to come down. I can see no prospects of any clearing up. . . . Our entire plan may have to be changed, and unless fortune favors us our chances for complete victory will not be very high. Could you come into Headquarters at any time during the day you would see that something was wrong; every one is moving around in an aimless, nervous way, looking at the clouds and then at the ground, and in knots trying to convince themselves that it is going to clear off and they will be able to move day after to-morrow."

The 25th dawned bright and springlike, with a good stiff breeze, which dried the mud rapidly. The day promised a spell of good weather and held out a prospect of an early move. The country was gay with fresh shrubs and flowers. Peach-trees were in full bloom. Bulbs and hyacinths abounded in the gardens of the deserted houses, and the Plymouth Mayflowers in the woods.

Howard was instructed to send knapsacks and other supplies to Buschbeck's brigade at Kelley's Ford, and informed confidentially that his whole corps would "probably move in that direction as early as Monday a.m., 27th."⁴

¹ 14 N. Y. Militia.

² The record, as published, gives this hour as 9 a.m., manifestly an error.

³ W. R., 39, pp. 137, 256.

⁴ The brigade had marched from its camp without knapsacks (*Autobiography of O. O. Howard*, I, 350).

The 91 Pa. (1. 3. V) was relieved from duty at United States Ford and Banks' Ford by the 155 Pa. (2. 3. III).

Hooker's feints, while they did not deceive the enemy, deceived his own army. Lieutenant Ropes wrote home on the 25th:

I hear from undoubted authority something which I tell you, and do not wish to have go further at present, viz., that it was, and probably still is, Hooker's plan to attack Fredericksburg again *in front* to accomplish what Burnside failed to do. The recent storm stopped it, but a few days ago the bridges were actually moved down and ready to be thrown across in the same places again. . . . Another thing, Macy [commanding 20 Mass.] has been asked if he will volunteer his regiment to lead in a desperate assault, and has of course accepted. So you may hear of another Fredericksburg any day, and the 20th will probably be ahead. Do not, of course, speak of this, for it must not get round. Nothing would so demoralize the army, and destroy the little confidence they feel in Hooker, as to know that he intended to repeat Burnside's move.

But he added on the 26th:

I heard from a staff officer last night that the projected move across the river here is given up. Couch told me so. . . . The rebels appear to be fitting up their works and increasing them. The river has now gone down to about its normal size. Weather fine.

Under date of April 25, 1 a.m., Lee wrote to Stuart:

I think it probable that among the considerations that prevent Stoneman from crossing the Blue Ridge is the apprehension that you will plunge into the rear of their army and cut up their line of communications. Should he cross into the Valley, nothing would call him back sooner than such a move on your part, and it is worthy of your consideration how you could, in that event, most damage him. Should you determine to follow him, Mosby and the Black Horse [Cavalry] might be let loose on his rear, which would, perhaps, produce similar consternation, though not so much harm.

Stoneman never thought of crossing the Blue Ridge. Lee's deception on this point was to prove, as we shall see, a potent and unexpected factor of success in the execution of Hooker's grand manœuvre.

Stuart's adjutant-general wrote on the 25th to Mosby that the general was extremely anxious to know what was going on behind Centreville, and whether Hooker was moving any troops up in that vicinity.¹

¹ W. R., 40, p. 860. Stuart wrote to Mosby on the 26th: "There is now a splendid opportunity to strike the enemy in rear of Warrenton Junction. The trains are

running regularly to that point (it may be by the time that you get this, the opportunity may have gone). Capture a train and interrupt the operation of the railroad.

April 26

On the 26th a detachment of the 1 Pa. Cavalry went from King George Cross-Keys down the Neck, the peninsula between the Rappahannock and the Potomac, for the purpose of capturing mails or small parties of Confederate troops, of breaking up contraband trade, seizing or destroying supplies intended for the enemy, stopping the Confederate couriers, and arresting any citizens that might appear to be actively hostile to the United States. It reached Leedsburg (Map 1, sheet A) and returned the same day with a dozen prisoners, having destroyed several boats and a considerable amount of contraband property.¹

At this time a material change was made in the Federal plan of operation. The new plan was stated and discussed by Hooker and his chief staff about a year later as follows:

Hooker

As the season was now more advanced, and the roads firmer, with a prospect that the rainy season had ended, I concluded to change my plan and strike the rebel army, instead of forcing it back on its line of retreat, which I could hope to accomplish in executing my first design.

The problem was to throw a sufficient infantry force to cross at a point beyond the Rappahannock, and knock away the enemy's forces at Lee's and Banks' Fords by attacking them in rear, and as soon as they were open to reinforce the marching column sufficiently for them to march upon the flank of the rebel army until the whole force was successful his retreat intercepted. Simultaneously with this the right, the left were [*sic*] to cross the Rappahannock below Fredricksburg and threaten the enemy in that quarter, including his depot of supplies, by dispatching an overwhelming force to his left.²

It was Lee's army; with that Richmond would have been ours, the capital of Virginia; and it was with this view that instructions were given to the army. I not only expected a victory, but I expected to capture Richmond. I had reason to expect it, and I struck for that object.⁴

Butterfield

Hooker finally determined upon a plan of campaign the intent and object of which was to destroy the army of General Lee where it then was,

body of cavalry is located at Junction, Bealeton, and so on. Keep far enough from the river to give you time to get off and prisoners. Information of large bodies is of the greatest importance to us just now. The transportation of divisions will be a part of a campaign. Be

sure to give dates and numbers and names as far as possible."

¹ *W. R.*, 40, p. 249; *History of the First Reg't Pa. Reserve Cav.*, by W. P. Lloyd, pp. 45-47.

² *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 116.

³ *Ib.*, 139.

⁴ *Ib.*, 145.

not merely to fight a battle and gain possession of the battle-ground, and have the enemy fall back on Richmond, but to destroy him there; for General Hooker believed that we could better afford to fight the enemy nearer Washington than Richmond.¹

The new plan lent itself, by turning the enemy's left, to forcing him off his communications and up against the impassable obstacles of the Atlantic seaboard, but Hooker had no thought of such strenuous tactics. His general idea, as it appears in the foregoing statements, was to "march upon" the enemy's left flank, to "threaten" his right flank, and at the same time to intercept his retreat. It was apparently expected that the enemy would retreat, or attempt to, at the slightest pressure on a flank. He was then, if possible, to be intercepted and captured on the heights of Fredericksburg, or if that was not possible, to be followed and harassed till he brought up against the Federal cavalry, and then to be crushed between that force holding him in front and Hooker's army falling on his rear.

The following instructions went to Stoneman at 9:10 a.m.:

. . . you will use all possible means of obtaining information in regard to the different routes leading from the Rappahannock Station into the interior and leaving Culpeper and Gordonsville to the right, the best place of crossing the Rapidan, the best roads, etc. . . . Also what information, if any, of the forces at Culpeper and Gordonsville. . . .

In the course of the day Hooker received a report from Stoneman that the people of the enemy's country were expecting an advance of Hooker's army on Gordonsville *via* Culpeper, that it was rumored that pontoon bridges had been thrown across the Upper Rappahannock for that purpose, and that there was probably a large force in front of Hooker at Fredericksburg.

He stated in reply:

. . . We know the strength of the enemy in front, and he is looking for us to advance in this vicinity.

He received the following telegram from Peck:

Longstreet is still here. Heavy artillery is coming to him from Petersburg. The storm has ceased; mud drying up. Advise me in cipher of as much as you deem proper of your operations.

To which he replied:

. . . I have communicated to no one what my intentions are. If you were here, I could properly and willingly impart them to you. So much is found

¹ *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 74, 75.

out by the enemy in my front with regard to movements, that I have concealed my designs from my own staff, and I dare not intrust them to the wires, knowing as I do that they are so often tapped.

Reference has already been made to the two years' and the nine months' men in Hooker's army whose time was to expire in the spring. These men, like all the volunteers, enlisted originally as state troops, and were subsequently mustered into the service of the United States. They were given to believe, it seems, that their period of service would be reckoned from the time when they enlisted as state troops; in other words, that they would be discharged the service of the United States two years after their enlistment in state regiments. On the 19th Hooker repaired to Washington to consult with the authorities on this question, and satisfied himself that they were not entitled to their discharge until two years from the time of their being mustered into the service of the United States. The men of the 5 N. Y. Volunteers, Duryee Zouaves, enlisted in the service of the state of New York April 23, 1861, and were mustered into the service of the United States May 9, 1861. They believed themselves entitled to their discharge from the service of the United States on the 23d of April, 1863. But on that day their colonel assembled them in a square, and read to them an order of Hooker's informing them that they would be held to service until May 9.¹ They took it in very bad grace. There were three years' men, too, in these two-year regiments who had been deceived, or had deceived themselves, into believing that they would be discharged with their regiments. They felt greatly aggrieved when notified that they would be transferred to other regiments to serve out their time. Many of the men thus disappointed resolved that they would not go into another battle.

About the 19th President Lincoln, Secretary Stanton, and General Halleck visited the army and spent a couple of days with it. Their presence in the camp was interpreted to mean an early move. It was intended to have, and doubtless did have, a favorable effect upon the dissatisfied men. Speeches were made which it was hoped would cause large numbers of the two years' and the nine months' men to decide to reenlist on the expiration of their terms of enlistment, but this hope was disappointed. On the 22d Hooker wrote to the Adjutant-General, U. S. Army, Washington, inclosing a list of the nine months' men and two years' men who were soon to be discharged by expiration of enlistment. Referring to them, he said:

... I have reason to believe but few, if any, will reenlist at this time. They appear to be of opinion that they will be under less restraint to retire from service before incurring new obligations, and that if they should conclude to re-

¹ G. O. No. 44, headquarters Army of the Potomac, April 20, 1863. See G. O. No. 85 for bounties offered in case of reenlistment (*W. R.*, 40, pp. 233, 234).

turn, they will be able to realize a larger bounty as substitutes for conscripts than is provided by law. The large bounties heretofore paid by the State and Federal Governments seem to be uppermost in their minds, and they will be likely to hold back for their recurrence. At all events, they are unwilling to reenlist now.

On the 24th of April, a general order from the Adjutant-General's office, Washington, directed that volunteer regiments about to be discharged be returned at the expiration of their terms of service to the states in which they were raised, and that they "turn over their arms and equipments" before leaving the army in which they served. The latter requirement caused dissatisfaction, as it deprived these troops of the privilege of parading on their way home with the arms which they had carried in the field.¹ This grievance was removed by an order issued from the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac on the 1st of May, when the army was engaged in active operations.²

¹ For the case of the 7 and 8 N. Y., which, on their return from two years of service in the Army of the Potomac, paraded in New York City without arms, see *New York Times*, April 29, 1863.

² "Pursuant to instructions which have been received from the War Department,

hereafter regiments of volunteers leaving the field on account of expiration of term of service will be permitted to take their arms and accoutrements to the place of discharge, to be delivered to the governor of the state or to the officers appointed by him to receive them."

PART II

PERIOD OF EXECUTION

CHAPTER XIII

APRIL 27 (MAP 7) . . . THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC IN MOTION

Right Wing

THE following orders were issued for the grand turning movement:

To Commanding Officers, XI and XII Corps, April 26

. . . the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, in the order named, will begin their march at sunrise to-morrow morning, the former to encamp as near Kelley's Ford as practicable, without discovering itself to the enemy, and the latter as nearly in its rear as circumstances will permit. They will be established in their camps on or before 4 p.m. on Tuesday, the 28th instant. Corps commanders will be held responsible that the men are kept in camp and do not go to the river. . . .

To Commanding Officer, V Corps, April 27, 1 a.m.

. . . your corps is to march to-morrow [to-day] so as to reach the vicinity of Kelley's Ford by Tuesday [28th] at 4 p.m. The corps of Generals Slocum [XII] and Howard [XI] take the same direction (and will be on the same route probably) from Hartwood.¹

To Commanding Officer, II Corps

The major-general commanding directs that you move at sunrise to-morrow morning two divisions of your corps to encamp as near as practicable to Banks' Ford without exposing your camps to the view of the enemy; that one brigade and one battery of one of these two divisions take position at United States Ford; the movement to be made quietly; the officers and men restrained from exhibiting themselves or making any show or appearance upon the river beyond the necessary picket duty. The division left in camp should be the one whose camps are most exposed to the view of the enemy. . . . [It] will be directed to keep up the picket line on the river and [to keep] in readiness to repel any attempt that may be made by the enemy to cross the river. Should the demonstration of the enemy prove of sufficient strength to indicate such a purpose, the Third Corps will be available for support. The division left in camp, as well as the divisions at Banks' and United States Fords, will be held in readiness to follow up any successful movements without delay. In moving from camp or breaking

¹ It had been originally proposed that south bank. This idea was abandoned on General Meade with the V Corps should the representation by Meade of difficulties cross at United States Ford, as the XI and likely to ensue. XII Corps moved down the river on the

The best road from Falmouth to United States Ford, and one that Hooker would naturally take, having regard to concealment, is the one through Hartwood Church. The V, XI, and XII Corps were assembled in the course of the day at this point (Map 7).

Medical Director Letterman, learning that only two ambulances per division were to accompany the troops, ordered all the other ambulances, and all the medicine and hospital wagons, to be taken to United States Ford and parked on the north side of the river.

The troops carried on their persons, as required by Hooker's circular of the 13th, eight days' field rations, except the beef for five days, which was driven along. The usual load of their haversacks had been three days' rations. They had carried five, but never more. Of the eight which they were now required to carry, they put five in their haversacks and three in their knapsacks. The men were stiff from their long encampment, and had not the strength and hardiness that might have been acquired from practice marches. The weight of the packs, as determined by certain quartermasters after the campaign, was about 45 pounds.¹ But these officers ignored all those personal belongings which a soldier thinks as important as many of the articles which he holds in trust for the government. No account was taken, for instance, of his towel or pocket-handkerchief, knife, pencil, pipe or tobacco, Bible or pack of cards, etc., or of the water or coffee in his canteen. The quartermaster of the VI Corps estimates the load of the soldier at from 56 to 60 pounds.² Swinton gives it as 60 pounds.³

The day was gloomy, rainy, and cold; the roads were in places almost impassable. The men made the short march to Hartwood Church in excellent spirits, but lining the road with overcoats and other articles thrown away as too heavy or cumbersome to be borne.⁴ General Hooker passed through the camp late in the afternoon and was greeted with deafening cheers. The soldiers sang "Hooker is our Leader":

The Union boys are moving on the left and on the right,
The bugle-call is sounding, our shelters we must strike;
Joe Hooker is our leader, he takes his whisky strong,
So our knapsacks we will sling, and go marching along.⁵

The XI Corps was accompanied by 58 wagons, about twice as many as accompanied either of the other corps. A number of them were loaded with the knapsacks of Buschbeck's brigade at Kelley's Ford. Others carried extra rations. This corps had provided itself with ten

¹ *W. R.*, 40, p. 545. ² *Ib.*, 40, p. 554.

³ *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, p. 272.

⁴ *Papers read before Illinois Commandery, Loyal Legion*, IV, 177.

⁵ The whole song will be found in the *History of the Corn Exchange Regiment* (118 Pa. Vols.), by the Survivors' Assoc., p. 166.

days' supplies, or two days more than it was required or authorized to carry.¹

It was expected that at the end of eight days, if not before, the troops would be joined by the main trains. These were loaded on an average with field rations for five days and grain for two, making, with the supplies accompanying the troops, subsistence for thirteen days and grain for eight. They contained also medical supplies and reserve ammunition for artillery and infantry. Besides the ammunition carried in the limbers and caissons, the artillery had from 100 to 150 rounds per piece in wagons of the main trains. The train of the V Corps remained at Stoneman's Switch. That of the XII Corps marched to the vicinity of Banks' Ford. That of the XI, which was required by order to do likewise, was parked at a road junction about a mile east of Berea Church by order of the corps commander.²

The 140 rounds of infantry ammunition prescribed by Hooker's circulars to be provided per man were carried as follows: 60 on the person (40 in cartridge-boxes, 20 in pockets of clothing), 20 on pack-mules, 60 in wagons of main trains.

Pursuant to instructions from Hooker, General Hunt, his chief of artillery, made a reconnaissance of the enemy's position at Banks' Ford, and determined upon the number and position of the guns to be placed there "to enfilade the enemy's rifle-pits; to crush the fire of his work on the hill overlooking the river; to cover the throwing of the bridges at that ford; and to protect the crossing of the troops."³ The necessary instructions for placing the pieces, preparing cover for them, and taking command of the artillery at this point were given by Hunt to his inspector of artillery, Major A. Doull. Two batteries of position from the General Reserve (Brooker's four 4½-inch guns and von Blücher's four 20-pounders), and the batteries left behind by the II, XI, and XII Corps, were posted accordingly by the major.

One regiment of the V Corps ($\frac{20}{3, I, V}$) was left in camp at Falmouth on account of its having the smallpox.⁴

¹ Report of chief quartermaster, XI Corps, *W. R.*, 40, p. 555. Howard says in his *Autobiography* (I, 353):

"Our orders were very strict to keep down the trains to the smallest number for ammunition and forage only. I found that on that march several of my subordinate commanders had been very careless in not carrying out these instructions to the letter. General Hooker and his staff passed my trains during the march and said to me: 'General Meade has done better than you.' Of course I had issued the orders, but field officers would here and there slip in an

extra wagon till there were many; for where were they to get their meals, if ration wagons were all left behind? This condition I quickly corrected, but it was my first mortification in this campaign. Some of the American officers were as careless as some of the foreign in the matter of orders—glorious in eye-service, but conscienceless when out of sight."

There is good reason, as we shall see, for questioning the assertion that the trains were quickly reduced to proper size.

² *W. R.*, 39, p. 632, and 40, pp. 557, 558.

³ *Ib.*, 39, p. 246. ⁴ *Ib.*, 39, p. 519.

In compliance with instructions from Halleck, General Stahel, with the 2d and 3d brigades of his cavalry division and a battery of four guns, marched from Fairfax Court-House to 2 miles beyond Middleburg. This movement, which the enemy might take for a reconnaissance to clear the way for Stoneman's cavalry into the Shenandoah Valley, was intended to hold in check the Confederate troops remaining in the Valley. Federal troops were being sent from the Valley westward to meet Jones and Imboden.

Stoneman forwarded to headquarters the result of the "inquiries and investigations into the character and nature of the country lying south of the Rappahannock and east of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad." He reported in part:

The roads leading out from Kelley's, Kemper's, and Barnett's Fords are country roads, and tolerably good in dry weather. There is a very good road leading from Culpeper Court-House to Germanna Mills [or Ford], on the Rapidan River, *via* Stevensburg, and another from the Court-House to Raccoon Ford, on the same river. The fords over the Rapidan River are numerous, and their practicability depends entirely upon the stage of water in the streams. The banks are generally rolling, open, and well cultivated, and the whole of it, as far north as Culpeper Court-House, is overlooked and in plain view from the top of Clark's mountain, on the top of which mountain the enemy has a telegraph station (signal).¹ . . .

The inhabitants of Culpeper Court-House have been leaving for the Shenandoah Valley. These fleeing inhabitants, as also the prisoners which have fallen into our hands, would lead us to suppose that the enemy expected an attack from this direction, but I am assured by yourself that such is not the case.

If Hooker meant that the enemy was not looking for an advance upon Gordonsville, he was mistaken. A correspondent in the field wrote as follows:

The rebels seem to regard Hooker's designs against Gordonsville as impolitic, and likely to result disastrously, saying that the "Confederates are making Gordonsville stronger than Fredericksburg was, and that we will discover [that] it is not the easiest way of getting to Richmond." . . . The blacks, as a general rule, come voluntarily forward, and disclose such facts as they deem to our advantage to be apprised of, oftentimes at much personal risk to themselves, for their masters threaten them with summary vengeance for all such acts. The owners regard their slaves with marked distrust.

Stoneman's reconnaissances have cleared up the country as far as the Rapidan. Beyond that line its most notable feature is a dense tangled forest of pine and oak interspersed with black-jack and other scrub growths, known as the Wilderness. A single good road, the Plank Road, leads from Fredericksburg westward, leaving comparatively open

¹ A station for flag or torch signaling.

country behind it, and enters the Wilderness at a place called Salem Church. About a mile beyond this point, or a half-mile from Tabernacle Church, it divides into two branches. The southern branch is the continuation of the Plank Road, and retains its name; the northern branch is known as the Turnpike. These two roads come together at Chancellorsville, about 4 miles from Tabernacle Church, or 10 miles from Fredericksburg. They continue one road to a point about 3 miles distant called Wilderness Church, where they separate as before, forming the two roads which connect this region with Orange Court-House, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad.

Chancellorsville consists of a single brick dwelling, and owes its importance to the meeting here of several roads. Around this house is an irregular cleared space of about 100 acres, or extending about 200 or 300 yards in every direction. A road of inferior quality, known as the River Road, runs from Fredericksburg along the river to the vicinity of Mineral Spring Run, and thence to Chancellorsville.

Left Wing

Instructions sent to Sedgwick, commanding the I, III, and VI Corps (left wing), were received about 6 p.m.

The three corps were to be in position to cross the river as follows:

I and VI Corps, at or before 3:30 a.m. the 29th—the former at Fitzhugh's Crossing, the latter at Franklin's Crossing.

III Corps, as a support, at or before 4:30 a.m. the 29th—at either of the forementioned crossings. The ambulances and trains to be parked in the rear, and concealed behind the range of hills that was visible to the enemy, and to be ready to move when desired. The troops, as far as possible, to be concealed until they executed the demonstration which was to follow. The necessary batteries of the corps and of the General Artillery Reserve to be placed in position under direction of General Hunt to cover the crossing. . . . Two bridges to be laid at each crossing under the supervision of General Benham before 3:30 a.m. the 29th. Any troops needed to assist the Engineer Brigade in the performance of this duty to be furnished to General Benham, under the direction of General Sedgwick. A demonstration in full force to be made on the morning of the 29th with a view to securing the Telegraph Road and barring that route to Richmond. In the event of the enemy detaching any considerable part of his force against the troops operating toward Chancellorsville, Sedgwick was to attack and carry the works in his front at all hazards, and establish his force on the Telegraph Road to prevent the enemy's turning his position on that road and gaining the route to Richmond. In case the enemy should succeed in doing this or should previously fall back on Richmond, Sedgwick was to pursue him with the utmost vigor.

It was suggested that, in case the enemy retired, a force be thrown on the Bowling Green Road and pursuit be made both on that road and on the Telegraph Road.

The 155 Pa. at Banks' and United States Fords was replaced by troops of the "Irish brigade," commanded by General Meagher. Two regiments ($\frac{69, 116}{2, 1, II}$) were posted at United States Ford and two ($\frac{63, 88}{2, 1, II}$) at Banks' Ford. The remaining regiment (28 Mass.) camped at Hartwood Church *en route* to United States Ford. Detachments of these regiments were distributed among the houses through the country, with instructions to keep the inhabitants from leaving their vicinity, and so prevent their giving information to the enemy.

In preparation for supporting the II Corps, if necessary, the following dispatch was sent to the commander of the III Corps:

The commanding general directs that you have your command in readiness to move early to-morrow [28th] with the subsistence (eight days) and ammunition prescribed by existing orders for the march. Further instructions will be sent to you later in the day.

This corps was reviewed to-day by a number of distinguished visitors who were received at Hooker's headquarters yesterday. The reviewing party consisted of Secretary Seward; the Swedish minister; the secretary of the Swedish legation; the Prussian minister; Mr. Peale, examiner of patents; Mr. French, second auditor of the Treasury; Mr. F. W. Seward, Assistant Secretary of State; the Governor of Maine; the Governor of New Jersey; General Hooker and staff, and a large body of civilians. The line was formed at 10 o'clock, the regiments having only company front. The artillery was formed in the rear, and the transportation in another part of the field. Notwithstanding this contracted formation, the infantry alone presented a mile and a half of army blue, gaily relieved by the regimental colors and the designating flags of brigades and divisions. Secretary Seward and the Swedish secretary rode on horseback with General Hooker and staff. The rest of the party were in two carriages, drawn by four horses each.

The troops appeared in heavy marching order, with knapsacks and haversacks packed. For nearly an hour, as the solid column filed by, General Hooker was enabled to entertain his foreign visitors with accounts of the exploits of its organizations.

A noticeable feature of the review was the excellent appearance of the transportation of the corps, embracing over 400 wagons, with a long string of pack-animals. After the review and a lunch at General Hooker's headquarters the visitors returned to Washington.

At 3:30 p.m. Lincoln telegraphed to Hooker:

How does it look now?

Hooker replied at 5 p.m.:

I am not sufficiently advanced to give an opinion. We are busy. Will tell you all as soon as I can, and will have it satisfactory.

Lee wrote to President Davis:

I feel by no means strong, and from the condition of our horses and the amount of our supplies, I am unable even to act on the defensive as vigorously as circumstances may require. A report sent me last night by Major Norris of the signal corps at Richmond, and which probably may have been submitted to you, states the strength of General Hooker's army to be from 150,000 to 160,000,² and that reinforcements had been sent him from Baltimore, Washington, Alexandria, and Harper's Ferry. Though bodies of troops heretofore retained in Maryland to keep that state in subjection, I believe, have been forwarded to General Hooker, still I think his numbers much exaggerated. But this report, said to be brought by a special scout from Washington, corroborates all previous intelligence showing that troops from the rear have been moved to the Rappahannock. This would indicate a forward movement of the Federal Army.

A dispatch last night from General Stuart, dated 2 p.m., 26th instant, states that General Stoneman is encamped at Warrenton Springs.

A brigade of infantry (Federal) is guarding Rappahannock Bridge and Beverly and Kelley's Fords, and trains over the Orange and Alexandria Railroad were arriving hourly without bringing troops, so far as known. He may intend to push his cavalry along by that route [toward Culpeper Court-House and Gordonsville], while his infantry attempt to seize this.

And to Longstreet:

Can you give me any idea when your operations will be completed and whether any of the troops you have in North Carolina can be spared from there?³

Major Norris, Chief Signal Officer, C. S. A., telegraphed to Longstreet and doubtless to Lee:

Washington is almost stripped of its garrison. Mules with pack-saddles for ammunition have been sent to him [Hooker]. Hooker is going to cross the river at three points—two above and one below [Fredericksburg].⁴

The Chief Signal Officer of the Army of the Potomac, Captain S. T. Cushing, was directed by the Chief of Staff to extend the telegraph line from headquarters to Banks' Ford and to Franklin's Crossing. Beyond this no intimation was given him as to any projected movement. He asked for information as to the general course of operations, but

² Doubtless the estimate referred to by Hooker in his letter to the Secretary of War, April 24 (page 182 ante).

³ See pp. 1024, 1025.

⁴ Banks' Ford and United States Ford above, and probably Franklin's Crossing below. J. B. Jr.

none was granted him. He was simply informed that the work ordered should be accomplished by night. The line that was to extend to Franklin's Crossing went *via* Phillips House to Tyler's Hill, where Sedgwick had his headquarters. The station at Tyler's Hill was ready for operation at 4:30 p.m., but was not operated to-day. The line to Banks' Ford was arrested by the Federal pickets at a point near England, about 2 miles from Banks' Ford. It was ready for operation by night. Imagining that a portion of the army would cross at or near Banks' Ford, Captain Cushing directed Captain B. H. Fisher of the Signal Corps to be at Banks' Ford at dawn on the 28th, and take charge of all signal operations with the right wing of the army. Signal stations (flag and torch) were now established watching the movements of the enemy from the England House, the Phillips House, the Seddon House, and opposite Buckner's Neck. Only the latter two, it seems, communicated with each other. The one at the Phillips House was equipped with a powerful telescope.

The departure of the V, XI, and XII Corps from their winter quarters may have been known this evening throughout the Army of the Potomac. But where they were going, and when the remainder of the army would move, and in what direction, were generally a mystery. Hooker's orders to his corps and wing commanders did not divulge his general plan. His messages to commanders in the right wing contained, so far as known, no reference to the orders issued for the left wing, and *vice versa*.

To-night Hooker sent for Couch, and explained to him, as next in rank, his plan of campaign. He informed Couch that, under certain contingencies, the right wing would be placed under his command.¹

Lee's dispositions were the same as they had been during the winter (Map 2), except that Early's division of Jackson's corps ($\frac{3}{11}$) had moved up the Rappahannock to the lines of Fredericksburg, and W. H. F. Lee's brigade of cavalry had gone up to Brandy Station, leaving only the 15 Va. in the vicinity of Port Royal.

What would Lee have done, had he at this time known the plan of operation which Hooker was starting to execute? During the last three months he must have spent many hours in thinking of manœuvres that Hooker might attempt against him, but the one that was now under way had never, it would seem, suggested itself to him; nor apparently did he ever express himself as to how, had it done so, he would have planned to meet it. On the latter point some speculation may not be unprofitable. Lee could hardly undertake to oppose Hooker in force at Kelley's Ford without exposing his depots and the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad to capture and destruction, or the fractions of his army, one at Fredericksburg and one at Kelley's Ford, to

¹ *B. and L.*, III, 157.

separate attack and defeat. It seems probable that he would have left a minor portion of his army in the lines of Fredericksburg to oppose Sedgwick, and established the major portion somewhere between Chancellorsville and the Rapidan to meet and repel the Federal right wing under Hooker.

It may be assumed that Hooker's chief concern for the present is :

1. That his columns may reach the Rapidan before Lee can take position to oppose its passage.
2. That he may strike a decisive blow before Longstreet can be brought up to Lee's assistance.

CHAPTER XIV

APRIL 28 (MAP 8) . . . THE RIGHT WING COMMENCES, AND THE LEFT WING
PREPARES, TO CROSS THE RAPPAHANNOCK

Right Wing

BUTTERFIELD wrote to Stoneman at Warrenton Junction:

One of Colonel Sharpe's¹ men just in from Kelley's Ford says, in his opinion, no large body of infantry there. Held mostly by cavalry and artillery. Rebel sympathizers on this side believe enemy have fallen back beyond Rapidan, meaning to make that their line of defence. . . . They think our cavalry move a feint, and that the crossing will be made at United States Ford, where they are still at work.

The cavalry brigade left with Pleasonton (Devin's) marched this morning to Grove Church, whence at 5 a.m. its commander wrote to Pleasonton:

We arrived here at 4 a.m.² . . . made a reconnaissance in person (after halting and feeding horses and men) to Ellis' Ford. Woke up their infantry, who came down into the rifle-pits and drew bead on us. . . . Picketed near Ellis', Kemper's, and Field's, and communicated on the right with a brigade of Howard's, between Kelley's and Rappahannock. Found no [Confederate] picket at the fords between Richards' and Kelley's. . . . The report among contrabands [negroes] here is that at the fords the water has been filled with iron wirework, calculated to entangle the feet of horses, while the sharpshooters pop them off. They say they have things fixed for our cavalry now. . . .

A battalion of the 2 N. Y. Cavalry (1. 3. C) reconnoitered from Warrenton Junction northeastward as far as Brentsville (Map 1, sheet A), capturing several guerillas;³ and Stahel's division marched from Middleburg to Rectortown, Salem, White Plains, and back, taking a number of prisoners, mostly from Mosby.

The First and Third Divisions of the II Corps, with two ambulances per division, three batteries of divisional artillery,⁴ and the two batteries of corps artillery, marched to the vicinity of Banks' Ford.

¹ Colonel G. H. Sharpe, Deputy Provost-Marshal-General, Chief of Secret Service.

² Official publication reads *p.m.*, evidently an error. J. B. Jr.

³ *Three Years in the Federal Cavalry*, by Willard Glazier, p. 175.

⁴ Thomas' and Pettit's (1. II), Arnold's (2. II). According to Hooker's orders,

The 5 N. H. and 81 Pa. (1. 1. II) were sent out, under Colonel Cross of the former regiment, to picket houses and roads to United States Ford, in order to prevent information from going to the enemy. The two regiments occupied 41 dwelling-houses and a number of roads. They found the occupants of the houses full of suppressed hostility, but civil.¹

The troops carried, on their persons or on the hoof, rations as prescribed, for eight days. The small-arm ammunition was carried in a train of 70 wagons. A supply-train of 45 wagons carried forage for six days and hospital stores, though the orders limited the forage to a supply for four or five days, and precluded the carrying of hospital stores in wagons. The remainder of the trains, containing five days' field rations and two days' grain, was parked in rear of Falmouth. The contents of all the trains, with what the troops had on their backs and on the hoof, would supply the command with subsistence for thirteen days and with forage for eight. Carroll's brigade ($\frac{1}{3}$ II), Ames' battery ($\frac{1}{3}$ II), and the train for two bridges near Falmouth went to United States Ford; Meagher's brigade ($\frac{2}{1}$ II) assembled at Banks' Ford. While a pretence of crossing was made at this point by throwing up works, etc.,² large working parties were employed repairing the road to United States Ford. The Second Division (Gibbon's) remained in position opposite Fredericksburg with two batteries.³

The III Corps remained with the left wing under Sedgwick. The "further instructions" which were to have been sent yesterday "later in the day," to the commander of this corps, were not sent—probably to avoid drawing forces of the enemy toward Banks' or United States Ford. Hooker expected that the arrival of his right wing on the Rapidan would cause the enemy to withdraw his troops from United States Ford and that the further advance of that wing, reënforced by his center, would dispose in like manner of the enemy at Banks' Ford. He repaired to Morrisville to superintend in person the passage of the Rappahannock at Kelley's Ford. About 2 p.m. he there issued the following instructions:

To Slocum, commanding XI and XII Corps

. . . so long as the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps are operating on the same line, you will exercise the command of both.

The general directs that the Eleventh Corps cross to the opposite side of the river to-night, and that the Twelfth Corps commence crossing at daylight tomorrow morning, and to be thrown over with all possible rapidity, and both corps marched by the most direct route without delay and seize the bridge, if

each division was to be accompanied by its own artillery. Arnold's battery for some reason took the place of Adams' battery of the Third Division.

¹ *History of the 5th Regiment N. H. Volunteers*, by William Child, pp. 179, 181.

² *W. R.*, 39, p. 306.

³ Brown's (2. II), Adams' (3. II).

standing, and the ford, at Germanna Mills. He suggests that you make use of a cavalry regiment and three or four smart marching [infantry] regiments to execute this duty and that you cross both of your corps over the Rapidan River to-morrow. You will find guides in General Pleasonton's cavalry.

Major-General Meade will move on almost a parallel line at the same time, and will be in easy communication with you. He will cross [the Rapidan] at Ely's Ford. If his passage should be disputed, as you will probably be able to learn from the firing, or through your communication with that officer, the general directs that you dispatch a corps along the south bank of the Rapidan, to knock away the enemy, to enable him to cross, and when the Fifth Corps is across, that you push on with both of your corps to Chancellorsville, at which point the three corps will come together and you will command by virtue of your seniority.

The enemy have a brigade¹ holding the United States Ford, which they will abandon as soon as they hear of your approach. This will open the United States Ford to us, when bridges will at once be thrown across the river, and will afford you a direct communication with headquarters. Telegraphic communication is established from that point [United States Ford to headquarters].² If your cavalry is well advanced from Chancellorsville, you will be able to ascertain whether or not the enemy is detaching forces from behind Fredericksburg to resist your advance. If [he is] not [doing so] in any considerable force, the general desires that you will endeavor to advance at all hazards, securing a position on the Plank road, and uncovering Banks' Ford, which is also defended by a brigade of the rebel infantry ($\frac{4}{11}$) and a battery ($\frac{2}{11}$). If the enemy should be greatly reënforced you will then select a strong position, and compel him to attack you on your ground. You will have nearly 40,000 men, which is more than he can spare to send against you.³ Every incident of your advance you will communicate to the general as soon as communication is established by the United States Ford. Two aides-de-camp are sent to report to you for this service. You are already advised of the operations going on below Fredericksburg.

The general desires that not a moment be lost until our troops are established at or near Chancellorsville. From that moment all will be ours. A copy of this will be furnished Major-General Meade.

It will be much easier to replenish batteries, ammunition, etc., by Banks' Ford than by the United States Ford, if you should succeed in uncovering it.

Here we see the first reference in a communication to an officer of the right wing to what is going on in the left wing, and Hooker's first reference to the possibility of the enemy's assuming the offensive. If the enemy advanced in force, Slocum was to renounce the offensive, take up a strong position, and compel the enemy to attack him on his own ground. How was he to effect such compulsion? He could only do it, if at all, by cutting every line by which Lee might retreat. "The general desires," says the order, "that not a moment be lost until our

¹ Two brigades and a battery. J. B. Jr.

² This was a mistake.

³ Testifying about a year later before the Committee on the Conduct of the War,

Hooker gave the strength of the three corps as probably not exceeding 36,000 men.

Adding 1000 for the cavalry would give for the whole command about 37,000.

The right wing, with the XI Corps in front, the XII next, and the V last, marched to the vicinity of Mount Holly Church, about 2 miles from Kelley's Ford. It rained almost all day, making the roads difficult and the packs heavy. Advantage was taken of every halt to throw away overcoats, knapsacks, or other articles of equipment that had become intolerable.¹ The XI Corps, which started at 4 a.m., was formed up in camp at 4 p.m. The V Corps did not all get in until after 10 o'clock. The distance marched was about 17 miles.

Every house along the route that might possibly harbor a disloyal man or woman was put under guard. So there was reason to believe that the movement had not been observed by the enemy. The men of Buschbeck's brigade, at Kelley's Ford, welcomed the arriving troops, and encouraged them with the prospect of an easy passage in the morning.

Slocum, who commanded the XI and XII Corps, issued the following instructions to Howard, commanding the XI:

. . . you will cross the river at Kelley's Ford at the earliest possible moment to-night. You will report to me as soon as your troops commence crossing, and also immediately after the crossing is effected. As soon as you have effected a crossing, you will take a defensive position, and await the crossing of the Twelfth Corps, which will precede you on the road to Germanna Bridge [Ford]. You will hold your command in readiness, and follow immediately in their rear. Keep your column well closed, with all your baggage-wagons in rear of your entire corps, except your rear-guards. Have two batteries accompany your leading brigades [in your several columns?].

Pleasanton received the following order:

. . . report with your command of cavalry [Devin's brigade] to Major-General Slocum, for service with his command. A portion of your force will accompany his command; and a portion will be sent to report for duty with the Fifth Corps, and will report to Major-General Meade.

Having reported to Slocum and received his orders, Pleasanton ordered Devin at Grove Church to send the 17 Pa. to report to Howard, to draw in his pickets, and concentrate the rest of his brigade in the neighborhood of Mount Holly Church; also to furnish guides acquainted with the country to Generals Howard and Meade.

The bridge train of canvas boats (advance-guard train) coming from Washington arrived at 5:30. At 7 p.m. the 15 N. Y. Engineers, assisted by men of the XI Corps, commenced laying it under the direction of Captain Comstock of the Engineer Corps. General Hooker was also present superintending this work. About 400 men of Buschbeck's brigade of the XI Corps manned a number of boats concealed in Marsh

¹ *History of the 22 Mass. Infantry*, by J. L. Parker, p. 284.

there be in position with your full force to cut off the retreat of the enemy by his shortest line. In all other respects your instructions as before referred to will remain the same.

You will direct all your force to cross to-night, or, if that should not be practicable, to be brought to the river, and have it all thrown over before 8 o'clock to-morrow morning. If the fords should be too deep for your pack-animals and artillery, they will be crossed over the bridge at Kelley's Ford. You will please furnish the officers in command of these two columns with a copy of this and of your original instructions.¹

Under this order Stoneman's latitude in the selection of a point of crossing was restricted to certain definite limits between Kelley's and Rappahannock Fords; he was required to be across by 8 o'clock in the morning, to divide his command into two columns, and to determine on some point for the columns, after the destruction of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad, to unite at and intercept the retreat of Lee's army.²

The cavalry corps was accordingly formed in two columns. One consisted of Averell's division, Davis' brigade of Pleasonton's division, and Tidball's battery of horse artillery. This column numbered about 3400 sabers and 6 guns, and was commanded by Averell. The other consisted of Gregg's division, Buford's reserve brigade, to which the 6 Pa. had been attached, and a provisional battery of horse artillery under Captain Robertson. It numbered about 4200 sabers and 6 guns, and was commanded directly by Stoneman. The provisional battery was formed by taking a section from Elder's, Clarke's, and Vincent's batteries. The remaining sections of these batteries were sent back to Falmouth.

The foregoing order was given to Stoneman at Hooker's headquarters at 5:45 p.m.

From Morrisville to where the cavalry corps lay was 13 miles, from there to where some of the extreme pickets were was 13 more, so that it was quite late at night before the command was all assembled and ready to start.

The head of Stoneman's column started, however, at 5 p.m., and the head of Averell's at 10 p.m.;³ the former directed upon Kelley's Ford,

this regiment completed its crossing by midnight, following Schurz's division (*The Volunteer's Manual*, by W. Simmers and P. Bachschmied, p. 20). Devens says that his division crossed "at 1 a.m. on the morning of April 29." J. B. Jr.

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 1065.

² "I concluded to divide the cavalry into two columns, each one outnumbering the entire cavalry force of the enemy between the Rappahannock and James Rivers. They

were to cross the Rappahannock the same day with the infantry, the 29th, and one column was to move directly to its destination, while the other was threatening Culpeper and Gordonsville, and as soon as one had passed, the other was to follow and join it. . . . The object was to have no time lost in severing Lee's communications with Richmond" (Hooker, *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 137).

³ *W. R.*, 39, pp. 1058, 1081, 1074. The following statement of the experience of one

From Butterfield

The major-general commanding has left for the scene of operation above. . . .

Signal officers have been directed to be vigilant and watchful and to report everything. I shall keep you fully advised of everything that is reported here at Falmouth. Have you any wishes or commands? . . .

The night before last, April 26, Rodes' (D. H. Hill's) division had not moved. A. P. Hill's and Trimble's¹ also, and there are no signs of a move. This from deserters who have just come in.²

From Williams, Adjutant-General

. . . your operations for to-morrow are for a demonstration only, to hold the forces of the enemy while the operations are carried on above, unless the enemy should leave the position, or should weaken his force materially by detachments.

As long as the enemy remained in position back of Fredericksburg, Sedgwick was to demonstrate to deter him, if possible, from moving, but not to attack. Should the enemy retreat, Sedgwick was to pursue. Should the enemy turn against the right wing, Sedgwick was to attack and establish himself on the Telegraph Road, and the right wing was to be reënforced with troops from the left. But the left wing might draw the main force of the enemy upon itself. It must try to anticipate this, and not expose itself to a serious attack. Under some apprehension on this score, Hooker wrote to Butterfield from Morrisville at 3 p.m.:

Considering the [backward] state of affairs here, it will be advisable to suspend the crossing of the troops under Sedgwick and Reynolds until further orders, except the number necessary to protect the bridges after they are thrown, which will be [thrown] as already directed. Be pleased to have it [this] communicated.

The dispatch was transmitted to Sedgwick at 11:45 p.m. Brooks' division ($\frac{1}{4}$) had already been selected by Sedgwick to protect the bridges of the VI Corps, and the following order to Brooks, commanding First Division, was probably issued about as the corps went into bivouac:

. . . you will have your division in the immediate vicinity of Franklin's Crossing at 11 p.m., ready to cross in boats and hold the ground on the opposite side until the bridges are completed. You will not move from the heights on this side of the river until you have the cover of the darkness. The crossing in the boats must be effected with the utmost celerity and in the strictest silence. General Benham will indicate to you the exact time and place of crossing.³

From the top of the ridge on which Sedgwick's lines were formed the ground sloped abruptly to the river, gullied here and there by ravines

¹ Commanded by Colston.

² *W. R.*, 107, p. 1015.

³ *Ib.*

movements up the river are feints. I can hardly believe this; it seems like stark madness. You may hear exciting news very soon. I sometimes think the entire thing may be a great feint, but it is generally thought that we are on the eve of a great battle. . . .

In the course of the day Lee was informed by Stuart that "a large body of infantry and artillery was passing up the river."¹ This vague item seems to have been the only information that Lee possessed regarding Hooker's movement. The Federal force, it would seem, might be anything from a division to an army. Its destination might be the Shenandoah Valley or Gordonsville.

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 796.

running obliquely to the base of the ravines roads had been built with pontoon trains to reach the confluence of the river. About dusk the pontoon edge of a piece of timber about 100 feet long. At 10 o'clock Brooks' division, The 3d brigade, Russell's, which was its part. It fixed and unfixed the boats, hardly hear themselves do it, and through the dark at an imagination of the 15 N. Y. Engineers were to go and return in the boats reached the opposite shore, where they were to be landed.

Similar preparations were made by Reynolds to cover the crossing. He commanded the Engineer Brigade in the laying of the bridges, under the command of Wadsworth, commanding the division subject to his orders. General Reynolds so understand. The consequence

In each corps the boats were ordered, lest the rumbling of pontoon trains of the intended crossing. It was of concealment by 11:30 they were to leave if the crossing commenced at 11:30. Leaving an hour and a half for the crossing were accordingly issued for the crossing at 11:30. It was nearly midnight when they left from its place of concealment, but had only gotten a number of boats. Reynolds ordered them put on teams.

Telegraphic communication between Hooker's and Hooker's headquarters to England, was extended to the crossing owing to an accident to one of the telegraph lines to-day. The heavy rain and the want of communication by flag

Lieutenant Ropes wrote how

... The great movement has been I believe, to be left to cover this crossing. I also hear that the real

¹ W. R., 39, p. 211, and *ib.*, 45.

CORPS

THE CORPS

THE CORPS

started from Grove Church about 4 a.m. and on arriving, crossed the river by the following units:

	AGGREGATE STRENGTH
... ..	267 ¹
... ..	500 ²
... ..	350 ³
... ..	40 ⁴
	1,157

The XII Corps. It started about 4 a.m., and crossed the river so as to cover the right and left of the crossing. Pleasonton accompanied this regiment. The 8 Pa. was assigned to the XI Corps and to cover the front and left of the crossing to Ely's Ford. Colonel Devin was in general charge of it. In rear of the crossing were five regiments accompanied by the 1 N. Y. This command moved forward at 4:30 a.m. as support and reserve of the column. The main body of the crossing was about 2½ miles. The XI Corps was to be ready at daylight, or the time fixed for the XII

staff of General Carl Schurz, "who

¹ The strength of the 8 Pa. is given by J. W. de Peyster as 200 (*Onward*, February, 1870, p. 164), by Major Huey and Captain Wells as 300 (*Charge of the 8 Pa. Cav. at Chancellorsville*, pp. 42, 49, 65), and by General Pleasonton as between 400 and 500 (*Rep. of Com.*, IV, 28).

⁴ Estimated.

represented that the Eleventh Corps was certainly across; how much more was to follow, he could not tell; but thought that the force altogether in this column was about 20,000."¹ In the light of this and other evidence, Stuart telegraphed to Lee at an early hour that Howard had crossed at Kelley's Ford with a "division" of about 14,000 men, 6 pieces of artillery, and some cavalry.² Expecting an advance toward Gordonsville, W. H. F. Lee had taken position between Brandy Station and Kelley's Ford, with the 13 Va. pushed out toward the ford. Fitzhugh Lee was held in reserve at Brandy Station, with a regiment at Stevensburg.³ Orders were telegraphed to the 10 Va. Cavalry near Beaver Dam Station (Map 1, sheet A) to move at once to hold and occupy the fords on the Rapidan, but it was doubted whether this would be done with sufficient promptness.⁴

The V Corps commenced to cross as soon as the XII had cleared the bridge. This was about 10:30 a.m., or three hours and a half after the time designated by Meade for his corps to be ready to start. At the same time the XI Corps took up the march in rear of the XII.

The weather was damp and misty. A threatening sky lowered impressively over masses of troops crouching in close columns near the river. The long, thin column that wound serpentlike down to them from an amphitheater of hills deployed here and there to ward off a possible attack. General Hooker came over from his headquarters at Morrisville to superintend the movement, and as he passed through the lines, was cheered to the echo.

About noon the First and Second Divisions of the V Corps had completed their crossing. The cavalry in advance of the XII Corps encountered the 13 Va. Cavalry about 2½ miles from Kelley's Ford, and skirmished with it until within about 3 miles of Germanna Ford.

It was about 10 a.m. when the Confederates at Germanna Ford first received reliable information of the crossing of the Federals at Kelley's Ford. The bridge-builders had three spans completed. All the men of the detail were quartered in an old mill on the south side of the river. About 50, who were engaged in the work of construction, were on the north side. On receipt of the forementioned information the Confederate commander put a picket of 10 men out on the road in his front, and had fifty who were working at the bridge go to their quarters, get their guns, and return.

About 11 a.m., when the infantry advance-guard under Ruger reached a point about 2 miles from Germanna Ford, its commander received the report that there was a detachment of about 150 men at the ford engaged in building a bridge. Soon afterward he learned that the Federal


¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 1046; *Reminiscences of Carl Schurz*, II, 408.

² *W. R.*, 39, pp. 796, 1045, 1046; *ib.*, 40, p. 758.

³ *Ib.*, 39, p. 1046.

⁴ *Ib.*

PLAN 1



FORMATION OF RUGER'S BRIGADE AS IT ADVANCED
ON GERMANNA FORD, APRIL 29, 1863

his troopers by the bridge. On the north side of the Rappahannock at Kelley's Ford was a slough, or swamp, which could not be crossed except by a trestle bridge, constructed for that purpose. Neither the ford nor pontoon bridge, therefore, could be used by the cavalry until the infantry of the V Corps (First and Second Divisions) had cleared the trestle bridge. The cavalry commenced crossing by both the ford and the pontoon bridge about noon. The Third Division of the V Corps (Humphreys') was detailed about this time to remain behind to cover the passage of the trains and bring up the bridge.

Right Wing, Afternoon

The detachments of Confederate cavalry that observed and followed the Federal columns (contact detachments) were careless, it seems, about reporting what they saw. It was about 1 p.m. when Stuart learned from his pickets about Madden that a large force of Federal infantry was moving in that direction. Assembling his two brigades, he marched to that point and there pierced the Federal column, taking prisoners from the V, XI, and XII Corps.¹ The rear of the XI Corps was shelled by a couple of light pieces. The only way to stop this annoyance was to attack and defeat Stuart's cavalry. But for this Pleasonton's cavalry was not sufficiently strong, Stuart's outnumbering it two to one. So the shelling had to be endured until about 3:30 in the afternoon, when a portion of Stoneman's force came up and drove the enemy away. When Stuart learned that the right column was marching upon Germanna Ford, it was too late for him to warn the Confederate detachment at that point; the Federals were in possession of the ford.² As already stated, this party had warning, hours before, of the Federal passage of Kelley's Ford, but they did not suspect, it seems, that it seriously concerned them.

The handful of Confederates that escaped from Germanna Ford retreated under cover of the woods to the vicinity of Wilderness Tavern, where they halted about 4 p.m. to await instructions from General Mahone or spend the night.³ The sound of firing at the ford brought

¹ These circumstances are deduced from conflicting statements in the official reports. Meade did not march in the same column with Slocum and Howard. The men of the corps who were captured by Stuart's first dash at Madden were perhaps flankers or connecting patrols (*W. R.*, 39, pp. 519, 796, 1046).

² Stuart says in his report: "Couriers had been, by direction, sent to Ely's and Germanna [Fords] to notify our parties there of the enemy's advance, but were captured; consequently the parties at those

points received no notice" (*W. R.*, 39, p. 1046).

³ Writing in 1888 for the *Century Magazine*, Pleasonton stated:

"In the afternoon (29th) at Germanna Ford, I surprised and captured a picket of some fifty of Stuart's cavalry soldiers. With them was an engineer officer belonging to Stuart's staff. On searching the party, as is done with all prisoners, I found on this engineer officer a very bulky volume, which proved to be a diary which he had been keeping throughout the war. I

issued that no clothing should be removed. The men arranged their cartridge-boxes, haversacks, knapsacks, blankets, and valuables about their heads and necks, or secured them to the ends of their fixed bayonets, and plunged into the cold water. Some were swept away as at Germanna Ford, to be picked up by cavalry stationed below. The Second Division followed the First across after dark. The river was lighted by large fires on the farther bank, the sight of which cheered the troops forward. Out of the chilly water they climbed the slippery hillside—for it was then raining—and went to hunting fire-wood in the darkness, building fires, cooking suppers, pitching shelter tents, drying clothes and shoes as best they could, and finally rolling up in blankets, feet to the fire, for a comfortless night.¹

Devin sent a squadron to scour the country to the right toward Germanna and the road leading from that point into the Wilderness. He also picketed the roads about Ely's Ford. In the meantime the Federal squadron sent to Barnett's Ford, having found no enemy, joined the two squadrons under Keenan, and all three marched to Richards' Ford, where they surprised the enemy in his rifle-pits, captured 28 men and 1 commissioned officer, and forwarded dispatches to Hooker. These were not received, it would seem, before night.

Butterfield wrote to Slocum from Falmouth:

... the bridges are all across here.² The demonstration here is a very strong one. Fifty or 60 prisoners taken in the enemy's rifle-pits report Jackson's whole force here. The enemy are in position, anticipating our main attack at Franklin's Crossing. The general directs that you move as high up as Chancellorsville; establish your right strongly on the Plank road; look out for your left, too. The map indicates that from Chancellorsville to the Rappahannock is a very strong position. You must have that, and move to command the Plank road, which is the line of the enemy's retreat. As soon as you uncover United States Ford, you will be reinforced by C. [Couch] (two divisions), and then probably by S.'s [Sickles'] entire command. The general will be up to-morrow. The bearer, if he succeeds in reaching you, may be able to return with a dispatch from you.

It will be observed that no reference is made in this communication to uncovering Banks' Ford. The idea is to secure a defensive position based upon United States Ford and cutting off Lee's retreat, thus compelling him to attack. That this will result in his defeat and loss of Fredericksburg, is a fixed idea in Hooker's mind. It is his intention that as soon as he has possession of Fredericksburg, the railroad bridge at that point, which has been destroyed, shall be reconstructed, and that as fast as the army advances along the railroad toward Richmond, the road shall be put in working order by his construction corps. From the following letter of Lieutenant Ropes, dated to-day, it would seem that

¹ *Mag. of Am. Hist.*, XX, 378.

² Five pontoon bridges below. J. B. Jr.

at least a part of the Army of the Potomac was still ignorant of the new plan of campaign:

As far as I can make it out, the whole of the army, except the II Corps, has gone down [the river] to make a grand attack on the enemy's right. . . . I understand the troops are in good spirits, and I am sure I hope for success, but I do not see how it can be decisive, for the enemy have a perfect line of retreat, unless Hooker crosses so far below as to be able to get between them and Richmond, while the bulk of their force is gathered to resist the feigned attack on their left. . . .

Using the ford and the pontoon bridge at Kelley's Ford, Stoneman managed "by dint of great exertion" to get all his cavalry over by 3 and his trains by 5 p.m. He camped with his column for the night at Madden. No fire or noise was allowed. The horses remained saddled, the men in each set of fours taking turns in holding the four horses by the bridles while the other three men slept. The night was rendered still more uncomfortable by the cold, drizzly rain.¹

Here [says Stoneman in his report] I assembled the division and brigade commanders, spread our maps, and had a thorough understanding of what we were to do, and where we were each to go. Averell . . . was to push on in the direction of Culpeper Court-House, and myself [with the main column] . . . to push on toward Stevensburg. It was expected that Averell would be able to reach Brandy Station that night, driving whatever enemy was there before him, and I was to communicate with him at that point.²

What orders he issued are not given verbatim in the official records, and appear to have been communicated verbally. Averell reports:

I was directed to proceed in the direction of Brandy Station, reach there, if possible, that night [29th], and communicate with Buford, who would be at Stevensburg. On the day following I was to proceed to Culpeper Court-House and Rapidan Station, attacking the cavalry of the enemy and keep him occupied while Buford proceeded with the major-general commanding the corps to execute that portion of the original instructions which referred to operations in rear of the enemy's main body.³

It would seem from the two reports that Averell was ordered to be at Brandy Station on the night of the 29th, "if possible"; and was to govern his movements beyond that point by orders which he was to receive from time to time from Stoneman and to carry out conformably to such general instructions as he might have received; also that he understood that the active operations on Lee's communications were to be executed by the reserve brigade under Buford, accompanied and directed by Stoneman. What Gregg was to do, can only be conjectured.

¹ *History of the First Maine Cavalry, 1861-1865*, by E. P. Tobie, p. 134.

² *W. R.*, 39, p. 1058.

³ *Ib.*, 39, p. 1074.

General.
General.

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XXVIII.

lowed by those of the V Corps.¹ Finally Humphreys crossed with his division, and about 7 p.m. the Engineers commenced taking up the bridge.² About this time Humphreys received a communication from his corps commander advising him of the importance, as he supposed, of having the pontoon train at Ely's Ford at the earliest possible moment. It was about 11:30 when the bridge train was ready to move, and Humphreys' division accompanied by it was put in motion through the darkness. At midnight this column was about 2 miles on its way from Kelley's to Ely's Ford.

Stahel marched this afternoon with his division of cavalry from Fairfax Court-House westward to the vicinity of Aldie and returned after dark.

Center and Left Wing

The two divisions of the II Corps completed the road to United States Ford. Excepting the two regiments under Colonel Cross (^{5.81}_{I.I.II}), they took up the march at 2 p.m. in compliance with the following instructions addressed to the "Commanding Officer, II Corps, Banks' Ford":

1

The commanding general directs that you encamp with your two divisions to-night at the United States Ford, leaving a company at Banks' Ford, and that you keep the road you have been repairing clear of wagons. The wagons must take the fields on the right and left of the road. Please acknowledge.

2

The commanding general does not care about your movement to the United States Ford being kept secret from the enemy. He wishes you to march to-day, and by the best road. He also desires to know what road you have repaired.

The two divisions, with the forementioned exception, bivouacked at United States Ford. The supply-train hauled two days' rations to them, and the wagons, after being reloaded at the depot at Falmouth, returned to the park. The trains for two bridges were also sent from Banks' Ford to United States Ford.

It was late in the afternoon when two cavalry videttes galloped up to General Mahone's headquarters, and reported the Federals to be advancing in force on the road from Ely's Ford. A little later information came to him of another column marching east by the Plank Road from Germanna Ford. In a few moments couriers were dashing off with orders, and within an hour the winter quarters were abandoned, wagons and *impedimenta* of all sorts were started to the rear, and the

¹ Humphreys, in his report, mentions a train consisting of at least 125 wagons and 55 spring wagons and ambulances belong-

ing chiefly, almost entirely, as reported to him, to the XI Corps (*W. R.*, 39, p. 550).

² *Ib.*, 39, p. 215.

brigades were posted to meet the advancing Federals—Mahone's to the north of Chancellorsville, covering the approaches from Ely's Ford and United States Ford; and Posey's to the west of it, covering the approach from Herrmann's Ford, with two guns of Grandy's battery (1.1) on each road. A regiment and a half, about 600 men, were left at United States Ford to hold the position as long as possible.¹

It was nearly sunset when a courier from General Mahone reached Henry at Wilderness Tavern with an order to make a reconnaissance toward Herrmann's Ford. This was done, and developed the fact that there was a large force of Federals at the ford. At midnight the reconnaissance party was on its way back to Wilderness Tavern.²

Shortly after 6:30 p.m. the following order was sent to Couch at United States Ford:

General Couch: Order that you establish communication with General Meade, at Rapidan, or vicinity, to-night. Use a pontoon boat or raft across the river. Send a horse if necessary above its junction with Rapidan. Communicate with General Meade and Slocum [V and XII Corps]:

General Couch: Order that pontoon bridge has been made use of for crossing. It is ordered that no dragoons should have crossed the Rappahannock. The crossing at Herrmann's and Ely's should be impracticable for artillery, and the crossing at United States Ford for artillery (infantry can raise cartridge-boxes) should be impracticable from before United States Ford." . . .

General Couch failed to the movement upon Chancellorsville for the night at United States Ford. He now required, as he should have required, that a force move upon the ford. Couch, it is true, received the message. At any rate, he failed to communicate it to General Meade nor Slocum took any action to move the detachment at United States Ford to retire. The crossing of the river by the left wing below United States Ford was not in the water until about 11:00 p.m. It was found impossible to get a crossing party. The movement could not succeed in the night. The boats could not embark before daylight. Benham was ordered to go to Sedgwick, but the night wore on and no change in it. At 4:20 a.m. boats were sent with 45 men and a quota of officers. The boats were soon lost in the fog. The river was 100 yards wide at this point, but the

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progress of the boats, owing probably to the necessity of silence, was unusually slow. Suddenly there rang out on the misty air the unmistakable sound "Fire," and about 200 yards of the opposite bank were lit up with musketry. The men crowded together in the boats could not reply. Their comrades on shore, peering after them through the impenetrable fog, held their breath. But soon a loud cheer followed by another, and then another, told that the opposite bank was reached and held. The boats made another trip, bringing over the remainder of Russell's brigade. A bridge was immediately and rapidly laid, being commenced at 5:50 and completed at 7 a.m. A second bridge was laid between 6 and 7:30; and a third between 7 and 9:45. In the meantime the remainder of the division crossed in boats with perhaps a dozen casualties.

Wadsworth did not have his boats in the water until about 4:30, and then no men were at hand to enter them. The crossing in boats at this point did not commence until about 9 o'clock. It was completed about 10. The work of laying two bridges commenced about 10:15. It was completed, and the troops commenced crossing on the bridges about 12 m. Russell's line of skirmishers drove the skirmishers opposing it out of two lines of rifle-pits, and established itself about 100 yards from the enemy and about 300 yards from the river. It was prolonged to the left until it connected with Wadsworth's line. It was known that troops up the river were executing an offensive movement, and it was thought that at any moment a sound of firing might come from them that would be a signal for the left wing to advance.

Benham received the following communication of this day from Hooker's adjutant-general:

Your attention is called to the following extract from orders issued yesterday, of which you were furnished a copy:

"The bridges, two at each crossing, to be laid complete before 3:30 a.m. on the 29th, under the supervision of General Benham, who is charged with the responsibility thereof."

The major-general commanding is informed that, agreeably to your request, General Sedgwick placed at your disposal a brigade of infantry, and he desires to know why these orders were not complied with, and those bridges laid at the hour specified.¹

Benham replied in the course of the day with a lengthy report,² which seems to have cleared him of all responsibility for the delay. Whether or not the responsibility was ever officially fixed upon any one, the author is unable to state. Russell, in his report, accounted for the delay by the bare and simple statement: "The arrangements for crossing were not perfected till 4:20 o'clock on the morning of Wednesday, April 29."

¹ *W. R.*, 39, pp. 204, 205.

² *Ib.*, 39, p. 205; *ib.*, 45, p. 63.

The two divisions covering Sedgwick's five bridges were themselves covered by groups of guns on the north bank posted under the direction of the Chief of Artillery of the Army of the Potomac. At Franklin's Crossing was a line of forty-six pieces ($\frac{21.62}{A}, \frac{3.4}{1.VI}, \frac{1}{2.VI}, \frac{1}{3.VI}, 4.VI, \frac{4}{2.III}$), commanded by Colonel Tompkins, Chief of Artillery of the VI Corps, and at Pollock's Mill, a line of thirty-four pieces of the I Corps ($\frac{1.2}{1.I}, \frac{1.3.4}{2.I}, \frac{1.2.3}{3.I}$), commanded by Colonel Wainwright, Chief of Artillery of that corps. Still further down the river, near Traveller's Rest, was a battery of sixteen pieces of the General Reserve under Colonel Warner, Inspector of Artillery of the Army of the Potomac.³ This battery was to command the bridge over the Massaponax and the valley of that stream, and so prevent the enemy from attacking Sedgwick's left flank after he had crossed. In addition to these groups of guns, five batteries of Napoleons (brass smooth-bore 12-pounders), numbering twenty-six pieces, were stationed near Falmouth, in readiness for service when and wherever they might be required.⁴ The batteries of the I, III, and VI Corps, not mentioned, were likewise available for action. There still remain to be accounted for two batteries attached to the Provost Guard, numbering ten pieces. These were probably on the line of communication between Falmouth and Aquia Creek.

About daybreak the officers at Jackson's headquarters were aroused with the stirring news that Federal troops were crossing the Rappahannock in pontoons under cover of a heavy fog. Jackson, who had spent the night at a house near by, was at once informed of the fact, and promptly issued orders for his divisions to prepare for action. As the long roll resounded through his camp, an officer of his staff rode over to army headquarters, and gave the news to General Lee, who expressed no surprise, but remarked in playful tones:

Well, I thought I heard firing, and was beginning to think it was time some of you young fellows were coming to tell me what it was all about. Tell your good general that I am sure he knows what to do. I will meet him at the front very soon.⁵

After going out and personally observing the enemy, he telegraphed to the Adjutant-General and to President Davis:

The enemy is crossing below Deep Run, about the same place as before [in the Fredericksburg campaign]. The fog has been so thick during the night and morning that we can only see a few yards.⁶ Taken with the reports received

³ Four 4½-inch guns.

⁴ Six 20-pounder guns.

⁵ Taft's 3 N. Y., four 20-pounders;

Hart's 13 N. Y., six 3-inch guns; and Gas-

ton's 32 N. Y., six 3-inch guns.

⁶ *See* *Life and Letters of R. E. Lee*, p. 241.

⁵ *B. and L.*, III, 203; for a slightly different version see *Life and Letters of R. E. Lee, Soldier and Man*, by J. W. Jones, p. 241.

⁶ The Rappahannock is usually covered with fog early in the morning.

from our left, it looks like a general advance; but where his main effort will be made, can not say. Troops not wanted south of James River had better be moved in this direction, and all other necessary preparations made.

About 5 a.m. a courier dashed into Fredericksburg with the intelligence that the Federals were crossing the Rappahannock a short distance below. Immediately the Episcopal Church bell, the ringing of which had been agreed upon as a signal, sounded the alarm, and the streets presented a spectacle of military preparation, and women and children leaving the town.

By 10 a.m. Lee received Stuart's report of Howard's passage of the Rappahannock yesterday at Kelley's Ford. The fog having then lifted, he observed that more Federal troops had crossed in his front. He telegraphed to the Adjutant-General at Richmond:

The enemy is in large force on north bank of Rappahannock, opposite railroad at Hamilton's Crossing. He is crossing troops below the point at which he crossed in December, and extends lower down the river.¹ I have discovered nothing lower than the mouth of Massaponax Creek. He is certainly crossing in large force here, and it looks as if he were in earnest. I hear of no other point at which he is crossing, except below Kelley's Ford, where General Howard has crossed with his division, said to be 14,000, six pieces of artillery, and some cavalry. Stoneman will probably cross about the Warrenton Springs, and I fear will make for Gordonsville, and may destroy our roads. I have nothing to oppose to all that force up there except the two weak brigades of cavalry under General Stuart. All available troops had better be sent as rapidly as possible by rail and otherwise.

Lee was inclining to believe that the main force of the Federals was crossing, after all, below Fredericksburg. But what, he asked himself, was Howard's objective? Apparently it was Gordonsville, but his "division" might be the advance of a force directed upon Richmond or Lee's communications or his army. Lee may have been misled by a subsequent report from Stuart. At any rate, he telegraphed also to the Adjutant-General somewhat later:

If any troops can be sent by rail to Gordonsville, under a good officer, I recommend it. Longstreet's division[s], if available, had better come to me; and the troops for Gordonsville and the protection of the railroads [be forwarded] from Richmond and North Carolina, if practicable. General Howard of the enemy's forces making toward Gordonsville. . . .

He contracted his main line by moving Jackson's corps into the space between the Massaponax Creek and Deep Run; placed Wright's brigade ($\frac{5}{11}$) within supporting distance of Early's left; formed Kershaw's brigade ($\frac{1}{21}$) on Early's left; and placed the half of Semmes' brigade

¹ The battle of Fredericksburg was fought on the 13th of December, 1862.

near the Plank Road in rear of Wofford ($\frac{3}{2.1}$) as reserve. Hill's division, and probably of the other divisions of the corps, were assembled in the vicinity of Hamilton's Cross-
 100

the following dispatch to the commander of the 15 Va.
 100

draw up your pickets below Port Royal as high as the enemy's picket; and replace the picket above Port Royal, where they are withdrawn. Station them at points where they can observe their number [of our pickets] may be diminished as much as possible. Caution your men to be very much on the alert, as a great watchfulness and coolness.²

Lee to attack the troops under Sedgwick that day. In reply Lee said: "It will be hard to get at the enemy, if we succeed in driving him to the rear, if you think you can effect anything, I will give the order."
 100

for a careful reconnaissance, and having made closer examination, he concurred with Lee in that an attack would accomplish nothing.³

at 4:45 p.m.⁴ couriers and stray cavalrymen from the Federal cavalry crossed the river at Germanna Ford about 1:30 p.m.⁵ and that there was infantry that crossed at Germanna Ford.⁶ This was Lee's movement toward the Rapidan. It came to take up, say nothing of intrenching, the line

Together with the fact that he had not before noon, it satisfied him that the enemy was at Germanna and Ely's Fords, and had cut Stuart's line presumably in doubt as to whether Howard was at Gordonsville or was with this force on the

1 p.m.; dispatch from Lee to Davis says 2 p.m.

In both of the opposing armies the cavalry was trained to fight both on foot and on horseback. It was never necessary to attach infantry to cavalry for the protection of the latter. The practice which obtained in Europe as late as the Franco-German War, of moving infantry in wagons beyond supporting distance of the army, was uncalled for and practically unknown in our war. Hence the presence of infantry, however few, indicated the proximity of a large force.

¹ Four
² Six
³ Taft's
 Hart's 15
 ton's 32
⁴ 2
⁵ 1. m.

Rapidan. The circumstance that after crossing this river the routes followed by the Federal columns converged toward Chancellorsville, suggested this point as the immediate, and Lee's army as the final, objective of the Federal force, but it did not preclude a movement by at least one of the Federal columns upon his line of retreat to Richmond. If the Federals wanted to close with his army, he would give them the opportunity; this meant for him an essentially defensive fight with his communications with Richmond intact. But if they were trying to cut him off from Richmond, he meant to get ahead of them by retiring. He would not commit himself to the tactical offensive with his supplies cut off. He telegraphed to Pendleton, his chief of artillery at Chesterfield Station, to come up with all the artillery. Most of the artillery of the II Corps was at Bowling Green. Its chief, Colonel Crutchfield, was promptly communicated with, and probably had all his artillery up before midnight. Of the artillery of the I Corps, Alexander's battalion, Manly's and McCarthy's batteries of Cabell's battalion (2. I), and Moore's battery of Hardaway's battalion (1. I) took up the march from near Chesterfield for Fredericksburg that afternoon. Wright's brigade ($\frac{5}{1.1}$) was ordered to report to Anderson, whose headquarters were near the point occupied by Perry's brigade ($\frac{3}{1.1}$), and the latter sent to relieve the half of Semmes' brigade in front of Falmouth. This half brigade reported to its brigade commander near Lee's Hill. Anderson was ordered to withdraw the brigades of Mahone and Posey from near United States Ford, where they were liable to be turned, and post these troops and Wright's brigade ($\frac{5}{1.1}$) at Chancellorsville, so as to cover the roads to Fredericksburg, taking the strongest line he could, and holding it to the best advantage. He was directed to go forward himself to attend to this matter. "See," said Lee, "if you can find where Colonel Davis' cavalry [10 Va.] is, and collect all the mounted men you can in your front."

Anderson received this order at 9 p.m. He proceeded to carry it out, sending an order to Wright to march with his brigade to Chancellorsville. Wright received this order in bivouac near Tabernacle Church at midnight, at which hour Anderson arrived at Chancellorsville. General McLaws, commanding at Fredericksburg, was ordered to communicate to General Jackson and General Anderson all movements of the enemy affecting them, and if they asked for reënforcements, to furnish what he could. Lee was anxious about his cavalry, for he depended upon it for information enabling him to anticipate or counteract the enemy's operations. In his dispatches to Anderson and McLaws he observed:

We may be obliged to change our position in consequence of the enemy's having come between us and General Stuart. Make your preparatory arrangements to-night to secure all your property.

observers did not catch sight of it to-day. The telegraph line was extended from England to United States Ford, but this extension was not in successful operation until 9 p.m. In the meantime communication between England and United States Ford was maintained by courier.

A flag and torch station was established at the Fitzhugh House, near Reynolds' headquarters, and Tyler's Hill near Sedgwick's, whence there was already telegraphic communication with Butterfield (old general headquarters). There was now a continuous line of flag and torch communication from opposite Buckner's Neck, through Seddon's, the Fitzhugh House, and Tyler's Hill, to the Phillips House. A flag and torch line of the Signal Corps connected Reynolds' with Sedgwick's headquarters.

Hooker received the following dispatch of this day from Peck:

I think I can hold Longstreet here [at Suffolk] for some time, which will favor your operations very materially. When he retires it will only be to his two railroads, where he can go to Lee or strike at me, according to circumstances. You and I will have plenty of work.

He telegraphed to "Major-General Peck or Dix":

I have fully commenced my operations here. The result may be to draw troops from your front, and afford you an opportunity to push or hold them.

The following dispatch sent to-day was probably received in the course of the night:

Davis to Lee

One half of Colonel Rhett's command (600 men and one battery) leave to-night by rail for Gordonsville. The remainder to-morrow morning.¹ Generals Longstreet, French,² and D. H. Hill³ have been telegraphed to on the subject of reënforcements, but have not yet been heard from. Three regiments of cavalry from Western Virginia supposed to be *en route* to join you, but have not been heard from; neither has anything been heard from the two cavalry regiments in North Carolina.⁴

In consequence of Jackson's movement, numerous messages were forwarded to-day from the Federal signal stations below Fredericksburg to the Federal headquarters, reporting infantry, artillery, and trains, of the enemy, in motion up the river. But these reports did not give a definite idea of the numbers of the troops that had moved or of the distance they had covered. The following dispatch from Butterfield to Sedgwick was sent from Falmouth probably after dark:

If the enemy are massing troops in front of Brooks ($\frac{1}{VI}$) it will suit the general's purposes.

¹ Total force, 1400. Letter of May 1 from Cooper to Lee, *W. R.*, 39, p. 763.

² At Petersburg, Va.

³ At Goldsboro, N. Ca.

⁴ *W. R.*, 108, p. 698.

CHAPTER XVI

APRIL 30 (MAP 11) . . . ARRIVAL OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC AT CHANCELLORSVILLE. DEMONSTRATION BY LEFT WING ORDERED AND SUSPENDED. LINE OF DEFENCE AT CHANCELLORSVILLE. III CORPS IN MOTION. ADVANCE FROM CHANCELLORSVILLE COUNTERMANDED. HOOKER'S CONGRATULATORY ORDER. AVERELL MARCHES TO RAPIDAN STATION. STUART INTERCEPTED AT TODD'S TAVERN

Right Wing, Forenoon

ABOUT 1 a.m. the Confederate party returning from Germanna Ford reached Wilderness Tavern, and delivered its report to a courier of General Mahone's. Between 4 and 5 a.m. its commander received an order from Mahone to fall back at once to Chancellorsville.

Anderson decided to move back from Chancellorsville with Posey's and Mahone's brigades, and take up a position across the Turnpike and Plank Road between Zion Church and Tabernacle Church. Before he began this movement the Federal cavalry had commenced clearing the ground in front of Meade. Three squadrons of the 8 Pa. (Arrow-smith's, McCallum's, and Wickersham's) started from Ely's Ford under Major Huey, commanding the regiment, to reach United States Ford, and open communication with the Federal forces on the opposite bank of the Rappahannock. Their advance-guard, favored by the fog and the mat of wet leaves which covered the ground, surprised and captured a picket of Mahone's consisting of Company H of the 12 Va. This party had taken possession of an old school-house which stood in a convenient position in the center of the road where it forked, and occupied it for shelter. The dash upon it was so sudden and unexpected that those who were inside had no opportunity to see, or judge of, the strength of the attacking force, which numbered only 8 men. While the Confederate sentries and videttes outside were being cared for, the door of the school-house was guarded, and each man was obliged to deliver his arms as he passed out. The 22 men and 3 commissioned officers who were thus taken were much chagrined when they saw the handful of men to whom they had surrendered, but it was then too late to make resistance.¹

¹ J. E. Carpenter, late Captain 8 Pa. Cavalry, in *Philadelphia Weekly Times*. See also *War Talks of Confederate Veterans*, p. 50, and Huey's report, *W. R.*, 39, p. 783.

Arrowsmith's squadron proceeded toward United States Ford, and McCallum's toward Chancellorsville. McCallum found a force of the enemy intrenched near the point where the road from Chancellorsville branched toward Ely's Ford and United States Ford, and became sharply engaged. Wickersham's squadron was sent to his assistance, and finally the whole of the 8 Pa. became engaged. Colonel Devin sent word to General Meade that he had driven in the enemy's pickets on the United States Ford Road, and having pursued them for several miles, had encountered the enemy drawn up in line of battle to the number, he thought, of at least a brigade. Meade received this message just as his main column was about to move. Concluding that the enemy was preparing to dispute the opening of the United States Ford, he ordered his leading division (Sykes') to proceed at once to that ford, and with Griffin's division took up the march for Chancellorsville. After crossing Hunting Run, he halted to await the development of Sykes' movement. By this time Devin had disposed of the enemy in Meade's immediate front and pursued him to the vicinity of Chancellorsville. Halting there, he sent a request to Meade—"that the point, from its evident importance, be occupied in force." Wright arrived with his brigade ($\frac{5}{1-1}$) at Chancellorsville and reported to Anderson at daybreak. About 6 a.m. the whole command took up the march for the vicinity of Zion Church, Mahone's brigade ($\frac{1}{1-1}$) by the Turnpike, Wright's and Posey's ($\frac{5}{1-1}$, $\frac{2}{1-1}$) by the Plank Road. Anderson in person took the Plank Road. An advance detachment of the 8 Pa. Cavalry also took this road in pursuit. On reaching the open ground about Magee (A),¹ it made a bold attack upon Mahone's rear-guard, consisting of the 12 Va. Infantry. The latter deployed in two lines of skirmishers, one in rear of the other, which retired alternately, uniting for combined fire when pressed. The Federal cavalry was so effectually repulsed that it desisted from further attempt to interfere with the enemy's retreat, contenting itself with following and observing him in small bodies. The main body remained in the vicinity of Chancellorsville.² Anderson, with Mahone's brigade, reached his new position about 9 a.m. Wright arrived with his about 8 a.m. Here Anderson was met by the chief engineer of the Army of Northern Virginia and another engineer officer, who were sent to him by General Lee to assist him in selecting a defensive position. Mahone's brigade ($\frac{1}{1-1}$) was established on the Turnpike; Posey's ($\frac{2}{1-1}$) between the Turnpike and the Plank Road; and Wright's ($\frac{5}{1-1}$) between the Plank Road and the unfinished railroad. Anderson

¹ The affixes (A) and (B) are the author's, to prevent confusion between the name *Magee* and that of *McGee* beyond Mott Run.

² *War Talks of Confederate Veterans*,

by G. S. Bernard, p. 50; *W. R.*, 39, pp. 850, 862, 783; *The Charge of the 8 Pa. Cav. at Chancellorsville*, by Pennock Huey, p. 26.

wrote to Lee requesting that Semmes' brigade ($\frac{2}{2.1}$) be sent to him as reënforcement. His line being selected, the work of intrenching it commenced. Alexander's battalion of artillery (24 pieces) arrived at Anderson's position about 10 a.m., and Moore's battery (4 pieces 1. I) somewhat later in the forenoon. At noon the General Artillery Reserve and the Washington Artillery, advancing from Chesterfield depot by the Telegraph Road, were perhaps in the vicinity of Chilesburg (Map 10).

About 1 o'clock this morning Captain Comstock, on the march with Humphreys from Kelley's Ford, received a message from the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac urging him to hurry up the bridge train. It was evidently sent under the impression that a bridge would be needed for the passage of the Rapidan. The train was in rear of the troops, and could not move faster than they, but kept well closed up on them. At 3 o'clock the whole column was brought to a halt by the darkness. As soon as it was light enough to see, the bridge train was sent ahead under escort of two regiments, and the column resumed its march. At 7 a.m. Humphreys received the following dispatch from corps headquarters:

The major-general commanding is of the opinion that, in consequence of the force we have across the river, there is no necessity for keeping the whole of your command with the train. He thinks one regiment ought to suffice. You are desired, therefore, to push forward with all speed possible with the rest of your command, in order to join the column. . . .¹

Early this morning General Warren at United States Ford reconnoitered the approach to the river, and finding it impracticable, procured 500 men from General Couch, and put them to work improving it. The mist so obscured his view of the opposite bank that he could not tell whether the enemy had withdrawn from it until about 9 o'clock, when the appearance of a number of Meade's cavalymen showed it to be in possession of the Federals.

At 9:40 Humphreys received the following dispatch sent at 8:15:

The major-general commanding (V Corps) . . . has gone on to Hunting Run, at the head of General Griffin's column. You will follow on at once. The order of march this morning is, Sykes first, then Griffin, on the road to Chancellorsville.²

The Confederate scouting party falling back from Wilderness Tavern on Chancellorsville reached the latter point just as Devin's cavalry emerged from the woods into an open field immediately north of the Chancellor House. The Confederates quickened their steps to escape

¹ *W. R.*, 107, p. 1017.

² *Ib.*, 107, p. 1018.

capture, and a moment or two afterward came upon Mahone's rear-guard, retreating toward Zion Church, and joined it.¹

Meade, still on Hunting Run, received Devin's report, and concluding therefrom that there was no enemy at United States Ford, proceeded with Griffin's division ($\frac{1}{3}$) to Chancellorsville. He arrived about 11 a.m.² The Federals found the house occupied. On an upper veranda were four ladies in light, attractive spring costumes, who, neither abashed nor intimidated, scolded audibly and criticized severely. They seriously condemned the stoppage, and urged a more expeditious movement, representing General Lee as just ahead, and anxiously awaiting an opportunity to dispense the "hospitality of the country." They little suspected the terrors that were in store for them as participants in that bountiful hospitality. General officers with their staffs, as the troops approached, gathered about the house and occupied the porches.³

On Meade's arrival Griffin directed Colonel Devin to send out a strong picket on the Plank Road, and a reconnoitering patrol toward Banks' Ford. At noon these parties were still out. Sykes' and Humphreys' divisions were marching up from the Rapidan. The former ($\frac{2}{5}$) was about 2 miles, and the latter ($\frac{3}{5}$) about 4 miles from Chancellorsville.

According to the instructions given Slocum on the 28th, the right wing was to advance from Chancellorsville to a point that should give it command of Banks' Ford. Once there, it could be reënforced by Gibbon's division ($\frac{1}{4}$) and soon afterward by the III Corps, assuming that the latter started from below Fredericksburg about the same time as the right wing from Chancellorsville. But it was decided this morning at Hooker's headquarters that the right wing should wait to-day at Chancellorsville for the enemy to attack it. Butterfield wrote to Warren at 9:30 a.m.:

I have not received a word from United States Ford this morning. Do send me by the bearer all the news. He is directed to run his horse.

I have sent up additional details from the Engineer brigade to assist at the bridges [at United States Ford]. When they are thrown across, I desire you to report to the commanding officer at Chancellorsville, to assist him, and give him the benefit of your advice in establishing a line of defence at that place or vicinity. The maps indicate that a formidable position can be taken there. Please show this to General Slocum, and to General Couch when he comes up.

I am informed that the enemy continues in full force in front of General Sedgwick. At all events, we want to hold the strongest position that section

¹ W. C. Smith in *War Talks of Confederate Veterans*, pp. 307-311.

² Barnes, commanding the leading brigade, says that his brigade "reached Chancellorsville at noon" (*W. R.*, 39, p. 514). Griffin's division had but one of its four batteries with it. The other three were to

join it by way of United States Ford. As previously stated, one of its regiments ($\frac{20}{31.5}$) was left at Falmouth.

³ *History of the Corn Exchange Regiment*, by the Survivors' Assoc., p. 171; *Marginalia*, by "Personne," p. 53.

[about Chancellorsville] affords to-night, and be in readiness to take the initiative in the morning.

Until Banks' Ford is uncovered, the route by the United States Ford must be understood as our line of operations. The weather is favorable for securing our positions, and, after all is over [across], the Rapidan is no advantage to the enemy over ourselves.

Colonel Owen upon halting with his two squadrons at Locust Grove, or soon after 12 p.m. the 29th, sent out scouting parties to Germanna and Ely's Fords with instructions to get as close to the enemy as possible and ascertain his strength and position. At 3 a.m. he received a dispatch from Fitzhugh Lee directing him to move forward, get in front of the enemy, and delay him, giving all attainable information to General Lee. He marched to Wilderness Tavern, turned up the road to Germanna Ford, and sent forward another scouting party. Between 6 and 7 a.m. his scouts from Germanna Ford reported a column of from 15,000 to 20,000 infantry across the Rapidan, with a considerable advance-guard of cavalry, mounted and forming to march. At 8 a.m. his scouts reported back from the direction of Ely's Ford.¹ About the same time a detachment of the 6 N. Y. Cavalry at the head of Slocum's column came into view. This was soon followed by skirmishing and charging for the possession of the cross-road, in which the Confederates had some success, until the odds against them became too great. One of their best-mounted troopers was sent westward with a dispatch for Fitzhugh Lee reporting what had been learned as to the force at Germanna Ford, also that a heavy wagon-train and artillery-train were across at Ely's, and under escort of a large force of infantry moving toward Chancellorsville. This man was captured by Federal cavalry in the woods before he had gone a mile. Couriers returning from Chancellorsville to the vicinity of Wilderness Tavern reported that they had been unable to communicate with the Confederate troops who were falling back; and that the Federals were already at Chancellorsville, and sending out scouting detachments. It was now nearly 9 a.m. Owen wheeled about and went toward Chancellorsville, but finding a strong force in his front, he turned to the right toward Todd's Tavern. As his column moved on, he started a courier with a dispatch to Major Taylor, R. E. Lee's adjutant-general, giving him all the information that he had of the two columns moving from Germanna and Ely's Fords. This man was cut off by the Federal cavalry at Chancellorsville, and thus compelled to go around that place, but he reached the general sometime between 11 a.m. and 1 p.m., bringing him the first intelligence that he received that day from the direction of the Rapidan.² It

¹ *So. Hist. Soc. Papers*, VIII, 252.

² Testifying a year later before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Pleas-

anton said: "At a place called the Wilderness [Tavern] I captured a courier from General Lee with a dispatch in Lee's own

amounted to little more than a confirmation of the information last received by telegraph from Stuart. At noon Owen was at Todd's Tavern resting and feeding his horses.

Slocum resumed his march between 6 and 7 a.m.,¹ the XII Corps leading, with Geary's (2d) division in front. About 10 a.m., or soon after Owen's departure with his two squadrons of the 3 Va., Stuart with the remainder of Fitzhugh Lee's brigade, including the three squadrons of the 3 Va. under Carter, arrived in the vicinity of Wilderness Tavern, and, with three or four regiments and two pieces of artillery, attacked the 28 Pa., covering the right of Geary's division. Two regiments of infantry went out, and about noon drove him away. In the meantime the

handwriting. It was dated at 12 o'clock that day [30th], and I captured it at 1 o'clock, only one hour from his, Lee's hands. It was addressed to General Anderson, and read: 'I have just received reliable information that the enemy have crossed the [Rappahannock] river in force. Why have you not kept me informed? I wish to see you at my headquarters as soon as possible.'

"As soon as I got that dispatch I went to General Slocum and showed it to him, and told him that the rebel army had not moved from Fredericksburg and did not know the crossing of the three corps at the Rapidan, and I advised him then to send one of his corps, the 11th, as that was the nearest one, immediately to Spottsylvania Court-House, and to take up a position there and intrench. General Slocum said that he was ordered to concentrate his three corps at Chancellorsville. I told him that General Hooker never dreamed of getting three corps across that river in that position and Lee not know it, and without a fight, and that it gave us such an advantage that he ought to take the responsibility of putting that corps in that position. But he declined to do so and concentrated his three corps at Chancellorsville.

"I think it was about 5 or 6 o'clock in the evening that General Hooker arrived there and I saw him. I mentioned this fact to him of the importance of the position at Spottsylvania Court-House, and told him what I had recommended to General Slocum, and urged him by all means to put a corps there that night. General Hooker, however, said that he did not think it was necessary; that he had the rebel army, and it could not get away" (*Rep. of Com.*, IV, 27).

Writing for the *Century Magazine*,

Pleasanton stated that the dispatch was addressed to Major-General McLaws, and continued: "At 2 o'clock p.m., one hour later, I reported to General Hooker at Chancellorsville, and submitted to him the diary [of an engineer officer captured the day before] and General Lee's dispatch, both of which he retained, and I suggested that we had evidently surprised General Lee by our rapid movements, and, as Lee had prepared for a battle at Chancellorsville, he had better anticipate him by moving on toward Fredericksburg. . . . Every instinct induced me to suggest to General Hooker—to relieve ourselves from our embarrassment—to send the Eleventh Corps to Spottsylvania Court-House by the Jack Shop road, and make the line of battle from Chancellorsville to Spottsylvania. This proposition was not approved" (*B. and L.*, III, 173).

Pleasanton thus contradicts himself, stating that the dispatch was addressed to Anderson, and that it was addressed to McLaws; that Hooker, he thinks, arrived at Chancellorsville about 5 or 6 p.m., and that he arrived at or before 2 p.m. In neither of his official reports (one to Sickles, and one to Hooker) does he mention any such incident as the capture of a dispatch from Lee. The document referred to is not among the records of the War Department.

¹Slocum says at *daylight* (*W. R.*, 39, p. 669), which would have been by 5 a.m. Geary, whose division led the column, says *early* (*ib.*, p. 728). His subordinates (*ib.*, pp. 743, 748, 750, 755, 764) give the hour as 8 a.m. Howard, who followed Slocum, says 7 a.m. (*Autobiography*, I, 355). It is probable that the cavalry started an hour or two before the infantry.

Federal main body continued its march.¹ Learning that the Federals were in possession of Chancellorsville, Stuart took up the march with Fitzhugh Lee's brigade toward Todd's Tavern. He meant to proceed thence by way of Spottsylvania Court-House to join the army under Lee.

Right Wing, Afternoon to 4 O'clock

With reference to the reënforcement of the right wing the following instructions were issued to Couch:

. . . You will have the bridges laid without delay as soon as the enemy leaves. Don't let a small force keep you back. Establish rapid communication [by signal or courier] with the telegraph at Banks' Ford and with Meade and Slocum, as the telegraph from Banks' to United States Ford works so slow. You will move to support Slocum. Be careful that no trains [not even fighting trains] cross at United States Ford until further orders, as they will only be in the way. Meade's ammunition wagons may have to cross. [Until orders authorize the passage of trains at United States Ford,] the trains should cross at some point to be designated [by you].

The general directs me to add,—in moving in support of Slocum, move toward the heaviest firing, in the event of his advance being disputed. The general wishes you to be up with him to-night.

At 1 p.m. Sykes' division ($\frac{2}{V}$) joined Griffin's ($\frac{1}{V}$) at Chancellorsville.

The II Corps, it will be remembered, was to have crossed the Rappahannock at 7 a.m. By 1 p.m. there was a practicable approach to the United States Ford. At 2 the laying of the two bridges commenced; at 3:30 the work was completed, and the band of the Engineer Brigade crossed playing "In Dixie's land I 'll take my stand." It was followed by the II Corps. The advance was taken by Carroll's brigade ($\frac{1}{3, II}$), which formed line of battle on the south side, and skirmished through the woods, finding no enemy, but catching reports of artillery that came rumbling through the forest from the left. A road had to be made up the river-bank; this was soon done, whereupon the whole force pushed on past the enemy's abandoned defences, elated with the prospect of meeting him in the open field. The two divisions of the II Corps were accompanied by six ambulances,² or two more than they were allowed.³ They left on the north side of the river the two regiments under Cross ($\frac{5, 81}{I, I, II}$) and the 88 N. Y. of Meagher's "Irish" brigade ($\frac{2}{I, II}$).

Humphreys reached Ely's Ford with his division between 12 m. and 1 p.m., but his troops being greatly fatigued, he proceeded only as far

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 669. Stuart, who was deceived by appearances, thought that he delayed the main body (*ib.*, 39, p. 1047).

² *Ib.*, 39, p. 549.

³ *Ib.*, 39, pp. 266, 267.

as Hunting Run, and halted for the night. He received the following dispatch sent at 2 p.m.:

Bring your command on as far as you can without destroying entirely their efficiency. We are going into camp near this place [Chancellorsville], and I [Meade] would like you to get up as far at least as the crossing of Hunting Creek by the road from Ely's Ford. Report where and when you go into camp.¹

Colonel Owen, after feeding his horses at Todd's Tavern, marched toward Fredericksburg. Before 4 p.m. he joined General Wright at Tabernacle Church, where he bivouacked in rear of the infantry, throwing out pickets to the front and upon each flank of Anderson's position.²

At 4 p.m. Stuart, marching toward Todd's Tavern, was probably in the vicinity of Poplar Run. The 6 N. Y. Cavalry reached Chancellorsville about 1 p.m. By order of General Pleasonton, its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel McVicar, reported his arrival to General Slocum, who was about 3 miles back. He received the following verbal order:

You will proceed with your command to Spottsylvania Court-House, where you will be joined by others of our troops. Should you meet the enemy in force and offering resistance, you will gradually fall back and report to me by couriers. Meeting no resistance, you will continue the march.³

After repeating the order to insure that he understood it, he saluted and retired. He had not gone far toward his regiment when it occurred to him that he had no instructions or intimation as to whom he should report to at Spottsylvania Court-House upon the arrival of other troops at that point. He remarked to his adjutant, who was with him,—“I wish for more definite information as to the troops we shall meet at Spottsylvania, and to whom I shall report.” Riding back to Slocum, he began his inquiry and was interrupted with the statement,—“You have your orders, sir; go.” As he went away he remarked that the order indicated a “dusty job with results uncertain and perilous.” Upon rejoining his regiment he put it in motion toward Spottsylvania Court-House (Map 11). He followed the Plank Road to Aldrich, turning off there on the road that led by Piney Branch Church, and at 4 p.m. was probably not far from the latter point. Meade heard from Devin that he had driven in the enemy's pickets on the Banks' Ford Road, and pursued them until he could see their line of battle, and that from the wagons visible he concluded they were about to evacuate the position. He sent him Barnes' brigade of infantry⁴ ($\frac{1}{11}$).

¹ *W. R.*, 107, p. 1018.

² *So. Hist. Soc. Papers*, VIII, 254; *W. R.*, 39, p. 850.

³ *History of the Sixth New York Cavalry*, by Committee, pp. 102, 103.

⁴ Meade in his report gives the time

when this took place as 3 p.m. (*W. R.*, 39, p. 506). Barnes gives it as 1 p.m. (*ib.*, p. 514). J. L. Parker, in his *History of the 22 Mass.*, gives it as 1:30 p.m. It was probably about 1:15 p.m.

Slocum's column, after passing Wilderness Tavern, kept on the Germanna Plank Road to Wolfrey, and then followed the Orange Plank Road northeastward to the Turnpike (Map 11).¹

The head of the XII Corps reached Chancellorsville about 2 p.m. Before he arrived there, Slocum received the following order, copies of which were sent to Couch and Meade:

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, April 30, 1863, 2:15 p.m.

Captain Comstock:

The general directs that no advance be made from Chancellorsville until the columns [II, III, V, XI, and XII Corps] are concentrated. He expects to be at Chancellorsville to-night.

DANL. BUTTERFIELD,

Major-General, Chief of Staff.

Meade could not have received his copy of the foregoing order, for he greeted Slocum with the words: "This is splendid, Slocum; hurrah for old Joe; we are on Lee's flank, and he does not know it. You take the Plank Road toward Fredericksburg, and I 'll take the Pike, or *vice versa*, as you prefer, and we will get out of this Wilderness." His anticipations were at once dampened by the reply: "My orders are to assume command on arriving at this point, and to take up a line of battle here, and not to move forward without further orders."²

Howard reached the vicinity of Dowdall's Tavern with the head of his corps by 4 p.m. While his corps closed up and went into bivouac he rode over to Slocum's headquarters at Chancellorsville and reported for orders. Slocum told him that Hooker's orders were for Howard to cover the right of the general line, posting his command near Hunting Creek.³ Pointing to the place on the map marked *Mill*, he said,—“Establish your right there.”⁴ He gave Howard to understand that he would himself take care of the entire front from Chancellorsville to Howard's left, the latter to be in the vicinity of Dowdall's Tavern, but afterward one of his division commanders sent Howard word that he would have to cover about three fourths of a mile of the Plank Road east of Dowdall's Tavern in order to connect with Slocum. Howard gave the right of his line to his First Division (Devens'). Of the two brigades of this division the 2d (McLean's) was posted near Taylor, facing southward; and the 1st (von Gilsa's), about half a mile to the right of the 2d, facing westward, with half a regiment deployed as skirmishers in the interval to keep up connection between them. In rear of the First Division, on the open ground about Hawkins' Farm,

¹ Map 6, Plate CXXXV, Atlas, *W. R.*

² *W. R.*, 39, p. 628. In *Battles and Lead-*

³ *Life of General G. G. Meade*, by R. M. Bache, p. 260.

ers (III, 191) he says "near Dowdall's Tavern."

⁴ Howard says there was no mill at this point, but the point was definitely located (*W. R.*, 39, p. 268; *B. and L.*, III, 191).

he placed the Third Division (Schurz's), facing westward. The Second Division extended in a single thin line a mile long to the vicinity of the Old School-House. The XI Corps was apparently considered by Hooker, Slocum, and Howard as a sort of flank detachment to secure the army against an attack from the west.¹ As such it was too much scattered and did not extend far enough to the rear. Howard says in his report that his right "rested in the vicinity of the point marked *Mill* on the map." But his own map, as well as Schurz's, shows that he had not a battalion within half a mile of that point. On the other hand, pickets were placed out in front on the Brock Road a considerable distance beyond the general line of outposts.²

The XII Corps formed a curve projecting southward and extending from the Old School-House eastward beyond the Plank Road. In the angle between this road and the Turnpike two batteries supported by two regiments were posted to command both roads. Further to the left and near Chancellorsville were the two divisions of the V Corps.

Some intrenchments and abatis were constructed along the fronts of the XI and XII Corps. It does not appear that any intrenching was done to-day in the V Corps.

About 4 p.m. Meade heard from Barnes that his brigade was in the presence of a superior force of the enemy, and would require support if it was to maintain its position. Meade now learned to his surprise that the scene of action was not on the Banks' Ford Road, but on the Turnpike. Devin, who chased the Confederate cavalry up the Turnpike, had been brought to a halt in front of an outpost of Anderson's on an eminence to the east of Mott Run (McGee, Map 11). McQuade's brigade of Griffin's division ($\frac{2}{1-V}$) now went to the support of Barnes, but Griffin had orders not to bring on an engagement.

"After several hours of impatient waiting, in buoyant expectancy of a promised success, the whole force was withdrawn to the rifle-pits near the Chancellorsville House, over which they had charged the enemy in the morning. There they remained in bivouac for the night. The soldiers were as discomfited as if they had been checked by a serious repulse. . . .

"Both General Griffin and [General] Barnes were much chagrined at the peremptory order to stop. . . . Griffin, filled with soldierly enthusiasm, and justly confident of his ability to take and hold the eminence, offered to surrender his commission if his attempt should prove a failure."³

¹ The commanding officer of the 145 N. Y. (1. XII) says in his report: "Our position at this time was about the center of the XII Corps, which occupied the right flank of the army" (*W. R.*, 39, p. 706).

² Devens says in his report at a distance

of 3 miles from the position taken by his division (*W. R.*, 39, p. 633). They probably did not remain out that far.

³ *History of the Corn Exchange Regiment* (118 Pa. Volunteers), by the Survivors' Assoc., pp. 173, 174.

At 4 p.m. Lee's General Artillery Reserve, under Pendleton, had arrived or was arriving at Massaponax Church (Map 10). The Washington Artillery was still in rear.¹

Right Wing, 4 p.m. to 12 p.m.

Hooker, with a portion of his staff, started from Falmouth for Chancellorsville about 4 p.m. His aide, Captain Candler, who was in the saddle from 6 p.m. yesterday till 5:30 a.m. to-day, wrote home:

We are off. Have some 30 miles to ride. Fight to-morrow. We have outwitted the Rebels so far. God grant us good fortune.

The distance to Chancellorsville was little over 20 miles. Hooker arrived there between 5 and 6, and presumably received in due time the following message signaled to him by Butterfield at 6:45:

Considerable cannonading in front of Sedgwick. Nothing from him yet. I have received no orders for Gibbon. He is held in readiness to move in accordance with your last instructions. . . . Comstock is here, pretty well used up; gone to bed; reports his train in bad condition; not fit for crossing trains, only for infantry, possibly for cavalry. Have directed him to United States Ford very early to-morrow a.m. in case nothing from you,—to take his train again.

All quiet here [Falmouth] now. No apparent diminution in enemy's strength in front of Sedgwick, and no movement reported.

By this time the following congratulatory order had been published to the troops under Sedgwick and to the II Corps. It was published in the right wing in the course of the evening and the following morning:

Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
Camp near Falmouth, Va., April 30, 1863.

General Orders, No. 47:

It is with heartfelt satisfaction the commanding general announces to the army that the operations of the last three days have determined that our enemy must either ingloriously fly or come out from behind his intrenchments and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him.

The operations of the 5th, 11th, and 12th Corps have been a succession of splendid achievements.

By order of Major-General HOOKER:

S. WILLIAMS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.²

Here, then, is Hooker's answer to the question: What was to be done in case the enemy would not attack him on his own ground? In this case the enemy would "ingloriously fly," and there would be nothing for the Army of the Potomac to do but to pursue him.

¹ According to Pendleton it was on the march, but had lost its way (*W. R.*, 39, p. 810).

² *Ib.*, 39, p. 171.

The two divisions of the II Corps, with the batteries already mentioned accompanying them, commenced arriving at the Chandler House about 10 p.m. and were closed up, and went into bivouac there about midnight. The two regiments under Cross ($\frac{5, 81}{1, 1, II}$) marched from the vicinity of Banks' Ford to United States Ford, where they were joined by the 88 N. Y. of Meagher's brigade ($\frac{2}{1, II}$). These three regiments were here formed into a provisional brigade which was commanded by Colonel Cross throughout the campaign. It will be considered as the 5th brigade of Hancock's division.¹ In addition to this infantry on the north bank, the 116 Pa. of Meagher's brigade was left in the vicinity of United States Ford, on the south bank. Meagher's brigade, with the exception of the 88 N. Y. and 116 Pa., took post in the vicinity of Scott's Dam. The two divisions of the II Corps were accompanied by the corps ammunition-train (wagon) and six ambulances,² or two more ambulances than they were required or authorized to take.³

The 17 Pa. Cavalry, attached to the XI Corps, picketed the roads to the right and rear.

The V, XI, and XII Corps had each marched with one battery per division. The XII was joined by one of its remaining batteries, F, Pa., Second Division. The other two ($\frac{1, 2}{1, XII}$) were on the south bank of the Rappahannock near United States Ford. The five batteries of the V Corps that were left on the north bank marched to-day to Hartwood Church. Those of the XI Corps (corps artillery) crossed the river at United States Ford, but did not join the corps.⁴ Brooker's Battery B, 1 Conn. (four 4½-inch guns), of the General Artillery Reserve, from Banks' Ford, crossed also at United States Ford, and remained near the river.

The following order was sent to Humphreys ($\frac{2}{V}$) at 9:30 p.m.:

. . . come forward to this place to-morrow morning. You will march by early daylight, as it is all-important that you report with your command at the earliest possible moment. Headquarters are at Mrs. Chancellor's house at this place. . . . The orderly who brings this will remain with you to-night to communicate with the commanding general.


The Federal cavalry in this part of the field, consisting of the 8 Pa., bivouacked without unsaddling on the west side of Mott Run, with one squadron picketing the Turnpike beyond it. Hooker had available for action between the Rapidan and Chancellorsville about 50,000 men and

¹ *A History of the 5th Regiment N. H. Volunteers*, by William Child, pp. 179, 182; *W. R.*, 39, p. 159. Corps, April 27 and 30, *W. R.*, 40, pp. 266, 267, 304.

² Batchelder's report, *W. R.*, 40, p. 549.

³ Williams to commanding officer II

⁴ It is assumed that they bivouacked on the south bank in the vicinity of United States Ford.



108 pieces of artillery.¹ With this force he barred Lee's line of retreat to Gordonsville, and, together with Sedgwick below Fredericksburg, threatened to cut him off from Richmond. His confident expectation of victory was shared by the army. It was generally expected that on the morrow it would advance to attack the enemy if he should stand; to pursue him if he should flee. Hooker's congratulatory order should have disabused all minds of the idea that he intended to attack. But understood, or misunderstood, as it was, the order was received with wild demonstrations of enthusiasm. In every direction as it was read, regiments could be seen cheering and tossing their hats in the air, while bands discoursed national music. But here and there an old soldier went on smoking his pipe in silence, and when reproached for his seeming apathy would reply to the effect that Lee had never been known to ingloriously fly, that it would be better to wait until after the battle to do one's cheering.²

Colonel McVicar, with the 6 N. Y. Cavalry, followed the road from Aldrich (Map 10) past Piney Branch Church to the first road on his left, and proceeded thereby to the road that led from Todd's Tavern to Spottsylvania Court-House, which he reached at the junction from half to three quarters of a mile northwest of H. Alsop. The road from Chancellorsville to this point was scarcely wide enough for a column of fours, and lined with woods nearly the entire distance. Night was falling. The moon was between half and full. Detachments commanded by officers were sent out, one toward Spottsylvania Court-House, one toward Fredericksburg, and one to the right, perhaps on a wood road or path. The main body closed up in column, and dismounted to await developments.

At nightfall Stuart halted at Todd's Tavern, intending that his troops should bivouac here, and he with his staff ride on through Spottsylvania Court-House to army headquarters and receive instructions. He had not gone far beyond the Tavern when he found himself confronted by a detachment of the 6 N. Y. numbering about 30 men. Fired upon and charged by these men, he beat a hasty retreat for some distance, and then the pursuit ceasing, he halted and sent on to Todd's Tavern for aid. About as this firing was heard at the head of the

¹ ORGANIZATIONS	INFANTRY	CAVALRY	ARTILLERY	AGGREGATE	PIECES
$\frac{1.3}{II}$	7,414	9	733	8,156	36
V	14,477	100	286	14,863	14
XI	12,170	50	757	12,977	36
XII	12,929		335	13,264	18
General Artillery Reserve . .			92	92	4
Pleasanton		1,150		1,150	
	46,990	1,309	2,203	50,502	108

² *Slocum and his Men*, by Committee, p. 161.

Federal column, the officer sent out to Spottsylvania Court-House returned with the report that hostile troops blocked the way to that point,¹ and another came in with the report,—“The road is full of rebs.”² Men mounted without orders. “We must have room to fight,” they said. “Down with that gate! Forward!” and the regiment dashed through the opening made for itself into a field between the two roads that part at this point and meet about a mile further on, the Alsop Field. Here the command was formed in line facing the gate through which it had entered, or toward its late rear. Stuart’s brigade had not yet dismounted. The 5 Va., being the nearest regiment, was launched at once toward Spottsylvania Court-House. Driving the Federal detachments before it, it dashed in column of fours at the opening into the Alsop Field, but was driven back with considerable loss by the concentrated carbine fire of the Federal horsemen delivered from the saddle. The rest of the command having come up, Stuart now ordered his next regiment, the 3 Va. (three squadrons under Carter), to renew the attack. It attempted, like the 5th, to charge through the entrance, but, like the former, was hurled back with the fire of carbines from the saddle. Colonel McVicar, perceiving that he was heavily outnumbered, concluded that he was in danger of being surrounded and captured with his whole force. So forming column of fours with sabers drawn, and rising in his stirrups, he called out: “Sixth New York follow me. Charge!” The bugles sounded, the men cheered, and the column darted at the gate. About 70 feet from it McVicar fell, shot through the heart. The charge nevertheless continued through the gate to the right on the road to Spottsylvania, and then again to the right back by the lower road, driving fragments of the enemy’s regiments before it, aiming at the junction where the road branches off toward Piney Branch Church and Chancellorsville. The 2 Va. was now ordered to take the road, and open the way, if possible, to Spottsylvania Court-House. Stuart informed Colonel Munford, its commander, of the importance of his reporting in person to R. E. Lee, and stated that if he could not get through by Alsop’s he would have to take some other route to the Court-House.³ The 2 Va., with a yell which is said to have had more effect than sabers or pistols,⁴ broke through the column of the 6 N. Y., cutting off the rear portion, and opened the way for Stuart. The latter

¹ *Hist. of the 6 N. Y. Cav.*, by Committee, p. 103. According to another authority, this report was that there was a heavy force at Spottsylvania Court-House (*Journal U. S. Cav. Assoc.*, June, 1891, p. 110). Stuart says in his report,—“Artillery as well as trains were passing Spottsylvania

unprotected at the time” (*W. R.*, 39, p. 1046).

² Verbal statement of Lieutenant F. A. Easton, 6 N. Y. Cav.

³ Letters from Colonel T. T. Munford and Sergeant C. E. Adams, 2 Va. Cavalry.

⁴ Letters of Corporal M. T. Rucker and Sergeant C. E. Adams, 2 Va. Cavalry.

pushed on with the brigade toward Spottsylvania Court-House, and the unintercepted portion of the 6 N. Y. went back by way of Piney Branch Church toward Chancellorsville. This was about midnight. The Federal loss in killed, wounded, and missing was 51 officers and men.¹ The Confederate loss is not reported. The Federals took a number of prisoners, but seem to have lost them afterward. Major McClellan, in his *Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry* (p. 231), mentions but one Confederate casualty. As result of the contest the 6 N. Y. was prevented from reaching Spottsylvania Court-House, and Stuart was delayed some twelve hours in communicating with R. E. Lee.

The train of led horses, mules, etc., from Stoneman's cavalry, went by way of Germanna Ford to Chancellorsville, and thence to United States Ford, yielding the main road to troops going to the front. The rear portion of the column was cut off by the enemy at or near Chancellorsville. At United States Ford, after waiting for the troops that were crossing to clear the bridge, the train crossed the river to the north side and went into camp near the ford.²

Early this morning (April 30) Averell received the following order from Stoneman's adjutant-general:³

... we did not get off this morning as soon as was anticipated, but will endeavor to carry out our original instructions in the next twenty-four hours. Keep your communications open with your infantry support. Our pack-train with Eleventh Corps.⁴

By "infantry support" Averell not unnaturally understood the division of the V Corps left at Kelley's Ford. It was intended, it seems, to mean the nearest portion of the right wing at the front (XI and XII Corps). W. H. F. Lee fell back through Culpeper Court-House to Rapidan Station, leaving a squadron at Culpeper Court-House. Averell's movement to the latter point was made in extended order. For miles to right and left lines of mounted skirmishers steadily advanced in excellent order, driving back the enemy's skirmishers. Immediately in rear marched their support of squadrons in line about $\frac{1}{8}$ of a mile apart. Then came the main body of the division, in columns of regiments with squadron front, about $\frac{3}{4}$ of a mile apart, each regiment with a squadron as special advance-guard. The horse artillery was distributed between the regiments. The whole as it moved to the sound of cracking carbines over the beautiful open country formed a grand and imposing spectacle. About noon it contracted its front, and

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 192.

² *History of the 10th Regiment of Cavalry, New York State Volunteers*, by N. D. Preston, pp. 70, 77.

³ Averell gives the hour of receipt both as 7 a.m. and as 8:05 a.m. (*W. R.*, 39, pp. 1075 and 1078).

⁴ *Ib.*, 39, p. 1075.

marched through Culpeper Court-House toward Rapidan Station, meeting with some resistance from Lee's squadron.¹

At 4 p.m. he halted for rest on the battle-field of Cedar Mountain (1862), recognizable at this time by a number of open trenches filled with human bones. At 6:30 p.m., being again on the march, he received the following dispatch:

The major-general commanding [General Stoneman] directs me to say that we have been delayed by high water, etc., and that he desires you to push the enemy as vigorously as possible, keeping him fully occupied, and if possible, drive him in the direction of Rapidan Station. He turns the enemy over to you.²

He understood from these instructions that he was not expected to rejoin the cavalry corps for an indefinite time. The intention was that he should disperse W. H. F. Lee's brigade at once, and march without delay to join the force under Stoneman. Between 7:30 and 8 p.m. he arrived at Rapidan Station, and found himself confronted by W. H. F. Lee on the opposite side of the river. All the information that he had been able to gather from a mail captured at Culpeper Court-House, prisoners, and other sources, went to show that the enemy believed the Army of the Potomac to be advancing behind him, and that Stonewall Jackson was at Gordonsville with 25,000 men to resist it. This information, strange to say, was "deemed reliable and important" and was sent to General Hooker at 11 p.m.³

Left Wing, Forenoon

The following message was probably received at Hooker's headquarters early this morning:

F Signal Station, April 30, 1863, 7 a.m.

Captain Samuel T. Cushing,

Act'g Chief Signal Officer, Hqrs. Army of the Potomac:

The enemy have occupied the cut of the River road from the city to near Hamilton's Crossing, the stone wall in front of Marye's, the ditches near Hazel Run, at the foot of the hill back of Hoblison's [Howison's] house [Map 12]; also on the top of the hill. See but two batteries in position yet. No force above the city other than pickets.

JAS. S. HALL,

Captain and Signal Officer.

The enemy seemed then to be remaining in position, but if he was, would he continue to do so? To obtain an answer to this question,

¹ *History of a Cavalry Company* (A, 4 Pa.), by Captain William Hyndman, p. 89; and *History of the 3 Pa. Cavalry*, by Committee.

² *W. R.*, 39, p. 1075.

³ *Ib.*, 39, p. 1078.

Hooker had the following instructions sent at 8:30 a.m. to the commander of the left wing:

. . . make a demonstration on the enemy's lines in the direction of Hamilton's Crossing at 1 o'clock, the object being simply to ascertain whether or not the enemy continues to hug his defences in full force; and if he should have abandoned them, to take possession of his works and the commanding ground in their vicinity. . . .

If you are certain that the enemy is in full force in your front . . . the demonstration herein directed will not be made. The general must know the position of affairs and be advised fully; also as to what you do, at once.

The enemy have a pontoon train at Hamilton's.¹ The general expects that you will not permit them to cross the river.

Sedgwick wrote to Butterfield probably about 11 a.m.:

General Reynolds is satisfied that the enemy have not weakened their forces either in infantry or artillery; and that a demonstration will bring on a general engagement on the left. General Brooks thinks the infantry force in his front is undiminished and strong. He can see nothing of their batteries.

This intimation of a possible movement of artillery from in front of Brooks seems to have been the only cause for apprehending any transfer of troops toward Chancellorsville.

In answer to the foregoing note Butterfield wrote at 11:30 a.m.:

Let the demonstration be suspended until further orders.

Left Wing, Afternoon

Having renounced the idea of a movement beyond Chancellorsville to-day, Hooker wanted to secure every possible advantage for the one to be undertaken to-morrow. Among these was early communication by way of Fredericksburg and Banks' Ford, and the reënforcement of the right wing,—whence the following instructions:

To Haupt (12 m.): To be ready to commence work on the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad on the 2d.

To Benham: To have two bridges, one at Franklin's and one at Fitzhugh's Crossing, taken up during the night and placed in position to be laid at Banks' Ford before daylight. Nothing to be done before dark, the movement to be concealed from the enemy.

To Sickles (12:30 p.m.): To march with his corps to United States Ford and cross by 7 a.m. to-morrow.²

¹ There was no pontoon train with Lee's army. J. B. Jr.

² *Butterfield to Sickles, 12:30 p.m.*: "Upon the receipt of this order you will proceed with your corps [III] without de-

lay, by the shortest road, concealed from view of the enemy, to the United States Ford. The batteries taken from your command, placed in position to cover the crossing [below Fredericksburg], will be re-

To Sedgwick: In case of the enemy's exposing a weak point, to attack and destroy him; in case of his appearing to fall back, to advance in pursuit by the Bowling Green Road and Telegraph Road.

To Gibbon (about 5:30 p.m.): To be ready to move with his division at daylight to-morrow to join his corps.

In Hooker's instructions to Sedgwick there was much stress laid upon attacking, striking, destroying, capturing, etc., but all to be done by Sedgwick. There was no promise in them of any such action on the part of Hooker. The right wing was apparently intended to serve as a sort of anvil on which Sedgwick was to crush Lee's army. The instructions required him to throw his whole force on the Bowling Green Road and at the same time to have a column advance on the Telegraph Road.¹ Sedgwick telegraphed for an explanation of this contradiction (*Appendix 15*).

Reports from Fredericksburg indicated to Hooker that Lee was being reënforced from Richmond, but they gave him apparently no serious concern.²

Butterfield wrote to Sedgwick:

The general in speaking privately to me about the order No. 47, in which the movements of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps were commended, said he had been informed that there was some little feeling down on the left that they

lieved, it is expected, in time to join you. It is desired that, in marching, your troops and your trains entire should be concealed from the sight of the enemy, that they may not be aware of your movement. Your pack-mules, small-arm ammunition-train, and two ambulances to a division, to accompany you. Forage for animals for two days from to-day. The greatest promptness in executing this movement and arriving at your destination is expected of you. As much of your corps as can cross on the bridge at United States Ford to cross to-night, and all to cross by 7 a.m. to-morrow.

"General Couch precedes you, and the batteries left by General Meade also. After crossing, you will take up your line of march toward Chancellorsville. . . ."

¹ *Butterfield to Sedgwick:* ". . . [Hooker's] Headquarters will be at Chancellorsville to-night. It is proposed that the army now at that point [V, XI, and XII Corps] will assume the initiative to-morrow morning, and will advance along the line of the Plank road, uncovering what is called Backs' Ford, where bridges will be at once thrown across the river, which route will then become the shortest line of communication between the two wings of the army.

. . . It is not known, of course, what effect the advance [of the right wing] will have upon the enemy, and the general commanding directs that you observe his movements with the utmost vigilance, and should he expose a weak point, attack him in full force and destroy him. If he should show any symptoms of falling back, *the general directs that you throw your whole force on the Bowling Green road*, and pursue him with the utmost vigor, turning his fortified positions by the numerous by-roads which you can make use of for that purpose. If any portion of his organized forces should pass off to the east of the railroad, you will by detachments pursue until you destroy or capture him. *Simultaneously with the advance of your column on the Bowling Green road, if at all, a column will also advance on the Telegraph road*, and between you [your two columns] will sweep the country between the two highways and the railroad [between the Bowling Green road and railroad on one hand and the railroad and Telegraph road on the other]. . . . when you strike, let it be done to destroy. . . ."

The italics are mine. J. B. Jr.

² *Reynolds to Hooker, 2:20 p.m.:* "I think that movements indicate that they

were not counted in. He said that would all come right. He expected when he left there, if he met with no serious opposition, to be on the heights west of Fredericksburg to-morrow noon or shortly after, and if opposed strongly, to-morrow night. . . .

The departure of Brooker's battery had left at Banks' Ford only von Blücher's light battery of the General Reserve and perhaps a detachment of engineers and provost guard.

Hooker's order for the III Corps to come up to Chancellorsville by United States Ford was received at 1 p.m. By 1:30 the corps was under way. Orders had been issued to the chief commissary to replace the rations that had been consumed. This was generally done, but there were instances in which the troops refused to burden themselves with the new rations, and left them lying on the ground. The brigade commissaries remained behind, gathered up these stores, and replaced them in the supply-wagons. The corps marched in three parallel columns, well concealed from the enemy, to Hamet, where it went into bivouac about 11:30 p.m. The train, left below Fredericksburg, broke camp about 5 p.m. It was formed of the supply section, carrying subsistence stores; the baggage section, carrying camp and garrison equipage; and the ammunition section, carrying ammunition. Each section carried eight days' rations of grain for itself. As the train proceeded in the wake of the troops it passed many places where knapsacks had been emptied of their contents, or slung into the bushes. When it reached Falmouth, the officer in charge was ordered to park the baggage and supply sections and push forward the ammunition section at all hazards. The ammunition section accordingly went on. The baggage and supply sections did not leave Falmouth again during the campaign, though portions of the supply section were detached and sent to the front as occasion required. The ammunition section kept close behind the troops.

Martin's horse battery (1. C), ordered to report to Pleasonton, marched to United States Ford, and camped on the north side.

Lee's expectation that more Federal troops would cross in front of Fredericksburg was not realized. The troops under Sedgwick and under Early remained quiet to-day, except for some long-range artillery dueling,—a bit of the "Song of the Rappahannock," interesting to the spectators, and more or less impressive to every one within range of its

are passing troops up to our right [toward Chancellorsville]. . . . The railroad seems to be busy to-day. . . ."

Butterfield to Reynolds: "What did the locomotives draw? Could it be transportation trains [transportation of troops]?"

Reynolds to Butterfield: "The trains they ran were passenger and platform cars."

Sedgwick to Butterfield (3:45 p.m.): "General Reynolds sends word in regard to movement of troops of the enemy on his front as follows: 'I think it must be troops from Richmond.'"

Butterfield to Sedgwick: "General Hooker hopes they are from Richmond, as the greater will be our success."

far reverberations, but not of any tactical effect. The men, for the greater part, continued their usual games of ball and quoits, played cards, cut hair, and slept. Officers sat under their little shelter tents as deeply buried in a novel as in the days of drills, parades, and reviews.

Lee was undecided during most of the day as to whether he should abandon his position near Fredericksburg or fight to retain it. He wrote at 2:30 p.m. to Anderson, at Tabernacle Church:

Set all your spades to work as vigorously as possible. I hope to send you additional troops. . . . Keep two days' rations cooked that the men can carry on their persons, and give orders that everything be prepared to pack your trains and move off at any moment when ordered. All your baggage, camp equipage, including your headquarters, etc., must be immediately reduced in order to accomplish this.

General Stuart writes that the Third Virginia Cavalry, Colonel Owen, and Second North Carolina [Cavalry], Colonel Payne, have been ordered to report to me. They are probably on the Plank road; direct them to keep in your front, and to keep you advised of all movements of the enemy, and to delay his progress as much as possible.

The concentration of troops at Chancellorsville, together with the inactivity of those at Franklin's Crossing, satisfied him later in the day that the enemy's main effort was being made upon his left flank and rear. Expecting that Hooker would push on from Chancellorsville to attack him, he determined to leave a sufficient force in his lines to hold them, and to move out with the main body of his army to give battle to the advancing columns. He issued the following order:

I. Major-General McLaws will designate a brigade of his division to hold the lines in rear of Fredericksburg, the commander of which will report to the major-general left in charge [division commander: see paragraph II]. With the rest of his division [three brigades and artillery] General McLaws will move as soon as possible to reinforce General Anderson at the Tabernacle Church, on the Plank road to Orange Court-House.

II. General Jackson will designate a division to hold the lines in front of the enemy on Pratt's and Bernard's farms. The commander of the division will establish such pickets as may be necessary. With the remainder of his corps General Jackson, at daylight to-morrow morning, will proceed to Tabernacle Church, and make arrangements to repulse the enemy.

III. The troops will be provided with two days' cooked provisions. The trains of the divisions will be packed with their equipage, and [will] move to the rear in the direction of the chief quartermaster of the army. The reserve of the army will be under the charge of the chief of ordnance [at the rear]. The ordnance wagons, ambulances, and medical wagons will

be under the charge of the chief of ordnance. The service of the batteries in the rear will be under the charge of those not required to operate with the

McLaws designated Barksdale's brigade ($\frac{4}{11}$), and Jackson, Early's division ($\frac{3}{11}$), to remain in the lines of Fredericksburg. Wilcox with his brigade and two batteries was to hold Banks' Ford.

At 6 p.m. Semmes' brigade ($\frac{2}{11}$), by General Lee's order, left its position in rear of Howison's, and marched toward Anderson's at Zion Church. At midnight it was probably within a mile of its destination¹ (Map 12).

Lee wrote to Lieutenant-Colonel Critcher, commanding the 15 Va. Cavalry:

You will close your cavalry pickets up to the infantry on the Rappahannock. I have sent you orders by a courier, but have heard nothing from you.²

This officer, it seems, had crossed the river, and been captured by men of Reynolds' corps.³

Longstreet was ordered to move with his command to Richmond "to effect a junction with General Lee."⁴

Hooker's canvas bridge train brought down from Kelley's Ford recrossed the Rappahannock at United States Ford, and was not laid again during the campaign. His telegraph line was extended across United States Ford and a station established at the Red House. The line between England and United States Ford was not working well, but flag and torch stations were established connecting these points; on the left the telegraph was extended from Sedgwick's to Reynolds' headquarters, but communication was not opened to-day. At 3 p.m. the flag and torch station opposite Buckner's Neck was broken up.

In compliance with a request of the United States Senate, this day was designated by President Lincoln, in a proclamation, to be set apart for the expression of national humiliation, and the invocation of divine blessing. Little could be done in observance of it. Here and there, out of the immediate presence of the enemy, a chaplain succeeded, with the aid of more or less coercion, in getting an audience, and held forth on the crisis through which the nation was passing, the seriousness of life, and the solemnity of death.

¹ Semmes' report, *W. R.*, 39, p. 833. McLaws erroneously reports that it took up the march toward Anderson's position at 12:30 a.m. on the 1st of May (*ib.*, p. 824).

² *Ib.*, 108, p. 699.

³ On the 25th of May Captain Lytle, Provost-Marshal, Army of the Potomac, wrote to Colonel Hoffman, Commissary-General of Prisoners:

"Colonel Critcher has undoubtedly been detailed to remain on the north side of the

Rappahannock to organize bushwhacking parties, and to furnish information of our movements to the enemy. One dispatch from him to General Lee was intercepted, which led to his capture. There is not sufficient evidence to hold him as a spy, but it is requested that every impediment possible be thrown in the way to prevent his exchange for some time to come" (*W. R.*, 118, p. 706).

⁴ *Ib.*, 26, p. 1032.

and prevented him from warning his pickets along the Rappahannock. For this error of judgment Stuart is hardly to be criticized. "Show me the commander who has never made a mistake, and I will show you one who has never made war."

Had Hooker been imbued with the true offensive spirit he would not have allowed his whole force to camp in the vicinity of Chancellorsville, but would have pushed at least a portion of it down the Rappahannock and gained possession of Banks' Ford. All necessary arrangements should have been made beforehand for proceeding by rapid marches from the time the general movement commenced until Banks' Ford was secured. These arrangements in fact were made, and the movement went on with every promise of success until Hooker conceived the idea of receiving an attack at Chancellorsville.

A year later he was asked by the Committee on the Conduct of the War: "What was your reason for leaving so large a reserve force under Sedgwick at or near Falmouth?" He answered: "I left Sedgwick's corps and Gibbon's division there for this reason in part: they were encamped in sight of the enemy, and to have moved their camp would have betrayed our movement. I knew I could not cross the river in the presence of Lee's army, if he was informed of my movement. The great difficulty I apprehended was in crossing the river. I apprehended no serious trouble after I had crossed. At the time I had to leave a force at Falmouth to keep the rebel force there. I did not want the enemy to throw a force to meet me on the Rapidan; and, besides, I was informed that they had a pontoon bridge at Hamilton's Crossing, and did not want them to cross the river while I was away, as that would enable them to strike at my depots. Mine were large and full, and the enemy would have willingly exchanged theirs for them; for theirs were comparatively empty."¹

This is only half an answer. It does not account for Reynolds and Sickles as part of Sedgwick's command. If they were not necessary for Sedgwick, one at least should have been with Hooker from the start; at any rate, if one of them was necessary to Hooker, and could not have been furnished him without entailing a delay in his advance, the plan of campaign was radically defective, and should not have been adopted.

Any advance that Hooker might make with the right wing was to have one of two objects: the pursuit of a fleeing enemy, or the taking up of a new defensive position. He had no intention apparently of looking up the enemy and attacking him. Now Lee was not retreating,—was he going to retreat? Suppose he should march on Chancellorsville. Would Hooker, after waiting for Sickles to join him, have time to anticipate Lee at a position commanding Banks' Ford or otherwise preferable to Chancellorsville? Misgivings in this regard prevented his issuing

¹ *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 145.

orders to-day for a movement to-morrow. His indecision, which was more or less apparent and disquieting to visitors at headquarters, did not in the least abate his confidence of victory. In his mind Lee was doomed to destruction. It was only a question as to how and where he should meet his ignominious fate. He said in the hearing of at least one newspaper correspondent:

The rebel army is now the legitimate property of the Army of the Potomac. They may as well pack up their haversacks and make for Richmond. I shall be after them.¹

Without the boastful speeches of which this is a sample, or the vain-glorious order No. 47, Hooker was under peculiar and heavy bonds to gain a victory. His severe and open criticisms of his predecessors in the command of the army warranted a general expectation of something brilliant and decisive from him.²

¹ Swinton's *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, p. 275.

² The state of the public mind was reflected in an editorial of the *New York Herald* of this day:

"The army of General Hooker is in motion and has been for several days past. . . . He must win or his fall will be, like that of Lucifer, never to rise again. His published testimony before the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War [given December 20, 1862, and March 11, 1863] places him in a position of extraordinary responsibility. . . . General Hooker has now no alternative before him but victory or death—death in the field or death to his reputation as a military leader. He has voluntarily set himself up as the superior of McClellan and Burnside, and he must make his pretensions good or sink

into irretrievable public disgrace. . . . We have no doubt that General Hooker is aware of all this, and that with his magnificent army he goes forward with his plans so carefully considered, and in such resolution to succeed, that he can not fail. . . ."

Another paper said:

"He enters upon the momentous task before him with everything supplied him, essential to success, by the government and the people, except those essential qualities of unfailing skill, promptitude in action, and vigilant discretion, which he is expected himself to supply, and which we trust he will supply as the leader to the magnificent army which he commands. We await the next intelligence of his advance, therefore, with confidence that it will give us the best assurance of a victorious campaign."

CHAPTER XVII

MAY 1 . . . ADVANCE TOWARD FREDERICKSBURG. SEDGWICK ORDERED TO DEMONSTRATE. RETURN TO CHANCELLORSVILLE. DEMONSTRATION COUNTERMANDED. ARTILLERY AT BANKS' FORD

Right Wing until 11 a.m.

IN the course of the night the 6 N. Y. Cavalry arrived in the vicinity of Chancellorsville and took position with the Federal pickets on the Plank Road.¹ Its scattered fragments were here reformed and brought together during the day.²

On the morning of the 1st of May, there existed much anxiety and apprehension among nearly all, if not all, the corps, division, and other commanders [of the Federal army]. It was of current report that General Hooker, the night before, had said that God Almighty could not prevent his destroying the rebel army, which created great uneasiness—even to the most irreligious. Doubtless the absence of plan and preparation for combat contributed largely to disturbing the minds of many; still the blasphemy (no one hesitating to call it that) produced a profound impression.³

It was a beautiful day. A fresh soft breeze stole through the forest, rustling the banners uncased to dry. Warren had gone out bright and early toward Fredericksburg on a reconnaissance. Hooker was waiting to hear from him and from the III Corps. A calm like that of an old-time Sabbath rested upon the camps. The corps commanders, impelled by impatience and curiosity, drifted over to Chancellorsville, and gathered encouragement from conferring with the army commander or members of his staff. Hooker showed in his countenance and speech the complete confidence which he felt that a decisive victory was about to crown his brilliant manœuver.

At 7:30 a.m. the III Corps commenced crossing the Rappahannock at United States Ford and massing on the south side. At 9 o'clock Sickles, in advance of his corps, reported to Hooker at Chancellorsville. At 10 Warren returned from his reconnaissance, having gone a little over 3½ miles, and taken a look at the enemy's lines.⁴ Generals were

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 779.

² *Journal U. S. Cavalry Assoc.*, June, 1891; *The Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry*, by H. B. McClellan, pp. 230, 231.

³ E. S. Pittman in *Papers of Michigan*

Commandery, Loyal Legion, I, 77; *History of the 27 Indiana Vol. Inf.*, by a member of Company C, p. 313.

⁴ *W. R.*, 39, p. 198.

orders to-day for a movement to—more or less apparent and disquiet not in the least abate his confidence—doomed to destruction. It was only should meet his ignominious fate. one newspaper correspondent:

The rebel army is now the legitimate Stoneman?" an officer asked of another. They may as well pack up their haversacks after them.¹ was the reply; "he has cut the enemy's

Without the boastful speeches of the kind. But the effect of the speech glorious order No. 47, Hooker With Stoneman tearing up his communi- gain a victory. His severe and retreat, and there was therefore no serious the command of the army was on the way to Fredericksburg. While brilliant and decisive from his previous hours in waiting for reënforcements,

¹ Swinton's *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, p. 275.

² The state of the public mind is shown by an editorial of the *New York Herald* of this day:

"The army of General Hooker has been for several days in a position of the kind. But the effect of the speech . . . He must win or his fall will be that of Lucifer, never to rise again. With Stoneman tearing up his communi- published testimony before the Senate, and there was therefore no serious the command of the army was on the way to Fredericksburg. While brilliant and decisive from his previous hours in waiting for reënforcements, the rebel army is now the legitimate Stoneman?" an officer asked of another. They may as well pack up their haversacks after them.¹ was the reply; "he has cut the enemy's

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² Not found.

this dispatch by telegraph, but the line works very badly, and I send by orderly. I hope to have the new line constructed by night and in working order, with a party to work across [to you] from Banks' Ford the moment the bridge is laid. Please leave directions there [at Banks' Ford as to] where they will carry the telegraph to on the other side.

The questions here raised were partly anticipated by the following dispatch from Hooker, which was not delivered until 11:30 a.m.:

To Butterfield, 7 a.m.

Hurry over the provost-marshal-general and his cavalry. Major-General Sedgwick was directed [in to-day's dispatch] to throw his whole force on the Bowling Green road, and no other.

Sedgwick's movement seems now intended as a manœuvre against the enemy's communications. With Sedgwick threatening one line of supply and Hooker astride of the other, Lee would have to choose at once between taking to flight and closing with Hooker.

Butterfield, still in doubt as to Hooker's intentions regarding Gibbon, sent the following dispatches:

To Gibbon, 9:25 a.m.

I have received a dispatch from the general directing you to cross at Banks' Ford to-morrow at 9 a.m.¹ This dispatch is dated May 1. I have strong reason to apprehend that it was intended that you should cross to-day at 9 a.m. I am momentarily expecting a telegram. I wish you would send a staff officer to Banks' Ford to read all telegraphic dispatches there. Hold your command in readiness to spring,—in case this should prove an error, and it is intended you should cross to-day at 9 o'clock,—to move to that point as rapidly as possible, to cross. . . .

To Hooker, 10:13 a.m.

Is the order still effective for General Gibbon to move to Banks' Ford to-day with his whole division, or is he to wait until it is uncovered?

About 6 a.m. Martin's six-gun battery of horse artillery (6 Independent N. Y.) arrived at Chancellorsville, and reported to Pleasonton for duty with the cavalry. At the same time the two batteries of the First Division of the XII Corps ($\frac{1}{12}$) arrived from United States Ford and joined their division. The XII Corps now had all its artillery. At 7 a.m. Humphreys' division ($\frac{3}{4}$) joined its corps on the left of Chancellorsville. Probably about the same time the 17 Pa. Cavalry, which had been attached to the XI Corps, reported at brigade headquarters near Hunting Run, leaving two squadrons to picket the right and front of the XI Corps and observe the country toward Orange Court-House and Spott-

¹ Butterfield seems to refer here to the dispatch referred to in his of 8:30 a.m. to Hooker.

sylvania Court-House.¹ The XI Corps was still short of its corps artillery, which was probably between United States Ford and Chancellorsville. Between 9 and 10 a.m. Cross's brigade crossed the Rappahannock and proceeded toward Chancellorsville. It was not to arrive until 4 p.m.²

Between 11:30 last night and 7 this morning two pontoon bridges were brought up to Banks' Ford from below Fredericksburg—one from Franklin's Crossing, and one from Fitzhugh's Crossing. This left three bridges below Fredericksburg. The two at Banks' Ford were held ready to be laid as soon as the ford was uncovered.

Including the forementioned reënforcements, Hooker's available force numbered about 70,000 men,³ with 184 pieces of artillery (32 batteries).

The general movement for to-day was prescribed in detail as follows:

Circular: Chancellorsville, Va., May 1, 1863, 11 a.m.

The Fifth Corps, including three batteries,⁴ will be thrown on the River road by [the] most direct route, the head of it advanced to near midway between Mott's and Colin Runs, the movement to be completed at 2 o'clock.

The Twelfth Corps, including its [5] batteries, will be massed below the Plank road, the head of it resting near Tabernacle Church, and masked from the view of the enemy by small advanced parties, and the movement to be completed at 12 o'clock to enable the Eleventh Corps to take its position.

The Eleventh Corps, with its [6] batteries, will be masked on the Plank road, about 1 mile in rear of the Twelfth. This movement to be completed at 2 o'clock.

One division of the Second Corps, with one battery, will take a position at Todd's Tavern, and will throw out strong detachments on the approaches in the direction of the enemy.

The other division and batteries⁵ of the corps will be massed out of the road near Chancellorsville, these dispositions to be made at once.

The Third Corps will be massed as fast as it arrives about 1 mile from Chancellorsville, on the United States Ford road,⁶ excepting one brigade with a battery, which will take position at Dowdall's Tavern.

General Pleasonton will hold his command, excepting those otherwise engaged, at Chancellorsville.

After the movement commences, headquarters will be at Tabernacle Church.

By command of Major-General HOOKER:

WM. L. CANDLER,
Captain and Aide-de-Camp.

¹ At 9:30 a.m. Hooker issued the following circular: "Corps commanders will hold their corps in hand, and wherever their commands may find themselves night or day, they will keep pickets well thrown out on all the approaches to their positions. The safety of this army depends upon this being rigidly executed. . . ."

² *History of the 5th Regt. N. H. Volunteers*, by William Child, p. 179.

³ Infantry 65,188; cavalry 1309; artillery 3641.

⁴ Of the eight batteries belonging to this corps only three had crossed the river ($\frac{3}{1.V}, \frac{2}{2.V}, \frac{2^*}{3.V}$). These aggregated 14 pieces.

⁵ Of the eight batteries of this corps only six had crossed the river.

⁶ At the junction of this road with the Ely's Ford Road.

This order appears to be incorrectly timed. It was probably issued, in substance, verbally or in writing, formally or informally, at an earlier hour than it purports to have been. According to J. Watts de Peyster, orders for the V Corps to advance on the River Road were given verbally to Captain Paine of Hooker's staff about 10:30, and orders for the XII Corps were issued in printed form upon the return of Captain Paine from the V Corps.¹ Warren says that on returning from his reconnaissance, about 10 a.m., he found that an advance had been ordered.² Captain Waterman, commanding a battery (1³), says:

Broke camp at 10 a.m. . . . and marched on the road to . . . Fredericksburg.³

According to Humphreys he received instructions from Meade not long, it would seem, after 7 a.m.⁴ It can hardly be doubted that the hour of starting was nearer 10 than 11.

Regarding the text of the forequoted 11 a.m. order, there was no reference in it to attacking. Hooker testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War:

As soon as Couch's divisions and Sickles' corps came up, I directed an advance for the purpose, in the first instance, of driving the enemy away from Banks' Ford, which was six miles down the river, in order that we might be in closer communication with the left wing of the army.⁵

The movements prescribed are only a transfer of the army from one defensive position to another. Besides uncovering Banks' Ford it would take the army out of the Wilderness to ground on which its artillery would be able to act and its general preponderance to tell. So much for Hooker's purpose "in the first instance." What was it in the second instance? What, if anything, did Hooker mean to do after he had placed his army in its new position? When asked by the Committee: "What action was taken on the 1st of May?" he answered: "I went out to attack the enemy."⁶ There is reason to believe that he contemplated advancing at 2 p.m. from the position of Tabernacle Church against a force supposed to be on a line of hills between Salem Church and Banks' Ford.⁷ But in the light of subsequent events it seems more probable that, when the time had come, he would have decided to await an attack. However that may have been, his immediate

¹ *John Watts de Peyster*, by Frank Allaben, p. 113.

² *W. R.*, 39, p. 198.

³ *Ib.*, 39, p. 524.

⁴ *Ib.*, 39, p. 546.

⁵ *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 124. See also Hooker's Comments on Chancellorsville, *B. and L.*, III, 218.

⁶ *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 140. In a dispatch to Butterfield received at 8:45 p.m., he said: "The attack was ordered at 2 p.m.," but no such order can be found in the records.

⁷ Warren and Meade, *W. R.*, 39, pp. 198, 506; Warren, *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 44; *John Watts de Peyster*, by Frank Allaben, p. 113.

object was to take up a new defensive position. His main line was to be covered in rear by a division at Todd's Tavern, a brigade at Dowdall's Tavern, a corps (with the exception of a brigade) near Chandler's, and the cavalry at Chancellorsville.

A signal station was established in a tree about a mile and a half east of Chancellorsville, in the vicinity of Newton, under Captain Fisher, and one about a mile and a half east of Howard's headquarters under Captain Castle. The former was to be used as an observation station and the latter to connect Howard's headquarters with Hooker's.

Semmes' brigade ($\frac{2}{2.1}$) reported to Anderson, and, about 1 a.m., went into position with its left resting on the right of Mahone's brigade ($\frac{1}{1.1}$), the left of the latter resting on the Turnpike. Between midnight and 12:30 a.m., Kershaw's and Wofford's brigades of McLaws' division ($\frac{1.3}{2.1}$) took up the march, by General Lee's order, for Anderson's position, where, on arrival, they formed up to the right and left about Smith's Hill, their left connecting with Semmes' right.¹ About 8 a.m. Jackson, in advance of his column, arrived at Tabernacle Church, and assumed command. By this time Anderson, with the help of Lee's engineers, had strongly intrenched the whole front. The flanks were more or less protected, on the right by Mott's Run and the Rappahannock, and on the left by Massaponax Creek. For the defence of this line, about 3 miles in length, there were to be available about 40,000 infantry, which would furnish from 7 to 8 men to the yard, but the force at present on the ground did not number more than about 13,000 men with 44 pieces of artillery² (Map 12). Stuart and Fitzhugh Lee's brigade went on from Alsop's to Spottsylvania Court-House and about daylight proceeded thence toward Anderson's position at Zion Church. Stuart started from Spottsylvania Court-House about daylight, followed by Fitzhugh Lee's brigade. By 11 o'clock he had probably communicated with Lee or Jackson and directed his march northward toward Chancellorsville. About this time he was joined by the 10 Va. and parts, at least, of the 15 Va. and 2 N. Ca. Allowing for casualties, he must now have had a force of about 2000 sabers,³ or about twice as many as Pleasanton had. The Confederate cavalry presented about the same anomaly as an organization that the Federal did. It consisted in the main of a brigade commanded by a major-general and a brigadier-general (Stuart and Fitzhugh Lee). Lee's instructions to Jackson were to "proceed to Tabernacle Church and make arrangements to re-

¹ *W. R.*, 39, pp. 824, 830, 833.

² Mahone	1,915	Infantry	11,695
Semmes and Wofford	4,068	Artillery (44 pieces)	880
Kershaw	2,712	Cavalry (4 Va. and	
Wright and Posey . .	3,000	part of 3)	500
Infantry	11,695	Total	13,075

³ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, and part of the 15 Va. and 2 N. Ca., and 8 guns (*Chancellorsville*, by Hotchkiss and Allan, p. 151; *W. R.*, 39, pp. 794, 1049, 1051; *So. Hist. Soc. Papers*, VIII, 249).

pulse the enemy." They did not require him to go beyond Tabernacle Church. On the other hand, they did not prohibit it. That was enough for Jackson. With only about 10,000 Confederates between him and Sedgwick, he thought with dread of Federal guns thundering in his rear. For this reason as well as to secure, if possible, the advantage of the initiative, which he knew so well how to utilize, he ordered the work on the intrenchments to cease and the troops to prepare to advance. But he had first to wait for his own column and other reënforcements. About 10:30 a.m. his advanced troops moved out, Mahone's brigade on the Turnpike and Posey's on the Plank Road.¹ His reënforcements were still 2 or 3 miles off, but the sight of them approaching, as it seemed, from every direction, was restoring the spirit of the troops, somewhat dampened by the recent retrograde movement.

The Federals were now pursuing their way eastward in columns well closed up, by the two roads that fork at Chancellorsville. Arriving opposite the house, they halt by brigade, load their pieces, and move on.

Right Wing, 11 a.m. to 2 p.m.

The V Corps with three batteries, and the XII with two batteries,² altogether about 28,000 men and 28 guns, formed three columns (Map 12). The V Corps had two roads, the River Road and Turnpike. Griffin's and Humphreys' divisions ($\frac{1}{2}$ ³) under Meade took the River Road, and Sykes' division ($\frac{2}{3}$), the Turnpike. Humphreys' division was to hold itself ready to reënforce Griffin's or Sykes', as exigencies might require.³ The XII Corps marched on the Plank Road. After crossing Mott's Run Sykes' division was to turn to the left, deploy and open communication with Griffin's on its left and Slocum's corps on its right. The two corps were to take up a position extending from Tabernacle Church on the right to near Banks' Ford on the left, a distance of about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles—the position actually held by Anderson. Together with the XI Corps, which was to support the movement, the forces thus set in motion aggregated about 40,000 men and 62 guns. Two batteries ($\frac{2}{3}$ ², $\frac{2}{3}$ ²) went with Sykes, one battery ($\frac{1}{3}$ ¹) with Meade. The other five batteries of the V Corps were on the march from Hartwood Church.

¹ Authorities differ considerably as to the hour when the movement commenced. Semmes, Kershaw, and Wright give it as about noon (*W. R.*, 39, pp. 833, 829, 865). Lee and McLaws give it as 11 (*ib.*, pp. 794, 849, 824), and Posey gives it as 9. Mahone's leading regiment was the 12 Va. Lieutenant Keiley of this regiment wrote on the 7th of May, 1863, "About 10 we moved to the front" (*War Talks of Confederate Veterans*, p. 62).

² $\frac{2}{1, XII}$, $\frac{1}{2, XII}$ (*W. R.*, 39, p. 674). The author can not state why this corps was not accompanied by its five batteries as required by Hooker's order of 11 a.m.

³ Meade's report, *W. R.*, 39, p. 506. Humphreys was originally directed to follow Sykes, but his instructions were subsequently modified so as to require him to follow Griffin (*ib.*, 39, p. 546). This change, it will be seen, proved unfortunate.

General Warren, Hooker's chief of topographical engineers, accompanied Sykes' column.

The woodiness of the country would considerably restrict the use of artillery, but would not altogether prevent it. There were straight stretches of road where a single gun might bring a hostile column to a halt or compel it to take to the woods. There were openings, too, affording positions for lines of guns.

About 11 a.m. Sickles' corps commenced arriving from United States Ford at the junction of Ely's and United States Ford roads, and being massed there by Hooker's order. It left at United States Ford, on the south bank, as guard to the bridge, Mott's brigade of six regiments ($\frac{3}{2. III}$) and Jastram's and Seeley's batteries ($\frac{3}{1. III}$, $\frac{4}{2. III}$); and on the north bank, the ambulances.¹ Colonel Ingalls, chief quartermaster of the army, forbade the crossing of trains until further orders.² The engineer battalion, numbering 300 men, was also at the ford on the south side of the river.³ Meagher's brigade ($\frac{2}{1. II}$) at Scott's Dam was joined by the 116 Pa. from United States Ford.

The following instructions were issued to the left wing:

Chancellorsville, May 1, 1863, 11:30 a.m.

General Butterfield:

Direct Major-General Sedgwick to threaten an attack in full force at 1 o'clock, and to continue in that attitude until further orders. Let the demonstration be as severe as can be, but not an attack.

JOSEPH HOOKER,
Major-General Commanding.

That Sedgwick's attack was to be a pretended and not a real one shows that Hooker was not aware of the transference of most of Lee's army from the lines of Fredericksburg toward Chancellorsville.

As Hooker outwitted Lee by massing his right wing at Chancellorsville, so Lee outwitted Hooker by concentrating his army at Zion Church. The first point in the game was made yesterday by Hooker; the second, which, as we shall see, neutralized the first, was made to-day by Lee. Sedgwick, by his demonstration at 1 o'clock, was to prevent the now consummated reënforcement of Anderson.

Jackson's force marched in two columns. On the Turnpike went Mahone's brigade ($\frac{1}{1. I}$) and McLaws' three brigades ($\frac{1. 2. 3}{2. I}$), with six batteries of artillery ($\frac{1. 2. 4}{1. I}$, $\frac{3. 4}{2. I}$, $\frac{2}{1}$), numbering 24 pieces, all under the command of McLaws. This force was covered by Owen's two squadrons of the 3 Va. Cavalry and Jordan's battery of 4 guns (included in the 24 above mentioned), and followed by Wilcox's brigade

¹ *History of Battery E, 1 R. I. Light Artillery*, by George Lewis, p. 157; *W. R.*, 39, pp. 384, 421.

² *W. R.*, 39, pp. 399, 401, 411, 493.

³ *Ib.*, 39, pp. 384, 216.

($\frac{4}{1-1}$) from Banks' Ford, and Perry's brigade ($\frac{3}{1-1}$) from the vicinity of Falmouth.

On the Plank Road the column was headed by Posey's and Wright's brigades ($\frac{2.5}{1-1}$), together with Alexander's battalion of artillery of the I Corps, numbering 14 pieces.¹ The main body of this column consisted of Rodes' and A. P. Hill's divisions ($\frac{2.1}{1-1}$). Its left flank was covered by the 4 Va. Cavalry (Colonel Wickham), detached by General Stuart this morning. The right column, including Wilcox's and Perry's brigades, numbered about 12,000 men with 24 pieces of artillery; the left column (including Jackson's leading and next division), commanded directly by Jackson, about 28,000 men with 54 pieces of artillery. These columns aggregated, it would seem, to a man the same strength as the forementioned Federal columns (40,000 men), but comprised 78 pieces of artillery, or 16 more than the Federal columns. They were followed by Colston's division ($\frac{4}{1-1}$) and Jackson's corps artillery, numbering together about 7800 men with 56 pieces, which were too far behind to come up before the afternoon was well spent, but might be counted on as a reserve to be used before night. On both sides the movements at this time were somewhat disjointed. The units were separated by excessive distances—on the side of the Federals, to right and left, and on the side of the Confederates, to front and rear.

Stuart's cavalry was divided into two parts, each with its particular function to perform. One, under Fitzhugh Lee, was to preserve contact with Hooker's army, and furnish information regarding it; the other, under Stuart, was to keep in touch with Lee's army, and protect it from annoyance and as far as possible from observation. Of Stuart's artillery, 6 pieces were detached with W. H. F. Lee. Two pieces, under Breathed, accompanied Fitzhugh Lee; 8 pieces, under Beckham, were with Stuart.

Jackson's columns are hardly in motion when the Federals become aware of the fact. About 11:15 the pickets of the 8 Pa. Cavalry in front of Mott's Run are attacked by McLaws' skirmishers, consisting of the 12 Va. The 8 Pa. comes to the support of its pickets, and succeeds in retarding the enemy's progress, but not in checking it. While it is giving way the head of Sykes' division, with Watson's battery of four pieces ($\frac{2}{2-2}$), comes up. The only artillery opposing the Federal battery is a piece of Jordan's battery ($\frac{2}{1}$) and a piece of Grandy's ($\frac{1}{1-1}$).² As a shell is seen bursting over the woods, a captain in the XII Corps, looking at his watch, remarks: "Twenty minutes past eleven; the first gun of the battle of Chancellorsville."

¹ The number left after deducting for Jordan's battery on the Turnpike and Rhett's battery and two pieces of Parkers at Fredericksburg.

² *W. R.*, 39, pp. 525, 883; *War Talks of Confederate Veterans*, p. 69. The Confederate artillery was subsequently reinforced to 4 pieces (*ib.*).

The rumbling of the guns traveling on to Fredericksburg informs Lee that Jackson has met and engaged the enemy, and assures Sedgwick, so far as he may need to be assured, of the success, thus far, of Hooker's turning movement. Sykes, advancing still at double time, drives the Confederate skirmishers back, and about 12 o'clock¹ occupies a ridge with open ground in its front, about 2½ miles from Chancellorsville or about half-way from Chancellorsville to Anderson's late position at Zion Church² (Map 13). Sykes' position is not the open ground that Hooker has been aiming at outside of the Wilderness, but an open space within the Wilderness. His formation is in two lines. In his first line, Burbank with the 2d brigade and Watson's battery forms the right and center; and Ayres with the 1st brigade, the left. His second line is formed of the 3d brigade.

McLaws sends word to Jackson that the enemy is in force in his (McLaws') immediate front and is advancing, and that a large force can be seen along the heights about a mile or more to the rear (h), and that the country is favorable for an attack from the Plank Road upon the Federal right flank. Jackson in reply tells McLaws to hold his position; that he is advancing his artillery; and that if this does not succeed, he will try to gain the enemy's rear. About this time Jackson receives the following dispatch:

General:

Headquarters Cavalry Division, 12 m., May 1, 1863.

I am on a road running from Spottsylvania C. H. to Silvers, which is on Plank Road, three miles below Chancellorsville. General Fitz Lee is still further to the left and extends scouts to Plank Road (Orange), and has Turnpike watched beyond to see if any large movement takes place that way. I will close in on the flank and help all I can when the ball opens. I will communicate through Wickham and Owen to you.

May God grant us victory.

Yours truly,

J. E. B. STUART,
Major-General.

Upon the back of this dispatch Jackson wrote:

MAJOR-GENERAL J. E. B. STUART.

12½ p.m., May 1, '63.

General:

I trust that God will grant us a great victory. Keep closed on Chancellorsville.

Yours very truly,

T. J. JACKSON,
Lieut. General.³

Precisely where Fitzhugh Lee was at this time, is not known. He was perhaps near the junction of the Brook Road and Brock Road (Map 15). Stuart was probably not far from Welford's Furnace.

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 198.

² *Ib.*

³ These two communications are taken from the *So. Hist. Soc. Papers*, XI, 137, 138.

About noon Colonel Owen of the 3 Va. reported to McLaws that a Federal column was advancing by the Mine Road. This was probably a flanking detachment of Meade's. McLaws kept the four brigades of Mahone, Wofford, Semmes, and Kershaw (about 8700 men) in his front to oppose Sykes, and sent the two brigades of Wilcox and Perry, as they arrived, out to his right to cover his flank and rear against a movement by the Duerson's Mill Road and Mine Road (Map 13). McLaws' main force now maintained a defensive attitude. His skirmishers, however, especially on his flanks, kept up a vigorous demonstration.

Sykes heard no sound of cannon from the direction of Meade or Slocum. He was totally isolated. He had a good field of fire in his front, and his flanks rested upon woods, but these were not impassable to the Confederate skirmishers, who were threatening to envelop both of his flanks and gain his rear. Colonel O'Rorke, commanding his second line, sent out six companies of the 146 N. Y. as skirmishers to protect the right flank, and the whole of the 5 N. Y. (Duryee Zouaves) also as skirmishers to protect the left flank (Map 14). A detachment of the 8 Pa. Cavalry sent to the left to connect with the column on the River Road failed to do so. An aide of General Warren's who attempted to communicate with General Slocum ran into the enemy's skirmishers and narrowly escaped capture. A similar effort by one of General Sykes' aides was foiled in the same way.¹ About 1 p.m. Sykes reported his situation to Hooker. Soon afterward he received an order to retire in the direction of Chancellorsville. Arnold's battery (Σ^1_{II}) was sent to report to him, and later Couch was ordered to support him with a division. Couch went himself with the available infantry of Hancock's division ($\frac{1}{II} \frac{3}{4}$), about 3800 men.² Before this infantry arrived, probably soon after 1:30 p.m., Sykes commenced retiring, covered by Arnold's and Watson's batteries (Σ^1_{II} , Σ^2_{IV}). The 8 Pa. Cavalry retired to the vicinity of Chancellorsville, where it stood to horse the rest of the day.³ By 2 p.m. Hooker had probably received the following dispatch of 12:30 from Butterfield:

Butterfield to Hooker, 12:30 p.m.

Patrick [provost-marshal-general] ordered from Banks' to United States Ford, and cavalry⁴ ordered there from Hartwood. Balloon and signal reports

¹ *W. R.*, 39, pp. 198, 199.

² Couch says he gave his order to Arnold at 1 p.m.; Arnold says it was given at 2 p.m. (*W. R.*, 39, pp. 306, 360). Couch says in a report of May 9 that he went with Hancock's division at 1 p.m. (*ib.*, 39, p. 305); and in a report of May 20, that instructions for him to do this were given him soon after 1 p.m. (*ib.*, 39, p.

311). It is probable that Arnold moved out a little before 1:15 and Hancock a little later.

³ *The Charge of the 8 Pa. Cavalry at Chancellorsville*, by Pennock Huey, p. 77.

⁴ About 140 of Patrick's cavalry. About 40 of these went on to Chancellorsville to keep the communications open.

to this moment all sent you. The enemy will meet you between Chancellorsville and Hamilton's Crossing. He can not, I judge from all reports, have detached over 10,000 or 15,000 men from Sedgwick's front since sun cleared fog. . . . I will have telegraph to Banks' Ford shortly. Shall I keep party waiting there to cross, or build line from United States Ford to Chancellorsville?

It was long after the time for Sedgwick's demonstration ordered this morning, and there were no signs of its being made. Hooker could not count on Sedgwick's coöperation, and feared that without it, and perhaps with it, he would be unable to deploy outside of the Wilderness; that the heads of his columns would be crushed, and his forces beaten in detail. We will leave him now to his disquieting reflections, and take a look at the Federal column on the right.

The XII Corps took up the march as ordered on the Plank Road about 10:30 a.m. Having advanced about a mile, it came upon the skirmishers of the enemy with one howitzer¹ in the vicinity of Decker (A). The advance-guard deployed in line of skirmishers, and pushed on, driving the enemy before it. The main body deployed on either side of the road; Geary's division ($\frac{2}{\text{XII}}$) on the right, Williams' ($\frac{1}{\text{XII}}$) on the left, each division with two brigades in the first line and one in the second. The brigades in the first line were formed each in two lines; and those in reserve in double column. This triple line of battle was a long time in forming. It did not advance until about 1 p.m., or about the time when Sykes, barely holding his own on the Turnpike, sent a report of his situation to Hooker.²

Jackson reënforced his advance under Anderson with Ramseur's brigade ($\frac{5}{\text{II}}$). The three brigades, Posey's on the right, Ramseur's in the center, and Wright's on the left, pushed back Slocum's advance upon his main line (Map 14). The artillery of the head of Jackson's column (14 pieces) went into action and was opposed by Atwell's battery ($\frac{1}{\text{XII}}$) of 6 pieces; Winegar's battery ($\frac{2}{\text{XII}}$) was put into position to add its fire to that of Atwell's; and Crosby's battery ($\frac{3}{\text{XII}}$) was brought up from Chancellorsville and posted near Atwell's. Neither Winegar nor Crosby had opened fire, and Atwell had fired but about sixty rounds,³ when, about 1:30 p.m., Slocum received an order from Hooker directing him to return to the position which he occupied the night before.⁴ Consequently before the artillery duel was decided or his reserve brigades were brought into line, he broke off the engagement, and put his force in retreat. He was followed by the three brigades under Anderson, a part of Stuart's cavalry, Alexander's battalion of artillery, and McGraw's battery of A. P. Hill's division

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 821.

² *Ib.*, 39, p. 728, first line.

³ *Ib.*, 39, pp. 723, 771.

⁴ Slocum errs, it seems, in stating that this order was received at 1 p.m. (*W. R.*, 39, p. 670).

($\frac{4}{1, II}$).¹ Rodes' artillery, it seems, was not engaged at all. Rodes deployed his four remaining brigades ($\frac{1, 2, 3, 4}{2, II}$) between the Plank Road and the Turnpike. A. P. Hill's division ($\frac{1}{II}$) formed line of columns on both sides of the Plank Road.

Howard received an order at 12 o'clock to place his corps a mile in rear of the XII, but he had hardly started from camp when it was countermanded.² The corps resumed its former positions, except that the Third Division, which had been at Hawkins' Farm, facing westward, was placed in the line between the First and Second Divisions, facing southward, leaving the 82 O. (not brigaded) at Hawkins' Farm (Map 15). When the corps started forward Captain Castle's signal station was broken up. It was not reestablished.

The V Corps marched, as ordered, by the River Road. An order was issued for its recall probably about 1 p.m., but at 2 p.m. it had not been received. About 1 p.m. Graham's brigade ($\frac{1}{I, III}$)³ and Turnbull's battery ($\frac{3}{I, III}$) took up the march from the junction of the Ely's Ford and United States Ford Roads by way of Chancellorsville for Dowdall's Tavern, pursuant to a provision of Hooker's order of 11 a.m. Whether it was before or after the issue of this order can not be stated, but by midday Hooker had an apprehension that a force of Confederate cavalry was demonstrating against his right and rear, which was probably caused by patrols of Fitzhugh Lee's looking for Federal troops on the Germanna Plank Road. As a consequence Graham was directed to picket well out to the right and rear, connecting on his right with Whipple ($\frac{3}{III}$), who was to connect his right with Berry ($\frac{2}{III}$).⁴ On arriving at Dowdall's Tavern Graham halted by order of General Howard to await further orders.⁵ Whipple on the left and Berry on the right

¹ W. R., 39, pp. 821, 937.

² Howard's report, *ib.*, 39, p. 628. Howard says in his *Autobiography* (I, 361) that his corps had "gone out two miles." Captain Castle, Howard's signal officer, says in his report that the corps was turned back at Chancellorsville (W. R., 39, p. 231).

³ Except the 105 Pa., which had not come up from United States Ford.

⁴ W. R., 39, p. 384.

⁵ "Howard met Graham half-way from Chancellorsville[?] to Dowdall's Tavern. 'Where are you going?' Howard asked Graham. 'To Dowdall's Tavern.' 'Perhaps you mean Todd's Tavern?' 'No, Dowdall's.' 'That can not be; there must be some mistake about this. My headquarters are there.' 'I do not know anything about that,' replied Graham; 'such are my orders. Perhaps they are afraid of an attack, and I am

sent to support you.' 'That can not be,' replied Howard. 'I would send my compliments to the whole rebel army, and invite them to attack me, in my present position; and if it was not out of compliment to General Sickles, I would order you back.' To this Graham, having observed that he would not be justified in obeying such an order, turned to Briscoe (attached to Birney's staff as engineer) and said to him: 'There seems to be some misunderstanding here; you had better go back with Bullard [his aide] to General Birney, and find out.' Graham then proceeded on to Dowdall's Tavern, where he found General Carl Schurz and a number of officers of the XI Corps; while Howard kept on to Chancellorsville to see General Hooker" (*Chancellorsville*, by J. Watts de Peyster; *Onward*, December, 1869. See *Report of Committee on Con-*

established a line of outposts extending from the Plank Road to the United States Ford.¹

In the meantime General French with his division ($\frac{3}{11}$) and Pettit's battery ($\frac{1}{11}$) got under way for Todd's Tavern. After he had made about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles the XII Corps, coming up the Plank Road, intersected his column, and compelled him to halt until it had passed, when he received orders to return to his original position. He turned back about the same time as Howard.²

Right Wing, 2 p.m. to 6 p.m.

A little after 2 p.m. Couch with Hancock's division met Sykes with his in the vicinity of Newton. At this moment Couch received the following order:

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, May 1, 1863.

General Sykes will retire to his position of last night, and take up a line connecting his right with General Slocum [XII Corps], making his line as strong as he can by felling trees, etc. General Couch will then retire to his position of last night.

Major-General HOOKER.³

Hancock deployed to cover Sykes' withdrawal. "General Couch, while preparing to obey the order, so far as concerned Hancock's division, determined at least to delay its execution until he could communicate to the commanding general his own earnest belief that the position which had been reached should be held, and he accordingly dispatched Major Burt, his senior aide, to headquarters, with urgent representations as to the admirable nature of the ground he held, and his ability to 'stand off' any enemy on his front, if Meade and Slocum could keep their place on his flanks. Major Burt returned with a peremptory order to retire."⁴

At 2 o'clock Hooker telegraphed to Butterfield:

From character of information have suspended attack. The enemy may attack me—I will try it. Tell Sedgwick to keep a sharp lookout, and attack if [he] can succeed.

Probably about the same time he wrote:

. . . Hope the enemy will be emboldened to attack me. I did feel certain of success. If his communications are cut [by Stoneman] he must attack me. I

duct of the War, 1865, I, xlv, 4, 6, 34, etc.; *Chancellorsville*, by Hotchkiss and Allan, 48, 50; *W. R.*, 39, pp. 412, 413).

¹ *W. R.*, 39, pp. 385, 448.

² French in his report says that he received the order to move to Todd's Tavern at 8 a.m. and implies that he started about that time. But his report, read in connection with the reports of Captain Pettit,

Colonel Powers, commanding his leading brigade, General Slocum, and General Howard, seems to show that he could not have started much before noon (*W. R.*, 39, pp. 362, 375, 628, 669).

³ *History of the II Army Corps*, by Francis A. Walker, p. 221.

⁴ *Ib.*

have a strong position. . . . All the enemy's cavalry are on my flanks, which leads me to suppose that our dragoons will meet with no obstacles in cutting their communications.

The "information" to which Hooker referred in his telegram does not admit, unfortunately, of specification. But it probably consisted in substance of the items that 15,000 men or more had moved from about Fredericksburg toward Chancellorsville; and that the total in the former position did not appear to have been diminished, from which Hooker naturally inferred that Confederate reënforcements had arrived from Richmond. This view of the situation was probably confirmed by the receipt of the following dispatch from Butterfield:

2:05 p.m.

I have two deserters just from Hays' brigade, Early's division. They report A. P. Hill left here this morning to move up to our right [Chancellorsville]. Hood's division arrived yesterday from Richmond. The deserter was from New York State originally; an intelligent man. He said he knew it was Hood's division, for he asked the troops as they passed along. He reports D. H. Hill, Early, and Trimble in front of Sedgwick. Anderson, McLaws, A. P. Hill, and Hood would therefore be in your front.¹

Hooker's reckoning with the cavalry involved three erroneous ideas:

1. That all of Stuart's cavalry was with Lee,
2. That all of Stoneman's cavalry was with Stoneman,
3. That Stoneman was carrying out Hooker's orders.

Reynolds wrote to Sedgwick:

If they have not detached more than A. P. Hill's division from our front, they have been keeping up appearances [of detaching more], showing weakness [here], with a view of delaying Hooker.

Reynolds, it seems, was now satisfied that the enemy's forces had for the greater part been withdrawn from their old lines, but was in doubt as to whether they had gone on to Chancellorsville or lay concealed in rear of Fredericksburg.

About this time Slocum, falling back before Jackson, made a stand on the Welford's Furnace and Newton Road, but there was no communication between Slocum and Couch.

¹ D. H. Hill was in North Carolina; his division, commanded by R. E. Rodes, was with Jackson; Trimble's division, commanded by Colston, was also with Jackson; Hood was still south of the James River.

This dispatch represented the force opposing Sedgwick as nearly three times as strong as it was, and that opposing Hooker as about four fifths as strong as it was.

At 2:30 p.m. the following dispatch was sent from Jackson's headquarters to McLaws:

The lieutenant-general commanding directs me to say that he is pressing on up the Plank road; also that you will press on up the turnpike toward Chancellorsville, as the enemy is falling back.

Keep your skirmishers and flanking parties well out, to guard against ambuscade.


About 3 p.m. General Heth of A. P. Hill's division was detached with three brigades ($\frac{1.3.4}{1.11}$) to go over to the Turnpike, and having reached it, to feel his way, and advance in the direction of Chancellorsville; and General Wright of Anderson's division was ordered to move his brigade ($\frac{5}{1.1}$) "across and to the left of the Plank Road, and bearing well off from the road, endeavor to get upon the enemy's right flank and rear."¹ Slocum, having resumed his retreat, was pressed in rear and on his right rear by Posey's brigade ($\frac{2}{1.1}$), supported by Alexander's artillery and Jackson's leading division (Rodes'). His command was thrown into some disorder, but got back without much loss to its original position about 4 p.m. His artillery, numbering twenty-eight pieces, was disposed in two batteries of equal strength, "for defence against the probable following enemy"—one at the junction of the Plank Road and Turnpike east of Chancellorsville, commanding both approaches; and the other on the height of Fairview, west of Chancellorsville, facing south. Wright took the line of the unfinished railroad, followed it rapidly to the Welford's Furnace Road, and proceeded by the latter toward the Furnace. He apparently intended to go on from the Furnace to the elevation of Hazel Grove and there place himself in an advantageous position on the flank and rear, as he thought, of the Federal line. He arrived at the Furnace about 4:30 p.m.² Here he found Stuart with his staff, and Beckham, commanding the horse artillery, with six guns.³ From Stuart he learned that the Federals occupied the woods north of the Furnace. His brigade comprised three regiments of about 380 men each and one battalion numbering, say, 150 men. He deployed two of his regiments, keeping one regiment and the battalion in reserve. The former were ordered, he says, "to move cautiously forward through the almost impenetrable forest, and finding the enemy, to press him vigorously." They advanced rapidly, and were soon engaged with two regiments on the outposts of Williams' division, the 3 Wisc. and 123 N. Y. ($\frac{3}{3.1. XII}$, $\frac{123}{2.1. XII}$). Colonel Hawley of the 3 Wisc. says that he saw three Confederate regiments, so Wright's third regiment was probably put into action. At any rate, Wright

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 866.

² This is about an hour and a half earlier than the hour given by Wright (*W. R.*, 39,

p. 866), but is based upon a careful study of all the reports, Federal and Confederate.

³ *W. R.*, 39, pp. 1048, 1049.



SHOWING ENGAGEMENT

RIGHTS MANEUVER

Green Federal

About

y 1

Red Confed

1/2

1 Mile

10 Yards

forced the Federals back to the Farm-House, whereupon he ordered a halt and called upon Stuart for a portion of his artillery. Beckham was sent forward with four guns, under the supposition that the Federals had little or no artillery at this point. Owing to the character of the ground and the bad condition of the roads, it was about 5:30 when the Confederate guns came into position and opened fire. The immediate effect of the fire was to compel the Federal regiments to fall back to the intrenchments on the northern edge of Hazel Grove. A third regiment, the 27 Ind. (3. 1. XII), which had come to their support, was ordered back with the others before it had time to deploy. This was no sooner accomplished, however, than Beckham's four pieces were fired upon by eight pieces of artillery at Fairview.¹ Soon afterward they became the target also of two pieces at Hazel Grove, the latter supported by a regiment of infantry (Sketch 1). While this action was in progress, General Jackson with his staff came galloping up from the Plank Road. Going forward with the artillery, he came under the heavy fire to which it was subjected. The danger of the situation elicited from Stuart the remark: "General Jackson, we must move from here." Before they could turn, Stuart's adjutant-general was mortally wounded.

Fitzhugh Lee, with his brigade of cavalry and two pieces of Breathed's battery of horse artillery, had been feeling the Federal outposts about a mile and a half further west. Soon after 4 p.m. his two pieces of artillery opened fire on Carpenter's Farm. A regiment was sent out from Howard's line (1. 3. XI) and drove them back, silencing their fire.

Probably about 4 p.m. Wilcox, coming over with his brigade ($\frac{4}{I-XI}$) from the Turnpike, took position on the right of Perry's brigade, occupying part of a line of rifle-pits running from Banks' Ford to within a few hundred yards of the Mine Road (Maps 13, 14).

McLaws received Jackson's order of 2:30 at 4 p.m. and proceeded accordingly with his whole force "to press on up the Turnpike toward Chancellorsville." He left Wilcox, however, in the position just described, and Perry in his position on the Mine Road (Map 14). The latter moved forward about 5 p.m., following the Mine Road.

Heth passed between Rodes and McLaws, and came out on the Turnpike about half a mile in advance of McLaws, Couch having fallen back from Newton. Heth's skirmishers became engaged with Hancock's.

It may have been in answer to an inquiry from Hooker that Butterfield wired the latter at 2:45 p.m.:

All passage of troops from enemy's right to his left ceased about 11:30 o'clock. Nothing apparently going now except small detachments. . . .

¹ Winegar's battery ($\frac{2}{I-XII}$) and one section of Crosby's ($\frac{3}{I-XII}$).

At any rate, the receipt of this message or some other circumstance seems to have revived Hooker's spirits. After Sykes, in compliance with Hooker's order to retire, had passed through Hancock's line, Hancock commenced withdrawing his division. When all but two of his regiments had retired (about 4:30 p.m.) the following order was delivered to Couch:

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, May 1, 1863.

General Couch:

Hold on to your position till 5 p.m., and extend your skirmishers on each flank, so as to secure yourself against being surrounded. General Slocum will hold a position on the Plank road equally advanced.

By command of Major-General HOOKER:

WILLIAM L. CANDLER, Captain,
Aide-de-Camp.¹

But what might have been done a couple of hours before was now no longer possible. Couch replied with warmth to the bearer: "Tell General Hooker he is too late; the enemy are on my right and rear. I am in full retreat," and proceeded accordingly. Fisher's signal party fell back from their observation station. The position thus abandoned (Newton) was high ground, more or less open in front, over which an army might move, and artillery be used advantageously. General Meade is said to have remarked: "... if we can't hold the top of a hill, we certainly can't hold the bottom of it." Hancock, with his division, stood across the main road to Fredericksburg, with two pieces of artillery on the Turnpike, and one on a wood road nearly parallel to it about 200 yards to the left.

The following answer to Hooker's telegram of 2 p.m. went to him from Butterfield at 4 p.m.:

... copy announcing suspension of your attack sent Sedgwick. He and Reynolds remain quiet. They consider that to attack before you have accomplished some success, in view of the strong position and numbers in their front, might fail to dislodge the enemy and render them [Sedgwick and Reynolds] unserviceable at the proper time. They are anxious to hear from you. . . .

Hooker was waiting for Sedgwick to do something, and Sedgwick was waiting for Hooker to do something.

When Hooker ordered a return to Chancellorsville, Meade was still advancing; and Couch and Slocum felt able to hold their positions. The latter expected to be adequately supported, and resume the advance. Hooker saw that to advance in the face of the attack which had developed or seemed impending meant his making a general attack with his somewhat scattered forces. He was more or less unnerved by the unex-

¹ *History of the II Army Corps*, by Francis A. Walker, p. 222.

pected aggression of the enemy. He wanted the enemy to attack him, but not then or there. He had started out to fight a battle, but he wanted to fight it in a position of his own choice. But here he was between his position of the night before, which he had but partially abandoned, and his contemplated new position, which he could not reach without fighting an offensive battle. He had remained at Chancellorsville in order, no doubt, to be as near as possible to the terminus of his telegraph line, which was broken or out of order most of the day. Not being at the front, he did not know the ground on which his troops were fighting. He had not uncovered Banks' Ford, and therefore could not expect any reënforcement from the north side of the river. He felt that he must choose between attacking in full force and retreating. At this critical moment he perhaps recalled the President's earnest warning: "Beware of rashness."

General Francis A. Walker in his interesting biography of General Hancock says: "Various explanations have been given of Hooker's actions on the afternoon of the 1st of May. The writer has always believed that they were due partly to lack of that firm moral stamina which is so often found to accompany a spirit of arrogance and boastfulness, but chiefly to a nervous collapse occasioned by the excitement and fatigue of the four preceding days. Drunkenness, once alleged, certainly was not any part of the cause."¹ It has indeed been asserted that Hooker was suffering at this time from the need of a stimulant.²

About 3 p.m. the V Corps, on the River Road, had reached Decker (B), about two miles from Banks' Ford and in sight of that point, when it received orders to turn back. Humphreys' division proceeded to execute the order at double time. Griffin did not receive the order, it would seem, until sometime between 5 and 6 o'clock, when his division took the back track at a killing pace.

¹ The report that Hooker was drunk at Chancellorsville is denied or discredited by Siekles, Birney, Wadsworth, and Pleasonton, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War (IV, 15, 37, 73, 31), by the Committee itself (IV, p. xlix), and finally by Hooker himself, testifying before the same (IV, 149). "The truth seems to be that Hooker was accustomed to drink a large amount of whisky daily without being prevented from attending to his round of duties; but when he started on this cam-

paign, or, at all events, on the day that he reached Chancellorsville, from motives which do him honor, he stopped drinking entirely" (Rhodes' *History of the United States*, IV, 264, foot-note).

² Letter from Brooks to Hooker in *Army and Navy Journal*, III, 27; Couch's article in *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, III, 170; *Military Miscellanies*, by James B. Fry, p. 432; and *The Campaign of Chancellorsville*, by T. A. Dodge, pp. 268, 269.

CHAPTER XVIII

MAY 1 (CONTINUED) . . . DISPOSITIONS FOR THE NIGHT. PLANS. CARE OF THE WOUNDED. GAINS AND LOSSES. THE FEDERAL LEFT WING. AVERELL RECALLED. COMMENTS

Right Wing, 6 p.m. to 12 p.m.

HETH kept up his pressure on Hancock until the latter, in obedience to an order from Hooker, took position on Sykes' left (Map 15). O'Rourke's (3d) brigade of Sykes' division was then between these commands and the enemy. About 6 p.m. Heth was forced by the Federal fire and approaching darkness to withdraw. To make room for McLaws, who was approaching from the rear, he moved to the left and went into bivouac near the right of the Plank Road.¹ McLaws halted at dark and bivouacked along the heights between Newton and R. McGee, Jr.

Lee wanted to attack from his right, and cut Hooker off from United States Ford. He went forward himself to examine the ground and receive reports from officers charged with reconnoitering and feeling the enemy. About 6:30 p.m. Wilcox moved with his brigade (¹/₁) to Duereson's Mill. From there he sent out a patrol of two companies "with the view of ascertaining whether or not the enemy occupied the River Road near Decker's house," and, if not, to communicate with the Confederate pickets left near Banks' Ford. The patrol did not catch sight of Meade's column, but captured three Federal soldiers, making their way, they said, to the United States Ford. Perry's and Wofford's brigades (²/₁ ³/₁) moved up the Mine Road—Wofford on the left and losing connection with the line on *his* left. The 4 Va. Cavalry was transferred to the right, and coöperated with the two squadrons of the 3 Va. under Owen. But no suitable point of attack was found. Posey (²/₁), between the Turnpike and the Plank Road, brought up about this time in Big Meadow Swamp, where he was arrested by the difficulty of the ground and a rapid shelling. On Posey's left, Ramseur (⁵/₁₁) charged up the Plank Road. Receiving the fire of eight pieces of artillery, he withdrew, and, night approaching, went into bivouac. Off to their left and front Beckham's four pieces of artillery pluckily held out against the ten pieces of Best's for about three quarters of an hour, and then,

¹ *W. R.*, pp. 890, 894.

together with the infantry, went back, by order of General Wright, to the Furnace.

Wright's operation failed not only as a flank manœuvre, but also as a reconnaissance. Neither Wright nor Fitzhugh Lee, so far as can be learned, penetrated the Federal outposts far enough to see the main line.

General Howard says in his *Autobiography*:

During the confusion of the changes of troops at Dowdall's Tavern some female members of a family there, taking a basket of provisions with them, escaped from our lines and informed some Confederate officer of the situation, carrying accurate information of how we occupied that position.¹

On what authority this statement is made is not known. The author is convinced, however, that the information thus carried into the Confederate lines did not serve to locate the Federal right flank.

Lee, who had followed Jackson's advance from Zion Church, was puzzled by the feebleness of the resistance which it met with. To clear this matter up, he dispatched the following message to Stuart:

Plank Road, 2 miles from Chancellorsville,
May 1, 1863, 4 o'clock.

General:

The captured prisoners agree in stating that this is Meade's [V] corps with which we are now engaged, and that Howard's [XI] corps preceded them across the Rapidan, and has taken some other road. This is the only column that we can find in this direction. What has become of the other two [Howard's and Slocum's XI and XII Corps]?

Meade appears to be falling back.

I am, very respectfully yours, etc.,

R. E. LEE,

General.

Lee apparently was not aware that the III Corps and two divisions of the II Corps had joined the Federal right wing, and was uncertain as to whether the XI and XII Corps were still with it. At the close of the day he had a fairly correct idea of the position of Hooker's left, his line from the Plank Road around northward to the Rappahannock; but as to his right wing, he was quite in the dark. He not improbably supposed it to extend from near Slocum's right over the Vista of Hazel Grove south of west through the woods between Carpenter's Farm and the Orange Plank Road. Apprehending, it would seem, that a considerable fraction of Hooker's army was marching upon Gordonsville, he ordered W. H. F. Lee at Rapidan Station to destroy the bridge over the Rapidan at that point.

¹ See also *B. and L.*, III, 194.

In the Army of the Potomac two general plans of operation were now considered. One was to select a line of defence and intrench it; the other, to select a point of attack and advance upon it.¹ The former plan was adopted. The line chosen was the one actually held, except that the right was to be thrown back to a better position. At 4 p.m. Sickles was directed to bring up his whole corps except Mott's brigade ($\frac{2}{2. III}$) and Seeley's battery ($\frac{4}{2. III}$), still guarding the United States Ford, and get it rapidly into position parallel to the Plank Road at Chancellorsville. This he proceeded to do, recalling Graham's brigade of Birney's division from Dowdall's Tavern. Instructions for the adjustment and strengthening of the lines were issued in the following form:

4:20 p.m. Commanders of the Second, Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps will at once have their commands established on the lines assigned them last night, and have them put in condition of defence without a moment's delay. The major-general commanding trusts that a suspension in the attack to-day will embolden the enemy to attack him. . . .

Chancellorsville, Va., May 1, 1863, 4:45 p.m.

Major-General Slocum:

Let the right of your line [XI and XII Corps] fall back and rest at the saw-mill ruin on Hunting Run, or in that direction, and have everything passed to the rear of it.

By command of Major-General HOOKER:

WM. L. CANDLER,

Captain and Aide-de-Camp.

6 p.m. Corps commanders will set their pioneers at work in their fronts to make abatis, and clearing for artillery. The pioneers will be kept at work during the night.

A copy of the second dispatch was sent directly to Howard. Both Slocum and Howard protested against the refusal of the right wing. They believed that the forest about them was impenetrable to troops except on the roads, and represented that they were abundantly able to hold their position against any force which the nature of the ground in their front would enable the enemy to bring against them, and that to fall back would have some of the demoralizing effect of a retreat. It was consequently decided not to change the position of the right wing, but to strengthen it with breastwork and abatis, for which the timber and brushwood afforded an abundance of useful material. The line was strengthened as rapidly as possible "by each division, brigade, or regiment, according to its own idea of military engineering."² The art of field fortification was not so well understood nor the advantage of it so highly appreciated, in either army, as it was to be later in the

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 199.

² *Ib.*, 39, p. 199; *Journal of the Mil. Serv. Inst. of the U. S.*, XII, 285.

war. The intrenchments constructed in the XI Corps were weak even for this time, and decidedly inferior to those constructed in the XII, V, and II Corps. Where the line had not been intrenched, it was generally covered with abatis. It was commanded in several places, but Hooker preferred retaining it to changing it in the presence of the enemy. The work of fortifying it went on here and there through the night. It does not appear that there was any fortifying in Lee's army until after midnight.

Did Hooker consider that the passive defence, if good for himself, might be good for his opponent; and think of what he should do, should Lee now renounce the offensive, leaving the initiative again to Hooker? What was there in this case for Hooker to do, but to attack; and would it not be harder for him to advance from his present position than it was to continue advancing from the one that he had abandoned? No, he did not worry himself with any such questions; his all-absorbing thought was hurling back the enemy's decimated ranks, trusting that Lee's easy success thus far had made him bold enough to attack the Federal intrenchments in front.

When Couch after the fight went to Hooker and made his report on it, Hooker remarked: "It is all right, Couch; I have got Lee just where I want him; he must fight me on my own ground." "The retrograde movement," says Couch, "had prepared me for something of the kind, but to hear from his own lips that the advantages gained by the successful marches of his lieutenants were to culminate in fighting a defensive battle in that nest of thickets was too much, and I retired from his presence with the belief that my commanding general was a whipped man."

In the course of the afternoon, probably between 2 and 4 p.m., Devin's cavalry brigade with its battery of artillery was assembled in camp on Little Hunting Run to feed and rest, having left the 8 Pa. near Chancellorsville and two squadrons of the 17 Pa. with General Howard, "charged with the duty of picketing to his right and front, and observing the country toward Orange and Spottsylvania Court-House."¹ Companies D and H of the 33 Mass. (2. 2. XI) were placed in observation on a road leading to Ely's Ford (Map 15). The infantry picket line extending from the Plank Road on Howard's right to United States Ford was withdrawn.

Hancock's division ($\frac{1}{11}$) bivouacked about on the ground taken up early this morning in three lines of battle supported on its right and rear by Sykes' division ($\frac{2}{9}$), which formed parallel to the Turnpike, facing south. About dusk Humphreys' division ($\frac{3}{4}$) arrived on its return from Decker's. Meade now received orders to occupy a line from Chancellorsville to the river. He at once sent Humphreys with his divi-

¹ W. R., 39, p. 778.

sion ($\frac{3}{V}$) to take the extreme left of this line on the river-bank near Childs and hold the approach to the United States Ford by the River Road. The woods through which the column wound its way to the new position were on fire. Their light was taken by the enemy for that of camp-fires, and this, together with the rattling of canteens, drew upon it a brisk fire of musketry. Griffin's division ($\frac{1}{V}$), on its return from Decker's, was halted some distance from Chancellorsville and put in position on Hancock's left (Map 15). The V Corps was reënforced this evening by its five batteries from the north bank of the river (28 pieces); and the II Corps by the three regiments which it left at United States Ford ($\frac{5}{I. I. II}$, $\frac{81}{I. I. II}$, and $\frac{83}{2. I. II}$).

Of the batteries which had been in action on the Turnpike, Arnold's ($\frac{1}{2. II}$) returned to the artillery camp at Chandler's, Watson's ($\frac{2}{2V}$) bivouacked near Chancellorsville, Randol's ($\frac{3}{3V}$) rejoined its division under Humphreys on the left. Of Waterman's battery ($\frac{1}{1V}$), which had accompanied Humphreys on the River Road, two pieces took position about midway between Chandler's and Childs; the other four bivouacked near Chancellorsville.

The artillery of the XII Corps was formed, as stated, in two batteries: one near Chancellorsville, commanding the Plank Road from Fredericksburg; the other on the height of Fairview, facing south. Each numbered fourteen pieces. These were the only masses, or considerable groups, formed by the artillery of the right wing, which (including Seeley's and Jastram's batteries at United States Ford) numbered 183 pieces.

Hooker had dispensed with the services of his chief of artillery, and there was no one to make proper disposition of the batteries.¹

French's division ($\frac{1}{II}$) was held massed near Chandler's until about sunset, when the 1st and 2d brigades were deployed on the skirts of a wood between Chandler's and the position held by the XII Corps. The 3d brigade remained near Chandler's. The III Corps, moving in accordance with Hooker's order of 4 o'clock, arrived in the vicinity of Chancellorsville while the Confederates were pressing Slocum in front and on his right. Graham's brigade, after receiving several orders and counter-orders, took position in close column of regiments in rear of Best's batteries at Fairview, ready to support them or to advance to the aid of Williams' division, then engaged in repelling Wright's attack. The brigade was immediately ordered to lie down to escape the fire of Beckham's artillery, to which it was subjected, and from which it lost 1 man killed and 5 wounded.

About sunset Birney's division ($\frac{1}{III}$), except Graham's brigade ($\frac{1}{1. III}$) and Jastram's battery ($\frac{1}{1. III}$), was moved up the Plank Road to the right

¹ *Journal of the Mil. Serv. Inst. of the U. S.*, XII, 285.

of the XII Corps, and bivouacked near the interval between the XI and XII Corps. Two regiments and three pieces of this division took a forward position near two regiments of the XII Corps (Map 15).¹ While this was being done the sound of skirmishing indicated that an enemy was near. Shells and bullets reached the troops as they came into position.

"To discover the enemy's movements five or six daring men had climbed to the tops of the highest trees, from which they had a view over the surrounding woods. The position was very dangerous, for they might become targets for the rebel sharpshooters. In order to guard against it as much as possible, they kept up a continual shaking of the trees in which they were; they could be seen thus swinging in the air more than 100 feet above the ground, braving the double danger of the enemy's bullets and a fall—death in either case."²

Jastram's battery ($\frac{1}{111}$) moved up from United States Ford, and about midnight bivouacked near Chandler's.³

Whipple's division ($\frac{3}{111}$) bivouacked in reserve at Chancellorsville, also the infantry of Berry's division ($\frac{2}{111}$), except Mott's brigade ($\frac{3}{2.111}$), left at United States Ford. Berry's artillery, except Seeley's battery ($\frac{4}{2.111}$), left at United States Ford, bivouacked near the junction of the United States Ford and Ely's Ford Roads, about a mile in rear of Chancellorsville.

With Hooker's approval, Sickles gave orders during the night to Birney to occupy at daybreak a portion of the front line between the XI and XII Corps, so as, to some extent, to relieve those corps, and enable them to strengthen their lines.

In the course of the day a line of shallow rifle-pits was constructed from the vicinity of Buschbeck's position northward past Dowdall's Tavern. This will be referred to hereafter as the Buschbeck line (Map 15).⁴

About nightfall, von Gilsa's brigade ($\frac{1}{1.111}$) was drawn in, and the half a regiment by which it maintained connection with McLean's brigade on its left replaced by two regiments. The brigade now connected directly with McLean's. Two pieces of Dieckman's battery ($\frac{1}{111}$) were placed in the angle on the Turnpike facing down the latter. The 8 Pa. joined the cavalry brigade on Hunting Run.⁵

During to-day's fighting in the Wilderness the wounded, who were not numerous, were taken to some houses near the scene of action,

¹ *W. R.*, 39, pp. 408, 429, 442, 708.

² *Four Years with the Army of the Potomac*, by R. G. de Trobriand, p. 438.

³ *History of Battery E, 1 R. I. Light Artillery*, by George Lewis, p. 159.


⁴ Schurz's map, *W. R.*, 39, p. 649.

⁵ Pleasonton's report, *W. R.*, 39, p. 774; Devin's report, *ib.*, pp. 778, 781; Martin's report, *ib.*, p. 786; Carpenter's letter in *The Charge of the Eighth Penn. Cavalry at Chancellorsville*, p. 77.

where they were promptly attended to. Authority was obtained to take a few ambulances to the front from United States Ford, by which, when the lines fell back, the wounded were removed to the field hospitals. After urgent representation permission was obtained to order a few medicine-wagons to the field; not enough, however, to supply the wants of all the wounded. The defect was remedied by transporting the supplies in the ambulances and on horses and mules. In this way medical and surgical supplies in ample quantities were conveyed to the field hospitals.¹ The wounded of the V Corps were carried to the Chancellor House, part of which was turned into a hospital and the remainder used by General Hooker as his headquarters. The yard was occupied by wounded who could not be accommodated in the house. The ladies of the house, suppressing their feelings as hostiles to obey their kindly and tender instincts as women, came with their gentle ministrations to the assistance of the surgeons. A hospital for Hancock's division, which became the hospital of the II Corps, was established in the woods near Chandler's. Here the wounded were placed in rows upon blankets. Dry leaves gathered by attendants served as straw, which ordinarily took the place of mattresses. This evening, by order of the medical director, all the wounded were sent to the division hospitals prepared for them beyond Falmouth.

Anderson's division ($\frac{1}{2}$) bivouacked on or near the Turnpike, and Jackson's corps (II) on or near the Plank Road (Map 15). Jackson sent word to Lee that his advance was checked and that the enemy was in force at Chancellorsville. This brought Lee toward Jackson, who met him on his return from the Furnace, or about 7:30 p.m., at Decker(A). Lee had now more reason than Jackson had this morning to apprehend an advance on the part of Sedgwick against his rear. He knew Hooker's reputation as an aggressive fighter, even to the nickname that it had fastened upon him; and must have credited him with knowing that Longstreet had been detached from Lee's army. He had every reason to expect, and, as it seems, did expect, of his opponent a speedy resumption and a vigorous prosecution of the offensive. He felt that he could not himself remain inactive where he was. Before deciding to retire he wanted to try an attack. He believed that to succeed he must strike quickly. The question was, Where should he deliver his blow? Satisfied that it should not be in the direction of his right, he asked Jackson if he had found any suitable point for an attack by the left. Jackson replied with a description of Wright's unsuccessful attempt to advance from the Furnace. Major Talcott, an aide of General Lee's, and Captain Boswell, Jackson's chief engineer, were now sent out together to reconnoiter the enemy's front. During their absence

¹ *Medical Recollections of the Army of the Potomac*, by Jonathan Letterman, late Medical Director of the Army of the Potomac, pp. 124, 125.



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Jackson spoke to Lee about what he had seen and heard during the advance, and commented upon the promptness with which the enemy had appeared to abandon his movements toward Fredericksburg when opposed, and the ease with which he had been driven back to Chancellorsville, and concluded by expressing the opinion very decidedly, and repeating it more than once, that the enemy would recross the Rappahannock before morning. He said in substance: "By to-morrow morning there will not be any of them this side of the river." General Lee expressed the hope that General Jackson's expectations might be realized, but said that he did not look for such a result; that he did not believe the enemy would abandon his attempt so easily; and expressed his conviction that the real move was to be made from Chancellorsville and not from Fredericksburg. On this point there was a great difference of opinion among the higher officers of his army, and Lee was the only one who seemed to have the absolute conviction that the real movement of the Federal army was the one he was then meeting. In this belief he never wavered from the first.

Talcott and Boswell returned about 10 p.m. and made a report that was unfavorable to an attack in front. According to Hooker's thinking, there was now no recourse for Lee but inglorious flight. But Lee did not think so. About this time he received a report from Fitzhugh Lee "describing," says Dabney,¹ "the position of the Federal army and the roads which he held with his cavalry leading to its rear." This description could not have been very accurate. The positions of the Federal troops were determined mainly, it would seem, by feeling the pickets. The positions of the latter can not now be determined. It would seem that they changed frequently, also that the pickets, patrols, and larger detachments kept the Confederate scouting parties at a good distance from the Federal lines.

Howard says: "The first distant symptoms occurred on the evening of May 1. Then was heard the sudden crack of rifle-shooting. It began with Steinwehr's skirmishers and then passed on to Schurz. Schimmelfennig pushed out a brigade² straight forward toward the southwest and received a sudden fire of artillery from the intruders. They left him and pushed on.

"It was a 'rolling' reconnaissance, evidently to determine for Lee's and Jackson's information the position of our flank."³

It may be safely asserted that not an officer or soldier of Lee's had seen the right flank of Hooker's army, and that the road which led to

¹ *Life of Jackson*, p. 673.

² Doubtless an erroneous reference to the regiment sent by Schimmelfennig to Carpenter's Farm (*W. R.*, 39, pp. 628, 650).

³ *B. and L.*, III, 193, 194. According to

Schurz, a negro brought in from Carpenter's Farm reported that he had seen Confederate troops moving westward, but the information which he gave was very indefinite (*W. R.*, 39, p. 650).

its rear, the Brock Road (Map 15), was not held by Confederate cavalry further north than the Orange Plank Road, if that far. It would seem that Fitzhugh Lee considered and represented the Federal right flank as resting somewhere in the angle formed by the Orange Plank Road and the Brook Road. Rev. Mr. Lacy, a chaplain in Jackson's corps, who was familiar with the country about Chancellorsville, and acquainted with the roads in that neighborhood, stated to Lee that troops could be conducted around Hooker's right by way of Wilderness Tavern.¹ On the strength of the foregoing representations Lee and Jackson in consultation projected a turning movement against Hooker's rear.² The execution of this movement was intrusted to Jackson. Lee indicated its principal features and said in conclusion: "General Stuart will cover your movement with his cavalry." General Jackson listened attentively, and his face lighted up with a smile while General Lee was speaking. Then rising and touching his cap, he said: "My troops will move at 4 o'clock." Lee remarked that before he moved, if he should have any doubt as to whether the enemy was still in position, he could send a couple of guns to a spot close by and open fire, which would speedily settle the question. This was after midnight.³ The general direction of his march being indicated by Lee, it was left to Jackson to decide upon the route that he would take. When Mr. Lacy pointed out to him on a map the road that he had in mind for him to follow, Jackson remarked: "That is too near; it goes within the line of the enemy's pickets. I wish to get around well to his rear without being observed. Do you know no other road?" It seems probable that the road proposed by the chaplain was the one running from Decker(A) past Welford's Furnace to the Brook Road (generally parallel to the Plank Road between Chancellorsville and Dowdall's Tavern) and that what Jackson objected to was the stretch from the Furnace to the Brook Road. To Jackson's question the chaplain replied that he had no perfect knowledge of any other road, but presumed that the one running from Welford's Furnace southward past Welford's House intersected the Brock Road, as the directions of the two roads were convergent. The needed information was soon obtained. It was found that the roads came together, affording a practicable route outside of the Federal outposts. This route Jackson decided to adopt. The bend in the road at the Furnace was held by the

¹ *Memoirs of R. E. Lee*, by A. L. Long, p. 252; *General Lee*, by Fitzhugh Lee, pp. 245, 246.

² Lee's report, *W. R.*, 39, p. 798; Lee to Mrs. Jackson, Henderson's *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 582; *W. R.*, 39, p. 940; and other Confederate reports.

³ The details of the interview between Lee and Jackson are deduced from conflict-

ing accounts by a number of writers (*Life and Campaigns of Lieut.-Gen. T. J. Jackson*, Dabney, pp. 672, 673; *Chancellorsville*, Hotchkiss and Allan, pp. 41, 42; *Memoirs of Robert E. Lee*, Long, pp. 252, 254; *Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War*, Henderson, II, 532; *So. Hist. Soc. Papers*, XXXIV, 1; Fitzhugh Lee's *Chancellorsville Address*, *ib.*, VII, 545).

main body of Stuart's cavalry and his horse artillery. The latter had probably been reënforced by midnight by the two detached pieces, making ten pieces. Wright's brigade, recalled by an order from Jackson, rejoined the force on the Plank Road at 11 p.m.

At this hour Posey received an order from Anderson to advance as far as he could. He succeeded in crossing the swamp, and pushed on to within "a short distance of the enemy's line of works."

Since the commencement of operations this morning both sides have been reënforced by artillery—the Federals by 28 pieces (560 men), and the Confederates by 2 pieces (40 men). The losses since the opening of the campaign have been slight on both sides, the Federal amounting to about 290 infantry, 80 artillery (4 pieces),¹ and 65 cavalry, the Confederate to about 100 infantry and 50 cavalry. The Federal loss in infantry fell wholly on Sykes' division, and the Confederate on Anderson's, McLaws', and Rodes' divisions. Adding the gains and deducting the losses, we get for the forces about Chancellorsville at the end of the day the following figures:

	INFANTRY	CAVALRY	ARTILLERY	AGGREGATE	PIECES
Federal	64,900	1,246	4,121	70,267	208
Confederate	42,170	1,953	2,880	47,626	144

Lee was still at a loss to estimate the numbers that confronted him. He had no knowledge of more than two corps. He probably believed 30,000 and apprehended as many as 45,000 Federals to be intrenched or intrenching about Chancellorsville.

Federal Left Wing

Hooker's order of yesterday to Sedgwick regarding an attack or pursuit was received about 11:30 a.m. Sedgwick did not observe any "weak point" in the enemy or any symptom of his "falling back," so he continued inactive. Hooker's order of to-day for a demonstration at 1 p.m. did not reach Butterfield until 4:55 p.m., nor Sedgwick until about 5:45 p.m. A feeble demonstration was made by the I and VI Corps after 6 p.m. The light division of the VI Corps was sent across the river, its infantry relieving Russell's brigade ($\frac{3}{I\ VI}$) at the front. At 9:05 p.m. Sedgwick received from Butterfield an order from Hooker countermanding the demonstration as too late.²

In the expectation that Sedgwick was soon to drive the defenders of Fredericksburg before him, Rufus Ingalls, Chief Quartermaster of the Army of the Potomac, still on the north side of the Rappahannock, wrote to W. W. Wright, railroad superintendent at Aquia:

Be prepared to lay the railroad bridge over the Rappahannock on short notice.

¹ 4½-inch battery returned to north side of river.

² *W. R.*, 107, p. 1034.

On the completion of the telegraph line between Sedgwick's and Reynolds' headquarters, the flag and torch station at Fitzhugh House was broken up. Orders were issued for patrols on the telegraph lines to put to death instantly any person found tampering or interfering with them. Ten miles of telegraph wire were at Banks' Ford, with instruments, ready to cross there or be sent, if necessary, to United States Ford. The provost-marshal-general spent the day at United States Ford with 100 cavalry, engaged in keeping the communications open. He reported that the telegraph wire was broken by the carelessness of the artillery.¹

The main train of the XII Corps moved to-day from Banks' Ford to United States Ford, where it connected with the troops.²

At 1:30 p.m. Hooker received copies of dispatches from Butterfield to Reynolds and Sedgwick, which, together perhaps with other reports, gave him the impression that one of the enemy's columns was threatening to gain possession or command of Banks' Ford. He ordered General Hunt, Chief of Artillery, to return to headquarters at Falmouth, collect the disposable artillery, move it to Banks' Ford, and prevent any attempt of the enemy to cross at that point. Hunt did not go to Falmouth. He went to United States Ford, which was then in telegraphic communication with Falmouth, and telegraphed to Butterfield to send to Banks' Ford the disposable batteries near headquarters. He ordered the 4½-inch battery which had crossed the Rappahannock to recross, and return to its position at Banks' Ford, and proceeded to that point himself. From there he sent von Blücher's battery of the General Reserve (four 20-pounders) down the river to relieve Hart's (six 3-inch guns), which he had called up from Traveller's Rest. While Hart's and von Blücher's batteries were changing posts, Hart's battery was replaced at Traveller's Rest by Amsden's ($\frac{3}{3.1}$) from Pollock's Mill.³ Von Blücher's was placed in battery near the Fitzhugh House.

The following dispatches were sent this evening:

Hunt to Hooker, 7:20 p.m.

There are up here [at Banks' Ford], ten more will come certain, and more [unclear] Sedgwick can send them. I have carefully examined the passes [unclear] approaches], and it is not practicable to prevent the passage of [unclear] if a serious attempt is made, without infantry, at least a very [unclear] General Benham has but 600 men [2. 2. II].

Hooker to Butterfield, 8:45 p.m.

General Gibbon to send one brigade of his division to Banks' [unclear] officer sent there to see that they are properly posted

[unclear] 219.

[unclear] "Left this [unclear] 4 p.m. May 1;

took position near Traveller's Rest, on Widow Gray's Farm, about 10 a.m." (W. R., 39, p. 304). He probably left Pollock's Mill at 4 a.m.

to prevent crossing. . . . If the absence of one brigade should weaken General Gibbon too much, which I hope will not be the case, he must call on General Sedgwick for assistance. . . . all the enemy's cavalry are in my immediate presence, which I trust will enable Stoneman to do a land-office business in the interior. I think the enemy in his desperation will be compelled to attack me on my own ground. . . . In half an hour more I shall probably have been engaged.¹

Butterfield to Hooker, 10 p.m.

There are now twenty-two guns of the Horse Artillery at Banks' Ford² and a brigade of infantry ordered there.³ There will be in the neighborhood of thirty-four guns in all in the morning.⁴ . . . Benham says if he had a full division from any troops, he should feel that he could defy them. If he could not defy them from the river with thirty-two pieces of artillery and a brigade of infantry, he ought to be pitched into the river himself. . . .

There was apparently a serious disagreement between Hunt and Benham on one side, and Hooker and Butterfield on the other, as to the amount of infantry needed at Banks' Ford.

Regarding the strength of the enemy, a Federal spy from Richmond reported 59,000 rations as issued to Lee's army, and gave the forces about Richmond at "8000 or 10,000 troops." Butterfield telegraphed to Peck (7:30 p.m.):

Hood's and Pickett's divisions of Longstreet's corps are in our front; so reported by deserters and prisoners captured to-day.

Peck replied:

There may be portions of Longstreet's troops with your opponents. If so, they are the first instalments. Deserters and contrabands who came in yesterday from Hood's and Pickett's divisions agree in all points with others that have fallen into our hands. . . .

Touching this matter the following dispatch of this date from Cooper to Lee was probably received to-day:

Orders were sent on Wednesday [April 29] to General Longstreet to move forward his command to reënforce you. He replied he would do so immediately, but expected to be a little delayed in gathering up his transportation train . . . General D. H. Hill, at Kinston, was also directed to send forward a brigade

¹ *W. R.*, 107, p. 1034.

² There were only 28 pieces of horse artillery altogether. Of these 6 were with Pleasonton, 6 with Stoneman, and 6 with Averell. There could not have been more than 10, therefore, at Banks' Ford. The additional force at that point was probably Graham's and Meinell's batteries of the General Reserve (12 pieces).

³ $\frac{2}{11}$, except the picket details of the

several regiments. These were left in front of Fredericksburg. An additional regiment ($\frac{19}{11}$) was ordered to Banks' Ford.

⁴ The heavy battery from United States Ford (B. 1. Conn.) arrived and was posted after 7:30 p.m., making 26 guns in position. Hart's battery of 6 guns and Kinzie's of 4, both of the General Reserve, arrived during the night, but were not posted.

that place, you will immediately return to United States Ford, and remain there until further orders, and report in person.

P.S. If this reaches you at one o'clock in the morning you will start immediately.¹

In compliance with the request sent yesterday from Hooker's headquarters, the 3d brigade of Stahel's cavalry division was sent to-day from Fairfax Court-House to Bristoe Station. One regiment (5 N. Y.) reconnoitered from there to Rappahannock Station, and took post at Warrenton Junction.

COMMENTS

In the advance from Chancellorsville, the connection that was to have been established after crossing Mott's Run was not effected. The Confederates formed but two columns. The smaller one under McLaws demonstrated against Hooker's front while the larger one under Jackson sought to overpower his right. The two commands were in constant communication with each other. While the Federals advanced in isolated columns, the Confederates came on practically in unbroken line of battle, and overlapped and turned their enemy wherever they met him.

The Federal cavalry did not prove itself as efficient as the Confederate. When Hooker marched out toward Tabernacle Church there was not a trooper in advance of his columns except the pickets of the 8 Pa. Cavalry. When this regiment was relieved by Sykes' division, it should have taken a post of observation on a flank of that division, or have occupied itself with establishing and maintaining connection with the adjoining columns. Instead of that, it went to the rear, leaving the two squadrons of Owen's 3 Va. Cavalry unopposed.

It was a capital mistake of Hooker's to detach the cavalry corps. Sending it ahead of the army as the latter ascended the Rappahannock served the important purpose, already pointed out, of deceiving the enemy as to Hooker's intentions. So far its employment was judicious, but after it crossed the Rappahannock it should have been used to screen and protect the turning columns and to keep Stuart from joining Lee. Especially after the right wing crossed the Rapidan was the cavalry needed to reconnoiter toward Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg, and to screen the army on the side of Spottsylvania and Richmond. In testifying before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Hooker said:

From the place of crossing the river, Kelley's Ford, the infantry had about twenty-five miles to march to Chancellorsville; and the cavalry between fifty and sixty, to their post on the Aquia and Richmond railroad. Hence I concluded that they would reach their respective destinations about the same time.

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 1080. This dispatch was borne by Lieutenant Blunt of the 6 N. Y. Cavalry, with an escort of 4 men. The party passed through Stevensburg, where hostile patrols were encountered, going and coming (*ib.*, 39, p. 782).

It is probable that the cavalry and the rest of the army would cross the Rappahannock by the morning of the 31st and that by the night of the 31st they would have crossed at W. E. F. Lee and joined Stoneman near Hanover Junction. As it turned out, Averell on the night of the 31st did not receive orders to proceed and Stoneman had not gotten across the Rappahannock. The morning was at Chancellorville and the cavalry was not sent to Hanover Junction. This backwardness of the cavalry was due to uncertainty in Hooker's orders in issuing his orders for the march from Watkinson Junction.

CHAPTER XIX

MAY 2 . . . JACKSON'S FLANK MARCH AND DEPLOYMENT FOR ATTACK

Right Wing until 8 a.m. (Map 16)

DURING the night of the 1st and 2d, Sykes' division ($\frac{2}{V}$) was withdrawn to the Mineral Spring Road near the Chandler House, where it intrenched itself. Griffin's division ($\frac{1}{V}$) fell back into the interval between Sykes' and Humphreys'. Hancock's ($\frac{1}{II}$) formed a new line of which the left crossed the Turnpike perpendicularly and the right ran obliquely thereto, connecting with Geary's left ($\frac{3}{XII}$) near the Plank Road.

At 1:55 a.m. Hooker wrote to Butterfield:

Direct all the bridges to be taken up at Franklin's crossing and below before daylight, and for Reynolds' corps to march at once, with pack-train, to report to headquarters.

He intended, it seems, to place this corps and Averell's cavalry on Howard's right, so as to form a continuous line from the Rappahannock on the left to the Rapidan on the right.

While there was more or less discouragement, as already shown, in consequence of yesterday's retrograde movement, the army was generally buoyed up with the belief that it was about to fight a great and decisive battle. Captain Candler, aide-de-camp to Hooker, wrote home at 3 a.m.:

. . . Were attacked by Johnny Reb yesterday. Fell back at first to draw him on, then took a position and gave him "fits." Expect the fight to commence again in half an hour. We are all right. They have reënforcements from Richmond, but we can whip them anyway, for they must come out of their works and attack us in our own position. To-day will tell a big tale. God grant we may be successful. Staff and general all sound as yet.

At or about daylight the following movements took place within the Federal lines: Graham's brigade ($\frac{1}{I-III}$) from the rear of Fairview to its division on the Plank Road; Arnold's battery ($\frac{1}{2-II}$) to Chandler's; one section of Pettit's battery ($\frac{1}{I-II}$) from Chandler's to the Irish brigade ($\frac{2}{I-II}$) at Scott's Ford, the remainder of this battery (4 pieces) taking position near Chandler's; Pleasonton's cavalry, with its battery, from

... the ... of ... the 6 N. Y. ... Carroll's brigade ... where it is entrenched ...

[The page contains extremely faint, illegible horizontal bands of text.]

1. The first of these is the fact that the
2. Government has not been able to secure the
3. necessary funds to carry out its policy.
4. This is due to the fact that the
5. Government has not been able to secure the
6. necessary funds to carry out its policy.
7. This is due to the fact that the
8. Government has not been able to secure the
9. necessary funds to carry out its policy.
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11. Government has not been able to secure the
12. necessary funds to carry out its policy.

1. The first step in the process is to identify the problem or issue that needs to be addressed. This involves gathering information and understanding the context of the problem.

2. Once the problem is identified, the next step is to define the objectives and goals of the project. This helps to clarify what needs to be achieved and provides a clear direction for the team.

3. The third step is to develop a plan or strategy to address the problem. This involves breaking down the problem into smaller, manageable tasks and determining the resources needed to complete each task.

4. The fourth step is to implement the plan. This involves putting the strategy into action and monitoring progress regularly to ensure that the project is on track.

5. Finally, the fifth step is to evaluate the results of the project. This involves assessing the outcomes against the objectives and goals to determine the effectiveness of the project and identify areas for improvement.

As already stated, Lee decided to endeavor to turn the Federal right flank with a portion of his army under Jackson while demonstrating against the Federal left and front with the remainder.

To Jackson were assigned the infantry of his three divisions and the 8 S. Ca. of Kershaw's brigade of McLaws' division ($\frac{8}{1.2.1}$),¹ Stuart's three regiments of cavalry, and fractions of two others, the artillery of the II Corps (except Dance's and Hupp's batteries of the corps artillery, and the artillery of Early's division), Alexander's battalion of the corps artillery of the I Corps (except Rhett's and Jordan's batteries and 2 pieces of Parker's battery), and Stuart's 10 pieces of horse artillery, altogether about 31,700 men and 112 pieces of artillery (88 of the II Corps, 14 of the I Corps, and 10 of the cavalry). The following forces were to remain under Lee, confronting the Federal left and front: the infantry of Anderson's division ($\frac{1}{1}$) except Wilcox's brigade, —with Dance's and Hupp's batteries of the corps artillery of the II Corps (8 pieces); the infantry of McLaws' division ($\frac{8}{11}$) except Barksdale's brigade and the 8 S. Ca., —with Manly's and McCarthy's batteries of McLaws' division, Grandy's battery of Anderson's division ($\frac{1}{1}$), and Jordan's, of the corps artillery of the I Corps, each numbering 4 pieces; the 4 and about half of the 3 Va. Cavalry; altogether about 13,000 men with 24 pieces of artillery. Lee thus assigned to his turning force about $\frac{2}{3}$ of his infantry and $\frac{4}{5}$ of his artillery—retaining for demonstration about $\frac{1}{3}$ of his infantry and $\frac{1}{5}$ of his artillery.²

The enemy was astir at an early hour. Between 2:30 a.m. and daylight Wilcox with his brigade and Moore's and Lewis' batteries ($\frac{2.4}{1.1}$) returned to Banks' Ford. Wofford moved to the left, establishing connection with the line in that direction. About daylight Iverson's brigade ($\frac{3}{2.11}$) relieved Ramseur's ($\frac{5}{2.11}$) at the front on the Plank Road. At 7 a.m. Thomas' brigade ($\frac{6}{1.11}$) relieved Posey's ($\frac{2}{1.1}$). The latter with Wright's ($\frac{5}{1.1}$) took position on the left of the Plank Road near Decker(A) (Map 16).

Major Pegram, commanding an artillery battalion of Jackson's corps, was directed to advance as many rifled guns on the road leading from the right of the Confederate line to Chancellorsville as could be used, "for the purpose of shelling the enemy's infantry in the woods." According to Major Pegram this was at 6:30 a.m. But Colonel B. T. Brockman of the 13 S. Ca. says, "the cannon firing opened at 5:16

¹ W. R., 39, p. 832.

² The numbers in each fraction were about as follows:

	INFANTRY	CAVALRY	ARTILLERY	AGGREGATE	PIECES
Under Jackson	28,050	1,450	2,240	31,740	112
“ Lee	11,981	500	480	12,961	24
Total	40,031	1,950	2,720	44,701	136

o'clock."¹ The order was probably received about 5 o'clock. Pursuant thereto Brunson's and McGraw's batteries ($\frac{1}{1} \frac{4}{H}$) were posted between the Plank Road and Turnpike and afterward reinforced with 2 pieces, making a line of 10 pieces. They drew upon themselves the fire of two Federal batteries (Atwell's ($\frac{1}{2} \frac{1}{XII}$) and probably Hampton's ($\frac{2}{2} \frac{1}{XII}$), say 12 pieces). For about twenty minutes they kept up their cannonade, some of the guns shelling the woods while the others engaged the Federal batteries.² A strong line of skirmishers advanced from McLaws' position,³ which together with the fire of the artillery developed the fact that Hooker was still in the vicinity of Chancellorsville and ready at least to defend himself.

In consequence of these and other preliminaries Jackson did not make as early a start as he had intended to. There was some delay in assembling his troops.⁴ Colquitt's brigade took up the march from the vicinity of Aldrich Tavern about 5:30 a.m., proceeded by the Plank Road to Decker(A), and thence, apparently after some further delay, pursued its way westward toward Welford's Furnace. Colonel E. P. Alexander says: "Two hours after sunrise [about 7 a.m.] Lee, standing by the roadside, watched the head of the column march by, and exchanged with Jackson the last few words ever to pass between them."⁵ This was probably in the vicinity of Decker(A).

The infantry was preceded by the 2 Va. Cavalry, and protected on the right by the 1 and 5 Va. Cavalry and part of the 3.⁶ The 4th regiment and the other half of the 3d, under Wickham and Owen, remained behind watching the Federal left. The main column was headed by the Second Division (Rodes'), of which the 4th brigade (Colquitt's) was in front. Behind the Second Division came the Fourth (Colston's), and behind the Fourth the First (A. P. Hill's). In each division the infantry was followed by the artillery and the fighting train, composed of ambulances and ammunition-wagons.⁷ The regimental and main trains went by roads further to the South directed upon Todd's Tavern.⁸ A detail of cavalry was attached to Jackson's staff as couriers: frequent reports were to be sent back to General Lee.⁹

Right Wing from 8 a.m. to 2 p.m. (Map 17)

About 8 a.m. the column commenced crossing the high open ground on the east side of Scott's Run, near Welford's Furnace, and descend-

¹ *W. R.*, 39, pp. 937, 910.

² *Ib.*, 39, pp. 937, 938, 890, 771.

³ *Ib.*, 39, p. 825.

⁴ *Military Memoirs of a Confederate*, by E. P. Alexander, p. 333.


⁵ *Ib.*, p. 329.

⁶ Letters of Colonel T. T. Munford, 2 Va. Cav., to the author.

⁷ *Military Memoirs of a Confederate*, by E. P. Alexander, p. 330.

⁸ *Papers of Mil. Hist. Soc. of Mass.*, V, 371.

⁹ *Johnny Reb and Billy Yank*, by Alexander Hunter, p. 359; *Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War*, by G. F. R. Henderson, II, 532.



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ing therefrom to cross the creek. Here Colquitt, by order of General Jackson, detached from his brigade the 23 Ga. "with instructions to guard the flank of the column in motion against a surprise, and to call, if necessary, upon any officer whose command was passing, for reënforcement."¹ Jackson crossed the Run at the head of his infantry, and declining a breakfast prepared for him at the Furnace, pushed on by the road leading southward. The procession of infantry, artillery, and wagons, rising into the clearing east of Scott's Run and sinking with a southward trend into the woods beyond, was soon observed from General Birney's lookouts in the tops of high trees about Hazel Grove.² Birney ordered up a section (two guns) of Sims' battery ($\frac{1}{I. III}$) and about 10 a.m. had it open fire on the column at a distance of about a mile and a quarter, causing the troops to "double-quick" past the point fired at.³ Sims brought up the rest of his battery and about 11 a.m. opened on a train which was then passing.⁴ In the meantime Turnbull's battery ($\frac{3}{I. II}$) was brought up to Hazel Grove and parked on the edge of the clearing, where it was joined probably about 11:30 by Jastram's battery ($\frac{2}{I. III}$) from the vicinity of Chandler's.⁵

The peppering to which Sims subjected the enemy's column caused some hastening of its movement and perhaps a slight deflection of the line of march from the route over the high open ground to one concealed by the latter.

"Never can I forget," says Hunter McGuire, late medical director of Jackson's corps, "the eagerness and intensity of Jackson on that march to Hooker's rear. His face was pale, his eyes flashing. Out from his thin compressed lips came the terse command: 'Press forward, press forward!' In his eagerness as he rode, he leaned over on the neck of his horse, as if in that way the march might be hurried. 'See that the column is kept closed, and that there is no straggling,' he more than once ordered; and 'Press on, press on!' was repeated again and again. Every man in the ranks knew that we were engaged in some great flank movement, and they eagerly responded and pressed on at a rapid gait."⁶

Regimental commanders were ordered to march in rear of their regiments with a guard of strong men with fixed bayonets to prevent straggling.⁷

¹ *W. R.*, 39, pp. 975, 979.

² There is reason for believing that it was seen also from one or more of the Federal balloons; but it is doubtful whether any report of the fact reached Hooker. A Federal balloon was visible to the Confederates as they marched over the open ground near the Furnace (Letter to the author from Captain Randolph Barton, Baltimore).

³ *W. R.*, 39, pp. 408, 443. "There would be a temporary break in the column, as though it had stopped or was going by

some other route. Sometimes the men and teams would go on the run while passing. That was all. Shortly the column would be moving as before" (*The 27 Indiana Vol. Infantry*, by a member of Company C, p. 318).

⁴ *W. R.*, 39, pp. 404, 443.

⁵ *History of Battery E, 1 R. I. Light Artillery*, by George Lewis, p. 159.

⁶ *Southern Hist. Soc. Papers*, XXV, 110.

⁷ *Histories of the Several Regiments and Battalions from N. Ca. in the Great War*

The roads were wet enough to be easy to the feet and free from dust. The weather was fine, but very warm, at least for a soldier in a marching column, shut in by dense wood on either side. There was suffering for want of water and food.¹

Captain Smith, Jackson's assistant adjutant-general, after starting the last of the heavy trains on the road from Aldrich to Todd's Tavern, proceeded to join his chief at the head of the column. As he slowly and with difficulty forced his horse along the narrow, crowded road past the plodding infantry, he was the target for all the chaff at their command. "Say, here 's one of Old Jack's little boys; let him by, boys! Have a good breakfast this morning, sonny? Better hurry up or you 'll catch it for getting behind. Tell Old Jack we 're all a-comin'. Don't let him begin the fuss till we get there!" and so on.²

At a little after 9 o'clock Hooker had completed the inspection of his lines. Returning to his headquarters, he found waiting there couriers from General Birney, who informed him that a column of the enemy was visible moving continuously across his front toward the right, accompanied by trains, guns, and ambulances, and had been visible since 8 o'clock. From his tent Hooker caught sight of one portion of Jackson's column after another coming up on the divide near the Brick House, saw it sink into the valley of Scott's Run, and reappear on high open ground, going southward down the Run. This southward turn was suggestive of a march on Richmond. However, after watching the movement awhile, he spread a map on his bed and carefully studied it, soliloquizing, says J. Watts de Peyster, somewhat thus: "It can't be retreat; retreat without a fight? That is not Lee. If not retreat, what is it? Lee is trying to flank me." For the first time, it seems, he considered the possibility of Lee's attacking him, not on his, but on Lee's own ground. His recent inspection had revealed to him that his position, though strong in front, was weak on the extreme right. To remedy this defect, he sent the following dispatch:

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, Saturday, May 2, 9:30 a.m., 1863.

TO GENERAL HOWARD.

General:

I am directed by the Major-General commanding to say the disposition you have made of your corps has been with a view to a *front* attack by the enemy. If he should throw himself upon your flank, he wishes you to examine the ground, and determine upon the position you will take in that event, in order that you may be prepared for him in whatever direction he advances.

1861-5, by W. Clark, I, 191. According to Lieutenant-Colonel Henderson, "all stragglers were to be bayoneted" (*Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War*, II, 532).

¹ "Many," says the colonel of the 27

Ga., "fell out of ranks exhausted, some fainting and having spasms; only a few had eaten anything since the morning before" (*W. R.*, 39, p. 981).

² J. P. Smith, in *B. and L.*, III, 205, 206.

He suggests that you have heavy reserves well in hand to meet this contingency.

J. H. VAN ALLEN,

Brig. General and A. D. C.

We have good reason to suppose that the enemy is moving to our right. Please advance your pickets for purposes of observation as far as may be safe in order to obtain timely information of their approach.¹

Hooker thus protected himself, as he thought, against an attack in flank. He did not know, as he should have known, that his right flank was more than 2 miles from the Rapidan, and that there was practically nothing in the interval to cover his communications. So he did nothing for the safety of the latter. His problem, as he now viewed it, was to meet an attack in front or flank or both. Had he risen to the occasion, he would have made Lee look to his own security. Rather than accept his present situation, he would have recognized the fault that he committed in assuming the defensive, and have put forth his whole strength offensively. At 9:30, when he sent his message to Howard, he wrote to Butterfield:

The General Commanding desires you to instruct General Sedgwick, if an opportunity presents itself with a reasonable expectation of success, to attack the enemy in his front. We have reliable information that all the divisions known to us as having belonged to the army at Fredericksburg except Ewell's [Early's] are in this vicinity. It is impossible for the general to determine here whether it is expedient for him [Sedgwick] to attack or not. It must be left to his discretion.

It is to be observed that Sedgwick's attack as above prescribed was to be a real, not a pretended one. Hooker was now aware that Sedg-

¹ I am indebted for the text of this document to H. M. Kellog, Esq., of Cortland, N. Y., who copied it from the original while on duty as clerk at Howard's headquarters on the 30th of June, 1863. Until then, nearly two months after the campaign of Chancellorsville, and forty-eight hours after the departure of General Hooker from the Army of the Potomac, no record of this order had been made in the *Letters Received* book of the XI Corps (Affidavit of H. M. Kellog, in *The Battles of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg*, by Captain A. H. Nelson, p. 36). The original has disappeared from the files of the War Department, and can not be found. A dispatch of the same import, but addressed: "Major-Generals Howard and Slocum," is given in the *War Records* (40, p. 360). It is taken from Hooker's *Letters Sent* book, in which the order is annotated in red ink: "Copy furnished General Howard." An-

other document of the same import, but marked "Circular" and addressed: "Major-General Slocum and Major-General Howard," is given in the *Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War* (IV, 126). It is presumably this one that is given as addressed to "Major-Generals Slocum and Howard," in *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War* (III, 219). Howard received two copies of this dispatch a short time apart. They made so little impression on him that he afterward denied having ever received them (Carl Schurz in *B. and L.*, III, 220, and in *McClure's Magazine*, June, 1907; and Howard in *B. and L.*, III, 196). In his *Autobiography* (1907) Howard neither denies nor admits having received this order. In 1874 Hooker wrote with reference to Howard: "His offence to me was forgotten when he acknowledged it" (Letter to General W. G. Le Duc, Feb. 24).

the Turnpike; Jordan's, Dance's, and Hupp's ($\frac{2}{1}$, $\frac{2.4}{11}$) with Lee on the Plank Road.

McLaws had orders from Lee to "hold his position, as General Jackson would operate to the left and rear, . . . not to engage seriously, but to press strongly as soon as it was discovered that General Jackson had attacked."¹ As the troops between Semmes' brigade and the Plank Road marched off to follow Jackson, Kershaw's brigade came into the front line and, together with Semmes' and the artillery, occupied the space between the Plank Road and the Turnpike. Lee on the left and McLaws on the right, each had 8 pieces of artillery in position and 4 in reserve. Lee's 8 were posted by Major Hardaway, Anderson's chief of artillery, as follows: 2 pieces on the Plank Road, 2 on a road further to the left leading into the Plank Road, and 4 distributed along the Welford's Furnace Road at intervals of about 400 yards to command the hollows leading into Scott's Run. McLaws' 8 ($\frac{3.4}{2.1}$) were posted between Semmes' and Wofford's brigades on the left of the Turnpike. His reserve battery ($\frac{1}{1.1}$) had been withdrawn on account of the pieces not having sufficient range.²

About 11 o'clock Sickles received several reports in quick succession from Birney to the effect that a column of the enemy was moving toward the Federal right. He consequently, with Hooker's approval, joined Birney at Hazel Grove. The movements of the enemy indicated to Sickles a retreat on Gordonsville or an attack upon the Federal right flank—perhaps both, for if the attack failed, the retreat might be carried out. Sickles hastened to report the movement through staff officers to Hooker, and proposed that he use his whole corps in following up the enemy and attacking his columns. He communicated the substance of this message to Howard on his right and to Slocum on his left, inviting their coöperation in case Hooker should accede to this proposition. About noon Hooker sent him orders to "advance cautiously toward the road, followed by the enemy, and harass the movement as much as possible,"³ with Birney's and Whipple's divisions ($\frac{1.3}{111}$), but refused to let him have Berry's ($\frac{2}{111}$). Hooker's dispatch of 9:30 a.m. reached Howard a little after 12. Howard in the meantime had sent the following dispatch, which reached Hooker about 11:30:

Headquarters 11th Corps, May 2, 10 m. to 11 o'clock [10:50 a.m.].

MAJ. GEN. HOOKER, Com'd'g Army.

General:

From Gen. Devens' headquarters [Taylor] we can observe a column of infantry moving westward on a road parallel with this on a ridge about $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 m. south of this. I am taking measures to resist an attack from the west.

Respectfully,

O. O. HOWARD,
Maj. Gen.

¹ *W. R.*, 39, pp. 825, 826.

² *Ib.*, 39, p. 883.

³ *Ib.*, 39, p. 386.

The distance of the column referred to, from Devens' headquarters, was 2 miles or more.¹ What these "measures to resist an attack from the west" consisted in, Hooker could only conjecture. He probably conceived them to be a refusal of Howard's right, and pictured to himself a division or more of this corps thrown back and prolonged toward the Rapidan. All that was done, so far as can be learned, was to place the reserve artillery, as it arrived, in position facing west (Map 17)² and to send Captain Castle of the Signal Corps toward the west to watch the movements of the enemy.³ This was about 11 o'clock. The captain established a station in the vicinity of von Gilsa's line on the extreme right. About noon Lieutenant Keen opened a signal station at Dowdall's Tavern (Howard's headquarters) to communicate with Castle. These two stations were in communication with each other until about 6 o'clock this evening, when, as we shall see, the movements of the enemy broke them up.⁴


About noon the 26 Pa. was withdrawn from its forward position on the Plank Road and returned to its brigade ($\frac{1}{2}$ III), leaving the 11 Mass. of the same brigade on the Turnpike, cooperating with Hancock's advance skirmishers under Colonel Nelson A. Miles of the 61 N. Y. Volunteers.

At noon Sickles received Hooker's order for harassing the enemy. He brought up two battalions of sharpshooters under Colonel Berdan to be deployed as skirmishers and as flankers, so as to get all possible knowledge of the enemy's movements and of the approaches to his line of march; he communicated again with Slocum and Howard, and was assured of their prompt cooperation;⁵ and hastily ordered Birney "to follow the enemy, pierce the column, and gain possession of the road over which it was passing."⁶ About 12:30 Hayman's brigade ($\frac{1}{2}$ III),⁷ covered in front and on both flanks with skirmishers from Berdan's and his own, pushed across Scott's Run, heading for the point on the road which had been reached by the fire of the artillery. Jackson's corps artillery, followed by its ammunition-train and other trains, was now passing the Furnace. Orders were sent back for the rear portion of the column to take the road which turns south at a point east of the Furnace and joins the Furnace Road beyond the Welford House. Birney's battery of four 12-pounder Napoleons ($\frac{1}{2}$ II) was taken out of the column. One piece was hastily thrust out to the right with orders to fire one charge and retire, thus giving time for the other pieces to take position on a hill south of the railroad cut. The single piece fired one round of canister, double-shotted, from the right of the road,

¹ *Ib.*, 39, p. 386.

² *Ib.*, 39, p. 408.

³ Except the 37 N. Y., which remained between Birney's right and Howard's left.



and fell back to join the other three pieces, which in the meantime had taken position at Welford's House. This was about 2 p.m.

The 23 Ga. ($\frac{23}{4.2. II}$), covering the flank of Jackson's column, had not suffered from the Federal artillery, which had aimed only at the column; it was therefore quite fresh, but it was altogether too weak to resist the force directed upon the Furnace. Lee had directed Anderson to send a brigade to resist the further progress of the Federal column. Anderson about noon sent Posey's ($\frac{2}{I. I}$) with orders to dislodge the enemy.¹ About 1 p.m. its pickets were driven in. Its skirmishers, however, delivered such an effective fire that Birney had to order up Graham's brigade ($\frac{1}{I. III}$) to the support of Hayman's. At the same time Sickles ordered Whipple's division to come within supporting distance of Birney's. Best soon perceived that he was greatly outnumbered and would not be able to maintain his position. So, leaving about 40 men as rear-guard, he withdrew about 2 p.m. with the remainder of the regiment toward the cut of the unfinished railroad.

At the time of Birney's advance against the Furnace (12:30-1 p.m.) the fraction of the 3 Va. Cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel Carter was on picket duty at the Furnace. Carter himself carried to the rear of Jackson's column a report that the train was attacked and in danger of being captured. A similar report was sent to Lee's headquarters. As a consequence the 14 Ga. of Thomas' brigade was sent back "to the assistance of the artillery-train,"² and Wright's brigade ($\frac{5}{I. I}$) started from the Plank Road toward the Furnace to support Posey. About the same time Ward's brigade ($\frac{2}{I. III}$) moved out to support Hayman's and Graham's brigades, and Whipple's division ($\frac{3}{III}$) commenced arriving at Hazel Grove as reserve.³

Jackson's column kept moving on. The cavalry guarding its right flank had here and there come in sight of Federal pickets and patrols, and generally maintained toward them an attitude of observation or defence. The advance-guard had not met a hostile soldier when about 1 p.m., as it approached the Orange Plank Road, the 2 Va. Cavalry, still leading the way, caught sight of a Federal vidette, who quickly disappeared. On reaching the Plank Road, the Confederate cavalry turned to the right and followed the road as far as Hickman's place, where it dismounted to rest.⁴ Soon afterward one squadron went further down the road, and meeting a picket of Federal cavalry, dislodged it and pursued it some distance, returning thereupon to Hickman's. The officer commanding this detachment reported to Colonel Munford that

¹ *W. R.*, 39, pp. 798, 851, 871. This brigade left one regiment (48 Miss.) behind as skirmishers, which reduced it to three regiments.

² *Ib.*, 39, p. 913.

³ Two pieces of Lewis' battery of this division remained, it seems, in the vicinity of Chancellorsville (*W. R.*, 39, p. 726).

⁴ The name *Wolstry* on the map, near Hickman's, should read *Wolfrey*.

the railroad cut, where it arrived and established itself about 2:30 p.m. It had in the meantime been joined by two companies of the 14 Tenn. and perhaps two companies of the 7 Tenn., which had been marching to overtake the columns and had turned back from some point southwest of Welford's House, before reaching the column, to assist in protecting the train.¹ About 3 p.m. the 14 Ga., marching back from Thomas' brigade, took position on the left of the main Furnace Road, at the point where a road comes into it from the north, to prevent the Federals from cutting off the rear of the column by that road. Hayman's and Graham's brigades ($\frac{3.1}{1.111}$) started to go past the Furnace in pursuit of the retiring 23 Ga., which brought them under a galling fire of musketry poured into their flanks by Posey's brigade, and the fire of Brooke's battery ($\frac{1}{11}$) at Welford's House. This caused them to halt and wait for artillery to engage that of the enemy. Birney ordered Sims' battery ($\frac{1}{1.111}$) to move to the Furnace. But the chief of artillery of the corps disapproved of moving it on account of its being already in position, and sent an order to the chief of artillery of the division to send one of the other two batteries to the front. Turnbull's battery ($\frac{3}{1.111}$) went forward with the guns and limbers only, the caissons being left behind.

About 3:30 p.m. the last regiment of Birney's division on Howard's left ($\frac{37}{3.1.111}$) moved out to join its brigade.

Wright's brigade, on arrival, took position on Posey's right; its place on the left of the Plank Road was taken by Mahone's brigade ($\frac{1}{1.1}$). While Turnbull's battery was coming up, the Federal skirmishers developed Best's position in the railroad cut.

About 2:45 p.m. Sickles sent word to Hooker that it was practicable to gain the road by which the enemy was marching and break his column, adding that, as he must expect to encounter a heavy force and stubborn resistance, and bearing in mind Hooker's admonition to move cautiously, he would not advance until the support from the XI and XII Corps closed up on Birney's right and left.² At the same time he wrote to Howard and to Slocum:

I am advancing a strong line of two brigades to ascertain whether the enemy is retreating. General Birney reports that he has reached a brigade of the enemy in rifle-pits, posted, as I think, to cover the retreating column. I will attack if the enemy is not stronger than the reports so far represent him, and occupy the road by which he is retreating.

Please support my advance.

This message was received by Howard at 3 p.m. Slocum received his at 3:30. The latter referred the matter to Hooker. Howard replied that he had no troops to spare.

¹ W. R., 39, pp. 934, 929.

² *Ib.*, 39, pp. 386, 387.

duties that were to devolve on him. He said that the impression was that the enemy was retreating, and that the cavalry was to charge through his lines, open communication with Sedgwick, and harass the rear of the enemy's column; that the 8 Pa. would take the advance, and he would follow with the remainder of the brigade, including Martin's horse battery.

About 4 p.m. Howard received an order from Hooker to send a brigade to the support of Sickles' corps. He at once went forward, accompanied by von Steinwehr with Barlow's brigade ($\frac{3}{1. XI}$), except the two companies of the 33 Mass., left on the road to Ely's Ford. The men left their knapsacks stacked in their camp.

Let us now look at Howard's dispositions in detail. His First Division, commanded by Devens, comprised two brigades, an unattached company of the 8 N. Y., and one battery of six guns. The 1st brigade (von Gilsa's) numbers four regiments, the 2d (McLean's) numbers five. Von Gilsa's brigade was on the right with two regiments, and two companies of another regiment, thrown back at right angles to the Pike, the men standing about three feet apart, or one to every five feet, and covered only by a slashing of small trees and bushes. In the angle on the road two guns were posted to enfilade the road, which here passed through dense wood. About 1000 yards out on the Turnpike was a picket formed of two bodies of sharpshooters, each of about the strength of a company, one on each side of the Turnpike,—the whole without support. On the left of the 1st brigade was the 2d, with three regiments in the front line and two, the 75 O. and 25 O., in support; the former regiment was well in rear of the 2d brigade, with instructions to act as reserve for the 1st brigade, if necessary.¹ On the left of the First Division, about half a mile from the two guns already mentioned, were the other four guns of the battery trained on the Plank Road. In the vicinity of the Taylor House, division headquarters, was the flag and torch station communicating with Howard's headquarters at Dowdall's Tavern. Next to the First Division was the Third, commanded by Schurz. It had the same organization as Devens'. The 1st brigade (five regiments) was in line connecting with Devens' left, with two regiments (82 Ill., 157 N. Y.) in second line. Of the other brigade (four regiments) one regiment (119 N. Y.) was in line somewhat in advance of the other regiments; one (75 Pa.) was on picket, and two (26 Wisc., 58 N. Y.) were on a road leading to Ely's Ford facing west, and covered, like von Gilsa's brigade, with slight abatis. An unattached regiment of this division (82 O.) stood in rear and to the left of these two regi-

Devin, *ib.*, p. 781; Martin, *ib.*, p. 786; Huey, *ib.*, p. 784, and *Charge of the 8 Pa. at Chancellorsville*, p. 12; *The Battle of*

Chancellorsville, by A. C. Hamlin, p. 51; and *B. and L.*, III, 183-185.

¹ *Trials and Triumphs*, by Hartwell Osborn, p. 64.

Turnpike Road was at the same time the only line of communication we had between the different parts of our front."¹

The danger gathering about the Federal right flank should have been well known to Howard and to Hooker. Captain Castle, from his signal station on Howard's right, sighted the enemy's column, and reported the fact to Howard. He stated subsequently that his information was not credited, and that no attention was paid to it.² Between 11 and 12 o'clock there had been skirmishing along the line of McLean's brigade ($\frac{2}{1. XI}$) caused by aggressions of Confederate cavalry. The pickets of Devens' division ($\frac{1}{XI}$) brought in two men who stated that they had been sent out from another portion of the line as scouts, and that the enemy was moving in great force upon the Federal right flank. They were immediately sent to corps headquarters, under charge of a trusty sergeant, with orders that, after reporting to General Howard, they should at once proceed to the headquarters of the major-general commanding the army.³

Several reconnaissances, made by a small body of cavalry placed at Devens' disposal, discovered early in the afternoon bodies of the enemy's cavalry moving upon his right. In one case the party was fired on, and the fact was immediately reported by its commanding officer to the corps commander.⁴ General Schimmelfennig, commanding Schurz's 1st brigade, made several reconnaissances in his front and in front of General Devens' division, especially on the Plank Road and through the wooded country south of it. These reconnaissances made with infantry, in bodies not larger than a regiment, were necessarily confined to a narrow zone, but they brought the fact to light that there were hostile skirmishers at a distance of from 1½ to 2 miles in considerable number. The enemy's column which had been observed marching westward had disappeared, but reports from Hooker's headquarters indicated that it was harassed by Sickles in flank and rear. Sickles' artillery, too, was heard, but not for long, and when it ceased it seemed to Schurz and others that Sickles' operation had been checked or given up. But Devens and Howard continued to believe that it was progressing successfully. Devens was lying down resting at the Taylor House. About 1 o'clock, and again about 2, Colonel Lee, commanding the 55 O. of Devens' 2d brigade, came to his headquarters with a messenger from the picket line, who reported that the enemy was moving with infantry and artillery across the front of the division to its right flank. Devens said that he had no information to that effect from

¹ *McClure's Magazine*, June, 1907, p. 164.

² *W. R.*, 39, p. 231; *History of the Army of the Potomac*, by J. H. Stine, p. 350.

³ *W. R.*, 39, p. 958.

⁴ Devens' report, *ib.*, 39, p. 633. There

seems to be no reason to doubt that the two men sent by Devens to corps and army headquarters saw both Howard and Hooker.

corps headquarters, and that he certainly would have had if the reported movement were a fact. It is doubtful whether he sent the report to corps headquarters.¹ Colonel Friend, his officer of the day, came to him from the pocket line and reported that a large force of the enemy was passing to his rear, but Devens refused to give credit to the report. Friend then went to the headquarters of the corps, where he was rebuked for his statement, and warned not to bring on a panic. He returned to the pocket line, and again at 2 p.m. went to corps headquarters and was called a coward, and ordered to his regiment, with the remark that the enemy was retreating.² Von Gilsa, commanding the 1st brigade, and Schurz, commanding the Third Division, as well as many of the regimental commanders, apprehended danger. Acting Major Owen Rice of the 153 Pa., in command of von Gilsa's pocket line, sent in the following message:

On Skirmish Line, on Culpeper Road, 2:45 p.m.

Colonel L. von Gilsa, Commanding 1st Brig., 1st Div., 11th Army Corps:

A large body of the enemy is massing in my front. For God's sake, make disposition to receive him!

OWEN RICE,

Act. Maj. 153 P. V.

Von Gilsa himself carried this dispatch to Howard, and was repulsed with taunts and the dictum that no force could penetrate the outlying thickets.³

At 3 p.m. Major Schleiter was sent with the 74 Pa. ($\frac{1}{A\ XI}$) on a reconnaissance up the Plank Road, with instructions from Howard's headquarters to avoid everything that might bring on an engagement. He returned with the information that the enemy was massed for an attack, and was sent by Schurz to report the same to Howard. He made his report to Howard's staff—Howard being absent—and was laughed at, and told not to be alarmed, for the corps commander had gone forward with Barlow's brigade to join Birney and capture some regiments.

Captain Dilger, commanding a battery in Howard's corps, went out with an orderly on the exposed flank to reconnoiter. He ran into Jackson's column advancing, and was pursued by some of his cavalry, narrowly escaping capture. Making his way by the rear of the XI Corps to Hooker's headquarters, he reported the result of his reconnaissance, and was told to go to his corps and tell his yarn there. At Howard's headquarters he was told that General Lee was in full retreat, and that

¹ *The Battle of Chancellorsville*, by A. C. Hamlin, pp. 58, 144; *Trials and Triumphs*, by Hartwell Osborn, p. 69.

² *The Battle of Chancellorsville*, by A. C. Hamlin, pp. 55, 145.

³ *Publications of Loyal Legion, Ohio Commandery*, 1888, I, 379.

Barlow's brigade, accompanied by the corps commander, had gone out to fall upon his rear.¹

As Jackson's column proceeded across the Orange Plank Road Paxton's (Stonewall) brigade ($\frac{1}{4}$ II) and Moody's and Parker's batteries of Alexander's battalion ($\frac{3}{4}$ I) were detached from it and posted at Hickman's under the command of Fitzhugh Lee to support the two squadrons of cavalry at Burton in covering the marching columns. With the exception of these two squadrons and the 2 Va., still at the head of Jackson's column, the brigade of cavalry was scattered along the line of march as flank guards.

By 2:30 p.m. Jackson's leading regiment of infantry, the 5 Ala., had reached the Turnpike, followed it eastward to the vicinity of Luckett, and proceeded to form for attack about 6 miles from its starting-point in the morning, having marched about 12 miles.

Hooker had quite recovered from his apprehension of the morning, and was bent upon following the retreating enemy. The following circular letter was sent to the corps commanders:

Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
May 2, 2:30 p.m., 1863.

General:

The Major-Gen. Com'g desires that you replenish your supplies of forage, provisions, and ammunition to be ready to start at an early hour to-morrow.

Your obdt. servant,

J. H. VAN ALLEN,

Brig. Genl. & A. D. C.²

¹ These particulars are deduced from statements some of which do not quite agree. See *The Battle of Chancellorsville*, by A. C. Hamlin, Chapter VI, and notes 7 and 8, pp. 143, 144; also Schurz's report, *W. R.*, 39, p. 654.

An eminent authority says: "It is passing strange that in spite of incessant reports of Jackson's advance, and the fact that two deserters came in about 2 p.m. and were sent to General Howard's headquarters, who confirmed the reports of our scouts, and gave all details of the movement, Howard nevertheless left his command at 4 p.m. to accompany Barlow's brigade. Nor did he keep Hooker informed of the reports received. General Howard speaks in the *National Tribune* of the pickets he threw out, but in every case they seem to have been sent out by his subordinates without his knowledge; in other words, all knowledge of Jackson's movements was obtained by independent scouts.

When they reported to Howard, it would seem from regimental histories that he wholly disapproved of these expeditions. He said that he 'commanded the corps, and his subordinates were usurping his functions' (Doubleday). See also *The 25 Ohio Volunteer Infantry*, by E. C. Culp, p. 63.

Howard's purpose in accompanying Barlow was "to examine the ground between his left and Sickles, thinking that if the battle became general in that quarter he might have to move his entire corps to the support of Sickles." Having attained this purpose, he returned at a gallop to his headquarters at Dowdall's Tavern (Captain Hartwell Osborn, *Military Order Loyal Legion, Commandery of Illinois*, IV).

² I am indebted for this document to Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel G. A. Bruce, author of *The 20th Regiment Mass. Vol. Infantry*.

As this message was going out Jackson arrived at Luckett's and sent the following dispatch to Lee:

Near 3 p.m., May 2, 1863.

General:

The enemy has made a stand at Chancellors [Dowdall's Tavern], which is about 2 miles from Chancellorsville. I hope as soon as practicable to attack.

I trust that an ever-kind Providence will bless us with great success.

Respectfully,

T. J. JACKSON,

Lt. Gen.

P.S. The leading division is up, and the next two appear to be well closed.

T. J. J.¹

The wording of this dispatch can hardly be explained without the assumption of former dispatches sent back by Jackson to R. E. Lee, representing the Federals as falling back. It seems to confirm the intimation given in the preceding chapter that Jackson believed the Federal right flank to lie somewhere in the angle formed by the Orange Plank Road and the Brock Road.

About 4 p.m. the Confederate videttes showed themselves to von Gilsa's picket, and were fired on by the latter. This occurrence, which was signaled to Howard's headquarters, brought on a brief skirmish in which the two guns with von Gilsa's brigade participated by firing their two charges without orders.² Howard had no suspicion of danger.

The following message went to Butterfield at 4:10 p.m.:

The Major-General commanding directs that General Sedgwick cross the river as soon as indications will permit; capture Fredericksburg with everything in it, and vigorously pursue the enemy. We know that the enemy is fleeing, trying to save his trains. Two of Sickles' divisions are among them.

Again he does not say in what direction the enemy is to be pursued, from which we may infer that by pursuing the enemy he means marching on Hanover Junction, or Richmond. It would appear that he did not himself believe everything that he said in this dispatch, but felt justified in sending it as a means of hastening Sedgwick's movements. He could not have known that Sickles was among the enemy's trains, as Sickles never was among them. But he probably believed that the movement observed and reported by Sickles indicated the retreat of a portion of Lee's army, and hoped that by the time his dispatch would reach Sedgwick the retreat would be converted into a rout.³ At this

¹ Dabney's *Life of Jackson*, p. 679; *B. and L.*, III, 206.

² These particulars are also deduced from conflicting statements. See report

of Signal Officer, *W. R.*, 39, p. 231; reports of Generals Devens and Schurz, *ib.*, pp. 634, 654.

³ Referring to a report from Sickles on

time "there was a general feeling in the army that Lee's army was running away."¹ Late in the afternoon, probably about 4:20, a party of cavalry went out on the Pike, but soon returned, and the captain in command reported to Devens at the Taylor House that he could go but "a little ways," as he met a large body of infantry. Devens replied impatiently: "I wish I could get some one who could make a reconnaissance for me." The captain replied: "General, I can go further, but I can not promise to return." The cavalry was ordered to bivouac.²

Jackson formed his available force in three lines perpendicular to the Turnpike and extending about a mile on each side of it. In the first line he deployed the Second Division, except Ramseur's brigade ($\frac{5}{2-11}$), which was to form in the second line. He gave Colquitt ($\frac{4}{2-11}$) the right, Iverson ($\frac{3}{2-11}$) the left,³ Doles ($\frac{2}{2-11}$) the right center, and O'Neal ($\frac{1}{2-11}$) the left center. This line was covered with sharpshooters deployed as skirmishers about 400 yards to the front, and charged with preventing communication with the enemy.⁴ The second line was formed of the Fourth Division (Trimble's command by Colston), except Paxton's (1st) brigade, which had been detached, and Nicholls' (4th),⁵ which formed by mistake in the third line. To the right of the second line Ramseur's brigade ($\frac{5}{2-11}$) was formed in support of Colquitt's ($\frac{4}{2-11}$), overlapping it by the front of one regiment.⁶ To the left of the first and second lines the 23 N. Ca. of Iverson's brigade ($\frac{3}{2-11}$) was formed as flankers in column of route, with skirmishers on its left.

which the dispatch was based, he testified a year later before the Committee on the Conduct of the War: "At the time this news [that the enemy was retreating] was received by me, I was of the impression that the general was mistaken, but nevertheless felt that no harm could follow from its transmission to General Sedgwick."

¹ Warren's testimony, *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 45.

² *The Battle of Chancellorsville*, by A. C. Hamlin, pp. 60, 145. The cavalry is called a squadron, and a few lines further on is referred to as a squad (p. 60). It was probably a small company.

³ Iverson had left his skirmishers, say one regiment, behind when he started on the march in the morning, and was not rejoined by them until late at night (*W. R.*, 39, p. 984).


⁴ "Jackson's orders were carried out so accurately by these men [on the skirmish line] that although over ten thousand men rested on their arms for two hours or more within a mile of the Army of the Potomac, not a man deserted or escaped to give warn-

ing of the coming storm" (*The Battle of Chancellorsville*, by A. C. Hamlin, p. 16).

⁵ The distance of the second line from the first is given by Colston, commanding the second line, as about 200 yards; Colonel H. A. Brown, commanding a regiment in Colston's brigade ($\frac{4}{11}$), and Brigadier-General Ramseur, commanding the brigade on the right of Colston's division, give it as about 100 yards (*W. R.*, 39, pp. 1004, 1032, 995).

Hamlin in his *Battle of Chancellorsville* (p. 16) gives it as about 100 paces. Hotchkiss and Allan give it as 200 yards (*Chancellorsville*, by H. and A., p. 47). It was probably about 150 yards.

⁶ The distance of this brigade in rear of the first line is given by its commander, General Ramseur, as about 100 yards. According to Rodes, commanding the first line, Ramseur's brigade was formed about 100 yards from the first line and in continuation of the second. It may be assumed to be in the second line or about 150 yards in rear of the first.



CHAPTER XX

MAY 2 (CONTINUED) . . . JACKSON'S ATTACK. SICKLES' NIGHT ATTACK

5 to 6:10 p.m. (Map 18)

AT 5 o'clock Jackson inquired of Rodes at the Lockett Farm: "Are you ready?" "Yes," Rodes replied, and nodded to Major Blackford, commanding his sharpshooters, or line of skirmishers. The mass in rear of the skirmishers was soon in motion, the center following the Turnpike; but on account of the command not being promptly transmitted to the skirmishers on the left, these failed to advance, and the first line, coming up on them, caused some confusion. This necessitated a general halt to straighten out the lines and allow the skirmishers to gain their distance to the front.¹ About 5:15 the lines moved silently forward again, and buried themselves in the depth of the forest; in a moment—so close had they been to the enemy—their skirmishers were engaged by the sharpshooters of the XI Corps on the Turnpike. Silence and secrecy were now discarded. For a mile on either side of the Turnpike the bugles rang out clear and loud in the evening air, and a mighty roar of human voices shook the forest, starting the deer and other animals from their lairs. As swiftly as the dense brushwood would permit, the first line pushed forward, followed by the second and third. The men had their clothing almost torn from their bodies, but still the lines swept on in tolerable order and with great enthusiasm. The Federal picket fell rapidly back, firing and giving the alarm to the forces in rear. The two pieces of Stuart's artillery in the first line galloped well out to the front and fired two shots which went whizzing down the Pike and finally struck the ground in front of the Taylor House. The guns that had fired were then passed by others ready to fire. Breathed, commanding the artillery at the front, was directed to advance with the infantry, "keeping a few yards in rear of the line of skirmishers."

¹ Authorities differ as to the hour when Jackson advanced to the attack. Rodes gives it as 5:15, Colston as "6 o'clock precisely," Hill as "about 6 p.m." (*W. R.*, 39, pp. 941, 1004, 885). Colonel Vandeventer, commanding Jones' brigade (²/₄ II), gives it as 4 p.m. The other brigade commanders of Jackson's corps who make any mention


of it give it as 5 or 5:30. Hotchkiss and Allan say, "Just before 6 o'clock." Captain Poland, chief of staff of the Federal III Corps, gives it as about 3 p.m., and Colonel Brooke, commanding Hancock's 4th brigade, as about 4 p.m. A. C. Hamlin gives it as about 5 p.m. (*Battle of Chancellorsville*, p. 65).

This he could not do, on account of the narrowness of the road and its obstruction by fallen trees and other obstacles. He was able, however, to keep up an almost continual fire from one or two guns.¹ Howard's troops with "stacked arms" were preparing their evening meal and making themselves comfortable for the night. They had time, however, to seize their guns, take their places in ranks, and occupy the positions assigned them.² Colonel Lee, commanding the 55 O., mounted his horse and galloped to the right, where he found von Gilsa ready to receive the attack, but not aware of the extent of Jackson's front. He rode thence to the Taylor House and found Devens mounted and uncertain as to what to do; and there was no one to tell him, his corps commander having just left Barlow's brigade, about 2 miles away, to return to the corps. Lee asked permission to change front with his regiment. "Not yet," was the reply, and he galloped to the right of his regiment, where he found it raked by the fire of the artillery and infantry coming down the Pike. The two regiments of von Gilsa in the road, exposed to the same fire, began to break. Lee again rode at the top of his speed to Devens, and asked permission to change front. After some time he was dismissed with a wave of the hand. The enemy marched steadily on, and Doles' brigade ($\frac{2}{2, 11}$) encountered von Gilsa's. The front which the latter presented facing the enemy was something of a surprise to him. From the Burton hilltop Jackson had observed Schurz's and von Steinwehr's divisions and part of Devens', but had not seen von Gilsa's little brigade, hidden by the trees, on the extreme right of the Federal line.³ Two of Doles' regiments were detached: one by the right, against the two regiments parallel to the Turnpike; one by the left, against and around the outer flank of the face perpendicular to it. The other two regiments assailed the latter in front (Sketch 2). Von Gilsa's two pieces of artillery fired several times, and seeing that resistance was useless, tried to limber up and retreat. But before they could do so the horses were shot down and the pieces captured. The two regiments facing south, exposed to a withering fire in front, flank, and rear, broke up without firing a shot. About half of them formed in rear of the two regiments facing down the Pike. The joint force of about three regiments stood its ground long enough to fire three rounds and went to pieces. Having run about 400 yards, they came upon the 75 O., which had changed front and moved up to von Gilsa's assistance. A few attached themselves to this regiment, which now confronted two brigades of the enemy and Stuart's two guns on the Pike, the latter playing upon it with canister. For ten minutes this single regiment with its few rallied supports attempted to breast the fiery tide. Its colonel was killed, its adjutant wounded, and 150 of its rank and file struck down.

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 1050.



² J. Watts de Peyster, A. C. Hamlin.

³ A. C. Hamlin in *Stories of Our Soldiers*, collected by the *Boston Journal*, pp. 34, 38.



SHOWING JACKSON'S ATTACK
About 5.30 p. m. May 1

Green Federal



Red Confederate

The survivors retreated to a new line formed by the 25, 55, and 107 O., supported by the 17 Conn., in the vicinity of the Taylor House. This position was soon enveloped by three brigades of the enemy and subjected to a rapid fire of canister at short range.

Howard had got back to his headquarters before a sound or other indication of the conflict had reached it. "There was no news for me," he says, "except what the scouts brought, and what General Devens had frequently reported, that Lee's columns had been crossing the Plank Road obliquely, between 2 and 3 miles ahead, and apparently aiming toward Orange Court-House. Had I then been familiar with the routes as I am now, I should have distrusted the conclusion. . . . It was already 6 o'clock. Hearing the sound of a skirmish toward Devens' position, I mounted with my staff and rode toward a high ridge."¹

There on the Taylor height he saw the startled game scampering and scurrying across the fields, and then his disordered and disheartened men with their shooting and yelling pursuers, who, on every side, came swarming out of the thickets which Howard had pronounced to be impenetrable. "It was a terrible gale. The rush, the rattle, the quick lightning from a hundred points at once; the roar redoubled by echoes through the forest; the panic, the dead and dying in sight, and the wounded straggling along; the frantic efforts of the brave and patriotic to stay the angry storm."² The hapless commander exerted himself bravely to check these disastrous consequences of his own neglect and disregard of orders. Lieutenant-Colonel Dickinson of Hooker's staff urged him to direct a fire upon the fleeing mass, but he replied: "I will never fire on my own men." Putting away his revolver, he took up a national color and held it against his heart with the stump of his lost arm. Captain Dessauer, another staff officer, fell by his side. His own horse reared and fell with him, but without doing him any serious injury. After a hopeless struggle of ten or fifteen minutes the fragments of his line retreated rapidly and tumultuously toward the Wilderness Church. Devens' four pieces of artillery lately at the Taylor House were taken in flank and rear, and before they could get away, were all captured. They had not fired a shot. Von Steinwehr, as he returned from the Furnace, dropped behind Howard, and at 6:10 p.m. was still on his way to the corps, but he knew from the sound of the firing that the corps was attacked. Schurz had given way before Jackson's left wing, and was falling back on the woods in rear of Hawkins' Farm. The reserve artillery was waiting for its front to be cleared to open fire. In about one hour Jackson had wrecked Devens' division and gained possession of the first point of vantage, the elevation on which stood Taylor's Farm, and of Howard's second line of defence, Hawkins' Farm.

¹ *Autobiography of Gen. O. O. Howard*, I, 368, 370.

² *Ib.*

Grandy's battery ($\frac{1}{11}$), which had too short a range for use in McLaws' position, was brought over to the Plank Road. From there it was sent off by Lee to the artillery depot at Chesterfield, its horses being unfit for service.¹

All this time Sickles at the Furnace did not hear a sound of the grand attack on the right, nor did a single fugitive or assailant show himself to him. About 5 p.m. Captain Comstock, Hooker's chief of engineers, and General Warren, his chief of topographical engineers, started out together from army headquarters "to examine the line." They had got to the vicinity of Hazel Grove, when a heavy fire of musketry began on the right, and caused them to hasten in that direction.² Meeting fugitives of the XI Corps, Warren sent his aide to inform Pleasonton and Sickles of the rout of the XI Corps and then turned back toward Fairview. Comstock started to report to Hooker.

About 5:30 the head of Reynolds' corps ($\frac{1}{21}$), coming up from below Fredericksburg, crossed the Rappahannock at United States Ford, stacked arms near it, and proceeded to rest and refresh itself.³ The Second and Third Divisions were approaching the ford, followed at a distance of several miles by the First Division.

Lowe, the Federal aeronaut, having observed the depletion of the lines of Fredericksburg, already related, wrote to Butterfield at 5:30 p.m.:

Nearly all the enemy's force have been withdrawn from the opposite side. I can only see a small force in the neighborhood of their earthworks.

I can not at this time get a sufficient elevation to tell what road they take, but should judge, by the appearance of army wagons moving toward Chancellorsville road, that the troops are moving that way also.

6:10 to 6:30 p.m. (Map 19)

Jackson's next important objective was Dowdall's Tavern. Between him and this point Schurz's division and the fragments of Devens', together with the brigade and battery of von Steinwehr's division, formed a line of defence extending from Wilderness Church southward and eastward around Dowdall's Tavern and northward along the edge of the wood facing Hawkins' Farm. These forces may be roughly estimated at 5000 men, about 3000 of whom were facing westward. One of the corps batteries, some distance in rear, threw its shot over the heads of the infantry at the masses of the enemy about Hawkins' Farm. Again the Confederate ranks resounded with the command and signal to advance. As they approached Schurz's position and felt its strength, Rodes called upon Colonel Warren, commanding a brigade in his rear, to support him. The troops of the second line had pressed

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 884.

² *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 45.

³ *W. R.*, 39, p. 279.

on so ardently that they were already within a few steps of the first and in some places mixed up with them. Warren's and Jones' brigades pushed on with, and through, the first line. After a contest of about twenty minutes, or about 6:30 p.m., Jackson's exultant battalions planted their colors on Schurz's second position (Map 19). Colquitt on receipt of Ramseur's message put his command in march toward the sound of the firing. He was followed by Ramseur, Paxton, and Stuart. These troops were too far behind to overtake those engaged, and could do no more than occupy the conquered positions.

About 6:10 p.m., when Jackson took Schurz's second position, Birney cleared the railroad cut of the enemy. Sickles still knew nothing of the conflict on the Federal right. The moment seemed to him opportune for Pleasonton to pursue. He was about to send a staff officer to bring up his brigade when an aide-de-camp from General Howard rode up, and reported that the XI Corps had yielded the right flank of the army to the enemy, who was advancing rapidly, and indeed was already in Sickles' rear. He did not credit this statement until the aide-de-camp sent by General Warren shortly afterward confirmed it, and asked, in the name of General Howard, for a regiment of cavalry to check the movement. He sent staff officers to recall Birney and Whipple, and directed Pleasonton to comply with Howard's request. Pleasonton ordered Huey to report with his regiment to Howard. At 6:30 p.m. Huey was on his way to his regiment.

While Jackson was rolling up and crushing the Federal right, Hooker with his two aides, Candler and Russell, sat on the veranda of the Chancellor House, enjoying the summer evening. Now and then a shot came from the south and east, where Lee was keeping up a show of force, but nothing occurred to give them anxiety. Not a sound of the fighting at the Taylor Farm or even at the Wilderness Church had reached them. Not an officer from the forces attacked had come to them for aid, or to warn them of the impending danger, and so the hours passed until between 6:15 and 6:30 (about the time when Warren's aide-de-camp reported to Sickles), when the sound of distant cannonading came to their ears, which they attributed to the movements of Birney's force. In Hancock's line it was thought that Stoneman's cavalry or some other Federal force had come up in the rear of a body of the enemy and was driving it toward the Federal lines. The shells, which came sailing through the air toward Chancellorsville from the northwest, were thought to be fired by pursuing Federals. Hooker and his staff were listening attentively and speculating as to the result of Sickles' operations, when Captain Russell stepped out in front, and turned his glass, with some trepidation, it would seem, in the direction of Dowdall's Tavern. A moment later he shouted to General Hooker: "My God, here they come!" meaning Birney's men. Hooker and his

knapsacks, overcoats, and blankets behind, and put in position to support Carroll's ($\frac{1}{a. II}$). A portion of it was placed across the road to Chancellorsville to check the retreat of the XI Corps, which it did "by arresting their flight, forming them into companies, and sending them to the rear."¹

As these changes were taking place and the main body of the I Corps was crossing the river at United States Ford and going into camp, General Reynolds, who preceded the corps, leaving Doubleday in command, reported to Hooker at Chancellorsville about 6:30. Here a military band was playing the national airs as a means of checking the disorder and encouraging the troops. The roads were crowded with panic-stricken men flying in one direction and reserves advancing in another.² Had he arrived a little earlier he would have been told to bivouac with his two leading divisions to-night near United States Ford, and proceed in the morning to take position on Howard's right. He was directed instead to place his available troops on the "ground vacated by a portion of the XI Corps."³ Captain Candler and Captain Paine of Hooker's staff were sent to Doubleday with orders for him to march rapidly to the front. Reynolds proceeded to join his corps.

6:30 to 7:10 p.m. (Map 20)

Schurz fell back upon Buschbeck's line. The two reserve batteries not yet engaged came into action—one on the left of Schurz's battery, south of the Plank Road; one in Buschbeck's rifle-pit, north of the Plank Road; and the corps battery previously in action ceased firing on account of the exhaustion of its ammunition. About this time the corps artillery was all ordered to withdraw to Chancellorsville. Schurz's and von Steinwehr's batteries fell back to the Buschbeck line, the former having lost one piece and the latter two pieces, making a total loss for the corps of nine pieces, or 25 per cent. of its artillery. Captain Dilger, commanding Schurz's battery, put one gun in the Plank Road; this being all the artillery that he could use, he sent his four remaining pieces to the rear under charge of a lieutenant, with orders to report to the first artillery officer he should meet. Captain Wiedrich, commanding von Steinwehr's battery, took his four pieces back to near Chandler's and proceeded to refit it.⁴ The infantry on Buschbeck's line now consisted of Buschbeck's brigade of four regiments, two regiments and two companies of Schurz's first brigade, three regi-

volunteered to remain through the fight, had been on special duty as guard to the corps hospital at Chandler's since the 1st.

¹ *History of the 1st Regiment Delaware Volunteers*, pp. 66, 69.

² *The Fifth Army Corps*, by W. H. Powell, p. 450.

³ Hooker and other officers were under the impression that the position lately held by the XI Corps inclined more than it did toward the Rapidan (*W. R.*, 39, pp. 225, 263, 279, 282, 288, and maps, pp. 673, 683).

⁴ *Ib.*, 39, p. 647.


ments of his second, and his unattached regiment, altogether ten regiments and two companies, besides fragments of Devens' division (Map 20). This whole force may be estimated as 4000 men. The work was but a shallow shelter trench, and many of the men were badly shaken; on the other hand, the line was not 1000 yards in length, and among its defenders were entire regiments which were perfectly fresh. If the foregoing estimate is correct, there were more than four men of fairly good *morale* to the running yard; these men were capable of standing off all the infantry that Jackson had in front of them or could possibly put there. But Jackson had reckoned on just such a case as this, and he was prepared to meet it. With his broad mass he assailed the Federal line along its whole front and converged with crushing force upon both its flanks.¹ About 7:10 p.m. he gained possession of this third and last line of Howard's corps. The latter retired in two bodies: one of five regiments, under Schurz, north of the Plank Road; one of four, under Buschbeck, south of it. Dilger with his single piece of artillery, supported by two companies of infantry, and a cavalcade of officers forming a sort of mounted escort for it, took the Plank Road. The first halting-place or line of defence for these troops was one formed by the works covering the right of the XII Corps, and constructed by the men of Williams' division ($\frac{1}{XII}$). These were stout barricades of logs, with abatis on the western side and extending from the south of the Plank Road to a point about 400 yards north of it, with a break of 100 yards at the road. Troops prolonging the line beyond the works, assuming that these were adequately manned, would derive some advantage from resting their left flank on a fortification. The whole line may be designated for convenience as the line of Slocum's Log Works. The only troops in the works were the four companies of the 28 N. Y. which had been left in them to guard the baggage of Williams' division when it moved out to support Sickles' corps. About $\frac{3}{4}$ of a mile in rear of this line the plateau of Fairview constituted the last point of vantage for the defence. Here Captain Best was engaged in placing his batteries.

About 6:30 p.m. Jastram's battery ($\frac{2}{I-III}$) arrived at the Furnace, and about the same time Birney received orders from Captain Moore of Hooker's staff "to advance rapidly."² Leaving two of Jastram's pieces at the Furnace, he promptly advanced with his three brigades and the remainder of Jastram's battery. Placing his four pieces in position, he wasted some ammunition on the retreating column, and

¹ "Along this line the contest raged for some time. Hooker states that it was an hour [6:10 to 7:10]; but the actual fighting did not last over twenty minutes, prob-

ably" (*The Battle of Chancellorsville*, by A. C. Hamlin, p. 76).

² *History of Battery E, 1 R. I. Light Artillery*, by George Lewis, p. 162; *W. R.*, 39, p. 408.



then, about 7 p.m., without orders from Sickles or from Hooker, prepared to go into bivouac. At this moment he was informed by Lieutenant-Colonel Hart, Sickles' adjutant-general, that the XI Corps had given way in disorder, and that Sickles ordered his immediate return. He withdrew in good order, leaving two regiments ($\frac{63}{1.1. III}$, $\frac{20}{2.1. III}$) in position south of the railroad cut as rear-guard, and sent an order to Barlow to follow him. By this time he had caught the sound of the infantry and artillery fire on the Plank Road.¹ Soon afterward he met Devin coming to report to him with the 6 N. Y. Cavalry, and ordered him to return with his regiment, and ascertain whether the Plank Road was open to Chancellorsville.² Barlow had lost all touch with the troops on his right and left, and was marching on alone in search of Birney or Jackson in the direction of Orange Court-House. Whipple and Williams received orders to withdraw, the former from Sickles, the latter from Slocum, about the time when Birney received his from Hooker, or about 7 p.m.

Buschbeck, as he fell back, halted in line of battle on the edge of the wood to check pursuit. Not being pressed, he filed his brigade into the road and went on toward Chancellorsville, covered in rear by Dilger with his piece of artillery.³

About 6:45 p.m. the 8 Pa. mounted and, headed by Major Huey, started off for the Plank Road in column of twos.⁴ The roar of battle, which rolled on past Chancellorsville, through the Federal lines, and out in feeble accent to the enemy on the Turnpike, had not broken the stillness of Hazel Grove, or if it had, had not disturbed the serenity of the few troops assembled there.

No one in the regiment except its commander, Major Huey, knew where it was going. As the column entered the forest which extends about a mile south of the Plank Road, the officers and men saw halted

¹ *Four Years in the Army of the Potomac*, by P. R. de Trobriand, p. 441.

² *W. R.*, 39, p. 781.

³ "Dilger's resolute action while retreating with his single gun, supported by the two companies of brave Irishmen of the Sixty-first Ohio, keeping the enemy at bay and the Plank Road free from active pursuit, forms one of the bright and pleasing episodes of this ill-fated campaign, but which has not received even at this late day [1896] the least notice whatever" (*The Battle of Chancellorsville*, by A. C. Hamlin, p. 78).

⁴ The time of day is given by C. A. White, late Adjutant of the 8 Pa. Cavalry, as "shortly after six o'clock" (*The Charge at Chancellorsville*, by Pennock Huey, pp.

99, 105). A. B. Wells, late captain in the regiment, says with reference to it: "This was at twenty minutes past six in the evening. I remember it, for I looked at my watch . . ." (*ib.*, p. 71). T. E. Carpenter, late captain in the regiment, gives it as "about half-past six o'clock in the evening" (*ib.*, p. 78). Huey gives the time when Sickles gave the order to Pleasonton as "half-past six o'clock—not later" (*ib.*, pp. 14, 15). This must make the time when Huey put the order into execution later than half-past six. According to Hamlin, Huey received the order "shortly" before seven and put it in execution some time after seven (see his *Battle of Chancellorsville*, pp. 82, 142).

by the roadside, in the opening called the Vista, caissons, guns, carriages, and other material, belonging to the Federal troops who had gone down to the Furnace. None of the soldiers and camp-followers there seemed to be aware that a conflict had taken place in the vicinity or that the least danger was impending. Not a straggler from the line of battle had yet reached this spot to give the alarm. And so Huey and his men marched along with their sabers in their scabbards and their pistols in their holsters. Being, as they thought, well within their own lines, they had no regular advance-guard or flankers. About a third of a mile from the Plank Road a narrow road or path coming from near Dowdall's Tavern joins the road leading directly from Hazel Grove to the Plank Road. As Huey reached this point he saw several men in gray uniforms moving about in the twilight some distance from him, but he took them to be Federal scouts dressed in Confederate gray, and passed on. As he approached the Plank Road he saw, to his astonishment, groups of Confederates in his front between him and the Plank Road, moving in the direction of Chancellorsville, and others on his left approaching his left flank. It flashed upon him that he had marched up against a part of Lee's army, that it was too late to retreat, that the best thing he could do would be to break through the crowd in his front, gain the Plank Road, turn to the right, and fight his way to Chancellorsville. He instantly ordered his men to draw sabers and follow him at a gallop. This was about 7:30 p.m., about the time when Stuart started off for Ely's Ford. When he struck the Plank Road he saw, to his dismay, a crowd of Confederates blocking the way on the right. The XI Corps had all gone by, and he was in the midst of the enemy's advance troops, the main body being to his left, but out of sight. He led the column in the direction which seemed to be that of least resistance, or to the left. After he had gone about 100 yards he was met with a murderous volley from concealed troops in the woods. He turned his staggered column to the right, and passed on eastward.¹

At 7 p.m. Seeley's battery ($\frac{4}{2\text{ III}}$) took up the march from United States Ford for Chancellorsville.² Berry was still near the Chancellor House with two of his brigades. The noise of the rapid flight and the close pursuit of Jackson's troops was borne to the ears of his men, first in faint, indistinct murmurs, constantly increasing in volume until it seemed as though pandemonium had broken loose. Then came the fugitives, frantic and terror-stricken, blindly pushing their way through his steady ranks. In the midst of the rout and tumult Hooker hurried up.

¹ *The Battle of Chancellorsville*, by A. C. Hamlin, p. 92. See also *Papers of Mil. Hist. Soc. of Mass.*, V, 212.

² It appears that in the impending battle this battery had but four pieces engaged.

The other two pieces may have been left on the north side of the Rappahannock, but the author assumes that they were left on the south side, in the vicinity of United States Ford.

"General," he shouted, "throw your men into the breach—receive the enemy on your bayonets—don't fire a shot—they can't see you!"

Berry at once advanced at double-time with his 1st and 2d brigades.¹ Hooker, sitting on his white horse, a familiar sight to his old division, watched them go hurrying by—remarking from time to time as he looked down into their upturned faces: "Receive them on your bayonets, boys! Receive 'em on your bayonets!"² Hays' brigade ($\frac{2}{3.H}$), ordered to support Berry's division, followed at double-time. There can hardly be a severer test of discipline and *esprit de corps* than the one to which these troops were now subjected. Berry's division was the largest and one of the best in the Army of the Potomac, and the II Corps, from which came Hays' brigade, was making a splendid record. Through the surging rout of the XI Corps these sterling organizations forged their way, unchecked and unshaken, toward the mass of yelling and firing assailants. Berry was ordered "to cover the rear of the XI Corps, and if possible to seize and hold at all hazards the high ground which had been abandoned by that corps."³

General Reynolds, on reaching United States Ford, was joined by Captains Candler and Paine of Hooker's staff, and about 7 p.m. took up the march with his two divisions, accompanied by these two officers as guides, his 1st brigade, Second Division, in front. Through the dark woods, with here and there a moonlit opening, in and out among wagons, ambulances, and gun-carriages, they pushed slowly but steadily on. A regiment ($\frac{94}{1.2.1}$) was deployed across the road, and as it advanced, drove back hundreds of fugitives of the XI Corps. Reynolds left behind near the ford one regiment of infantry ($\frac{135}{1.3.1}$) and all his artillery.

Williams was getting into position to coöperate with Whipple and Birney in pressing Anderson back upon the Plank Road, when about 7 p.m., as Jackson was carrying Buschbeck's position, he received an order to reoccupy his log works at once. Apprehending that some disaster had happened to the corps on his right, he ordered his brigades to retire in good order, but without loss of time.

¹ *Major-General Hiram G. Berry*, by Edward K. Gould, pp. 258, 297. The reports show a great diversity of statement as to the hour of the receipt and execution of this order. Captain Poland, Berry's acting assistant inspector-general and chief of staff, and Captain Tyler, commanding the 74 N. Y., give it as 4 p.m. Both of the brigade commanders and Colonels McLaughlin and Farnum, commanding the 1 Mass. and 70 N. Y., respectively, give it as 5 or about 5 p.m. Lieutenant-Colonel Merriam,

commanding the 16 Mass., gives it as 6:30 p.m. Lieutenant-Colonel Westbrook, commanding the 120 N. Y., gives it as sundown. A. C. Hamlin, in his *Battle of Chancellorsville*, indicates on his maps that it was about 7 p.m.

² *Men and Things I Saw in Civil War Days*, by James F. Rusling, p. 303.

³ Hooker's testimony, *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 126; Hooker's letter to Ross, *B. and L.*, III, 223.

7:10 to 8 p.m. (Map 21)

The XI Corps continued its retreat to the position of Fairview without making any stand on the line of Slocum's Log Works. Buschbeck started to do so south of the Plank Road, and was ordered by a staff officer to continue his march.¹ When Schurz reached the line Buschbeck had doubtless abandoned it, as he moved faster than Schurz. From Slocum's Log Works Schurz retreated by the Bullock Road. Rodes' and Colston's men went over the works of Buschbeck's line together, becoming mingled in inextricable confusion. They proceeded with apparently inexhaustible ardor and endurance to the edge of the woods beyond the works. Here about 7:15 p.m. Rodes brought them to a halt (Map 21). In his official report he accounts for this action by the statement: "The right becoming entangled in an abatis near the enemy's first line of fortifications, caused the line to halt, and such was the confusion and darkness that it was not deemed advisable to make a further advance."² He sent word to Jackson urging him to push forward the comparatively fresh men of the third line in order that his own line might be reformed. A portion of the Confederate force failed to hear or to heed the command to halt; parts of three brigades pushed on up the Plank Road or in the woods on either side of it, thus forming an advance body of foragers or ground scouts, but there was no line of skirmishers. Paxton had taken position in the rifle-pits of Buschbeck's old line. Colquitt and Ramseur had halted near Dowdall's Tavern.

About 7:30 Barlow, about a mile below the railroad cut, with his brigade, was overtaken by the bearer of Birney's order recalling him. He at once proceeded to return.

On the opposite side of the battle-field the Second and Third Divisions of the I Corps were advancing from United States Ford. At 8 o'clock the First Division, on the north side of the river, was about 4 miles from the ford.

Colonel Munford, with the 2 Va. Cavalry, had got within sight of Ely's Ford, having skirmished with some Federal cavalry, probably the squadron of the 6 N. Y. left in the vicinity of the ford. He sent back reports of his progress to Jackson,³ who perhaps communicated them to Stuart. At any rate, about 7:30 p.m., Stuart, seeing nothing else for him to do, proposed to Jackson that he "take some cavalry and infantry over and hold the Ely's Ford Road." The proposition was approved and acted upon.⁴

Jackson's artillery having arrived at the front under Crutchfield,

¹ *The Battle of Chancellorsville*, by A. C. Hamlin, pp. 77, 97, 148, 149.

² *W. R.*, 39, p. 941.

³ Private letters of Colonel Munford to the author.

⁴ *W. R.*, 39, pp. 799, 887; *Chancellorsville*, by Hotchkiss and Allan, pp. 57, 58; *The Battle of Chancellorsville*, by A. C. Hamlin, pp. 81, 181; *Memoirs of the Confederate War*, by H. von Boreke, II, 227.



MAP 21

CHANCELLORSVILLE

Positions of Troops at 7.15 p.m.

May 2, 1863

Green Federal Red Confederate



Chief of Artillery, the horse artillery, about 8 p.m., withdrew from its advanced position on the Plank Road, leaving there Captain Moorman with 2 pieces which had not been engaged. The men and horses in general were exhausted, not having been fed for forty-eight hours.¹

Huey, pushing eastward through the woods with a formed remnant of the 8 Pa. Cavalry, outstripped the Confederate troops marching on the road, and striking the Mountain Road, led his men to the Plank Road, where he met Captain Best, Chief of Artillery of the XII Corps, placing his artillery in position. He requested the captain not to fire his guns down the road, as many of his men were still in the woods trying to work their way out. The rear of the column, hearing the attack on the head, turned to the right out of the road on which the column marched from Hazel Grove, and made its way through the woods and over or past the intrenchments of the XII Corps to the Fairview plateau. The regiment, on assembling, took position to support Best's artillery, but from this duty it was soon relieved by the infantry. It then fell back to Chancellorsville, where it was formed in a line of skirmishers for the purpose of intercepting and gathering up stragglers.²

Most of the fugitives of the XI Corps preceded the formed or intact bodies under Schurz and Buschbeck. The remainder kept coming in until late in the night. But besides the swarms of XI Corps men which issued from the Plank Road and the roads on each side of it, a current of fleeing soldiery of two other corps reached Chancellorsville from the direction of Hazel Grove. To account for this fact it is necessary to go back a little in the narrative. When the 8 Pa. started to report to Howard it left at Hazel Grove the battery attached to Pleasonton's cavalry, 6 pieces; the three batteries of Whipple's division ($\frac{3}{11}$), 16 pieces;³ the 17 Pa. Cavalry, and the 110 Pa. Infantry. Everything was quiet there, when suddenly a sharp fire of musketry broke out from the woods in the direction of the XI Corps. Captain J. F. Huntington, the senior artillery officer present with Whipple's three batteries, assumed command of them, and proceeded to place them in position.⁴ Pleason-

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 1050.

² This account of the movements of the 8 Pa. Cavalry is substantially, and in large part verbatim, that given by A. C. Hamlin in his *Battle of Chancellorsville*, pp. 90-92. The author was favored, however, in the preparation of it by the use of a manuscript article by Colonel T. A. Dodge, U. S. Army, retired, entitled "A Romance of Chancellorsville," and of Major Pennock Huey's history of the event. He, moreover, consulted the official reports, *W. R.*, 39, pp. 772-789. It appears from a map in Major

Huey's book (p. 31) that the regiment while in line of skirmishers at Chancellorsville occupied the River Road and Turnpike and the span between them. The road to United States Ford was barred by the head of the I Corps.

³ These batteries numbered 18 pieces. Two pieces were with Muhlenberg on the Plank Road (*W. R.*, 39, p. 726).

⁴ Captain von Puttkammer, the chief of artillery of the division, had left the field to look for orders,—which led to his trial by court-martial, and dismissal from the

ton's battery (Martin's) formed not far from Huntington's, making a total of 22 guns ready to fire. Before the line was formed a mass of fugitives, together with caissons, guns, ambulances, beef-cattle, mules, etc., came surging out of the Vista, and dashed through the incomplete formation, nearly carrying it away.¹ Soon afterward, the line meantime being formed, a regiment of the enemy's infantry ($\frac{4}{2.2.11}$), about 200 strong, issued from the woods. At once the 22 guns opened fire with canister. The assailants were probably surprised, having reason to believe that everything in this quarter was well started to the rear. They quickly retreated to the woods, taking with them a gun of Turnbull's battery ($\frac{3}{1.111}$), three caissons, and the whole mule-train of small-arms ammunition of the III Corps. The forementioned mass of fleeing men, animals, and material was made up of Birney's park of artillery, which was left at Hazel Grove, camp-followers, and fugitives of the XI Corps. As it went through Williams' division ($\frac{1}{x11}$), which was trying to regain its old position in the log works, it was increased by a contribution from that organization.

A few moments after Dilger with his pieces of artillery and escort passed Slocum's Log Works, the Confederate advance troops (foragers or ground scouts) arrived there, surrounded the four companies of the 28 N. Y., and demanded their surrender. Escape seeming impossible, the colonel complied, ordering the men to lay down their arms. Sixty-seven men were thus taken prisoners.² The rest, numbering about 40 men who escaped, retired rapidly through the woods,³ joining in their flight the portion of Huey's cavalry retreating south of the Plank Road. The demoralized crowd carried with it the 13 N. J., also of Williams' division ($\frac{13}{3.1.x11}$), which had been left in reserve at Hazel Grove.⁴ The stampede is thus described by Captain Osborn, Chief of Artillery of Berry's division ($\frac{2}{111}$): "As we passed General Hooker's headquarters, a scene burst upon us which, God grant, may never again be seen in the Federal army of the United States. The Eleventh Corps had been routed, and were fleeing to the river like scared sheep. The men and artillery filled the roads[sic], its sides, and the skirts of the field; and it appeared

service (J. F. Huntington, in letter to Major Huey, *The Charge of the 8 Pennsylvania at Chancellorsville*, p. 65).

¹ With reference to this incident, Lieutenant Martin, commanding the battery of horse artillery, says in his report: "Carriages, wagons, horses without riders, and panic-stricken infantry were rushing through and through my battery, overturning guns and limbers, smashing my caissons, and trampling my horse-holders under them.

"While Lieutenant Browne was bringing

his section into position, a caisson without drivers came tearing through, upsetting his right piece, and severely injuring one of his drivers, carrying away both detachments of his horses, and breaking the caisson so badly as to necessitate its being left upon the field" (*W. R.*, 39, pp. 787, 788).

² *History of the 28 Regiment N. Y. State Volunteers*, by C. W. Boyce, p. 54.

³ *W. R.*, 39, p. 693.

⁴ This regiment was rallied about dark and formed in rear of Ruger's brigade ($\frac{3}{1.111}$) (*W. R.*, 39, p. 715).

that no two or one company could be found together. Aghast and terror-stricken, heads bare and panting for breath, they pleaded like infants at the mother's breast that we should let them pass to the rear unhindered."¹

The hospitals of the XI Corps had been formed in rear of their respective divisions. The retreat of the corps compelled their hasty evacuation; all the wounded who could walk were sent to the rear on foot, the more severe cases were carried in ambulances. Small parties of slightly wounded men, "scattered all through the woods," were collected and sent to hospitals finally established on the north bank of the river, from which they were transported to those at Brooke's Station. A number of medical officers were taken prisoners, among whom was Surgeon George Suckley, Medical Director of the corps.² Birney's division ($\frac{1}{III}$) had its hospital in the Old School-House on the Plank Road, about a mile west of Chancellorsville. "The fleeing Dutchmen," says Medical Director Sim, "actually ran over our hospital." The wounded had to be carried on stretchers to the new hospital established at Chandler's, where for a while the enemy's shells came thick and fast. A number of the surgeons ran away, and did not stop until they got about a mile beyond the river.³ One of the hospitals of the XII Corps was also run over by the XI Corps and ruined.⁴

"Some of the fugitives," says General Francis A. Walker in his life of General Hancock, "were so completely beside themselves with fear that they ran past the Chancellor House, down the Fredericksburg Pike, through Hancock's line, and into the hands of the Confederates without being stopped. One ingenuous German approached Hancock and begged to be directed to the pontoons. The answer he received has been handed down by tradition, but it is best not to put it into cold and unsympathetic type!"⁵

An officer of the III Corps writes: "The officers of other corps made themselves speechless by striving to rally the 'flying Dutchman,' who was no longer an illusion, but a despicable reality; and the cavalry with their sabers, generals and staffs with revolvers, and artillerists with whips and rammers, vainly attempted to stop the disgraceful flight, which was finally checked by the Rappahannock. 'Var ish de pontoons?' 'Der wash too many mens for us.' 'I ish going to mine company,' they continually exclaimed. . . . The Germans sought to escape the censure which the whole army justly bestowed upon them, by tearing the badges from their caps,—for the crescent was recognized as the

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 483.

² *Medical Recollections of the Army of the Potomac*, by Jonathan Letterman, p. 133.

³ *W. R.*, 39, p. 401.

⁴ *Medical Recollections of the Army of the Potomac*, by Jonathan Letterman, p. 134.

⁵ *General Hancock*, in *Great Commanders Series*, p. 83.



JULIUS BIEN & CO.

JULIUS BIEN & CO.

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JULIUS BIEN & CO.



returned to its corps, but not to its former position. Its 2d brigade was in the old works on Geary's right; the 3d and 1st brigades extended the line northward toward, but not to, the Plank Road. The left regiment of the 3d brigade, the 27 Ind., was formed astride of the old works, the eight right companies inside, the other two outside, of them facing west. Colonel Colgrove of this regiment got Lieutenant Lewis to place two of his 12-pound Napoleon guns (1. 3. III) on a piece of high ground on his left to enfilade a ravine that extended along his front.¹ In rear of these guns, as support, he put about 200 men of the 110 Pa. (3. 3. III), placed at his disposal by an officer of that regiment.² On the right of Williams' line were Buschbeck's brigade and other fragments of the XI Corps. When the division had been in this position about fifteen minutes, the 1st brigade, on the right of the line, was sent forward through the darkness to retake its original position, where it had left its knapsacks. It advanced in line of battle with skirmishers in front, and arrived behind the barricades, or log works, south of where they were occupied by the enemy, without knowing that the enemy was in possession of any portion of them.

About dark Perry's brigade of Anderson's division ($\frac{3}{I-V}$) moved, by order of General Lee, from the right of McLaws' to the right of its own division (Map 22).

8 p.m. to 9:30 p.m.


Sickles was now undecided as to whether he should conform to the retreat of the Federal right or maintain his position. His last communication from Hooker was the order to attack, which he received about 5 p.m. To open communication with him he sent Lieutenant-Colonel Hart, his assistant adjutant-general, with a small mounted escort, detailed by General Pleasonton, taking the precaution of seeing that no orders, communications, or memoranda, of a nature to be of value to the enemy, should be found upon him in case of his capture. Colonel Hart reported back, probably about 9, with orders for Sickles to hold Hazel Grove. He was then sent to inform Hooker that a portion of Whipple's ammunition (mule) train, some of the caissons of his batteries, and two or three of his cannon were in the woods occupied by the enemy, between Sickles' line of battle and the Plank Road, and that to recover these, as well as the line of the Plank Road, he would, with Hooker's sanction, make a night attack, if supported by the line of Williams' and Berry's divisions ($\frac{1}{XII}$, $\frac{2}{III}$).

In rear of Crutchfield's guns, A. P. Hill's division ($\frac{1}{I}$) moved up the Plank Road to deploy, but as it approached the artillery it was raked by the fire from Fairview, and forced to seek shelter on the side of the


¹ These pieces came from Hazel Grove.

² *W. R.*, 39, p. 711.

Positions of Troops at 9 p. m.
May 2, 1863



PLAN 2



FORMATION OF BERRY'S FIRST AND SECOND BRIGADES AND HAYS' BRIGADE between 9.30 p.m. and midnight, May 2, 1863

The numbers below the lines of Berry's regiments stand for Brigades to which the regiments belong

account, no doubt, of the threatening appearance of things on the Plank Road. Between his right and the troops on the Ely's Ford Road was a gap of about 600 yards (Map 22). The seven regiments in his front line on the right of the road took up about 700 yards, or about 2 yards to a man. With the regiments in the second and third lines there was less than a man to a yard. On the left of the road Berry connected with Slocum. The 11 Mass. of Berry's 1st brigade was still on the Turnpike in front of Hancock. Neither Jackson nor Hill nor Lane was aware of the line of battle formed by Berry and Hays, to say nothing of Sykes ($\frac{2}{3}$) on the Ely's Ford Road, and the two divisions under Reynolds ($\frac{2.3}{1}$) plodding on by the road from United States Ford in pursuance now of the following order:

Chancellorsville, Va., May 2, 1863, 8:15 p.m.

Major-General Reynolds:

The general commanding understands that General Meade has sent General Sykes' division on [to] the Hunting Run. He [Sykes] will establish his line on that [stream], resting on the Rapidan, and extend it in the direction of Chancellorsville, along the line of the Chancellorsville and Ely's Ford Road, as far as he can defend it. The general desires that you connect your right with General Sykes' left along the same line or road.

J. H. VAN ALLEN,

Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp.

The First, or rear, Division of this corps ($\frac{1}{1}$) halted about 9 p.m. on the north side of the river about 2 miles from United States Ford.¹

The Confederate commanders were under the impression that the Federal infantry was back of the guns at Fairview except for a line of skirmishers, or pickets, which they knew to be nearer. Where the Federal picket line crossed the Plank Road were two pieces of Lieutenant Dimick's battery ($\frac{3}{2-III}$), thrown out from Fairview and commanded by the lieutenant; at the corresponding point of Lane's line were the three forementioned pieces of Crutchfield's. Lane in placing his regiments had cautioned them to keep a sharp lookout for the enemy, as he was far in advance and alone, and they must be prepared to repel an attack. As soon as his line was formed he went to report for further orders. When he called out in the darkness for General Hill he was answered by Jackson. He found the latter at the junction of the Bullock Road, Hazel Grove Road, and Plank Road, where he had intended to change direction toward the rear of Chancellorsville. But Jackson did not order any change of direction. He had not yet estab-

¹ The Itinerary of the I Corps (*W. R.*, 39, p. 257) represents the First Division as crossing the river ahead of the other two divisions. For my authority to the contrary

see reports of the inspector-general and of brigade and regimental commanders (*ib.*, pp. 261, 263, 264, 266, 268, *et seq.*).

lished connection with Lee. This he meant to do by pushing Lane's brigade straight on toward Chancellorsville. While Lane and Lee engaged the attention of the enemy in that direction, Jackson with Heth's and Pender's brigades ($\frac{1}{I} \cdot \frac{2}{II}$) on the Plank Road, and others at hand ready to follow, would deliver a thrust in Hooker's rear. Colquitt was still in the vicinity of Dowdall's Tavern. Paxton was in rear of his left. Archer's brigade ($\frac{5}{I \cdot II}$) went into bivouac about 9 o'clock at the intersection of the Brook Road and Germanna Plank Road.¹ Jackson's front had contracted from about 2 miles to about half a mile. He probably did not know or rightly estimate the force that the Federals put forth in the course of the day beyond the Furnace, and thought that Lane in advancing on Chancellorsville would leave that force at a safe distance behind him or to his right. In answer to Lane's application for orders he raised his arm in the direction of the enemy and exclaimed: "Push right ahead, Lane; right ahead." This was about 9 p.m. Lane at once rode along his line to prepare for the movement; he was on the extreme right, ready to clasp hands with Anderson on Lee's left, and was about to give the signal to advance when one of his bravest officers begged him not to do so until he could ascertain whether the troops and trains heard moving on his right and rear were Lee's or Hooker's. While General Lane was considering what he should do, a Federal officer came up along Slocum's Log Works from the right flank, waving a handkerchief and demanding information as to what troops were in his front. The officer proved to be the colonel of the 128 Pa. of the 1st brigade of Williams' division, looking in the darkness for the former position of his regiment in the log works. He was promptly seized and brought before General Lane. After a moment's conversation with him, Lane had a patrol sent into the woods on the right to ascertain how much of a hostile force was concealed there. About as the patrol disappeared on Lane's right, a Federal officer, probably General Knipe, rode up in the woods in his front, and called out for General Williams, commanding his division. This drew the fire of a part of Lane's skirmish line (33 N. Ca.); the fire was returned by portions of the Federal line confronting it. Part of Lane's line of battle fired a volley at the Federal officer and incidentally into the rear of the line of Confederate skirmishers. This made the latter rush forward for shelter, and this rushing forward gave the Federals the impression that a charge was being made and caused a number of Federal regiments to fire into the woods. Soon after Lane left Jackson, about 9 p.m., the latter was joined by Hill and some of his staff, and Jackson gave Hill his orders in the brief sentence: "Press them; cut them off from the United States Ford, Hill; press them." Hill replied that none of his staff were familiar with the country. Jackson turned to Captain

¹ W. R., 39, p. 929.

Boswell, his chief engineer officer, who was well acquainted with all the roads and paths, and ordered him to report to Hill. Then, about as General Knipe had started toward the Confederate lines, he went with Hill and a number of staff officers out in advance of Lane's line of battle to look and listen, or reconnoiter. The party was preceded by a mounted orderly as a *point*. When this man, having passed through the line of the 33 N. Ca., came into view to the Federal troops across the Plank Road, an attempt was made to capture him. As he turned and galloped away, making his escape, a desultory fire was sent after him.

Jackson with his party had halted in rear of the 33 N. Ca. After listening for a while to the sounds coming from the Federal lines—the ringing of axes in the building of log works and abatis, and the voices of officers giving commands—he turned his horse about and went back toward the Confederate lines. He had halted a second time to listen, when, about 9:15, the sound of the firing caused by General Knipe's call for General Williams and by the appearance of his orderly in front of the Federal lines broke upon his ears. A moment before, the colonel of the 18 N. Ca. of Lane's brigade, with his adjutant, had gone forward on the Plank Road to consult with the colonel of the 33 N. Ca. At the sound of this firing these officers dashed back on the Plank Road to regain their positions in line. Jackson and his party hurriedly left the Plank Road, and pursued their way to the rear through the woods on the right, or north, side of the Plank Road. The Confederate troops were now keenly alert, having been warned against a possible attack by the Federal cavalry.¹ The thumping of hoofs and the clanking of sabers produced by Jackson and the forementioned colonel with their escorts caused an impression in the line that a charge was about to break upon it. The order was given to fire and repeat the firing. The returning party was at this time not more than 20 paces from the line,² and could perhaps be vaguely descried through the darkness. The fire of the North Carolina mountaineers, some of which may have been aimed at indistinct, shadowy forms, but most of which was delivered unaimed in the direction of the approaching sounds, was fearfully effective.

¹ *Memoirs of R. E. Lee*, by A. L. Long, p. 257. Randolph Barton, Esq., of Baltimore, at that time on General Paxton's staff, writes to the author: "I have a decided impression, almost a conviction, that when Jackson's assault had carried us to east of Dowdall's Tavern, a rumor ran through our immediate command, of a cavalry attack, and that we must look out for cavalry. This rumor had, no doubt, filtered through from the front, and undoubtedly referred to the remarkable experience of

the 8 Pa. Cavalry under Major Huey. . . . This encounter was most unexpected to both sides. An attack from, or an encounter with, cavalry in that dense country seemed to be as unlikely as an attack from a gunboat. But I am sure that the feeling of a possible attack after Huey's affair had impressed the army, and I think our men had become supersensitive on the subject."

² *Memoirs of R. E. Lee*, by A. L. Long, p. 257.

Captain Boswell and his horse fell dead. One of the orderlies was killed and one wounded. Jackson received three balls at the same instant. One penetrated the palm of his right hand, a second passed around the wrist of his left hand, and a third passed through the left arm half-way between the shoulder and elbow. It splintered the bone to the elbow-joint, and severed the artery. His horse, frantic with terror, plunged into the wood and rushed toward the Federal lines. An overhanging bough struck him violently in the face, tore off his cap, and nearly unhorsed him; but recovering his seat, he managed to seize the bridle with his bleeding hand, and turn his horse toward the road. In spite of this he would probably have been carried into the Federal lines, had not Lieutenant Wynn of his staff, whose horse had also broken toward the Federal lines, caught Jackson's horse by the bridle and stopped it about 100 yards from a line of Federal skirmishers. The voices of the latter, says Lieutenant Wynn, could be distinctly heard. The lieutenant, with the aid of Captain Wilbourn, took Jackson from his horse, and laid him under a tree. Then giving him some water, he got on his horse, reported to General A. P. Hill, and after taking the latter to Jackson, proceeded to the rear for an ambulance. In the meantime Jackson's broken arm was bandaged with a handkerchief. Soon afterward members of his staff started to bear him to the rear. The party, swollen by the arrival of officers desiring to render him assistance, drew the fire of Dimick's two guns on picket. This was taken by the artillery at Fairview as a signal that the enemy was advancing in force, and immediately, or about 9:30 p.m., it commenced firing by the light of the moon with canister over the heads of the Federal infantry at the Confederate lines of battle.¹ It was in this iron tempest that Stonewall Jackson gave his last order. General Pender, who had not deployed his brigade (²_{I. II}), expressed to him a doubt as to his ability to hold his men in their position in the road. Pushing aside the men who supported him, Jackson stretched himself to his full height, and answered feebly, but distinctly enough to be heard above the din: "You must hold your ground, General Pender; you must hold your ground, sir." Still more exhausted by this effort, he asked to be permitted to lie down for a few moments; but the danger from the fire and of capture by the Federal advance was too imminent, and his aides hurried

¹ Captain Best gives the number of guns in his line, or mass, as 34 (*W. R.*, 39, p. 675); General Hunt gives it as 38 (*ib.*, p. 249); A. C. Hamlin, in his *Battle of Chancellorsville*, p. 104, gives it as 43. It consisted of the artillery of the XII Corps, except Atwell's and Hampton's batteries and Muhlenberg's section of Crosby's battery (*W. R.*, 39, pp. 675, 721, 249)—14

guns; the artillery of Berry's (2d) division, III Corps (except Seeley's battery and one section of Dimick's, in front on the Plank Road) (*ib.*, pp. 483, 484, 162, 249, 488)—16 guns; one section of Hill's battery and Dilger's battery of the XI Corps (*ib.*, pp. 249, 167, 656, 657)—7 guns; total 37 guns. Dimick's battery was on and to the right of the Plank Road. The other batteries were

him on. A litter having been obtained, he was placed on it, and the bearers passed on as rapidly as the thick woods and rough ground permitted. One of the bearers, shot in the arm, let go the handle, and the general was thrown from the litter upon his wounded arm. For the first time a groan escaped him. His aide, Captain Smith, sprang to his side. As he raised his head, a bright beam of moonlight made its way through the thick foliage and rested upon the pale face of the sufferer. The captain was startled by its great pallor and stillness, and cried out: "Oh, General, are you seriously hurt?" "No," he answered; "don't trouble yourself, my friend, about me," and presently added something about winning the battle first, and attending to the wounded afterward. Again he was placed on the litter; and the party turned from the wood into the road and carried him a few hundred yards to where Dr. McGuire was waiting for them with an ambulance. Having readjusted the bandage so as better to stop the flow of blood, the doctor placed him in the ambulance, which already contained Colonel Crutchfield, Jackson's chief of artillery, who was wounded by Best's artillery, and went with them to the hospital at Wilderness Tavern.¹ Crutchfield was succeeded by Colonel Alexander, commanding a battalion of the I Corps, and senior artillery officer present.

We left Lane awaiting the return of a patrol from his right. In a few moments it returned, bringing with it 150 or more men of the 128 Pa. (1. 1. XII), who had become bewildered in the dark forest, and surrendered to it.² While their colonel, previously taken prisoner as already stated, was protesting against the capture of these men as an abuse of the handkerchief of truce, the Federal batteries commenced

on the left of the Plank Road, with Winslow's on the right (*W. R.*, 39, p. 487).

¹ *Lee's Last Campaign, with an Accurate History of Stonewall Jackson's Last Wound*, by Captain J. C. Gorman, p. 56; *Chancellorsville*, by Hotchkiss and Allan, p. 56; *Stonewall Jackson and Chancellorsville*, by J. P. Smith, *Papers of Mil. Hist. Soc. of Mass.*, V, 372-374; *Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War*, by G. F. R. Henderson, II, 553-558; *The Richmond Howitzers in the War*, by a Member of the Company, pp. 73 et seq.; *The Battle of Chancellorsville*, by A. C. Hamlin, pp. 109 et seq.; and manuscript letters of Confederate officers in the possession of Captain I. P. Gragg, U. S. Volunteers.

The horse which Jackson rode was called by the soldiers "Little Sorrel" and by the staff "Fancy." Jackson captured him at Harper's Ferry in 1861, and rode him during the Valley campaign, at the battles

around Richmond, and at Cedar Run, Bull Run, Antietam, and Fredericksburg. After the general was lifted from him the horse was turned loose and dashed into the Federal lines. The saddle being an ordinary one, free from the housing and trappings of an officer, he was not recognized as Jackson's horse, and was turned over to the cavalry. In the course of the summer of 1863 General Stuart captured a squad of cavalry, and among its horses one was recognized as Little Sorrel. In 1879 this horse was in the possession of Captain J. G. Morrison, formerly of Jackson's staff, and one of whose sisters Jackson had married (Manuscript letters from Captain Morrison and General D. H. Hill to Captain I. P. Gragg, U. S. Volunteers).

² *The Battle of Chancellorsville*, by A. C. Hamlin, p. 112; *So. Hist. Soc. Papers*, XXX, 113.

their firing. At this the Federal prisoners and the Confederate infantry sprang together to the safe side of the log works, where they remained in a temporary informal truce, waiting for the artillery storm to blow over. Williams' 1st brigade, attacked on its right and rear, returned to its position in the division line, and there took ground to the right so as to connect with Berry's left (Map 22).

About 9 p.m. the corps artillery of Couch's corps, numbering 12 pieces, and 3 pieces of Thomas' battery ($\frac{2}{1.11}$) under Thomas were placed in position by Captain Comstock of the engineers "to the right of the Plank Road and beyond the Chancellor House."¹ Who commanded these pieces is not known. The group will be considered as Comstock's. Together with Muhlenberg's 20 pieces and Hancock's 3, it made the pieces in position about Chancellorsville number 38.

About this time Barlow's brigade commenced arriving at Hazel Grove. The two divisions of the I Corps were still coming up from United States Ford. A member of the 13 Mass. (3. 2. I) writes of this march:

Tramp, tramp, all day until nearly 8 o'clock at night, when we filed down between the hills to the ford, which we crossed on pontoons, and then half a mile further, when, tired and weary, we gladly received the order to halt for the night. Our bivouac fires were scarcely lighted and preparations made for sleep when the drums were sounded, followed by orders to "fall in!" and then "*f-o-r-w-a-r-d, march!*" and at a good round pace we started for Chancellorsville, wondering what had happened to necessitate this sudden change in our programme. Something serious, for mounted officers were hurrying about with orders urging forward the troops. We had not long to wait, however, before we got some idea of the disaster which had overtaken the army. Very soon we saw men of the XI Corps hurrying to the rear, many of them panic-stricken with fear. Orders were received to drive back to the front all men who were not wounded. . . . "Halt, there! Where in hell are you going?" was frequently heard, followed by "Turn back, you cowards."²

At 9 p.m. Hooker had the following dispatch sent to Butterfield and to Sedgwick, under the impression that the latter was still on the north side of the Rappahannock:

The major-general commanding directs that General Sedgwick cross the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg on the receipt of this order, and at once take up his line of march on the Chancellorsville road until you [he] connect[s] with us, and he will attack and destroy any force he may fall in with on the road. He will leave all his trains behind, except the pack-train of small ammunition, and march to be in our vicinity at daylight. He will probably fall upon the rear of the forces commanded by General Lee, and between us we will use him up. Send word to General Gibbon to take possession of Fredericksburg. Be sure not

¹ *W. R.*, 39, pp. 726, 309.

² *Three Years in the Army*, by C. E. Davis, Jr., p. 203.

to fail. Deliver this by your swiftest messenger. Send word that it is delivered to General Sedgwick.

Testifying before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Hooker said:

. . . I was of the opinion that if that portion of the army advanced on Lee's rear, sooner than allow his troops to remain between me and Sedgwick, Lee would take the road that Jackson had marched over on the morning of the 2d, and thus open for me a short road to Richmond, while the enemy, severed from his depot, would have to retire by way of Gordonsville. . . .¹

Every disposition was made of our forces to hold our line as long as practicable, for the purpose of being in readiness to coöperate with the movement which had been ordered to be made on our left.²

. . . When I gave the order to General Sedgwick I expected that Lee would be whipped by manœuver. I supposed that he would be compelled to march off on the same line that Jackson had. He would have been thrown on the Culpeper and Gordonsville road, placing me 50 or 60 miles nearer Richmond than himself.³

To the question: "Did you expect General Sedgwick to form a junction with you?" he answered:

No, sir; but I expected that while he attacked Lee's rear, I would attack him in front, and compel him to move off toward Gordonsville.⁴

General Warren says:

By our leaving a sufficient force in front of the right wing of the enemy [under Lee] to hold our breastworks, the whole of the rest of our force was to be thrown upon his left at dawn of day, with every prospect of annihilating it.⁵

From all this evidence, it may be concluded:

1. That Hooker meant, if forced from his present line, to take up and hold his new or second one.
2. That if Hooker attacked at all, it was to be against the left flank of Lee's left wing, under Stuart; or against Lee's front; the latter in case Sedgwick should attack Lee.
3. That with Stoneman operating against Lee's communications with Richmond, Hooker was trying to force Lee to retreat upon Gordonsville.

The Federal telegraph line was extended to-day from the Red House near United States Ford to near Hooker's headquarters, but before it could be put in operation, wagons tearing down the road to the ford at a full gallop knocked down many of the poles. Trees in which the wires were placed were cut down to open a way for stalled wagons. The line was thus rendered unserviceable.

¹ *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 131.

² Testimony, *ib.*, 127. For memoranda of Hooker's see *W. R.*, 40, p. 359.

³ *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 145.

⁴ *Ib.*, 148.

⁵ *W. R.*, 39, p. 201.

9:30 to 11 p.m. (Map 22)

Best's guns kept up a destructive fire with intermissions until 10 o'clock. Shots fired from some of the rifled pieces of Jackson's corps passed over the heads of the Federals and fell in rear of the Confederates beyond them. Reverberations of the conflict reached the Federal camps on the north side of the Rappahannock. Among the victims of the Federal gunnery was A. P. Hill, who had shortly before succeeded Jackson in command.

When the Federal artillery ceased firing Lane's prisoners were sent to the rear. Soon afterward General Pender informed Lane of the accident to Jackson and the wounding of Hill, and advised Lane not to attack. Hill sent Rodes information that he himself was disabled and that the command of the corps devolved upon Rodes,¹ who was next in rank.

This morning Averell, who was still at Rapidan Station, opposed by a Confederate rear-guard, received Hooker's order of the 1st inst. recalling him, and proceeded to execute it. He sent off the following report:

En route to United States Ford, May 2, 1863, 7:20 a.m.

Captain Candler, A. D. C., etc.:

Your dispatch of yesterday, stating that the major-general commanding did not understand what I was doing at Rapidan Station, was received at 7:05 a.m. to-day, and I have the honor to state in reply that I have been engaged with the cavalry of the enemy at that point and in destroying communications, and beg to inclose a copy of an order received from headquarters cavalry corps.²

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM W. AVERELL,
Brigadier-General.

About 10:30 p.m. he arrived at Ely's Ford with his command of 3400 sabers and 6 guns (Averell's division, Davis' brigade of Pleasonton's division, and Tidball's battery), and went into bivouac on the north side of the river, confronted on the south side by Stuart with his available cavalry and the 16 N. Ca. infantry, numbering together about 1000 men.³ The squadron of the 6 N. Y. lately on picket at Ely's Ford had fallen back toward United States Ford. Stuart prepared to attack. In the meantime Rodes held a conference with the other division commanders (Colston and Heth) and decided that it would be unadvisable to attempt to carry out a night attack. One of the reasons was that the troops were considerably shaken by the fire of the Federal artillery. The "confusion and disorder" among them, especially on the Plank

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 942.

² Dated April 30, turning the enemy over to Averell (p. 228 *ante*).

³ Von Borecke gives the strength of the infantry alone as about 1000 men (*Memoirs of the Confederate War*, II, 228).

Road, were such as to necessitate his placing guards across the road to stop stragglers.¹ Another was the apprehension of danger to his right and rear from the direction of Hazel Grove. But the one to which he doubtless gave the greatest weight was the general uneasiness and perhaps dismay and paralysis likely to result from the loss of Jackson. It was decided to attack in the morning. Jackson's idea of taking Chancellorsville in rear was not known to Rodes or his advisers. Moreover, Captain Boswell, the officer assigned to Hill to guide him to the rear of Chancellorsville, was killed or mortally wounded by the fire which wounded Jackson. Rodes made his disposition with a view to throwing his force directly upon Chancellorsville. His first line was to be formed of Hill's (now Heth's) division. About 9:45 p.m. Pender deployed his brigade ($\frac{2}{I, II}$) on Lane's left, and about 11 p.m. Thomas deployed his ($\frac{6}{I, II}$) on Pender's left. The other brigades were not yet up. But while Rodes was making these preparations, steps were being taken to give the corps another commander. About 10 p.m. Hill, who had remained in a litter near the line of battle, and had, as already stated, turned the command of the corps over to Rodes, sent to Ely's Ford for Stuart to come and take command of it. Rodes says that Stuart was sent for by Major Pendleton, Jackson's assistant adjutant-general.² Hill and R. E. Lee say that he was "sent for," but do not specify by whom.³ Stuart says that the message was borne and delivered to him by Captain Adams of General Hill's staff.⁴ A Southern writer says that Jackson upon the wounding of Hill "expressed a desire that General Stuart should direct the subsequent movements of his corps." But he adds that General Rodes had already dispatched a messenger to Stuart.⁵ According to another Southern writer, Jackson was not instrumental in transferring the command of his corps to Stuart, but was in a measure responsible for it. He might have prevented it, but permitted it, and acquiesced in it.⁶

The brigadiers of General Jackson's corps, after determining to offer the temporary command to General Stuart, sent Captain Wilbourn [Jackson's signal officer] to General Lee to announce what had been done, and to request that he would himself come to that side and assume the direction of affairs!⁷

Captain Wilbourn was accompanied on this errand by Captain Hotchkiss, one of Jackson's topographical engineer officers.

On the side of the Federals, Reynolds' two divisions continued moving up from United States Ford, catching more and more of the din and

¹ Rodes' report, *W. R.*, 39, p. 942.

² *Ib.*

³ *Ib.*, 39, pp. 885, 799.

⁴ *Ib.*, 39, p. 887.

⁵ *Life of Stonewall Jackson*, by A. Virginian, p. 255.

⁶ *Life of Lieutenant-General T. J. Jackson*, by Dabney, II, 474, 475.

⁷ *Ib.*, p. 478.

rear of the contest in front of Fairview. At last, not far from Chandler's, they halt and load their pieces, but only to unload them, and be off in obedience to another order:

Chancellorsville, Va., May 2, 1863, 9:45 p.m.

General Reynolds:

The orders for the position of your corps and Sykes' divisions were communicated to you under the impression that General Sykes was already on Hunting Run. This is not the case; hence the general desires that you will hold the right of the line extending along Hunting Run and resting on the Rapidan, and that General Sykes' right will rest on your left along the Ely's Ford and Chancellorsville road. The general desires that you make yourself particularly strong where this road crosses Hunting Run.

J. H. VAN ALLEN,

Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp.

As their shuffling footfalls pass on down the moonlit road, the thickets are awakened with cheers and the strains of the grimly humorous Northern song: "John Brown's body lies a-mouldering in the grave."

About 10 p.m. Mott's brigade ($\frac{3}{2. III}$), except the 7 N. J., started from the United States Ford for Chancellorsville, and Sickles received through Colonel Hart permission to make his proposed attack. The colonel was sent to communicate with Williams and Berry, and returned at 11 with the report that those officers were ready.¹ This report appears to have been erroneous and unwarranted. General Berry, who was killed next day, left no report of his action or understanding in the matter; the report of Captain Poland, his chief of staff, contains no mention of it, nor is there any reference to it in the report of General Carr, who succeeded Berry, or in that of either brigade commander present.² General Williams says:

During the evening a staff officer of General Sickles' corps communicated to me the intention of attacking the enemy on his [the enemy's] right flank in the woods with at least one brigade of that corps [Sickles']. On account of the position of most of my line, at right angles to the position of General Sickles' troops on the left, and from the evident danger of confusion and mishap in the darkness of the night, I asked this officer to have the attack deferred until I could communicate with General Slocum, who was then at the headquarters of the army. The attack, however, began before I could see General Slocum. . . .³

General Ruger, commanding Williams' 3d brigade, heard unofficially that a night attack was talked of, but had no official notice regarding it.⁴ The other brigade commanders and the corps commander General Slocum appear to have been unprepared for it.⁵

¹ *W. H.*, 39, p. 389.

² *Ib.*, 39, pp. 450, 445, 461, 462.

³ *Ib.*, 39, p. 679.

⁴ *Ib.*, 39, p. 709.

⁵ *Ib.*, 39, pp. 686, 698, 670.

About 11 p.m. the XI Corps was reorganized in the vicinity of Chancellorsville.¹ Regarding the artillery of this corps, the battery of the First Division (Dieckmann's) was lost. The battery of the Second Division (Wiedrich's) lost two pieces; the remaining four were still at Chandler's, refitting and recuperating. The battery of the Third Division (Dilger's) lost one piece; the remaining five pieces were in the line of artillery at Fairview. Here, too, was one section of Hill's West Virginia battery of the reserve, or corps, artillery.² The other two batteries and the remainder of Hill's battery were probably at Chandler's.

Regarding the situation about Fredericksburg, Van Alen wrote to Butterfield at 10 p.m.:

General Sedgwick's dispatch [of 8 p.m. to Butterfield] has been received. It does not alter in any sense the character of the instructions sent General Sedgwick [at 9 p.m.]. They must be fully carried out to the very letter. This is vitally important. Gibbon must cross the river to-night.

11 p.m. to 12 p.m. (Map 23)

Sickles, having authority for his night attack, and, as he understood, assurance of coöperation from Williams and Berry, ordered Birney to advance. Pursuant to this order, Birney's 2d and 3d brigades (Ward's and Hayman's) were formed one in rear of the other, or in two echelons. In the first line of the first echelon were the six regiments of the 2d brigade, except the 20 Ind., which had not yet returned from its position south of the railroad cut. In this echelon were also the 63 Pa. of the 1st brigade (Graham's) and the 17 Me. of the 3d. These two regiments followed the 40 N. Y. of the 2d brigade, and the three regiments marched by the road and the open space on each side of it (the Vista) in column of companies at full distance.³ On their right the other regiments of the first echelon (2d brigade) formed a line of companies at deploying intervals, each company in column of fours. The second echelon was about 100 yards in rear of the first, and consisted of the four remaining regiments of the 3d brigade, also in company columns of fours at deploying intervals. The lines advanced by the light of the moon, with bayonets fixed and pieces uncapped, and with orders not to fire until the Plank Road and Slocum's Log Works were reached.⁴ There were no skirmishers or ground scouts in advance, and the enemy's position had not been located. The center of the Federal mass rushed into the

¹ Schurz's report, *W. R.*, 39, p. 657.

² *Ib.*, 39, p. 249.

Warren says in his report: "To the credit of the artillery of the Eleventh Corps that came off the field, it went into battle on this line [Fairview] with the greatest alacrity" (*W. R.*, 39, p. 200). It does not seem probable, however, that more than

Dilger's five and Hill's two pieces took position there.

³ The average company was about 40 strong, or the equivalent of a platoon in the U. S. Army of to-day on a war footing, as contemplated in its present drill regulations.

⁴ Birney's report, *W. R.*, 39, p. 409.

interval between the Federal and Confederate lines; the right struck the center of Williams' division ($\frac{1}{XII}$); and the left, the right of Lane's brigade ($\frac{4}{I, II}$). Receiving the cross-fire of friend and foe, the troops, despite the injunction to the contrary, opened fire, and dashed through the darkness at whatever might be in front of them. Those on the right charged a battery of the XII Corps before they discovered that they were attacking friends.¹ The three regiments in column of companies had to change, on reaching the end of the Vista, into a column of fours. The two foremost regiments were thrown into considerable disorder, but were reformed, and this portion of the line produced some consternation in Lane's brigade. But it was repulsed. The troops in the center, practically beating the air, reached the Plank Road, but could not hold it. Slocum says: "As I had not been informed that a night attack was contemplated by our forces, I supposed on hearing the firing that the enemy were advancing on Williams' division, and at once opened upon them with our artillery. General Williams also fired upon all lines that made their appearance in his front. I have no information as to the damage suffered by our troops from our own fire, but fear that our losses must have been severe."² But Best, who commanded the artillery, says: "So far as I can learn, and I am happy to record it, not one of our men was killed by our fire or indeed wounded." Ruger, whose brigade ($\frac{3}{I, XII}$) was nearest Sickles' corps, reports that when the attack occurred he gave orders to his regimental commanders to keep their men steady, and not to fire unless fired into, as he "believed the attack was by Federal troops."³ These orders were obeyed as well as could have been expected. A volley of bullets whistling over the heads of the 3 Wisc. of Ruger's brigade started that regiment partly to firing and partly to running, and the fleeing portion caused the 13 N. J., in its rear, to fire into it. The firing of the 3 Wisc. was kept up briskly for about half an hour.⁴ Knipe's brigade, on Ruger's right, repulsed two advances of the enemy,⁵ and Berry's line, one.⁶ General Williams, describing the operation in a private letter, says:

A tremendous roll of infantry fire, mingled with yellings and shoutings, almost diabolical and infernal, opened the conflict on the side of Sickles' division. For some time my infantry and artillery kept silent, and in the intervals of the musketry I could distinctly hear the oaths and imprecations of the rebel officers, evidently having hard work to keep their men from stampeding. In the meantime Sickles' artillery opened fire over the heads of the infantry, and the din of arms and inhuman yellings and cursings redoubled. All at once Berry's division, across the road on our right, opened in heavy volleys, and Knipe, commanding my right brigade next to the road on the south, followed suit.

Best began to thunder with his thirty-odd pieces. In front, and on the flank,

¹ *W. R.*, 39, pp. 430, 437.


² *Ib.*, 39, p. 670.

³ *Ib.*, 39, p. 708.

⁴ *Ib.*, 39, pp. 715, 720.

⁵ *Ib.*, 39, p. 687.

⁶ *Ib.*, 39, p. 449.



shell and shot and bullets were poured into these woods, which were evidently crowded with rebel masses preparing for the morning attack. . . .

Human language can give no idea of such a scene—such an infernal and yet sublime combination of sound and flame and smoke, and dreadful yells of rage, of pain, of triumph, or of defiance.

As Sickles' two brigades fell back from the Plank Road, portions of them were thrown into confusion, and ran to the rear, apparently as much panic-stricken as any of Howard's men had been, having to be rallied at the point of the bayonet.¹

The start and the return of these troops were witnessed by Barlow's brigade ($\frac{2}{2 \text{ XI}}$), which had formed up at Hazel Grove (Map 23). The brigade had lost all its knapsacks by leaving them in its camp near Dowdall's Tavern.

What sort of support Sickles expected from Berry's and Williams' lines can only be conjectured, but it is safe to say that it was something aggressive, and was not furnished. For this, Berry does not seem to have been at all responsible. Williams, in the absence of his corps commander, should have made all necessary arrangements for action by his division. But in spite of faults and mishaps, Sickles' night attack justified itself. The gun and three caissons which had been lost in the Vista were retaken and brought in. Sickles took up and held a more advanced position. He did not gain the Plank Road, and so could not establish the desired connection with the main force under Hooker. But he got where he could cut a road that would answer his purpose. His pickets formed connection on their right with those of the XII Corps.

We left Stuart preparing to attack Averell. Before his preparations were completed he received Hill's message to the effect that both Jackson and Hill had been wounded, and that the command of Jackson's corps devolved upon him. His infantry, the 16 N. Ca., having already deployed, he ordered it to fire three rounds into the enemy's camp, and then retire and join its brigade. Without awaiting the result of this fire, and leaving Fitzhugh Lee and his cavalry to guard the road from Ely's Ford, he hastened to assume the responsibility so unexpectedly devolved upon him.²

Across the Rapidan Averell's men had lighted fires, made coffee, and were enjoying their pipes, some had already lain down to sleep, when they were startled by a rattle of musketry and a rain of bullets. The horses stampeded, creating confusion among the men. The men rushed

¹ *The Three Years' Service of the 33d Mass. Infantry Regiment*, by A. B. Underwood, pp. 68, 69; *W. R.*, 39, p. 418.

² *Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry*, by McClellan, p. 235. The cavalry remained in

observation between the left of Stuart's infantry and Ely's Ford. The 16 N. Ca. rejoined its brigade ($\frac{2}{1 \text{ II}}$) at 3 a.m. (*W. R.*, 39, p. 937).

for their arms and returned the fire until it stopped.¹ It was necessary to wait for morning to try to recover the scattered horses.

Averell received the following communication from Butterfield, sent probably before Jackson's attack:

The major-general commanding has directed that you report to him in person with your entire command, save one regiment. This regiment you will direct, in accordance with the commanding general's instructions, to be employed in patrolling the country between the Aquia Railroad and Orange and Alexandria Railroad. This regiment must be kept well thrown out, for the purpose of giving timely notice of any raids, and destroying any guerilla parties that may invade that district. . . .

Similar instructions to the above were sent you when your command was at Rapidan Station. Up to this time they have not been complied with. The major-general commanding directs it to be done immediately.

Best's artillery and Berry's infantry covered themselves with hasty intrenchments. About midnight the 7 N. J. started from Humphreys' left and the 11 Mass. from Hancock's front to rejoin their respective brigades ($\frac{3.1}{2.111}$).²

Reynolds, with his two divisions ($\frac{2.3}{1}$), was toiling on, harking to the diapason of musketry and artillery on the Plank Road, and pondering on a sound as of infantry volleys coming for a short time from the direction of Ely's Ford. The noise finally subsided, and the tired soldiers of both armies lay down, looking up through the dark foliage at the moon and stars, and lulled by "the weird, plaintive notes of the whip-poorwills, which were never known to sing so long and loud as they did that Saturday night at Chancellorsville."³

As it appeared that the Chancellor House would be under fire, all the wounded, except five or six severe cases which were likely to be injured by being moved, were sent to-day to the corps hospitals in the vicinity of Potomac Bridge.

In the course of the day the Federal right wing gained by reënforcement about 9000 men and 45 pieces of artillery. Estimating the losses at about 3000 men and 8 pieces of artillery, Hooker had at midnight under his immediate command about 76,000 men with 244 pieces of artillery. The Confederates received no reënforcements. They lost one battery of 4 pieces, sent away by General Lee, one regiment of infantry detached from McGowan's brigade, and about 1250 men killed, wounded, or missing. This left them at midnight, under Lee and Stuart, facing Hooker, about 43,000 men with 132 pieces of artillery.⁴

¹ *History of the 3 Pa. Cav.*, by Committee, pp. 232, 233.

² *W. R.*, 39, pp. 478, 452.

³ *Slocum and his Men*, by Committee, p. 164.

	INFANTRY	CAVALRY	ARTILLERY	AGGREGATE
Federal	70,207	1,175	4,841	76,223
Confederate	38,470	1,933	2,640	43,043

Captured pieces are not counted.

CHAPTER XXI

MAY 2 (CONTINUED) . . . THE LEFT WING. COMMENTS

AT 5:05 a.m. Butterfield telegraphed to Hooker:

Dispatch dated 1:55 o'clock [a.m.] for removal of Reynolds and bridges just received 4:55 o'clock [a.m.]. . . . Copy has been delivered to Sedgwick.¹ It cannot be complied with as regards before daylight.

The bridges could hardly be taken up without attracting the attention of the enemy and indicating to him that he was free to move upon Chancellorsville, for taking up the bridges meant withdrawing all the Federal troops from the south side of the river. But the troops were needed at Chancellorsville. An attempt had, therefore, to be made to get them there, and at the same time to keep the enemy from going in that direction. Reynolds' Second and Third Divisions, on the north bank, were put in motion up the river, and his First Division, on the south bank, was ordered to recross and follow them. Newton's division ($\frac{3}{VI}$) came down from Franklin's Crossing to cover these operations and make a show of force, but could not prevent the enemy's artillery from firing with effect at the division recrossing the river. Sedgwick at 8:55 a.m. sent the following report to Butterfield:

General Reynolds' movement will be a little delayed in consequence of the heavy shelling they have given him. His infantry have been in motion for some time, and the whole movement will be pushed.²

He received the following dispatch from Reynolds, sent at 11:05 a.m.:

The troops are all [back] across [the river] and moving up the road. The bridge is on this side and being taken apart. The enemy interfered in no way except with his artillery, one shot striking the bridge while the troops were crossing, delaying us until a new boat could be put in. I report that pontoon bridge will be piled on this side and left. There are no trains to haul them off.³

The bridge material was guarded by Wheaton's brigade ($\frac{3}{a-VI}$) from Franklin's Crossing.⁴

Reynolds remained at the crossing below to superintend the with-

¹ Butterfield's dispatch transmitting the order was marked 5 a.m. (*W. R.*, 40, p. 361). Sedgwick received it at 5:25 a.m. (*ib.*, 39, p. 558), and Reynolds at 7 a.m. (*ib.*, 39, p. 254).

² *Ib.*, 107, p. 1034.

³ *Ib.*

⁴ For the story of a curiously erroneous description of this operation, the reader is referred to *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, by William Swinton, p. 274, foot-note.

drawal of his First Division, and having done so, proceeded to overtake the head of his column. He was in doubt, it seems, as to whether he should direct his march with regard primarily to rapidity or to concealment. On this point he was advised by Butterfield as follows:

In regard to your line of march, the general indicated no route. Under present circumstances the shortest line would seem to be the one [for you to take], but you must consider whether the fire your troops would receive from the enemy's artillery while passing along the River road, the guns of the enemy in position, etc., would make it proper for you to diverge for a short time to avoid it; time is everything. . . .

The head of his column was already directed upon Hartwood Church to proceed thence to United States Ford. There was no attempt made to conceal the march, and it was observed, at least in part, by the enemy. Pendleton says that he and Barksdale united in a note to Early stating that the Federals "appeared massing troops toward Falmouth."¹ Barksdale says: "appearances indicated that the enemy were leaving their encampments on this side the river, and were marching to reënforce Hooker."² Early makes no reference to the movement or to the note mentioned by Pendleton. Reynolds was probably in the vicinity of Falmouth when he received from Butterfield the following dispatch:

The telegraph operator just reports that the rebels are evacuating Banks' Ford and moving toward the firing [Chancellorsville].³ It may be that this ford will be opened at any time and the bridge[s] thrown over. Keep yourself in communication with me as far as possible, to be advised of this. It would seem to be proper, if an opportunity occurs, that you should cross there, and reënforce General Hooker, and so shorten the line. You had better send a staff officer ahead to Banks' Ford, if communication is opened there, and communicate with General Hooker.

Reynolds went to the ford himself, but finding that no bridge had been thrown, made no change in his line of march.

On the withdrawal of Reynolds' corps (I) the only Federal troops left on the Confederate side of the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg were Brooks' division ($\frac{4}{1. VI}$) and Burnham's light division ($\frac{4}{VI}$) with Williston's battery ($\frac{4}{1. VI}$).

At Franklin's Crossing the enemy was much more threatening than he was at Reynolds'. The danger of recrossing the river and taking up the bridges in the presence of the enemy, together with the significance of such action to the enemy, determined Sedgwick to leave things as they were, until he could hear from headquarters. He wrote to Butterfield:

I have not dared to take up the bridge at Franklin's Crossing. Reynolds' bridge ought not to be taken away until after dark; it may cost the loss of many

¹ W. R., 39, p. 811.

² *Ib.*, 39, p. 839.

³ This report was without foundation.

boats. Will pontoon wagons be sent to take them at dusk? Shall the bridges at Franklin's Crossing be taken up at dark without further instructions? Please communicate [answer].

This message was delivered to Butterfield and repeated by him to Hooker at 10 a.m. In a dispatch of 2:30 p.m. Van Alen said to Butterfield: "The bridge[s] can be taken up at such time as General Sedgwick thinks best." Under this authority the three bridges were left, one piled on the bank of the river at Fitzhugh's Crossing, the other two spanning the river at Franklin's Crossing.

The telegraph line was extended this morning by a spur from England to the vicinity of Scott's Ford. The regiment and brigade ordered to Banks' Ford ($\frac{19}{1.2.11}, \frac{2}{2.11}$) arrived there at an early hour, also a signal party which established a flag and torch station to open communication with the troops on the south bank as they approached the ford. But only Confederate troops showed themselves. Wilcox with his brigade ($\frac{4}{1.1}$) and two batteries ($\frac{2}{1.1}$) arrived on the south bank about the same time as the Federals on the north bank. The Federal regiment left at Falmouth ($\frac{20}{3.1.V}$) took post probably between Banks' Ford and United States Ford to guard the telegraph line.¹

Wilcox received an order from Lee to leave a small force to watch the ford, if in his judgment the enemy did not intend to cross there, and move up the Plank Road, reporting the fact to Lee. But the movements of Federal troops on the opposite side of the river determined him to remain at the ford.²

At 10:13 a.m. Butterfield wrote to Hooker inquiring whether General Gibbon was to move to-day with his division to Banks' Ford or to wait until the ford was uncovered. At 2:30 p.m. he received the reply:

. . . no orders have been sent for General Gibbon's division to move to Banks' Ford. The order was only for one brigade of his division.

Butterfield wrote further:

To Gibbon, 10:20 a.m.

Two bridges ready to be thrown across [at Banks' Ford] whenever the ford is uncovered. Stoneman's cavalry is supposed to be in the enemy's rear, on the line of his railroad.³ . . .

To Hooker, 2:10 p.m.

. . . Supplies of Howard's, Slocum's, and Meade's infantry expire a.m. of Monday [May 4], unless replenished from the trains. All quiet here.

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 519; *Maine in the War for the Union*, by W. E. S. Whitman and C. H. True, p. 492.

² *W. R.*, 39, p. 855.

³ For approximate position of Stoneman's cavalry see Map 22, sketch in upper right-hand corner.

intended to require a withdrawal, but to leave the question of such a movement, as he did in his order of yesterday, to Early's discretion,—to be decided "according to the force and movements of the enemy near Fredericksburg." By this time it was late in the afternoon. The column was immediately faced about and marched back toward the heights.

On the north side of the Rappahannock numerous dispatches were sent to report movements in rear of Fredericksburg:

Gibbon to Butterfield, 3 p.m.

Reports from my picket line on the right state that the rebels are withdrawing their pickets all along the river above the dam.

Lowe to Butterfield, 4:12 p.m.

The enemy have entirely withdrawn their advance lines with the exception of a small picket force.¹

About 3 p.m. the flag and torch station at Seddon's was broken up, and the telegraph line drawn in from Reynolds' to Sedgwick's headquarters.

Hooker's dispatch of 4:10 p.m. ordering Sedgwick to cross the river, and reporting Sickles among the enemy's trains, reached Sedgwick at 6 p.m. Sedgwick supposed that Hooker when he sent this dispatch had a substantially correct idea of Sedgwick's position on the south side of the Rappahannock between Franklin's Crossing and Fitzhugh's Crossing. He was puzzled, therefore, at being directed to combine a movement on Richmond with the capture of Fredericksburg. He thought that possibly the pursuit which he was to make was not to be directed by the Bowling Green Road, as previous dispatches had indicated, but by the road to Gordonsville. He accordingly sent a request for information.

In reply he received the following dispatch, sent by Butterfield at 7:05 p.m.:

The major-general commanding directs you to pursue the enemy on the Bowling Green road.

He now knew that the capture of Fredericksburg, if expected of him at all, was subordinated to the pursuit of the enemy, and he believed that a march on Richmond would cause the evacuation of the heights and town of Fredericksburg. He therefore ordered his Second and Third Divisions to cross at his lower bridge, or near Mansfield, and had his First Division, Brooks', and one regiment of the light division ($\frac{31}{0.4 \text{ VI}}$) push across the River Road, driving the enemy back behind the

¹ W. R., 107, p. 1035.

railroad, and so open the way to the Bowling Green Road. At 8 p.m. he reported to Butterfield:

General Brooks ($\frac{1}{VI}$) has taken the Bowling Green road in front of him; is still skirmishing, and will advance as long as he can see, and will then take position for the night.

Newton ($\frac{3}{VI}$) is moving in the direction of Hamilton's crossing, and at daylight the entire corps will be in motion.

Sedgwick thought that the Bowling Green Road went through Hamilton's Crossing. By *Bowling Green road* he meant *River road*. When he wrote this dispatch Newton's division was in the act of crossing, about half of it having crossed. Howe's division was in rear of Newton's, waiting for a chance to cross. Sedgwick doubtless intended that, under cover of Brooks' division, the remainder of the corps should file off by the Bowling Green Road toward Richmond, and Brooks bring up the rear. Butterfield believed that an attack upon almost any point of Early's line ought to succeed, and that an attack upon some point of it was about to be made.¹

According to the instructions sent by Van Alen at 10 p.m., Butterfield transmitted to Sedgwick at 10:10 p.m. the instructions contained in the dispatch of 9 p.m. to march through Fredericksburg on Chancellorsville. These reached Sedgwick at 11 p.m.; those of 9 p.m. sent directly to him had not come. If there had been a bridge at Fredericksburg in the possession of the Federals, he would not have hesitated to recross the river where he was and cross it again at Fredericksburg. But there being none, recrossing and crossing again would have been an all-night operation. It was light enough for the enemy to fire with effect upon a party attempting to lay a bridge. It would therefore be necessary, before a bridge could be laid, to drive the enemy away from the opposite bank. To do this from the south bank meant stealing a passage above or below the enemy, as was done at the first battle of Fredericksburg. Sedgwick decided not to recross, but to march by the south bank to Fredericksburg. His four divisions were to march in the following order: Newton ($\frac{3}{VI}$), Burnham ($\frac{4}{VI}$), Howe ($\frac{2}{VI}$), Brooks ($\frac{1}{VI}$); Burnham's division had been attached to Newton's.² At midnight, or

¹ He wrote:

To Sedgwick, 8 p.m.: "Their horses are poor. They cannot but be panic-stricken if you give them a sharp blow in the night. Your opportunities are grand beyond question. I know you will improve them." *Ib.*, 8:25 p.m.: "Can't you take Fredericksburg to-night, so we can commence railroad and telegraph, and pontoon bridge, by daylight?"

To Gibbon, 8:25 p.m.: "Everything work-

ing well. Sickles is in the enemy's trains. Sedgwick is pursuing here. Be ready to spring with your full supplies whenever you receive the order. Expect it at any moment."

To Haupt: "Have all your material, men, and everything ready to move to-night with [construction] train to commence work in the morning, if required. I may telegraph you at any moment."

² *W. R.*, 39, p. 563.

an hour after Sedgwick received his orders, the 1st brigade of Newton's division (Shaler's), which was to form the advance, having thrown out a line of skirmishers, drew out into column of march, and pushed on in the direction of Fredericksburg. Considering that his troops had to be roused and formed, and his orders issued and transmitted, the time spent in initiating the movement was perhaps not excessive. The 1st brigade was followed by the 3d (Wheaton's), and this by the 2d (Browne's). Butterfield, about when he received and transmitted the 9 p.m. dispatch from Hooker directing Sedgwick's movement, sent to Sedgwick a negro who knew the Plank Road to Chancellorsville, and wrote or telegraphed:

To engineer officer: To be ready to lay the pontoon bridge brought up from Fitzhugh's Crossing by midnight, place to be indicated.¹

To Gibbon (received 11 p.m.): To get under way soon and cross the river to Fredericksburg to-night, taking care not to come into contact with Sedgwick.

To Sedgwick: To push on without delay, taking care not to come into contact with Gibbon; to seize citizens and put them to death if they failed to put him on the right road.

Captain Razderichin of Hooker's staff² was sent from Chancellorsville to deliver verbally and explain the instructions forwarded by telegraph. He instructed Sedgwick that he was to fall upon Lee's rear at daylight. At midnight Butterfield wrote to Sedgwick: "It seems to be of vital importance that you should fall upon Lee's rear with crushing force. . . . Give your advance to one who will do all that the urgency of the case requires." General Warren, Hooker's chief of topographical engineers, who knew much of the road which Sedgwick was to march over, left Hooker's headquarters about 10:30 p.m. to join Sedgwick and guide his column from Fredericksburg to Chancellorsville. He was charged, no doubt, too, with keeping Hooker posted as to the progress of Sedgwick's movement.

At 11 p.m. General Gibbon broke up his headquarters, and moved in person down to the river near the Lacy House, where the engineers were at work laying a pontoon bridge, but these were fired on by the enemy in Fredericksburg, and forced to suspend work.

It was night before the Confederates, withdrawn this forenoon from the heights of Fredericksburg, reached them on their return; at

¹ This bridge had been moved by teams to the Lacy House. Benham says in his report that it was moved on the 3d (*W. R.*, 39, pp. 214, 215), but this dispatch and the following one (*ib.*, 40, pp. 360, 368) seem to show that it was moved on the 2d, though not laid until the 3d. The two

bridges at Franklin's Crossing were not moved until the 3d.

Butterfield thought that by midnight Sedgwick might be in possession of Fredericksburg.

² A volunteer aide-de-camp not appointed in orders (*The Campaign of Chancellorsville*, by T. A. Dodge, p. 169).

11 o'clock Early was still engaged in reestablishing and adjusting his lines. Much of his artillery, it seems, went too far to be recalled; at any rate, only a portion of it was brought back.

The participation of the Federal War Department in the direction of operations led to the following correspondence:

Halleck to Dix, 10 a.m.

. . . If, as is supposed, the mass of Longstreet's troops has joined Lee, the demonstration agreed upon [against West Point] should be immediately made.¹

Dix to Halleck

. . . deserters from Pickett's division state that they saw Pickett yesterday, and that no brigades have gone from Longstreet's command. . . . One of the deserters—a Texan—says that Hood was there [before Suffolk] yesterday. Jenkins' division is before Suffolk.²

The substance of the latter dispatch was communicated by Peck directly to Hooker.

Schenck telegraphed to Stanton:

. . . it is desirable I should know whether [whatever?] you can tell me of General Hooker. The night is full of rumors.

Stanton replied:

You may rest assured that General Hooker's operations are progressing successfully and in all respects as desired unless you are otherwise advised by this department.

Any mishap you will be promptly notified of, but, for obvious reasons, details of his movements and position cannot be given while in successful progress.

That the Confederate public was better posted than it should have been on the general situation of the Army of the Potomac may be inferred from the following communication:

Washington, D. C., May 2, 1863, 11 a.m.

Major-General Hooker:

We can not control intelligence in relation to your movements while your generals write letters giving details. A letter from General Van Alen [aide-de-camp] to a person not connected with the War Department describes your position as intrenched at Chancellorsville—can't you give his sword something to do, so that he will have less time for the pen?

EDWIN M. STANTON.

COMMENTS

Jackson's flank march was as brilliant an operation as Hooker's grand turn. His manœuver, like Hooker's, was little favored by secrecy

¹ *W. R.*, 26, p. 682.

² Jenkins commanded a brigade of French's division on the Blackwater.

or concealment, and owed its success particularly to being mistaken for a retreat. The principal circumstances which led to this mistake were:

1. Statements of deserters the day before.
2. The direction of Jackson's march after he turned off the Furnace Road.
3. The expectation that Lee would retreat in consequence of the operation of Stoneman's cavalry.
4. The indications about Fredericksburg that the Confederates were retreating from there,—due to the misinterpretation of the verbal order sent by Lee to Early.

While the Confederate cavalry under Stuart was feeling the Federal lines and driving back their patrols and scouting parties, the Federal cavalry was for the greater part lying idle in camp.¹ Just before Jackson rushed upon Howard's right a reconnoitering party of Howard's cavalry went into the woods in front of the 26 Wisc. On returning about ten minutes later, it informed the officers of this regiment that "it was all right," and then went quietly to rest behind Hawkins' Farm.²

Jackson's attack, which was to give effect to his manœuvre, terminated without having attained its object. Lee's separate fractions, by their skilful and vigorous coöperation, had dealt Hooker a staggering blow, but not a finishing one. They were now themselves in a most critical position. The force which held them at bay might turn against either one and overpower it. It was particularly to prevent such a situation that Jackson had issued his explicit orders that there should be no pause in the advance. He had no doubt expected that before dark he would join hands with Lee and be thanking God with him for the complete rout of the Federal army. He meant that the Federals should be given no time in which to recover from their first surprise and confusion. In this he was disappointed by the halting of his lines as stated about 7:15 by General Rodes.

It is harder to find a commander who will require of troops all that they are capable of than to find one who will not call upon them for more than they are capable of; how rarely and imperfectly, too, are troops prepared by drill or field exercise for doing anything in a state of disorder! Neither Rodes nor Colston asserts or implies that the troops were exhausted or incapable of another effort. They account for their halting by the two conditions of *confusion* and *darkness*.³ If Jackson had been at the front, the advance would have continued. What the effect would have been is a question on which historians differ. With Map 21 and the foregoing account before him, the reader may be able to answer it to his satisfaction.

Had Jackson not been wounded and disabled, he might have carried

¹ The 8 Pa. took this occasion to change its organization from a three-battalion to a two-battalion regiment.

² *W. R.*, 39, p. 654.

³ *Ib.*, 39, pp. 941, 1004. See also Colston in *B. and L.*, III, 233.

CHAPTER XXII

MAY 3 . . . BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE UNTIL 9 A.M.

Preparation (Map 23, Plan 3)

STUART arrived from Ely's Ford about midnight.¹ The command of Jackson's troops was formally turned over to him by General Hill, though he himself had previously yielded it to General Rodes.² How this treatment of General Rodes was taken by that officer is best told in his own words:

I yielded the command to General Stuart, not because I thought him entitled to it, belonging as he does to a different arm of the service, nor because I was unwilling to assume the responsibility of carrying on the attack, as I had already made the necessary arrangements and they remained unchanged, but because, from the manner in which I had been informed that he had been sent for, I inferred that General Jackson or General Hill had instructed Major Pendleton to place him in command, and for the still stronger reason that I feared that the information that the command had devolved on me, unknown except to my own immediate troops, would, in their shaken condition, be likely to increase the demoralization of the corps. General Stuart's name was well and very favorably known to the army, and would tend, I hoped, to reestablish confidence. I yielded because I was satisfied the good of the service demanded it.³

Stuart heard of Sickles' "midnight" attack, and was informed that there was much confusion on the Confederate right owing to the fact that certain troops there had mistaken friends for the enemy and fired into them. Apprehending that the Federals would repeat their attack, and the Confederates their mistake, he decided to suspend operations until daylight.⁴ He had no intimation from Jackson that the latter was aiming at the White House (Chandler's). No one under Jackson knew of his intention of gaining Hooker's rear except A. P. Hill, his second in command.⁵ The Confederates, it seems, did not know by what troops they had been attacked on their right, or that Sickles had returned from the Furnace. They apprehended a hostile force being somewhere in that direction, but seemed not to suspect the proximity

¹ Stuart erroneously says 10 p.m. (*W. R.*, 39, p. 88). See McClellan's *Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry*, pp. 235, 247, 248.

² *W. R.*, 39, pp. 887, 942.

³ *Ib.*, 39, pp. 942, 943.

⁴ *Ib.*, 39, p. 887.

⁵ *Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War*, by Lieutenant-Colonel Henderson, II, 560.

of so large a force as Sickles'. T. J. Leigh, aide-de-camp to General Ward, was taken prisoner between 12 and 1 a.m. Some of the enemy said to him in a very confident tone: "We got Dan Sickles' corps cut off, and we 'll capture the whole of them."¹

All through the night Confederate troops came up from the rear and took their places in the new lines. About 12 p.m. McGowan ($\frac{3}{1.11}$) formed on Lane's right, obliquely to Lane, so as to face Sickles. Brockenbrough, commanding Heth's brigade ($\frac{1}{1.11}$), formed it in rear of Pender's and Lane's, in immediate support of the center. Archer's brigade ($\frac{5}{1.11}$) broke up its bivouac about midnight, and took up the march for the front. In rear of A. P. Hill's (now Heth's) (1st) division, Colston's (4th) division formed an irregular second line.² Rodes' (2d) division was at Dowdall's Tavern, reformed or reforming.³ At 3 a.m. the 16 N. Ca. rejoined its brigade (Pender's $\frac{2}{1.1}$) from Ely's Ford. The cavalry, under Fitzhugh Lee, was in observation between Ely's Ford and the left of Stuart's infantry.

Stuart dispatched Major Pendleton, Jackson's assistant adjutant-general, to inform Jackson of the situation, obtain his views upon it, and learn his wishes. Jackson had been conveyed to the corps hospital at Wilderness Tavern. Chloroform having been administered to him, a round ball, used with the Springfield musket, was removed from his right hand, and his left arm amputated two inches below the shoulder. He was recovering from the effects of these operations when, about 3:30 a.m., Major Pendleton arrived at the hospital, and asked to see him. At first the surgeon declined to permit an interview, but the major urged that the safety of the army and the success of the cause might depend upon his seeing him, and he was permitted to do so. Pendleton briefly explained the condition of affairs, and asked what should be done. Jackson was at once interested, and asked, in his quick, rapid way, a number of questions. When they were answered he remained silent for a moment, evidently trying to concentrate his thoughts. He seemed to have succeeded, but it was only for a moment. Presently he answered very feebly and sadly: "I don't know, I can't tell; say to General Stuart he must do what he thinks best."

Stuart doubtless heard from Hill of Jackson's purpose of turning the position of Chancellorsville;⁴ but, as previously stated, the officer who

¹ *W. R.*, 118, pp. 624, 625.

² A. P. Hill in his report places his division in the second line (*W. R.*, 39, p. 886). But see Heth's report (*ib.*, p. 891), and Colston's (*ib.*, pp. 1005, 1008).

³ The 12 S. Ca. of McGowan's brigade and 23 Ga. of Colquitt's were absent,—the former guarding prisoners, the latter captured.

⁴ Hunter McGuire, late medical director of Jackson's corps, says: "... after the battle, when still well enough to talk, he [Jackson] told me that he had intended, after breaking into Hooker's rear, to take and fortify a suitable position, cutting him off from the river and so hold him until, between himself and General Lee, the great Federal host should be broken to pieces.

was to have guided the column in this movement was killed or mortally wounded. Besides, he must have doubted the feasibility of this operation. Having decided not to act until morning, he could not expect to find the direct way to Hooker's rear unguarded. Moreover, a movement by his left would take him further away from Lee. He decided to consult Lee. In the meantime he ordered Colonel Alexander, his senior artillery officer, to occupy with artillery all points along the line bearing upon the Federal position. In this duty Alexander was engaged most of the night. He placed Marye's and Brunson's batteries of Walker's battalion (1. II), numbering 8 pieces, in two lines about 300 yards apart, on and near the Plank Road, the second line to fire over the first and the adjoining infantry. The other three batteries of Walker's battalion and Page's battery of Carter's battalion (2. II)—18 pieces—were posted or massed on or near roads leading to Hazel Grove, to support or accompany infantry advancing upon that point.¹ This left him a reserve of 96 pieces, without counting the 10 pieces of horse artillery which were sent to the left to coöperate with the cavalry under Fitzhugh Lee in guarding against an attack from Ely's Ford. The corps artillery was parked near Dowdall's Tavern.

The messengers from Jackson's corps, Captain Wilbourn and Captain Hotchkiss, making a wide detour to avoid Sickles' scouts and pickets, reached General Lee's headquarters between midnight and three o'clock this morning, and found the commander-in-chief resting upon a bed of straw. When he heard of General Jackson's misfortune, he exclaimed with emotion: "Thank God it is no worse! God be praised he is still alive!" Then he added: "Any victory is a dear one that deprives us of the services of Jackson, even for a short time." When reminded that General Rodes was now the senior officer in the corps, he said he was a gallant, efficient, and energetic officer. But he acquiesced in the selection of General Stuart to lead the troops on that day.² One of the officers remarked that he believed it was General Jackson's intention to have pressed the enemy on Sunday, had he been spared. General Lee said quietly: "These people shall be pressed to-day." He wrote to Stuart:

3 a.m. It is necessary that the glorious victory thus far achieved be prosecuted with the utmost vigor, and the enemy given no time to rally. As soon, therefore, as it is possible, they must be pressed so that we can unite the two wings of the army.

He had no fear. It was then that I heard him say: "We sometimes fail to drive them from position, they always fail to drive us" (*So. Hist. Soc. Papers*, XXV, 110). It would seem that Jackson never knew of Colquitt's blunder and the danger of an attack from the direction of Hazel Grove. Had he known the situation as it was, he

would hardly have thought of directing his main force toward Hooker's communications. J. B. Jr.

¹ Alexander and Pegram differ in their reports as to the strength and disposition of this artillery (*W. R.*, 39, pp. 823, 938).

² *Life of Lieutenant-General T. J. Jackson*, by R. L. Dabney, II, 479.

Sykes' infantry (2. V), contracting its line, took position along the Ely's Ford Road, on the left of the I Corps, covering the road to United States Ford, its left near the junction of this road and the Ely's Ford Road. The infantry of Griffin's division ($\frac{1}{V}$) formed on Sykes' left, connecting him with Chandler's (Map 23). At 5 a.m. Humphreys' infantry (3. V) was moving up toward Chandler's. Wadsworth's division ($\frac{1}{I}$) reached United States Ford and commenced crossing about 3 a.m. At 5 a.m. its four brigades were taking up positions, the 2d and 4th in support of Sykes ($\frac{2}{V}$), and the 1st and 3d in support of Robinson ($\frac{2}{I}$). The battery which crossed the river with it ($\frac{3}{I.I}$) joined the artillery park, it seems, at the Red House.

The infantry of the XI Corps formed on the ground vacated by that of the V. Schurz (3. XI) took the left, von Steinwehr (2. XI), with only Buschbeck's brigade, the center, and Devens (3. XI) the right.

Seeley with 4 guns of his battery ($\frac{4}{2.III}$), together with Mott's brigade ($\frac{3}{2.III}$), including the 7 N. J., arrived at the front about 2 a.m. Mott's brigade took position in rear of Williams' line on the left of the Plank Road. The battery was held in reserve near Chancellorsville. The 5 pieces of Dilger's battery (1. XI) and the 2 pieces of Hill's went from Best's line at Fairview to United States Ford. Of the 34 pieces of the II Corps at the front, 27 (including the 15 of Comstock's line) were sent by the corps commander, General Couch, pursuant to an order from Hooker, to the Red House near United States Ford.¹ The 4 N. Y., a 6-gun battery of Berry's division, was sent from Best's line by order of General Hooker to the ford, to be unhorsed and dismantled to refit other batteries of the division.² So, through the gray of the morning, 40 guns and caissons went rumbling past the sleeping camps, rocking and reeling, further and further away from the impending battle. Bailey's battery ($\frac{1}{1.XII}$) of 4 guns, in Best's line, was broken up. Two pieces were sent to General Meade, and 2 to Muhlenberg. Hampton's battery ($\frac{2}{2.XII}$) of 6 guns was sent from Muhlenberg to Best. This left Muhlenberg with 10 pieces and Best with 26, without counting the 2 pieces of Dimick's in line with the infantry.³

Chancellorsville was covered on the east, or the side of Fredericksburg, by Hancock's division ($\frac{1}{II}$) and Carroll's (1st) brigade of French's

¹ *W. R.*, 39, pp. 309, 360, 380; *ib.*, 40, Memoranda, p. 359; *B. and L.*, III, 167. The pieces of the II Corps left at the front were the 4 of Pettit's (1. 1. II) with Muhlenberg, and the 3 of Thomas' (2. 1. II) with Hancock.

² *W. R.*, 39, pp. 406, 484, 485.

³ Muhlenberg....Pettit ($\frac{1}{1.II}$) 4 pieces, Lewis ($\frac{1}{3.III}$) 2 pieces,
 Bailey ($\frac{1}{1.XII}$) 2 pieces, Crosby ($\frac{3}{1.XII}$) 2 pieces.
 Best.....Winslow ($\frac{1}{2.III}$) 6 pieces, McLean ($\frac{2}{2.III}$) 6 pieces,
 Dimick ($\frac{3}{2.III}$) 4 pieces, Winegar ($\frac{2}{1.XII}$) 6 pieces,
 Crosby ($\frac{3}{1.XII}$) 4 pieces.

division ($\frac{1}{11}$), on the south by Geary's and part of Williams' divisions ($\frac{1}{11}$), and on the west by the remainder of Williams' division (except the 10th Maine battalion). Berry's division ($\frac{1}{11}$), Hays' brigade ($\frac{2}{11}$), and Mott's brigade ($\frac{3}{11}$). The 10th Maine battalion (three companies) was placed on guard at the rear to prevent the escape of stragglers.¹

Nature drove the 11 N. J. on the left of Berry's second line, was moved to the left where it rested on the Plank Road. The 11 Mass., on arriving from in front of Hancock, was placed on the right of this regiment. The 16 Mass. was moved to the right in support of the 26 Pa. The 13 N. Y. was relieved by the 3 Md. of Sumner's corps, and placed in the second line. It was ordered to take position on the right of the division, and its commander says in his report that it did so. But the reports of other commanders indicate that it did not, and that it was practically lost. It must, however, be reckoned as a part of Berry's available force. The 7 N. J. of Mott's brigade ($\frac{1}{11}$) was detached to the left to complete the connection between Sickles and Sumner. The formation of the opposing forces on either side of the Plank Road about 3 a.m. is shown in Plan 5. The infantry, including Birney's and Whipple's at Hazel Grove, numbered in effective ranks and men about 27,000. Sumner's infantry numbered about 31,000. The new lines formed during the night and morning, extending from near Hazel Grove generally northward to the right of Reynolds' corps, but here or were being strengthened with elements of artillery except, it would seem, a portion of Williams' line. These works were about 1,000 feet apart, made of logs or the great crossing, and were covered with abatis.

The chief obstacle to the way of Lee's junction with Stuart was the position of Sickles with his command on the right of Hazel Grove. These were the only positions which made Hazel Grove an important objective of the Confederates and a valuable possession to the Federals. It was the line between a Federal position and a Confederate one, and was an important position from which to operate on either side of that point. It was a position of great importance, and was the center of the Williams' division of about 10,000 men. In the hands of the Confederates it would command the road with an entrenchment and reverse fire. The position was on the Plank Road under Hazel Grove and the western end of the line on Williams' way to be regarded as a fortified flank of the

the line of the Confederates was broken at Hazel Grove. It was a point of great importance, and was the center of the Williams' division of about 10,000 men. In the hands of the Confederates it would command the road with an entrenchment and reverse fire.

1st	10,000
2nd	10,000
3rd	10,000
4th	10,000
5th	10,000
6th	10,000
7th	10,000
8th	10,000
9th	10,000
10th	10,000
11th	10,000
12th	10,000
13th	10,000
14th	10,000
15th	10,000
16th	10,000
17th	10,000
18th	10,000
19th	10,000
20th	10,000
21st	10,000
22nd	10,000
23rd	10,000
24th	10,000
25th	10,000
26th	10,000
27th	10,000
28th	10,000
29th	10,000
30th	10,000
31st	10,000
32nd	10,000
33rd	10,000
34th	10,000
35th	10,000
36th	10,000
37th	10,000
38th	10,000
39th	10,000
40th	10,000
41st	10,000
42nd	10,000
43rd	10,000
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84th	10,000
85th	10,000
86th	10,000
87th	10,000
88th	10,000
89th	10,000
90th	10,000
91st	10,000
92nd	10,000
93rd	10,000
94th	10,000
95th	10,000
96th	10,000
97th	10,000
98th	10,000
99th	10,000
100th	10,000

ney's division followed Whipple's. Barlow with his brigade ($\frac{2}{2. XI}$) left Sickles to join his corps.

Before daylight Perry's brigade ($\frac{3}{1. I}$) on Anderson's right was put in motion toward the left and rear to clear the country, if necessary, of the enemy, and feel for Jackson's corps (Map 24). About daylight three rifled pieces of Jordan's battery (Alexander's battalion, I), and Posey's brigade ($\frac{2}{1. I}$), marched by the west side of Scott's Run to the Furnace. Finding the country clear of the enemy, this force went on past the Furnace in advance of Perry's brigade toward Hazel Grove. At the same time Mahone's brigade ($\frac{1}{1. I}$) on the right, its right resting on the Plank Road, gained ground to the front; and Wright's ($\frac{5}{1. I}$), between Posey's and Mahone's, conformed roughly to the movement of Posey's, the whole line pivoting on Mahone's. These movements were through a dense wood and shrubbery, making regular alignments impossible, and progress in any formation slow and fatiguing. No two of these four brigades were in sight or hailing distance of each other. McLaws on the Turnpike felt Hancock's skirmish line with skirmishers.

At early dawn Stuart's men were under arms, but not ready to advance. Rodes was to issue rations, and in the meantime the lines on the right of the Plank Road were to be straightened out perpendicularly thereto.¹ About 5:30 Lane started to execute a partial wheel to the left that should bring his brigade into line with the troops on its left. McGowan and Archer moved out straight to their front. These movements were hardly started when Stuart ordered his whole first line to advance, and the second and third lines to follow. Accounting for this action, he says in his report: "... when, as a preliminary to an attack, I ordered the right of the first line to swing around and come perpendicular to the road, the order was misunderstood for an order to attack, and that part of the line became engaged."² Colonel Perrin, commanding McGowan's brigade, says: "I received orders to advance, which was done, . . . the plan of the advance not having been communicated to me."³ Archer makes no mention of orders, but says: "about sunrise we moved forward to the attack."⁴ It can hardly be doubted that McGowan and Archer understood the orders which they received, and carried them out, but that they were not the orders which Stuart meant them to receive, and which Lane did receive. It is probable that Stuart gave his orders to Lane in person, and sent them to McGowan and Archer verbally, by a courier or staff officer, who delivered them incorrectly. But if they had been delivered correctly, the result would have been the same. The lines could not be straightened out without a fight. Had the movement been delayed a little longer the Confederates might have occupied Hazel Grove without firing a

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 887. ³ *Ib.*, 39, p. 907.

² *Ib.*


⁴ *Ib.*, 39, p. 925. The sun rose red and clear; not a cloud was to be seen.

MAP 24

CHANCELLORSVILLE

Positions of Troops at 5 a.m.
May 3, 1863

Green Federal Red Confederate



11

11

shot. About 6 a.m. the skirmishers along Stuart's whole front started forward, followed by the first line of battle (Heth's division, including Brockenbrough's brigade). None of the second line (Colston's) started forward at this time. While five of Heth's brigades were still working their way through damp thickets of black-jack and entanglements of swamp trees and vine, Archer's brigade on the right came upon and pressed Sickles' rear-guard at Hazel Grove. Graham's brigade, after firing a few volleys, which checked their advance to some extent, retired rapidly,—closely pursued, and subjected to a hot fire. Huntington's battery, with a regiment on each flank, covered this movement to the last moment, and brought up the rear, losing 3 pieces.

Sims' battery, 4 pieces of Jastram's,¹ and 4 of Seeley's took position in the line of guns at Fairview. These three batteries numbered 14 pieces, making the number of guns at Fairview 40.² One section of Lewis' battery was held in reserve at Chancellorsville, and Turnbull's and von Puttkammer's batteries (1. III, 3. III) at Chandler's; Huntington's 3 pieces (3. III) and a section of Jastram's were sent back to United States Ford. Pursuant to an order from Hooker, the two regiments of cavalry reported to him, and were formed as skirmishers "in rear of the line of battle to prevent any stragglers passing through."³ They had plenty to do. Officers forgot their dignity and ran away as well as privates. Most of them were stopped unless wounded.⁴ By Pleasonton's order Martin's battery of horse artillery took position behind Hooker's headquarters at Chancellorsville, and moved thence to United States Ford.

In the V Corps, Humphreys' infantry (3. V) formed in rear of Griffin's (1. V), with instructions to support Griffin, Sykes, or French. Wadsworth's division ($\frac{1}{I}$) completed its deployment as support of Robinson's, Doubleday's, and Sykes' divisions ($\frac{2,3}{I}$, $\frac{2}{V}$). At 6 a.m. Thompson's 4-gun battery ($\frac{3}{2,1}$) was posted near the right of the line covering the road to Ely's Ford. At 7 a.m. it was joined by Hall's 6-gun battery ($\frac{1}{2,1}$). About this time two of the batteries of the XI Corps (probably Jahn's, 2 N. Y., and de Beck's, K, 1 O.), hearing the sound of battle on their left, shamefully abandoned their positions and ran toward United States Ford.⁵

In front of Berry's and Williams' Log Works the woods had been cleared for a space varying in width from 50 to 100 yards. Up to that clearing an advancing enemy would be more or less concealed from

¹ *History of Battery E, 1 R. I. Light Artillery*, by George Lewis, p. 171.

² I have been unable to determine the exact location of all the batteries. They were not in one line, nor were they all on the height of Fairview. But for convenience, as they coöperated with the artillery

posted there, I refer to the artillery at or near that position as one mass or line.

³ *W. R.*, 39, p. 782.

⁴ *History of Battery B, 1 N. J. Artillery*, by Michael Hanifen, p. 55.

⁵ *W. R.*, 39, pp. 255, 276, 277, 279.

ORSVILLE

few seconds, but this was delayed. On this detail the assailants with fire, pending the order would make the fire as well as to foe. The pressure hardly be turned to action upon the enemy's supports. The action was prevented and in a measure the concealment which the position which these presented was favored by the large distance the Federal infantry was from the enemy had a depth of about

Sickles' rear-guard, arrived and halted a few minutes to reform. The position was thoroughly restored, and the section of Slocum's line (No. 3). It was sharply repulsed. Once, it returned about 6:45 a.m.

Light of Hazel Grove with 31 pieces of artillery on the southern front of the XII Corps, and on the west front; at the same time it was on the Plank Road were about 30 pieces of artillery between Dowdall's Tavern and the fire upon Fairview. The Confederate position to the 40 under Best, with the position to a diverging one. On the advantage of command, or height, and the position, while those of the Confederates were on the ground. For an artillery duel with the Federals; for firing upon the position, on the whole, with the Confed-

Completed his change of front he had without halting, he went on with the Federal line in his new front. This separation was inclined to the left, separating the position of Lane. But as he proceeded he was. McGowan, Archer, and Lane were

(except Eubank's and Rhett's batteries, 1 piece of Jordan's battery, and 2 pieces of Parker's), 13 pieces.

without support on his right or left.¹ McGowan's upon the rear regiment (37 N. Y.) of Hayman's was about to take up the march, attacked it in front before a proper fighting formation could be effected, threw it into disorder, disabling many of its officers. It encountered the 7 N. J. of Mott's brigade and Ruger's which had advanced. After a musketry duel of about duration and an attack upon its right flank, McGowan's was thrown back in disorder to Slocum's Log Works, closely followed by Ruger's brigade, and on the left of the latter by the 7 N. J.

The brigade was supported by the right wing of Brockenbrough's (Va.), and Pender's by the left wing (22 and 55 Va.). Lane threw themselves upon the center of the Federal line on the Plank Road. Here, with its right resting on the road and the right of Slocum's line, was the 3d regiment of Maryland, composed largely of new men. These green Marylanders could not stand the yell and rush of Lane's veteran North Carolinians, and gave way in unseemly haste. The foremost Confederates cleared the works and took a number of prisoners.² Others turned upon the section of artillery, which had fired volley after volley of canister into the enemy's ranks, and silenced it. The guns now try to save themselves. One is sent off before the enemy can seize it. The other is temporarily in his hands. Dimick, struck in the foot, conceals his wound, but in a moment is disabled by a shot in the spine, from which he is to die in a couple of days.

Captain Poland, Berry's chief of staff, tries in vain to move forward the 115 Pa. of Mott's brigade ($\frac{3}{2}$ III).³ The fight abandoned by the 3 Md. and refused by the 115 Pa. is taken up by the 5 and 8 N. J.⁴ Lane's brigade is checked, but stands its ground, firing defiantly and threateningly at its new opponents. The right wing of Brockenbrough's brigade, instead of reënforcing it, halted and remained well in rear of it. Lieutenant Sanderson of Dimick's battery (H, 1 U. S. Artillery) galloped up with a limber, and gallantly withdrew the remaining gun

¹ *W. R.*, 39, pp. 902, 904, 907, 921.

² Lieutenant-Colonel G. P. Robinson, commanding the 3 Md., says in his report: "I was forced from my position by superior numbers, but retired in good order to the rear. . . . my regiment, being composed of a good many new men, stood the fire well" (*W. R.*, 39, p. 703). Captain J. S. Poland, chief of staff of Berry's division, characterizes this movement in his report as a "premature and precipitate withdrawal"

(*ib.*, p. 450). General Carr calls it "an injudicious retreat" (*ib.*, p. 445); and General Sickles "a premature and hasty retirement" (*ib.*, p. 392). Captain J. G. Langston, commanding the 8 N. J. Volunteers, says of the 3 Md.: ". . . at the first volley from the enemy [it] gave way in confusion and fell back" (*ib.*, p. 480).

³ *Ib.*, 39, p. 450.

⁴ *Ib.*, 39, pp. 473, 475, 478, 445.

of Dimick's section amid a storm of musketry.¹ Pender's right now moved upon the exposed flank of Berry's division, the extreme left of which was held by the 1 Mass., resting on the Plank Road, supported in rear by the 11 N. J. Captain Poland, discovering the enemy crossing the Plank Road, ordered Colonel McAllister, commanding the latter regiment, to advance and force him back, "but unfortunately," says Poland, "my authority was questioned at an untimely moment."² Colonel McAllister sent his adjutant to his brigade commander, General Carr, to find out whether he should advance or remain in his position.³

Sickles' infantry brought in from Hazel Grove was placed generally in support of the artillery at Fairview. Berdan, on the right of the Plank Road, a little in rear of the guns, detached four companies to the right of Berry's line and by 7 a.m. went with the remainder of his force to their support (Map 25).

Hayman's brigade ($\frac{3}{I-III}$) had lost the greater part of the 37 N. Y. This regiment was thrown, as previously stated, into confusion by McGowan's brigade. It was rallied about 100 strong in rear of Chancellorsville, and was marched thence without authority to the vicinity of United States Ford by its lieutenant-colonel, and did not rejoin the brigade until after the battle.⁴

Averell at Ely's Ford sent an officer with a party of 20 men to examine the enemy's position in his front. He meant to throw his division upon the enemy's flank or rear, "if there was any chance of striking it."⁵ A considerable portion of his command had been out since daybreak, gathering up the horses that were scattered over adjoining fields by the fire of the 16 N. Ca. the night before.⁶

7 to 7:30 a.m. (Map 26)

Berry directed Captain J. B. Greenhalgh, his senior aide, to ride to General Hooker's headquarters, and inquire whether he was to continue to hold his position. Greenhalgh galloped away. What answer he got was never known to his chief in this world. General Berry had a custom that is rare among division commanders, of giving his orders in person when it was possible to do so. He told his staff to remain where they were, while he crossed the Plank Road to communicate with General Mott. His officers remonstrated and offered to go in his stead, pointing out that the enemy's sharpshooters were posted in the trees

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 450. The two pieces were sent to the rear.

² *Ib.*, 39, p. 450. ³ *Ib.*, 39, p. 457.

⁴ *Ib.*, 39, pp. 433, 442.

⁵ *Ib.*, 39, p. 1079.

⁶ *History of the 3 Pa. Cav.*, by Committee, pp. 232-234. The horses were not marked for identification. After the cam-



paign each regiment was furnished with a branding-iron, with a number and letter upon it, and the horses were branded on the hoof of the right fore foot, 3 P. or 16 P., as the case might be (*ib.*). This may be the origin of the present practice in our army, of branding cavalry horses on one hoof.

MAP 25

CHANCELLORSVILLE

Positions of Troops at 7 a.m.
May 3, 1863

Green Federal Red Confederate





and sweeping the Plank Road with their unerring rifles. The general replied that he preferred to give the order in person, and started on his way. He crossed the Plank Road in safety. On reaching General Mott, he conversed with him a short time, and started to return. He had gained the Plank Road, and was recrossing it, having nearly reached the place where his staff officers were standing, when, from the trees in which the North Carolina sharpshooters were posted, came a wreath of smoke, followed by the sharp crack of a rifle. Major-General Hiram G. Berry had fought his last battle. The minie-ball struck him in the arm close to the shoulder, passed downward through his vitals, and lodged in his hip.¹ He fell in the center of the road. At 7:26 o'clock, with a group of sympathetic staff officers and comrades by his side, and the embattled lines of his division about him, he breathed his last at the age of thirty-eight, one of the most promising young generals that the Civil War had produced.

Captain Poland, on seeing Berry fall, sent an officer to General Carr, lately commanding the 1st brigade, with notice that he commanded the division. Carr at once ordered the 11 N. J., on the left of his second line, to support Dimick's section of artillery. The 1 Mass. fell back, carrying with it or closely followed by the 11 Mass., both more or less shaken and broken. These regiments reformed about half a mile from the front line, probably in rear of Hays' brigade and the artillery at Fairview. The 11 N. J. remained covering the right flank of Mott's brigade. The hostile irruption was stayed on the left of the Mountain Road, but not on the right. The remainder of Carr's line, consisting of the 2d brigade and the 26 Pa. and 16 Mass. of the 1st brigade, broke off regiment by regiment from the left as Pender and Thomas in succession threatened to crush its flank, and fell back in a northerly direction. In the meantime Knipe's brigade ($\frac{1}{I. XII}$) was crippled by the departure of the 46 Pa. and portions of the 5 Conn. and 128 Pa.² Ward was sent with his brigade ($\frac{2}{I. III}$) to form on the right of General Carr and act as his support. Not finding Carr, he reported to French, who placed him near Chandler's. Carr had gone to the left of the Plank Road, where he found Mott's brigade advancing upon the enemy in two lines. Lane's

¹ *Major-General Hiram G. Berry*, by Edward K. Gould, pp. 266, 267; and Captain Poland's report, *W. R.*, 39, p. 450.



² These troops were marched without orders or authority, by Lieutenant-Colonel Betts of the 5 Conn., to United States Ford, where they were taken charge of by General Patrick, Provost-Marshal-General, moved across the river, and placed on guard over prisoners (*W. R.*, 39, pp. 689, 696). The brigade was thus reduced to two weak regiments, the 5 Conn. and 128 Pa.

(*ib.*, 39, pp. 688, 690, 692, 695, 696). General Williams, the division commander, says that three regiments of this brigade, "soon after the fight began, moved to the breastworks." It would appear, however, from the reports of the brigade and regimental commanders, that the regiments that remained on the field, with the possible exception of the 5 Conn., were in reserve from beginning to end of the fight (*ib.*, 39, pp. 680, 681, 696). Every regiment of the brigade lost its commanding officer yesterday.

MAP 26 CHANCELLORSVILLE

Positions of Troops at 7:30 a.m.
May 3, 1863

Green Federal Red Confederate



his corps commander, withdrew the 7 W. Va., 4 and 8 O., and 14 Ind. of Carroll's brigade ($\frac{1}{3. II}$) from the rifle-pits on Hancock's left, leaving to hold this portion of the line the 24 and 28 N. J. of the same brigade. The four forementioned regiments he drew up in a single line of battle in a plain in rear of their former position, facing obliquely toward the Plank Road, which was concealed from him by the woods. On his right he formed Albright's brigade ($\frac{3}{3. II}$) to support the left of a line of guns of the V Corps. Hooker came up and noticed these dispositions. Masses of troops were arriving from the front and forming in rear of French's lines. The situation seemed to have aroused Hooker's combativeness. At any rate, he dispatched a staff officer to French with an order for him to move forward with his division, "attack the enemy, and drive him through the woods."¹ It was about 7:30 when French received this message. In a moment his eager men were stripped to light fighting order, and striding in line of battle across the plain. At the verge of the surrounding woods, receiving some of the enemy's fire, they fired once, and dashed forward with a cheer. Thomas' men, threatened in flank and rear, turned and ran, receiving volley after volley, well put in by Carroll's Western regiments, the 14 Ind., 4 O., and 7 W. Va. Through some mistake the 8 O. remained behind supporting the artillery. French brought up on Carroll's right the 132 Pa. and 1 Del. of Albright's brigade ($\frac{3}{3. II}$)² and the last regiments of Carroll's (24 and 28 N. J.),³ and drove Thomas' and Pender's brigades over Berry's Log Works back upon Slocum's Log Works and Jones' artillery (Map 28), making several hundred prisoners and releasing a battalion of the III Corps captured by the enemy. Brockenbrough's left wing, after a sturdy effort to breast the tide of Federal success, its left flank being turned, joined the retreat.

South of the Plank Road, Lane's and McGowan's brigades were still hugging the log works for protection against Ruger's line. In rear of them Williams' and Garnett's brigades of the second line halted within supporting distance, but rendered no active support.⁴ By Ruger's advance south of the Plank Road and French's advance north of it, Stuart's first line was completely shattered. It devolved on the second line to hold the present position until the third line, which was coming up under Rodes, should warrant another general advance. The second

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 363.

² The other regiment was, as previously stated, on guard duty at the corps hospital.

³ The places of these regiments on Hancock's left were filled by troops falling back from other commands (*W. R.*, 39, p. 363).

⁴ The colonel of the 1 S. Ca., McGowan's brigade, says: ". . . we were reënforced,

or rather encumbered, by a portion of General Colston's command, for instead of pushing rapidly to the right and occupying the position, they took refuge (many of them) in rear of my line and annoyed my regiment very much by firing over their heads, in some instances wounding my men, and in one instance killing one of my best subalterns" (*ib.*, 39, pp. 902, 903).

line was hard pressed on the right by Ruger's left; to meet this danger Paxton's brigade was ordered to the right of the Plank Road and directed upon Slocum's Log Works. At the same time Garnett's brigade was ordered to advance.¹ Rodes had directed his brigade commanders to push forward until the enemy was encountered, and "engage him vigorously, moving over friend and foe alike, if in the way."

On the extreme right of the third line Colquitt's brigade ($\frac{4}{2 \cdot \text{II}}$) had been ordered to support Archer ($\frac{5}{1 \cdot \text{II}}$). Being too late for that, it was ordered toward the left to relieve the pressure there. Doles' brigade ($\frac{2}{2 \cdot \text{II}}$) broke into halves. One half, under Colonel Mercer, drifted to the right and was ordered by Stuart to support the artillery at Hazel Grove in conjunction with Archer's brigade. The other half moved on in touch with Ramseur, who, with the rest of Colston's line, reached the front about 8 a.m.

Paxton, with the Stonewall brigade ($\frac{1}{4 \cdot \text{II}}$), came upon the lines cowering six and eight deep behind Slocum's Log Works.² "At this point," says Colonel Funk of the 5 Va., "we found a large number of men of whom fear had taken the most absolute possession. We endeavored to persuade them to go forward, but all we could say was of but little avail." The brigade prepared to proceed, if necessary, alone. As soon as the lines were formed, it crossed the works, passing in part over McGowan's men, and advanced, accompanied on its right by Garnett's brigade. "We will show you," said Colston's men to McGowan's, "how to clear away a Yankee line." Before they crossed the works, General Paxton and Colonel Garnett fell, mortally wounded. Gallantly do surviving officers cheer and lead on, and bravely are they followed. Major McKim of the division staff is killed, two other members are wounded. The line pushes on through a terrific fire to within 70 yards of Ruger's line, but only to break and rush back in disorder to where it started from. General Paxton is succeeded by Colonel Funk, and Colonel Garnett by Colonel Vandeventer.

Ruger, having been in action nearly three hours and having repulsed three separate assaults by fresh troops (Archer's, McGowan's, and Paxton's), had reported that his ammunition was nearly exhausted.

As no ammunition could be furnished him, Graham was sent with his brigade to relieve him.³ By this time the two pieces of Lewis' battery had probably retired from Slocum's western front and taken position near Chancellorsville. About as Paxton advanced to the support of Lane and McGowan, J. M. Williams advanced to the support of Thomas and Pender.

Upon the death of Berry, the command of his division ($\frac{2}{\text{III}}$) devolved, as already stated, upon General Carr, who assumed it at 7:30. But

¹W. R., 39, pp. 1005, 1006.

²Ib., 39, p. 1006.

³Ib., 39, pp. 409, 709.

General Revere, commanding the 2d brigade, thought that he succeeded to the command of the division, and before 8 o'clock he marched his own command, which went by the inspiring name of the "Excelsior Brigade," and part of the 1st brigade, the larger part of nine regiments, off the field, and proceeded with this force to the vicinity of United States Ford, on the ground that the division needed to be reorganized and supplied with ammunition and rations, and that it was necessary that it intercept stragglers.¹ The remainder of Carr's division reformed about 8 a.m. in rear of Franklin's brigade, and was there joined by Ward's brigade. Reynolds had still two batteries of his corps ($\frac{1.3}{2.1}$) and two of the XI Corps, about 20 pieces, on his line. At 8 a.m. these pieces and the 6 of Atwell's battery ($\frac{1}{2. XII}$) sent him from the XII Corps were in position; Stewart's, Leppien's, and Ransom's batteries ($\frac{3}{1. I}, \frac{2.4}{2.1}$), numbering 17 pieces, were moving up to report to him.

8 to 8:15 a.m. (Map 28)

The artillery at Fairview could hold its own against any front attack of infantry. Its immediate danger was that the artillery at Hazel Grove would break down the bulwark of the XII Corps on its left or that a body of infantry would gain a lodgment on its right. Another danger, no less serious, was beginning to threaten it. The ammunition, both in the infantry and in the artillery, was running short. Repeated and urgent requests for a fresh supply sent to army headquarters met with no response, or with the impatient reply: "I can't make ammunition."² The artillery was being reduced to canister, which could not generally be fired over its own infantry, and would not reach the enemy's artillery. About 8 a.m. a limber and caisson exploded, mortally wounding the battery commander, Captain Hampton.

On the offensive, artillery is essentially an arm of preparation. It enables a commander to shake the enemy's infantry without exposing his own. Its principal function is the facilitation of the infantry attack. This requires that its fire be concentrated on the point determined upon for that attack. For the artillery to fire upon one point while the infantry attacks at another is a squandering of tactical power. That is

¹ *W. R.*, 39, pp. 446, 452, 460, 462. General Revere was tried by a court-martial, of which General Hancock was president, on charges of misbehavior before the enemy and neglect of duty, preferred by General Sickles. He was found *not guilty* of both charges, but guilty of "conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline," and sentenced to dismissal. President Lincoln approved the sentence, but afterward revoked it, and accepted General Revere's resignation. He could not in jus-

tice have let it stand without ordering the trial of the other officers who had taken their commands to the rear without authority; and this he doubtless deemed on political grounds to be inexpedient. The proceedings in the case of General Revere, together with that officer's comments thereon, were published in the form of a pamphlet entitled "A Statement of the Case of Brigadier-General Joseph W. Revere."



² *History of the II Army Corps*, by F. A. Walker, p. 242.

MAP 28

CHANCELLORSVILLE

Positions of Troops at 8.15 a. m.
May 3, 1863

Green Federal Red Confederate





MAP 29

CHANCELLORSVILLE

Positions of Troops at 8:45 a.m.
May 3, 1863

Green Federal Red Confederate



Colonel Pickens, halted at Berry's Log Works. Colquitt's brigade, on its way to the left, was ordered back to the right.

Ruger, being relieved by Graham, withdrew to Chancellorsville and thence to United States Ford. He probably carried with him the men of the 110 Pa., leaving on his left the 7 N. J. of Mott's brigade, and on his right the 123 N. Y. of Ross' brigade.

Ramseur ($\frac{5}{2-II}$), after vainly urging the troops in Slocum's Log Works to advance, went with his brigade (except the 30 N. Ca., detached to support a battery at Hazel Grove) against the Federal infantry in his immediate front. This brought him against the right flank of Graham's brigade (Map 29).

Meanwhile Doles with half of his brigade should have supported Ramseur's right, but in marching through the dense wood he had lost connection with Ramseur. Passing by Graham's left, he went toward the line lately commanded by Colonel Ross and now commanded by General Knipe. The heavy fire of the enemy made it impossible for Williams to get pack-mules to the front. So the only way of supplying ammunition to his infantry was to bring up fresh troops. He sent to Slocum for reënforcements, but none came. Soon afterward he was assured by Sickles that troops of the III Corps had already been sent to replace his line.¹ Bowman had sent a couple of regiments to occupy the works on the right of Ross' line. Doles took the combined line in flank and rear, making many prisoners. The regiments lately under Ross, literally without ammunition,² broke away in some disorder from the right and joined Ruger's brigade. Doles went on past the left of Best's artillery toward Chancellorsville.

About 8:30 Colonel Sewell, commanding the 5 N. J. of Mott's brigade ($\frac{3}{2-III}$), was informed that General Mott was wounded, which left him in command of the brigade. He rode to the right of the Plank Road in search of General Berry. General Knipe tried to bring a couple of regiments of Sewell's brigade up to the breastworks from which the 5 and 8 N. J. were firing upon Hall and Ramseur, but could not do so. He says: "Just at this moment a regiment of red-legged Zouaves [the 114 Pa. of Graham's brigade] came pell-mell from our left, with less than half their number of the enemy close at their heels. I endeavored to arrest the fugitives and induce them to defend themselves from behind the rifle-pits over which they had just retreated. This, however, I could not accomplish."³


¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 680.

² *Ib.*

³ *Ib.*, 39, pp. 687, 688. The commander of this regiment was tried by court-martial on the charge of misbehavior before the enemy, and honorably acquitted (*ib.*, 39, p. 410). It seems that his regiment did its full duty. It was probably to this regi-

ment that the Confederate writer Caldwell referred in describing the fight at Slocum's old works: "A regiment of Zouaves was particularly impetuous, but even they were forced to give way after frightful losses, and leave their disabled comrades behind them."

Positions of Troops at 9 a. m.
May 3, 1863



from the right of the battery, probably a sharpshooter's, found its billet in his breast. Five minutes later, at half-past 8 o'clock, his brief, honorable career was ended. His last words were: "Tell my parents that I die happy. Lord, forgive my sins."¹

Colonel Morgan, Hancock's chief of artillery, received orders from Hooker to bring up all the batteries of the corps that had not been engaged. He had to go to United States Ford for them, as they had all been sent there pursuant to Hooker's order. Captain Randolph, chief of artillery of the III Corps, sent to Chandler's for von Puttkammer's 11 N. Y. Battery (3. III), but it could not be got to the front.² The 5 Me. battery (2. I), on its way to the I Corps, was diverted by General Hooker toward Chancellorsville. The following description of the situation was received at 8:45 a.m.:

United States Ford, May 3, 1863.

General Butterfield, Headquarters Camp Falmouth:

A most terrible bloody conflict has raged since daylight. Enemy in great force in our front and on the right, but at this moment we are repulsing him on all sides. Carnage is fearful. General Hooker is safe so far. Berry is killed. I return to the front, but will keep you advised when in my power. Our trains are all safe, and we shall be victorious. Our cavalry has not come up.

RUFUS INGALLS,
Chief Quartermaster.

This message was sent by telegraph. The line to United States Ford was put in working order during the night, and a station opened about a mile in rear of Chandler's at 8:30 a.m. The last sentence of the message probably refers to Stoneman, but may refer only to Averell, who, it will be remembered, had been under orders, since the evening of the 1st, to return immediately to United States Ford, and report in person at Hooker's headquarters. He was still at Ely's Ford and had not reported.

General French, having been hotly engaged for about an hour, discovered that the enemy was taking a position on his right to flank him. His corps commander, General Couch, being far away, and Hooker, as he thought, comparatively near, he sent a report of the fact to be delivered to Hooker. For some reason it was delivered to Meade, who directed Humphreys to order a brigade of his division to French's support. Humphreys designated Tyler's ($\frac{1}{3-V}$).³ About 9 a.m. this brigade went into action on French's right, causing Williams to extend his line and change front to the left (Map 30).

¹ *Memorial of Lieutenant Franklin Butler Crosby*, 4 U. S. Artillery.

² Captain Randolph says: "I regret to report the disgraceful conduct of Captain von Puttkammer. As the matter has come

to the eye of the general commanding in another way, I will not enlarge upon it here" (*W. R.*, 39, pp. 406, 485).

³ *Ib.*, 39, pp. 363, 508, 547, 550, 552, 553.

The 5 Me. Battery ($\frac{2}{1}$) arrived at the front and went into action, dividing its fire between the enemy's advancing infantry and Jones' artillery. It suffered heavily from both. About 9 a.m., all its officers being killed or wounded, the command of the battery was given by Couch to Lieutenant Kirby, whose battery of corps artillery was in reserve.

Colquitt, on his way to Stuart's right, was again ordered to the left.

CHAPTER XXIII

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE AFTER 9 A.M. AVERELL ORDERED RELIEVED
FROM COMMAND

9 to 9:30 a.m. (Map 31)

WHILE Ramseur threatened Graham's right, Graham advanced his left against Ramseur's right. This movement was checked for a time by a charge made by the 30 N. Ca., as it came over to join Ramseur from Hazel Grove, but was favored later by a charge against Ramseur's right made by the 7 N. J. falling back on Graham's left. The latter regiment captured the colors and a large part of the *personnel*, including the colonel, of the 2 N. Ca. Colonel Francine, commanding the 7 N. J., now went to the rear, taking with him 400 men of the brigade and leaving 300 with Sewell. Francine had fought his regiment gallantly, and was under the impression that Sewell was wounded, and he in command of the brigade. He had been advised by his surgeon to retire from the field, having lost his voice, but had no excuse, it seems, for taking over half of the brigade with him.¹

Vandevanter's brigade had not advanced. Ramseur went back and personally exhorted and ordered its officers and men to take position on his right, but in vain. He then reported to General Rodes that unless the enemy was driven from his right he would have to fall back. Rodes made repeated efforts to bring up troops from the rear, but none would move forward. About this time Stuart rode up to Funk's brigade and in his usual happy manner ordered a charge. The order was obeyed with the characteristic enthusiasm of the Stonewall brigade. This attack in front, with Ramseur's pressure on the right, started Graham's brigade, about 9:15, on a disorderly retreat to Chancellorsville. Hayman's brigade ($\frac{3}{I-III}$), led by Birney himself, covered Graham's movement with a charge, which broke the formation of Hayman's brigade, and caused its withdrawal to Chandler's. From there a portion of the 17 Me. under the regimental commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Merrill, marched without authority to the river to reform.² Carr's brigade withdrew to Chandler's.

The Stonewall brigade took position on Ramseur's right (Map 31),

¹ *W. R.*, 39, pp. 445, 474, 478.

² *Ib.*, 39, pp. 433, 436.

and Ramseur's brigade, with depleted ranks and empty cartridge-boxes, withdrew to the rear of Slocum's Log Works, leaving behind it the 30 N. Ca., which took position on Funk's right.

Geary was engaged in establishing his new line, perpendicular to his old one, when about 9 a.m. Hooker rode up to him and directed him to resume his original position and hold it at all hazards, promising to support him by an attack in force on Stuart's left flank. Candy's men put their caps on their bayonets, swung them over their heads, and rushed with wild cheers back to their old lines. Geary's other two brigades (Kane's and Greene's) had received orders to retire. While the 1st brigade returned to the left of the original line, the 3d brigade, on the right of the latter, left its intrenchments and went to the rear, covered by two of its regiments, the 60 and 102 N. Y. On the opposite side of the field Tyler was pushing back the Confederate left, and Colquitt moving to its support.

About 9 a.m. the remnant of Best's artillery was compelled, by the fire it was receiving from the enemy's infantry on its right, the imminent danger of similar treatment on its left, and a shortage of ammunition, to abandon the position of Fairview.¹ At the same time Pettit's battery was withdrawn from Muhlenberg's line to Chandler's,² and O'Donohue's 3 pieces from Hancock's line to Muhlenberg's, which left Muhlenberg 9 pieces. A number of Best's pieces went into action between Fairview and Chancellorsville, forming with other artillery a cordon of 24 pieces about Chancellorsville.³

Sickles sent to Hooker his senior aide, Major Tremain, with a most urgent appeal for support. Hooker, on the porch of the Chancellor House, saw him coming, and bent over the rail in his eagerness to hear Tremain's report, when a solid shot struck the pillar against which he had been leaning, splitting it from end to end, and throwing one half of it violently against his body and head. He fell senseless, and for a few moments was thought to be dying, but under the care of his medical director he soon revived sufficiently to show himself to his troops. By great force of will, and with the assistance of his staff, he mounted his horse and started to the rear. In the meantime a rumor that he was killed had spread through the ranks. Couch, the senior corps commander, had heard it, and hastened to the Chancellor House, thinking to himself: "If he is killed, what shall I do with this disjointed army?" He was overjoyed at coming upon Hooker mounted and with his staff also in their saddles. Briefly congratulating him, he went on with his duties at the front. Hooker was not again fit to exercise command dur-

¹ *W. R.*, 39, pp. 405, 675.

² *Ib.*, 39, p. 349. Pettit's battery was joined at Chandler's by the section detached yesterday to serve with the Irish brigade.



³ Muhlenberg 9 pieces, Lewis 4 pieces, Jastram 2 pieces, Seeley 4 pieces, Kirby 5 pieces.

MAP 31

CHANCELLORSVILLE

Positions of Troops at 9:30 a.m.
May 3, 1863

Green Federal Red Confederate



ing the campaign. Nearly all the rest of the day he suffered pains which deprived him of the use of his faculties. His right side was partially paralyzed, and was livid for weeks afterward.¹ But as he rode away from Chancellorsville he said nothing to Couch about relinquishing command, nor did he give him any orders. "This," says Couch, "was the last I saw of my commanding general in front."² It was the last time that Hooker was to be at the front in command of an army. On riding to the vicinity of Chandler's he had a violent return of pain. He became faint, and would have fallen from his horse had not his staff rushed to his side and helped him to the ground. A blanket was spread, and he was laid upon it. Some remedy was administered to him, and he again revived. Proceeding to mount, he was scarcely on his feet when a solid shot from Hazel Grove struck the blanket in the spot where he had been lying. Being assisted into the saddle, he rode in paroxysms of pain to a less exposed position near Chandler's. Probably about this time he received the following dispatches from Butterfield:

6:45 a.m.

Sedgwick's prospects here look unfavorable from reports. He is not out of Fredericksburg.

7:05 a.m.

Sedgwick still in front of Fredericksburg, as far as I can judge. Trains were running up all night to vicinity of Hamilton's Crossing. It may be that the enemy were reënforced.

Hooker telegraphed:

To Sedgwick, 9:15 a.m.

You will hurry up your column. The enemy's right flank now rests near the Plank road at Chancellorsville, all exposed. You will attack at once.

To Butterfield

Communicate with Sedgwick. We are driving the enemy and only need him to complete the job.

Would the forces at Chancellorsville preserve this opportunity for Sedgwick? Their defence could not last much longer. The ever-

¹ The paralysis with which during his later years his entire right side was affected was the result of this blow (*The Battle of Chancellorsville*, by S. P. Bates, pp. 126, 127; *Medical Recollections of the Army of the Potomac*, by Jonathan Letterman, p. 137).

Captain Candler, Hooker's aide-de-camp, wrote home on the 7th: "The blow which the General received seems to have knocked

all the sense out of him. For the remainder of the day he was wandering, and was unable to get any ideas into his head excepting to remain in the extreme front and under as much fire as could be possibly found. In fact, at no time of trip after Sunday did he seem to be *compos mentis*" (Manuscript).

² *B. and L.*, III, 167.

aggressive Sickles wanted to make a counter-attack, but Couch refused to permit it. "It would not have been difficult," says Sickles, "to regain the lost ground with the bayonet, as I proposed to do, but the attempt was not deemed expedient (for the want of supports to hold it) by the senior officer present upon that part of the field, upon whom the direction of operations in front had devolved in the temporary absence of the general-in-chief."¹

Meade had been hoping for orders or permission to strike a blow at Stuart's left. By his own order, Colonel Webb of his staff had ridden to the left of Stuart's line, and seen it moving forward across his front. He went with Webb to Hooker's tent, and urged that he and Reynolds be allowed to attack the enemy's left, and sweep him from the front of Couch, stating what Webb had seen. Reynolds also besought Hooker for permission to attack, but Hooker, renouncing what offensive designs he may have entertained, positively refused to allow it. He disapproved of Meade's action in sending Tyler's brigade ($\frac{1}{3.V}$) to the relief of French, and ordered him not to send any more troops forward.²

Pursuant to an order received soon after 9, Caldwell, commanding Hancock's 1st brigade, reported to Hooker northwest of Chandler's with the available troops of his brigade and Zook's brigade ($\frac{1}{1.H}$), from 500 to 600 men.³ He deployed a company facing Chancellorsville to arrest the crowd of fugitives and stragglers going down the road. About 9:30, Hooker, who, in great physical pain, was on his horse, visiting his new lines, ordered him to advance across the open field and through the woods beyond.

9:30 to 10 a.m. (Maps 32, 33)

Hall's and Christie's men swarmed over the works of Fairview, but the troops on their left and rear gave way. French's infantry, with the support of Tyler's on its right, and of other infantry and the 5 Me. Battery on its left, forced the Confederates north of the Plank Road back in confusion upon such supports as they could find. In vain does Hall call upon the fugitives to come to his support. One of their officers tells him that "the d——d scoundrels" will not fight. All efforts to

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 393.

² *Ib.*, 39, p. 508; *Life of General G. G. Meade*, by R. M. Bache, pp. 272, 273; *General Meade*, by I. R. Pennypacker, pp. 122, 123; *Papers of Mil. Hist. Soc. of Mass.*, III, 219 *et seq.* Warren says: "We expected that Jackson's force would assault us in the morning at Chancellorsville, and the intention was that General Sickles, with all his

force, was to meet him at once, and the I Corps was also to attack him and envelop him, and if necessary more forces were to be drawn from the left of our line, leaving only force enough to hold Lee's forces in check" (*Rep. of Com.*, IV, 46).

³ This left in Hancock's main line about eight companies of the 140 Pa. of Caldwell's brigade and none of Zook's brigade.

rally them fail.¹ The Federals crowd in on his flank and rear. Franklin's brigade, lately forced back and thrown into some confusion by the enemy's impetuous advance, rallies, and, accompanied by a remnant of Sewell's brigade on its left, dashes back at the artillery position, recovers a number of cannon that the enemy had seized, and hurls him out of the works, taking the flags of Hall's 5 Ala. and 26 Ala. and many prisoners. The Confederates reform along Berry's Log Works, with their left thrown back to confront Tyler (Map 32).

Caldwell went forward, accompanied on his left by Meagher with his Irish brigade. As he did so, he met French falling back with Carroll's brigade. Meagher had not gone far before he came under the fire of Jones' guns, which broke up his column. He returned to his position as support of the 5 Me. Battery.²

Diagonally across the field the Stonewall brigade advanced, broke the Federal line, and captured a Federal flag. While exulting in the possession of this trophy and the commanding position of Fairview, from which the Federals could be seen fleeing toward Chancellorsville, Colonel Funk, commanding the brigade, observed a Federal column moving to gain his flank. He sent an officer to urge forward all supports within reach. The 26 Ala. of Hall's brigade made a charge, recovering its lost color. Other regiments came up on his left, but retired before they had fired a volley. Being thus unsupported and threatened on every side, his force reduced about 30 per cent. and without ammunition, he fell back to Williams' old works, *hors de combat* (Map 33).

The Federals, though they had lost some ground, had beaten back all the men that Stuart had sent against them. But this they had only been able to do by throwing in fresh troops. Against Stuart's 26,500 infantry they had had in action from first to last the following forces of the same arm:

Sickles, Williams, and Hays	22,894
Carroll and Albright	2,276
Tyler	1,711
Meagher	1,150
Caldwell	550 ³
Total	28,581

About 9:45 a.m. Geary's 2d brigade followed the 3d toward Chancellorsville, leaving the 1st and two regiments of the 3d (60 and 102 N. Y.) at the front. On the left of Geary, the Federals had not yielded an inch. Hancock's advance line of skirmishers, or picket line, facing toward Fredericksburg, was still under the command of Colonel Nelson A.

¹ W. R., 39, p. 954.

² *Ib.*, 39, pp. 1044, 410, 328, 327.

³ *Ib.*, 39, pp. 313, 319.

Miles of the 61 N. Y. Volunteers. It consisted this morning of the following troops:

6 companies of the 148 Pa. of Caldwell's brigade ($\frac{1}{1.11}$). This was a new regiment, in its first fight. It was commanded by Colonel James A. Beaver, who was to become in after years the Governor of Pennsylvania.

66 N. Y. of Zook's brigade ($\frac{2}{1.11}$).

64 N. Y. of Brooke's brigade ($\frac{4}{1.11}$). This was John R. Brooke, later Governor-General of Cuba.

About 8:45 a.m. this force was increased by 250 men of the 145 Pa., also of Brooke's brigade. It was vigorously attacked on its left and pressed along its whole front by the troops under McLaws. Every effort to break it with infantry failed. The enemy then opened on it with artillery, but with no better result.¹ About 9:15 a.m. Colonel Miles was shot through the abdomen and taken, more dead than alive, from the field. As he was carried on a blanket into the Chancellor House he saw General Hooker, covered with dust, going out on the other side of the building.²

Hooker had been momentarily expecting to learn that Sedgwick had come up in Lee's rear.³ Having no thought of attacking if Sedgwick did not attack, or of reënforcing the troops that he had in action, and unwilling to suffer further loss on an uncertainty as to Sedgwick's coöperation, he decided to abandon the field. About 9:30 a.m. one of his staff officers rode up to Couch and requested his presence with Hooker. Couch turned to Hancock, near by, told him to "take care of things," and rode to the rear. Near Chandler's he came upon three or four tents, around which, mostly dismounted, were a large number of staff officers. Meade was present, and perhaps other general officers. Hooker was lying in a tent by himself. Raising himself a little as Couch entered, he said: "Couch, I turn the command of the army over to you. You

¹ *W. R.*, 39, pp. 331, 332, 826, 830, 834.

² In his report after the battle the brigade commander paid this handsome tribute to the youthful colonel of the 61 N. Y. (Miles was then only twenty-four years old):

"I greatly regret to report that Colonel Miles was severely, if not mortally, wounded on Sunday morning (May 3) while handling the picket line with masterly ability. I have had occasion heretofore to mention the distinguished conduct of Colonel Miles in every battle in which the brigade has been engaged. His merits as a military man seem to me of the highest order. I know of no terms of praise too exaggerated to characterize his masterly ability. If ever a soldier earned promotion, Colonel

Miles has done so. Providence should spare his life; and I earnestly recommend that he be promoted, and intrusted with a command commensurate with his abilities" (*W. R.*, 39, p. 321).

Colonel Miles was spared to distinguish himself in many another battle, and destined to attain, and for many years to fill, the highest and most honorable position in the army of the United States.


³ *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 148. It is not clear how he expected to be informed of this event. With Lee between him and Sedgwick, he could hardly be reached by messenger, and with such a noise as there was about Chancellorsville, a firing by Sedgwick in Lee's rear might not have been heard and recognized in Hooker's line.


MAP 33

CHANCELLORSVILLE

Positions of Troops at 10 a.m.
May 3, 1863

Green Federal Red Confederate





will withdraw it, and place it in the position designated on this map," as he pointed to a line traced on a field-sketch.¹ In his official report (*W. R.*, 39, p. 307) Couch says:

I was called to the Chandler House briefly to take command of the army, simply acting as executive officer to General Hooker in fulfilling his instructions, which were to draw in the front, and make some new dispositions.²

As Couch came out of the tent he met Meade, who looked at him inquiringly as if at last to receive the long-wished-for order to "go in." Colonel Davis, Hooker's assistant inspector-general, broke out: "We shall have some fighting now." But alas! the words were hardly out of his mouth when a messenger dashed off with orders for Sickles to retire to the new line. Hancock received word that, after Sickles had retired, he and Geary would be ordered to follow him.

Hancock faced his main line about, forming two sides of a square, one fronting west toward Gordonsville, and one east toward Fredericksburg, about $\frac{3}{4}$ of a mile apart. Geary with a brigade and a half held the approach from the south.

The two regiments of cavalry near Chancellorsville withdrew again and formed a line of skirmishers in rear of Chandler's to intercept stragglers.³ The other regiment of cavalry, the 8 N. Y., had probably by this time started, by Pleasonton's order, to cross the river at United States Ford and do picket duty, as we shall see, on the north side.

Colquitt came up on the Confederate left and pressed Tyler's right. Tyler sent twice for ammunition, but got none. Reporting his situation to French, and asking him for orders, he was told to retire when his ammunition was exhausted. This soon occurred, when he yielded to Colquitt's increasing pressure, and fell back to Meade's line.

On the south Anderson's disjointed line had worked its way through thickets and gullies and over slopes and ridges to the southern front of the Federal position. As his men crowd over Geary's breastworks, Lee rides up to Archer at Hazel Grove, and orders him to advance with the fraction of Doles' brigade attached to his own, which he promptly does. At the same time the troops under Stuart push forward on the right and left of the Plank Road. Sickles' line is forced out of the works of Fairview.⁴ Anderson's men arrive on the height comparatively fresh and secure its possession. The Confederate infantry that reached Fairview was soon followed by artillery from Hazel Grove, which coöperated with Jones' artillery on the Plank Road and artillery south of Chancellorsville under Hardaway. The Federal artillery at

¹ Couch, *B. and L.*, III, 169, 170.

² *W. R.*, 39, p. 307. ³ *Ib.*, 39, p. 782.

⁴ It does not appear that Sickles had received Hooker's order to withdraw.

Chancellorsville was reduced by the withdrawal of Lewis' battery to 18 pieces, but these were full of fight. The 4 pieces of Seeley's and 2 of Jastram's were astride of the Plank Road, and near them was the section of Bailey's, withdrawn from Muhlenberg's line. Lieutenant Seeley loaded his guns with canister, and reserved his fire until the enemy was within 350 yards of his position, when he opened on them with terrible effect, making them break and take to the cover of the woods. He followed them with solid shot until the ammunition in his limbers was exhausted. The debris of his battery was then drawn from the field to the cheering of his men, and under the fire of three of the enemy's batteries. His loss in *personnel* was 1 officer and 45 men out of a total of 3 or 4 officers and 120 men.¹ The two pieces of Jastram's had lost so many horses that one piece had to be removed by hand and the other abandoned.

Projectiles from the edge of the Fairview plateau on the west, and McLaws' lines on the east, passed over both of Hancock's lines; others from the Plank Road, on the south, enfiladed them. At 10 a.m. Pettit's battery (II), brought back from Chandler's, was placed in position at Chancellorsville. Its fire was combined with that of Lep-pien's 5 pieces (2. I) and the 3 pieces of Thomas' battery ($\frac{1}{II}$), making a fire of 14 pieces, which was directed upon the artillery enfilading Hancock's lines. Four additional pieces probably fired on the enemy's infantry. It was not long before one of Pettit's caissons exploded. But this did not divert the gunners from their furious work. Stripped of all superfluous clothing, like imps of darkness, jumping back and forth, and in and out, among their devilish implements, as these recoiled with dripping muzzles from their deadly blasts—swabbing and ramming, priming and sighting, bracing themselves with eager ears for the sharp signal *Fire*—they had no thought but for the fierce task of sending as much death and destruction as possible into the enemy's ranks. The wounded lying and reclining about the Chancellor House gloated over their execution.

After the loss of Huntington's 3 guns Hooker still had between United States Ford and Fairview 246 pieces of artillery. Lee had to oppose to them only 132. Yet the line of guns at Chancellorsville was greatly outnumbered by the artillery combating it,² and this was not its only disadvantage.

¹ In his report Lieutenant Seeley says that his loss in men was probably greater than that of any other battery in the war (*W. R.*, 39, p. 490).

² Colonel Carter gives the number of Confederate pieces in action at Fairview alone as "some twenty-five" (*ib.*, 39, p. 1000). According to Major Pegram, they consisted

of McGraw's battery (4 pieces), Carter's battalion (20 pieces), and McIntosh's battalion (20 pieces), altogether 44 pieces (*ib.*, p. 938), to which should be added 3 pieces of Jordan's battery, making 47 pieces (*ib.*, pp. 821, 878). Hancock gives the distance of these pieces from his lines as about 900 yards (*ib.*, p. 313).

Colonel Morgan, chief of artillery of the II Corps, says with reference to the position of the Federal artillery:

I do not think it could have been held by any number of guns I could have placed in the contracted ground near the Chancellor House. The enemy's position was greatly superior, and our batteries were subjected to a direct, enfilading, and reverse fire.

Regarding the direction of the artillery fire he says:

I understand that some dissatisfaction has been expressed that the batteries near the Chancellor House did not disregard the artillery fire against them, and turn their attention to the rebel infantry in the woods near by, but from whose fire they [the batteries] were suffering little or nothing. My own judgment is that the only thing that could have enabled us to hold the ground was to have silenced the enemy's batteries.¹

After Sickles, Geary was ordered to withdraw, and passed in an orderly column to the rear. This left Hancock holding the field alone, except for the remaining artillery. Despite the fact that the southern flanks of his lines, which had been covered by Geary, were entirely exposed and the enemy's infantry only a few hundred yards from them, the 18 pieces of artillery kept the enemy from advancing. It was still of great importance to gain time; to hold the enemy at bay until the roads leading to the rear should be cleared of troops, and the broken and disordered brigades should be reformed. This necessity pressed strongly upon General Couch, and nobly did he set himself to discharge the duty. His example was superb. Of slight stature, and usually of a simple and retiring demeanor, he became sublime as the passion of battle and the high-mounting sense of duty took complete possession of every power and faculty, every thought and feeling, every limb and nerve. His horse was killed; he was himself twice hit. Nobly, too, was he seconded by the chief of his First Division, General Hancock, whose horse was killed, and who was only able to secure a remount on an animal hardly large enough to allow the general's feet to clear the ground.²

Meade directed or authorized Captain Weed, his chief of artillery, to collect "all the available batteries," and place them "in position around Chandler's to cover the withdrawal of our troops and check the advance of the enemy." While this was being done, Hooker directed Colonel Wainwright, chief of artillery of the I Corps, in the absence of General Hunt, chief of artillery of the army, to take command of all the artillery.³ It should be remembered that, under Hooker, Hunt had

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 310.

² *History of the II Army Corps*, by F. A. Walker, p. 246.

³ *W. R.*, 39, pp. 253, 255, 381. Hunt is in error in stating (p. 250) that Wain-

wright was placed in general command on the 2d. According to his own statements (pp. 252, 253) this action was not taken until the 3d.

ried to a place of safety.¹ About 10:30 a.m. the artillery had retired, leaving Lieutenant O'Donohue of Thomas' battery in the hands of the enemy, mortally wounded.²

About 11 o'clock Allabach, by order of General Humphreys, threw back the two left regiments of his brigade ($\frac{2}{3}$) perpendicularly to the road to Chancellorsville, and advanced in line of battle with these regiments, under a severe fire of shell and canister, as far as the edge of the wood near Chancellorsville, to cover the final withdrawal. During this movement, which was effected between 11 and 12—and for some time before—the Chancellor House was subjected to more or less of the enemy's artillery fire. Missiles pierced the walls or stuck in the brickwork; shells exploded in the upper rooms, setting the building on fire; the chimneys were demolished, and their fragments rained down upon the wounded about the building. All this time the women and children (including some slaves) of the Chancellor family, nineteen persons in all, were in the cellar. The wounded were removed from in and around the building, men of both armies nobly assisting one another in this work. The people in the cellar were rescued and cared for by Colonel Dickinson of Hooker's staff. The only avenue of escape from the house was the road leading to United States Ford, which for some distance extended through an open field. One by one those who had been at the house, and who were able to do so, including the women and children, ran the gauntlet of the fire by which this field was swept. At the edge of the woods they crossed the line of Allabach's men, lying on the ground awaiting orders to advance.³ The dry leaves, abatis, and dead wood of the surrounding forest caught fire, and many of the poor cripples whom it was intended to save were forgotten or overlooked, and perished miserably in the flames. Their cries and groans succeeded, as the fighting subsided, to the fiendish yells and savage shouts, the frightful fusillades and awful detonations, that during the last five hours had rent the air of this beautiful Sabbath morning. "It was pitiful," says Caldwell, "to see the charred bodies hugging the trees, or with hands outstretched, as if to ward off the flames. We saw around some of them little cleared circles where they had evidently raked away the dead leaves and sticks to stay the progress of the fire.

¹ *W. R.*, 39, pp. 310, 327, 328, 329, 314, 337, 347. The last shot from this battery was fired by Corporal Lebroke alone. Captain Leppien died on the 24th of May, on the amputation of his wounded leg, receiving his promotion to a lieutenant-colonelcy of volunteers on his death-bed (*Maine in the War for the Union*, by W. E. S. Whitman and C. H. True, p. 412).

Lieutenant Kirby died on the 28th. On

the 23d President Lincoln had sent him a general officer's commission in recognition of his brilliant abilities, undaunted courage, and faithful service (*History of the II Army Corps*, by F. A. Walker, pp. 245, 246).

² *W. R.*, 39, pp. 307, 309.

³ *History of the First- Tenth- Twenty-ninth Maine Regiment*, by Major J. M. Gould, p. 347.

And there were ghastly wounds there—heads shot off or crushed, bodies and limbs torn and mangled, the work of shells. The smoke and steam were stifling.”¹

The withdrawal was accomplished between 11 and noon. The two divisions of the II Corps, Hancock's on the right and French's on the left, connected on the right with the V Corps, to which Tyler's brigade ($\frac{1}{3.V}$) had returned, and on the left with the XI Corps. Allabach's two regiments remained in their forward position. By an error in the direction given one of the retiring regiments (27 Conn.), the entire body present, consisting of eight companies and most if not all of the field officers, was marched into the enemy's lines and taken prisoner. The capture of this regiment is claimed by General Wright for the I brigade ($\frac{5}{1.I}$), and by Lieutenant-Colonel Holt, commanding the 10th of Semmes' brigade ($\frac{2}{2.I}$), for his regiment. Wright gives the number of men captured, without counting officers, as from 600 to 700. He gives the aggregate (officers and men), including a fraction of another regiment, as 340. According to the Federal official returns, the killed, wounded, and missing in the regiment from the 1st to the 3d of May aggregated 291.² On the whole, the Federal withdrawal was as well executed as could have been reasonably expected.³

At 10 a.m., about as Hancock received the order to fall back, his column of artillery started out from United States Ford with three batteries: Arnold's ($\frac{1}{2.II}$), Kirby's ($\frac{1}{II}$), and Cushing's ($\frac{2}{II}$), numbering 18 pieces, intending to “put in” every gun that could be worked, but as the head of the column arrived at the Chandler House he met the corps falling back.

General Lee rode to the front of his pursuing lines.

His presence was the signal for one of those uncontrollable outbursts of enthusiasm which none can appreciate who have not witnessed them.

The fierce soldiers, with their faces blackened with the smoke of battle, the wounded, crawling with feeble limbs from the fury of the devouring flames, seemed possessed of a common impulse. One long, unbroken cheer, in which the feeble cry of those who lay helpless on the earth blended with the strong voices of those who still fought, hailed the presence of the victorious chief.

His first care was for the wounded of both armies, and he was among the foremost at the burning mansion, where some of them lay. But at that moment, when the transports of his troops were drowning the roar of battle with acclamation, a note was brought to him from General Jackson.⁴

¹ Colonel Hamilton of the 1 S. Ca. refers to his bivouacking on the night of the 3d “in a swamp, with dead, dying, and roasted Yankees” (*W. R.*, 39, p. 905). See also *History of McGowan's Brigade*, by J. F. J. Caldwell, p. 84.

² *W. R.*, 39, pp. 869, 838, 176.

³ *History of the II Army Corps*, by A. Walker, p. 247; Couch, *B. and L.*, I, 170; *Military Memoirs of a Confederate* by E. F. Alexander, p. 349.

⁴ Address by Colonel Charles Marshall at the Soldiers' Memorial Meeting, Baltimore.

In the most unpretending words Jackson stated that he had been disabled by his wounds, and had accordingly transmitted his command to the general next in rank, A. P. Hill. He congratulated Lee upon the great victory which God had that day vouchsafed to his arms.¹ Lee at once dictated the following reply:

Headquarters, May 3, 1863.

GENERAL THOMAS J. JACKSON, Commanding Corps.

General: I have just received your note informing me that you were wounded. I can not express my regret at the occurrence. Could I have directed events, I should have chosen, for the good of the country, to be disabled in your stead. I congratulate you upon the victory, which is due to your skill and energy.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE,

General.

The rattle and rumble of the conflict was distinctly heard at the hospital. Jackson made frequent inquiries about the fighting, and listened with interest to the accounts that he was able to obtain of the performances of particular officers or organizations. When Lee's message was read to him, he remarked: "General Lee is very kind, but he should give the praise to God." In the early part of the day he suffered in his right side, but in the evening the pain had left him, and he was thought to be doing well.

The falling back of the Federal lines brought the hospitals of the II and III Corps at Chandler's within reach of the enemy's shells, by which several men were killed or wounded. The hospitals were moved further to the rear, in part to near Compback's Mill and in part to the brick house near United States Ford. Great difficulty was experienced in removing the wounded for want of ambulances, plenty of which were parked on the north side of the river. While the surgeons were actively engaged in dressing wounds, extracting bullets, etc., the enemy's shells again found them out, causing a stampede among the wounded who were able to get away, and a considerable perturbation among the poor fellows who could not. The hospital at the brick house became the principal one of the army. A medical depot was established on the north side of the river, near where the ambulance corps was parked. Men able to walk were sent there afoot. As many as possible of these went on by ambulance to the hospitals on Potomac Creek.²

COMMENTS

The chief advantage that the defensive has over the offensive is its superiority of fire. As an offset thereto the offensive has the privilege

¹ *Life of Lieutenant-General T. J. Jackson*, by R. L. Dabney, II, 488.

² *Recollections of Medical Director Letterman*, and *Report of Medical Director Sim*, III Corps.

of determining the time and the point of attack. The defensive has to be strong at every point, the offensive has to be strong at but one point. A commander who attacks when and where his opponent expects him to suffers all the disadvantages of the offensive without realizing its characteristic advantage. Hooker expected an attack from the direction of Jackson's advance on the 2d. Stuart's attack was made in that direction and in what tacticians call the *parallel order*—in lines parallel to those of the enemy—against the straight line formed by the western face of the Federal angle. His infantry was formed, as under Jackson, in division lines, one in rear of another.

The Comte de Paris, commenting on the Confederate formation for attack, or order of battle, on the 2d and 3d of May, says: "In giving their whole front to a single division and forming the other divisions in rear of it in successive lines, Jackson and then Stuart, as has been seen, introduced at the first serious encounter a great complication into their order of combat. The brigades, the regiments of the different lines, were soon mixed up, and each part of the front found itself under the direction of chiefs whom chance brought to it, whilst the division commanders could not embrace all the movements of their commands. This inconvenience, so serious in marching in battle formation through a thick wood, would have been avoided if each division had been formed three lines deep, thus presenting but a small front to the enemy."¹

A corps marching on a single road, as Jackson's was, can by the use of division lines cover its front with a line of battle in less time than it can by the formation of divisions with brigade front. But there was not the same justification for this formation to-day that there was yesterday, and there was more to be gained to-day by having the divisions in compacter form. Perhaps, however, the retention of the original formation may be justified by the general weariness of the troops and the importance of their resting before daylight.

As compared with brigade lines, the division lines, in rear of one another, are less handy or mobile, but may compensate for the lack of mobility by greater unity and strength. This possible advantage was forfeited by the distances between the lines. Had the three lines attacked together, or supported each other closely, they would probably have won the field with the first rush. But about an hour elapsed after the first line went into action before the second became generally engaged; and there was as long a period after this before the third line came up to the first and second lines. This was not "Stonewall Jackson's way."

The preparation by the artillery had, on account of the topography of the battle-field, to be directed against the south face of the Federal angle, held by Slocum. This circumstance, the danger of a counter-

¹ *History of the Civil War in America*, by the Comte de Paris, V, 159, 160.

attack from the Federal right, Lee's injunction to Stuart to "work by the right wing," and the presentation of a salient in the Federal line opposite Hazel Grove, combined to demand a massing of Confederate infantry against Hazel Grove and Slocum's right or front, leaving, say, a division astride of the Plank Road as a feint. The first thing to do was to take Hazel Grove as a position for the artillery. After the artillery had fired a sufficient length of time to produce the desired effect, and not before, the mass of the infantry should have been thrown upon the point thus prepared for attack, and the rest launched as a diversion or demonstration against other points of the enemy's lines. Had this mode of operation or some approximation to it been adopted and carried out, the battle would have been decided in about half the time which it actually consumed; and hundreds of the devoted victims of its carnage and conflagration would have survived it.

It was not left to the writer of this history to be the first to criticize the operations of the II Corps under Stuart. The contemporary criticisms that they evoked stirred him to write to Lee on the 9th of May, soliciting a vindication of his generalship. Lee replied, with his characteristic tact:

. . . In the management of the difficult operations at Chancellorsville, which you so promptly undertook and creditably performed, I saw no errors to correct, nor has there been a fitting opportunity to commend your conduct. I prefer your acts to speak for themselves, nor does your character or reputation require bolstering up by out-of-place expression of my opinions.

A general who should think of adopting the tactics that Lee and Stuart employed at the battle of Chancellorsville should be sure, before doing so, that he realizes the conditions under which these tactics succeeded—the mental collapse of the enemy's commanding general, and a lack of ammunition. To try them on a commander in his senses, whose troops are supplied with ammunition, would be to court defeat and invite disaster, as was to be shown a couple of months later at the battle of Gettysburg. Lee and Stuart won the battle because:

1. Their bad tactics were opposed by worse tactics on the part of Hooker;

2. Hooker's careful provisions for the supply of ammunition¹ proved ineffective.

Referring to the ammunition supply, General Abner Doubleday says: "There should have been some staff officer specially charged with this

¹ "G. O. No. 30, March 25, 1863:

" . . . Division ordnance officers will be held responsible that the following supply of ammunition is kept constantly on hand: For infantry, 140 rounds, with that in the cartridge-boxes; for cavalry, 100 rounds of carbine and 40 rounds pistol, with that in

the cartridge-boxes; for artillery, 250 rounds, with that in the ammunition-chest. . . .

"The wagons containing the reserve ammunition will be under the control of the division ordnance officers. Ammunition-wagons will be distinguished by a horizon-

subject, but there seemed to be no one who could give orders in relation to it."¹

This is a singular statement to be made by a historian who participated in the campaign as a division commander. Lieutenant Flagler, the chief ordnance officer of the army, was on the field, so were the ordnance officers of the several corps and divisions. These officers were specially charged with seeing in their respective spheres to the supplying of ammunition, and were competent to give orders regarding it. There was an abundance of ammunition between United States Ford and Chancellorsville. Why was it not forwarded and distributed to the troops? General Williams, as already stated, considered it impossible to get ammunition across the fire-swept zone in rear of the lines. But General Geary, commanding the other division of Slocum's corps, says, referring to his ordnance officer, Captain G. M. Elliott:

By dint of great exertion he had succeeded in bringing forward a large supply-train of ammunition, the arrival of which was most opportune. Many divisions besides our own had expended their entire stock, and could not have continued the action had it not been for the timely supply afforded by the foresight and energy of Captain Elliott, who prosecuted his duties under the hottest fire.²

And Birney, commanding Sickles' First Division, says:

Lieut. C. H. Graves, Fortieth N. Y., the division ordnance officer, kept us well supplied with ammunition.³

In Hancock's division ammunition was brought to the firing-line by Captain H. H. Bingham, division judge-advocate, and by the pioneers of the 64 N. Y.⁴ Hancock says nothing about lacking ammunition, nor does any of his brigade commanders, nor his corps commander. French says:

Lieut. W. E. Potter, ordnance officer, was indefatigable, brave, and zealous. His department was never better served.⁵

tal stripe, 6 inches wide, painted on each side of the cover; for artillery ammunition, red; for cavalry, yellow; for infantry, light blue. The wagons will also be distinctly marked with the number of the corps and division to which they belong and the kind and caliber of ammunition contained. The main depot for the army will be designated by a crimson flag marked 'Ordnance Depot, U. S. A.' Upon the march, or when the brigades are widely separated from each other, the wagons containing the reserve ammunition for each brigade may, at the discretion of the division commander, be turned over to the brigade quartermaster, who will draw his supplies from the division ordnance officer.

"In time of action, division ordnance officers will be careful to get explicit instructions from their division commanders in regard to the disposition to be made of their trains, and they will themselves remain with their trains to attend to the issue of ammunition. If it should be necessary during a prolonged action to replenish the trains, the division ordnance officers will be informed where the ammunition can be obtained. . . ." (*W. R.*, 40, pp. 156, 157).

¹ *Chancellorsville and Gettysburg*, p. 49.

² *W. R.*, 39, p. 732. See also Knap's report, *ib.*, p. 772.

³ *Ib.*, 39, pp. 410, 411.

⁴ *Ib.*, 39, pp. 317, 344, 349.

⁵ *Ib.*, 39, p. 364.

In the V Corps, Tyler's brigade ran out of ammunition, but there was apparently a supply for it with the division. Referring to the ammunition for which Tyler had asked, Humphreys says: "This it would have been impracticable to distribute had it been with the brigade, and it would probably have fallen into the hands of the enemy, had it been sent, so close was the brigade pressed by them. General Tyler was therefore directed to withdraw when his ammunition was expended."¹

The lack of ammunition was a serious factor in Tyler's brigade, in Berry's and possibly Whipple's divisions, in Williams' division, and in Best's line of guns. But it can hardly be considered as general.

Its two fundamental causes were:

1. Inefficiency on the part of certain ordnance officers.
2. Division of responsibility between the quartermaster's and ordnance departments in the handling of ammunition-trains.²

Stuart's attack made up in spirit for what it lacked in skill. His first line, without any material support from the second or third, forced Williams' intrenchments, and penetrated in part to his and Berry's last infantry reserves. This feat may be accepted as a signal proof of the valor of our Southern countrymen. But the battle was not decided by native valor. That quality did not count for as much as the artificial valor, the combination of steadiness and obedience, which come of military training and experience. On the part of the Confederates there was no such wholesale marching to the rear as there was on the part of the Federals. The Federal organizations that were taken off the field by their officers without authority must have numbered over 5000 men. The individual skulking probably came up to an equal number. This discreditable showing should be ascribed to inefficiency on the part of officers rather than to poltroonery among the men. Say what one will about the man behind the gun, he is about what his officers make him. Good officers will make good soldiers of almost any kind of men; the best men under poor officers will make but indifferent soldiers. On the *morale* of the opposing armies Hooker expressed himself as follows: "Our artillery had always been superior to that of the rebels, as was also our infantry, except in discipline, and that, for reasons not necessary to mention, never did equal Lee's army. With a rank and file vastly inferior to our own, intellectually and physically, that army has by discipline alone acquired a character for steadiness and efficiency unsurpassed, in my judgment, in ancient or modern times. We have not been able to rival it, nor has there been any near approximation to it in the other rebel armies."³

The fire of Pegram's artillery from Hazel Grove on Slocum's flank

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 547.

² This defect of administration was remedied by a reorganization of the artillery

after the campaign (*Journal of the Mil. Service Inst. of the U. S.*, XIII, 302).

³ *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 113.

and along his line was annoying and effective, but could not prove decisive. It was the giving way of Williams' division and Graham's brigade on his right, under the pressure of Stuart's infantry, accompanied or followed by the assaults of Anderson's infantry in his front, and not the flanking and raking fire of Pegram's guns, trying as that was, that forced Geary out of his intrenchments; and so with the Federal artillery, it was the loss of their infantry supports and the approach of the enemy's infantry on their flanks, rather than the lack of ammunition or the execution of the enemy's artillery, that made Best's guns retire when they did. With the canister left in their chests they might have held out some time longer against front attacks.

The position to which Hooker retreated, like the one he abandoned, had the general form of an angle. The left side was occupied by the II and XI Corps, the right by the I and V. The III Corps was formed at the salient, or between the II and V Corps, except the portion under General Revere, which did not return from United States Ford until about 3 p.m. The XII Corps was assembled in a central position as a general reserve. The artillery by 12 m. formed four groups or masses, one of 26 pieces on the left under Captain Randol, chief of artillery of Humphreys' division ($\frac{3}{5}$); one of 48 pieces in the center under Weed, chief of artillery of the V Corps; and two groups, one of 10 and one of 18 pieces, on the right, under Wainwright, chief of artillery of the I Corps. Four pieces of Waterman's battery stood between Weed's and Randol's masses, and 140 lay in reserve between Chandler's and United States Ford (*Appendix 16*).

In the course of the day the Federal right wing was reënforced by about 7700 men with 6 pieces of artillery and lost about 8400 men and 4 pieces of artillery, which left it numbering about 75,500 men with 246 pieces.

The Confederates lost about 8800 men, which reduced them to about 34,000 with 132 pieces of artillery.¹

The Confederate forces formed on Chancellorsville as a center and extending therefrom to the right and left in the general direction of the Plank Road and Turnpike. Colston was in the center with two brigades on each side of Chancellorsville; Rodes some distance to the left of Colston. On Colston's right were Anderson's and McLaws' divisions, and Heth's division was on the left of Rodes.

Lee had no idea that the Federals were in position to give battle. He had mistaken Hooker's withdrawal to his new lines for a retreat. He was about as badly deceived to-day by Hooker's retrograde movement

¹	INFANTRY	CAVALRY	ARTILLERY	AGGREGATE
Federal	69,618	1,175	4,714	75,507
Confederate . .	30,013	1,933	2,300	34,246

The losses were insignificant after 12 m.

as Hooker was yesterday by Jackson's manœuvre. Regarding the campaign as decided, he announced its successful termination in the following bulletin:

President Davis:

Milford, May 3, 1863.

Yesterday General Jackson, with three of his divisions, penetrated to the rear of the enemy, and drove him from all his positions from the Wilderness to within 1 mile of Chancellorsville. He [the enemy] was engaged at the same time in front by two of Longstreet's divisions. This morning the battle was renewed. He was dislodged from all his positions around Chancellorsville, and driven back toward the Rappahannock, over which he is now retreating. Many prisoners were taken, and the enemy's loss in killed and wounded large.

We have again to thank Almighty God for a great victory. I regret to state that General Paxton was killed, General Jackson severely, and Generals Heth and A. P. Hill slightly wounded.

R. E. LEE,

General Commanding.

He was on the point, about 12:30 p.m., of throwing his 34,000 men against Hooker's 75,000, when his hand was stayed by the ominous tidings that the Federals had carried the heights of Fredericksburg and were advancing in his rear by the Plank Road. He rode up to McLaws, and directed him to march with Kershaw's brigade, and Manly's battery of his division, and Mahone's brigade of Anderson's, to meet the enemy. Learning afterward that an aide-de-camp of General Sedgwick's, captured near Banks' Ford, reported two corps under Sedgwick,¹ he directed McLaws to take the remainder of his division, which he did. Later Alexander with his battalion of artillery was ordered to McLaws' support.

Averell with his division crossed the Rapidan at Ely's Ford at 1 p.m., proceeded to United States Ford, and reported to Hooker, who placed him in support of Howard, on the left near the river. The following order was issued probably not long afterward, but was not received to-day:

Camp near —, May 3, 1863.

Brigadier-General Pleasonton will assume command of the division of cavalry now held by Brigadier-General Averell. The latter will, on being relieved, report for orders to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

By command of Major-General HOOKER:

J. H. VAN ALLEN,

Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp.

[P.S.] General Pleasonton will please deliver the above to General Averell.²

While Lee's detachments were marching toward Fredericksburg, and Averell with his cavalry toward United States Ford, was perhaps the

¹ *W. R.*, 39, pp. 801, 826, 844, 888.

² *Ib.*, 39, p. 1080.

most critical time for Lee during the campaign. It was a grand chance for Hooker to make a decisive counter-attack. Hooker had apparently forgotten President Lincoln's parting injunction: "In your next fight, put in all your men." The I Corps, except a small part of its artillery, and three fourths of the V Corps, had not been engaged at all. These forces with 8000 reliable men of the XI Corps, and the 3400 men under Averell, formed a fresh army about 35,000 strong, which if thrown, with the support that was available, against Stuart's tired men, should have wiped them off the field. But there was not the necessary leadership. Couch did not for a moment exercise supreme command. To do so he would have had to supersede Hooker against the latter's wishes, and without the sanction of the chief of staff or the chief medical officer. It does not appear that he had any information from either of these officers to the effect that Hooker was disabled. Hooker was not officially reported among the wounded. It looks as if the medical director failed to do his full duty toward freeing the army of its disqualified and incompetent commander.

On a rumor that Fitzhugh Lee had crossed the Upper Rappahannock, the 8 Pa. Cavalry was sent across the river, and for a number of hours picketed the road from Hartwood Church to Kelley's Ford. Not finding any enemy, it returned to United States Ford, where it bivouacked for the night.¹

About nightfall the 17 Pa. Cavalry was sent by Pleasonton's order to the north side of the Rappahannock at United States Ford to supply itself with rations and forage. It did not return during the campaign. The 6 N. Y. was kept in rear of the line of battle. The squadron which had been picketing Ely's Ford, having been completely cut off from the army, fought its way through the enemy's skirmishers, and rejoined the regiment.

Before we go back to the VI Corps, which we left at midnight just taking up the march for Fredericksburg, let us run our eyes over the following reports of Hooker's recent operations and present prospects:

May 3, 1863.

General Humphreys,

Commanding 3d Division [V Corps]:

. . . Everything goes well. Sedgwick has Fredericksburg. Sickles is in Jackson's rear.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

FRED T. LOCKE,

Assistant Adjutant-General [V Corps].²

¹ *History of Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1861-1865*, by S. P. Bates, III, 165; *The Charge at Chancellorsville*, by P. Huey, p. 73.

² *W. R.*, 107, p. 1036.

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, May 3, 1863, 12:45 p.m.

General Butterfield:

I think we have had the most terrible battle ever witnessed on earth. I think our victory will be certain, but the general told me he would say nothing just yet to Washington, except that he is doing well. In an hour or two the matter will be a fixed fact. I believe the enemy is in flight now, but we are not sure.

RUFUS INGALLS,
Chief Quartermaster.

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, near Chancellorsville,
1:25 p.m., May 3, 1863; by orderly to U. S. Ford, thence
by telegraph 3:30 p.m. Received at 4 p.m.¹

His Excellency A. Lincoln, President United States:

We have had a desperate fight yesterday and to-day which has resulted in no success to us, having lost a position of two lines, which had been selected for our defence. It is now 1:30 o'clock, and there is still some firing of artillery. We may have another turn at it this p.m. I do not despair of success. If Sedgwick could have gotten up, there could have been but one result. As it is impossible for me to know the exact position of Sedgwick as regards his ability to advance and take part in the engagement, I can not tell when it will end. We will endeavor to do our best. My troops are in good spirits. We have fought desperately to-day. No general ever commanded a more devoted army.

JOSEPH HOOKER,
Major-General.

¹ *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 225.

CHAPTER XXIV

MAY 3 . . . SECOND BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. ENGAGEMENT AT
SALEM CHURCH

Battle of Fredericksburg (Map 34, Plans 4 and 5)

SEDGWICK'S orders required him to be in the vicinity of Chancellorsville at daylight. The night was bright moonlight, but the fog which hung heavily over the river and the adjacent country made an atmosphere peculiarly difficult to see through. Under the most favorable sky, and assuming that he met with no resistance, and that his corps already possessed the marching power for which it was later to be distinguished, Sedgwick would have done well to cover the 10 miles between the head of his column and "the vicinity of Chancellorsville" by a night march of about five hours' duration. For daylight comes at this time of the year in Virginia at about 5 o'clock.

As soon as the head of his column moved away from the vicinity of the bridge it found itself opposed by hostile skirmishers. At the same time Brooks, facing the heights, was sharply pressed as if to find out whether the force behind him was withdrawing. Under these circumstances the progress of Sedgwick's column was necessarily slow and cautious. It was about 2 a.m. when the advance reached the outskirts of Fredericksburg and commenced driving the enemy through the town. A negro came into the lines and reported that the heights were occupied and the enemy was cutting the canal to flood the roads. The investigation which followed caused a considerable delay. In the meantime the troops, as they arrived, were halted in the streets. It was about 3 o'clock when the Second and Third Divisions took up the march. About this time General Warren, coming from Hooker's headquarters, crossed the river and joined Sedgwick near Franklin's Crossing, where Sedgwick's bridges were still down, and proceeded with him toward Fredericksburg. He gave Sedgwick another copy of Hooker's last order, and explained to him "somewhat confidentially" the exact position of things at Chancellorsville, that he might know the importance of the order.¹ About 4 o'clock the head of the Second Division reached Hazel Run, and that of the Third Division, Deep Creek.

¹ *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 46.

Butterfield used all his influence and authority to secure vigorous coöperation on the part of Gibbon and Sedgwick, and kept Hooker posted as to the progress made. He wrote:

To Gibbon, 12:20 a.m.

Push everything to get that bridge over. If you are likely to fail with the bridge, keep your ammunition dry, and push over the ford, if practicable. You must cross to-night.

1:45 a.m.

If it is found to be entirely impracticable to lay a bridge or cross at the fords near Falmouth, you can go *via* Sedgwick's [Franklin's] crossing, where the two bridges remain. . . .

To Sedgwick, 1:45 a.m.

Captain Razderichin's (aide-de-camp of General Hooker's staff) explanations will tell you how necessary it is that you should push through every obstacle in your path. The enemy will no doubt make every effort to delay and stop your force by a smaller one, that their main force may be used upon the right wing of our forces [at Chancellorsville].

At 2 o'clock Gibbon's division moved to the banks of the river directly opposite Fredericksburg. Twenty-five men of the 19 Mass., and an equal number from the 20 Mass., having volunteered therefor, were designated to cross over in boats, drive the enemy from rifle-pits near the city, and cover the laying of the bridges.¹ At the same point of crossing as before, with pontoons ready to be slid into the water, the detachments lay waiting for daylight to enter upon their perilous duty. Opposite these Massachusetts men, on the right bank of the river, were the same riflemen from Mississippi who opposed them in December. Everything indicated a repetition of the contest at this point.² Dispatches were sent as follows:

Butterfield to Hooker, 2:25 a.m.

General Sedgwick just reports three regiments threatened his left flank and have engaged his pickets; [that] there is still a force in Fredericksburg; that he is marching as rapidly as possible, but can not reach you by daylight.

Butterfield to Sedgwick, 2:35 a.m.

. . . Everything in the world depends upon the rapidity and promptness of your movement. Push everything. . . .

Barstow, Assistant Adjutant-General, Falmouth, to Sedgwick, 3:15 a.m.

Gibbon telegraphed at 2:40 o'clock that he is putting his pontoons [brought up from Reynolds' Crossing] in the water just above the Lacy House without opposition. The two guns were Gibbon's answer with canister to a volley of musketry from the opposite shore. No firing since.

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 358.

² *The 20th Regiment Mass. Vol. Inf.*, by G. A. Bruce, p. 250.

Gibbon was permitted to put his pontoons in the water, but was still prevented by the enemy's fire from laying a bridge.

Van Allen to Butterfield, 4:10 a.m.

The general commanding directs me to say that any force in front of General Sedgwick must be a small one, and must not check his advance.

In spite of Butterfield's and Hooker's assurances, Sedgwick was not convinced that the force in front of him was "a small one." Having halted and faced it from column of route, he had Newton on his right, Burnham as right center, Howe as left center, and Brooks on the left. The Confederate position may be considered as divided, like the Federal line, into four sections: right, right center, left center, and left (Map 34); the right extending from Hamilton's Crossing to a point known as the Brick Cabin (5600 yards); the right center, from the Brick Cabin to Hazel Run (1650 yards); the left center, from Hazel Run to the Plank Road (900 yards); the left, from the Plank Road to the Rappahannock (3200 yards). The position was fortified from one end to the other.¹

Perhaps the strongest section topographically was the left center, Marye's Hill (Plan 4). The artificial defence at the base of it consisted mainly of a stone fence partially covered in front with earth thrown up from behind. This intrenchment was already famous as the position against which Burnside's columns were shattered in the battle of December, 1862. From the Pike to the Plank Road and beyond it a shelter trench was constructed in prolongation of the stone wall. The low ground in front of this trench beyond the Plank Road had been flooded and thus rendered difficult, if not impracticable; the low ground to the left or east of the Plank Road was naturally boggy and difficult. In general the land behind the town formed an open plain extending back a quarter of a mile to the base of the ridge.²


¹ In a letter of April 26, Major A. S. Pendleton of Jackson's staff described the fortifications as follows:

"The greatest destruction, and change in the appearance of the country, is from the long lines of trenches and the redoubts which crown every hillside from ten miles above Fredericksburg to twenty miles below. The world has never seen such a fortified position. The famous lines at Torres Vedras could not compare with them. As I go to Moss Neck I follow the lines, and have a ride in the trenches. These are five feet wide and two and a half deep, having the earth thrown toward the enemy, making a bank still higher. They follow the contour of the ground and hug the bases of the hills as they wind to and from the river,

thus giving natural flanking arrangements; and from the tops of the hills from the redoubts for sunken batteries and barbette batteries *ad libitum*,—far exceeding the number of our guns; while occasionally, where the trenches take straight across the flats, a redoubt stands out defiantly in the open plain to receive our howitzers, and deal destruction broadcast to the Yankees, should their curiosity tempt them to an investigation" (*Memoirs of William Nelson Pendleton, D.D.*, by his daughter Susan P. Lee).

² I visited this position in September, 1897, and, from what I saw and heard, am satisfied that the stone wall was at both battles substantially as it was before the war. I saw other walls in the country

PLAN 4



Sections




DIAGRAM OF STONE WALL AT FREDERICKSBURG

at 100 Feet
200 Feet

Scale for Sections
0 10 20 30 40 Feet
10 8 6 4 2

General Sedgwick directed Newton to feel the enemy's position, and learn what he could regarding the nature of the defences, and number of men and guns, etc., behind them. Newton's leading brigade was not available, being engaged in clearing the town of the enemy. So the next brigade in the column, the 3d, was designated for the reconnaissance. Its commander, General Wheaton, selected the 62 N. Y. and 102 Pa. for his first line, deployed them in the gray of the morning just below a crest about 450 yards from the stone wall, and about 4 o'clock, supported by one or two batteries, the first in position, marched upon the enemy. He intended that his other three regiments, which were a short distance in rear, should follow when these two had got the distance usual between lines of battle, or about 200 yards. Before they had done this they were fired on by infantry and artillery with terrible effect, and compelled to fall back. They halted and lay down. The remaining three regiments and McCarthy's battery ($\frac{3}{VI}$) now came up on a line with them. The brigade thus reënforced maintained its position, but was *hors de combat* so far as assaulting the stone wall was concerned. Sedgwick rode out near the left of the line and witnessed the repulse of his men. The enemy, perceiving a commanding officer whose presence indicated authority, directed their fire upon him. After a few seconds of delay Colonel McMahon, his adjutant-general, ventured to suggest to him to retire from his exposed position. Sedgwick replied, "By Heaven, sir, this must not delay us," and slowly turned his horse and rode back into the town.

During the few moments that he stood gazing at the enemy's works his plans for carrying Marye's Heights were completed. Gibbon was to attack on the right, Howe on the left, and Newton to demonstrate against the front. Beyond Newton, on the extreme left, Brooks was to hold the enemy in check. Apprehending a general counter-attack, which might endanger his communications, he wrote to Butterfield at 5:30 a.m.:

My command is all in Fredericksburg, and I have no men [at work] on the bridges. These bridges should be taken up as soon as possible. We are warmly engaged on Sumner's old ground¹ and on the right.

On this report officers of Hooker's staff at Falmouth issued orders in his name:

Williams to Engineer Officer at Franklin's Crossing:

. . . proceed immediately to take up the two bridges at Franklin's Crossing, and relay them in the vicinity of the Lacy House. The transfer must be made

about Fredericksburg covered, as this one undoubtedly had been, by the earth excavated in digging draining-ditches along the road. Plan 4 represents the wall and the road as I conceive them to have been. The

dimensions given are my own measurements or estimates. J. B. Jr.

¹ Referring to Brooks' position and the battle of Fredericksburg, December, 1862. This sentence, it will be observed, contra-

in the most expeditious manner possible, and it is suggested whether time might not be saved by floating the boats up to the point indicated. The bridges will be removed one at a time.

Butterfield to Sedgwick, 6:20 a.m.

Have telegraphed your dispatch [of 5:30] to General Hooker. You know how much depends on your pushing, and of course will do everything in your power

It was probably left to Sedgwick to designate the exact places where the bridges were to be laid as well as to furnish troops of the line to assist in laying them and to guard them. They were promptly towed up stream, accompanied on the right bank by the artillery that had covered them below, and by Sedgwick's main train. The latter on arrival was parked near the Lacy House. In the meantime the leading detachment had proceeded to cross. Two boats were taken from their carriages, pushed into the stream, and manned. The orders were to wait until the guns of Sedgwick's skirmishers were heard. The oarsmen were ready and at the first sound of fire the boats pulled out into the stream. The firing increased and was now heard well into the city. The men of Sedgwick's corps were occasionally seen as they moved in and out among the buildings in their work of driving out the enemy. Just as the sun cast its first rays over the waters, the men landed on the Fredericksburg shore at the same place where two regiments landed on December 11, 1862.¹

About 5 o'clock Colonel Johns with the 7 Mass. took a defensive position in a cemetery, and the Federals came into complete and secure possession of the town. The special service of the 19 and 20 Mass. regiments thus became unnecessary. General Sedgwick crossed in a boat to the Stafford shore, and held a conference with General Gibbon. As a consequence, the bridge which was brought up yesterday from Fitzhugh's Crossing was laid just above the Lacy House between the hours of 5:15 and 6:30. The two bridges from Franklin's Crossing were laid somewhat later—one near the Lacy House, the other below the ruined railroad bridge.² As soon as the first bridge was laid at the Lacy House Gibbon crossed on it, with his two brigades (1st and 3d), numbering about 3400 men, and two batteries ($\frac{1}{2}$ II, $\frac{2}{4}$ II), numbering 12 guns which gave Sedgwick about 24,400 infantry and 11 batteries, or about

dicts the opening one and so prohibits the suspicion that Sedgwick meant to deceive Butterfield into believing that the whole of the VI Corps was in Fredericksburg.

¹ *History of the 19th Regt. Mass. Vol. Inf.*, by Committee, p. 203; *History of the 20 Mass.*, by G. A. Bruce, p. 251.

² According to Benham's *Tabular Statement of Bridges Laid*, etc. (W. R., 39, p.

215), these two bridges and the bridge from Fitzhugh's Crossing were laid at the same time. But it would seem from the text of his report (*ib.*, p. 214), the foregoing dispatches, and other evidence, that they were laid as stated, the single bridge first, and the couple of bridges some time afterward. J. B. Jr.

25,600 men and 66 guns. Of Gibbon's 1st brigade the 19 Me., lately detached to Banks' Ford, returned to-day to Falmouth, where it remained as a camp guard. The 2d brigade remained at Banks' Ford. There were no bridges now below Fredericksburg.

In compliance with Lee's order of yesterday, Wilcox prepared this morning to march toward Chancellorsville, leaving about 50 men and 2 pieces of artillery at Banks' Ford and taking with him about 1700 infantry, the remaining pieces of his two batteries,¹ and 50 cavalymen (15 Va.); but learning of Gibbon's movements between the river and the canal, he directed his march toward the canal, taking with him all his artillery (8 pieces). Arriving behind Taylor's Hill, he left his force there, and went on to Marye's Hill, where he conferred with General Barksdale.

The Confederate infantry was disposed as follows (Map 34, Plan 5): on the right, between Hamilton's Crossing and Brick Cabin, Gordon's, Hoke's, and Smith's brigades of Early's division (about 6100 men); in the right center, between Brick Cabin and Hazel Run, one regiment of Hays' brigade, same division, and two regiments of Barksdale's brigade of Anderson's division (about 1300 men); in the left center, between Hazel Run and the Plank Road, two regiments of Barksdale's brigade (about 900 men); on the left, between the Plank Road and the Rappahannock River, part of Wilcox's brigade and four regiments of Hays' brigade (about 3300 men). These forces, aggregating about 11,600 men, gave the Confederates a little more than 1 infantryman per yard. The Federals had more than 2 infantrymen per yard.

The Confederate artillery on the field numbered 48 pieces, of which 42 were in position as follows: 16 in two batteries on the right (Andrews'); 12 in the right center (Fraser 4, Patterson 4, Carlton 4); 7 in the left center, including the piece on the Plank Road (Parker 2, Washington Artillery 5); and 7 on the left (Washington Artillery 1, Penick 4, Moore 2).² The Federals had 66 pieces on the south side of the river; these could be more or less supported by the 40 pieces on the north side, among which were 12 guns of position (20-pounder Parrotts and 4½-inch siege-guns).

At 7:40 a.m. Sedgwick reported to Butterfield that he intended to make a general assault. But at 9:30 Gibbon's troops were still marching through Fredericksburg, and the operation was not to commence until all the troops were in position. In Gibbon's front was a canal which he would have to cross twice in order to get at the enemy. He crossed it once, but before he could do so the second time the enemy broke up the

¹ Penick's and Moore's ($\frac{2.4}{1.1}$).

² The six pieces not in position were four of the Washington Artillery, under Richardson, moving from the right to report

to Pendleton, and two of Moore's battery. The places given on Map 34 to the pieces in position are partly conjectural.

ericksburg], and that the enemy appear to be evacuating their intrenchments at Banks' Ford.

About 9:50 a.m.?

. . . I wish to facilitate your operations in every way. Command me in any way, and I am at your disposal. Telegraphic communication with the general *via* United States Ford is broken. Will advise you when restored. I am of no service here while the line is down. If I can aid you on the field, command me.

P.S. My orders were to remain here, from General Hooker, but I feel like disobedience now. Please consider this confidential.

10:05 a.m.

What can I say to General Hooker of your position [and] prospects, and what he can expect? Telegraph is open to him partially.

The answer to this inquiry, if there was one, is not known. About this time, however, Sedgwick informed Howe that an attack was about to be made between Hazel Run and Fredericksburg, stating that he wished Howe to assist. Howe at once¹ placed his divisional artillery where it could fire effectively upon the enemy's works without interfering with the advance of his infantry, and formed the mass of the latter in three lines as follows:

First line—33 N. Y., 7 Me., $\frac{1}{2}$ of 21 N. J., and 77 N. Y. of General Neill's brigade (3. 2. VI), the 77 N. Y. deployed as skirmishers.

Second line—2 Vt., 6 Vt., and 26 N. J. of Colonel Grant's brigade (2. 2. VI).

Third line—3 Vt. and 4 Vt. of Grant's brigade, and $\frac{1}{2}$ of 21 N. J. of Neill's brigade, under Colonel Seaver.²

The 5 N. J. was placed in support of a battery.³ The two remaining regiments (20 and 49 N. Y.) were, it seems, similarly employed or held in reserve.

Newton's men had long been standing in the streets of Fredericksburg listening to the rumble of the cannon at Chancellorsville, and were impatient to advance. At last everything was ready. The necessary commands were given and transmitted. At 10:35 a.m. Butterfield reported to Hooker:

Sedgwick at this moment commences his assault. He is on our old ground of December [1862]. The force in his front is small but active. Will post you speedily as to result.

Two regiments in column of fours took the Telegraph Road; and four regiments in like formation, the Plank Road. On the left of these col-

¹ He gives the time erroneously as *about 11 a.m.* (*W. R.*, 39, p. 599). Neill gives it as *about 10 a.m.* (*ib.*, p. 608).

² Howe's division comprised a 2d and 3d brigade, but no 1st.

³ *W. R.*, 39, p. 603.

tle on the left, fell wounded from his horse. The line and column recoiled some distance, and took shelter.

In front of the stone wall, facing down the road, was a house inclosed by a high board fence. While the 7 Mass. was enjoying a breathing-spell behind the latter, some of the men, looking between the boards, caught sight of the enemy's unprotected flank. A flag of truce was sent forward, probably by a brigade commander. The officer bearing it asked to be allowed to remove the dead and wounded in front of the 18 Miss. Colonel Griffin, the regimental commander, without referring to his brigade commander, granted the request, and allowed his own men to show themselves while the wounded were being delivered. The feebleness and vulnerability of the defence was soon reported and passed along the line of the assailants.¹ On the right the thrilling cry rang out: "Massachusetts colors to the front!" With a rallying shout from the color-guard the colors of the 7 Mass. were thrust forward; in a moment a mass of men rushed to the board fence, and went through it pell-mell, directly upon the enemy's flank, giving them the contents of their muskets point-blank.² On the left Colonel Allen of the 5 Wisc. took the place of Colonel Burnham, and electrified his men with the words: "When the signal *forward* is given, you will start at double-quick, you will not fire a gun, and you will not stop until you get the order to halt. You will never get that order."³

The charge was sounded. The first line sprang forward with a cheer, followed at 30 steps by the second, which was followed by the third, all accompanying the columns on the right. The stone wall, which had cost the Federal army so many brave lives, was gained and cleared. A short rest, a final rush, and the works on Marye's Hill shared the fate of the stone wall.

Newton's reserves followed the assaulting columns up the heights, and secured the conquered positions. The gallant feat cost little more time than it takes to describe it. At 10:50 a.m., as Lee was sweeping Hooker's rear-guard out of Chancellorsville, Butterfield telegraphed to Hooker:

Am signaled that Sedgwick has carried Marye's Heights, and, officer thinks, captured the guns.

Howe, as soon as he heard the firing in front of Marye's Hill, proceeded to attack. Five of his regiments obliqued to the right, and crossing the Run, united or coöperated with Burnham's division. One of them (6 Vt.) was the second regiment to gain Marye's Heights.⁴ In-

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 840; *Military Memoirs of a Confederate*, by E. P. Alexander, p. 351.

² *Stories of our Soldiers*, collected from the *Boston Journal*, p. 192; *History of Battery B, 1 R. I. L. A.*, by J. H. Rhodes, pp. 172, 173.

³ *History of the Army of the Potomac*, by J. H. Stine, p. 373.

⁴ *Chancellorsville*, Hotchkiss and Allan, p. 82; *History of the Army of the Potomac*, by J. H. Stine, p. 373.

Since the battle Marye's Heights has

alive with fleeing soldiers, riderless horses, and artillery and wagon-trains on a gallop. The writer hurried back to Sedgwick, who was giving directions for Brooks and Howe to come up, and suggested that it was a rare opportunity for the use of cavalry. With evident regret Sedgwick replied that he did not have a cavalryman. The carrying of the heights had completely divided the enemy's forces, throwing either flank with much confusion on opposite roads, and it seemed as though a regiment of cavalry might not only have captured many prisoners, guns, ammunition, and wagons, but also have cleared the way for the corps almost as far as the immediate rear of Lee's army at Chancellorsville."¹

Gibbon's men, after cheering the victors, marched through the city and out by the Pike to the rear of the Confederate defences.

Butterfield received the following dispatch, and transmitted it as indicated to Sedgwick:

General Butterfield:

United States Ford, May 3, 1863, 12 m.

. . . We have plenty of fresh troops still left, but have gained no ground to-day, yet our lines are strong; but no doubt another desperate effort will be made to force our position. We feel confident that Sedgwick must press them fast. Answer me here. I will take it to General Hooker. He wants Sedgwick to press them.

RUFUS INGALLS,
Chief Quartermaster.

[Indorsement]

General Sedgwick:

May 3, 1863, 12 m.

What answer can I send General Hooker?

BUTTERFIELD.

Evidently without waiting to hear from Sedgwick, Butterfield replied:

R. Ingalls,

May 3, 1863, 12 m.

Chief Quartermaster:

Sedgwick is by this time (12 m.) probably free from all obstacles of earth-works. He has carried the heights on right of Telegraph road [Marye's]. Two lines of his troops have disappeared in the wood on the hills, and all seems going well. Will advise you further as soon as I can get word from Sedgwick.

BUTTERFIELD.

Lieutenant Pitzer of Early's staff, who was on Lee's Hill when it was captured, galloped at once to General Lee, and informed him of the loss of that position.² Early with his main force retreated by the Telegraph Road to Smith's on the Ny River (Map 2), leaving Gordon's brigade to cover the movement at Cox's (Map 34). Barksdale rallied and reformed his fleeing regiments on Lee's Hill, under cover of Carlton's and Fra-

¹ Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel H. W. Jackson, U. S. Volunteers, *B. and L.*, III, 229, 230.

² Fitzhugh Lee's *Chancellorsville Address*.

CHANCELLORSVILLE

at his brigade and these batteries in the line of battle and succeeded in the Second Position, Map 34). The whole moved in the direction of Chancellorsville, with a general advance. He tried to induce Hamilton upon rejoining his command

to turn upon Early's force, at Hamilton's Crossing. But his order was a great delay toward Chancellorsville, breaking through an enemy's center communication. But herein lies the chief attraction of the enemy's trains and off his retreat, may carry the attack to the line of battle, leaving the separation to take their late assailants in rear, which an attacking force, having carried off pillaging the enemy's camp, was its chief broken a portion of the enemy's line, separate fractions and disperse them in the enemy's rear. This principle Sec. 10 ignore. At any rate, he pushed on from the division directly toward Chancellorsville, Barksdale from following him. Brocks with the greater part of his division toward Fredericksburg. Gibbon remained on the heights of Fredericksburg, self authorized to order him forward, and others. Sometime between 11 and 1, p.m. moved himself as far from support as possible, and halted to await the arrival of a messenger reported the situation to Butterfield

his division on the Plank road as far as Gues, splendidly at 11 a.m. by Newton. Howe immediately to the south of Hazel Run. We have been behind us before advancing, to get up by brigades straightened out, which were a little and pursuit. Our loss, though honorably very severe. The Sixth Corps is in splendid. General Howe reports a force yet in his front by the enemy's fire in position on our left, at 3 miles to march to join us. He is not yet u

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This dispatch was received and transmitted to Hooker at 2:30 p.m. About the time when it left Warren's hands the following one came into Butterfield's:

U. S. Ford, May 3, 1863.

General Butterfield:

Do not expect dispatches much from General Hooker at present. He wishes to hear constantly from you, but he is too engaged. He has been slightly hurt, but not at all severely. No firing for an hour. Am just back from Hooker's headquarters. The slaughter has been fearful on both sides. The enemy must have suffered most, as he has been forced to attack every time. Your last dispatch [12 m. ?] is received and forwarded.

RUFUS INGALLS,
Chief Quartermaster.¹

This elicited the following message:

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, May 3, 1863, 1:15 p.m.

GENERAL HOOKER.

Dear General:

I deeply regret to hear that you are even slightly wounded. I have put every officer and man here in use during the operations, even to the Twentieth Maine.² As I can not now by any possibility be able to join you if permitted,³ can I join General Sedgwick? The enemy will undoubtedly make a desperate effort, as his custom is, toward dusk, if he lasts that long. Our troops are still advancing, cheering lustily. A portion of Sedgwick's force is moving to the right, on Bowling Green road.⁴ Haupt is at Falmouth with his force, ready to spring with the railroad bridge when ordered. Affairs seem to justify it now here. Am sending 200 prisoners to the rear; [including] 1 colonel. While I do not know who could replace me here, I am heartsick at not being permitted to be on the actual field, to share the fate and fortune of this army and my general.

BUTTERFIELD.

Under the impression that Gibbon advanced with Sedgwick, Butterfield wrote at 2 p.m. to Hunt:

General Gibbon, right of Sedgwick's advance, should be about 2 or 3 miles from Fredericksburg, moving toward Chancellorsville. We can not now tell where he is. Send scouts to swim the river, and report to you. Act according to orders from General Hooker. Keep him advised of Sedgwick's advance, with time. . . . Better lose a few men as scouts than not have news and report of our advance on Chancellorsville Plank road.

Sedgwick was anxious to communicate with Benham at Banks' Ford, as he wanted a bridge laid there. For some time his attempts to get a

¹ *W. R.*, 107, p. 1035.

² This regiment of infantry ($\frac{20}{21. V}$), left in camp near Falmouth on account of small-pox, was employed guarding the telegraph line to U. S. Ford (Report of brigade commander, *ib.*, 39, p. 519).

³ This assertion would seem to be based on the delusion that Hooker was pursuing Lee.

⁴ No portion of Sedgwick's force was moving on or toward the Bowling Green Road. J. B. Jr.

message to the ford were frustrated by roving bands of Confederate cavalry to which he had nothing to oppose. But he was finally successful.¹

Brooks' and Howe's divisions joined Newton's at the Guest House about 2 p.m. Brooks' seemed to be in better fighting and marching trim than either of the other two, and was deemed the best qualified "to do everything that the urgency of the case required." It was therefore ordered to take the advance. Shortly afterward the following report was made to Butterfield by an aide-de-camp, whom he sent to Sedgwick to keep him posted as to the latter's movements.

2:20 p.m. Brooks' division has just moved ahead again, and other two divisions will follow shortly. Sedgwick says loss heavier than he expected, having lost several colonels and many field officers. Warren thinks 1½ miles beyond this [beyond Guest's House, or at the Toll-House] the enemy have halted and will make a stand. The men show much fatigue, but Sedgwick intends to push vigorously. . . .

This dispatch was transmitted to Hooker at 3:25.

Brooks had with him Brown's and Bartlett's brigades ($\frac{1}{2}$ and $\frac{2}{3}$) and his four batteries of artillery, having left Russell's brigade behind to cover his withdrawal. The country being open, the division was formed on a broad front, one brigade on each side of the Plank Road, each brigade in two lines, the front and flanks covered by a line of skirmishers. The artillery formed in column on the road between the brigades. The bridge that was being thrown was a portion of the one of the two bridges brought up from Franklin's Crossing. Its location was Scott's Ford, about a mile below Banks' Ford, but was commonly called Banks' Ford in subsequent dispatches and reports. Hooker, it seems, was opposed to the laying of a bridge at this point as tending to weaken Sedgwick's resolution to push on. With a view to improving his own communications, he issued an order at 2:30 p.m. for another bridge to be laid at United States Ford, authorizing the use of Comstock's canvas pontoons "as far as they would go."

Wilcox had posted a small force of dismounted cavalry and 4 pieces of artillery on the Plank Road about three fourths of a mile west of the Guest House, and about a mile from Salem Church. With his main force he took position at the Toll-House. McLaws with his three brigades, Mahone's brigade of Anderson's division, Manly's and McCarthy's batteries (8 pieces), and Alexander with his battalion (14 pieces), were marching in the direction of Fredericksburg; McLaws by

¹ T. W. Hyde, Provost-Marshal and Acting Aide-de-Camp on General Sedgwick's staff, says: "Colonel Tompkins was sent there with a message. He did not return. Captain Farrar was sent. He came back to us some months after by way of Rich-

mond exchange. Then General Sedgwick in impatience sent me. I did not take the road, but took a bee-line across country, most fortunately, for I was back in an hour, having seen no wandering rebels" (*Following the Greek Cross*, p. 129).

the Turnpike, and Alexander by the Plank Road. Lee seemed to be thinking more of Stoneman than of Sedgwick. He wrote to Seddon:

I request that Ransom's and Pettigrew's brigades [coming up from D. H. Hill's command] be stopped at Hanover Junction, with orders to protect the railroads from the enemy's cavalry.

It is reported that the enemy has crossed at Fredericksburg, and driven back our force that was left there. I have sent back reinforcements.

Battle of Salem Church (Map 35)

About 2 p.m. McLaws arrived at Salem Church, and formed line of battle on the edge of a strip of wood, about 250 yards wide, pushing his skirmishers out to the far edge (Map 35). The ground fell away from his line to the Toll-Gate, where a slight rise gave command of it back to the wood. The intervening ground, though generally clear and open, was intersected by a number of ravines parallel to McLaws' position, which would throw disorder into lines advancing upon it and break the *élan* of a charge. From the Toll-Gate to McLaws' line was about 1000 yards. Leaving an interval in the center for Wilcox, McLaws threw Kershaw's and Wofford's brigades ($\frac{1}{2}, \frac{3}{4}$) out to the right, and Semmes' and Mahone's ($\frac{2}{3}, \frac{1}{4}$) to the left. His artillery had not yet come up. Hays had by this time joined Early. It was about 3:15 p.m., more than four hours after the capture of Marye's Heights; more than an hour after the assembly of the VI Corps at the Guest House, and the arrival of McLaws in the intrenched position of Salem Church; and about an hour after the departure of Brooks' division for Chancellorsville, when Newton's and Howe's divisions took up the march, the former to follow Brooks', and the latter to follow Newton's. These divisions marched in column of route. Sedgwick's corps might have made an earlier start from Fredericksburg, had Newton's division, when it gained the heights, been thrown against the inner flank of the line confronting Howe and Brooks, instead of being marched on to the Guest House, where it was kept inactively waiting for the other divisions to break away from their plucky, tenacious opponents. Nothing was gained and precious time was lost by moving toward Chancellorsville with a single division. Butterfield, dissatisfied with the rate of Sedgwick's progress, started three times to relieve him from command.

Hunt at Banks' Ford wired to Butterfield at 3 p.m.:

Parties [of skirmishers] across from this command. Colonel Doull¹ sent over with directions to ascertain and report the distance of Sedgwick's and Gibbon's advance on the Plank road. The bridge is being thrown.

The [telegraph] wires are across; taken by swimmers of the signal corps.²

¹ Major Alexander Doull, Inspector of Artillery on General Hunt's staff, probably brevet colonel, crossed the river by swimming his horse.

² "This movement, though bold and dar-

ing, was of no immediate importance, and the instruments and wires were brought back in the evening" (*The Signal Corps in the War of the Rebellion*, by J. W. Brown).

ing up the Plank Road in line of battle. A 6-gun battery, accompanying their advance, halted at the Toll-Gate, and opened fire.¹ Penick's battery at the church fired one shot in reply, and retired by order of General McLaws to a point several hundred yards from the church.² Moore's battery could not find an eligible position and so was sent to the rear. Manly's and McCarthy's batteries were just coming on the field; Alexander's battalion was still far off. The Confederates at Salem Church and the Toll-Gate now numbered about 10,000 men and, except in front of Wofford on the extreme right, were covered with intrenchments. The battery with the Federal advance (reënforced probably by one or two others) shelled the woods to the right and left of the road for a short time. When the artillery ceased firing, Brooks' division advanced to the attack.

The Confederate skirmishers are pushed back to the wood and then upon their line of battle. The Federals follow quickly. Reaching the edge of the wood, they give a cheer and rush forward to the charge. Within 80 yards of the enemy's line they receive his fire. They waver, but only for a moment. Bartlett with the 2d brigade dashes forward, surrounds the school-house, and captures the garrison. Pushing on, he delivers all the impetus of his attack on the 10 Ala., and shatters it. A little further on, and the victory will be won. Wilcox still has the 9 Ala. in reserve just behind this part of the line. In a moment he hurls it upon the advancing Federals. The Alabamians deliver a deadly fire at close quarters, and rush forward to gain what has been lost. Gallantly does Bartlett strive to hold the advantage he has won. A fierce struggle, and in turn the Federal line gives way. No time is allowed it to rally. Wilcox follows closely, increasing at each step the confusion and carnage in the Federal ranks. The school-house is reached, the captured garrison is set free, and their captors are in turn captives. It is now 6:30 p.m. In vain do the Federals try again to turn the tide of battle. Once more their line is broken, and rushes in confusion to the rear. The field is cleared of Federal troops to the Toll-Gate.³ A fresh regiment of Bartlett's brigade, just arrived from Fredericksburg, is drawn up across the road to stop stragglers. As the broken lines come back they are reformed in front of it.⁴ Newton's division comes up on the right, too late to turn the tide of battle, but reënforcing and restor-

night might have informed the enemy of your movements, which it was desirable to avoid. . . ." But this message had not reached Sedgwick, and Cushing's instructions of 7:15 Sedgwick did not consider as authoritative.


¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 858.

² Report of Lieutenant Penick, *ib.*, 39,


p. 884, but Wilcox says in his official report: "The two batteries fired some 15 or 20 minutes, when ours was withdrawn for the want of ammunition" (*ib.*, 39, p. 858).

³ *Chancellorsville*, by Hotchkiss and Allan, pp. 86, 87.

⁴ *History of the 27th Regiment N. Y. Volunteers*, by C. B. Fairchild, p. 169.



en Federal **ENGAGEMENT AT SALEM CHURCH** Red Confederate





Toll-Gate was increased to three, but this new line of guns did not open fire until the infantry came running back with the enemy after them; the artillery then fired over the heads of the infantry, and by their excellent practice checked the pursuit. These batteries were afterward replaced by three others kept in reserve. Of the nine batteries of the VI Corps, not more than three were in action at any one time; and two (Martin's and McCartney's) were not engaged at all. The corps seems to have lost in this engagement about 1500 officers and men.¹ With reference to the Confederates, Penick's four guns probably went into action a second time as the Federal infantry advanced, and expended the remainder of their ammunition; at any rate, they had no ammunition with which to fire on the Federal infantry as they retreated. Manly's and McCarthy's batteries did not get into position until after the main attack was repulsed. Alexander with his battalion of 14 pieces did not reach the field until the fighting was all over. Like the "Battle of Chancellorsville," the engagement at Salem Church was essentially an infantry fight.

The following correspondence explains itself:

Butterfield to Hooker, 4:05 p.m.

Gibbon's division still in and around Fredericksburg. Shall it be pushed after Sedgwick or remain here?

5:30 p.m.

[A] Captain of the Washington Artillery captured reports Hood's and Pickett's divisions as expected to-night. . . . The general impression of the prisoners seems to be that we shall hear from Hood before long.²

To Gibbon, 6:20 p.m.

General Hooker wishes you kept at Fredericksburg.

It was not expected that Gibbon would be able to hold the heights of Fredericksburg in case of an attempt to retake them, and they were only guarded by a picket line. The duty assigned him was to keep the town, and preserve the bridges in the event of the VI Corps finding it necessary to return by that route. His force was stretched out from Hazel Run across the plain to the river above Fredericksburg, to meet an attack—should one be made—along the Bowling Green Road on the left, or the River Road on the right, or over the heights in front.³

¹ Bartlett reports a loss of 580 out of his four regiments numbering less than 1500 (*W. R.*, 39, p. 582). The 121 N. Y., commanded by Colonel Emory Upton, having never been in action before, lost 276 out of an aggregate of 453 (*ib.*, pp. 189, 589).

² Hood and Pickett had orders from

Longstreet to "move back from front of Suffolk to the right bank of the Blackwater immediately after dark." It is safe to say that Lee did not expect either of these commands or any other reinforcement to-day.

³ *History of the 20 Mass. Volunteers*, by Colonel Bruce, p. 257.

At 10 p.m. General Hunt, chief of artillery, reported in person to Hooker in obedience to an order from Butterfield. The service rendered by the Federal artillery would have been greater and more effective if Hooker had kept his chief of artillery with him, and allowed him to discharge his proper functions. "There was no one upon the field whose special business it was to look for eligible positions for batteries, and having found them, with authority to post them there, and to command them when so posted; to select rifle batteries for positions requiring such pieces, and smooth-bores for service adapted to their kind. It was not until after disaster had befallen his army, and everything was in confusion, that Hooker recalled his chief of artillery, and invested him with authority to restore order."¹ During the battle Hooker's Chief of Staff, Chief of Artillery, Chief Engineer Officer, and Chief Signal Officer were all on the north side of the Rappahannock, to observe, direct, and assist Sedgwick, on whose fighting the success or failure of the campaign was so largely to depend. Warren returned this evening to Hooker's headquarters, arriving there at 11 p.m. He found Hooker in a deep sleep and still suffering from the concussion of the morning. He asked him if he had instructions to send to Sedgwick, and was answered, "None." Rather than leave Sedgwick in the dark as to how matters stood, he wrote to him at midnight on his own responsibility:

I find everything snug here. We contracted the line a little, and repulsed the assault with ease. General Hooker wishes them to attack him to-morrow. If they will, he does not desire you to attack them again in force unless he [Hooker] attacks him [them] at the same time. He says you are too far away for him to direct. Look well to the safety of your corps, and keep up communication with General Benham at Banks' Ford and Fredericksburg. You can go to either place, if you think it best. To cross at Banks' Ford would bring you in supporting distance of the main body, and would be better than falling back to Fredericksburg.²

Several messages passed to-day between Hooker's chief of staff and the President:

Lincoln to Butterfield, 4:35 p.m.

Where is General Hooker? Where is Sedgwick? Where is Stoneman?

Butterfield to Lincoln, 4:40 p.m.

General Hooker is at Chancellorsville. General Sedgwick, with 15,000 to 20,000 men, at a point 3 or 4 miles out from Fredericksburg, on the road to Chancellors-

¹ *Artillery Service in the Rebellion*, by Tidball.

² The abandonment of Chancellorsville, and taking up a position of which the nearest point is $\frac{3}{4}$ of a mile and the center $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Chancellorsville, Warren calls *contracting the line a little*. Referring especially to this incident, A. C. Hamlin says

in his *Battle of Chancellorsville* (p. 164): "This deceptive and dangerous dispatch to Sedgwick may be excused perhaps in war, but it was false, and Warren was aware of it." Warren says in his official report: "This dispatch was written at a time when I was exceedingly exhausted."

ville. Lee is between. Stoneman has not been heard from. This is the situation at the hour from latest reports, 4:30 p.m.

The state of the supplies occasioned the following correspondence:

Butterfield to Ingalls, 8 p.m.

How about the question of forage for animals? How can they fare and get on? The rations of the Eleventh, Twelfth, and Fifth expire to-night unless replenished from trains [on north side of Rappahannock]. I telegraphed the general yesterday, and reply came that orders would issue to-day. Have heard nothing. How stands it? Advise me.

Ingalls to Butterfield, 8:15 p.m.

We can do nothing at present about forage and subsistence. If we succeed we shall march at once to Fredericksburg. If we fail, we must try soon to reach our depots [by retreating]. The question must soon resolve itself. I propose to order all empty teams down to Falmouth.

Major Rusling wrote home:

. . . It has been a sad day here. General Berry was killed this morning at the head of our division. General Mott was again wounded; and every colonel in his brigade, except one, either killed or wounded. The carnage on both sides has been awful. Oh, what a Sunday!

. . . We hope and believe that to-morrow will wind up a week's fighting with a great and overwhelming victory.

At 3 p.m., as Howe and Newton started to follow Brooks toward Chancellorsville, Lee initiated a movement toward Hooker. In a low, quiet tone he gave his orders to Colston (Map 36):

General, I wish you to advance with your division on the United States Ford road. I expect you will meet with resistance before you come to the bend of the road. I do not want you to attack the enemy's positions, but only to feel them. Send your engineer officer with skirmishers to the front to reconnoiter and report. Don't engage seriously, but keep the enemy in check, and prevent him from advancing. Move at once.¹

Pursuant to this order Colston advanced with two of his brigades on each side of the road and two Napoleon guns in the road between them. He had hardly started when he received a terrific fire of shell and canister from Weed's artillery. In less than two minutes 50 officers and men fell, killed and wounded, by his side. By this time he was aware that the Federals occupied a formidable position. To advance against it with a division so much reduced as his was, would have been only to insure its destruction, and would have been contrary to the

¹ General Colston, *B. and L.*, III, 233; and *W. R.*, 39, pp. 1006, 1007.



MAP 36

CHANCELLORSVILLE

Positions of Troops at 12 p. m.

May 3, 1863

Green Federal Red Confederate



instructions that he had received. He accordingly reported to Stuart that he was not able to attack with any prospect of success,¹ and about 3:45 was ordered to return with his division to his place in line.

At 4 p.m. Anderson proceeded, by order of General Lee, with the three brigades then present (Wright's, Perry's, and Posey's), to the River Road, opposite the Federal left (Map 36), "to watch that road, and to threaten the enemy's communications, and his line of retreat from Chancellorsville." Major Hardaway with a battery of 13 rifled pieces was attached to this command. He selected a position near Hayden's, from which to fire at the Federal camps across the river in the vicinity of United States Ford.² These dispositions were completed about nightfall.

It may have been in consequence thereof that about 10 p.m. the Federal XII Corps (excepting Knipe's regiments guarding prisoners) was moved from its position as a general reserve to the left of the XI Corps, between that corps and the Rappahannock—Geary ($\frac{2}{\text{XI}}$) on the right. To make room for it, Schurz's division ($\frac{3}{\text{XI}}$) was withdrawn from the left of the XI Corps, and placed in rear of Devens' division ($\frac{1}{\text{XI}}$).

Anderson remained quiet, watching Slocum; and McLaws slept on his arms in front of Sedgwick. Early wrote to McLaws that he purposed attacking Marye's Hill and Sedgwick's rear at daylight, and McLaws transmitted this message to Lee.

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 1007. See also the report of Colonel Hinrichs, chief engineer, *ib.*, pp. 1011, 1012.

² *Ib.*, 39, pp. 857, 879, 880. The pieces

were 3 of Hurt's, 4 of Jordan's, 2 of Carter's ($\frac{3}{\text{A}}$), 2 of Fry's ($\frac{4}{\text{A}}$), and 2 of Marye's ($\frac{1}{\text{A}}$).

CHAPTER XXV

MAY 4 . . . SEDGWICK FALLS BACK TO SCOTT'S FORD. AVERELL RELIEVED

ANDERSON had prepared during the night for a demonstration against the extreme left of Hooker's line. A large park of wagons was discovered on the north side of the river within range of the rifled artillery, and before daybreak Major Hardaway opened fire upon it with 10 rifled pieces. "At 3:30 o'clock," says Lieutenant-Colonel Woods, chief commissary of subsistence of Sickles' corps, "[I] was awakened by the rapid explosion of shells near where I was, some of them falling in the same field where the beef-cattle were, but the most of them falling in a cavalry camp, about $\frac{1}{3}$ of a mile away, among some rebel prisoners, and amid the ammunition-trains of one of the other corps. This shelling lasted for the space of about seven minutes.¹

"During this time the entire park had become the scene of the greatest confusion; teamsters and drivers of ambulances were fleeing to the rear in great haste upon their horses, in many instances without saddles, boots, or hats, and every path appeared to be filled with those wearing the crescent. We attempted in vain to stop the incipient panic, and the fortunate cessation of the shells soon restored order."² Meanwhile Anderson pushed forward his skirmishers and found the Federals holding and fortifying the high ridge along the Mineral Spring Road. It appearing therefrom that Hooker would not advance down the river, Lee decided that Anderson should proceed to Salem Church and unite with McLaws and Early. The three divisions and the corps artillery of Jackson's old corps, and Stuart's cavalry, about 25,000 men, were to remain under Stuart in front of Hooker's 75,500 men, and the divisions of Anderson, Early, and McLaws, with the corps artillery of the I Corps and a portion of the General Artillery Reserve (about 23,000 men), were to be thrown against Sedgwick, whose corps now numbered about 19,000 men. Lee was not aware that Reynolds' corps had been transferred from Sedgwick's command to Hooker's, and was under the impression that Sedgwick had two corps with him. Sedgwick believed that Early had been reënforced by a column 15,000 strong from Richmond and that it was this force or a part of it that had occupied the heights of

¹ Hardaway himself heard the crashing of the wagon bodies (*W. R.*, 39, p. 880).

² *Ib.*, 39, p. 398.

Fredericksburg, cutting him off from the town.¹ Thus Lee and Sedgwick each estimated the other's strength in this quarter as about twice as great as it was.

Sedgwick continued anxious and perplexed. At 1:30 a.m. he wrote to Hooker:

We were checked here [near Salem Church] last night and held until dark. I believe the enemy have been reënforcing all night, and will attack me in the morning. How do matters stand with you? Send me instructions.

At 6:20 a.m. he wrote to Butterfield:

I am anxious to hear from General Hooker. There is a strong force in front of me, strongly posted.² I can not attack with any hope of dislodging them until I know something definite as to the position of their main body and ours. I have sent two or three messengers to Banks' Ford, but none have returned, nor have I heard from the general since yesterday.

Ten minutes later he received Warren's dispatch of midnight. He naturally concluded that he was not expected to do more than take care of himself unless Hooker attacked, but in that case he was to attack also. As with Hooker yesterday at Chancellorsville, he was deterred from falling back to a stronger position by the prospect of assistance coming to him from the enemy's rear.

McLaws received the following dispatch sent at midnight by Lee's adjutant-general:

I am directed by General Lee to say that he thinks well of what General Early proposes, if it is practicable. Such a movement would be a virtual relief to you, and might cause the enemy to pause or retire, and should this occur, he [General Lee] would desire that you press them so as to prevent their concentration on General Early.

The general says General Anderson is on your left [facing westward], watching for any movement down the river; has not yet heard from him; thinks his presence there will render your left flank secure.

This dispatch was forwarded by McLaws to Early.

About 7 a.m. Anderson was relieved on the River Road by Heth with three brigades of his division, and started for Salem Church. By 8 a.m. Early had taken the heights of Fredericksburg, leaving Gibbon in possession of the town, but severing all tactical connection between him and Sedgwick, and capturing six empty wagons and a number of pack-mules of Stoneman's that were returning to the main train at the Lacy

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 560; Butterfield to Hooker, 11:30 a.m., *ib.*, 40, pp. 399, 340. folk via Ivor to Richmond (*ib.*, 26, p. 1045).

Pickett's and Hood's divisions were ordered to-day to march from in front of Suffolk. ² McLaws, now numbering about 9000 men.

House. He left Barksdale's brigade (about 1300 strong) and Andrews' battalion (4 batteries), altogether about 1600 men with 16 pieces, to hold Gibbon in check, and with the remainder of his force (about 10,400 men) formed line facing a little west of north. He sent information of the state of affairs to McLaws, and waited to hear from him.

While Early retook the heights two Federal signal officers escaped to General Sedgwick, and established a station within his lines. The messages went therefrom by signal either to Scott's Ford or to the vicinity of Falmouth, and *via* United States Ford, by telegraph, to within a mile of Hooker's headquarters.

Sedgwick received the following dispatch from Van Alen, sent at 6 a.m.:

The general commanding desires that you telegraph to him your exact position. What information have you respecting the force of the enemy in front and rear? What is your own strength? Is there any danger of a force coming up in your rear and cutting your communications? Can you sustain yourself acting separately or in coöperation with us?

Sedgwick wrote in reply:

8:30 a.m.

I am occupying the same position as last night.

9 a.m.

. . . I have secured my communication with Banks' Ford. The enemy are in possession of the heights of Fredericksburg in force. They appear strongly in our front, and are making efforts to drive us back. . . . It depends upon the condition and position of your force whether I can sustain myself here. Howe reports the enemy advancing upon Fredericksburg [from the heights].

9:45 a.m.

The enemy are pressing me. I am taking position to cross the river whenever necessary.

He formed his corps on three sides of a rectangle covering Scott's Ford,—with Howe on the left, Brooks in the center, and Newton on the right. Batteries were posted along the line at the weaker points (Map 37). This line, about 6500 yards in length, numbered about 3 men per running yard.

The 8 Pa. Cavalry, except one squadron, which was ordered to report to General Schurz, crossed the Rappahannock this morning at Scott's Ford, and reported to General Sedgwick, who ordered it to report to General Howe, by whom it was sent to the rear to cover the communications with Scott's Ford.¹

¹ *The Charge at Chancellorsville*, by Pennoek Huey, p. 73; *History of Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1861-1865*, by S. P. Bates, III, 115.

Gibbon had one of his two brigades in the town of Fredericksburg, and the other one and his two batteries on the north side of the Rappahannock at the bridges. He wrote to Butterfield that if Sedgwick had gone forward and he (Gibbon) was forced out of Fredericksburg, he would take up the bridges; and that if Sedgwick had "gone away" [by Scott's Ford], he "had better withdraw at once and take up the bridges."

Butterfield replied:

"Hold on to the last extremity, until further orders. Sedgwick holds the same position as he did."

He wrote also:

To Hooker, 9:40 a.m.

. . . No information yet received shows more than a [Confederate] division in front of Fredericksburg. Should Sedgwick throw himself rapidly and boldly on their flank, he would capture or destroy them, if circumstances of your movements and position, and presence of enemy on his front and left, permit.¹

To Gibbon, 10:27 a.m.

Make your disposition so that no confusion or panic ensues. . . . Short of the loss of every man of your command, do not permit the enemy to cross. In case you retire from the town, be vigilant. I am just ordered to General Hooker and leaving here. Keep the fords well guarded by batteries and your picket line strong. Keep an eye out for the pontoon train that was reported at Hamilton's Crossing.² Much may depend on you. . . . You perhaps had better take up your lower bridge, and get boats out of water, and hold engineer force ready to work on others. Use your discretion.

At 10:35 a.m. Van Alen wrote to Butterfield:

. . . Gibbon's command is to remain where it is. The bridges, of course, are to remain. It would seem from your dispatch that Gibbon and the enemy are retreating from each other.

General Early, not receiving any message from McLaws nor hearing any sound of firing in his direction, sent out Smith's brigade to feel the Federal lines. It went up against Neill's brigade of Howe's division, which, with the assistance of two pieces of Martin's battery ($\frac{2}{2 \text{ VI}}$), drove it back, capturing the flag of the 58 Va. Concluding that the Federals were too strong for him to attack alone, Early reported the situation to McLaws, "requesting him to move."³ He stated that if McLaws would attack in front, he would advance two brigades, and strike the enemy in flank and rear. McLaws did not consider himself

¹ A copy of this dispatch was sent to Sedgwick.

² There was no pontoon train at Hamilton's Crossing.

³ *W. R.*, 39, p. 1002.

strong enough to attack in front, but he thought that if Early would attack in flank and rear the Federals would be obliged at least to move and would probably expose a flank or other weak point. So he agreed to advance provided Early would attack first. He informed General Lee of the plan proposed and asked for reinforcement.¹ Lee in reply sent him word of Anderson's movement toward him, and McLaws, receiving it, gave orders that no attack should be made until General Anderson arrived. In the meantime Early was also informed that Anderson was coming, and was not to attack until he was in position on McLaws' right, connecting with Early's left. Anderson arrived at Salem Church at 11 and reported as directed to McLaws. Lee arrived soon afterward, and took charge of affairs. He directed Anderson to form his three brigades (Posey, Perry, and Wright) on Early's left and sending for Early, gave him his instructions. A general attack was to be made at a signal of three guns to be fired in rapid succession. Three of Early's brigades—Hoke's, Hays', and Gordon's—were to join in the assault. The other brigade, Smith's, was to be held in reserve to reinforce Barksdale, if necessary, or portions of the attacking line. Anderson's three brigades on Early's left and the two brigades on McLaws' right (Kershaw's and Wofford's) were also to advance at the signal or when firing was heard on the right. The remainder of McLaws' force was to maintain a defensive attitude at least until the enemy in its front was in retreat.² Hardaway with his rifle battalion of 13 pieces, 2 pieces of Parker's battery of Alexander's battalion (I), Penick's battery ($\frac{1}{2}$), and 2 pieces of McCarthy's battery, altogether 20 pieces, took position on Smith's Hill (Map 36).

Sedgwick had decided to hold his present position until dark and then fall back upon his bridges.³ He wrote:

To Butterfield and Hooker, 11 a.m.

. . . If I can hold until night, I shall cross at Banks' Ford, under instruction from General Hooker, given by Brigadier-General Warren.⁴

To Hooker, 11:15 a.m.

. . . It is not improbable that bridges * at Banks' Ford may be sacrificed. Can you help me strongly if I am attacked? . . . My bridges * are two miles from me. I am compelled to cover them above and below from attack, with the additional assistance of General Benham's brigade alone.⁵

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 827.

² *Ib.*, 39, pp. 802, 828, 831.

³ *Ib.*, 39, p. 560.

⁴ Warren's dispatch of midnight, p. 403 *ante*.

⁵ Only one bridge was laid at Scott's Ford, but Benham had the material for laying another.

⁶ Owen's brigade of Gibbon's division ($\frac{2}{3}$).

To Hooker, 1:40 p.m.

. . . I have no means of judging of the enemy's force about me; deserters say 40,000. I shall take position near Banks' Ford and the Taylor house, at the suggestion of General Warren. Officers have already gone to select a position.

It is believed that the heights of Fredericksburg are occupied by two divisions of the enemy.

Messages now arrived from Hooker's headquarters:

1, 10:30 a.m.

The commanding general directs that in the event you fall back, you reserve, if practicable, a position on the Fredericksburg side of the Rappahannock, which you can hold securely until to-morrow p.m.

2

. . . I inclose substance of a communication sent last night [Warren's midnight dispatch]. Its suggestions are highly important, and meet my full approval. There are positions on your side, commanded by our batteries on the other side, I think you could take and hold. The general would recommend as one such position the ground on which Dr. Taylor's is situated.

HOOKER.

These dispatches would seem to sanction the withdrawal of Sedgwick's corps, provided a portion of it was left in a commanding position south of the Rappahannock. But it is safe to say that none of them was written or dictated by Hooker, notwithstanding that the last one was signed with his name. They were doubtless all written by staff officers, and sent off without being shown to Hooker, who since he was injured at Chancellorsville had been almost continuously alternating between sleep and stupor. It seems that on coming to himself and realizing their tenor he apprehended that Sedgwick would recross the river, and to prevent it, wrote or dictated the following dispatches:

To Sedgwick, 11 a.m.

The major-general commanding . . . does not wish you to cross the river at Banks' Ford unless you are compelled to do so. The batteries at Banks' Ford command the position. If it is practicable for you to maintain a position [on the] south side [of the] Rappahannock, near Banks' Ford, you will do so. . . .

11:50 a.m.

If the necessary information shall be obtained to-day, and if it shall be of the character he anticipates, it is the intention of the general to advance to-morrow. In this event the position of your corps on the south bank of the Rappahannock will be as favorable as the general could desire.

1:20 p.m.

I expect to advance to-morrow, which will be likely to relieve you.

You must not count on much assistance without I hear heavy firing. Tell General Benham to put down the other bridge, if you desire it.

Sedgwick replied at 2:15 p.m.:

I shall do my utmost to hold a position on the right bank of the Rappahannock until to-morrow.

Hooker's intentions at this time were later expressed by himself as follows:

I proposed to leave troops enough where I was to occupy the enemy there, and throw the rest of my force down the river and reënforce Sedgwick; then the whole of Lee's army except that which had been left in front of Sedgwick would be thrown off the road to Richmond, and my army would be on it.¹

As previously stated, Sedgwick informed Benham yesterday that he wanted another bridge put down. He signaled to him to-day: "I wish the second bridge laid close by the first one."² At 1 p.m. Benham commenced laying this bridge, using the material left over from the bridges already laid at Banks' Ford and at United States Ford. He reported to Sedgwick at 3 p.m.:

I will have the [second] bridge done by 3:30 o'clock.³

But he was reckoning without Hardaway's battery of 21 guns, which, whether intentionally or not, dropped an occasional shell annoyingly near the crossing, which delayed the construction of the bridge. Points of direction were established for night firing from Smith's Hill upon Scott's Ford.⁴

The reoccupation of Marye's Heights gave the Confederates control of the country between the Federal hospitals and the VI Corps. This necessitated the removal of the wounded across the river and the reestablishment of communication with the corps by way of Scott's Ford. By 10 a.m. the hospitals were established in tents on the north side of the river; and by 11 all the wounded were removed to them. The ambulances were then dispatched to Scott's Ford, but as the pontoon bridge, on their arrival there, was found to be under fire, they could not cross the river.

About the middle of the afternoon, Hooker was waked out of one of his slumbers by Pleasonton handing him a paper with the remark: "General, this is a dispatch from the President." He took the paper, and read:

Washington, D. C., May 4, 1863, 3:10 p.m.

Major-General Hooker:

We have news here that the enemy has reoccupied heights above Fredericksburg? Is that so?

A. LINCOLN.

¹ *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 148.

² *W. R.*, 39, p. 236.

³ *Ib.*

⁴ *Ib.*, 39, p. 821.

Having waited for some time in silence, Hooker at 4:20 p.m. had Pleasonton answer the message as follows:¹

I am informed that it is so, but attach no importance to it.

JOSEPH HOOKER,

Major-General.

The bridge brought up yesterday from Banks' Ford to United States Ford was laid at the latter place this morning between 10 and 11:30, making three bridges at United States Ford.

Anderson got into the position assigned him about 12 m.² McLaws swung his two right brigades to the left, bringing his right within about $\frac{3}{4}$ of a mile of Anderson's left. This gap was to be closed as the troops advanced. The afternoon, however, wore away in skirmishing for information and getting into position.³ Excluding Barksdale's brigade and Andrews' battalion (about 2000 men), neutralized by Gibbon, Lee had 21,000 men confronting the 19,000 under Sedgwick.⁴ Had he become aware of the thinness of Hooker's line, he might have planned to break through it. According to Doubleday, Lee, after personally examining Sedgwick's position, "gave orders to break in the center of the Sixth Corps so as to defeat the two wings, throw them off in eccentric directions, and scatter the whole force."⁵ But he gives no authority for this statement, and his own description of the action seems inconsistent with such a plan. Lee's general idea seems to have been to crush the Federal left under Howe and drive the corps in the general direction of the Plank Road toward McLaws, who, together with Heth on the River Road, was to prevent a junction of Sedgwick with Hooker. Anderson and McLaws' right were to press the retreating Federals toward the Rappahannock. To prevent their crossing it, Hardaway's artillery was to riddle their bridges, and Early's right brigade, Gordon's, to push toward the crossing and intercept or harass their retreat.

About 1 p.m. Howe received reliable information that the enemy was assembling a force largely outnumbering his division immediately in rear of Fredericksburg for another attack. In view of his repulse of Smith's brigade in the morning, he expected that if the enemy made a second attempt it would be against his left. He therefore carefully examined the ground, and made arrangements, in case his left was unable to hold its position, to withdraw it to a position of safety. His formation was in two lines (advanced line and main line) besides his line of skirmishers. His advanced line and skirmish line were formed of

¹ Pleasonton in *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 31.

² *W. R.*, 39, pp. 802, 852.

³ This delay is not satisfactorily accounted for in the records. The only refer-

ence to it that the author finds is in Lee's report (*W. R.*, 39, p. 802).

⁴ Without counting Owen's brigade at Scott's Ford.

⁵ *Chancellorsville and Gettysburg*, p. 65.

Neill's brigade and two regiments (4 Vt. and 5 Vt.) of Grant's brigade; his main line, of Grant's brigade and 12 pieces of artillery.

It was about 5:30 p.m. when Lee's three signal shots were at last fired,¹ and his troops advanced to the attack. Hays' brigade moved to the right across the front of the 5 Vt. and the 2 pieces of artillery which it supported. The latter had exhausted their ammunition, but the 5 Vt. poured a heavy enfilading fire into the enemy's ranks, and kept this up until Hoke's brigade, coming up on its right and rear, threatened to cut it off, when it withdrew to the right of the 3 Vt. Hays struck the 20 N. Y. in flank, front, and rear, and flung it back on Rigby's battery ($\frac{3}{1. VI}$), which threw this organization into such confusion that "it could do nothing."² It withdrew without firing again. The 20 N. Y. went on to the rear and could not be rallied.³ Hoke coming up in the dusk on Hays' left, the two brigades fired into each other and were thrown into such confusion that they had to fall back to reform. A portion of Smith's brigade came up to their assistance, and presumably covered their withdrawal.⁴ Howe now extended his left and sent to Sedgwick for reënforcement. Gordon, meanwhile, had moved northward, compelling the withdrawal of Howe's skirmishers and advanced line. Howe was compelled to yield some ground, but at the end of the contest his main line was practically where it was at the beginning. Thanks to his preparations on his left, and to his being reënforced with a battery and seven regiments of infantry, he presented in his new position an effective barrier to the enemy's progress⁵ (Map 38). The attack on Brooks was easily repulsed, principally by his skirmishers and artillery. The only force that he had to oppose was Wright's brigade, as it masked the movements of Posey's and Perry's brigades. McLaws' two right brigades worked their way slowly and laboriously through the wood and underbrush in the direction of Brooks' right, but did not reach it. Newton and Burnham were not molested. Hardaway, on Smith's Hill, opened fire with 18 pieces on 12 Federal pieces near Banks' Ford, which were in position to enfilade McLaws' line of battle.⁶ He states in his report that he disabled 6 pieces and drove 2 off the field, but, according to one of his battery commanders, 16 of Hardaway's pieces were silenced by the Federal fire.⁷ Such was the situation when, about 6:45 p.m., Sedgwick, in accordance with his decision of this morning, issued orders for a general withdrawal. General Newton, a trained engineer

¹ The Federal authorities generally say 5, the Confederates 6 p.m.

² *W. R.*, 39, p. 597.

³ *Ib.*, 39, p. 610.


⁴ *Chancellorsville*, by Hotchkiss and Allan, pp. 93, 94.

⁵ His reënforcements consisted of Butler's regular battery ($\frac{2}{3. VI}$), Wheaton's brigade,


and two regiments of Burnham's brigade (*W. R.*, 39, p. 561).

⁶ *Ib.*, 39, p. 881. The Confederate pieces in action were 5 of Parker's and Penick's (1. I), 2 of McCarthy's (2. I), and the 13 of Hardaway's mixed battalion brought up from the River Road, except 2 of Hurt's.

⁷ Captain McCarthy (*W. R.*, 39, p. 848).



Green Federal SEDGWICK'S LEFT About 6.45 p.m. May 4, 1863 Red Confederate



100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

officer, was sent back to select and prepare the new line of defence. The movement was successfully executed. Pursuit was checked on the Federal left by Howe, and was not promptly undertaken anywhere else. A dense fog settled over the field, increasing the obscurity, and necessitating caution to avoid collision with one's own troops.¹ About 9:30 Wilcox with the 8 and 9 Ala. of his brigade, Kershaw's brigade, and Manly's battery, began following the retreat. He was too late to interfere with it, but reached the river near Banks' Ford, and there succeeded in capturing a few prisoners.²

The Federals now found themselves on high ground with shelter trenches in front of them and 34 pieces of artillery on the still higher ground behind them. Their second bridge, on which they had been working, was completed at 10 p.m.

About this time Colonel Alexander of the Confederate artillery received orders "to fire upon the ford over which the enemy was retreating." The guns of Hardaway's rifle battalion (probably 11 pieces) opened fire, and continued firing one gun at intervals of twenty minutes until half an hour after sunrise on the 5th;³ and Manly's battery shelled the woods along the river and the ford for about half an hour from the advanced position occupied by Wilcox.⁴

The two following dispatches show how matters were viewed by Lee and Sedgwick:

Downman's House, May 4, 10 p.m.

MAJOR-GENERAL MCLAWS.

General:

. . . We cannot find any of the enemy south of the Plank road. But if we let them alone until morning we will find them again intrenched, so I wish to push them over the river to-night. . . .

Direct Colonel Alexander to endeavor to arrest all movements [of the enemy] across Banks' Ford, or up the river road [toward Hooker]. Anderson and Early are north of the Plank road.

I am, very respectfully yours,

R. E. LEE,
General.⁵

Banks' Ford, Va., May 4, 1863, 11:50 p.m.

General Hooker, United States Ford:

My army is hemmed in upon the slope, covered by the guns from the north side of Banks' Ford. If I had only this army to care for, I would withdraw it to-night. Do your operations require that I should jeopard it by retaining it here? An immediate reply is indispensable, or I may feel obliged to withdraw.

JOHN SEDGWICK,
Major-General.

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 802.

² Thirteen officers and 150 men (*W. R.*, 39, p. 860).

³ *Ib.*, 39, pp. 821, 882.

⁴ *Ib.*, 39, p. 831.

⁵ *Ib.*, 40, pp. 860, 861.

(3. 2. V), were relieved to-day from duty with the army in order that they might return to the place where they had been mustered in, and arrive there in time to be mustered out on the expiration of their period of enlistment. They were honored with a complimentary order.¹

To the music of the enemy's bullets, amid the rattling of their comrades' rifles and the thundering of their cannon, officers and soldiers turned their backs on the field of battle, and marched to the rear. After crossing the pontoon bridge at United States Ford, they took up the other two-year men of the regiment, who were guarding the wagons, and proceeded briskly, about 200 strong, toward Stoneman's Switch. As they passed Banks' Ford they saw firing between Sedgwick's men and Lee's, and were harassed with fears that they would be again ordered to the front. But they reached the railroad without any such *contretemps*, and were safely conveyed North, receiving on the way and at their destination the ovations with which our people are wont to honor their military heroes.

In contrast with this incident it is pleasant to consider that the 123 Pa. of Allabach's brigade (Colonel J. B. Clark) should, under existing orders, have been on its homeward march to-day. But it remained on the field of battle, and did not leave the army until the 8th, the day on which its term of enlistment expired.² The 4 N. Y. (Colonel J. D. McGregor) was enlisted, for the greater part, to be mustered out on the 1st of May. The whole regiment remained with the army through the campaign, and was not mustered out till the 25th.³

This morning the New York *Herald* said in an editorial:

The city yesterday was full of absurd rumors of defeat and disaster, which we hope will be completely dispelled by official intelligence to-day of the greatest achievement of the war; . . . considering the numbers of the rebel forces en-

¹ "Headquarters 2d Division, V Corps,
"Camp near Chancellorsville, Va.,
"May 4, 1863.

"General Order No. 99.

"I. The term of service of a portion of the 5th Regiment being about to expire, the Major-General commanding desires the officers and men to know that he parts from them with very great regret, a regret which he is confident is shared with the whole division. The regiment has been distinguished in all the operations of his command, especially at Gaines' Mill and the battle of Manassas Plains. Its ranks, thinned and scarred by battle, are the best and proudest witness of the fact. The General hopes to see again the brave men who have served under him. Many of their comrades still have to hold in trust the respect of the old

regiment, and the General has no fears but that it will be sacredly guarded and preserved. The officers and men who are to leave this army will proceed to New York on the 5th. Colonel Winslow will turn in to the proper department at Aquia Creek all ordnance stores and all supplies of property not needed for the men who remain.

"By command of General SYKES:
"G. RYAN, Captain, A. A. General."

Camp and Field Life of the 5 N. Y. Volunteer Infantry, Duryee Zouaves, by A. Dav-enport, pp. 387, 388.

² *W. R.*, 39, p. 549.

³ *New York in the War of the Rebellion*, by F. Phisterer, p. 377.

CHAPTER XXVI

MAY 5 . . . HOOKER RECROSSES THE RAPPAHANNOCK

AT midnight (4th-5th) all the corps commanders of the Army of the Potomac, except Sedgwick and Slocum, assembled in a large tent at Hooker's headquarters in consultation. Hooker, Warren, and Butterfield were also present. Slocum was called, but, on account of the long distance from his post, did not arrive until after the meeting broke up. Hooker set forth the condition of affairs in the right wing, expressing apprehension of a want of steadiness on the part of some of the troops, exhibited, it seemed to him, by uncalled-for firing along parts of the line, and gave his hearers to understand that he was in favor of withdrawing the army to the north bank of the Rappahannock. He presented for consideration the question whether the army should advance or withdraw. Hooker and Butterfield then retired. Warren, thinking that some information might be wanted of him, remained. Meade and Howard spoke in favor of advancing.¹ Reynolds said that, as his corps was the only one that had not been engaged, he would not urge his opinion, but that he agreed with Meade. He asked Meade to vote for him, and then went to sleep. Couch expressed himself as incompetent from lack of knowledge to give an opinion. The knowledge which he felt himself lacking was whether in case of an advance Hooker would be in active command, and how he purposed to operate. Couch said that he favored an attack, provided he could choose the point of attack. Sickles modestly remarked that his profession had not been that of a soldier, and that therefore his opinion was perhaps entitled to but little consideration. He then presented reasons for retiring. He created a little stir as he went on to remark that he was astonished at the manner in which the commanding general had presented the subject, that he had not expected that "the responsibilities" would be thrown on the corps commanders. At this point the loyal Warren, perceiving that his chief was coming in for some criticism, withdrew.

The question was raised and discussed whether a withdrawal could be safely effected. Before the assemblage dissolved, Hooker returned to

¹ "Howard voted to remain, without reference to the situation of the army, because, in his opinion, his corps had behaved badly, and he wished to retrieve his reputation" (*Chancellorsville and Gettysburg*, by A. Doubleday, p. 68).

my force recross the river, march down to Banks' Ford, and turn the enemy's position in my front [at United States Ford] in so doing."¹

Benham and Sedgwick had been classmates and friends at West Point. As they walked up and down upon the slope on which the men were lying at Scott's Ford, Benham cautioned Sedgwick not to recross the Rappahannock under any circumstances without his entire command, nor without Hooker's express sanction.² Acting upon this suggestion, Sedgwick wrote to Hooker:

Second Dispatch

I shall hold my position, as ordered, on south [side] of Rappahannock.

The messenger with his first dispatch (11:50 p.m., May 4)³ had to ride perhaps 3 miles to reach the place of telegraphing, and Sedgwick thought that the messenger with the second one would overtake him, but he did not. To Sedgwick's first dispatch Butterfield replied:

1 a.m. Dispatch this moment received. Withdraw. Cover the river, and prevent any force crossing. Acknowledge this.

About ten minutes later he received Sedgwick's second dispatch. In reply thereto Hooker wrote:

1:20 a.m. Yours received, saying you should hold position. Order to withdraw countermanded. Acknowledge both.

Having received the dispatch of 1 a.m., Sedgwick wrote to Butterfield:

2 a.m. General Hooker's order received. Will withdraw my forces immediately.

He acted accordingly. Hooker's messenger with the dispatch countermanding the order to withdraw was delayed *en route*. To this dispatch Sedgwick replied:

2:30 a.m. Yours just received, countermanding order to withdraw. Almost my entire command has crossed over.

The crossing being completed, this message was supplemented with the two following ones to Butterfield:

5 a.m. The bridges at Banks' Ford are swung, and in process of being taken up. The troops are much exhausted. The dispatch countermanding my movement over the river was received after the troops had crossed.

7 a.m. I recrossed to the north bank of the Rappahannock last night, and am in camp about a mile back from the ford. The bridges have been taken up.

¹ *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 133.

² *Chancellorsville and Gettysburg*, by A. Doubleday, p. 66.

³ P. 415 *ante*.

the tent and stated as his decided opinion that the army could be moved without loss of men or material. In other circumstances satisfied Couch that the army could move in whichever way the army moved. So when the army moved as rear-guard, Reynolds, and Howard voted for an advance, and Hooker voted for the head of a withdrawal.¹ Hooker thereupon announced that he would take upon himself the responsibility of withdrawing. As he neared the tent, Reynolds broke out: "What are you doing?" The Massageth at this time of night when he intended to cross the pontoon. Thus Hooker, after stating to Sedgwick the morning, decided, against the advice of his lieutenant in the lurch. He directed the army to move to a new and shorter line of defence in his rear. He ordered any attempt of the enemy to interrupt its movement. He ordered the corps commanders to cut road from their positions to United States Ford "to cover all the fords, and prevent the enemy from getting over."² General Hunt, chief of the artillery, ordered at daybreak to cross all the batteries not in line of the Rappahannock, under cover of the fog, to the Hartwood Church to their old camps. The Captain Best, chief of artillery of the XII Corps, ordered the positions to protect the recrossing of the army, designated as rear-guard. This corps was the best of the roads to United States Ford; its advanced position it as the one to retire last. It had, moreover, all the corps, except the I, whose position on the Rappahannock was suitable for the rear-guard. It had been the Rappahannock at Kelley's Ford, and its commander was of bringing up the rear of the army on that manner. Finally, it comprised the regular artillery, and its positions may all have had weight in determining the rear-guard.

Hooker was still unwilling that the VI Corps should cross the Rappahannock. "My desire," he says, "was to maintain a position on the south side of the river, and a sufficient force to hold the position I was

¹ "Whenever afterward Couch's action was challenged he replied: 'And I would do it again under such a commander'" (*History of the II Army Corps*, by F. A. Walker, pp. 250, 251).

² Testifying before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Hooker said: "Being resolved on recrossing the river, . . . I

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the battery
the battery

the battery. to
the battery

instructed (confidentially) to fight to the death. Let them have good supply of rations and lose a copy of dispatch to General Pleasonton, Richards' Ford, as soon as he can, from Falmouth.

[Inclosure]

Pleasanton, 8:45 a.m.

and a horse battery to guard our right, above long tools with them. General Reynolds will be infantry and a battery to Richards' Ford. Ob- sers up to Rappahannock Station. Officers and to the death to guard our right. Put most reliable send copy of Reynolds' instructions.

Sedgwick, 2:30 p.m.

duty of guarding the river. General Gibbon's at your disposal for this purpose. The probabili- on the south bank will retire [across the river] tions accordingly. . . .

field at 10:10 a.m.:

gade of five regiments under Colonel Davis, and Ford. . . .

A. PLEASONTON.

was reported to President Lincoln by the to-day, which was not received until 10:45

yet learned about, have failed in executing their ed; nothing done; loss of 2 or 3 men. Buford's al Sedgwick failed in the execution of his orders, crossed the river at Banks' Ford last night; his

ed], and two divisions of II Corps are now on nched between Hunting Run and Scott's Dam. nth bank of Rappahannock. Position is strong, will be fully explained, make it expedient, in ould retire from this position to the north bank sible position. Among these is danger to his emy crossing river on our right flank and e departure of two years' [troops] and three ntantly weakening him. The nature of the oving in such a way as to find or judge of

of Com., IV, 226.

across the river, without having observed the work of the Confederates, intrenched itself also during the night.

Under cover of darkness and a drenching rain, the retreat of the Federals commenced about 7:15 p.m., the artillery leading. The bridges were covered with pine boughs to deaden the sound. About 10 o'clock, hardly half of the artillery having crossed, the movement was interrupted by a sudden rise in the river so great as to submerge the ends of the bridges on the north side, and the velocity of the current threatened to sweep them away.¹ Some of the batteries that had moved toward the river were sent back to their positions. The infantry was still in the Chandler line, with pickets out (Map 39).

¹ Captain Candler says that the river rose 6 feet 8 inches in two hours (manuscript).

CHAPTER XXVII

RETURN TO STAFFORD HEIGHTS. DEATH OF JACKSON

MAY 6. When the order was given for the army to recross the river, General Hooker was almost the first man to cross, "leaving everything to his corps commanders."¹ At midnight (5th-6th) Meade sent word to Couch that the river was over the bridges, that Hooker was on the other side, and that communication with him was cut off. Couch immediately rode over to Hooker's late headquarters, and satisfied himself that he was in command of the army. He proceeded with Sickles and Reynolds to Meade's headquarters to confer as to what should be done, and told Meade that the crossing was suspended. "We will stay where we are," he said, "and fight it out." He then went to his tent, and turned in, as he thought, for the night.

Meade, it seems, was not satisfied with the situation in which Couch had thus placed him. At any rate, he directed Major Biddle of his staff to cross the river by way of United States Ford, find General Hooker, and ask for orders. The aide found the army commander fast asleep on the floor of a house. He awakened Butterfield, and reporting the situation, was told that the order for a retreat was imperative. On communicating this reply to Meade, Biddle was directed to transmit it to Reynolds. "Tell General Meade," said Reynolds, "that some one should be waked up to take command of this army." Who, if any one, was consequently waked up, history does not tell. At 2 a.m., however, Couch was roused to receive a sharp message from Hooker about recrossing the army as he had directed.

One of the bridges had been taken up, and used to piece out the other two, making the passage feasible. It was now resumed, and was continued through the dark, rainy night. The batteries which were waiting at the river commenced again to recross. General Hunt sought General Hooker on the north side of the river, and proposed to him to postpone the movement for one day, as it was certain that the army could not all cross in a night. He expressed himself as doubtful whether the artillery could all go over before daylight.² But Hooker refused to suspend the movement, and it proceeded, disturbed only by the rain, which

¹ Private letter of Captain Candler, aide-de-camp, May 7, 1863. "It was so different," says Candler, "from his former acts."


² *The Campaign of Chancellorsville*, by T. A. Dodge, p. 230.

MAP 39

CHANCELLORSVILLE


Positions of Troops at 5 a.m.
May 6, 1863


Green Federal Red Confederate



SKETCH

showing disposition of Stoneman's cavalry
at 12 p.m.





flooded the trenches so that they had to be cut through to let the water out. The infantry commenced withdrawing from the intrenchments, leaving its pickets out. These were to veil the retreat of the army at all hazards. Under their protection the columns marched back by their several roads to the vicinity of the ford, except the infantry of the V Corps, which took position on the third line of defence, the Second and Third Divisions in the trenches, the First Division in rear of them as support. The bulk of the infantry, near the ford, was ployed into masses to wait for their turns to cross (Map 39). Every effort was made to keep the ammunition dry, but it is doubtful whether at this time half of the muskets in the army could have been discharged. Sleep was out of the question. It has been remarked by writers on this campaign that a sudden onset by the enemy or a few shells dropped among the masses of troops assembled near the bridges would have precipitated a panic that would have resulted in the destruction of the army.¹ It may be answered that the V Corps, reënforced perhaps by other troops, would have taken care of the onset, and that the Army of the Potomac had been so inured to shell-fire that its only effect in this case would have been to cause a deployment of the masses into lines of battle. The army might, however, have been placed in a serious predicament, had the enemy been able to train a gun upon its bridges. As already stated, this danger had been anticipated and provided against by General Hunt. As Hunt had apprehended, it was daylight before the artillery had all crossed. About this time the infantry pickets commenced falling back, unobserved by the enemy. The artillery being all over, the masses of infantry, soon after daylight, commenced recrossing. Parties of Confederate skirmishers moved out to feel the Federal pickets, and finding them gone, pushed on after them. The Federal pickets halted occasionally to fire at them. In the meantime the masses of infantry had finished crossing; they were followed by the Third and Second Divisions, and these by the First Division of the V Corps. The First Division (Griffin's) was selected to cross last because it was strong in numbers, composed of veterans who had fought on the Peninsula, while Sykes' division was numerically weak, and Humphreys' was made up almost wholly of new regiments. The last brigade to cross was Barnes', Griffin's 1st brigade. It waited on the south bank the arrival of the pickets coming from the front under General Ayres, the field officer of the day. As the main column toiled up the north bank of the Rappahannock, many a backward look was taken at these last troops in contact with the enemy. Before they reached the bridges or the protection of Barnes' brigade they came under cover of the Federal artillery on the north side of the river. The pickets having crossed, Barnes' brigade

¹ *Reminiscences of Carl Schurz*, II, 432; *The Campaign of Chancellorsville*, by T. A. Dodge, pp. 231, 232.

proceeded to follow them, with a rear-guard formed of detachments from the 18 Mass. and 118 Pa.

A portion of the army supposed that it was making a flank march of great importance, but the general belief among officers and men was that they were retreating beaten. "The wonder of the private soldiers was great. How could they have been beaten with so little fighting? How had one half of the army been defeated while the other half had not fought? The muttered curses were prolonged and deep as they plodded back in the mud to their old camps."¹ Somewhere among the disorganized soldiery, having recrossed the river with the army, was the party of ladies that had experienced the bombardment of the Chancellor House.² On account of the information which they possessed they could not be sent into the Confederate lines until after the campaign.

Lee, having passed the night in complete ignorance of Hooker's movements, sent off this morning a report in which, after correcting a former misapprehension, he makes another as serious as the one that he corrected.

Near Chancellorsville, via Fredericksburg, May 6, 1863.

Gen. Sherman at War.

General Hooker did not move to Rappahannock after his defeat on Sunday (May 3), but remained in a strong position in front of the United States Army, where he is now training himself with a view, I presume, of holding a position this side of the Rappahannock. I understand from prisoners that he is sending reinforcements, and that among others, General Hentzelman [commanding Department of Washington] is expected. I have received none of the reports which have come from the James River. . . . I had hoped that Langstreet would have been sent down the river. . . . I hope every effort will be made to prevent the Rebels from recrossing the river to abandon this country.

Very respectfully,

R. E. Lee.

General.

Very respectfully, in respect of the campaign:

"The Rebels were not allowed to cross the river at daylight on the 8th, but they were not driven back. It was found that under cover of the storm and darkness of the night they had crossed the river."

This statement is incorrect. The Federals had not completed their crossing of the river. Their retreat was not performed under cover of the storm and darkness of the night." That some of them did cross the river was due mainly to the protection afforded

by Gen. P. D. K.

Gen. Murray F. Taylor, C. S. A.

by the Federal artillery on the north bank, as Lee himself testified, writing to Davis on the 7th:

. . . The line of skirmishers was pressed forward until they came within range of the enemy's batteries, planted north of the Rappahannock, which, from the configuration of the ground, completely commanded this side. His army, therefore, escaped with the loss of a few additional prisoners.¹

It would seem from the statements of a prominent Southern writer that Lee was dissatisfied with some of his own officers for having failed to discover Hooker's retreat and to intercept or harass it. Jed. Hotchkiss says:

Just at dawn, on the morning of the 6th, as Lee was about to order an advance, General Pender came galloping to his field headquarters under a tent-fly at Fairview cemetery, and informed him that his skirmishers had advanced and found Hooker gone. In surprise he exclaimed: "Why, General Pender! That is what you young men always do. You allow these people to get away. I tell you what to do, but you don't do it."²

This interview must have taken place after "dawn." It was some time after daylight before the Confederate skirmishers discovered that the Federal army had withdrawn.

Before the Committee on the Conduct of the War Hooker represented that his recrossing of the river was consequent upon Sedgwick's withdrawal, and with a view to resuming offensive operations below Fredericksburg. "As soon," he said, "as I heard that General Sedgwick had recrossed the river, seeing no object in maintaining my position where I was, and believing that it would be much more to my advantage to hazard an engagement with the enemy at Franklin's Crossing, where I had elbow-room, than where I was, the army on the right was directed to recross the river."³ Almost in the same breath he gave the testimony already cited to the effect that he had decided on withdrawing before he called his corps commanders together, or before Sedgwick commenced to withdraw.

Sedgwick's withdrawal deprived him of all hope of flanking Lee and driving him off the direct line of communication with Richmond. Butterfield said:

He [Hooker] felt that he could remain perfectly well on the south side of the river, and possibly force the enemy to fall back; but as the enemy would fall back toward Richmond, they would constantly become stronger and go into their fortifications there, while we should grow weaker.⁴

At dawn this morning Colonel Alexander put Eubank's 4 Napoleons and 2 of Jordan's rifles in his unfinished gun-pits under Jordan, and

¹ *Richmond Whig*, May 8, 1863.

² *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 133, 134.

³ *Confederate Military History*, III, 392.

⁴ *Ib.*, 77.

Just heard from brigade on the right ($\frac{3}{2}$ to 6) up to 6 p.m. last night. Were at Deep Run, and found that stream impassable. The Sixteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry have pickets at Morrisville, Kelley's and Ellis' Fords. Scouts from the other side of the river report no enemy this side of the Rapidan. The brigade is 1700 strong, without the battery.

Lee could not venture across the Rappahannock. Assuming that he could have gathered together the necessary bridge material, and that the Army of the Potomac was as inferior in prowess to the Army of Northern Virginia, or as demoralized by its recent reverse, as he now naturally believed it to be, he could not, for lack of supplies, have kept his army north of the Rappahannock long enough to strike or attempt to strike an effective blow. He must have appreciated, too, the risks that he would run of losing, or being severed from, his bridges over the high and turbulent river in his rear. "At Chancellorsville," he is reported to have said, "we gained another victory; our people were wild with delight. I, on the contrary, was more depressed than after Fredericksburg; our loss was severe, and again we had gained not an inch of ground, and the enemy could not be pursued."¹

A detachment was left at Chancellorsville to guard the battle-field, while the wounded were removed, and the captured property collected. The rest of the army returned to the lines of Fredericksburg.

Lincoln telegraphed to Hooker, 12:25 p.m.:

We have through General Dix the contents of Richmond papers of the 5th. . . . The substance is, General Lee's dispatch of the 3d (Sunday) claiming that he had beaten you, and that you were then retreating across the Rappahannock, distinctly stating that two of Longstreet's divisions² fought you on Saturday, and that General Paxton was killed, Stonewall Jackson severely wounded, and Generals Heth and A. P. Hill slightly wounded. The Richmond papers also stated, upon what authority not mentioned, that our cavalry have been at Ashland, Hanover Court-House, and other points, destroying several locomotives, and a good deal of other property, and all the railroad bridges to within 5 miles of Richmond.

12:30 p.m.

Just as I had telegraphed you contents of Richmond papers, showing that our cavalry has not failed, I received General Butterfield's, of 11 a.m. yesterday. This, with the great rain of yesterday and last night, securing your right flank, I think, puts a new face upon your case, but you must be the judge.

Lincoln wrote this dispatch under the impression that Hooker was still on the south side of the Rappahannock. By referring to Butterfield's dispatch, it will be seen that it was Hooker's line of communication, not his right flank, that was thought to be imperiled.

¹ *Address of Colonel Chapman Biddle*, Hist. Soc. of Pa., March 8, 1880.

² Anderson's and McLaws'.

and trusting to luck result in another disastrous campaign of the Army of the Potomac. We shrink from the contemplation of the fearful consequences which in this event may befall the administration and the country.

Before the day was out a correspondent wrote to the *New York Times*:

The news that Hooker and his army had recrossed the Rappahannock flashed through Washington about 5 o'clock this afternoon. The impression produced by it was profound. Men's minds were cast down from the congratulatory cheerfulness with which all had for three days discussed the events which succeeded the brilliant passages of the Rappahannock and the Rapidan. . . . It made men silent and thoughtful beyond anything I have ever seen in Washington.

The wildest rumors were set on foot; but it was known that the President and General Halleck had gone to the front, taking a special steamer at the navy yard at four o'clock that afternoon. It was commonly believed that Hooker was or would be put under arrest; that Halleck would be placed in command of the Army of the Potomac; that Stanton had resigned; that Lee had cut Hooker to pieces, and was approaching Washington by way of Dumfries; that McClellan was coming on a special train from New York, and that Sigel, Butler, Fremont, and several other shelved generals had been sent for.¹ Many men who were earnest in support of the war gave up all idea that the South could be conquered. But the general feeling of the country, as well as of the army, was one of disappointment and mortification rather than of discouragement or despair. The general gloom and sickness at heart that followed the first and second Bull Run, the defeat of McClellan before Richmond, and the battle of Fredericksburg, did not manifest themselves in anything like the same degree.²

The following messages went over the wires:

Governor Morgan, New York, to President Lincoln, 3 p.m.

Nothing will so cheer the hearts of all good men as the immediate reënforcement of General Hooker by troops from around Washington, Fort Monroe, and Suffolk.

Hooker to Lincoln, 4:30 p.m.

Have this moment returned to camp. On my way received your telegrams of 11 a.m.³ and 12:30. The army had previously recrossed the river, and was on its return to camp. As it had none of its trains of supplies with it, I deemed this advisable. Above, I saw no way of giving the enemy a general battle with the prospect of success which I desire. Not to exceed three corps, all told, of my troops have been engaged. For the whole to go in, there is a better place nearer at hand. Will write you at length to-night. Am glad to hear that a portion of the cavalry have at length turned up. One portion did nothing.

¹ *Washington in Lincoln's Time*, by Noah Brooks, pp. 58, 59.

² *Rhodes' History of the U. S.*, IV, 266.

³ Not found.

The President left Halleck with the army, to remain until he knew "everything." The President's letter elicited the following reply:

. . . I do not deem it expedient to suspend operations on this line, from the reverse we have experienced in endeavoring to extricate the army from its present position. If in the first effort we failed, it was not for want of strength or conduct of the small number of troops actually engaged, but from a cause which could not be foreseen, and could not be provided against.¹ After its occurrence, the chances of success were so much lessened that I felt another plan might be adopted in place of that we were engaged in, which would be more certain in its results. At all events, a failure would not involve a disaster, while in the other case it was certain to follow the absence of success. I may add that this consideration almost wholly determined me in ordering the army to return to its old camp. As to the best time for renewing our advance upon the enemy, I can only decide after an opportunity has been afforded to learn the feeling of the troops. They should not be discouraged or depressed, for it is no fault of theirs (if I may except one corps) that our last efforts were not crowned with glorious victory. I suppose details are not wanted of me at this time. I have decided in my own mind the plan to be adopted in our next effort, if it should be your wish to have one made. It has this to recommend it: It will be one in which the operations of all the corps, unless it be a part of the cavalry, will be within my personal supervision.

The following circular was issued at 12:15 p.m.:

Corps commanders will have three days' rations issued and ready to cook at short notice; lost knapsacks replaced, and supplies on hand to fill them; arms and equipments in order; a full supply of ammunition; everything prepared for at once resuming active operations.

Captain Candler wrote home:

I am of the opinion that we will move within twenty-four hours. The report now is that Johnny Reb retreated at the same time we came back, and that the pontoons are to be thrown across at Fredericksburg to-morrow morning. . . . it will be found out that the enemy was retiring at the same time we were. . . . It is my opinion that already they have commenced their retrograde march on Gordonsville, and that the troops seen in our front are only a rear-guard. We shall undoubtedly attack again in twenty-four hours.

Lee wrote:

To Critcher

. . . take position on the right of the infantry, beginning at Moss Neck Mill, and picketing as before down the Rappahannock. Keep a good lookout and report any movement of the enemy that may be discovered.²

¹ The rout of the XI Corps.

² *W. R.*, 108, p. 705.

United States and Banks' Fords. . . . Upon an intimation from you as to any deficiency in your immediate necessities of medical supplies of your own, by reason of their use for my wounded or other causes, I shall with pleasure replace them.

Lee to Hooker

The reasons that prevented me from complying with your request with reference to your wounded no longer existing, I have the honor to inform you that you can extend to them such attention as they may require. All persons whom it may be necessary to send within my lines for this purpose will remain until the wounded are finally disposed of. The burial of your dead has already been provided for.

At daylight this morning Dr. McGuire, Jackson's medical director, was aroused and informed that the general was suffering great pain. An examination disclosed pneumonia of the right lung. This complication was due to Jackson's persisting, in opposition to Dr. McGuire's urgent dissuasion, in treating a cold which he had by the application of wet blankets.¹

Toward evening he became better, and hopes were again entertained of his recovery. Mrs. Jackson arrived with her infant child, and contributed her tender and faithful nursing to the skilful and no less faithful attendance that he was receiving from the doctor.

May 8. The hopes that Jackson would recover were of short duration. On the 8th his wounds were found to be doing well, and the pain in his side had disappeared, but he breathed with difficulty, and complained of a feeling of exhaustion. On the 9th his breathing was less difficult, but he grew steadily weaker. About daylight on the 10th Mrs. Jackson informed him that his recovery was very doubtful. He continued to lose strength with increasing rapidity. About half-past one he was told that he had but two hours to live. "Very good, it is all right," he answered feebly, but firmly. After lying for some time unconscious, he came to himself, crying out: "Order A. P. Hill to prepare for action! Pass the infantry to the front! Tell Major Hawks—" leaving the sentence unfinished. Once more he was silent; but soon afterward said very quietly and clearly, with an expression as if of relief: "Let us cross over the river, and rest under the shade of the trees." It was his last utterance. General Stonewall Jackson was dead.

¹ *Memoirs of the Confederate War*, by H. von Boreke, II, 259; General Pendleton, in *Memoirs of William Nelson Pendleton, D.D.*, by his daughter, p. 269.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE INDEPENDENT CAVALRY

1862

General Sherman suggested to Mosby on the 26th of May the interrupting the railroad communication between Aquia and United States Ford. Mosby's cavalry division at Warrenton started with a following of from 100 to 150 men, intending to strike the line between Aquia and United States Ford, about 10 miles of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. A force of Federal cavalry was encountered and adopted this force as his objective. Mosby's force captured the 1 W. Va. Cavalry. A large building and compelled to surrender. Mosby's force then attacked by the 5 N. Y. Cavalry. Mosby's force captured the Southern pistols from the field, and the prisoners. Another Federal force was engaged. It was this affair that gave rise to the rumor that Fitzhugh Lee

was the author of the following:

"I had just been sent up [from Fairfax Co.] to see General Lee. He committed a great blunder in allowing me to see him from the purpose of my escape. I was in a position where they were, and could have been captured. I should at least have endeavored to get around them. If I had succeeded, I should have been the equivalent of

Major-General Abercrombie (Federal) was the attacking force at "about 125 miles" (pp. 1105, 1106). Major Chamberlain, commanding the 1 W. Va., says his force was attacked "by about 1000 rebel cavalry" (p. 1106). See also *ib.*, pp. 1104, 1105, and *Historic Records of the 5 N. Y. Cavalry*, pp. 55, 56.

80 miles.

damage I might have done to Hooker by appearing at United States Ford during the agony of the fight. There all of his wagons were parked. It would be difficult to calculate the demoralizing effect of the news on his army that the enemy was in the rear, and their trains and rations were burning up."¹

Stoneman

On the 29th of April, having followed the army across the Rappahannock, Stoneman camped, as already stated, at Madden (Map 10).

April 30. At daylight this morning he prepared to resume his march with as few encumbrances as possible. All the pack-mules and led horses were started toward Germanna Ford to follow in rear of the army. No supplies were retained except three days' subsistence and three days' short forage (ten pounds to the ration), and forty carbine and twenty pistol cartridges per man, all of which were to be carried on the horses of the men and officers. Not a wheel of any description accompanied the expedition, outside of the artillery.² Stoneman wanted to reach Verdierville by the interval between Mountain Run and Clark's Mountain, and selected Raccoon Ford as his point of crossing. But satisfied that he would find this point guarded, he ordered Buford to cross at Mitchell's Ford, about 6 miles below, and open up Raccoon Ford. At 9 a.m. he received Averell's note of the 29th informing him that Stuart was ignorant of his (Stoneman's) whereabouts.³

Buford reached Mitchell's Ford about 11 a.m. and found it impracticable. His leading squadron under Lieutenant Mason swam across, and marched up the right bank. About 12 m. the remainder of the brigade crossed at Morton's Ford, and detached a squadron to accompany Mason's as advance-guard.

The two squadrons under Mason scoured the country to Somerville Ford. The remainder of the brigade marched to Raccoon Ford, and finding it practicable, was joined by the main body under Stoneman. The rear of the column got over about 10 p.m., when the whole command went into bivouac. Stoneman heard that Stuart with Fitzhugh Lee's brigade crossed this morning at Somerville Ford, and that he proceeded toward Fredericksburg.⁴ He had allowed no fires to be made, as his camp was in plain view of the Confederate signal station on Clark's Mountain, and issued orders for the command to be in the saddle at 2 o'clock in the morning, and in the meantime to stand to horse without unsaddling. A dense fog settled down in the valley; it became very

¹ *Mosby's War Reminiscences*, pp. 130-132.

² For further details of the logistics of "Stoneman's Raid" the reader is referred to the report of Stoneman's chief quartermaster, Lieutenant-Colonel C. G. Sawtelle, U. S. Army (*W. R.*, 39, pp. 1067 *et seq.*).

³ P. 202 *ante*.

⁴ Stuart crossed, as previously stated, about midnight (29th-30th) at Raccoon Ford (*R. E. Lee's report, W. R.*, 39, p. 797; *Stuart's report, ib.*, p. 1046; *Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry*, by H. B. McClellan, p. 227).

water-tank was also destroyed, and some commissary stores were seized at the depot. About 10 a.m. Stoneman arrived at Louisa Court-House with the remainder of his corps, and pushed out a squadron of the 1 Me. under Captain Tucker toward Gordonsville, to ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy. When W. H. F. Lee about 11 a.m. reached Gordonsville, he heard it rumored that "a large body of the enemy was at Trevilian's Station and Louisa Court-House." He at once detached the 9 Va. Cavalry in the direction of those places. It had hardly started when its pickets were driven in by the squadron of the 1 Me. The latter was then in turn forced back by the 9 Va. Both sides were subsequently reënforced and the contest resumed, with the net result that each of the opposing commanders gained the information which he desired. W. H. F. Lee learned that there was "no large body of the enemy" at Trevilian's Station, but that Stoneman, with his whole corps, was at Louisa Court-House; and Stoneman learned that W. H. F. Lee was at Gordonsville with infantry, cavalry, and artillery. A train which started from Gordonsville for Charlottesville had to turn back on account of the presence of a force of Federal cavalry at Cobham Station. At 4 o'clock this afternoon there were three trains at Gordonsville that could not leave by any of the railroads.¹

Stoneman put an operator in the telegraph office at Louisa Court-House, who received messages from Richmond giving information of the success of Hooker's operations up to that time. For nearly an hour Confederate messages continued to arrive. When the discovery was made in Richmond that the "Yankees" held the line, a few forcible remarks came over the wires, and communication ceased.²

Stoneman's present duty, under his orders from Hooker, was to make all haste for Hanover Junction. But no such thought, it seems, entered his mind. He detached Captain Lord with 265 officers and men of the 1 U. S. Cavalry to destroy the track and buildings of the Virginia Central Railroad as far as Frederickshall, a distance of 12 miles, and, if possible, Carr's bridge over the North Anna, about 6 miles north of Frederickshall, on the main road from Spottsylvania to Goochland on the James. From Louisa Court-House the main column proceeded to Yanceyville, where the South Anna was crossed on a bridge. From this point Captain Merritt was detached with a squadron of the 1 Md., about 50 strong, including pioneers, to destroy the bridges and the fords as far as possible down the South Anna. Stoneman went on to Thompson's Cross-Roads, where he arrived at 10 p.m.; his rear-guard, consisting of the 1 Me., came up with him here about midnight. This regiment of Gregg's was again to pass the night without unsaddling and without sleep except what it might get in the saddle. At mid-

¹ Stahel to Heintzelman, *W. R.*, 40, p. 433.

² *Annals of the 6 Pa. Cavalry*, by S. L. Gracey, pp. 140, 142.

night Lord's and Merritt's detachments were still out. W. H. F. Lee, being joined by Rhett with 1400 men from Richmond, settled down to the defence of Gordonsville. His force now numbered about 2400 men and 6 guns.

May 3. At Thompson's Cross-Roads Stoneman captured the baggage-wagon of a surveying party under a Captain Blackford, in which he found a set of section maps of this part of Virginia, which were to prove very useful to him. The maps that he had brought with him had been prepared by the U. S. Topographical Engineer Corps, and were based upon surveys made years before the war.

In the course of the forenoon he caught sounds of the artillery firing at Chancellorsville, 35 miles off as the crow flies, and was more or less disquieted by it.¹ Respecting his intentions he says in his official report:

At this point the James and South Anna Rivers are less than 12 miles apart, and here I determined to make the most of my 3500 men in carrying out my previously conceived plan of operations. I called together all my regimental commanders, showed and explained to them the maps, and gave them an idea of what I wished done. I gave them to understand that we had dropped in that region of country like a shell, and that I intended to burst it in every direction, expecting each piece or fragment would do as much harm and create nearly as much terror as would result from sending the whole shell, and thus magnify our small force into overwhelming numbers, and the results of this plan satisfied my most sanguine expectations. . . .

According to instructions thus issued, parties went out as follows:

1. COLONEL WYNDHAM, with the 1 N. J. and 1 Md., about 400 men, to strike the James River at Columbia (the junction of the James and Rivanna Rivers), destroy, if possible, the canal-aqueduct over the Rivanna, and proceed along the canal in the direction of Richmond, doing all the damage possible. If thought expedient, a detachment was to be sent across the James River to make a dash on the railroad bridge over the Appomattox.

2. COLONEL KILPATRICK, with the 2 N. Y., about 400 men, to push on to the railroad bridges over the Chickahominy, destroy them and the telegraph, and operate in the direction of Richmond, about 4 miles from the Chickahominy bridges, doing as much damage as possible.

3. LIEUTENANT-COLONEL DAVIS, with the 12 Ill. Cavalry, about 300 men, to penetrate to the Richmond and Potomac Railroad, and, if possible, to the Virginia Central, and destroy communications.

4. BRIGADIER-GENERAL GREGG, with the 1 Me. and 10 N. Y. and 2 pieces of artillery, to destroy the bridges, including, if possible, the two railroad bridges, on the South Anna.

¹ My authority for this statement is Lieutenant-Colonel A. S. Austin, Stoneman's commissary officer. J. B. Jr.

The bulk of Buford's regular brigade and the 6th Lancers remained in camp as a reserve and provost guard.

The raiding parties were all off by 3 a.m. They were instructed to endeavor to strike the railroad and telegraph at 3 p.m. of this day, in order that, all striking at the same time, they should find some at least of their objectives unguarded.

The first three commanders, Wyndham, Kilpatrick, and Davis, were directed, if they crossed the Virginia Central Railroad, to push on to Williamsburg on the Peninsula as a place of refuge. Gregg was ordered to return to the reserve. It will be observed that none of these parties (6, including Lord and Merritt) was directed upon Hanover Junction, "somewhere in the vicinity" of which Hooker expected the main blow to be struck.¹ Gregg's column was directed to the railroad crossing of the South Anna about 5 miles south of the Junction, and the other three columns upon or toward Richmond. Stoneman was apparently less intent upon checking a retreat of Lee's army than he was upon entering Richmond, which Hooker did not expect him to do.²

Elzey wrote to Lee:

One regiment has been sent to [railroad] bridge on North Anna, one to Hanover Junction, and a force to [railroad] bridge over South Anna. General Pettigrew's brigade arrived to-day from Petersburg. General Lee from Gordonsville reports enemy moving toward Columbia on James River. They have left the [Virginia Central] railroad. General Lee is moving after them. I shall detail Pettigrew's force here to-day.

Captain Lord, sent out by Stoneman yesterday, and Colonel Wyndham, sent out this morning, returned to-day. Lord destroyed Carr's bridge over the North Anna, and disabled the Virginia Central Railroad for a distance of 15 miles. Wyndham cut the James River Canal at Columbia, burned five bridges, and destroyed a large quantity of supplies. For want of proper implements, he did not succeed in materially injuring the stone aqueduct across the Rivanna. Hearing that W. H. F. Lee was after him with cavalry and artillery, he did not attempt to reach the Appomattox or to proceed as ordered in the direction of Richmond, but took up the march to return to Thompson's Cross-Roads. W. H. F. Lee marched all night in pursuit of him.

Kilpatrick, making a forced march for Hungary Station, went into camp at daylight about 15 miles from his objective, and remained in camp, concealed, all day and about half of the night. At midnight he was again on the march, but not far from his late camp. Davis destroyed one bridge on the South Anna. He struck the Richmond and Potomac Railroad at Ashland, catching an ambulance-train from Fredericksburg that contained 250 sick and wounded. He received their

¹ Williams to Stoneman, April 12.

² W. E., 39, p. 1965.

version of the fight at Chancellorsville, paroled them, and let them go. He destroyed a railroad trestle bridge, and went on to the Virginia Central Railroad at Hanover Station, arriving about 8 p.m. Here also he destroyed a trestle bridge. Proceeding to Hanover Court-House and thence to within 7 miles of Richmond, he halted and camped for the night.

Merritt, sent out yesterday, left intact the bridge at Yanceyville and one a few miles below it. The latter, it seems, was afterward destroyed by some one else. The second bridge below Yanceyville he destroyed. Overtaken by Gregg, he proceeded with him down the river, destroying a ford at Paine's Mill, then a bridge known as the Factory Bridge, and, a few miles further down, the Ground Squirrel Bridge. Late in the afternoon Gregg halted his column at Rocky Mills, 15 miles from Richmond. Here his horses were fed and groomed, and the more fortunate of his men got something to eat. On a report that the railroad bridge across the South Anna was guarded only by a small cavalry picket, a detachment of 200 men, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Smith of the 1 Me., was sent about an hour before sunset, with a negro guide, to destroy it. Captain Merritt joined this party with his squadron. An erratic ride through the woods with no roads, seemingly in no particular direction (the guide knowing little about the country), and for the greater part at a trot, brought the column to the bridge. There it was discovered that the enemy had sent a force of infantry and artillery for its protection. The bridge was not destroyed, but a portion of the railroad track was torn up and some storehouses were burned. At midnight the column was on its return march to Rocky Mills. Another night for the 1 Me. without unsaddling. Two thirds or more of the men allowed themselves to go to sleep and their horses to wander at will. The column was immensely strung out. The utmost efforts of the officers and of the men who were not asleep no more than sufficed to keep the rest of the men in the straggling column of files. Twenty wide-awake determined Confederate soldiers could have captured the whole 200.¹

The people of Richmond were seized with apprehension. A "Rebel War Clerk" wrote in his diary:

There has been some commotion in the city this afternoon and evening, but no painful alarm,—caused by intelligence that the enemy's cavalry had cut the road at Trevilian's Depot, had reached Ashland, and destroyed the depot. Subsequent rumors brought them within 8 miles of the city, and we have no force of any consequence here. . . . I think they will disappear down the Pamunkey, and of course will cut the Central and York roads and the wires. Thus communication with Lee is interrupted. The Fredericksburg train of course failed to come in to-day at 6 p.m., and it is rumored there were 700 of our wounded in it.

¹ *History of the First Maine Cavalry*, by E. P. Tobie, p. 139.

The Philadelphia correspondent of the New York *Times* wrote:

The latest news from Chancellorsville is that Stoneman has cut the railroad.

That Stoneman had cut Lee from Richmond, at least for a time, must have been known this evening both to Lee and to Hooker.¹

There were anxious moments now for Stoneman, waiting for the scattered fragments of his "bursting shell" to do their work and come together again. Apprehending an attack upon his feeble reserve at Thompson's Cross-Roads, he sent Lieutenant Mason with a squadron of the 5 U. S. to guard the bridge at Yanceyville, and prepare to destroy it, should that become necessary. With a view, in this case, to passing the river by a ford, he detached Captain Drummond with 200 picked men and 4 officers of the 5 U. S. to examine all the fords of the South Anna as far down as Allen Creek. The captain was directed to proceed, if possible, from the mouth of that stream to Goochland Court-House on the James River, and clear the place of any hostile force that might be found in it. He found the upper ford practicable and the others impracticable. An hour or two after midnight he went into camp below Allen Creek. Captain Harrison with the remainder of the 5 U. S., numbering 119 officers and men, was sent to Shannon's Cross-Roads with orders to scout the country in the directions of Gordonsville, Fluvanna,² and Columbia.

Uneasy as Stoneman may have been as to the result of the pending operations, he was not influenced, it seems, by a single thought of what he should have been doing. Breaking up his command and sending it off on separate expeditions would have been very well if his sole duty had been to make raids. But his principal duty was to check the enemy's retreat, and if this failed, to fall upon his flanks and harass or delay him.³ The operation that has gone into history as Stoneman's Raid was to have been a part of a grand tactical and strategic manœuvre. Without Averell, Stoneman's force numbered only about 4000 sabers, but outnumbered the cavalry opposed to it about 2 to 1. The latter advantage was thrown away in order to spread alarm through the enemy's country.

The measures taken for the protection of Lee's communications appear in the following dispatches:

GENERAL R. E. LEE.

Richmond, May 3, 1863.

General:

One regiment has been sent to bridge on North Anna, one to Hanover Junction, and a force to bridge over South Anna. General Pettigrew's brigade arrived to-day from Petersburg. . . .

ARNOLD ELZEY,

Major-General.

¹ For Butterfield's erroneous or misleading testimony on this point, see *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 77.

² About 13 miles northwest of Columbia. Not shown on map.

³ Williams to Stoneman, April 12, pp. 142-144, *ante*.

War Department, C. S. A., Richmond, May 3, 1863, 12 midnight.

General Hampton, Lynchburg, Va.:

I do not think Farmville or Lynchburg threatened. The enemy have, I learn, turned down the river on the north side, either for a daring dash on this city, or, more probably, to escape by the Peninsula to Yorktown or around Port Royal. Move with your forces, as you concentrate, toward Gordonsville.

J. A. SEDDON,

Secretary of War.

May 4. Apprehending the approach of hostile cavalry, Stoneman moved back to Shannon's Cross-Roads, about 6 miles in his rear. There he had an encounter with the brigade of W. H. F. Lee, set free by the recall of Averell's command. The raiding column under Davis ($\frac{12}{2.3.0}$) started at 8 o'clock this morning from its camp, about 7 miles from Richmond, for Williamsburg. At Tunstall Station it was met by a train of cars filled with infantry and a battery of 3 guns run out from White House. The Confederates took position in a line of intrenchments and repelled the Federal assault. Davis withdrew, and determined to cross the Pamunkey and Mattaponi Rivers and make for Gloucester Point.¹

Kilpatrick with his regiment ($\frac{12}{2.3.0}$) reached Hungary, on the Richmond and Potomac Railroad, at daylight, and destroyed the depot, telegraph wires, and railroad, for several miles, charged a battery, and drove it to within 2 or 3 miles of Richmond. He was now with his single regiment within the line of fortifications of the enemy's capital. A Confederate officer rode up to him with the question, "What regiment?" and was answered, "The Second New York, and you, sir, are my prisoner." This officer proved to be an aide to General John H. Winder. "You're a mighty daring sort of fellows," he remarked, "but you will certainly be captured before sundown." "That may be," said Kilpatrick, "but we intend to do a deal of mischief first."

Kilpatrick appropriated the specially fine horse which the prisoner was riding, secured the 11 men by whom he was escorted, and made off with his booty and captives. He forded the Chickahominy above Meadow Bridge, burned that bridge, by which the Virginia Central Railroad crossed the Chickahominy, and ran a train of cars into the river. Having now crossed the railroad, he was debarred by Stoneman's orders as well as by circumstances from returning to the cavalry corps. Instead, however, of proceeding toward Williamsburg, he decided, as Davis had done, to cross the Pamunkey and Mattaponi Rivers, and make for Gloucester Point. Picking up an intelligent negro who knew the roads, he made him act as guide, and in less than two hours reached Hanover town. There he performed the tedious operation of crossing the Pamunkey on a ferry-boat that would not carry

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 1087.

more than 20 horses with their riders. The last load being safely landed, he destroyed the ferry just in time to check a force of pursuing cavalry, burned a train of 30 wagons loaded with bacon, took 13 prisoners, and camped for the night about 5 miles beyond the Pamunkey. The two railroads connecting Hanover Junction with Richmond were now both cut, each in two places.

Captain Harrison, with his 119 officers and men of the 5 U. S., arrived at Shannon's Cross-Roads about half-past 2 o'clock a.m. and established pickets. He had hardly done so when he was attacked by a regiment of Virginia Cavalry, about 800 strong, under W. H. F. Lee, and driven back upon Lieutenant Mason at Yanceyville, where he made arrangements to hold the bridge. Word was sent to Stoneman of the proximity of the enemy, and Buford's command and the lancers (6 Pa.) came up at a trot, accompanied by Stoneman, but not in time to strike the enemy. Captain Harrison, in this affair, lost 2 officers and 30 men captured, and 4 men wounded, one having seven saber-cuts. W. H. F. Lee returned to Gordonsville. Captain Drummond with his 200 men, also of the 5 U. S., took up the march about daylight for Goochland Court-House. Halting in the vicinity of that place, he had it examined, and found it unoccupied and almost deserted. He then returned to Thompson's Cross-Roads, but not to his regiment, which was now with the reserve at Yanceyville.¹

About 2 a.m. Lieutenant-Colonel Smith with his 200 men, returning from his attempt to destroy a bridge, arrived at Rockville, and found that the remainder of Gregg's command had gone. Without stopping to rest, he pushed on in search of it. Men who had thus far kept awake gave up in despair. Arguments, orders, curses, and even blows, could not keep them awake. About 3:30 a.m. the detachment found the command about 3 miles from Rockville, standing "to horse," and expecting every moment to receive orders to move. Oblivious to this circumstance, the exhausted troopers threw themselves upon the ground to rest, and got about an hour's sleep.² Half a dozen of them did not get this much, for as soon as they arrived they were sent off by General Gregg to carry dispatches to General Stoneman at Thompson's Cross-Roads. They reached Stoneman, and delivered the dispatches, just as he was starting out from the Cross-Roads for Yanceyville. W. H. F. Lee wrote to Elzey, magnifying Stoneman's 11 regiments of cavalry to 28.³

This was the sixth day since the cavalry corps crossed the Rappahannock, the last, according to Stoneman's understanding, that he had to wait to hear from Hooker. He had not received any communication

¹ This detachment did not rejoin the regiment until noon of the 6th.

² *History of the First Maine Cavalry*, by E. P. Tobie, p. 140.

³ *W. R.*, 39, p. 1097.

ties of clothing and commissary stores. Crossing the Mattapony, he destroyed the ferry just in time again to check the enemy's cavalry. Late in the evening he destroyed a third wagon-train and a depot a few miles above and west of Tappahannock on the Rappahannock. Through the night he continued his march southward, aiming at King and Queen Court-House, and pursued by cavalry which he supposed to be a portion of Stuart's.

At Aylett's Lieutenant Estes of the 1 Me., serving on Kilpatrick's staff, was detached with 10 men to dash across country northward, and communicate, if possible, with Hooker. He struck the Rappahannock at Tappahannock, and found the river too much swollen to cross, but surprised, captured, and paroled a lieutenant and 15 men. The county militia, about 400 strong, assembled under a General Mule, and took the field against him. Summoned to surrender, he refused, mounted, and spurred rapidly with his escort down the river. *En route* he caught a Confederate major, 2 captains, and 3 privates, going to join their regiments, and paroled them. General Mule with about 300 of his men followed closely, and soon had the little party in a *cul-de-sac* between the swollen river and the Dragon Swamp. They again refused to surrender, abandoned their horses, destroyed their arms, and took to the swamp. Here the militia gave up the pursuit, but the planters turned out, and went after them with bloodhounds. At midnight they were probably in full cry on a hot trail.

The perplexity of President Davis and others at having to reconcile Lee's report of a "great victory" with rumors created by Stoneman's cavalry occasioned to-day the following communications:

Seddon to Lee

. . . The enemy's cavalry in detachments, varying in numbers from 500 to 2000, reported by General W. H. F. Lee to be twenty-seven regiments [say 8100 men], have been making raids from Louisa Court-House to Columbia; in Goochland [County], to Ashland, Hungary Station, Hanover Court-House; [and] the line of the [Virginia] Central Railroad to the Chickahominy. They have been hovering around the city with two or three regiments, apparently menacing attack, probably covering escape of all down the Peninsula. We have a force to protect the bridges over the Annas and to defend the city, but want cavalry to punish the marauders. Hood's division is expected here this evening. The railroad communication shall be opened at the earliest practicable moment.

To W. H. F. Lee, Gordonsville

The general detachments of the Yankee cavalry that have been prowling in Goochland and around this city, with the exception of about 500 who escaped down the Peninsula, are from concurring reports believed to have returned toward Louisa Court-House or somewhere thereabouts, perhaps toward the Rapidan.

Longstreet to Elzey

. . . I shall remain here [at Petersburg] for the present, to try and prevent this place falling into the hands of the enemy. Some of my troops marched 34 miles the night before last, and all marched all night and nearly all day and night last night, so they must be somewhat scattered. I will hurry them up as much as possible. Hood is not yet at Ivor.¹

Send out citizens in all directions, to try and have all roads blocked by which the enemy may effect his retreat. Felling trees thickly, particularly in the streams, may prevent the escape of the enemy.

To Seddon

I leave at 7 o'clock this evening for Richmond.²

W. H. F. Lee at Gordonsville heard by telegram from Richmond "that the enemy was everywhere."³

May 6. Stoneman halted for breakfast and rest from 4 to 7 a.m., then resumed the march with great caution. He received no intelligence from the Army of the Potomac. Every few miles he ordered a halt, and had the country in front and on the flanks thoroughly patrolled. He reached Orange Springs between 9 and 10 a.m. and there found Buford awaiting him. Buford came near being cut off. When the head of his column reached the North Anna, which was about daylight, the water was rising rapidly, and before the rear had crossed the river, it was swimming. The rear-guard found it impassable, and crossed on rafts. Rodenbough and Drummond were given up as lost, but rejoined the command safely, the former about 10 a.m., the latter about 12 m.

Stoneman now first heard through negroes that the army, having been repulsed, had withdrawn to the north bank of the Rappahannock, but he did not know how much of such reports to believe. Starting at noon, he made another all-night march. It rained harder, the darkness was blacker, and the roads were muddier, than the night before. There was the same mournful refrain of a whippoorwill, and an occasional shot as if from the same guerilla. At the halts the men and horses were generally sound asleep. Intense quiet would prevail until some luckless fellow would lose his balance and fall to the ground, when the rattling of his saber and accoutrements would wake those about him and subject him to a shower of unfeeling epithets, or some innocent snorer would evoke an outcry of "Put a nose-bag on him," "Buck and gag him," etc. The advance got out of the woods and swamps at Verdierville on the Orange Plank Road, and shivered there an hour or two, waiting for the rear of the column to close up. When the march

¹ Pickett was in rear of Hood.

² *W. R.*, 26, p. 1045.

³ *Ib.*, 39, p. 1098.

was resumed, it was comparatively easy, pleasant, and rapid. The men had no longer to give constant attention to their horses. Many of them took advantage of their freedom from care to go to sleep. A number were led off the road by Confederate scouts, and taken prisoners. An attempt was made thus to mislead and capture the train, but was frustrated by the quartermaster in charge of it. The column passed within sight of the enemy's camp-fires and within sound of his drums, but was not attacked.¹

Kilpatrick at sundown came upon a body of cavalry in the vicinity of King and Queen Court-House, and advanced to attack it, when he discovered that it was the stray portion of the 12 Ill. under Bronson. The two commands probably bivouacked there together.²

Lieutenant Estes and his 10 men in the Dragon Swamp were run down and captured. Refusing to be paroled, they were put under guard and marched off for Richmond.

The first report received in the Federal lines from any part of Stoneman's force was the following dispatch:

Yorktown, May 6.

Major-General Dix:

Colonel Davis, of the Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, with the advance of his regiment, has arrived at Gloucester Point, having accomplished fully the orders of General Stoneman. I have sent a cavalry scout up the Richmond road to get information of any of our cavalry which may be coming down. General Stoneman seems not to have been aware that the enemy have all along had troops on this Peninsula. . . .

E. D. KEYES,

Major-General.³

The perplexity of the enemy occasioned the following communications:

Lee to Seddon

. . . Unless some of the cavalry in North Carolina and the south is sent here, it will be impossible to arrest these raids, and they will roam through this entire section of country with little or no molestation.

Longstreet to Seddon

. . . General Hampton ordered to unite his force with that of Captain Minor and with the main force to hover on the enemy's [Stoneman's] rear with the small, select parties, to block all roads that the enemy can take in retiring, and use every means of detaining the enemy until we may be able to set out a force that may destroy the enemy's column. General W. H. F. Lee and General Pettigrew are ordered to keep out their scouts, and endeavor to intercept the passage back of the enemy's cavalry, and to have all of his roads blocked by felling trees in his way.

¹ *History of the First Maine Cavalry*, by E. P. Tobie, p. 142.

² *W. R.*, 39, p. 1084.

³ *Ib.*, 26, p. 701.

Seddon to Lee

. . . General Longstreet reached here last night. His forces in part were then in Petersburg, resting from long march. A train with escort and provisions was sent [to you] yesterday. All possible effort shall be made to keep open the railroad and supply you.

It would appear from the last two sentences that railroad communication between Fredericksburg and Richmond was reestablished yesterday, the 5th, having been interrupted during part of the 3d, the 4th, and part of the 5th, say two days. That this line was open at any rate on the 6th is shown by the following message telegraphed to-day by Colonel Bradley T. Johnson at Hanover Junction to General Elzey at Richmond:

Train has taken my forage to Fredericksburg. Please send me forage for 70 horses on next train.

May 7. As Stoneman's cavalry left the Orange Plank Road, heading for Raccoon Ford, the 2 U. S. Cavalry was detached to Germanna Ford, to guard that crossing against any enemy that might threaten the column. There the first reliable information was obtained to the effect that the Army of the Potomac had recrossed the Rappahannock. Stoneman's advance crossed the Rapidan at Raccoon Ford about 2 a.m., and the rear about daylight.

Lieutenant E. V. Sumner, Jr., aide-de-camp of General Stoneman with 10 of the best men and horses of the regular brigade, was detached to find the commanding general of the Army of the Potomac, and deliver to him a written report from General Stoneman. Skirting the left bank of the Rapidan, and keeping off the road as much as possible, he reached Germanna Ford without seeing any one. He entered the ford with his party, intending to cross, and hoping to find the Army of the Potomac on the right side and victorious, when, sitting on his horse in the stream and scanning the landscape about him with the hawk-like glance that a soldier acquires in reconnoitering, he caught sight of a small white object that looked like a handkerchief, waving at him from a window in a house that he had passed. Taking a couple of men and riding back, he found, where he had been looking, a lady, who, though a Virginian, was in sympathy with the North. She warned him not to go any further in the direction that he had taken, stating that the Confederates had an outpost just beyond the ford. He promptly withdrew from the ford, and, on a little reflection, decided to heed this warning and take a longer but safer route. He accordingly took up the march with his escort in the direction of Kelley's Ford. Coming suddenly upon an outpost of the enemy, he rushed past it, firing into it. In a few moments a mounted party was in hot pursuit, and it was a race between him and the enemy for the ford, perhaps 8 miles off. He succeeded, by turning

on the foremost of his pursuers, in dismounting several of them, and just before dark reached his goal with all his men. But on this day it was not a ford. The Rappahannock was swimming, full to the banks, and about 200 yards wide. Giving his men the choice between following him and being captured, he plunged into the stream and started across alone. His men, with the exception of two or three who hid in the bushes and afterward joined Stoneman, were soon in the enemy's hands. His pursuers, on reaching the water's edge, commenced firing at him. Being deep in the water by the side of his swimming horse, he made a difficult target, and the Confederate fire was distracted by that of a strong Federal picket on the opposite side of the river. Neither horse nor rider was hit. Wet and chilled as he was, and urged to rest and recuperate, he started at once on the last stretch of his journey, a distance of about 22 miles. Reaching the headquarters camp, he guided his horse into the maze of tents and headed him toward that of the commanding general. The animal kept the direction, and did not stop until his nose rubbed against the front pole of the general's fly. The rider was unconscious. It was 11 o'clock at night. The apparition of this equestrian statue caused sufficient excitement to bring out the adjutant-general, who, inspecting it, exclaimed: "Why, this is Lieutenant Sumner of Stoneman's staff." There was no reply. He was gently lifted from his horse, carried into an adjoining tent, stripped and rubbed, under the direction of a surgeon, rolled in warm blankets, and left to rest, which he did by sleeping until noon of the following day. In the meantime papers found in his boot were delivered to General Hooker.¹

Stoneman's main column on the north side of the Rapidan took a good rest. The horses were unsaddled and fed what little forage there was. The men were permitted to build fires and cook what meager rations they had. About 10 a.m. the march was resumed, and the whole command went on to Kelley's Ford, where it arrived about 9 p.m. The night being too dark to attempt a passage, the troops rested until morning near the ford. Here it was learned that the army was back in its old camps about Falmouth.

About as Stoneman started out from Raccoon Ford, Kilpatrick with his regiment, after a 50-mile march, arrived at Gloucester Point. Since leaving Stoneman he and Davis had marched about 200 miles in less than five days.

The following dispatch went to Washington:

Yorktown, Va., May 7, 1863.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War:

Colonel Kilpatrick, with the Harris Light Cavalry and Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, have just arrived at Gloucester Point, having accomplished the object of their mission fully and most gallantly. . . .

RUFUS KING,
Brigadier-General.²

¹ Manuscript of General Sumner.

² *W. R.*, 26, p. 706.

This morning General Dix and General Keyes moved up the Pamunkey River with about 5000 infantry, 2 batteries of artillery, and a battalion of 100 cavalry, to West Point, and established a post there. The cavalry under Major Hall was pushed on at once to White House, where it destroyed the railroad bridge across the Pamunkey. On its way back it met the Confederate column escorting Lieutenant Estes and his men to prison. A short, sharp action, and the escort and the prisoners changed places. Lieutenant Estes and his men escorted their late escort to Gloucester Point.

Lee sent off the following communications:

To Seddon

. . . It is probably Stoneman, on his way to Rappahannock. General Stuart with Fitz Lee's brigade will endeavor to strike them.

To President Davis

I hardly think it necessary to state to your Excellency that unless we can increase the cavalry attached to this army we shall constantly be subject to aggressive expeditions of the enemy similar to those experienced in the last ten days. . . . If I could get two divisions of cavalry, I should feel as if we ought to resist the three of the enemy. . . .

May 8. As soon as it was light enough to see, Stoneman's cavalry proceeded to cross the Rappahannock at Kelley's Ford. The only craft available was a flat-bottomed boat, or scow. This was used to transport the ammunition-chests of the artillery. The pieces and caissons were drawn over the bottom of the river, the horses swimming. One piece after another was pulled out by its eight horses as they gained their footing on the north bank—its muzzle running like a water-main. The troopers and cannoneers swam their horses sitting in the saddle.¹ The emaciated animals could hardly stem the swift current. There was but one exit for them on the north side wide enough for two to land and ascend the bank together. Every one felt that the enemy was not far off and might come up yelling and shooting at any moment. This feeling grew stronger as the remnant still to cross grew less. Stoneman remained nevertheless on the south bank until almost the entire command had left it, when he took to the boat, and went over among the last. The only losses were one man and five or six horses. The crossing was completed about dark, when the march was continued to Bealeton Station.

Lieutenant-Colonel Austin, Stoneman's commissary, who crossed the Rappahannock with the head of the column, rode on to Falmouth. The informal report which he rendered of Stoneman's operation was received rather coldly. Hooker was apparently not pleased. Butterfield intimated that Stoneman had not done what he set out to do. He remarked: "From your account, I don't see but that you are ready to

¹ There were not more than twenty yards to swim (W. R., 39, p. 1063).

start out on another expedition right away." Austin, somewhat nettled, retorted: "Perhaps, sir, your long experience with infantry has unfitted you to form a fair estimate of the work of cavalry," or words to that effect.

Longstreet wrote to Seddon:

All our reports represent the enemy's main cavalry force returning to the Rappahannock by the same or nearly the same route as that they came [by]. I fear that no effort has been made by our forces or citizens to obstruct his routes.

The Cavalry Corps remained over the 9th at Bealeton, receiving supplies from Alexandria. On the 10th, leaving a squadron to picket the railroad from Rappahannock Station to Cedar Run, it marched to Deep Run; and on the 11th, leaving the Reserve Brigade, Buford's Regulars, to guard the Rappahannock from the railroad to Falmouth, it returned to its old camp with the Army of the Potomac.¹

The projected movement of Stuart with Fitzhugh Lee's brigade against Stoneman was not made. It seems that the Confederates had no suspicion of the faithful and efficient guidance that was furnished the Federal cavalry by negroes, and no exact information as to its movements. Stoneman's passage of the river was not known to them for several days after it was effected. As late as the 11th Lee wrote to Stuart: "Hood is at Frederickshall. . . . I hope between you two you may scatter Stoneman."

Kilpatrick remained at Gloucester Point, resting and recuperating, until the 30th of May. He then marched with his own regiment and the 8 Ill. through Gloucester Court-House and the Dragon Swamp to Saluda and thence to Urbana on the Rappahannock, taking some prisoners and destroying a considerable amount of property. He crossed at Urbana with his command on transports sent to meet him, and proceeded to Falmouth, where he reported to Hooker on the 3d of June.

COMMENTS

Stoneman must be held responsible for Averell's not rejoining him from the vicinity of Rapidan Station. His order of April 30 admits of the interpretation by which Averell accounts for his continued separation from him; and Averell could not refuse or fail to obey an order from Stoneman, though it contravened a prior order of Hooker's. He was bound to obey the last order that he received; and he carried out Stoneman's orders as he understood them. But it must be said that a general of cavalry, taking Stoneman's orders in connection with Hooker's of April 12, should not have misunderstood them as Averell did. Averell contented himself between April 29 and May 2 with advancing

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 1063.

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from Kelly's Ford to Rapidan Station, a distance of 28 miles, without inflicting any appreciable injury upon his opponent, whom he outnumbered more than three to one. On this matter Hooker expressed himself to the Adjutant-General, U. S. Army, as follows:

There is no excuse or justification of his course that he received instructions from General Stoneman in conflict with my own, and it was his duty to know that those instructions afforded an excuse for his culpable indifference and inactivity. If he disregarded all instructions it was his duty to do something. If the enemy came to him, he should have gone to the enemy. . . . It is unnecessary to add that this army will never be able to accomplish its mission under commanders who not only disregard their instructions, but at the same time display a lack of zeal and devotion in the performance of their duties. I could excuse General Averell in his disobedience if I could anywhere discover in his operations a desire to find and engage the enemy. I have no disposition to prefer charges against him, and in detaching him from this army my object has been to prevent a strong and powerful column from being paralyzed in its future operations by his conduct.

Neither Stoneman nor Averell seems to have caught the spirit of the orders he received. Hooker is but just when he remarks before the Committee on the Conduct of the War: "It is charitable to suppose that Generals Stoneman and Averell did not read their orders, and continued to carry on operations in conformity with their own views and inclinations."²

Instead of being scattered to raid, Stoneman's troopers should have been used in a body to beat the road to Fredericksburg for the retreating Confederate army. Possibly Stoneman's tactics are attributable to his physical condition. Throughout this campaign he was a sufferer from hemorrhoids, the cavalryman's complaint. He could not sit in a saddle without pain, and so was physically unfit to be in active service. It is not improbable that this circumstance determined his adoption of a plan that would exempt him for a day or two from riding.

The damage done by the Federal cavalry to the railroads was easily repaired. Traffic was not interrupted for more than two days. Stores were destroyed in considerable quantity, but their loss did not seriously affect the Confederate commissariat. The question may be asked: What would have been the strategic effect, had Lee's army been defeated by the damage done by Stoneman to the Confederate communications? If the pursuit had been prompt and vigorous, and Stoneman had used his scattered regiments to operate against the front and flanks of the retreating army,—neither of which suppositions seems, in the light of events, altogether plausible,—it would have been a serious embarrassment, but not necessarily a fatal check, to the enemy. Stoneman

¹ W. R., 39, pp. 1072, 1073.

² *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 140.

claims in his report that "all the road bridges across the South Anna and several across the North Anna were completely destroyed, placing a ditch fordable only in a very few places between the enemy and Richmond." Admitting that this was the case, it is not improbable that these "very few places" would have been found and utilized, and that Lee would have got away from Hooker as he got away from McClellan after Antietam, and was to get away from Meade after Gettysburg.

Nearly all the transportation of Lee's army was collected at Guiney's Station, 18 miles from Chancellorsville, with little or no guard, and might have been destroyed by one third of Stoneman's force. The destruction of the few days' supplies that Lee had on hand, together with that of his transportation, would have proved a heavy, if not a decisive, blow to him. The absence of the Federal cavalry from the front and flanks of the army was, or should have been, severely felt by Hooker, while Lee's plans were not disarranged by its presence in his rear.¹

Stoneman's cavalry had indeed a share in deterring the enemy from following the defeated Army of the Potomac across the Rappahannock, but it might better have prevented that army from being defeated. It gained from its operations hardihood, instruction, and *morale*, but these acquisitions, together with the damage which it inflicted upon the enemy, directly and indirectly, materially and morally, were hardly an offset to the loss which it sustained in horse-flesh. About 1000 of Stoneman's horses were abandoned. Most of these were replaced by broodmares and work-horses—not suitable for cavalry—and mules. A number of men, who could not be remounted, were left behind to fall into the enemy's hands. On the 13th of May Stoneman reported the portion of the force brought back with him that was then fit for duty in the field as about 2000—less than 50 per cent. of the total. On the 27th of May Pleasonton, who had succeeded Stoneman in command of the Cavalry Corps, reported the number of serviceable cavalry horses present in the corps as 4677. The trimonthly return for May 31 gives the number of enlisted cavalymen present for duty as 9626. Thus about 50 per cent. of the force was dismounted.²

¹ *Chancellorsville*, by Hotechkiss and Allan, p. 108.

² See also Ingalls to Meigs, *W. R.*, 40, p. 547.

CHAPTER XXIX

OPERATIONS OF INDEPENDENT CAVALRY (CONTINUED)

Jones and Imboden

ON the 20th of April Imboden marched from Shenandoah Mountain (Map 1, sheet B) with about 1825 men, and on the 21st was reënforced at Hightown to about 3365, of whom about 700 were mounted. His column was accompanied by a wagon-train carrying 13 days' rations of flour and 30 days' of salt. He relied upon the country for meat. W. E. Jones marched from Lacy Spring on the 21st. Such men and horses as were unfit for a hard campaign he left near Harrisburg to hold the Valley. These troops were to keep up communication with Fitzhugh Lee at Sperryville. The force which Jones took with him consisted mainly of cavalry, but comprised some infantry and artillery, a pack-train, and a wagon-train. It numbered about 3500 men. According to the original plan, approved by General Lee, these two columns were to strike the railroad at the same time, Imboden's at Grafton and Jones' at Oakland. But they were hardly in motion when Jones received a letter from Imboden informing him that when Jones reached Oakland Imboden would be at Beverly. It was too late to rearrange matters, and the movement proceeded on this new plan.¹ Jones had intended by the original plan, and perhaps still hoped, to accomplish such destruction on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad that for six months at least no troops might pass over it.² That the Federals were not taken unawares appears from the following dispatch of 3:30 p.m., the 21st, from Schenck to Halleck:

Many circumstances now tend to indicate that the rebels are preparing to make some movement in force in Western Virginia. General Milroy telegraphed to me yesterday that, except some small scattering parties, the enemy had fallen back with all troops as far as Harrisburg. In a dispatch to-day he says:

"From information received, which I deem reliable, the baggage of [Stonewall] Jackson's army and some artillery and ordnance stores arrived at Staunton some ten days since."

On the 23d Imboden reached Huttonsville, having marched 70 miles in four days, most of the time in a drenching rain, which made the

¹ *W. E.*, 38, p. 119.

² *History of the Laurel Brigade*, by W. N. McDonald, p. 117.

roads very difficult.¹ Jones marched on Moorefield, which the Federals had left unoccupied. He intended to cross the south branch of the Potomac at that point, but before he reached it the stream was so swollen by the downpour that he abandoned the idea. He reached Moorefield on the 23d. The unfavorable weather and bad condition of the roads made these first three days exceedingly arduous.²

April 24. Imboden reached and attacked Beverly, garrisoned by about 900 men with 2 pieces of artillery under Colonel Latham. From a point 25 miles north of Beverly, he wrote to General Samuel Jones:

Had three hours' fight [with] the enemy on the heights in rear of Beverly to-day. Drove him from the town; cut his retreat on Buckhannon; hurried [harried?] him till dark toward Philippi. Renew the pursuit in the morning. Casualties small on both sides. Enemy set fire to the town in his retreat, and burned a large part of it. Enemy's loss of stores considerable. Our captures of wagons and mules valuable.³

Roberts at Buckhannon reported the affair to Halleck, stating:

. . . Colonel Latham [commanding at Beverly] has retreated on the road to Philippi. The enemy interposed cavalry and artillery in the road to this place, and prevented his falling back [on this place]. Reënforcements should be thrown into Grafton without delay, or the enemy will reach the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and do great damage. The roads in this region are impassable.

He received the following answer sent at 8 p.m.:

Collect your forces, defend the railroad, and drive the enemy back. You are strong enough to do it if you try. Do not call for reënforcements from here. You have no need of them, and we have none to give you, if you had. I do not understand how the roads there are impassable to you when by your account they are passable enough to the enemy. If you can not drive the enemy out, we will seek some one who can.

Roberts replied at 9:40 p.m.:

. . . I have collected my forces from Sutton [Suttonville] and Bulltown into this place, to repel the enemy. Colonel Latham, with half of my command, has allowed himself to be surprised, and has been compelled to retreat in the direction of Philippi, where he can not reach me. The enemy has five regiments of cavalry. I have but four companies [of cavalry]. The roads the enemy has passed over are mountain roads. Those I must move over are in the valley, and I have never seen any in so impassable a condition. I shall fail in nothing that is possible.

General Jones, to increase his mobility, sent back from Moorefield to the Valley his infantry, artillery, and wagon-train, thus reducing his column to cavalry, mounted infantry, and a pack-train.

¹ *W. R.*, 39, pp. 90-106.

² *Ib.*, 39, p. 116.

³ *Ib.*, 39, p. 97.

After making a detour he reached Petersburg, where the river was found to be still dangerously high. Men with weak horses were not forced to attempt the ford, and a few here turned back. A number of citizens of the neighborhood who were familiar with the crossing, having provided themselves with long poles, boldly rode out into the river, and took stations at regular intervals along the ford. They constantly warned the troopers to keep their horses' heads up-stream, and when a horse would start down, would tap him on the neck with a pole, and thus help keep him in the ford. One man and two horses were drowned.¹ Descending the river from Petersburg, Jones camped nearly opposite Moorefield.

April 25. Imboden spent the day in resting and reconnoitering and trying to open communication with W. E. Jones, who according to the plan should have been at Oakland. Neither Imboden nor Jones had heard from the other. Roberts, at Buckhannon, sent the following dispatches to Kelley at Harper's Ferry, the first one at 3 p.m.:

1

The troops that reach Grafton should force a march to Philippi, where Colonel Latham attempted to retreat [from Beverly]. I don't know whether he succeeded or not, but a rapid movement on Philippi may save him.

2

Just heard from Colonel Latham. He was near Philippi. Had a running fight of eight hours. Proposes to join me, if possible, to-morrow night.

After leaving Petersburg, Jones' route lay through Greenland Gap. Contrary to his expectations, he learned that this point was occupied. The Federal force consisted of portions of two companies (G, 23 Ill., Captain Martin Wallace; and A, 14 W. Va., Captain Jacob Smith), numbering together 86 men.² The position could have been turned, but the consequent delay might have endangered the success of the general plan. Accordingly, Jones decided to force it. The Federals took shelter in a log church and two log houses, and repulsed the repeated assaults of the raiders, who numbered, according to Captain Wallace, 3100 men,³ and according to a Confederate writer and participant in the affair, 3500.⁴ The defenders would not yield until the assailants had succeeded in setting fire to the church, in which the main force of the defence was stationed. By this action the Confederates were detained four hours, and prevented from making important captures at their next objective point. The fight gave them 4 wagons and 1 ambulance,

¹ *History of the Laurel Brigade*, by W. N. McDonald, pp. 118-120; *W. R.*, 39, p. 116.

² *W. R.*, 39, pp. 108, 109.

³ *Ib.*, 39, p. 110.

⁴ *Forty Years of Active Service*, by C. T. O'Ferral, p. 58.

encumbered them with 75 or 80 prisoners, and cost them 42 men in killed and wounded.¹ Fortunately for them, they had delayed the assault until near dark. This saved them from a much heavier loss.

The stubborn resistance of the Federals greatly enraged the Confederates. Some insisted that the prisoners should be killed, but General Jones, like the officer and gentleman that he was, replied: "They fought like brave men and did their duty. They shall receive honorable treatment."²

Proceeding on a night march, he detached Colonel Harman with the 12 Va. Cavalry, Brown's Maryland battalion of cavalry, and McNeill's company of Partisan Rangers, to burn the bridge of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at Oakland, in the southwestern corner of Maryland, and march thence by way of Kingwood and Morgantown to rejoin the main column; and a squadron of the 11 Va. Cavalry under Captain McDonald to Altamont, 12 miles east of Oakland, to burn some small bridges there and follow Colonel Harman. With the remainder of his force he went on toward Rowlesburg. At 12 p.m. he was still on the march. It was a freezing cold night. Many men, wet to the skin, suffered severely. These operations occasioned the following correspondence:

Schenck to Halleck, April 25, 12 m.

The rebel Jones appears to have left the Valley to go in the direction of Moorefield, perhaps to coöperate with Imboden and [W. L.] Jackson,³ but more likely to threaten the railroad at New Creek, or some point this side. Elliott's brigade has been sent from Winchester, toward Moorefield, to reconnoiter. I must draw troops westward from Winchester and Harper's Ferry. Will you have General Stahel, with his cavalry, look out toward the Blue Ridge and the Valley, while my forces are thus partially drawn off?⁴ . . .

April 26. Imboden camped between Philippi and Buckhannon, about 12 miles from each place, and sent all his cavalry to seize and hold the bridge across Buckhannon River near its mouth, intending to cross there. He had not yet heard from W. E. Jones. In a conference which he held with his colonels, it was judged by all that Jones had failed to reach, or interrupt, communications on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad; that Imboden's command was exposed to attack, and its safety required that it should fall back to a position where escape would be possible, if it were overpowered. It was accordingly decided to move back on the morrow. Latham, falling back from Beverly, joined Rob-

¹ Jones reported that for lack of transportation he destroyed 90 Enfield rifles. According to Wallace's report the defenders threw these arms into the flames to save them from the enemy (*W. R.*, 39, pp. 110, 114, 117).

² *History of the Laurel Brigade*, by Captain W. N. McDonald, pp. 121-123.

³ Included in Imboden's command.

⁴ This movement of Stahel's was made on the 27th.

Harman marched to Morgantown. Several hundred citizens, who had armed themselves and collected here, prepared to offer resistance, when summoned, surrendered unconditionally, depositing their arms in the court-house, and retired to their homes.¹ A portion of Harman's force remained in this place, with the Confederate flag flying over it, for about two hours. While no resistance was made, no sympathy was shown him by the inhabitants. The best efforts of his gallant followers to propitiate the ladies were of no avail. When induced to sing or play they gave the "Star-Spangled Banner," or "Hooker is Our Leader," or the Union version of "Maryland, My Maryland," or some other expression of decidedly Union sentiment.

On receipt of the news from Morgantown the court-house bell at Uniontown, Pa.,² was rung, and intense excitement prevailed. The specie of its bank was removed to Pittsburg. The latter place itself was somewhat disturbed. Wheeling was filled with excitement. The mills were stopped, and picked citizens proceeded to form a home guard. A large amount of its specie was shipped also to Pittsburg.

From Morgantown Harman proceeded toward Independence, and camped about 7 miles from that place.

Jones' movements so scared the telegraph operator at Grafton that he destroyed his instruments and left. A Colonel Wilkinson coöperated with the enemy by having a bridge burned near Bridgeport and the track torn up, to prevent the enemy from coming to him by rail.³

At 11:30 p.m. Schenck telegraphed him:

. . . You are evidently in a causeless panic. . . . Your burning of the bridge at Bridgeport is disgraceful.

I sincerely hope Mulligan is, as you suppose, at Grafton, where you ought to have been. . . .⁴

Colonel Mulligan, falling back from Philippi, where he had gone to cover Latham's retreat, reached Grafton with two regiments of infantry and a battery of artillery.⁵

Roberts received from Wilkinson a telegram that Grafton was captured, and that he was preparing to evacuate Clarksburg in two hours. He replied that he would reach Clarksburg the following day at noon, and directed him "to hold on, if possible, but if compelled to retreat, to run the railroad stock and supplies to Parkersburg, destroy such as could not be secured, and to fall back to Parkersburg or Weston."⁶

At 4 p.m. Roberts, with the troops at Buckhannon, took up the march for Clarksburg.

April 28. Imboden marched to within 4 miles of Buckhannon, hav-

¹ *W. R.*, 39, pp. 126, 134.

² North of the map.

³ *W. R.*, 40, p. 296.

⁴ *Ib.*, 40, p. 298.

⁵ *Ib.*, 39, pp. 91, 112.

⁶ *Ib.*, 39, pp. 91, 92.

tion, Confederate money being freely accepted.¹ He received his first information from W. E. Jones in the form of the latter's dispatch of the 27th. He also heard that the enemy was massing his troops at Janelew, a village about midway between Buckhannon and Clarksburg, and fortifying his position.

Jones attacked Fairmont, which was defended by 400 men, carried the place, and destroyed the bridge, an iron structure which it had taken two years to build. The result of his day's work was the destruction of 4 railroad bridges, and the capture of 1 piece of artillery, 300 small arms, 260 men, and many horses.

At 9:20 a.m. Roberts at Clarksburg telegraphed to Schenck at Baltimore:

Arrived myself last night [from Buckhannon], men and horses, all exhausted by three days' and nights' forced march. Can do nothing with them for twenty-four hours or more. . . . Jones is now at Fairmont, probably 2000 strong. . . . We must keep this [place] and the supplies here. . . . If General Cox [at Cincinnati] can send 4000 or 5000 men to Parkersburg, it should be done, and the enemy captured or defeated. . . .

Schenck telegraphed to Halleck at 11:30: "Bridge at Fairmont is safe," and on receipt, at 1:10 p.m., of the dispatch of 9:20 a.m. from Roberts: "I do not credit the report of Jones and his 2000 at Fairmont." But at 11 p.m. he added that he had just received the following dispatch from Roberts at Clarksburg:

Fairmont is taken, and the bridge at that place burned, and the piers blown up.

In the meantime Halleck telegraphed:

To Schenck, 3:05 p.m.

The enemy's raid is variously estimated at from 1500 to 4000. You have 45,000 under your command. If you can not concentrate enough to meet the enemy, it does not argue well for your military dispositions.

According to his consolidated morning report Schenck's command numbered on the 30th of April 34,297 present for duty.²

Burnside, under orders from Halleck, collected all the troops that could be spared from his department, and shipped them up the Ohio to Parkersburg to coöperate with Schenck's forces. He also arranged with the naval authorities for sending a couple of gunboats up the river.

Governor Curtin of Pennsylvania telegraphed to Stanton:

It is reported to me that the rebels have taken Morgantown in force. Please say if you have any information, and if force will be sent on, if true. We have no force in the state, and you could send troops before we could organize any.³

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 102.

² *Ib.*, 40, pp. 321, 322.

³ *The Army of the Potomac from 1861 to 1863*, by S. L. French.

being raised Mulligan was to march off the retreat of the besiegers in that until Kelley heard "something definite, for lack of cavalry, could get no in- Kelley telegraphed to Roberts:

the enemy? Don't let him escape you if it communicate fully with me.

Reply:

left through Bridgeport to-day. It is . . . evidence with Imboden's. . . They intend, after joining

reached Bridgeport with his command, and will

not can do any service. The forces of Milroy should join, to cut off Jones' retreat. Scammon's forces [at be drawn round toward Summerville and Lewisburg, direction.

this call for cavalry the 12 Pa. was ordered by westward from Martinsburg at 6 p.m. to Curtin, Governor of Pennsylvania:

coöperation from the direction of Pennsylvania and the and capture the enemy, if he does not escape by Clarksburg

s escaping, not by Clarksburg, but by Bridgeport. coöperation coming from the Ohio, but none from At 4:25 p.m. Governor Curtin telegraphed to President was in hourly receipt of dispatches from the western e, that the people of West Virginia were calling for aid sylvania militia, and that he should like to have the union as to the propriety of his complying with such re- owing no reply, he telegraphed later:

dispatches stating that the Union forces have been repulsed and back into Pennsylvania. If it is your pleasure that I should call out immediate arrangements should be made for their transportation and

President replied:

e disposable force at Baltimore and elsewhere in reach have already ter the enemy that alarms you. t thing the enemy could do for himself would be to weaken himself

¹ Preceding dispatch.

did to the railroads in Virginia, but the military effect of it was less than Stoneman's brief interruption of Lee's communication Richmond. They were greatly disappointed in the number of rec obtained. The Secessionists were rather incensed than pleased by treatment that they received from their raiding visitors. The property seized was taken from these people perhaps more than the Unionists, for the reason that the latter were active in hiding their property, while the Secessionists, trusting to the consideration of their friends, took no such precaution. The raiders had little regard for persons whose only aid was their sympathy. A rich Secessionist, who rode into Fairmont on a fine horse, told General Jones how much he was doing to help the Southern cause. The general interrupted him with a requisition for his horse. In answer to his protestations on the score of his loyalty, he was told that he ought cheerfully to give his horse to the cause that he loved so well.

The best that General Lee could say of Jones' and Imboden's operations may be gathered from his indorsements of June 15 on their reports:

The expedition under General Jones appears to have been conducted with commendable skill and vigor, and was productive of beneficial results. The injury inflicted on the enemy was serious, and he will doubtless be induced to keep troops to guard the railroad who might be otherwise employed against us. General Jones displayed sagacity and boldness in his plans, and was well supported by the courage and fortitude of his officers and men.¹

Although the expedition under General Imboden failed to accomplish all results intended, it nevertheless rendered valuable service in the collection of stores and in making the enemy uneasy for his communications with the river. The men and officers deserve much credit for the fortitude and endurance exhibited under the hardships and difficulties of the march, which interfered seriously with the success of the enterprise.²

The Federal defence depended upon anticipating the enemy at the points of attack or at points commanding his line of retreat. For lack of cavalry it could not undertake to follow or harass him. What cavalry it had might perhaps have been used to better advantage than it was in observing and reporting the enemy's movements. At any rate, the failure of the defence to intercept either of the enemy's columns was the natural consequence of its imperfect information. The defence at Greenland Gap stands out as the finest thing of the whole operation and seems really deserving of the much-abused characterization of heroic.

¹ *W. R.*, 30, p. 121.

² *Ibid.*, 30, p. 105. For some interesting details of the operation, the reader is referred to *The Comanches, a History of*

White's Battalion, Virginia Cavalry, Lee's Brigade, Hampton Division, A. N. V. F. M. Myers, late Captain Company A, Va. Cavalry.

CHAPTER XXX

LOSSES IN THE OPPOSING ARMIES. COMMENTS

THE losses in killed, wounded, and missing which the campaign entailed upon the Army of the Potomac are given in the following table:

ORGANIZATION	AGGREGATE PRESENT FOR DUTY EQUIPPED	KILLED AND WOUNDED		KILLED, WOUNDED, AND MISSING	
		NUMBER	PER CENT.	NUMBER	PER CENT.
General headquarters, cavalry					
escort	60	0	0	0	0
I Corps	16,908	245	1	299	2
II Corps	16,893	1,193	7	1,925	11
III Corps	18,721	3,023	16	4,119	22
V Corps	15,824	541	3	700	4
VI Corps	23,667	3,145	13	4,610	19
XI Corps	12,977	1,618	12	2,412	19
XII Corps	13,450	1,703	13	2,824	21
General Artillery Reserve . .	1,610	0	0	0	0
Cavalry Corps {	Active force	81	1	389	4
	Depot force	0	0	0	0
Provost Guard	2,217	0	0	0	0
Army of the Potomac . . .	133,868	11,549	9	17,278 ³	13

The percentages express the ratios of casualties to *Present for Duty Equipped*. The casualties among non-combatants were insignificant in number. There were no losses reported in the General Artillery Reserve or Provost Guard of the army. Two men were reported wounded on signal duty.⁴ The VI and XII Corps reported 3 killed and wounded, and 1 captured or missing, in their respective provost guards.⁵ Berry's old division had 2 men wounded in the ambulance detachment.⁶

The portion of the II Corps that fought under Couch at Chancellors-

¹ Pleasanton, 1020; Averell, 3520; Stoneman, 4320 (including horse artillery in each case), and 200 artillerymen, who, with 10 pieces of horse artillery, were in battery at Banks' Ford.

² Guarding camps and communications north of Rappahannock.

³ One casualty was reported in General

Hooker's staff and 8 in the Engineer Brigade. These casualties, not included in the table, make the grand aggregate 17,287 (*W. R.*, 39, pp. 173, 216, 192).

⁴ *Ib.*, 39, p. 223.

⁵ *Ib.*, 39, pp. 183, 189.

⁶ *Ib.*, 39, p. 451.

writing home on the 7th of May, gives the number of 3000 to 4000.¹ In a bombastic order published to his of the campaign, which will be presented later, Hooker The Confederate missing, including those who escaped safely be estimated as 3000.

es of the Army of Northern Virginia may now be tabu- rs. The killed and wounded are generally those reported l director. The killed, wounded, and missing are partly ommanders and partly computed by the author.

ORGANIZATION	AGGREGATE EFFECTIVE	KILLED AND WOUNDED		KILLED, WOUNDED, AND MISSING	
		NUMBER	PER CENT.	NUMBER	PER CENT.
son	8,370	1,189	14	1,445	17
VS	8,665	1,395	16	1,775	20
TY	720	52	7	106	15
.	17,755	2,636	14	3,326	19
Hill	11,751	2,616	23	2,940	26
.	10,063	2,228	22	2,937	29
.	8,596	846	10	1,346	16
n	6,989	1,870 ²	27	2,078	30
ry	800	69	9	80	10
.	38,199	7,629 ³	18	9,381	25
lery Reserve . .	480	3	1	3	1
.	2,500	25	1	111	4
orthern Virginia .	60,892	10,293 ³	17	12,821 ³	22

pect to non-combatants the Confederates report 1 killed in corps attached to Jackson's headquarters, and 2 wounded eer corps of Colston's division. In artillery the Federals loss of 14 pieces⁴ and the Confederates a loss of 8.⁵ But rates claim only 13⁶ and the Federals only 7⁷ as captured. ls lost 17 colors, the Confederates 15.⁸ The closeness of is attested further by the casualties among the general e Federals lost Berry killed and Whipple mortally wounded. erates lost Paxton killed, and Jackson, who died of pneu- rinduced upon the effects of his wounds. The other wounded re, on the side of the Federals, Mott and Devens, and on the

t.
2 artillerymen. Loss reported
ible" (*W. R.*, 39, p. 1044).
ing 5 casualties at headquar-

ort, *W. R.*, 39, p. 253.
s report, *ib.*, 39, p. 816. Lieu-

tenant-Colonel Baldwin, Chief of Ordnance,
Army of Northern Virginia, reported a loss
of 10 pieces (*ib.*, 40, p. 795).

⁴ Lee's report, *ib.*, 40, p. 804.

⁷ Hooker's Order No. 49, *ib.*, 40, p. 171.

⁸ *Ib.*, 39, pp. 804, 171, and *ib.*, 40, p.
594.

side of the Confederates, A. P. Hill, Heth, McGowan, Hoke, and Nicholls. The general officers numbered in the Army of the Potomac 70 and in the Army of Northern Virginia 40. Hence the Federals lost in killed or wounded 1 general in 18, or, counting Hooker, who was not reported, 1 in 14; and the Confederates 1 in 6. The Federals lost one general captured (General Hays).¹ General Sedgwick reports the capture of a general officer, but does not mention his name.² The report must be a mistake. There is no Confederate general identified as captured at Fredericksburg.

An important tactical lesson that may be learned from this campaign is the advantage of rapid or timely deployment, of being properly formed for attack before undertaking it, and the error of piecemeal or dribbling assaults. Sedgwick's failure at Salem Church was due to his attacking before his forces had come up and deployed. His leading division gained some advantage, but, not being supported, was driven back with heavy loss. Stuart's attack of Berry's lines was on the same order. What would have been the effect of Jackson's attack if it had been made as Sedgwick's was at Salem Church? Perhaps not so complete a failure, but certainly not the stunning blow that Jackson's was.

Referring to his situation on the 3d and 4th, Hooker said in a private letter:

With Lee in my front and Jackson on my flank, I was unwilling to attempt to force my way through Lee, especially as the roads through the forests would only enable me to present my columns with narrow fronts, which the enemy would cut down as fast as they were exposed. I knew that I could do this, and I gave the enemy credit for being able to do as much as I could, but no more. Had Sedgwick come up on Lee's rear, the latter would have found himself between two armies, and would doubtless have followed Jackson's flank movement, which I desired, as that would throw the enemy off the short road to Richmond and our troops on it.³

Hooker could not have cut down the heads of the enemy's columns because the enemy would not have presented them to him. The forests did not prevent the Confederates as they did the Federals from deploying off the roads and marching in line. The Confederates moved through the Wilderness in every direction and in every kind of formation. They were better woodsmen than the Federals, and better acquainted with the terrain, or better supplied with guides. They were hardier, tougher men. They cared less if they tore their clothes or scratched their hands and faces. Not but that the Federal soldiers would follow their officers, and when so led did follow them, through

¹ This officer was erroneously reported as wounded (*W. R.*, 39, pp. 177, 376, and *ib.*, 118, pp. 570, 571, 618).

² *Ib.*, 39, p. 561.

³ General Hooker to Colonel Samuel Ross, *B. and L.*, III, 223.

the thickets. The Confederate movements were better connected and better covered than the Federal.

Hooker was asked by the Committee on the Conduct of the War what he thought would have been the result had Sedgwick carried out his orders vigorously. He replied: "My impression was that Lee would have been compelled to move out on the same road that Jackson had moved on, and pass over to my right."¹ Such a statement does not sound like the remark in Van Alen's dispatch of the 2d to Sedgwick: "You will probably fall upon the rear of the forces commanded by General Lee, and between you and the major-general commanding, he expects to use him up." With such apparent indecision on Hooker's part, it is hard to conjecture what he would have done had Sedgwick succeeded in striking Lee in rear. General Warren was asked by the Committee: "What would have been the effect of an attack by General Sedgwick in conjunction with the main army on the enemy's lines . . . ?" He discreetly answered: "I think we ought to have destroyed Lee's army. But it would depend a great deal upon how hard the other [Hooker's] part of the army fought. . . . If he [Sedgwick] had got over there, and the other part had fought as they ought to have done, I think we should have pretty nearly destroyed General Lee's army. I do not believe that if General Sedgwick had done all that he could, and there had not been harder fighting at the other end of the line, we would have succeeded."²

Hooker contented himself with holding his line as a bridge-head. True, if he had moved to join Sedgwick both he and Sedgwick might have been caught between the fords and driven against, if not into, the river. But if Hooker, with the mass of the army, could not safely undertake to join Sedgwick when Sedgwick was moving to join him, it was hardly to be expected that Sedgwick, with a single corps, would succeed in joining Hooker. If Hooker was not to move, Sedgwick's movement should have been directed up the north bank of the Rappahannock and over United States Ford, instead of across country from Fredericksburg, or the I Corps (Reynolds') should have been left with Sedgwick, who would then have had about 40,000 men instead of about 25,000. The I Corps, be it remembered, was taken from Sedgwick, and yet was not actively engaged at Chancellorsville.

Hooker's irresolution in this campaign was only partially due to the injury which he received at the Chancellor House. It was exhibited, as has been shown, long before he sustained that injury, and would in all probability have lasted through the campaign had he not been injured at all.³

¹ *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 145.

² *Ib.*, 47, 48.

³ A couple of months later, when Hooker

had crossed the Rappahannock with the Army of the Potomac in the campaign of Gettysburg, he was asked by General

Before the campaign it appeared from reports and returns that the best corps in the Army of the Potomac was the XI and the poorest the II.¹ After the campaign it appeared from performance on the march and in action that the best, if there was any best, was the II and the poorest the XI. Military efficiency can not be reliably estimated without reckoning with the tactical judgment and ability of the commanding general.

On the 6th of May Lieutenant Ropes wrote home: "Everywhere we hear of the shameful cowardice of the XI Corps"; and on the 10th Major Busling wrote: "The army all did well except the Eleventh Corps. That broke and ran discreditably. 'I fights mit Sigel' is played out. Tell S. that his Dutchmen can't begin to stand up against the fury and rush of Americans, even if they are Rebels!"

For the rout of the XI Corps no one was ever officially held to account. General Schurz in concluding his report of the battle said: "Being charged with such an enormous responsibility as the failure of a campaign involves, it would seem to me that every commander in this corps has a right to a fair investigation of his conduct and of the circumstances surrounding him and his command on that occasion. I would therefore most respectfully and most urgently ask permission to publish this report."²

To this request, it seems, no attention was paid. While the report was in Hooker's hands, Schurz wrote through regular channels to the Secretary of War asking permission to publish it, and, as an alternative, that a court of inquiry be convened to investigate the circumstances surrounding his command on the 2d of May, and the causes of its defeat.³ Howard forwarded this communication without remark. Hooker indorsed it: "I hope to be able to transmit all the reports of the recent battles, and meanwhile I cannot approve of the publication of an isolated report." Schurz was consequently informed by the Adjutant-General of the Army that it was contrary to orders to publish the reports of battles except through the proper official channels. He thereupon requested that his report be published when it should reach the War Department through "the proper channel," and repeated his request for a court of inquiry, should his report not be published. His letter was indorsed by Howard on the 30th of May as follows:

With reference to the court of inquiry asked for, I recommend that the request be granted. I do not know of any charges against General Schurz from an official

Doubleday: "Hooker, what was the matter with you at Chancellorsville? Some say you were injured by a shell, and others that you were drunk; now tell us what it was." Hooker answered frankly and good-naturedly: "Doubleday, I was not hurt by a shell and I was not drunk. For once I had confidence in Hooker, and that is all

there is to it" (Manuscript letter of Major E. P. Halstead, U. S. Volunteers, April 19, 1903). See also *History of the Army of the Potomac*, by J. H. Stine, p. 368.

¹ See figures of efficiency of the several corps, *Appendix 3*.

² *W. R.*, 39, p. 658.

³ *Ib.*, 39, pp. 658, 659.

quarter, but I do not shrink from a thorough investigation of all the circumstances connected with the disaster of May 3.

It was forwarded by Hooker without remark, and returned by Halleck on the 4th of June indorsed: "Publication of partial reports not approved till the General commanding has time to make his report." General Hooker never made his report, and General Schurz never had his court of inquiry.

General Howard forwarded to Hooker on the 21st of May a *List of German Troops in the Eleventh Army Corps*, from which it would appear that the Germans in the corps numbered but 5282, or about half the corps present for duty.¹ But the list does not indicate how the count was taken nor what was understood or meant by "German Troops." A veteran of the XI Corps writes on this point as follows: "There were 15 of these so-called foreign regiments in the corps, 11 of which were exclusively German, and numbered about 4500 men; the other four regiments were of mixed nationalities, and numbered some 2500 men. . . . Probably $\frac{3}{5}$ of the command were foreign-born."² There can hardly be a reasonable doubt that the corps was composed mainly of men of German parentage, but it is preposterous to ascribe its *débandade* on the 2d of May to that fact. Such a disaster would have happened to any body of troops situated as the XI Corps was when Jackson struck it. But other men might have comported themselves with more dignity, or less ignominy, even while running for their lives. On this point General Francis A. Walker, who fought through the Civil War, says:

I never saw an American so frightened as to lose his senses, though I have seen thousands of the natives of Columbia leave one battle-field or another in the most dastardly manner. But if an American is mean enough to abandon the line, it is always done coolly and collectedly. Indeed, he will exhibit a degree of engineering skill in getting out of a fight under cover which would do credit to a member of the topographical staff.³

It should be observed that the XI Corps was commanded by an American; that the compatriots of the Old Dessauer, of Frederick the Great, of von Blücher and von Moltke, who belonged to the corps, were more or less the product of American influences. They were American Germans, or, as they are more commonly and properly called, German-Americans. Their courage can hardly be impugned without reflecting to some extent upon the people among whom they had lived as citizens, and many of them been born and bred.

¹ *W. R.*, 39, p. 660.

² Captain Hartwell Osborn, *Papers of Illinois Commandery, Military Order Loyal Legion*, IV, 174.

³ *History of the Second Army Corps*, by F. A. Walker, p. 229, foot-note.

. . . no difficulty was experienced by our department in bringing forward all [the subsistence] that was required. At no time did I feel that there could be any failure to supply the army on either side of the Rappahannock.¹

Lieutenant-Colonel Woods, chief commissary of subsistence of the III Corps, says:

. . . many commands were obliged to throw away the rations they had received; and during the eight days there were upon an average thirteen days' rations issued. This extraordinary demand was, of course, not anticipated, and the labors of the commissaries were proportionately increased; but during all the time, the troops, so far as I have been able to ascertain, were fully supplied with food.²

Lieutenant-Colonel Tolles, chief quartermaster of the VI Corps, says:

As fast as supplies were exhausted, they were replenished from the depots at Falmouth, so that when the movement was completed, the quartermaster's department was as well prepared for a march as at the beginning.³

A heavy rain and consequent rise of the Rappahannock threatened to sever his communications.

This rain did not set in until about 4 p.m. on the 5th; Hooker's decision was formed and announced to the army before there was any sign of rain. "The order to retire was given 12 hours before any rain, and during a cloudless sky."⁴

The nature of the country prevented his forcing the enemy's lines in his front.

That might have been an excuse for not undertaking offensive operations, but could not justify his withdrawing across the river.

He wanted to get his army together and adopt a plan which would allow of his directing the movements of the several corps himself.

His errors were largely due to his interfering with his corps commanders, and not allowing them to do what their own judgment dictated. Had he not interfered with Slocum on the 30th, Banks' Ford would probably have been opened on that day. It is questionable whether on the 1st his right wing could have beaten Jackson's force, but had he not, against the judgment of his corps commanders, compelled it to return to Chancellorsville, it would at least have taken up and held a better position than the one to which he withdrew it. But Hooker's desire to have his troops under his own eye was due not so much to distrust of his corps commanders as to his realization of a serious mental defect of his own. He had not the imagination neces-

¹ W. R., 40, p. 546.

² *Ib.*, 39, p. 399.

³ *Ib.*, 40, p. 554.

⁴ *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, by William Swinton, p. 307.

They were not typical Americans, but neither were Germans. An appreciable proportion of our German soldiers came to our country to escape from military service, and for this reason a representative of the military population of Germany is necessary to understanding how a people so expert in the art and science of war, who have produced a host of the highest order, and have a long and glorious record, should have furnished our country some of its best soldiers. Whether a man who abandons his colors preserves his manhood, he is equally lost to the firing line. His duty is a duty moment only in so far as it influences other men. The American's deliberation is ordinarily to be pronounced a man-American's precipitation, but the sight of our own Americans marching off the field under the command of a foreign contingent might be hardly less demoralizing to onlooking troops than a foreign contingent.

Let us consider the reasons which Hooker has given for the rout of the Rappahannock:

The rout of the XI Corps.

This occurred on the 2d. He was stronger in the morning after the 2d than he was before. At no time during the campaign was he better situated for gaining a decisive victory than on the 2d.

His army had none of its trains of supplies with it.

There were ample supplies along the north bank of the river to be hauled to the troops.

Major J. F. Huntington, the gallant commander of the 1st Massachusetts Cavalry at Hazel Grove on the evening of May 2, says in a paper read before the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts:

I think (if we can imagine Grant allowing his army to be cut off from Hooker's was at noon on that day (Sunday))that he would have fried their boots, if there was nothing else to eat, before they crossed the river.

The army had at least five days' supplies in its rear. The trains were not 15 miles away; and there was an abundance of food on its lines of communication.² Ingalls says in his report to the quartermaster-general:

¹ Ingalls says six or eight (*W. R.*, 40, p. 545).

² Ingalls says: "To show what was our custom on the eve of battle with regard to our trains, I take the liberty to inclose a copy of my report of our arrangements during the Chancellorsville campaign, here-

with, marked B. The accompanying papers will give you full details. (*W. R.*, 27, p. 103) The report has disappeared from the War Department.

paramount importance. "In all
er, "there is not recorded a cam-
on preponderance of skilful direc-
week's fighting in the forest of
Lee's conduct of the campaign as

General Lee's most brilliant achieve-
ment, it was certainly grand. As I had
propos to this writing to consider the
with previous, i.e., to stand behind our
troops from Suffolk.

we had time to strengthen and improve
at Chancellorsville.

while his adversary was divided by
Lee's 60,000 for defence about equal to
the time that the divisions of Pickett and
General Hooker would have found that he
without battle. It seems probable that
have given fruits worthy of a general
have had opportunity, and have been
have compelled his retirement to Wash-
ington Grant from Vicksburg; whereas
his victory that he was a full month
in the field.

and that neither Lee nor Longstreet
of the enemy as Hooker manifested
been the result if, with Lee on the
marching to join him, Hooker had
against these separate fractions?
There would seem to have been more
principles of war, and a safer pre-
was, than that which his illustrious

ing orders and dispatches the Con-
to the Federals. The Confeder-
and more to the point than those
ter were misunderstood. Suffice
ers to Sedgwick for his demon-
ation of a position south of the
field relative to Gibbon's passage
Stoneman's order to Averell re-
may be noted, on the other hand,
the 3d to Stuart required expla-
attine, Captain 15th Hussars, p. 95.

Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
Camp near Falmouth, May 6, 1863.

General Orders, No. 49:

The major-general commanding tenders to this army his congratulations on its achievements of the last seven days. If it has not accomplished all that was expected, the reasons are well known to the army. It is sufficient to say they were of a character not to be foreseen or prevented by human sagacity or resource.

In withdrawing from the south bank of the Rappahannock before delivering a general battle to our adversaries, the army has given renewed evidence of its confidence in itself and its fidelity to the principles it represents. In fighting at a disadvantage we would have been recreant to our trust, to ourselves, our cause, and our country.

Profoundly loyal, and conscious of its strength, the Army of the Potomac will give or decline battle whenever its interests or honor may command. It will also be the guardian of its own history and its own fame.

By our celerity and secrecy of movement, our advance and passage of the rivers were undisputed, and, on our withdrawal, not a rebel ventured to follow.

The events of the last week may swell with pride the heart of every officer and soldier of this army. We have added new luster to its former renown. We have made long marches, crossed rivers, surprised the enemy in his intrenchments; and whenever we have fought, we have inflicted heavier blows than those we have received.

We have taken from the enemy 5000 prisoners [and] fifteen colors; captured and brought off seven pieces of artillery; placed *hors de combat* 18,000 of his chosen troops; destroyed his depots filled with vast amounts of stores; deranged his communications; captured prisoners within the fortifications of his capital; and filled his country with fear and consternation.

We have no other regret than that caused by the loss of our brave companions; and in this we are consoled by the conviction that they have fallen in the holiest cause ever submitted to the arbitrament of battle.

By command of Major-General HOOKER:

S. WILLIAMS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.¹

Headqrs. Eleventh Army Corps, May 10, 1863.

General Orders, No. 9:

As your commanding General, I cannot fail to notice a feeling of depression on the part of a portion of this corps. Some obloquy has been cast upon us on account of the affair of Saturday, May 2.

I believe that such a disaster might have happened to any other corps of this Army, and do not distrust my command. Every officer who failed to do his duty by not keeping his men together, and not rallying them when broken, is conscious of it, and must profit by the past.

I confidently believe that every honorable officer and every brave man earnestly desires an opportunity to advance against the enemy, and demonstrate to

¹ W. R., 39, p. 171.

of War, and himself held a conference, and concluded "that both the check at Chancellorsville and the retreat were inexcusable, and that Hooker must not be intrusted with the conduct of another battle. Halleck had brought a message from Hooker to the effect that, as he had never sought the command, he could resign it without embarrassment, and would be only too happy to do so, if he could have the command of his old division, and so keep in active service."¹ But as he was appointed by political selection, so on political grounds he was temporarily retained with a view to relieving without disgracing him. In the meantime the command was offered to Couch, who declined it. "Neither his health, always delicate, nor his retiring disposition qualified him for such a post of responsibility."² But unwilling to make another campaign under Hooker, he asked to be relieved from duty with the Army of the Potomac, and his request was complied with.

On the 29th of May General Ingalls, in compliance with a request of the Quartermaster-General of the Army, forwarded a report of the operations of the quartermaster's department, inclosing reports of corps quartermasters. These documents throw much light on the logistics of this campaign. The principal conclusions to which they seem to have led may be summarized as follows:

1. *The troops were overloaded.* Many carried both overcoat and blanket. It was intended that either should be taken without the other. Forty rounds of ammunition were deemed sufficient for the soldier to carry on his person in the future.

2. *The knapsack was an unnecessary incumbrance, and should be replaced by the blanket roll.* About 25 per cent. of the knapsacks were lost—thrown away on the march or in action; or laid aside to go into action, and not recovered. In parts of the army the loss in knapsacks was considerably greater. In the V Corps it was about 30 per cent., and in the XI and XII about 50 per cent. The loss in blankets, shelter tents, haversacks, etc., was correspondingly great. General Rodes says in his report: ". . . the enemy abandoned such a large number of knapsacks in retreating to his works that when this division began its homeward march in the rain it was thoroughly equipped with oilcloths and shelter tents of the best quality."³

3. *The pack-mule system could not be relied on for long marches with heavy wagons.* Pack-mules should be made auxiliary to wagons for short distances over rough country, where roads are few or bad—the wagons to be moved as far to the front as is safe or practicable, the pack-mules then to be packed with ammunition and necessary forage, and pushed on after the troops to follow them everywhere.

¹ *B. and L.*, III, 241.

² *General Hancock*, by F. A. Walker, pp. 92, 93.

³ *W. R.*, 39, p. 945.

APPENDIX 1

COMPOSITION AND DISPOSITION OF THE POTOMAC FLOTILLA ¹

1 DIVISION, UNDER LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER MAGAW

Steamers:

In Rappahannock River (<i>Anacostia</i> and <i>Dragon</i>)	2
Off Aquia Creek (<i>Freeborn</i>)	1
At Piney Point ² (dispatch-boat <i>Ella</i>)	1

Sailing-vessels (mortar schooners):

Off Aquia Creek (<i>T. A. Ward</i>)	1
At Alexandria, Va. (<i>Dan Smith</i> , <i>Adolph Hugel</i>)	2

2 DIVISION, UNDER LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER MCCREA

Steamers:

Store-ship, not available for other use	1
Convoy of General Hooker's supplies (<i>Reliance</i> , <i>Jacob Bell</i>)	2
Other serviceable steamer (<i>Eureka</i>)	1

Sailing-vessels (mortar schooners):

Including 1 tender at Piney Point and 1 guard-vessel	5
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UNDERGOING REPAIRS AT THE NAVY YARD

Steamers (<i>Satellite</i> , <i>Currituck</i> , <i>Resolute</i>)	3
--	---

WITH ACTING REAR-ADMIRAL LEE

Steamers:

Disabled (<i>Teaser</i> , <i>Cœur de Lion</i>)	2
Serviceable (<i>Yankee</i> , <i>Primrose</i>)	2
Total	23

APPENDIX 2

Special Orders, No. 77:

9. There being now 2000 pack-saddles for issue at Aquia Creek, they will be distributed as follows, and corps commanders will at once cause requisitions to be made for the number apportioned to them, viz.: First Corps, 329; Third Corps, 361; Fifth Corps, 328; Sixth Corps, 450; Eleventh Corps, 275; Twelfth Corps, 257.

Of these pack-saddles, two will be distributed to each regiment to carry the

¹ *Naval W. R.*, Series I, Vol. V, p. 260.

² Marked on map *Piney Ft.*

shelter tents, with which officers will be provided, and extra rations for officers. The remainder will be devoted to the transportation of ammunition, the average amount of which, to be carried in each pack-saddle, will be two and a half boxes;¹ the stronger and larger animals to carry three boxes, and the lighter ones two boxes.

Waterproof pouches will be used to protect the ammunition in rainy weather.² Drill for a few hours each day in packing and unpacking will be instituted, without delay, to familiarize the men and animals to the use of the pack-saddles.

The animals for the ammunition-pack, if there are none extra on hand, will be taken from the ammunition-wagons, in which case the wagons and harness will be turned in to the quartermaster's department.

APPENDIX 3

On the basis of the inspection reports the following order was issued with a view to promoting emulation and efficiency throughout the army:

Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
Camp near Falmouth, Va., March 3, 1863.

General Orders, No. 18:

V. The inspection reports of the following regiments and batteries give evidences of the necessity of strong exertions on the part of every officer and member of the command to bring them up to a proper state of discipline and efficiency. No further leave of absence or furloughs will be granted to these commands, and all officers absent therefrom must be recalled and their leaves revoked:

Regiments—12, 21, 23, 26, 34, 35, 42, 59, 60, 78, 88, 104, 105,³ 107, 149 New York; 29, 68, 69, 124, 125, 132, 136, 155 Pennsylvania; 27 Indiana; 32 Massachusetts Volunteers.

Batteries—B, 1 New York, *Pettit's*; 10 New York, *Bruen's*; 11 New York, [von] *Puttkammer's*; C, 1 New York, *Barnes'*; B, 1 Maryland, *Snow's*; A, 1 New Jersey, *Hexamer's*; C, 1 Pennsylvania, *McCarthy's*; D, 1 Pennsylvania, *Hall's*;⁴ 12 Ohio, *Johnson's*; 3 Pennsylvania, *Hampton's*; and C, 1 New York Battalion, *Langner's*.⁵

VI. The following regiments and battalions appearing from the inspection reports to have earned high commendation from inspecting officers, it is left to the discretion of the corps commander, having regard to the efficiency of the command, to increase the leaves of absence and furloughs to these commands for the 15 days following the receipt of this order to 3 instead of 2 enlisted

¹ A box held 1000.

² The metallic-case cartridge had not yet come into general use. A few of the kind known as the Burnside cartridge were in service, but the common cartridge was cased in paper and was not waterproof.

³ Consolidated with the 104 N. Y., March 20, 1863 (*W. R.*, 39, p. 278).

⁴ Consolidated before the commencement

of active operations with Company C, 1 Pa., Captain McCarthy.

⁵ This organization appears in the statement of the organization of the Army of the Potomac for January 31 (*W. R.*, 40, p. 16), but not in that for May 1-6 (*ib.*, 39, pp. 156-170). It was presumably detached.

men for every 100 present for duty and 3 officers instead of 2, as provided in General Orders, No. 3, January 30, 1863, from headquarters Army of the Potomac, viz.:

Regiments—1, 2, and 20 Massachusetts; 10 and 19 Maine; 5 and 10¹ New York; 5 New Jersey; 111 Pennsylvania; 3 Wisconsin; and 1 Minnesota Volunteers.

Batteries—5 Maine, *Leppien's*; A, 1 Rhode Island, *Arnold's*; B, 1 Rhode Island, *Hazard's*; K, 4 United States, *Seeley's*; D, 1 New York, *Osborn's*; E, 1 Rhode Island, *Randolph's*; D, 5 United States, *Hazlett's*; C, 1 Massachusetts, *Martin's*; A, 1 Massachusetts, *McCartney's*; 3 New York, *Harn's*; 2 New York, *Blume's*; K, 1 United States, *Graham's*; 5 New York, *Taft's*; B, 1 Connecticut, *Brooker's*.

By referring all the regiments and batteries to their respective corps, balancing the proficient against the deficient, calculating for each corps the ratio of the result to the total number of regiments and batteries in the corps, and reducing the scale of comparison thus obtained to positive numbers, we get the order of instruction and discipline indicated in the following table:

CORPS		FIGURE OF INSTRUCTION AND DISCIPLINE
1.	XI Corps (Sigel)	105
2.	V " (Meade)	96
3.	III " (Sickles)	94
4.	VI " (Sedgwick)	93
5.	XII " (Slocum)	61
6.	I " (Reynolds)	14
7.	II " (Couch)	1

This showing, be it observed, rests upon inspections, not of corps, but of regiments and batteries. They were poor criterions of tactical efficiency, especially of the larger units (corps and divisions). Regarding the XI Corps, an officer wrote in a private letter under date of March 1, 1863:

Sigel's corps is, or seems to be, composed wholly of Germans. They are disgracefully undisciplined. . . . Sigel's and Slocum's [corps] are very near each other, but there is little communication between them. Sigel is pretty generally regarded as a humbug by the Army of the Potomac. His men are marauders, and are not believed in as fighters.

APPENDIX 4

February 7

XII. The flag designating the headquarters of army corps will be as follows: A blue swallowtail flag, with white Maltese cross in center of field; the numerical designation of the corps in red figures in the center of the cross.

The chief quartermaster will furnish the flags, on proper requisition, to commanders of army corps.

March 21

For the purpose of ready recognition of corps and divisions in this army, and to prevent injustice by reports of straggling and misconduct through mistake as


¹ See note 5, p. 490.

to its organization, the chief quartermaster will furnish without delay the following badges, to be worn by the officers and enlisted men of all the regiments of the various corps mentioned. They will be securely fastened upon the center of the top of the cap.

Inspecting officers will at all inspections see that these badges are worn as designated:

First Corps, a sphere	First Division, red; Second, white; Third, blue.
Second Corps, trefoil	First Division, red; Second, white; Third, blue.
Third Corps, lozenge	First Division, red; Second, white; Third, blue.
Fifth Corps, Maltese cross . .	First Division, red; Second, white; Third, blue.
Sixth Corps, cross	First Division, red; Second, white; Third, blue.
Eleventh Corps, crescent . . .	(Light Division, green.) First Division, red; Second, white; Third, blue.
Twelfth Corps, star	First Division, red; Second, white; Third, blue.

The sizes and colors will be according to pattern.¹



¹ As printed, the badges are one-half size.

APPENDIX 5

The following table shows the ratio of sick in the several army corps on the 28th of March: ¹

CORPS		SICK PER 1000
1.	VI Corps (Sedgwick)	46
2.	XII " (Slocum)	53
3.	V " (Meade)	61
4.	XI " (Sigel)	69
5.	III " (Sickles)	76
6.	II " (Couch)	85
7.	I " (Reynolds)	90

Letterman says in a letter to Hooker dated April 4, from which the foregoing data are taken: ²

The paper marked A ³ shows the whole number of sick in this army to be on the 28th of March ultimo 10,777. The corps exhibiting the greatest ratio of sick are those in which there is the greatest number of new regiments. Thus, the First Corps, having a ratio of 90.02 per 1000, has, according to the data in this office, eighteen new and twenty-one old regiments.

The Sixth Corps, with a ratio of 46.16 per 1000, has only four new regiments and thirty old regiments. The ratio of sick for the whole army is 67.64 per 1000.

Numerous reports made to this office refer to the general improvement in the health, tone, and vigor of those who are not reported sick; an improvement which figures will not exhibit, but which is apparent to officers whose attention is directed to the health of the men. ⁴

The foregoing table of health exhibits roughly the length of service, or experience, of the several corps. As an approximate figure of experience let us take the number of well men per 1000 as shown in this table. We have now for each corps a numerical expression, or factor, (1) of desertion, (2) of instruction and discipline, (3) of sickness, and (4) of experience. By multiplying the factor of instruction and discipline by that of experience, and dividing the result by the product of the factors of sickness and desertion, we get what may be called a figure of efficiency. Doing this for each corps will enable us to arrange the several corps in an order of efficiency as follows:

CORPS		FIGURE OF EFFICIENCY
1.	XI Corps (Sigel)	32.94
2.	V " (Meade)	16.23
3.	VI " (Sedgwick)	15.70
4.	III " (Sickles)	9.60
5.	XII " (Slocum)	9.01
6.	I " (Reynolds)	1.32
7.	II " (Couch)	0.12

¹ W. R., 40, p. 240.

² This letter is published without date in W. R., 40, p. 239, and without list in Letterman's *Medical Recollections*, pp. 109-111.

³ Omitted.

⁴ Butterfield testified before the Commit-

tee on the Conduct of the War that the ratio of sickness was decreased from about 10 per cent. to below 5 per cent. (*Rep. of Com.*, IV, 74). According to Letterman, the ratio of sickness at the end of April was under 4½ per cent. (*Medical Recollections*, p. 112).

APPENDIX 6

Under date of January 30, Hooker wrote to Halleck:

By General Orders, No. 61, War Department, 1862, leaves of absence cannot be granted in the field, except to prevent death or permanent disability. This rule never has been strictly regarded in this army . . . and I have thought proper to issue the inclosed order. I believe by it much desertion will be stopped, and a more contented feeling pervade the army. . . .

I. No leaves will exceed fifteen days.

II. Leaves to commanders of corps, divisions, and cavalry brigades will only be granted upon approval at these headquarters. One brigade commander only in a corps to be on leave at one time.

III. Not more than one field officer of a regiment to be absent on leave at one time, where the full complement of field officers are present. . . .

IV. Not more than two line officers to be given leave from any regiment at the same time; not more than one from any battery or detachment.

V. Leaves [are] not to exceed ten days, except to residents of the following states, when it [sic] may be given for fifteen days; viz.: Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont; Ohio, Michigan, and the States west of these last named.

VI. Furloughs to enlisted men must in no case exceed two for every 100 men present for duty in the regiment, battery, or detachment. . . .

VII. In case of the failure of any officer or soldier to return before their [sic] leave expires, leaves will not be granted to others from the same commands until their return. . . .

VIII. A return from each regiment, battery, and detachment will be forwarded to these headquarters within eight days from the date of this order, showing the number of officers and men absent from duty from any cause whatever. . . .

Halleck replied February 30:

. . . In no case will commanders of grand divisions, army corps, etc., be allowed to grant leaves. The number of applications sent to the War Department, approved by such officers, shows a recklessness and carelessness exceedingly reprehensible, for if one third so approved were granted, the efficiency of the army would be completely destroyed. All leaves to officers to visit Washington without the consent of the War Department are deemed null and void, and hereafter all general officers who come here on leave not properly granted will be dismissed. The mere passage through the city, when that is the shortest or only line of travel, is not considered visiting, but any officer who remains here twenty-four hours without authority will be arrested.

In the face of these instructions Hooker, on the 7th, issued an order authorizing corps commanders to grant leaves and furloughs.

Things were going on swimmingly under this order when the following correspondence took place:

Halleck to Hooker, February 27, 3 p.m.

The authority given to you to grant leaves of absence cannot be delegated by you to commanders of corps. Leaves not signed by your orders are null.

Hooker to Kelton, Assistant Adjutant-General, March 3

. . . the authority to exercise this power, under well-defined restrictions, was conferred upon corps commanders, and I have never heard of its having been

abused by them. If officers holding these high positions cannot be intrusted with this duty, it seems to me that they should be replaced by others who can.

The delay incident to applications for leave will be appreciated when you are informed that my camp is nearly 100 miles in circumference, and, if acted on immediately on their receipt at these headquarters, would, in the majority of cases, delay the departure of the applicant eight-and-forty hours. . . .

Halleck to Hooker, March 5

. . . As many officers presented themselves here in Washington with leaves from commanders of army corps, I applied to the Secretary to ascertain if such authority had been granted. He replied that he had conferred that authority only on you, and that it would not be given to commanders of army corps. . . . Last reports show that 9692 officers are now absent from their commands. It is the determination of the War Department to diminish this number by retaining to itself the power to grant leaves and by refusing them except in the most urgent cases.

The *War Records* contain no reply to this dispatch, nor any order of Hooker's revoking his permission to corps commanders to grant leaves of absence. It would seem that he was sustained by the President.

APPENDIX 7

On the 31st of January Lee wrote to General H. B. Kershaw in regard to a proposed formation of a "battalion of honor":

. . . The proper selection of the men and officers for such a battalion would be exceedingly difficult, and even were it organized, it would be more difficult still to fill properly vacancies which might occur in its ranks. The fact is, General, we have now an army of brave men. The formation of a battalion of honor would reward a few and leave many equally brave and equally faithful unnoticed, and perhaps with the feeling that an improper distinction had been made between themselves and their comrades.

Again, a battalion of honor would be a distinct order created among us, and such orders have generally been considered inconsistent with the spirit of our institutions. The Congress of the Confederate States, appreciating the difficulties of properly rewarding meritorious conduct in the army, and of inciting a spirit of emulation of deeds of gallantry, proposes the plan embodied in General Orders, No. 93, Act No. 27, of the Adjutant and Inspector General, at Richmond. By this act the President is authorized to bestow medals on such officers as shall be conspicuous for courage and good conduct on the field of battle; also to confer a badge of distinction upon one private or non-commissioned officer of each company after every signal victory he shall have assisted to achieve. This soldier to be indicated by a majority of the votes of his company. If the award fall upon a deceased soldier, the badge will be given to his widow, or to such relative as the President may adjudge entitled to receive it. This plan meets the difficulty in question in some measure.¹

Hooker wrote to Army Headquarters, Washington, on the 2d of February:

General Orders, No. 19, February 22, 1862, provide for the inscription, upon the colors of all regiments and batteries in the service of the United States, [of]

¹ For an instance of this plan carried out, see General Orders, No. 131, Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, Richmond, Va., October 3, 1863 (*W. R.*, 39, p. 1052).

the names of the battles in which they have borne a meritorious part. Most, if not all, the regiments and batteries now in the service with this army are entitled to distinction. Boards have been organized, and have reported upon the claims for these honorable inscriptions. There are no records at the [these] headquarters of these proceedings, but I am reliably informed that the recommendations of the boards have been forwarded to the headquarters of this army, although they are not now here. . . .

If these records are on file at the headquarters of the Army or of the War Department, I trust they may receive prompt and immediate action. . . .

Following is Kelton's reply:

. . . The only report transmitted to these headquarters was from the board instituted in the Fifth Corps. It was approved by the general-in-chief and submitted to the Secretary of War December 23, 1862.¹

It does not appear that any further action was taken on Hooker's letter of the 2d of February, but, of their own accord, regiments and batteries put the names of battles in which they were engaged on their colors, which led to great abuse.²

In the Confederate army a regular method had been instituted by the following order from the War Department, July 23, 1862:

1. It will be the duty of the commanding generals of separate armies to cause to be entered, in some conspicuous place on the standards of regiments, battalions, and separately organized squadrons of their commands, the names of the several battles in which their regiments, battalions, and separate squadrons have been actually engaged.³

APPENDIX 8

Couch to Williams,⁴ February 21

I telegraphed you last evening that the pickets had reported that sixteen pieces of artillery and eleven pontoons were seen passing through Fredericksburg down the river. The information did not get to me until twenty-four hours or more after the movement was observed—as stupid a thing as ever occurred in military history. It is but a specimen of how military duties are done by a great many officers in my corps. Higher officers spend their time in reading newspapers or books, playing cards or the politician, drinking whisky, and grumbling. Of course this charge does not include all by a long way, for it contains some of the finest officers that ever drew sword, from major-general down.

Upon a personal investigation, I find that the movement of pontoons and artillery was seen by so many that nobody reported the fact. The general officer of the day was Colonel Frank, one of our most sterling officers.

¹ *Rep. of Com.*, IV, 191.

² General Meade, when subsequently in command of the Army of the Potomac, sought to remedy this abuse by the appointment of boards whose investigations and conclusions are embodied in General Orders, No. 10, Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 1865.

³ The present regulations of the U. S. Army, issued in 1908, contain no provision for keeping the memories of battles fresh in the soldiers' minds.

⁴ Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.

Williams to Couch, February 21

In reply to your communication just received, Major-General Hooker directs me to say that it is a most extraordinary report. The general can not think you expect him to bring your officers to a sense of their duty. He trusts that you will have no delay in bringing the officer who neglected his duty to trial and punishment. It is of the utmost importance to him to know if the enemy have any pontoons¹ and, if so, how many and where they are. He desires that you should communicate to him without delay all reliable information you can obtain upon this point.

Couch to Williams, February 22

. . . The men I questioned yesterday were not positive that pontoons were seen, but thought they were.¹ As for the artillery, one man counted thirty-two 6-horse carriages that he supposed were artillery, but could not see the guns. In my letter I did not intend for the major-general commanding to understand that I wished to throw off the responsibility of disciplining my command, but rather for him to be informed as to the difficulties in the way of duty—as, for instance, this most unwarrantable neglect of duty occurred under the best picket officer I have, and as good a one as I ever knew, and, too, at a time when we were endeavoring to perfect our picket system, and thought we were successful.

Among the measures taken in the opposing armies for their protection against spies was the issuing of the following orders:

Camp near Falmouth, Va., February 13, 1863.

Brig. Gen. M. R. Patrick,
Provost-Marshal-General:

The commanding general directs that all trading establishments, peddlers, etc., within the lines of this army, except regularly authorized and appointed sutlers, be broken up, and the parties, with their goods, be sent outside our lines to the rear by to-morrow night; that notice be served upon them (and copies to department provost-marshals) that if found within our lines after twenty-four hours, their goods, wares, and horses will be confiscated,—one half to the hospitals of the corps within which they may be arrested or found, the balance to the general hospitals at Aquia, Belle Plain, and Windmill Point.

Very respectfully, etc.,

S. Williams,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

Hdqs. Army of Northern Virginia, February 16, 1863.

I. The presence of citizens in the camps or within the lines of the army, unless authorized, is forbidden. Persons coming into the lines on special business must make it known to the provost-marshal. Citizens properly vouched for will be allowed to visit within the lines of the army with passports signed by division commanders. Loyal citizens who reside within the lines will obtain permanent passports from the division commanders near them.

II. Corps commanders will take steps to enroll all citizens within the army who are not exempt from military duty, and assign them to such regions as they may select. They will cause the immediate arrest of all unauthorized persons wandering about the various camps and depots. If they can give a satisfactory account of themselves these persons will be liberated and sent out of the lines. . . .

¹ There is no reference to these pontoons of them elsewhere. They were undoubtedly an optical illusion or a fiction of the imagination.

On the 7th of March Hooker wrote to Lee:

As, in two instances of late, communications have been sent under flags of truce to subordinate officers of my command, I respectfully state that I have directed that, until further orders, no communication coming from your lines be received unless the same be addressed to myself, and under existing circumstances [as long as the armies are in their present position] delivered in front of Fredericksburg.

APPENDIX 9

Lee to Davis, February 16

The concentration of a large force of the enemy at Aquia Creek, with other indications, renders it probable that a general movement is in progress. I learn from Baltimore that all transports of every description are ordered from there to Aquia, and deserters report that their army is going to Tennessee or North Carolina; I think more probably the latter.

Seddon to Lee, February 17

An officer of the Signal Corps . . . reports as certain that about 20,000 men have been landed and are encamped at Newport News. . . . In addition to these troops at Newport News 8000 or 10,000 were reported . . . to have been sent to Suffolk. . . . I am inclined to think the enemy's movements too serious for a feint or a diversion, and that Hooker really designs withdrawing from the Rappahannock and changing his whole plan. . . .

From the foregoing numbers Lee concluded that two corps must have gone from the Army of the Potomac.

Lee to Seddon, February 17

Reports . . . state that a third corps of General Hooker's army was embarking on the 15th instant, and circumstances they give intimate a continuance of the movement.

To Davis, February 18

It appears that the Federal Army under General Hooker is abandoning its present position between the Rappahannock and the Potomac. The greater portion which has so far left has descended the Potomac. . . . Accurate information ought to be obtained of the enemy's movements and intentions in Hampton Roads, and it should be ascertained whether he is preparing to reembark his troops for the more southern port, or place them in camp, or advance them to Suffolk or into North Carolina.

To his daughter Agnes, February 21

General Hooker is obliged to do something: I do not know what it will be.¹

¹ *Memoirs of N. S. Lee*, by A. L. Long, p. 244.

APPENDIX 10

Lee to Seddon, March 27

. . . The troops of this portion of the army have for some time been confined to reduced rations, consisting of 18 ounces of flour, 4 ounces of bacon of indifferent quality, with occasional supplies of rice, sugar, or molasses. The men are cheerful, and I receive but few complaints; still I do not think it is enough to continue them in health and vigor, and I fear they will be unable to endure the hardships of the approaching campaign. Symptoms of scurvy are appearing among them, and to supply the place of vegetables each regiment is directed to send a daily detail to gather sassafras buds, wild onions, garlic, lambs' quarters, and poke sprouts, but for so large an army the supply obtained is very small. . . .

Lee to his troops, April 5

The commanding general again calls the attention of officers and soldiers of the army to the importance of aiding the farmers of the country in raising their crops by abstaining from destruction of fences and avoiding injury to fields of growing grain. The failure of the crops in districts occupied by the army will detract from our supplies, and render a large population heretofore contributing to our support dependent upon other portions of the country. The fortitude of citizens in districts which have suffered from our presence and the inroads of the enemy appeal[s] to the sympathy of their defenders.

The women who have devoted themselves to the care of our sick and wounded claim protection. The contracted limits of cultivated country render it more difficult to procure subsistence, and self-preservation requires that protection and every aid be given to the production of the necessities of life.

APPENDIX 11

ARTILLERY OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA

		<i>I Corps</i>		NUMBER OF PIECES
1 DIVISION (Anderson) ¹				
<i>Hardaway's battalion</i>				
1.	Grandy's battery	.	.	4
2.	Lewis' battery ²	.	.	4
3.	Maurin's battery ³	.	.	4
4.	Moore's battery	.	.	4
				16
2 DIVISION (McLaws)				
<i>Cabell's battalion</i> ⁴				
1.	Carlton's battery	.	.	4
2.	Fraser's battery	.	.	4
3.	McCarthy's battery	.	.	4
4.	Manly's battery	.	.	4
				16
		<i>Carried forward,</i>		32

¹ Commanded also by Garnett.² Commanded by Penick.³ This battery was in depot at Guiney's Station throughout the campaign.⁴ Commanded also by Hamilton.

ARTILLERY OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA—*Continued*

	NUMBER OF PIECES
<i>Brought forward,</i>	124
4 DIVISION (Colston)	
<i>Jones' battalion</i>	
1. Carrington's battery	4
2. Garber's battery ¹	4
3. Tanner's battery ²	4
4. Thompson's battery	4
	16
ARTILLERY RESERVE (Crutchfield)³	
<i>Brown's battalion⁴</i>	
1. Brooke's battery	4
2. Dance's battery	4
3. Graham's battery	4
4. Hupp's battery	4
5. Smith's battery	4
6. Watson's battery	4
	24
<i>McIntosh's battalion</i>	
7. Hurt's battery	4
8. Johnson's battery	4
9. Lusk's battery	4
10. Wooding's battery	4
	16
<i>General Artillery Reserve (Pendleton)</i>	
<i>Cutts' battalion</i>	
1. Patterson's battery	4
2. Ross' battery	4
3. Wingfield's battery	4
	12
<i>Nelson's battalion</i>	
4. Kirkpatrick's battery	4
5. Massie's battery	4
6. Milledge's battery	4
	12
<i>Cavalry Division (Horse Artillery) (Beckham)</i>	
1. Moorman's battery	4
2. Breathed's battery	4
3. McGregor's battery	4
4. Hart's battery	4
	16
Total	220 ⁵

¹ Commanded also by Fultz.² The name is also given in the *War Records* as *Latimer*, but see *W. R.*, 40, p. 729.³ Commanded also by Walker and by J. T. Brown. The artillery "on the field" was at that time commanded by Alexander (*W. R.*, 39, pp. 822, 824, 938).⁴ Commanded also by Watson and by Dance.⁵ Including Maurin's battery (3. I. I), 1 piece of Richardson's (8. I), and 1 of Eshleman's (10. I), total 6 pieces, absent throughout the campaign.

ARTILLERY OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC—*Continued*

		NUMBER OF PIECES
<i>Brought forward,</i>		159
<i>V Corps (Meade)</i>		
1 DIVISION (Griffin)		
1. Martin's battery	C, Mass.	6
2. Phillips' battery	E, Mass.	6
3. Waterman's battery	C, 1 R. I.	6
4. Hazlett's battery	D, 5 U. S.	6
2 DIVISION (Sykes)		
1. Gibbs' battery	L, 1 Ohio	6
2. Weed's battery ¹	I, 5 U. S.	4
3 DIVISION (Humphreys)		
1. Barnes' battery	C, 1 N. Y.	4
2. Randol's battery ²	E, G, 1 U. S.	4

42

VI Corps (Sedgwick)

1 DIVISION (Brooks)		
1. McCartney's battery	A, Mass.	6
2. Hexamer's battery ³	A, N. J.	6
3. Rigby's battery	A, 1 Md.	6
4. Williston's battery	D, 2 U. S.	6
2 DIVISION (Howe)		
1. Cowan's battery	1 N. Y.	6
2. Martin's battery	F, 5 U. S.	6
3 DIVISION (Newton)		
1. McCarthy's battery ⁴	C, D, 1 Pa.	6
2. Butler's battery	G, 2 U. S.	6
4 DIVISION (Burnham)		
Harn's battery	3 N. Y.	6

54

XI Corps (Howard)

1 DIVISION (Devens)		
Dieckmann's battery	13 N. Y.	6
2 DIVISION (von Steinwehr)		
Wiedrich's battery	I, 1 N. Y.	6
3 DIVISION (Schurz)		
Dilger's battery	I, 1 Ohio	6
<i>Artillery Reserve (Schirmer)</i>		
1. Jahn's battery	2 N. Y.	6
2. De Beck's battery	K, 1 Ohio	6
3. Hill's battery	C, 1 W. Va.	6

36

Carried forward, 291¹ Commanded by Lieutenant Watson.² Formed by the consolidation of two depleted batteries.³ Commanded by Lieutenant Parsons.⁴ Formed by the consolidation of two depleted batteries.

APPENDIX 12

TABLES OF DAILY LOSSES

These tables, while based upon the official records of the war, are in a measure conjectural.

*Army of the Potomac*¹

ORGANIZATION	Before May 2 ²	May 2	May 3	After May 3 ³
I Corps	55	109	97	38
II "	3	68	1,835	19
III "	4	311	3,767	37
V "	232	2	458	8
VI "	15	5	3,490	1,100
XI "	0	2,411	0	1
XII "	49	306	2,466	3
Cav. { Stoneman, including } ...	42	26	0	121
{ Averell				
{ Pleasonton	63	136	0	1
Army of the Potomac	463	3,374	12,113	1,328

*Army of Northern Virginia*⁴

ORGANIZATION	Before May 2	May 2	May 3	After May 3
1 Division, I Corps	66	5	1,291	83
2 " I "	18	38	1,719	0
Corps Artillery	0	0	106	0
I Corps	84	43	3,116	83
1 Division, II Corps	0	174	2,766	0
2 " II "	12	709	2,213	3
3 " II "	0	0	0	1,346
4 " II "	0	230	1,825	23
Corps Artillery	0	0	80	0
II Corps	12	1,113	6,884	1,372
General Artillery Reserve	0	0	3	0
Cavalry Division	94	17	0	0
Army of Northern Virginia.	190	1,173	10,003	1,455

APPENDIX 13

EFFECTIVE STRENGTH ACCORDING TO REPORTS

Where the figures in the reports appear to include enlisted men only, the officers have been added on the basis of 1 to every 20 men. The mark + indicates that the number which it follows is less, and the mark — that it is greater, than

¹ Without counting 1 on Hooker's staff and 8 in Engineer Brigade.

² With few exceptions, May 1.

³ With few exceptions, May 4.

⁴ Not including 5 casualties at headquarters II Corps.

the true number. The mark $\pm$ indicates that the number which it follows is greater or less than the true number.

<i>Federal</i>								
ORGANIZATION	April 27	April 28	April 29	April 30	May 1	May 2	May 3	May 4
I Corps		17,000 $\pm$						
4 O.—1. 3. II							372	
105 Pa.—1. 1. III		357						
114 Pa.—1. 1. III							420	
141 Pa.—1. 1. III		484					441	
72 N. Y.—2. 2. III							440	
120 N. Y.—2. 2. III							481	
5 N. J.—2. 2. III							320	
8 N. J.—2. 2. III							271	
11 th		3,500						
12 N. H.—2. 3. III							558	
4 U. S.—1. 2. V.	220							
10 U. S.—2. 2. V					108			
17 U. S.—2. 2. V	331							
1 st	3,684 ¹							
1 st V	1,711							
1 st V	1,973							
3 N. J.—1. 1. VI	349							
1 st VI							1,500	
121 N. Y.—2. 1. VI							453	
VI								6,000
XI						4,200 $\pm$		
1 st XI						1,470 $\pm$		
17 Conn.—2. 1. XI						517		
25 O.—2. 1. XI						349		
55 O.—2. 1. XI	471							
1 st XI						1,575 $\pm$		
1 st						4,143 $\pm$		
XII Corps					9,610 $\pm$			
1 st XII					5,700		5,000	
5 Conn.—1. 1. XII	481							
66 O.—1. 2. XII						362		
78 N. Y.—3. 2. XII					322			
137 N. Y.—3. 2. XII							563	
149 N. Y.—3. 2. XII							503	
<i>Confederate</i>								
22 Va.—1. 1. II							107	
40 Va.—1. 1. II							217 ²	
1 S. Ca.—3. 1. II							315	
13 S. Ca.—3. 1. II							315	
33 N. Ca.—4. 1. II					504	504 -		
45 Ga.—6. 1. II						375	350	
49 Ga.—6. 1. II			398				280	
1 st II							1,400	
1 Tenn.—5. 1. II							262	
1 st					8,551			
1 st II					1,895			
1 st II					1,622	1,594		
1 st II					1,795			
1 st II					1,730			

¹ Infantry only.

² After about an hour's fighting.

Confederate (continued)

ORGANIZATION	April 27	April 28	April 29	April 30	May 1	May 2	May 3	May 4
^A II					1,509			
6 Ala.—1. 2. II							473	
12 Ala.—1. 2. II						330		
12 N. Ca.—3. 2. II							225	
23 N. Ca.—3. 2. II							430	
^A II						6,000 +		
4 Va.—1. 4. II							355	
27 Va.—1. 4. II							185	
48 Va.—2. 4. II						345		
^A II			2,125				325 ± ¹	
23 Va.—3. 4. II							70	
1 La.—3. 4. II						131 ±		
2 La.—3. 4. II							129 ²	

APPENDIX 14

Williams to Stoneman, April 22

1

... it is expected that you are again prepared for a forward movement, so far as regards your stores. The commanding general, therefore, directs that you proceed across the river to-morrow morning, if the fords are practicable. The general does not look for one moment's delay in your advance from any cause that human effort can obviate, and directs me to add that his army is awaiting your movements.

2

The major-general commanding is of the opinion that you are encamped in the immediate vicinity of your depot of supplies, and that you will spare no labor to put your command in a state of the utmost efficiency, while you hold it in readiness to move at the earliest practicable moment. He also directs that you improve the opportunity to keep yourself advised of the condition of the water on the fords; also of the force of the enemy to guard the fords, and also mature your plans for an advance when the signal is given. Determine at what ford you will cross, at what hour, and the lines you will advance on to accomplish your mission. The line of the enemy's pickets, being extended, must be a weak one, and if attacked at break of day, will easily be broken. If you desire, vigorous demonstrations can be made by the infantry and artillery at Kelley's Ford at any hour, which, as before, will tend to draw the enemy in that direction. If necessary, a still larger force can be sent to that point; but as it will require the best part of two days for them to reach there from this camp, it may not be in season. If the detachment you dispatched [dispatch] to look into Culpeper and Gordonsville should find them held by an infantry force too numerous to engage, let them pass around those places. After you break through the enemy's advanced lines, you will find no force in the direction of Richmond, that city itself being without a sufficient force to keep out your own command, should you advance on it. This, however, is not expected. Major-General Keyes has a command at Gloucester Point and also at Fort Magruder. Wise is in his front

¹ After battle. Loss in killed, wounded, and missing (since April 29), 670. Stragglers, etc., 1130.

² After battle. Loss in killed, wounded, and missing (May 2 and 3), about 135.

with a small force. After crossing the Rapidan the major-general suggests that you subdivide your command, and let them take different routes, and have some point of meeting on your line of general operations. These detachments can dash off to the right and left, and inflict a vast deal of mischief, and at the same time bewilder the enemy as to the course and intentions of the main body.¹ It seems to him that these should move without artillery, and if necessary to strike a railroad or effect a surprise, make long marches at night. You have sent so many animals to the rear, the general hopes that you will be able to pack ammunition for your batteries and leave your wagons behind. All vehicles will only embarrass your operations. In his opinion two pieces of artillery to a division should be all that you attempt to move with. Of this you must be the judge. You have officers and men in your command who have been over much of this country in which you are operating; make use of them. The experiences of your march up the river will doubtless satisfy you of what can be accomplished by celerity. Remember that you are turning the rivers, which the enemy, to follow you, must swim, should they become swollen. Cross them, however, as low down as possible, as that will shorten your marches. Let the officers and men selected to destroy bridges, etc., be efficient, and let their work be done thoroughly.

Should you be out of forage and food, you will find them at the farm-houses between the rivers flowing into the Potomac, as that country north of York River, low down, has hitherto completely escaped drainage by the army. I am instructed to inform you that the general regrets that up to this time you have made no mention of Colonel Davis' disaster the third day out from here.² He requests that you will keep him fully and correctly advised of all your operations. He also requires that you will inform him, without delay, of the probable hour you will be able to resume your march. In marching you must require your men to keep together as much as in an Indian country. Send any officer to the rear who does not keep his command in hand. You will lose every man and horse who separates from his command.

APPENDIX 15

Battlefield to Hooker

Sidgwick asks if column to move on Telegraph road simultaneously with advance on Bowling Green road is to be portion of his present command. One portion of your line directs him to move his whole force on Bowling Green road. I presumed that contingency of moving forces on the two roads was the essence of the force of the message. Am I right?

To Sidgwick

The general commanding has gone to Chancellorsville. Sickles' (Third) Corps was ordered to move to that point before he wrote your letter of instruction. From this I judge if the column to move on Telegraph Road] was to be a portion of your present command. I will send your letter to him by an orderly with a copy of this reply and may get telegraphic answer.

The column to move on Telegraph Road and one on the Bowling Green Road, whether the column was to be in two columns or in one. These instructions also indicated that both columns were to consist of the remainder of Sidgwick's command.

The column to move on Telegraph Road and one on the Bowling Green Road, whether the column was to be in two columns or in one. These instructions also indicated that both columns were to consist of the remainder of Sidgwick's command.

APPENDIX 16

FEDERAL ARTILLERY BETWEEN CHANCELLORSVILLE AND UNITED STATES FORD
AFTER 12 M. MAY 3*In Position*

Randol—Three batteries of Griffin's division ($\frac{2.2.4}{1.V}$); the two batteries of Humphreys' division—total 5 batteries, numbering 26 pieces.

Weed—Amsden's battery of Doubleday's division; Ames' of French's division; Kirby's of the corps artillery of the II Corps; Seeley's of Berry's (now Carr's) division, except one section; Lewis' and von Puttkammer's of Whipple's division; both batteries of Sykes' division; Bailey's of Williams' division; a section of Waterman's battery of Griffin's division—total 9 batteries and one section, numbering 48 pieces.

Wainwright—Two groups: Stewart's battery of Wadsworth's division, and Hall's and Ransom's of Robinson's division, 18 pieces; Wiedrich's battery of von Steinwehr's division minus 2 pieces lost, and Atwell's of Geary's division, 10 pieces—total 5 batteries, numbering 28 pieces.

Grand total in position: 20 batteries, numbering 102 pieces;¹ or, including 4 pieces of Waterman's battery, about midway between Randol's and Weed's masses, 106 pieces.

In Reserve

Though given by corps, the batteries were not thus grouped.

I Corps—Edgell's and Reynolds' batteries of Wadsworth's division; Leppien's and Thompson's of Robinson's division; Cooper's and Ricketts' of Doubleday's division—total 6 batteries, numbering 29 pieces.

II Corps—Pettit's and Thomas' of Hancock's division; Arnold's of Gibbon's division; Cushing's of the corps artillery of the II Corps—total 4 batteries, numbering 24 pieces.

III Corps—The 3 batteries of Birney's division minus 1 piece of Jastram's lost; Winslow's, McLean's, and Dimick's batteries, and a section of Seeley's battery, of Berry's division; Huntington's battery of Whipple's division minus 3 pieces lost—total 7 batteries and one section, numbering 40 pieces.

¹ Hunt includes in Weed's mass Martin's battery (F), 5 U. S., representing it as of 4 guns. This was a 6-gun battery belonging to Howe's division of the VI Corps, with which it remained throughout the campaign (*W. R.*, 39, pp. 250, 613, 614). He ignores Watson's battery (2. V), which is entitled to the place he gives to Martin's (*ib.*, pp. 513, 544). His report is based on what he found at 10 p.m. By this time Seeley's and von Puttkammer's batteries (included above) were replaced by Edgell's (1. I)

and Ricketts' (3. I). Weed gives the number of guns in his mass as 56, but he does not specify the batteries, nor is he clear as to the time to which he refers. He probably counted guns which were held in reserve (*ib.*, p. 512). Hunt gives the number of guns under Wainwright as 32, but he includes Reynolds' 6-gun battery (1. I), which was not put in line until the 4th, and allows Atwell's battery (2. XII) only 4 pieces. It had 6 in position (*ib.*, pp. 251, 259, 771).

XI Corps—Dilger's battery of Schurz's division minus 1 piece lost; the 3 batteries of the corps artillery of the XI Corps—total 4 batteries, numbering 23 pieces.

XII Corps—Winegar's and Crosby's batteries of Williams' division and Hampton's of Geary's division—total 3 batteries, numbering 18 pieces.

Cavalry Brigade—Martin's battery of 6 pieces.

Grand total in reserve: 25 batteries, numbering 140 pieces.

APPENDIX 17

Pleasanton to Gibbon

1

Your note of this date [May 5] is received.¹ I am not authorized to detach any part of the cavalry to other commands without orders from headquarters Army of the Potomac, but I am positively ordered to obtain all the cavalry I can to carry out my instructions.

2. 3 p.m.

General:

I am here [near Phillips House] acting under the direct orders of Major-General Hooker, and am in communication with him. I will do all I can to assist you, but my own plans cannot be interfered with. I have a regiment of cavalry at Adamsville guarding the river, but I cannot say at what moment circumstances may induce me to withdraw it to some more important point. My line now extends from Kappahannock Station to below Fredericksburg some 10 or 12 miles, besides to the rear as far as Dumfries. Up to this time the reports are quiet from the right and rear. If the rebels have a pontoon train, they will try to use it below tonight. I will do my best to keep you informed of events.

[Enclosure addressed to Butterfield]

For the information of General Williams [Hooker's adjutant-general] I should like to be informed whether I am in command of the forces in this vicinity for the defense of the river. One thing is certain, if I am, two persons cannot command the troops.

JOHN GIBBON,
Brigadier-General.

Gibbon to Butterfield, 3:30 p.m.

General Pleasanton claims to be here [at Phillips House] under the direct orders of General Hooker, with certain plans to carry out. Please inform me whether I am responsible for the defense of this part of the river, and whether I have command of all the troops in the vicinity.

Williams, Adjutant-General, to Gibbon, 4:10 p.m.

Your note of this date with reference to General Pleasanton's command required. I have nothing of the instructions General Pleasanton has received, but will at once refer the subject to the major-general commanding for his decision thereon.

¹ Not found. J. R. Jr.

To Butterfield, 4:45 p.m.

There appears to be some conflict of jurisdiction between Generals Gibbon and Pleasonton. The former thinks he has under his instructions command of all the troops in this vicinity, and the latter considers that his orders give him exclusive control, so far as the cavalry is concerned. Please let me know the decision of the commanding general in the matter.

An examination of the records of the Army of the Potomac fails to discover any answer to this request. The question may have been settled without correspondence.¹

¹ Statement of Mr. J. W. Kirkley, Army Board of Publication.

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Besides the abbreviations given on page xiv and others in common use for the states of the Union, the following forms are here used:

adj.=adjutant; adm.=admiral; adv.=advocate;
art'y=artillery; assist.=assistant; bat'y=bat-
tery; C=Confederate; c.=corps; capt.=captain;
cav.=cavalry; ch.=church; C. H.=Court-House;
Ch'ville=Chancellorsville; com.=commanding;
com'r=commander; comm'y=commissary; corp'l
=corporal; dep't=department; eng.=engineer;
F=Federal; f'd=ford; Fred'b'g=Fredericks-
burg; gen.=general; H.=House; headq.=head-
quarters; hosp.=hospital; inf.=infantry; insp.=

inspector; lieutenant; maj.=major; med.
=medical; mil.=military; n.=foot-note; north'n
=northern; northw'n=northwestern; off.=offi-
cer; ordn.=ordnance; q.m.=quartermaster;
Rapp'k=Rappahannock; reg't=regiment; r. r.
=railroad; sec.=secretary; sta.=station; surg.=
surgeon; tav.=tavern; tel.=telegraph; transp.=
transportation; west'n=western; wil'ness=wil-
derness

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ERRATA

- Page ix . . "13 Positions of active forces, 11:30" should read: "13
Positions of active forces, 12:30."
Page x . . Sketches—"2 Jackson's attack, 5:45" should read: "2 Jack-
son's attack, about 5:30."
Map 19 . . facing page 301—"May 3" should read "May 2."
Map 20 . . facing page 304—*ib.*
Sketch 2 . facing page 297—"May 1" should read "May 2."

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